VaultSyncAdapter.kt

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1package com.peachpasswords.sync23import com.peachpasswords.vault.Tombstone4import com.peachpasswords.vault.VaultCrypto5import com.peachpasswords.vault.VaultEntry6import com.peachpasswords.vault.VaultRepository7import kotlinx.serialization.json.Json8import org.bouncycastle.crypto.digests.SHA256Digest9import org.bouncycastle.crypto.generators.HKDFBytesGenerator10import org.bouncycastle.crypto.params.HKDFParameters11import java.security.SecureRandom12import java.util.Base6413import javax.crypto.Cipher14import javax.crypto.spec.GCMParameterSpec15import javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec1617/**18 * Production [SyncVaultAdapter] backing the coordinator with the live19 * [VaultRepository]. Exact port of the browser `sync-vault-adapter.ts`:20 * the coordinator only ever moves opaque base64 envelopes; plaintext crosses21 * this boundary and nowhere else.22 *23 * Envelope cipher: AES-GCM under a PER-ENTRY key24 *   HKDF-SHA256(ikm = syncMasterKey, salt = "", info = entryId + "\u0000" + "sync-entry-v1")25 * with a random 12-byte nonce and aad = "peach-sync-entry-v1". Binding the key26 * to the entry id means a ciphertext minted for one slot cannot be replayed27 * into another — [applyEntries] rejects any envelope whose decrypted id does28 * not match the map key it arrived under. Both paired devices hold the same29 * syncMasterKey (same vault root key), so keys match without negotiation; the30 * Noise KK reconnect session is a second, independent encryption layer on top.31 */32class VaultSyncAdapter(33    private val repo: VaultRepository,34    private val ourDeviceId: String,35    private val pairedDevices: PairedDeviceRegistry? = null,36    private val pendingVouched: PendingVouchedRegistry? = null,37    private val syncAlerts: SyncAlertRecorder? = null,38    private var remoteDeviceName: String = "paired device",39    override val supportsDeviceManifest: Boolean = pairedDevices != null && pendingVouched != null,40) : SyncVaultAdapter {4142    override suspend fun computeVaultId(): String =43        repo.syncVaultId() ?: throw VaultLockedException()4445    override suspend fun getOurDeviceId(): String = ourDeviceId4647    override suspend fun getLocalVersion(): Long = repo.getVaultVersion()4849    override suspend fun buildEntryManifest(): Map<String, Long> {50        val snapshot = requireMasterKeySnapshot()51        VaultCrypto.zero(snapshot.key)52        val manifest = repo.getEntries().associate { it.id to it.modifiedAt }53        if (!repo.isSessionEpochCurrent(snapshot.epoch)) throw VaultLockedException()54        return manifest55    }5657    override suspend fun buildTombstoneManifest(): Map<String, Long> {58        val snapshot = requireMasterKeySnapshot()59        VaultCrypto.zero(snapshot.key)60        val manifest = repo.getTombstones().associate { it.id to it.deletedAt }61        if (!repo.isSessionEpochCurrent(snapshot.epoch)) throw VaultLockedException()62        return manifest63    }6465    override suspend fun getEncryptedEntries(entryIds: List<String>): Map<String, String> {66        val snapshot = requireMasterKeySnapshot()67        val master = snapshot.key68        try {69            val out = LinkedHashMap<String, String>()70            for (id in entryIds) {71                val entry = repo.getEntry(id) ?: continue72                // M-05: deriveEntryKey materializes a per-entry 32-byte key that73                // never leaves this loop; zero it after encrypt so the GC copy74                // doesn't outlive the ciphertext.75                var entryKey: ByteArray? = null76                try {77                    entryKey = deriveEntryKey(master, id)78                    out[id] = encryptEntry(entryKey, entry)79                } finally {80                    entryKey?.let(VaultCrypto::zero)81                }82            }83            if (!repo.isSessionEpochCurrent(snapshot.epoch)) throw VaultLockedException()84            return out85        } finally {86            VaultCrypto.zero(master)87        }88    }8990    override suspend fun applyEntries(entries: Map<String, String>) {91        val snapshot = requireMasterKeySnapshot()92        val master = snapshot.key93        val decrypted = try {94            entries.mapNotNull { (id, envelope) ->95                // M-05: per-entry derived key is used exactly once below; zero it96                // after the decrypt so it doesn't sit on the heap alongside the97                // plaintext VaultEntry we're about to commit.98                var entryKey: ByteArray? = null99                val entry = try {100                    entryKey = deriveEntryKey(master, id)101                    decryptEntryOrNull(entryKey, envelope)102                } finally {103                    entryKey?.let(VaultCrypto::zero)104                }105                // The map key is the authority on id — refuse a swapped envelope106                // so a ciphertext can't poison a different entry slot.107                if (entry != null && entry.id == id) entry else null108            }109        } finally {110            VaultCrypto.zero(master)111        }112        if (decrypted.isNotEmpty()) {113            repo.applyMergedRemoteEntries(decrypted, emptyList(), expectedEpoch = snapshot.epoch)114        }115    }116117    override suspend fun applyTombstones(tombstones: Map<String, Long>) {118        val cleaned = tombstones119            .filterValues { it > 0L }120            .map { (id, ts) -> Tombstone(id, ts) }121        if (cleaned.isNotEmpty()) {122            val snapshot = requireMasterKeySnapshot()123            VaultCrypto.zero(snapshot.key)124            repo.applyMergedRemoteEntries(emptyList(), cleaned, expectedEpoch = snapshot.epoch)125        }126    }127128    override fun bindAuthenticatedPeer(peer: PairedDevice) {129        remoteDeviceName = peer.deviceName?.takeIf { it.isNotBlank() }130            ?: peer.deviceId.takeIf { it.isNotBlank() }131            ?: "paired device"132    }133134    override suspend fun buildOutgoingDeviceManifest(): SignedDeviceManifest? {135        val registry = pairedDevices ?: return null136        val snapshot = requireMasterKeySnapshot()137        val master = snapshot.key138        return try {139            val signing = deriveSyncSigningKeypair(master, ourDeviceId)140            val revoked = registry.listRevocations()141            val revokedIds = revoked.map { it.deviceId }.toSet()142            val devices = registry.getAll()143                .filterNot { revokedIds.contains(it.deviceId) }144                .mapNotNull { it.toManifestEntry() }145            val manifest = buildSignedDeviceManifest(146                ourDeviceId,147                devices,148                signing.privateKey,149                revoked = revoked,150            )151            if (!repo.isSessionEpochCurrent(snapshot.epoch)) throw VaultLockedException()152            manifest153        } finally {154            VaultCrypto.zero(master)155        }156    }157158    override suspend fun applyIncomingDeviceManifest(159        manifest: SignedDeviceManifest,160        authenticatedRemoteStaticPublicKey: ByteArray,161    ) {162        val registry = pairedDevices ?: return163        val pending = pendingVouched ?: return164        if (authenticatedRemoteStaticPublicKey.size != 32) return165        val issuer = registry.getByPubkey(pubkeyToHex(authenticatedRemoteStaticPublicKey)) ?: return166        // Match the browser (`applyVerifiedPeerManifest` in sync-vault-adapter.ts):167        // the issuer must already be admitted locally, but it need not be the168        // device that performed the original pairing. Direct and vouched peers169        // are both Noise-authenticated same-vault members, so either may carry170        // the signed pool onward. Unknown and legacy-unclassified rows remain171        // fail-closed.172        if (issuer.trustSource != "direct" && issuer.trustSource != "vouched") return173        val signingKey = issuer.signingPublicKeyHex?.lowercase()?.takeIf { it.length == 64 } ?: return174        val body = verifyDeviceManifest(manifest, hexToPubkey(signingKey)) ?: return175        if (body.issuerDeviceId != issuer.deviceId) return176        val snapshot = requireMasterKeySnapshot()177        val master = snapshot.key178        val localKeys = deriveSyncIdentityKeypair(master, ourDeviceId)179180        try {181            if (!repo.isSessionEpochCurrent(snapshot.epoch)) return182            // Stage the complete result against one read-only registry snapshot.183            // No registry mutation is allowed until the epoch-fenced batch below;184            // a per-item epoch check would still leave a prefix behind if lock()185            // wins between two items.186            val incomingRevocations = body.revoked.filterNot { it.deviceId == ourDeviceId }187            val currentRevocations = registry.listRevocations()188            val knownRevokedIds = currentRevocations.map { it.deviceId }.toSet()189            val newlyRevoked = incomingRevocations.filterNot { knownRevokedIds.contains(it.deviceId) }190            val revokedIds = (knownRevokedIds + incomingRevocations.map { it.deviceId }).toSet()191            val revokedKeys = (currentRevocations + incomingRevocations)192                .map { it.longTermPublicKeyHex.lowercase() }193                .filterNot { it == NO_KEY_SENTINEL }194                .toSet()195            fun revokedInStagedBatch(deviceId: String, longTermKey: String): Boolean {196                return deviceId in revokedIds || longTermKey.lowercase() in revokedKeys197            }198199            val stagedUpserts = LinkedHashMap<String, PairedDevice>()200            val stagedAlerts = ArrayList<SyncAlert>()201            newlyRevoked.forEach { revocation ->202                stagedAlerts += SyncAlert(203                    type = SyncAlertType.DEVICE_REVOKED,204                    deviceName = issuer.deviceName ?: "paired device",205                    entryTitle = revocation.deviceId,206                    timestamp = System.currentTimeMillis(),207                )208            }209            for (entry in body.devices) {210                if (entry.deviceId == ourDeviceId || entry.deviceId == issuer.deviceId) continue211                if (revokedInStagedBatch(entry.deviceId, entry.longTermPublicKeyHex)) continue212                val existing = stagedUpserts[entry.deviceId] ?: registry.get(entry.deviceId)213                val meshRoute = deriveManifestMeshRoute(master, localKeys.publicKey, entry)214                if (existing == null) {215                    if (meshRoute == null) continue216                    stagedUpserts[entry.deviceId] = PairedDevice(217                        deviceId = entry.deviceId,218                        deviceName = entry.deviceName,219                        deviceType = entry.deviceType,220                        longTermPublicKeyHex = entry.longTermPublicKeyHex.lowercase(),221                        signingPublicKeyHex = entry.signingPublicKeyHex.lowercase(),222                        trustSource = "vouched",223                        wsPort = entry.wsPort,224                        rendezvousSecretHex = meshRoute.first,225                        relayUrl = meshRoute.second,226                        pairedAt = entry.pairedAt,227                    )228                } else {229                    deviceKeyRotationAlert(existing, entry, System.currentTimeMillis())?.let(stagedAlerts::add)230                    stagedUpserts[entry.deviceId] = existing.copy(231                        deviceName = existing.deviceName?.takeIf { it.isNotBlank() }232                            ?: entry.deviceName,233                        deviceType = entry.deviceType,234                        longTermPublicKeyHex = entry.longTermPublicKeyHex.lowercase(),235                        signingPublicKeyHex = entry.signingPublicKeyHex.lowercase(),236                        wsPort = existing.wsPort ?: entry.wsPort,237                        rendezvousSecretHex =238                            if (existing.trustSource == "vouched" && meshRoute != null) {239                                meshRoute.first240                            } else {241                                existing.rendezvousSecretHex242                            },243                        relayUrl =244                            if (existing.trustSource == "vouched" && meshRoute != null) {245                                meshRoute.second246                            } else {247                                existing.relayUrl248                            },249                        pairedAt = existing.pairedAt,250                        trustSource = existing.trustSource ?: "direct",251                    )252                }253            }254255            val batch = DeviceManifestRegistryBatch(256                incomingRevocations = incomingRevocations,257                removals = newlyRevoked.map { it.deviceId }.toSet(),258                upserts = stagedUpserts.values.toList(),259            )260            // Remove any matching pending introductions synchronously BEFORE261            // installing trust. If the registry commit fails, restoring this262            // exact pending subset is safe; if restoration also fails, the263            // fail-closed outcome is a lost introduction, never stale trust.264            val pendingIds = batch.removals + stagedUpserts.keys265            val priorPending = pending.getAll().filter { it.deviceId in pendingIds }266            val committed = repo.withSessionEpochCommit(snapshot.epoch) {267                val pendingRemoved = runCatching { pending.removeBatch(pendingIds) }.getOrDefault(false)268                if (!pendingRemoved) {269                    pending.restoreBatch(priorPending)270                    false271                } else {272                    val registryCommitted = runCatching { registry.applyManifestBatch(batch) }.getOrDefault(false)273                    if (registryCommitted) {274                        // Pending entries and alerts are kept inside the same275                        // epoch fence. Alerts follow the trust commit and never276                        // participate in its semantics.277                        if (stagedAlerts.isNotEmpty()) syncAlerts?.record(stagedAlerts)278                        true279                    } else {280                        pending.restoreBatch(priorPending)281                        false282                    }283                }284            }285            if (committed != true) return286        } finally {287            VaultCrypto.zero(master)288            VaultCrypto.zero(localKeys.secretKey)289        }290    }291292    private fun deriveManifestMeshRoute(293        masterKey: ByteArray,294        localPublicKey: ByteArray,295        entry: ManifestDeviceEntry,296    ): Pair<String, String>? = runCatching {297        val relayUrl = Rendezvous.normalizeRelayUrl(entry.relayUrl ?: return null)298        val secret = Rendezvous.deriveMeshSecret(299            masterKey,300            localPublicKey,301            hexToPubkey(entry.longTermPublicKeyHex),302        )303        try {304            Rendezvous.bytesToHex(secret) to relayUrl305        } finally {306            secret.fill(0)307        }308    }.getOrNull()309310    private fun requireMasterKeySnapshot(): VaultRepository.SyncMasterKeySnapshot =311        repo.syncMasterKeySnapshot() ?: throw VaultLockedException()312313314    private fun deriveEntryKey(masterKey: ByteArray, entryId: String): ByteArray {315        // Null-byte separator (HKDF hardening): entryId cannot contain U+0000, so316        // the (entryId, suffix) boundary is unambiguous regardless of future id317        // formats. Coordinated wire change — peach-browser deriveEntryKey produces318        // the identical info bytes; the two MUST stay byte-for-byte in lockstep.319        val info = (entryId + "\u0000" + ENTRY_KEY_INFO_SUFFIX).toByteArray(Charsets.UTF_8)320        val gen = HKDFBytesGenerator(SHA256Digest())321        gen.init(HKDFParameters(masterKey, ByteArray(0), info))322        return ByteArray(32).also { gen.generateBytes(it, 0, it.size) }323    }324325    private fun encryptEntry(key: ByteArray, entry: VaultEntry): String {326        // M-05: plaintext is the entry JSON (incl. password field). Zero in327        // finally so the serialized copy doesn't outlive the ciphertext.328        var plaintext: ByteArray? = null329        return try {330            plaintext = entryJson.encodeToString(VaultEntry.serializer(), entry).toByteArray(Charsets.UTF_8)331            val nonce = ByteArray(12).also(rng::nextBytes)332            val cipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES/GCM/NoPadding")333            cipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, SecretKeySpec(key, "AES"), GCMParameterSpec(128, nonce))334            cipher.updateAAD(ENTRY_AAD)335            val ct = cipher.doFinal(plaintext)336            b64(nonce + ct)337        } finally {338            plaintext?.let(VaultCrypto::zero)339        }340    }341342    private fun decryptEntryOrNull(key: ByteArray, envelopeB64: String): VaultEntry? {343        var pt: ByteArray? = null344        return try {345            val bytes = unb64(envelopeB64)346            if (bytes.size < 12 + 16) null else {347                val nonce = bytes.copyOfRange(0, 12)348                val ct = bytes.copyOfRange(12, bytes.size)349                val cipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES/GCM/NoPadding")350                cipher.init(Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE, SecretKeySpec(key, "AES"), GCMParameterSpec(128, nonce))351                cipher.updateAAD(ENTRY_AAD)352                pt = cipher.doFinal(ct)353                entryJson.decodeFromString(VaultEntry.serializer(), String(pt, Charsets.UTF_8))354            }355        } catch (_: Exception) {356            null357        } finally {358            // M-05: pt holds the serialized entry including password until the359            // decoded VaultEntry above is the only remaining reference. Zero it360            // so the raw bytes don't outlive the structure they were parsed into.361            pt?.let(VaultCrypto::zero)362        }363    }364365    private companion object {366        const val ENTRY_KEY_INFO_SUFFIX = "sync-entry-v1"367        val ENTRY_AAD = "peach-sync-entry-v1".toByteArray(Charsets.UTF_8)368        val rng = SecureRandom()369        val entryJson = Json { encodeDefaults = false; ignoreUnknownKeys = true }370        fun b64(b: ByteArray): String = Base64.getEncoder().encodeToString(b)371        fun unb64(s: String): ByteArray = Base64.getDecoder().decode(s)372    }373}374375class VaultLockedException : Exception("vault_locked")