messages.ts

1/**2 * messages.ts — the only background message handler.3 *4 * All `chrome.runtime.onMessage` handling for the service worker lives here.5 * Do not handle messages inline in entry.ts, alarms.ts, or any other6 * background file. Every background-bound MessageType in shared/types.ts7 * must have a case below. Content-script-bound message types (PING,8 * SUMMON_AUTOFILL, VAULT_LOCKED) are documented in shared/types.ts and9 * intentionally have no case here — they are sent *to* content scripts.10 */1112import { copyToClipboard, getEffectiveClearSeconds } from "./clipboard";13import { getPendingSyncAlerts, clearPendingSyncAlerts } from "./sync-alerts";14import { extractDomain } from "../shared/domain";15import {16  getPendingVouchedDevice,17  listPendingVouchedDevices,18  removePendingVouchedDevice,19} from "./pending-vouched-devices";20import {21  clearRecoveryConfirmPending,22  isRecoveryConfirmPending,23  setRecoveryConfirmPending,24} from "./recovery-pending";25import { setupAutoLock, touchAutoLock } from "./alarms";26import { runSelfTest } from "./self-test";27import * as vault from "./vault";28import {29  handleEstimateCodexPages,30  handleGetCodexVaultData,31  handleRestoreFromCodex,32} from "./codex-handlers";33import type { CodexRestorePayload } from "../shared/codex-types";34import {35  activateLicense,36  deactivateLicense,37  getLicenseInfo,38  getLicenseKey,39  isProUser,40  markCelebrationPlayed,41  shouldPlayCelebration,42} from "./license";43import {44  completeFirefoxPasskeyCreate,45  getPasskeyProviderState,46  getPendingPasskeyRequest,47  handleFirefoxPasskeyCreate,48  handleFirefoxPasskeyGet,49  handlePasskeyHasCredentials,50  initiateFirefoxPasskeyCreate,51  isPasskeyOfferDeclined,52  onVaultUnlocked,53  recordPasskeyOfferDecline,54  resolvePendingPasskeyRequest,55  setPasskeyProviderEnabled,56} from "./passkey";57import { buildAdvancedHealthReport } from "./health";58import { storageClear } from "../shared/storage";59import { findInvalidWords } from "../shared/recovery-words";60import type {61  Message,62  MessageResponse,63  MessageType,64  ProFeature,65  VaultEntry,66} from "../shared/types";67import { isPasskeyOnly } from "../shared/types";68import { generateTOTP } from "../crypto/totp";69import { isValidRpId } from "../shared/passkey-utils";70import { predictBatch as mlPredictBatch } from "./ml";71import type { MLFieldFeatures } from "../shared/ml";72import {73  buildLocalIdentity,74  getOrCreateDeviceId,75  setDeviceName as setDeviceNameV3,76} from "./device-identity";77import {78  isDeviceRevoked,79  listPairedDevices as listPairedDevicesV3,80  renamePairedDevice as renamePairedDeviceV3,81  revokeDeviceById as revokeDeviceByIdV3,82  upsertPairedDevice as upsertPairedDeviceV3,83} from "./paired-devices";84import { dropPairSecret } from "./pair-secrets";85// Sync and pairing are imported statically, never with `await import()`.86// `import()` throws `TypeError: import() is disallowed on87// ServiceWorkerGlobalScope` at runtime in MV3, and Vite's preload helper88// reports the failure through `window.dispatchEvent`, which does not exist in89// a worker either — so the real reason was replaced by "window is not defined"90// and the pairing UI just stopped. scripts/check-sw-static-imports.mjs fails91// the build if a runtime import() reappears anywhere in the worker's graph.92import {93  cancelRelayAdoptionSource,94  isRelayAdoptionSourceInFlight,95  resolveSourceSasConfirmation,96  startRelayAdoptionReceiver,97  startRelayAdoptionSource,98} from "./relay-adoption-bg";99import {100  getSyncSettings,101  setRelayUrl,102  setSyncMode,103  type SyncMode,104} from "./sync-settings";105import {106  getSyncState,107  triggerSyncIfReachable,108} from "./sync-trigger";109import { isMessageSenderAllowed } from "./message-policy";110111const SUMMON_CAPABILITY_TTL_MS = 30_000;112type SummonCapability = { tabId: number; frameId: number; origin: string; operation: "inventory" | "fill"; expiresAt: number };113const summonCapabilities = new Map<string, SummonCapability>();114115export function createSummonCapability(tabId: number, origin: string, frameId = 0): string {116  const token = crypto.randomUUID();117  summonCapabilities.set(token, { tabId, frameId, origin, operation: "inventory", expiresAt: Date.now() + SUMMON_CAPABILITY_TTL_MS });118  return token;119}120121function consumeSummonCapability(token: unknown, sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender>, operation: "inventory" | "fill"): boolean {122  if (typeof token !== "string") return false;123  const cap = summonCapabilities.get(token);124  if (!cap) return false;125  if (cap.expiresAt <= Date.now()) {126    summonCapabilities.delete(token);127    return false;128  }129  if (sender.tab?.id !== cap.tabId || (sender.frameId ?? 0) !== cap.frameId || attestedSenderOrigin(sender) !== cap.origin) return false;130  if (cap.operation !== operation) return false;131  if (operation === "inventory") cap.operation = "fill";132  else summonCapabilities.delete(token);133  return true;134}135136// Compile-time E2E flag, folded to a literal by Vite's `define` (false in137// every production build — verified in the bundled output). Mirrors the138// create-path bypass in passkey.ts so the Playwright passkey smoke can enable139// the provider without a real Pro licence; the gate is fully intact for users.140declare const __PEACH_E2E_PASSKEYS__: boolean;141const PASSKEY_E2E_PRO_BYPASS = __PEACH_E2E_PASSKEYS__ === true;142143function unhexBytes(hex: string): Uint8Array {144  if (hex.length % 2 !== 0) throw new Error("invalid hex");145  const out = new Uint8Array(hex.length / 2);146  for (let i = 0; i < out.length; i++) {147    out[i] = parseInt(hex.slice(i * 2, i * 2 + 2), 16);148  }149  return out;150}151152/**153 * The single Pro gate. Every gated handler calls this first; the broadcast154 * lets the popup react (navigate to the License section, highlight the155 * relevant feature). Background never touches the popup view directly —156 * the popup owns navigation. See Projects.md "Pro gate rule".157 */158async function requirePro(159  feature: ProFeature,160  trigger: "user" | "background" = "user"161): Promise<{ allowed: boolean }> {162  if (PASSKEY_E2E_PRO_BYPASS && feature === "passkeys") return { allowed: true };163  if (await isProUser()) return { allowed: true };164165  if (trigger === "user") {166    // User deliberately triggered this feature — redirect the popup immediately.167    chrome.runtime168      .sendMessage({ type: "PRO_GATE_TRIGGERED", payload: { feature } })169      .catch(() => {170        // Popup may be closed — the gate signal is best-effort.171      });172  } else {173    // Background trigger (e.g. passive sync initiation) — no popup is open.174    // Queue a notice so the next popup open shows a soft banner instead of175    // silently failing.176    if (chrome.storage.session) {177      chrome.storage.session178        .set({ pendingProNotice: { feature, triggeredAt: Date.now() } })179        .catch(() => {});180    }181  }182183  return { allowed: false };184}185186// LV-3: minimum interval between non-test canary pings per webhook+entry.187const CANARY_MIN_INTERVAL_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000; // 1 hour188189const PRIVATE_IPV4_RANGES = [190  { prefix: "10." },191  { prefix: "127." },192  { prefix: "169.254." },193  { prefix: "192.168." },194];195196export function setupMessageHandler(): void {197  chrome.runtime.onMessage.addListener(198    (msg: unknown, sender, sendResponse) => {199      if (!isMessage(msg)) {200        sendResponse({ ok: false, error: "invalid_message" });201        return true;202      }203      handleMessage(msg, sender)204        .then(sendResponse)205        .catch((err) =>206          sendResponse({207            ok: false,208            error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),209          })210        );211      return true;212    }213  );214}215216function isMessage(m: unknown): m is Message {217  return typeof m === "object" && m !== null && "type" in m;218}219220/**221 * The browser-attested origin of the page that originated this message. A web222 * page cannot call chrome.runtime.sendMessage directly (no externally_connectable),223 * so every page-driven message arrives via the content-script relay and the224 * browser stamps `sender.origin`/`sender.url` with the real frame origin — a225 * value the page cannot forge. This is the ONLY trustworthy origin for passkey226 * rpId<->origin enforcement; payload-supplied origins are attacker-controlled.227 */228function attestedSenderOrigin(sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender>): string | undefined {229  if (sender.origin) return sender.origin;230  if (sender.url) {231    try { return new URL(sender.url).origin; } catch { return undefined; }232  }233  return undefined;234}235236function isExtensionPageSender(sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender>): boolean {237  return sender.url?.startsWith("chrome-extension://") === true ||238    sender.url?.startsWith("moz-extension://") === true;239}240241/** True when the message came from a page frame rather than extension UI. */242function isPageSender(sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender>): boolean {243  return !isExtensionPageSender(sender) &&244    (sender.tab !== undefined || sender.url !== undefined);245}246247function entryDomains(url: unknown, additionalUrls: unknown): Set<string> {248  const domains = new Set<string>();249  const primary = typeof url === "string" ? extractDomain(url) : null;250  if (primary) domains.add(primary);251  if (Array.isArray(additionalUrls)) {252    for (const extra of additionalUrls) {253      if (typeof extra !== "string") continue;254      const domain = extractDomain(extra);255      if (domain) domains.add(domain);256    }257  }258  return domains;259}260261/**262 * PB-26-106: the autofill read path re-validates the frame origin against the263 * entry's domains on every request, so an unbound write path would let a264 * content script repoint an entry at its own origin and then read the265 * credential through a read path that is behaving correctly.266 *267 * Creating an entry: a page may only bind it to itself. Mutating one: a page268 * may never GROW the domain set — only shrink it, and never below its own269 * attested origin.270 *271 * Self-binding on mutation was considered and is not enough: the content272 * script on a foreign origin IS the attacker in the reported chain, so letting273 * it attach "its own" origin lets it mint the very capability the read path274 * exists to withhold. The legitimate flow that needs a new domain — the inline275 * "remember this site" toast — therefore asks the popup instead276 * (REQUEST_REMEMBER_SITE), which is an extension page and exempt here.277 *278 * Extension pages are exempt: the popup edits entries for sites it is not on.279 */280function senderMayBindEntryDomains(281  sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender>,282  domains: Set<string>,283): boolean {284  if (isExtensionPageSender(sender)) return true;285  const domain = attestedSenderDomain(sender);286  if (domain === null) return false;287  for (const candidate of domains) {288    if (candidate !== domain) return false;289  }290  return true;291}292293function senderMayMutateEntryDomains(294  sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender>,295  before: Set<string>,296  after: Set<string>,297): boolean {298  if (isExtensionPageSender(sender)) return true;299  const domain = attestedSenderDomain(sender);300  if (domain === null || !after.has(domain)) return false;301  for (const kept of after) {302    if (!before.has(kept)) return false;303  }304  return true;305}306307/**308 * Null for extension pages (which the callers exempt), for senders with no309 * attested origin at all, and for unparseable frame urls.310 */311function attestedSenderDomain(sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender>): string | null {312  if (sender.tab === undefined && sender.url === undefined) return null;313  const origin = attestedSenderOrigin(sender);314  if (!origin) return null;315  try { return extractDomain(new URL(origin).hostname); } catch { return null; }316}317318function patchChangesEntryOrigin(patch: object): boolean {319  return Object.hasOwn(patch, "url") || Object.hasOwn(patch, "additionalUrls");320}321322/** The entry's domain-bearing fields as the patch would leave them. */323function patchedUrlShape(324  patch: object,325  existing: Pick<VaultEntry, "url" | "additionalUrls">,326): { url: unknown; additionalUrls: unknown } {327  const candidate = patch as { url?: unknown; additionalUrls?: unknown };328  return {329    url: Object.hasOwn(patch, "url") ? candidate.url : existing.url,330    additionalUrls: Object.hasOwn(patch, "additionalUrls")331      ? candidate.additionalUrls332      : existing.additionalUrls,333  };334}335// Resolves once restoreFromSession() has run, so handlers see the correct336// post-restore unlock state. entry.ts registers this BEFORE the message337// handler so the onMessage listener is added synchronously at SW startup338// (MV3 requirement) while unlock-dependent handlers still wait for restore.339let restoreReady: Promise<void> = Promise.resolve();340341/** Called by entry.ts at startup with the in-flight restoreFromSession promise. */342export function setRestoreReady(p: Promise<unknown>): void {343  restoreReady = p.then(() => undefined, () => undefined);344}345346export async function handleMessage(347  msg: Message,348  sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender> = {}349): Promise<MessageResponse> {350  try {351    // Wait for session-restore to finish before reading any unlock/vault state.352    // On a cold SW start the popup's first message arrives while restore is353    // still in flight; without this gate IS_UNLOCKED would report locked (a354    // spurious lock screen) and the storage reads could race. The onMessage355    // listener itself is registered synchronously (entry.ts) so this gate, not356    // listener registration, is what absorbs the cold-start window.357    await restoreReady;358    // Validate sender — only allow messages from our extension pages/scripts.359    // `sender.id` is undefined for messages originating from extension UI360    // (popup/options), which is legitimate; reject only when it is defined361    // and does not match our extension id.362    if (363      sender.id !== undefined &&364      sender.id !== chrome.runtime.id365    ) {366      return { ok: false, error: "invalid_sender" };367    }368369    // PB-26-016: sender authorization is an exhaustive policy, not a370    // hand-maintained privileged denylist. A missing/unknown policy entry or a371    // background-only message fails closed before any handler runs.372    // Extension UI messages may legitimately omit sender.url. Resolve the373    // browser-attested extension origin only when a URL is present; this also374    // keeps test/runtime shims without getURL fail-closed for URL-bearing375    // senders instead of throwing before policy evaluation.376    const extensionOrigin = sender.url && typeof chrome.runtime.getURL === "function"377      ? chrome.runtime.getURL("")378      : "";379    if (!isMessageSenderAllowed(msg.type, sender, chrome.runtime.id, extensionOrigin)) {380      return { ok: false, error: "invalid_sender" };381    }382383    if (shouldRefreshAutoLock(msg.type, sender) && vault.isUnlocked()) {384      touchAutoLock();385    }386387    switch (msg.type) {388      case "CREATE_VAULT": {389        const { password } = msg.payload as { password: string };390        // Refuse to create a vault under an empty master password — the derived391        // key would be publicly known and the at-rest AES-GCM protection void392        // (audit HIGH; the CSV-import path previously passed ""). Length/strength393        // policy lives in the onboarding UI; this is the non-negotiable floor.394        if (typeof password !== "string" || password.length === 0) {395          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };396        }397        await vault.createVault(password);398        await setupAutoLock();399        broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });400        onVaultUnlocked();401        return { ok: true };402      }403      case "CREATE_VAULT_FROM_ROOT_KEY": {404        const { password, rootKeyHex } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {405          password?: unknown;406          rootKeyHex?: unknown;407        };408        if (typeof password !== "string" || password.length === 0 || typeof rootKeyHex !== "string") {409          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };410        }411412        try {413          const { vaultId } = await vault.createVaultFromRootKey(password, rootKeyHex);414          await setupAutoLock();415          broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });416          onVaultUnlocked();417          return { ok: true, vaultId };418        } catch (err) {419          return { ok: false, error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err) };420        }421      }422      case "UNLOCK": {423        const { password } = msg.payload as { password: string };424        const ok = await vault.unlock(password);425        if (ok) {426          // KAT: verify the WebCrypto stack is healthy before the user relies on it.427          // Runs after unlock so latency is hidden behind the vault-load time.428          const kat = await runSelfTest();429          if (!kat.ok) {430            console.error("[Peach] Crypto self-test FAILED:", kat.error);431            await vault.lock();432            return { ok: false, error: "self_test_failed" };433          }434          await vault.updateSettings({ pinPreferred: false });435          await setupAutoLock();436          broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });437          onVaultUnlocked();438          return { ok: true };439        }440        // Distinguish corruption from wrong password so the popup can offer441        // a history-restore path instead of falsely accusing the user of442        // mistyping (M7/COR-007).443        const failure = vault.consumeLastUnlockFailureReason();444        if (failure) {445          return {446            ok: false,447            error: "vault_corrupted",448            canRestoreFromHistory: true,449          } as MessageResponse;450        }451        return { ok: false };452      }453      case "UNLOCK_WITH_PIN": {454        const { pin } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { pin?: unknown };455        if (typeof pin !== "string") return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };456        const ok = await vault.unlockWithPin(pin);457        if (!ok) {458          const status = await vault.getPinUnlockStatus();459          if (status.configured && !status.available) {460            return {461              ok: false,462              error: status.attemptsRemaining === 0463                ? "pin_attempts_exceeded"464                : "pin_session_expired",465            };466          }467          return { ok: false };468        }469        const kat = await runSelfTest();470        if (!kat.ok) {471          await vault.lock();472          return { ok: false, error: "self_test_failed" };473        }474        await vault.updateSettings({ pinPreferred: true });475        await setupAutoLock();476        broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });477        onVaultUnlocked();478        return { ok: true };479      }480      case "GET_PIN_STATUS":481        return { ok: true, data: await vault.getPinUnlockStatus() };482      case "VALIDATE_RECOVERY_WORDS": {483        const { words } = msg.payload as { words: string[] };484        const invalid = findInvalidWords(words);485        return { ok: true, data: { valid: invalid.length === 0, invalid } };486      }487      case "GET_RECOVERY_WORDS": {488        // Must be unlocked and have recovery set up (vault must be v2.12+).489        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };490        // LV-4: the recovery words re-derive the ROOT KEY — the highest-491        // value secret in the vault. A session unlock (which may be hours492        // old on a shared machine) is not enough; require a fresh password493        // proof, matching the 1Password/Bitwarden pattern for revealing494        // escrow material. EXEMPTION: the create-vault / rotation confirmation495        // window (peach_recovery_pending) shows the words immediately after496        // the user authenticated, and that confirmation UI has no password to497        // resend — skip the re-auth there only.498        if (!(await isRecoveryConfirmPending())) {499          const { password } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { password?: string };500          if (typeof password !== "string" || !password) {501            return { ok: false, error: "password_required" };502          }503          if (!(await vault.verifyMainPassword(password))) {504            return { ok: false, error: "wrong_password" };505          }506        }507        try {508          const words = await vault.getRecoveryWords();509          return { ok: true, data: words };510        } catch {511          return { ok: false, error: "recovery_not_setup" };512        }513      }514      case "GET_RECOVERY_CONFIRM_PENDING":515        return { ok: true, data: await isRecoveryConfirmPending() };516      case "SET_RECOVERY_CONFIRM_PENDING":517        await setRecoveryConfirmPending();518        return { ok: true };519      case "CLEAR_RECOVERY_CONFIRM_PENDING":520        await clearRecoveryConfirmPending();521        return { ok: true };522      case "RECOVER_WITH_WORDS": {523        // User has lost their password but has their 12 recovery words.524        // We: (1) validate the words, (2) re-encrypt vault with new password.525        const { words, newPassword } = msg.payload as {526          words: string[];527          newPassword: string;528        };529        const stored = await vault.loadSlotA();530        if (!stored) return { ok: false, error: "no_vault" };531        if (!stored.recovery_salt || !stored.recovery_wrapped_root_key) {532          return { ok: false, error: "recovery_not_setup" };533        }534        // Unwrap the root key from the recovery escrow.535        try {536          await vault.unwrapRootKeyForRecovery(537            stored.recovery_wrapped_root_key,538            stored.recovery_nonce ?? "",539            stored.recovery_tag ?? "",540            stored.recovery_salt,541            words542          );543        } catch {544          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_recovery_words" };545        }546        // Re-key: derive fresh salt + key from new password.547        const newSalt = vault.generateSalt();548        const newKey = await vault.deriveKey(newPassword, newSalt);549        // Re-wrap root key under the new password's derived key so the same550        // recovery words continue to work after the password change.551        await vault.rewrapRootKeyForPassword(newKey, newSalt);552        // Re-encrypt vault entries with the new key.553        await vault.changePasswordWithNewKey(newSalt, newKey);554        await setupAutoLock();555        broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });556        return { ok: true };557      }558      case "LOCK":559        await vault.lock();560        return { ok: true };561      case "IS_UNLOCKED":562        return { ok: true, data: vault.isUnlocked() };563      case "GET_VAULT_STATUS":564        return { ok: true, unlocked: vault.isUnlocked() };565      case "HAS_VAULT":566        return { ok: true, data: await vault.hasVault() };567      case "GET_ENTRIES":568        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };569        return { ok: true, data: vault.getEntries() };570      case "EXPORT_ENTRIES": {571        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };572        const { password } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { password?: unknown };573        if (typeof password !== "string" || !password) {574          return { ok: false, error: "password_required" };575        }576        if (!(await vault.verifyMainPassword(password))) {577          return { ok: false, error: "wrong_password" };578        }579        return { ok: true, data: vault.getEntries() };580      }581      case "ADD_ENTRY": {582        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };583        const payload = msg.payload;584        if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) {585          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };586        }587        // PB-26-106: a page may only create an entry bound to itself. Entries588        // carrying no url have no domain surface to bind, so they are exempt.589        if (isPageSender(sender)) {590          const draft = payload as { url?: unknown; additionalUrls?: unknown };591          const domains = entryDomains(draft.url, draft.additionalUrls);592          if (domains.size > 0 && !senderMayBindEntryDomains(sender, domains)) {593            return { ok: false, error: "origin_binding_required" };594          }595        }596        const entry = await vault.addEntry(payload as Parameters<typeof vault.addEntry>[0]);597        return { ok: true, data: entry };598      }599      case "BATCH_ADD_ENTRIES": {600        const payload = msg.payload as { entries?: unknown } | null | undefined;601        if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) {602          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };603        }604        if (!Array.isArray(payload.entries)) {605          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };606        }607        const added = await vault.batchAddEntries(payload.entries as Parameters<typeof vault.batchAddEntries>[0]);608        return { ok: true, data: added };609      }610      case "RESTORE_ENTRIES": {611        const payload = msg.payload as612          | { entries?: unknown; mode?: unknown; settings?: unknown }613          | null614          | undefined;615        if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) {616          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };617        }618        if (!Array.isArray(payload.entries)) {619          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };620        }621        if (payload.mode !== "replace" && payload.mode !== "merge") {622          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };623        }624        const summary = await vault.restoreEntries(625          payload.entries as Parameters<typeof vault.restoreEntries>[0],626          payload.mode627        );628        if (payload.settings && typeof payload.settings === "object" && !Array.isArray(payload.settings)) {629          await vault.updateSettings(payload.settings as vault.VaultSettings);630        }631        return { ok: true, data: summary };632      }633      case "CLEAR_VAULT_ENTRIES": {634        await vault.clearVaultEntries("REPLACE_ALL");635        return { ok: true };636      }637      case "GET_VAULT_HISTORY": {638        const snapshots = await vault.getVaultHistory();639        return { ok: true, data: snapshots };640      }641      case "RESTORE_VAULT_SNAPSHOT": {642        const { snapshotId } = msg.payload as { snapshotId: string };643        const result = await vault.restoreVaultSnapshot(snapshotId);644        if (!result.ok) return { ok: false, error: result.error };645        broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_LOCKED" });646        return { ok: true };647      }648      case "COUNT_DUPLICATES": {649        return { ok: true, data: vault.countDuplicates() };650      }651      case "DEDUPLICATE_ENTRIES": {652        const removed = await vault.deduplicateEntries();653        return { ok: true, data: removed };654      }655      case "UPDATE_ENTRY": {656        const payload = msg.payload as { id?: unknown; patch?: unknown } | null | undefined;657        if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) {658          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };659        }660        const { id, patch } = payload;661        if (typeof id !== "string" || !id || !patch || typeof patch !== "object" || Array.isArray(patch)) {662          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };663        }664        const existingEntry = vault.getEntryById(id);665        if (!existingEntry) return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };666        if (patchChangesEntryOrigin(patch) || isPageSender(sender)) {667          const before = entryDomains(existingEntry.url, existingEntry.additionalUrls);668          const after = patchedUrlShape(patch, existingEntry);669          if (!senderMayMutateEntryDomains(670            sender,671            before,672            entryDomains(after.url, after.additionalUrls),673          )) {674            return { ok: false, error: "origin_binding_required" };675          }676        }677        // Single enforcement point for the Canary Entries Pro gate. Only678        // gates the transition into a canary entry — clearing/disabling a679        // canary (`canary: undefined`) is always allowed, so existing680        // canary entries remain manageable.681        const incomingCanary = (patch as { canary?: unknown }).canary;682        if (incomingCanary && typeof incomingCanary === "object") {683          const existing = vault.getEntryById(id);684          if (!existing?.canary) {685            const gate = await requirePro("canary_entry");686            if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };687          }688        }689        await vault.updateEntry(id, patch as Parameters<typeof vault.updateEntry>[1]);690        return { ok: true };691      }692      case "ADD_ADDITIONAL_URL": {693        const { id, url } = msg.payload as { id: string; url: string };694        const trimmed = typeof url === "string" ? url.trim() : "";695        if (!trimmed) return { ok: false, error: "url_required" };696        const existing = vault.getEntryById(id);697        if (!existing) return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };698        const merged = [...(existing.additionalUrls ?? []), trimmed];699        if (!senderMayMutateEntryDomains(700          sender,701          entryDomains(existing.url, existing.additionalUrls),702          entryDomains(existing.url, merged),703        )) {704          return { ok: false, error: "origin_binding_required" };705        }706        if (existing.type !== "login") return { ok: false, error: "login_entries_only" };707        await vault.updateEntry(id, { additionalUrls: merged });708        return { ok: true };709      }710      case "REQUEST_REMEMBER_SITE": {711        // PB-26-106: growing an entry's domain set needs a decision the page712        // cannot make for itself, so the page asks and the popup confirms. A713        // page may only ask about its own attested origin — otherwise this714        // becomes the same unbound write under a friendlier name.715        const { id, url } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { id?: unknown; url?: unknown };716        if (typeof id !== "string" || !id) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };717        const trimmed = typeof url === "string" ? url.trim() : "";718        if (!trimmed) return { ok: false, error: "url_required" };719        if (!senderMayBindEntryDomains(sender, entryDomains(trimmed, undefined))) {720          return { ok: false, error: "origin_binding_required" };721        }722        if (!vault.getEntryById(id)) return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };723        if (chrome.storage.session) {724          await chrome.storage.session.set({ pendingRememberSite: { entryId: id, url: trimmed } });725        }726        try { await chrome.action.openPopup(); } catch { /* user opens via toolbar */ }727        return { ok: true };728      }729      case "DELETE_ENTRY": {730        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };731        await vault.deleteEntry(id);732        return { ok: true };733      }734      case "GET_DELETED_ENTRIES":735        return { ok: true, data: vault.getDeletedEntries() };736      case "RESTORE_ENTRY": {737        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };738        await vault.restoreEntry(id);739        return { ok: true };740      }741      case "PURGE_ENTRY": {742        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };743        await vault.purgeEntry(id);744        return { ok: true };745      }746      case "PURGE_EXPIRED_TRASH": {747        const { retentionMs } = msg.payload as { retentionMs: number };748        const purged = await vault.purgeExpiredTrash(retentionMs);749        return { ok: true, data: purged };750      }751      case "SAVE_NOTE": {752        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };753        const { id, title, body } = msg.payload as { id?: string; title: string; body: string };754        const now = Date.now();755        if (id) {756          const existing = vault.getEntryById(id);757          if (!existing) return { ok: false, error: "not_found" };758          await vault.updateEntry(id, { title: title || "Untitled", notes: body, modifiedAt: now });759          return { ok: true, data: vault.getEntryById(id) };760        } else {761          // PCH-01-026 #10: addEntry stamps its own createdAt/modifiedAt762          // (EntryDraft omits both), so passing them was the only reason the763          // `as any` cast existed. Dropping them makes the call type-check.764          const entry = await vault.addEntry({765            type: "note",766            title: title || "Untitled",767            notes: body,768          });769          return { ok: true, data: entry };770        }771      }772      case "DELETE_NOTE": {773        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };774        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };775        await vault.deleteEntry(id);776        return { ok: true };777      }778      case "GET_NOTES": {779        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };780        const notes = vault.getEntries().filter(781          (e) => e.type === "note" && !e.deletedAt782        );783        return { ok: true, data: notes } as MessageResponse;784      }785      case "SEARCH_VAULT": {786        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };787        // AUD-002: shape-validate the payload before calling string methods.788        // A raw cast lets a malformed message crash the handler with TypeError.789        const { query } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { query?: unknown };790        if (typeof query !== "string") {791          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };792        }793        const q = query.toLowerCase();794        const searchResults = vault.getEntries().filter(795          (e) =>796            !e.deletedAt &&797            (e.title.toLowerCase().includes(q) ||798              e.notes?.toLowerCase().includes(q) ||799              e.username?.toLowerCase().includes(q))800        );801        return { ok: true, data: searchResults } as MessageResponse;802      }803      case "AUTOFILL_QUERY": {804        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) {805          return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };806        }807        const { domain, kind, capability } = msg.payload as {808          domain: string;809          kind?: "login" | "card" | "totp";810          capability?: string;811        };812        const includeAll = consumeSummonCapability(capability, sender, "inventory");813        if (capability !== undefined && !includeAll) {814          return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };815        }816        // kind="card": return saved cards as compact summaries for the817        // inline card silver platter. Cards are not domain-scoped — every818        // saved card is a candidate on every checkout page — so domain is819        // ignored when kind === "card".820        if (kind === "card") {821          if (!includeAll) return { ok: true, data: [] };822          const cards = vault.getEntries().filter((e) => e.type === "card");823          return {824            ok: true,825            data: cards.map((e) => ({826              id: e.id,827              title: e.cardNickname || e.title,828              cardholderName: e.cardholderName,829              last4: e.last4,830              expMonth: e.expMonth,831              expYear: e.expYear,832              network: e.network,833            })),834          };835        }836        const scopedDomain = isPageSender(sender)837          ? attestedSenderDomain(sender)838          : typeof domain === "string"839            ? extractDomain(domain)840            : null;841        if (!includeAll && !scopedDomain) {842          return isPageSender(sender)843            ? { ok: false, error: "origin_unverified" }844            : { ok: true, data: [] };845        }846        if (kind === "totp") {847          const matches = (848            includeAll849              ? vault.getEntries().filter((entry) => entry.type !== "note" && entry.type !== "card")850              : vault.queryDomain(scopedDomain!)851          ).filter((entry) => !isPasskeyOnly(entry) && Boolean(entry.totp));852          return {853            ok: true,854            data: matches.map((e) => ({855              id: e.id,856              title: e.title,857              username: e.username,858              email: e.email,859              url: e.url,860              hasTotp: true,861            })),862          };863        }864        // The inline selector fills username+password into a form. Passkey-865        // only entries have no password to fill; sign-in for those goes866        // through the WebAuthn path instead. Filter them out everywhere so867        // the user doesn't see four "GitHub" rows that mostly do nothing.868        // Notes and cards never belonged here either.869        const matches = (870          includeAll871            ? vault872                .getEntries()873                .filter((entry) => entry.type !== "note" && entry.type !== "card")874            : vault.queryDomain(scopedDomain!)875        ).filter((entry) => !isPasskeyOnly(entry));876        return {877          ok: true,878          data: matches.map((e) =>879            includeAll880              ? {881                  id: e.id,882                  title: e.title,883                  // username/email/url shipped so the inline popup's search884                  // affordance can match on them, not just titles. No secrets885                  // cross the boundary — same shape as the domain-matched886                  // response below minus hasTotp (which the search list887                  // doesn't surface).888                  username: e.username,889                  email: e.email,890                  url: e.url,891                  hasPasskey: e.passkey !== undefined,892                }893              : {894                  id: e.id,895                  title: e.title,896                  username: e.username,897                  email: e.email,898                  url: e.url,899                  hasTotp: Boolean(e.totp),900                  hasPasskey: e.passkey !== undefined,901                }902          ),903        };904      }905      case "GET_ENTRY_FOR_FILL": {906        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };907        const { id, capability } = msg.payload as {908          id: string;909          capability?: string;910        };911        const capabilityAuthorized = capability !== undefined && consumeSummonCapability(capability, sender, "fill");912        const senderDomain = isPageSender(sender) ? attestedSenderDomain(sender) : null;913        if (isPageSender(sender) && !senderDomain) {914          return { ok: false, error: "origin_unverified" };915        }916        const entry = vault.getEntryById(id);917        if (!entry) return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };918919        // MV-1: re-validate the entry against the requesting frame's origin.920        // sender.url / sender.tab.url are browser-attested — a page cannot921        // forge them. PB-26-005: the FRAME url (sender.url) is authoritative922        // for an all_frames content script; the top-frame tab.url would923        // misattribute a cross-origin iframe's request to the top page. When924        // the request does not come from a tab at all (popup surfaces use925        // GET_ENTRY_FOR_EDIT, not this), refuse.926        if (senderDomain && !capabilityAuthorized) {927          if (!entryDomains(entry.url, entry.additionalUrls).has(senderDomain)) {928            // Domain mismatch — refuse silently (no oracle about which ids exist).929            return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };930          }931        }932        // Passkey-only entries (passkey credential, no password) cannot be933        // filled into a form — sign-in goes through the WebAuthn path. A934        // login that ALSO has a passkey is still fillable for its password.935        if (isPasskeyOnly(entry)) return { ok: false, error: "passkey_not_fillable" };936        // Strip the passkey credential AND the raw base32 TOTP seed from the937        // response. Content scripts never need either: the private key is the938        // authenticator's, and handing over the TOTP seed would let a939        // compromised content script mint valid codes indefinitely (SEV-3-C).940        // Generate the *current* 6-digit code here in the background and send941        // only that, plus the seconds left so the UI can render a countdown.942        // Also drop passwordHistory: filling needs only the *current* password.943        // Handing every past password to a content script during passive944        // autofill on an arbitrary page would widen the blast radius of a945        // compromised page far beyond the one credential being filled.946        const {947          passkey: _strippedPasskey,948          totp: seed,949          totpAlgorithm,950          totpDigits,951          totpPeriod,952          passwordHistory: _ph,953          ...safeEntry954        } = entry;955        let totpCode: string | undefined;956        let totpRemaining: number | undefined;957        if (seed) {958          try {959            // PCH-01-019: honour stored algorithm/digits/period (defaults apply960            // when these are undefined, i.e. RFC-default bare-seed entries).961            const generated = generateTOTP(seed, totpAlgorithm, totpDigits, totpPeriod);962            totpCode = generated.code;963            totpRemaining = generated.remaining;964          } catch {965            totpCode = undefined;966          }967        }968        if (isPageSender(sender) && vault.isUnlocked()) touchAutoLock();969        return { ok: true, data: { ...safeEntry, totpCode, totpRemaining } };970      }971      // Trusted full-entry fetch for extension-owned edit surfaces. Content972      // scripts route editing to the popup and cannot call this message.973      case "GET_ENTRY_FOR_EDIT": {974        if (isPageSender(sender)) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_sender" };975        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };976        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };977        const entry = vault.getEntryById(id);978        if (!entry) return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };979980        const { passkey: _passkey, ...safeEntry } = entry;981        return { ok: true, data: safeEntry };982      }983      case "COPY": {984        // AUD-002: shape-validate the payload before passing to the clipboard985        // helper. A raw cast lets a malformed message reach the clipboard API986        // with a non-string and throw.987        const { text, label, alreadyWritten } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {988          text?: unknown;989          label?: unknown;990          alreadyWritten?: unknown;991        };992        if (typeof text !== "string" || typeof label !== "string") {993          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };994        }995        await copyToClipboard(text, label, Boolean(alreadyWritten));996        return { ok: true, clearSeconds: getEffectiveClearSeconds() };997      }998      case "CHECK_ALL_BREACHES": {999        const allEntries = vault.getEntries();1000        const results: Record<string, number> = {};1001        for (const entry of allEntries) {1002          if (entry.type === "note") continue;1003          if (!entry.password) continue;1004          results[entry.id] = await vault.checkBreach(entry.password);1005          // Small delay — be a good citizen to the HIBP API1006          await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 200));1007        }1008        // Persist any non-zero counts back to entries1009        for (const [id, count] of Object.entries(results)) {1010          const entry = vault.getEntryById(id);1011          if (entry && (entry.breach ?? 0) !== count) {1012            await vault.updateEntry(id, { breach: count > 0 ? count : undefined });1013          }1014        }1015        return { ok: true, data: results };1016      }1017      case "GET_SETTINGS": {1018        const settings = await vault.ensureSettingsLoaded();1019        if (!isPageSender(sender)) return { ok: true, data: settings };10201021        const safeSettings: Pick<vault.VaultSettings, "accentColor" | "theme"> & {1022          manualSummonDomains?: NonNullable<vault.VaultSettings["manualSummonDomains"]>;1023        } = {1024          accentColor: settings.accentColor,1025          theme: settings.theme,1026        };1027        const domain = attestedSenderDomain(sender);1028        const ownSummon = domain ? settings.manualSummonDomains?.[domain] : undefined;1029        if (domain && ownSummon) safeSettings.manualSummonDomains = { [domain]: ownSummon };1030        return { ok: true, data: safeSettings };1031      }1032      case "UPDATE_SETTINGS": {1033        const patch = msg.payload;1034        if (!patch || typeof patch !== "object" || Array.isArray(patch)) {1035          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1036        }1037        await vault.updateSettings(patch as vault.VaultSettings);1038        if (typeof (patch as Record<string, unknown>).autoLockMinutes === "number") {1039          await setupAutoLock();1040          if (vault.isUnlocked()) touchAutoLock();1041        }1042        return { ok: true };1043      }1044      case "SETUP_PIN": {1045        const { currentPassword, pin } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1046          currentPassword?: unknown;1047          pin?: unknown;1048        };1049        if (typeof currentPassword !== "string" || typeof pin !== "string") {1050          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1051        }1052        return (await vault.setupPinUnlock(currentPassword, pin))1053          ? { ok: true }1054          : { ok: false, error: "incorrect_current_password" };1055      }1056      case "DISABLE_PIN": {1057        const { currentPassword } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { currentPassword?: unknown };1058        if (typeof currentPassword !== "string") return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1059        return (await vault.disablePinUnlock(currentPassword))1060          ? { ok: true }1061          : { ok: false, error: "incorrect_current_password" };1062      }1063      case "GET_PENDING_PASSKEY":1064        return { ok: true, data: await getPendingPasskeyRequest() };1065      case "APPROVE_PASSKEY": {1066        const { requestId } = msg.payload as { requestId: number };1067        await resolvePendingPasskeyRequest(requestId, true);1068        return { ok: true };1069      }1070      case "DENY_PASSKEY": {1071        const { requestId } = msg.payload as { requestId: number };1072        await resolvePendingPasskeyRequest(requestId, false);1073        return { ok: true };1074      }1075      case "GET_PASSKEY_PROVIDER_STATE":1076        return { ok: true, data: await getPasskeyProviderState() };1077      case "SET_PASSKEY_PROVIDER_ENABLED": {1078        const { enabled } = msg.payload as { enabled: boolean };1079        // Disabling is always free; gating fires only when a free user is1080        // trying to turn passkey interception on.1081        if (enabled) {1082          const gate = await requirePro("passkeys");1083          if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1084        }1085        return { ok: true, data: await setPasskeyProviderEnabled(enabled) };1086      }1087      // AUD-003: this handler POSTs `entryTitle` to a user-configured HTTPS1088      // endpoint. Intentional product behavior — users configure their own1089      // dead-man's-switch. isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl blocks localhost, private1090      // IPs, and non-HTTPS schemes, but cannot defend against every DNS-1091      // rebinding case. The UI under CanarySection (Entry.tsx) discloses to1092      // users that the entry title leaves the device when the canary fires.1093      case "FIRE_CANARY_PING": {1094        // Canary alert fires unconditionally for any entry with canary: true.1095        // The Pro gate only governs creation/flagging of canary entries; once1096        // an entry is flagged, the alert path is a security property and must1097        // never be license-gated.1098        const { webhookUrl, entryTitle, trigger } = msg.payload as {1099          webhookUrl: string;1100          entryTitle: string;1101          trigger: "password_copied" | "username_copied" | "autofilled" | "submitted" | "test";1102        };1103        if (!isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl(webhookUrl)) {1104          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_webhook_url" };1105        }1106        // LV-3: debounce non-test pings per (webhook, entry) so a page that1107        // strobes focus/fill events can't turn the canary into a request1108        // firehose at the user's endpoint. Test pings are exempt — they are1109        // explicit user clicks in the settings UI and are awaited for1110        // feedback. The FIRST ping in a window always goes out, so the1111        // dead-man's-switch property (canary fires on access) is preserved;1112        // only repeats within the window are coalesced.1113        if (trigger !== "test") {1114          const rlKey = `canary-last-fetch:${webhookUrl}:${entryTitle}`;1115          const stored = await chrome.storage.local.get(rlKey);1116          const last = (stored as Record<string, unknown>)[rlKey];1117          if (typeof last === "number" && Date.now() - last < CANARY_MIN_INTERVAL_MS) {1118            return { ok: true, data: { rateLimited: true } };1119          }1120          await chrome.storage.local.set({ [rlKey]: Date.now() });1121        }1122        const body = JSON.stringify({1123          event: trigger === "test" ? "peach_canary_test" : "peach_canary_accessed",1124          entry: entryTitle,1125          trigger,1126          timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),1127          source: "peach-extension",1128        });1129        if (trigger === "test") {1130          // Permitted outbound fetch: user-configured canary alert endpoint1131          // (validated by isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl above). This is the1132          // only non-HIBP outbound call in the extension — see1133          // Projects.md §3.7. Test pings are awaited so the UI can show1134          // success/failure.1135          try {1136            const res = await fetch(webhookUrl, {1137              method: "POST",1138              headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },1139              body,1140            });1141            return { ok: res.ok, error: res.ok ? undefined : `HTTP ${res.status}` };1142          } catch (err) {1143            return { ok: false, error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : "network_error" };1144          }1145        }1146        // Non-test triggers are fire-and-forget1147        fetch(webhookUrl, {1148          method: "POST",1149          headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },1150          body,1151        }).catch(() => {});1152        return { ok: true };1153      }1154      case "ACTIVATE_LICENSE": {1155        const { key } = msg.payload as { key: string };1156        const licenseInfo = await activateLicense(key);1157        return { ok: true, data: licenseInfo };1158      }1159      case "GET_LICENSE": {1160        const licenseInfo = await getLicenseInfo();1161        return { ok: true, data: licenseInfo };1162      }1163      case "GET_LICENSE_KEY": {1164        const key = await getLicenseKey();1165        return { ok: true, data: key };1166      }1167      case "DEACTIVATE_LICENSE": {1168        await deactivateLicense();1169        return { ok: true };1170      }1171      case "SHOULD_PLAY_CELEBRATION": {1172        const should = await shouldPlayCelebration();1173        return { ok: true, data: should };1174      }1175      case "MARK_CELEBRATION_PLAYED": {1176        await markCelebrationPlayed();1177        return { ok: true };1178      }1179      case "GET_CODEX_VAULT_DATA": {1180        // Pro-gated. requirePro broadcasts PRO_GATE_TRIGGERED on miss so the1181        // popup navigates to the License section without further coordination.1182        // Also privileged-page-gated (PB-26-001), and recoveryWords inside the1183        // snapshot additionally require a fresh master-password proof.1184        const gate = await requirePro("codex");1185        if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1186        const { password } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { password?: string };1187        return await handleGetCodexVaultData(password);1188      }1189      case "ESTIMATE_CODEX_PAGES": {1190        const gate = await requirePro("codex");1191        if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1192        return await handleEstimateCodexPages();1193      }1194      case "RESTORE_FROM_CODEX": {1195        // !! IMPORTANT: intentionally NOT Pro-gated. A free device must still1196        // be able to restore a vault that was printed by a Pro user.1197        // DO NOT add a Pro gate here.1198        const payload = msg.payload as CodexRestorePayload;1199        return await handleRestoreFromCodex(payload);1200      }1201      case "OPEN_PRO_GATE": {1202        // Content script requests: open popup and navigate to License section.1203        const { feature } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { feature?: string };1204        if (chrome.storage.session) {1205          await chrome.storage.session.set({ pendingProGate: { feature: feature ?? "passkeys" } });1206        }1207        try { await chrome.action.openPopup(); } catch { /* badge fallback */ }1208        return { ok: true };1209      }1210      case "OPEN_POPUP": {1211        // Content script asks to open the trusted extension popup — used by the1212        // inline locked bubble so the master password is entered in the popup,1213        // never in page-hosted DOM (audit HIGH). Best-effort: openPopup needs a1214        // user gesture + Chrome 127+/Firefox; on failure the user clicks the1215        // toolbar icon. The badge already signals Peach needs attention.1216        //1217        // Set a session flag so the popup knows it was opened for inline unlock1218        // and should close itself once the vault is unlocked (returning the user1219        // to the inline autofill selector on the page).1220        const { entryId } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { entryId?: unknown };1221        if (entryId !== undefined && (typeof entryId !== "string" || entryId.length === 0 || entryId.length > 64)) {1222          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1223        }1224        if (chrome.storage.session) {1225          if (typeof entryId === "string") {1226            await chrome.storage.session.set({ peach_open_entry: entryId });1227          } else {1228            await chrome.storage.session.set({ peach_inline_unlock: true });1229          }1230        }1231        try { await chrome.action.openPopup(); } catch { /* user opens via toolbar */ }1232        return { ok: true };1233      }1234      case "OPEN_DETACHED_POPUP": {1235        // A window created by the action popup and then orphaned with1236        // window.close() is cascaded shut by Chrome, so the file-picker1237        // flows (OS dialogs that dismiss the popup on focus loss) ask the SW1238        // to open the standalone window instead — the SW has no window to be1239        // associated with. The query string is allowlisted so this can never1240        // open an arbitrary URL.1241        const { route } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { route?: string };1242        const search = route === "peachscript"1243          ? "?restore=peachscript"1244          : route === "csv"1245            ? "?restore=csv"1246            : route === "codex-pdf"1247              ? "?codex=pdf"1248              : null;1249        if (!search) return { ok: false, error: "bad_route" };1250        try {1251          const popupHtml =1252            chrome.runtime.getManifest().action?.default_popup ?? "src/popup/index.html";1253          await chrome.windows.create({1254            url: chrome.runtime.getURL(`${popupHtml}${search}`),1255            type: "popup",1256            width: 320,1257            height: 550,1258          });1259          return { ok: true, data: { detached: true } };1260        } catch {1261          return { ok: false };1262        }1263      }1264      case "GET_IDENTITIES": {1265        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1266        return { ok: true, data: vault.getIdentities() };1267      }1268      case "TOUCH_AUTO_LOCK": {1269        // touchAutoLock() is already called by shouldRefreshAutoLock above;1270        // this case just gives the popup a typed message to keep the session alive.1271        return { ok: true };1272      }1273      case "GET_ADVANCED_HEALTH_REPORT": {1274        const gate = await requirePro("advanced_health");1275        if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1276        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1277        const report = await buildAdvancedHealthReport(vault.getEntries());1278        return { ok: true, data: report };1279      }1280      case "IS_DURESS_ENABLED": {1281        const enabled = await vault.isDuressEnabled();1282        return { ok: true, data: enabled };1283      }1284      case "SETUP_DURESS": {1285        // Single enforcement point for the Duress Vault Pro gate. Free users1286        // who somehow reach this handler are rejected here; the popup also1287        // pre-checks isPro() to avoid showing the setup form to free users,1288        // but server-side is the actual security boundary.1289        const gate = await requirePro("duress_vault");1290        if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1291        // MV3 service workers restart after inactivity, losing the in-memory1292        // derived key. Detect this before calling setupDuress so the popup1293        // can show a meaningful prompt to re-lock and re-unlock.1294        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "session_expired" };1295        const { duressPassword } = msg.payload as { duressPassword: string };1296        await vault.setupDuress(duressPassword);1297        return { ok: true };1298      }1299      case "DISABLE_DURESS": {1300        await vault.disableDuress();1301        return { ok: true };1302      }1303      case "VERIFY_MAIN_PASSWORD": {1304        const { password } = msg.payload as { password: string };1305        const ok = await vault.verifyMainPassword(password);1306        return { ok: true, data: ok };1307      }1308      case "CHANGE_PASSWORD": {1309        const { currentPassword, newPassword } = msg.payload as {1310          currentPassword: string;1311          newPassword: string;1312        };1313        const changed = await vault.changePassword(currentPassword, newPassword);1314        return changed1315          ? { ok: true }1316          : { ok: false, error: "incorrect_current_password" };1317      }1318      case "GET_SITE_PASSWORD_POLICY": {1319        const [tab] = await chrome.tabs.query({ active: true, currentWindow: true });1320        if (!tab?.id) return { ok: true, data: null };1321        try {1322          const response = await chrome.tabs.sendMessage(tab.id, {1323            type: "GET_SITE_PASSWORD_POLICY",1324          });1325          return (response as MessageResponse) ?? { ok: true, data: null };1326        } catch {1327          return { ok: true, data: null };1328        }1329      }1330      case "RECORD_MANUAL_SUMMON": {1331        const { domain } = msg.payload as { domain: string };1332        const settings = vault.getSettings();1333        const existing = settings.manualSummonDomains?.[domain];1334        const now = Date.now();1335        await vault.updateSettings({1336          manualSummonDomains: {1337            ...settings.manualSummonDomains,1338            [domain]: {1339              firstSummonedAt: existing?.firstSummonedAt ?? now,1340              summonCount: (existing?.summonCount ?? 0) + 1,1341              lastSummonedAt: now,1342            },1343          },1344        });1345        return { ok: true };1346      }1347      case "DECLINE_CARD_SAVE": {1348        // PB-26-108: the declined-card digest is keyed by root-key material, so1349        // a decline cannot be recorded while locked. Offers are not shown while1350        // locked either, so this is unreachable in practice.1351        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1352        const { last4, expMonth, expYear } = msg.payload as { last4: string; expMonth: string; expYear: string };1353        await vault.declineCardSaveOffer(last4, expMonth, expYear);1354        return { ok: true };1355      }1356      case "IS_CARD_DECLINED": {1357        const { last4, expMonth, expYear } = msg.payload as { last4: string; expMonth: string; expYear: string };1358        const declined = await vault.isCardDeclined(last4, expMonth, expYear);1359        return { ok: true, data: declined };1360      }1361      case "INITIATE_FIREFOX_PASSKEY_CREATE": {1362        const { rpId, rpName, userName, userDisplayName } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1363          rpId?: string;1364          rpName?: string;1365          userName?: string;1366          userDisplayName?: string;1367        };1368        if (!rpId || !userName) return { ok: false, error: "rpid_and_username_required" };1369        return await initiateFirefoxPasskeyCreate({1370          rpId,1371          rpName: rpName ?? rpId,1372          userName,1373          userDisplayName,1374        }, attestedSenderOrigin(sender));1375      }13761377      case "COMPLETE_FIREFOX_PASSKEY_CREATE": {1378        const payload = msg.payload as Parameters<typeof completeFirefoxPasskeyCreate>[0] | undefined;1379        if (!payload) return { ok: false, error: "missing_payload" };1380        return await completeFirefoxPasskeyCreate(payload);1381      }13821383      case "PASSKEY_OFFER_DECLINE": {1384        const { domain } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { domain?: string };1385        const origin = attestedSenderOrigin(sender);1386        if (!domain || !origin || !isValidRpId(domain, origin)) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_domain" };1387        await recordPasskeyOfferDecline(domain);1388        return { ok: true };1389      }13901391      case "GET_PASSKEY_OFFER_DECLINED": {1392        const { domain } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { domain?: string };1393        const origin = attestedSenderOrigin(sender);1394        if (!domain || !origin || !isValidRpId(domain, origin)) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_domain" };1395        return { ok: true, data: await isPasskeyOfferDeclined(domain) };1396      }13971398      case "PASSKEY_HAS_CREDENTIALS": {1399        const payload = msg.payload as {1400          rpId?: string;1401          allowCredentials?: Array<{ id: string; type?: string }>;1402        } | undefined;1403        if (!payload?.rpId) return { ok: false, error: "rpid_required" };1404        return await handlePasskeyHasCredentials({1405          rpId: payload.rpId,1406          allowCredentials: payload.allowCredentials ?? [],1407        }, attestedSenderOrigin(sender));1408      }14091410      case "PASSKEY_CREATE": {1411        const payload = msg.payload as Parameters<typeof handleFirefoxPasskeyCreate>[0] | undefined;1412        if (!payload?.rpId || !payload?.userName) {1413          return { ok: false, error: "rpid_and_username_required" };1414        }1415        return await handleFirefoxPasskeyCreate(payload, attestedSenderOrigin(sender));1416      }14171418      case "PASSKEY_GET": {1419        const payload = msg.payload as Parameters<typeof handleFirefoxPasskeyGet>[0] | undefined;1420        if (!payload?.rpId) return { ok: false, error: "rpid_required" };1421        return await handleFirefoxPasskeyGet(payload, attestedSenderOrigin(sender));1422      }14231424      case "PASSKEY_AUTH_RESPONSE": {1425        const { requestId, approved } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1426          requestId?: string | number;1427          approved?: boolean;1428        };1429        if (requestId === undefined || requestId === null || typeof approved !== 'boolean') {1430          return { ok: false, error: 'requestId and approved required' };1431        }1432        const pending = await getPendingPasskeyRequest();1433        const senderOrigin = attestedSenderOrigin(sender);1434        if (1435          (pending && pending.requestId !== Number(requestId)) ||1436          (pending?.tabId !== undefined && sender.tab?.id !== pending.tabId) ||1437          (pending?.origin !== undefined && senderOrigin !== pending.origin)1438        ) {1439          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_passkey_approval_sender" };1440        }1441        await resolvePendingPasskeyRequest(Number(requestId), approved);1442        return { ok: true };1443      }14441445      case "GET_PASSKEY_FOR_DOMAIN": {1446        const { domain } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { domain?: string };1447        if (!domain) return { ok: false, error: "domain_required" };1448        // Scope to the caller's own origin: a page may only ask about passkeys1449        // for a domain it actually owns, so an arbitrary page cannot enumerate1450        // which sites the user holds passkeys for or read the username (audit MEDIUM).1451        const origin = attestedSenderOrigin(sender);1452        if (!origin || !isValidRpId(domain, origin)) return { ok: true, data: null };1453        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: true, data: null };1454        const match = vault1455          .getEntries()1456          .find((entry) => entry.passkey?.rpId === domain);1457        if (!match || !match.passkey) return { ok: true, data: null };1458        // Slim shape — only the fields State 11 needs. Never expose private1459        // key material, even though this is locked behind isUnlocked.1460        // bannerShown is the per-domain "already surfaced" flag, kept in1461        // trusted background session storage so content scripts never touch1462        // chrome.storage.session directly (PB-26-203).1463        let bannerShown = false;1464        if (chrome.storage.session) {1465          const flag = await chrome.storage.session.get(`peach_state11_shown:${domain}`);1466          bannerShown = Boolean((flag as Record<string, unknown>)[`peach_state11_shown:${domain}`]);1467        }1468        return {1469          ok: true,1470          data: {1471            rpId: match.passkey.rpId,1472            userName: match.passkey.userName,1473            browser: match.passkey.browser,1474            bannerShown,1475          },1476        };1477      }14781479      case "MARK_PASSKEY_BANNER_SHOWN": {1480        const { domain } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { domain?: string };1481        if (typeof domain !== "string" || !domain) return { ok: false, error: "domain_required" };1482        // Same origin binding as the read path: a page may only mark its own1483        // domain, and the flag reveals nothing either way.1484        const origin = attestedSenderOrigin(sender);1485        if (!origin || !isValidRpId(domain, origin)) return { ok: true };1486        if (chrome.storage.session) {1487          await chrome.storage.session.set({ [`peach_state11_shown:${domain}`]: Date.now() });1488        }1489        return { ok: true };1490      }14911492      case "DESTROY_VAULT": {1493        // Irreversible by design. Lock zeroes the derived key + in-memory entries;1494        // storage.local.clear() wipes every Peach key (slots, settings, license,1495        // onboarded flag, history, sync state, declined cards, recall, etc.);1496        // session.clear() wipes pending passkey requests + pro-notice queues.1497        // Caller (Panic.tsx) handles UI navigation back to onboarding.1498        //1499        // The Pro license is the one thing that must survive: the user paid for1500        // it, and destroying a vault (panic wipe, fresh start) is not a refund.1501        // Capture it before the clear and restore it after. peach_pro_celebrated1502        // rides along so the Pro celebration doesn't replay on the next unlock.1503        const preserved = await chrome.storage.local.get([1504          "peach_license",1505          "peach_pro_celebrated",1506        ]);1507        await vault.lock();1508        await storageClear();1509        await vault.clearVaultHistory();1510        const toRestore: Record<string, unknown> = {};1511        if (preserved.peach_license !== undefined) toRestore.peach_license = preserved.peach_license;1512        if (preserved.peach_pro_celebrated !== undefined) toRestore.peach_pro_celebrated = preserved.peach_pro_celebrated;1513        if (Object.keys(toRestore).length > 0) {1514          await chrome.storage.local.set(toRestore);1515        }1516        if (chrome.storage.session) {1517          await chrome.storage.session.clear();1518        }1519        await clearRecoveryConfirmPending();1520        return { ok: true };1521      }15221523      case "GET_IDENTITY_SUGGESTIONS": {1524        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1525        const entries = vault.getEntries();1526        const suggestions = buildIdentitySuggestions(entries);1527        return { ok: true, data: { suggestions } };1528      }1529      case "ML_INIT":1530        return { ok: true };15311532      case "ML_PREDICT_BATCH": {1533        // AUD-002: shape-validate before forwarding to the ML helper.1534        const { featuresArray } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { featuresArray?: unknown };1535        if (!Array.isArray(featuresArray)) {1536          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1537        }1538        return { ok: true, data: mlPredictBatch(featuresArray as MLFieldFeatures[]) };1539      }15401541      // ── Vault sync (v3) ───────────────────────────────────────────────1542      // Returns the public-facing local identity needed by the popup to1543      // drive Phase-1 audio pairing. The private long-term key never1544      // leaves the background.1545      case "GET_LOCAL_IDENTITY": {1546        // Not Pro-gated: a free device may attempt to pair so it can RECEIVE a1547        // Pro license from an already-Pro peer (at least one device must be Pro).1548        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1549        // Identity derives from the stable root key, not the password-derived1550        // key, so pairing survives a master-password change (SEV-2-B).1551        const masterKeyHex = vault.getRootKeyHex();1552        if (!masterKeyHex) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1553        const masterKey = unhexBytes(masterKeyHex);1554        try {1555          const identity = await buildLocalIdentity(masterKey);1556          // If this device is Pro, advertise the signed license so the peer can1557          // activate it after SAS confirmation — pairing carries Pro across.1558          if (await isProUser()) {1559            const license = await getLicenseKey();1560            if (license) (identity as { license?: string }).license = license;1561          }1562          return { ok: true, data: identity };1563        } finally {1564          masterKey.fill(0);1565        }1566      }15671568      case "LIST_PAIRED_DEVICES": {1569        const devices = await listPairedDevicesV3();1570        return { ok: true, data: { devices } };1571      }15721573      case "RENAME_PAIRED_DEVICE": {1574        const { deviceId, name } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { deviceId?: string; name?: string };1575        if (typeof deviceId !== "string" || !deviceId || typeof name !== "string") {1576          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1577        }1578        await renamePairedDeviceV3(deviceId, name);1579        return { ok: true };1580      }15811582      case "UNPAIR_DEVICE": {1583        const { deviceId } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { deviceId?: string };1584        if (typeof deviceId !== "string" || !deviceId) {1585          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1586        }1587        // Removing a device REVOKES it rather than just dropping the local1588        // row: a plain removal is undone the moment any other peer vouches it1589        // back through a manifest, which is exactly what the relay makes easy.1590        await revokeDeviceByIdV3(deviceId, await getOrCreateDeviceId());1591        // PB-26-213: forget the secret now so no further dial can use it.1592        // Removals that happen while locked leave orphans for the next1593        // unlock's reconcile to prune.1594        const unpairRootHex = vault.getRootKeyHex();1595        if (unpairRootHex) {1596          const unpairRoot = unhexBytes(unpairRootHex);1597          try {1598            await dropPairSecret(deviceId, unpairRoot);1599          } finally {1600            unpairRoot.fill(0);1601          }1602        } else {1603          await dropPairSecret(deviceId, null);1604        }1605        // Sync against the remaining hosts — the unpaired device no longer1606        // matters but the next alarm tick is up to ten minutes away.1607        void triggerSyncIfReachable({ reason: "device_list_changed" }).catch(() => undefined);1608        return { ok: true };1609      }16101611      case "RENAME_LOCAL_DEVICE": {1612        const { name } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { name?: string };1613        if (typeof name !== "string") return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1614        await setDeviceNameV3(name);1615        return { ok: true };1616      }16171618      // ── Relay pairing ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────1619      // Not Pro-gated (a free device may pair to receive Pro/sync). The whole NK1620      // session runs in the background; the SAS and the terminal result reach1621      // the popup as ADOPTION_SOURCE_SAS / ADOPTION_SOURCE_RESULT pushes.1622      case "START_ADOPTION_SOURCE": {1623        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1624        if (isRelayAdoptionSourceInFlight()) {1625          return { ok: false, error: "adoption_source_in_progress" };1626        }1627        try {1628          return { ok: true, data: await startRelayAdoptionSource() };1629        } catch (error) {1630          return {1631            ok: false,1632            error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : "adoption_source_failed",1633          };1634        }1635      }16361637      // Onboarding receiver — empty extension shows a QR, phone scans and1638      // sends the vault. The popup supplies the local-only password here so1639      // the background can wrap the adopted root key at rest without ever1640      // asking the user to retype it.1641      case "START_ADOPTION_RECEIVER": {1642        if (isRelayAdoptionSourceInFlight()) {1643          return { ok: false, error: "adoption_receiver_in_progress" };1644        }1645        const password = (msg.payload as { password?: unknown } | undefined)?.password;1646        if (typeof password !== "string" || password.length === 0) {1647          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1648        }1649        try {1650          return { ok: true, data: await startRelayAdoptionReceiver(password) };1651        } catch (error) {1652          return {1653            ok: false,1654            error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : "adoption_receiver_failed",1655          };1656        }1657      }16581659      // Popup→bg counterpart to ADOPTION_SOURCE_SAS (receiver flow).1660      // The receiver now auto-accepts the SAS (both sides derive it from the1661      // same Noise handshake hash, so the codes match by construction) so1662      // the popup never has a SAS screen to tap on. The id round-trips the1663      // same way so a stale late response can't approve the wrong session.1664      // Popup→bg counterpart for the source flow: Confirm/Cancel on the1665      // source's SAS screen.16661667      // Source-side mirror of RECEIVER_SAS_DECISION: the popup's confirm/cancel1668      // on the source's SAS screen. The id round-trips the same way so a stale1669      // late response can't approve the wrong session.1670      case "SOURCE_SAS_DECISION": {1671        const payload = msg.payload as { id?: unknown; ok?: unknown } | undefined;1672        if (typeof payload?.id !== "string" || typeof payload?.ok !== "boolean") {1673          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1674        }1675        return { ok: resolveSourceSasConfirmation(payload.id, payload.ok) };1676      }16771678      case "CANCEL_ADOPTION_SOURCE": {1679        cancelRelayAdoptionSource();1680        return { ok: true };1681      }16821683      case "TRIGGER_SYNC": {1684        const payload = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1685          reason?: "vault_change" | "foreground" | "manual";1686          force?: boolean;1687        };1688        const reason = payload.reason ?? "foreground";16891690        void triggerSyncIfReachable({ reason, force: payload.force === true });1691        return { ok: true };1692      }16931694      case "GET_SYNC_STATE": {1695        return { ok: true, data: getSyncState() };1696      }16971698      case "GET_SYNC_SETTINGS": {1699        return { ok: true, data: await getSyncSettings() };1700      }17011702      case "SET_SYNC_SETTINGS": {1703        const payload = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1704          mode?: unknown;1705          relayUrl?: unknown;1706        };1707        try {1708          // A custom relay URL implies private mode; Peach's own relay stays1709          // public. See setRelayUrl.1710          if (payload.relayUrl !== undefined) {1711            if (typeof payload.relayUrl !== "string") {1712              return { ok: false, error: "invalid_relay_url" };1713            }1714            return { ok: true, data: await setRelayUrl(payload.relayUrl) };1715          }1716          if (payload.mode !== undefined) {1717            if (payload.mode !== "public" && payload.mode !== "private" && payload.mode !== "off") {1718              return { ok: false, error: "invalid_sync_mode" };1719            }1720            return { ok: true, data: await setSyncMode(payload.mode as SyncMode) };1721          }1722          return { ok: true, data: await getSyncSettings() };1723        } catch (error) {1724          return {1725            ok: false,1726            error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : "invalid_relay_url",1727          };1728        }1729      }17301731      case "GET_SYNC_ALERTS": {1732        const { consume } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { consume?: boolean };1733        const alerts = await getPendingSyncAlerts();1734        // The popup reads on open and acknowledges with consume:true after1735        // rendering, so a popup crash between read and render doesn't lose1736        // the alerts.1737        if (consume) await clearPendingSyncAlerts();1738        return { ok: true, data: alerts };1739      }17401741      case "GET_PENDING_VOUCHED_DEVICES": {1742        return { ok: true, data: await listPendingVouchedDevices() };1743      }1744      case "CONFIRM_VOUCHED_DEVICE": {1745        const { deviceId } = msg.payload as { deviceId: string };1746        const pending = await getPendingVouchedDevice(deviceId);1747        if (!pending) return { ok: false, error: "not_pending" };1748        // Last gate before a vouched device becomes a sync peer. A queue entry1749        // can predate the revocation that names it, so revocation is re-checked1750        // here rather than trusted to have swept the queue.1751        if (await isDeviceRevoked(pending.deviceId, pending.longTermPublicKeyHex)) {1752          await removePendingVouchedDevice(deviceId);1753          return { ok: false, error: "device_revoked" };1754        }1755        await upsertPairedDeviceV3({1756          deviceId: pending.deviceId,1757          deviceName: pending.deviceName,1758          deviceType:1759            pending.deviceType as import("../shared/sync-types").PairedDevice["deviceType"],1760          longTermPublicKeyHex: pending.longTermPublicKeyHex,1761          signingPublicKeyHex: pending.signingPublicKeyHex,1762          wsPort: pending.wsPort,1763          pairedAt: pending.pairedAt,1764          trustSource: "vouched",1765        });1766        await removePendingVouchedDevice(deviceId);1767        // Newly confirmed vouched device is now a sync target — kick a round1768        // so the mesh introduction pays off without a 10-minute wait.1769        void triggerSyncIfReachable({ reason: "device_list_changed" }).catch(() => undefined);1770        return { ok: true };1771      }1772      case "REJECT_VOUCHED_DEVICE": {1773        const { deviceId } = msg.payload as { deviceId: string };1774        await removePendingVouchedDevice(deviceId);1775        return { ok: true };1776      }1777      case "ROTATE_SYNC_IDENTITY": {1778        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1779        const result = await vault.rotateSyncIdentity();1780        return result.ok ? { ok: true } : { ok: false, error: result.error };1781      }17821783      default:1784        return { ok: false, error: "unknown_message_type" };1785    }1786  } catch (err) {1787    return {1788      ok: false,1789      error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : "operation_failed",1790    };1791  }1792}17931794// Returns username use-counts from the vault, sorted by frequency. Each row1795// also carries the entry's email so the popup can suggest the email/username1796// pair the user has actually used together.1797function buildIdentitySuggestions(1798  entries: VaultEntry[],1799): Array<{ email: string; username: string; count: number }> {1800  const usernameCounts = new Map<string, number>();1801  const usernameEmail = new Map<string, string>();1802  for (const entry of entries) {1803    const username = entry.username ?? "";1804    const email = (entry as VaultEntry & { email?: string }).email ?? "";1805    if (!username && !email) continue;1806    const key = username || email;1807    usernameCounts.set(key, (usernameCounts.get(key) ?? 0) + 1);1808    if (!usernameEmail.has(key)) usernameEmail.set(key, email);1809  }1810  return Array.from(usernameCounts.entries())1811    .sort((a, b) => b[1] - a[1])1812    .map(([username, count]) => ({1813      email: usernameEmail.get(username) ?? "",1814      username,1815      count,1816    }));1817}18181819/** Notify all content scripts that the vault just became available. */1820function broadcastToContentScripts(message: { type: string }): void {1821  if (!chrome.tabs?.query) return;1822  chrome.tabs.query({}, (tabs) => {1823    for (const tab of tabs) {1824      if (tab.id !== undefined) {1825        chrome.tabs.sendMessage(tab.id, message).catch(() => {1826          // Tab may not have a content script — silently ignore1827        });1828      }1829    }1830  });1831}18321833function shouldRefreshAutoLock(1834  type: MessageType,1835  sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender>,1836): boolean {1837  if (!isExtensionPageSender(sender)) return false;1838  return (1839    type !== "HAS_VAULT" &&1840    type !== "IS_UNLOCKED" &&1841    type !== "GET_VAULT_STATUS" &&1842    type !== "LOCK" &&1843    type !== "UPDATE_SETTINGS" &&1844    type !== "GET_PENDING_PASSKEY" &&1845    type !== "GET_PASSKEY_PROVIDER_STATE" &&1846    type !== "DECLINE_CARD_SAVE" &&1847    type !== "IS_CARD_DECLINED" &&1848    type !== "AUTOFILL_QUERY" &&1849    type !== "ML_PREDICT_BATCH"1850  );1851}18521853function isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl(value: string): boolean {1854  try {1855    const url = new URL(value);1856    if (url.protocol !== "https:") return false;18571858    const hostname = url.hostname.toLowerCase();1859    if (1860      hostname === "localhost" ||1861      hostname.endsWith(".localhost") ||1862      isPrivateIpv4(hostname) ||1863      isPrivateIpv6(hostname)1864    ) {1865      return false;1866    }18671868    return true;1869  } catch {1870    return false;1871  }1872}18731874function isPrivateIpv4(hostname: string): boolean {1875  if (PRIVATE_IPV4_RANGES.some((range) => hostname.startsWith(range.prefix))) {1876    return true;1877  }18781879  const octets = hostname.split(".").map((part) => Number(part));1880  if (octets.length !== 4 || octets.some((octet) => !Number.isInteger(octet) || octet < 0 || octet > 255)) {1881    return false;1882  }18831884  return octets[0] === 172 && octets[1] >= 16 && octets[1] <= 31;1885}18861887function isPrivateIpv6(hostname: string): boolean {1888  const normalized = hostname.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "").toLowerCase();1889  // IPv4-mapped IPv6 literals embed a plain IPv4 address that the prefix1890  // list below can never match (WHATWG URL serializes [::ffff:192.168.0.1]1891  // as ::ffff:c0a8:1). Unwrap and test the embedded IPv4; unparseable mapped1892  // tails fail closed. (Codex Security 2026-08-04 LOW,1893  // ssrf.webhook-url-private-ip-filter.) DNS rebinding is out of scope for a1894  // one-shot host check.1895  const mapped = /^::ffff:(.+)$/.exec(normalized);1896  if (mapped) {1897    const tail = mapped[1] ?? "";1898    if (tail.includes(".")) return isPrivateIpv4(tail);1899    const parts = tail.split(":");1900    const [hi, lo] = parts;1901    if (1902      parts.length !== 2 ||1903      !hi ||1904      !lo ||1905      !/^[0-9a-f]{1,4}$/.test(hi) ||1906      !/^[0-9a-f]{1,4}$/.test(lo)1907    ) {1908      return true;1909    }1910    const octets = [1911      (Number.parseInt(hi, 16) >>> 8) & 0xff,1912      Number.parseInt(hi, 16) & 0xff,1913      (Number.parseInt(lo, 16) >>> 8) & 0xff,1914      Number.parseInt(lo, 16) & 0xff,1915    ];1916    return isPrivateIpv4(octets.join("."));1917  }1918  return (1919    normalized === "::1" ||1920    normalized.startsWith("fc") ||1921    normalized.startsWith("fd") ||1922    normalized.startsWith("fe80:")1923  );1924}