messages.ts

1/**2 * messages.ts — the only background message handler.3 *4 * All `chrome.runtime.onMessage` handling for the service worker lives here.5 * Do not handle messages inline in entry.ts, alarms.ts, or any other6 * background file. Every background-bound MessageType in shared/types.ts7 * must have a case below. Content-script-bound message types (PING,8 * SUMMON_AUTOFILL, VAULT_LOCKED) are documented in shared/types.ts and9 * intentionally have no case here — they are sent *to* content scripts.10 */1112import { copyToClipboard, getEffectiveClearSeconds } from "./clipboard";13import { getPendingSyncAlerts, clearPendingSyncAlerts } from "./sync-alerts";14import { extractDomain } from "../shared/domain";15import { computeVaultId } from "../shared/sync-identity";16import {17  getPendingVouchedDevice,18  listPendingVouchedDevices,19  removePendingVouchedDevice,20} from "./pending-vouched-devices";21import { isRecoveryConfirmPending } from "./recovery-pending";22import { setupAutoLock, touchAutoLock } from "./alarms";23import { runSelfTest } from "./self-test";24import * as vault from "./vault";25import {26  handleEstimateCodexPages,27  handleGetCodexVaultData,28  handleRestoreFromCodex,29} from "./codex-handlers";30import type { CodexRestorePayload } from "../shared/codex-types";31import {32  activateLicense,33  deactivateLicense,34  getLicenseInfo,35  getLicenseKey,36  isProUser,37  markCelebrationPlayed,38  shouldPlayCelebration,39} from "./license";40import {41  completeFirefoxPasskeyCreate,42  getPasskeyProviderState,43  getPendingPasskeyRequest,44  handleFirefoxPasskeyCreate,45  handleFirefoxPasskeyGet,46  handlePasskeyHasCredentials,47  initiateFirefoxPasskeyCreate,48  isPasskeyOfferDeclined,49  onVaultUnlocked,50  recordPasskeyOfferDecline,51  resolvePendingPasskeyRequest,52  setPasskeyProviderEnabled,53} from "./passkey";54import { buildAdvancedHealthReport } from "./health";55import { storageClear } from "../shared/storage";56import { findInvalidWords } from "../shared/recovery-words";57import type {58  Message,59  MessageResponse,60  MessageType,61  ProFeature,62  VaultEntry,63} from "../shared/types";64import { isPasskeyOnly } from "../shared/types";65import { generateTOTP } from "../crypto/totp";66import { isValidRpId } from "../shared/passkey-utils";67import { isNativePlatform, nativePlugin } from "../shared/native";68import { predictBatch as mlPredictBatch } from "./ml";69import type { MLFieldFeatures } from "../shared/ml";70import {71  buildLocalIdentity,72  getOrCreateDeviceId,73  setDeviceName as setDeviceNameV3,74} from "./device-identity";75import {76  listPairedDevices as listPairedDevicesV3,77  revokeDeviceById as revokeDeviceByIdV3,78  upsertPairedDevice as upsertPairedDeviceV3,79} from "./paired-devices";8081// Compile-time E2E flag, folded to a literal by Vite's `define` (false in82// every production build — verified in the bundled output). Mirrors the83// create-path bypass in passkey.ts so the Playwright passkey smoke can enable84// the provider without a real Pro licence; the gate is fully intact for users.85declare const __PEACH_E2E_PASSKEYS__: boolean;86const PASSKEY_E2E_PRO_BYPASS = __PEACH_E2E_PASSKEYS__ === true;8788let nativeSyncRunnerBootstrapped = false;8990function unhexBytes(hex: string): Uint8Array {91  if (hex.length % 2 !== 0) throw new Error("invalid hex");92  const out = new Uint8Array(hex.length / 2);93  for (let i = 0; i < out.length; i++) {94    out[i] = parseInt(hex.slice(i * 2, i * 2 + 2), 16);95  }96  return out;97}9899/**100 * The single Pro gate. Every gated handler calls this first; the broadcast101 * lets the popup react (navigate to the License section, highlight the102 * relevant feature). Background never touches the popup view directly —103 * the popup owns navigation. See Projects.md "Pro gate rule".104 */105async function requirePro(106  feature: ProFeature,107  trigger: "user" | "background" = "user"108): Promise<{ allowed: boolean }> {109  if (PASSKEY_E2E_PRO_BYPASS && feature === "passkeys") return { allowed: true };110  if (await isProUser()) return { allowed: true };111112  if (trigger === "user") {113    // User deliberately triggered this feature — redirect the popup immediately.114    chrome.runtime115      .sendMessage({ type: "PRO_GATE_TRIGGERED", payload: { feature } })116      .catch(() => {117        // Popup may be closed — the gate signal is best-effort.118      });119  } else {120    // Background trigger (e.g. passive sync initiation) — no popup is open.121    // Queue a notice so the next popup open shows a soft banner instead of122    // silently failing.123    if (chrome.storage.session) {124      chrome.storage.session125        .set({ pendingProNotice: { feature, triggeredAt: Date.now() } })126        .catch(() => {});127    }128  }129130  return { allowed: false };131}132133// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------134// Feedback submission target. Empty disables network submission while the UI135// continues to function as a no-op (the handler returns ok:true without136// calling fetch). When set, the URL is validated by137// `isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl` before any request.138// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------139140const FEEDBACK_ENDPOINT = "";141142// PCH-01-018: operations that irreversibly destroy or replace vault contents.143// These are gated to trusted extension-page senders in handleMessage; the144// confirmation UX otherwise lives only in the popup. Keep this in sync when145// adding new destructive handlers.146const DESTRUCTIVE_MESSAGE_TYPES: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([147  "DESTROY_VAULT",148  "CLEAR_VAULT_ENTRIES",149  "RESTORE_VAULT_SNAPSHOT",150  "RESTORE_FROM_CODEX",151]);152153// LV-3: minimum interval between non-test canary pings per webhook+entry.154const CANARY_MIN_INTERVAL_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000; // 1 hour155156const PRIVATE_IPV4_RANGES = [157  { prefix: "10." },158  { prefix: "127." },159  { prefix: "169.254." },160  { prefix: "192.168." },161];162163export function setupMessageHandler(): void {164  chrome.runtime.onMessage.addListener(165    (msg: unknown, sender, sendResponse) => {166      if (!isMessage(msg)) {167        sendResponse({ ok: false, error: "invalid_message" });168        return true;169      }170      handleMessage(msg, sender)171        .then(sendResponse)172        .catch((err) =>173          sendResponse({174            ok: false,175            error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),176          })177        );178      return true;179    }180  );181182  // Android: the chrome shim queues sendMessage calls until this handler is183  // registered. Without this hookup, every message hangs on Capacitor builds.184  // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any185  const reg = (globalThis as any).__peachRegisterMessageHandler;186  if (typeof reg === "function") {187    reg(async (m: unknown) => {188      if (!isMessage(m)) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_message" };189      try {190        return await handleMessage(m);191      } catch (err) {192        return {193          ok: false,194          error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),195        };196      }197    });198  }199  if (isNativePlatform()) {200    void bootstrapNativeSyncRunner();201  }202}203204async function bootstrapNativeSyncRunner(): Promise<void> {205  if (nativeSyncRunnerBootstrapped) return;206  nativeSyncRunnerBootstrapped = true;207  try {208    const { setSyncRunner, hydratePersistedSyncState } = await import("./sync-trigger");209    const { productionSyncRunner } = await import("./sync-runner");210    setSyncRunner(productionSyncRunner);211    await hydratePersistedSyncState();212  } catch (err) {213    nativeSyncRunnerBootstrapped = false;214    console.warn("[Peach] failed to bootstrap native sync runner:", err);215  }216}217218function isMessage(m: unknown): m is Message {219  return typeof m === "object" && m !== null && "type" in m;220}221222/**223 * The browser-attested origin of the page that originated this message. A web224 * page cannot call chrome.runtime.sendMessage directly (no externally_connectable),225 * so every page-driven message arrives via the content-script relay and the226 * browser stamps `sender.origin`/`sender.url` with the real frame origin — a227 * value the page cannot forge. This is the ONLY trustworthy origin for passkey228 * rpId<->origin enforcement; payload-supplied origins are attacker-controlled.229 */230function attestedSenderOrigin(sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender>): string | undefined {231  if (sender.origin) return sender.origin;232  if (sender.url) {233    try { return new URL(sender.url).origin; } catch { return undefined; }234  }235  return undefined;236}237238// Resolves once restoreFromSession() has run, so handlers see the correct239// post-restore unlock state. entry.ts registers this BEFORE the message240// handler so the onMessage listener is added synchronously at SW startup241// (MV3 requirement) while unlock-dependent handlers still wait for restore.242let restoreReady: Promise<void> = Promise.resolve();243244/** Called by entry.ts at startup with the in-flight restoreFromSession promise. */245export function setRestoreReady(p: Promise<unknown>): void {246  restoreReady = p.then(() => undefined, () => undefined);247}248249export async function handleMessage(250  msg: Message,251  sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender> = {}252): Promise<MessageResponse> {253  try {254    // Wait for session-restore to finish before reading any unlock/vault state.255    // On a cold SW start the popup's first message arrives while restore is256    // still in flight; without this gate IS_UNLOCKED would report locked (a257    // spurious lock screen) and the storage reads could race. The onMessage258    // listener itself is registered synchronously (entry.ts) so this gate, not259    // listener registration, is what absorbs the cold-start window.260    await restoreReady;261    // Validate sender — only allow messages from our extension pages/scripts.262    // `sender.id` is undefined for messages originating from extension UI263    // (popup/options), which is legitimate; reject only when it is defined264    // and does not match our extension id.265    if (266      sender.id !== undefined &&267      sender.id !== chrome.runtime.id268    ) {269      return { ok: false, error: "invalid_sender" };270    }271272    // PCH-01-018: irreversible operations must originate from a trusted extension273    // page (popup/options), never from a content script. The sender.id check above274    // only proves the message came from *our* extension — a content script injected275    // into an attacker page passes it. A single XSS-class bug in the injected UI276    // would otherwise escalate to vault destruction. Extension pages carry an277    // extension-origin sender.url; content scripts carry a page URL.278    if (DESTRUCTIVE_MESSAGE_TYPES.has(msg.type)) {279      const extensionOrigin = chrome.runtime.getURL("");280      if (!sender.url?.startsWith(extensionOrigin)) {281        return { ok: false, error: "invalid_sender" };282      }283    }284285    if (shouldRefreshAutoLock(msg.type) && vault.isUnlocked()) {286      touchAutoLock();287    }288289    switch (msg.type) {290      case "CREATE_VAULT": {291        const { password } = msg.payload as { password: string };292        // Refuse to create a vault under an empty master password — the derived293        // key would be publicly known and the at-rest AES-GCM protection void294        // (audit HIGH; the CSV-import path previously passed ""). Length/strength295        // policy lives in the onboarding UI; this is the non-negotiable floor.296        if (typeof password !== "string" || password.length === 0) {297          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };298        }299        await vault.createVault(password);300        await setupAutoLock();301        broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });302        onVaultUnlocked();303        return { ok: true };304      }305      case "CREATE_VAULT_FROM_ROOT_KEY": {306        const { password, rootKeyHex } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {307          password?: unknown;308          rootKeyHex?: unknown;309        };310        if (typeof password !== "string" || password.length === 0 || typeof rootKeyHex !== "string") {311          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };312        }313314        try {315          const { vaultId } = await vault.createVaultFromRootKey(password, rootKeyHex);316          await setupAutoLock();317          broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });318          onVaultUnlocked();319          return { ok: true, vaultId };320        } catch (err) {321          return { ok: false, error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err) };322        }323      }324      case "UNLOCK": {325        const { password } = msg.payload as { password: string };326        const ok = await vault.unlock(password);327        if (ok) {328          // KAT: verify the WebCrypto stack is healthy before the user relies on it.329          // Runs after unlock so latency is hidden behind the vault-load time.330          const kat = await runSelfTest();331          if (!kat.ok) {332            console.error("[Peach] Crypto self-test FAILED:", kat.error);333            await vault.lock();334            return { ok: false, error: "self_test_failed" };335          }336          await setupAutoLock();337          broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });338          onVaultUnlocked();339          if (isNativePlatform()) await publishInMemoryVault(vault.getEntries());340          return { ok: true };341        }342        // Distinguish corruption from wrong password so the popup can offer343        // a history-restore path instead of falsely accusing the user of344        // mistyping (M7/COR-007).345        const failure = vault.consumeLastUnlockFailureReason();346        if (failure) {347          return {348            ok: false,349            error: "vault_corrupted",350            canRestoreFromHistory: true,351          } as MessageResponse;352        }353        return { ok: false };354      }355      case "VALIDATE_RECOVERY_WORDS": {356        const { words } = msg.payload as { words: string[] };357        const invalid = findInvalidWords(words);358        return { ok: true, data: { valid: invalid.length === 0, invalid } };359      }360      case "GET_RECOVERY_WORDS": {361        // Must be unlocked and have recovery set up (vault must be v2.12+).362        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };363        // LV-4: the recovery words re-derive the ROOT KEY — the highest-364        // value secret in the vault. A session unlock (which may be hours365        // old on a shared machine) is not enough; require a fresh password366        // proof, matching the 1Password/Bitwarden pattern for revealing367        // escrow material. EXEMPTION: the create-vault / rotation confirmation368        // window (peach_recovery_pending) shows the words immediately after369        // the user authenticated, and that confirmation UI has no password to370        // resend — skip the re-auth there only.371        if (!(await isRecoveryConfirmPending())) {372          const { password } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { password?: string };373          if (typeof password !== "string" || !password) {374            return { ok: false, error: "password_required" };375          }376          if (!(await vault.verifyMainPassword(password))) {377            return { ok: false, error: "wrong_password" };378          }379        }380        try {381          const words = await vault.getRecoveryWords();382          return { ok: true, data: words };383        } catch (e) {384          // pre-v2.12 vault that hasn't migrated385          return { ok: false, error: "recovery_not_setup" };386        }387      }388      case "RECOVER_WITH_WORDS": {389        // User has lost their password but has their 12 recovery words.390        // We: (1) validate the words, (2) re-encrypt vault with new password.391        const { words, newPassword } = msg.payload as {392          words: string[];393          newPassword: string;394        };395        const stored = await vault.loadSlotA();396        if (!stored) return { ok: false, error: "no_vault" };397        if (!stored.recovery_salt || !stored.recovery_wrapped_root_key) {398          return { ok: false, error: "recovery_not_setup" };399        }400        // Unwrap the root key from the recovery escrow.401        try {402          await vault.unwrapRootKeyForRecovery(403            stored.recovery_wrapped_root_key,404            stored.recovery_nonce ?? "",405            stored.recovery_tag ?? "",406            stored.recovery_salt,407            words408          );409        } catch {410          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_recovery_words" };411        }412        // Re-key: derive fresh salt + key from new password.413        const newSalt = vault.generateSalt();414        const newKey = await vault.deriveKey(newPassword, newSalt);415        // Re-wrap root key under the new password's derived key so the same416        // recovery words continue to work after the password change.417        await vault.rewrapRootKeyForPassword(newKey, newSalt);418        // Re-encrypt vault entries with the new key.419        await vault.changePasswordWithNewKey(newSalt, newKey);420        await setupAutoLock();421        broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });422        return { ok: true };423      }424      case "LOCK":425        vault.lock();426        if (isNativePlatform()) await clearInMemoryVault();427        return { ok: true };428      case "IS_UNLOCKED":429        return { ok: true, data: vault.isUnlocked() };430      case "GET_VAULT_STATUS":431        return { ok: true, unlocked: vault.isUnlocked() };432      case "HAS_VAULT":433        return { ok: true, data: await vault.hasVault() };434      case "GET_ENTRIES":435        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };436        return { ok: true, data: vault.getEntries() };437      case "ADD_ENTRY": {438        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };439        const payload = msg.payload;440        if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) {441          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };442        }443        const entry = await vault.addEntry(payload as Parameters<typeof vault.addEntry>[0]);444        return { ok: true, data: entry };445      }446      case "BATCH_ADD_ENTRIES": {447        const payload = msg.payload as { entries?: unknown } | null | undefined;448        if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) {449          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };450        }451        if (!Array.isArray(payload.entries)) {452          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };453        }454        const added = await vault.batchAddEntries(payload.entries as Parameters<typeof vault.batchAddEntries>[0]);455        return { ok: true, data: added };456      }457      case "RESTORE_ENTRIES": {458        const payload = msg.payload as459          | { entries?: unknown; mode?: unknown; settings?: unknown }460          | null461          | undefined;462        if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) {463          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };464        }465        if (!Array.isArray(payload.entries)) {466          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };467        }468        if (payload.mode !== "replace" && payload.mode !== "merge") {469          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };470        }471        const summary = await vault.restoreEntries(472          payload.entries as Parameters<typeof vault.restoreEntries>[0],473          payload.mode474        );475        if (payload.settings && typeof payload.settings === "object" && !Array.isArray(payload.settings)) {476          await vault.updateSettings(payload.settings as vault.VaultSettings);477        }478        return { ok: true, data: summary };479      }480      case "CLEAR_VAULT_ENTRIES": {481        await vault.clearVaultEntries("REPLACE_ALL");482        return { ok: true };483      }484      case "GET_VAULT_HISTORY": {485        const snapshots = await vault.getVaultHistory();486        return { ok: true, data: snapshots };487      }488      case "RESTORE_VAULT_SNAPSHOT": {489        const { snapshotId } = msg.payload as { snapshotId: string };490        const result = await vault.restoreVaultSnapshot(snapshotId);491        if (!result.ok) return { ok: false, error: result.error };492        broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_LOCKED" });493        return { ok: true };494      }495      case "COUNT_DUPLICATES": {496        return { ok: true, data: vault.countDuplicates() };497      }498      case "DEDUPLICATE_ENTRIES": {499        const removed = await vault.deduplicateEntries();500        return { ok: true, data: removed };501      }502      case "UPDATE_ENTRY": {503        const payload = msg.payload as { id?: unknown; patch?: unknown } | null | undefined;504        if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) {505          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };506        }507        const { id, patch } = payload;508        if (typeof id !== "string" || !id || !patch || typeof patch !== "object" || Array.isArray(patch)) {509          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };510        }511        // Single enforcement point for the Canary Entries Pro gate. Only512        // gates the transition into a canary entry — clearing/disabling a513        // canary (`canary: undefined`) is always allowed, so existing514        // canary entries remain manageable.515        const incomingCanary = (patch as { canary?: unknown }).canary;516        if (incomingCanary && typeof incomingCanary === "object") {517          const existing = vault.getEntryById(id);518          if (!existing?.canary) {519            const gate = await requirePro("canary_entry");520            if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };521          }522        }523        await vault.updateEntry(id, patch as Parameters<typeof vault.updateEntry>[1]);524        return { ok: true };525      }526      case "ADD_ADDITIONAL_URL": {527        const { id, url } = msg.payload as { id: string; url: string };528        const trimmed = typeof url === "string" ? url.trim() : "";529        if (!trimmed) return { ok: false, error: "url_required" };530        const existing = vault.getEntryById(id);531        if (!existing) return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };532        if (existing.type !== "login") return { ok: false, error: "login_entries_only" };533        const merged = [...(existing.additionalUrls ?? []), trimmed];534        await vault.updateEntry(id, { additionalUrls: merged });535        return { ok: true };536      }537      case "DELETE_ENTRY": {538        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };539        await vault.deleteEntry(id);540        return { ok: true };541      }542      case "GET_DELETED_ENTRIES":543        return { ok: true, data: vault.getDeletedEntries() };544      case "RESTORE_ENTRY": {545        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };546        await vault.restoreEntry(id);547        return { ok: true };548      }549      case "PURGE_ENTRY": {550        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };551        await vault.purgeEntry(id);552        return { ok: true };553      }554      case "PURGE_EXPIRED_TRASH": {555        const { retentionMs } = msg.payload as { retentionMs: number };556        const purged = await vault.purgeExpiredTrash(retentionMs);557        return { ok: true, data: purged };558      }559      case "SAVE_NOTE": {560        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };561        const { id, title, body } = msg.payload as { id?: string; title: string; body: string };562        const now = Date.now();563        if (id) {564          const existing = vault.getEntryById(id);565          if (!existing) return { ok: false, error: "not_found" };566          await vault.updateEntry(id, { title: title || "Untitled", notes: body, modifiedAt: now });567          return { ok: true, data: vault.getEntryById(id) };568        } else {569          // PCH-01-026 #10: addEntry stamps its own createdAt/modifiedAt570          // (EntryDraft omits both), so passing them was the only reason the571          // `as any` cast existed. Dropping them makes the call type-check.572          const entry = await vault.addEntry({573            type: "note",574            title: title || "Untitled",575            notes: body,576          });577          return { ok: true, data: entry };578        }579      }580      case "DELETE_NOTE": {581        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };582        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };583        await vault.deleteEntry(id);584        return { ok: true };585      }586      case "GET_NOTES": {587        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };588        const notes = vault.getEntries().filter(589          (e) => e.type === "note" && !e.deletedAt590        );591        return { ok: true, data: notes } as MessageResponse;592      }593      case "SEARCH_VAULT": {594        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };595        // AUD-002: shape-validate the payload before calling string methods.596        // A raw cast lets a malformed message crash the handler with TypeError.597        const { query } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { query?: unknown };598        if (typeof query !== "string") {599          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };600        }601        const q = query.toLowerCase();602        const searchResults = vault.getEntries().filter(603          (e) =>604            !e.deletedAt &&605            (e.title.toLowerCase().includes(q) ||606              e.notes?.toLowerCase().includes(q) ||607              e.username?.toLowerCase().includes(q))608        );609        return { ok: true, data: searchResults } as MessageResponse;610      }611      case "AUTOFILL_QUERY": {612        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) {613          return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };614        }615        let { includeAll } = msg.payload as { includeAll?: boolean };616        const { domain, kind, userGesture } = msg.payload as {617          domain: string;618          kind?: "login" | "card" | "totp";619          userGesture?: boolean;620        };621        // MV-2: the vault-wide inventory (every title/username/email/url)622        // may only leave the background on an explicit user gesture — the623        // user opening the search affordance — never on passive form focus.624        // userGesture is self-declared by our own content script; the value625        // of this gate is that PASSIVE code paths (which never set it)626        // cannot ship the inventory, shrinking what a compromised page that627        // merely triggers focus events can observe.628        if (includeAll && userGesture !== true) {629          includeAll = false;630        }631        // kind="card": return saved cards as compact summaries for the632        // inline card silver platter. Cards are not domain-scoped — every633        // saved card is a candidate on every checkout page — so domain is634        // ignored when kind === "card".635        if (kind === "card") {636          const cards = vault.getEntries().filter((e) => e.type === "card");637          return {638            ok: true,639            data: cards.map((e) => ({640              id: e.id,641              title: e.cardNickname || e.title,642              cardholderName: e.cardholderName,643              last4: e.last4,644              expMonth: e.expMonth,645              expYear: e.expYear,646              network: e.network,647            })),648          };649        }650        if (kind === "totp") {651          const matches = (652            includeAll653              ? vault.getEntries().filter((entry) => entry.type !== "note" && entry.type !== "card")654              : vault.queryDomain(domain)655          ).filter((entry) => !isPasskeyOnly(entry) && Boolean(entry.totp));656          return {657            ok: true,658            data: matches.map((e) => ({659              id: e.id,660              title: e.title,661              username: e.username,662              email: e.email,663              url: e.url,664              hasTotp: true,665            })),666          };667        }668        // The inline selector fills username+password into a form. Passkey-669        // only entries have no password to fill; sign-in for those goes670        // through the WebAuthn path instead. Filter them out everywhere so671        // the user doesn't see four "GitHub" rows that mostly do nothing.672        // Notes and cards never belonged here either.673        const matches = (674          includeAll675            ? vault676                .getEntries()677                .filter((entry) => entry.type !== "note" && entry.type !== "card")678            : vault.queryDomain(domain)679        ).filter((entry) => !isPasskeyOnly(entry));680        return {681          ok: true,682          data: matches.map((e) =>683            includeAll684              ? {685                  id: e.id,686                  title: e.title,687                  // username/email/url shipped so the inline popup's search688                  // affordance can match on them, not just titles. No secrets689                  // cross the boundary — same shape as the domain-matched690                  // response below minus hasTotp (which the search list691                  // doesn't surface).692                  username: e.username,693                  email: e.email,694                  url: e.url,695                  hasPasskey: e.passkey !== undefined,696                }697              : {698                  id: e.id,699                  title: e.title,700                  username: e.username,701                  email: e.email,702                  url: e.url,703                  hasTotp: Boolean(e.totp),704                  hasPasskey: e.passkey !== undefined,705                }706          ),707        };708      }709      case "GET_ENTRY_FOR_FILL": {710        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };711        const { id, explicitSummon } = msg.payload as {712          id: string;713          explicitSummon?: boolean;714        };715        const entry = vault.getEntryById(id);716        if (!entry) return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };717        // Passkey-only entries (passkey credential, no password) cannot be718        // filled into a form — sign-in goes through the WebAuthn path. A719        // login that ALSO has a passkey is still fillable for its password.720        if (isPasskeyOnly(entry)) return { ok: false, error: "passkey_not_fillable" };721722        // MV-1: re-validate the entry against the requesting tab's origin.723        // sender.tab.url is browser-attested — a page cannot forge it. When724        // the request does not come from a tab at all (popup surfaces use725        // GET_ENTRY_FOR_EDIT, not this), refuse.726        if (sender.tab !== undefined || sender.url !== undefined) {727          let senderDomain: string | null = null;728          try {729            const rawUrl = sender.tab?.url ?? sender.url ?? "";730            senderDomain = rawUrl ? extractDomain(new URL(rawUrl).hostname) : null;731          } catch {732            senderDomain = null;733          }734          if (!senderDomain) return { ok: false, error: "origin_unverified" };735736          const entryDomains = new Set<string>();737          const primary = extractDomain(entry.url ?? "");738          if (primary) entryDomains.add(primary);739          for (const extra of entry.additionalUrls ?? []) {740            const d = extractDomain(extra);741            if (d) entryDomains.add(d);742          }743744          // explicitSummon=true means the user actively picked this entry745          // from the cross-domain search affordance — an intentional746          // off-domain fill. Passive fill paths must stay domain-bound.747          if (explicitSummon !== true && !entryDomains.has(senderDomain)) {748            // Domain mismatch — refuse silently (no oracle about which ids exist).749            return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };750          }751        }752        // Strip the passkey credential AND the raw base32 TOTP seed from the753        // response. Content scripts never need either: the private key is the754        // authenticator's, and handing over the TOTP seed would let a755        // compromised content script mint valid codes indefinitely (SEV-3-C).756        // Generate the *current* 6-digit code here in the background and send757        // only that, plus the seconds left so the UI can render a countdown.758        // Also drop passwordHistory: filling needs only the *current* password.759        // Handing every past password to a content script during passive760        // autofill on an arbitrary page would widen the blast radius of a761        // compromised page far beyond the one credential being filled.762        const {763          passkey: _strippedPasskey,764          totp: seed,765          totpAlgorithm,766          totpDigits,767          totpPeriod,768          passwordHistory: _ph,769          ...safeEntry770        } = entry;771        let totpCode: string | undefined;772        let totpRemaining: number | undefined;773        if (seed) {774          try {775            // PCH-01-019: honour stored algorithm/digits/period (defaults apply776            // when these are undefined, i.e. legacy bare-seed entries).777            const generated = generateTOTP(seed, totpAlgorithm, totpDigits, totpPeriod);778            totpCode = generated.code;779            totpRemaining = generated.remaining;780          } catch {781            totpCode = undefined;782          }783        }784        return { ok: true, data: { ...safeEntry, totpCode, totpRemaining } };785      }786      // Trusted full-entry fetch for Peach's own inline-popup surfaces that787      // genuinely need the raw TOTP seed: the edit form (which re-saves the788      // seed and would otherwise wipe it) and nothing else. Unlike789      // GET_ENTRY_FOR_FILL this fires only on an explicit user action inside790      // the inline popup, never during passive autofill on an arbitrary page.791      // The passkey credential is still stripped — the edit form never touches it.792      case "GET_ENTRY_FOR_EDIT": {793        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };794        const { id, explicitSummon } = msg.payload as {795          id: string;796          explicitSummon?: boolean;797        };798        const entry = vault.getEntryById(id);799        if (!entry) return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };800801        // PCH-01-006: re-validate the browser-attested sender origin, mirroring802        // GET_ENTRY_FOR_FILL (MV-1). The edit channel ships the raw TOTP seed and803        // full password history — at least as sensitive as the fill response — so804        // the boundary must be enforced here, not only by UI reachability. Today805        // the sole caller is the popup (no sender.tab, so this is a structural806        // no-op), but a future tab-context caller or an id leak would otherwise807        // inherit a full-credential oracle. Unlike the fill path we SKIP (not808        // refuse) when no sender domain resolves, to keep the popup caller working.809        if (sender.tab !== undefined || sender.url !== undefined) {810          let senderDomain: string | null = null;811          try {812            const rawUrl = sender.tab?.url ?? sender.url ?? "";813            senderDomain = rawUrl ? extractDomain(new URL(rawUrl).hostname) : null;814          } catch {815            senderDomain = null;816          }817          if (senderDomain) {818            const entryDomains = new Set<string>();819            const primary = extractDomain(entry.url ?? "");820            if (primary) entryDomains.add(primary);821            for (const extra of entry.additionalUrls ?? []) {822              const d = extractDomain(extra);823              if (d) entryDomains.add(d);824            }825            if (explicitSummon !== true && !entryDomains.has(senderDomain)) {826              return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" }; // no id oracle827            }828          }829        }830831        const { passkey: _passkey, ...safeEntry } = entry;832        return { ok: true, data: safeEntry };833      }834      case "COPY": {835        // AUD-002: shape-validate the payload before passing to the clipboard836        // helper. A raw cast lets a malformed message reach the clipboard API837        // with a non-string and throw.838        const { text, label, alreadyWritten } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {839          text?: unknown;840          label?: unknown;841          alreadyWritten?: unknown;842        };843        if (typeof text !== "string" || typeof label !== "string") {844          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };845        }846        await copyToClipboard(text, label, Boolean(alreadyWritten));847        return { ok: true, clearSeconds: getEffectiveClearSeconds() };848      }849      case "CHECK_ALL_BREACHES": {850        const allEntries = vault.getEntries();851        const results: Record<string, number> = {};852        for (const entry of allEntries) {853          if (entry.type === "note") continue;854          if (!entry.password) continue;855          results[entry.id] = await vault.checkBreach(entry.password);856          // Small delay — be a good citizen to the HIBP API857          await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 200));858        }859        // Persist any non-zero counts back to entries860        for (const [id, count] of Object.entries(results)) {861          const entry = vault.getEntryById(id);862          if (entry && (entry.breach ?? 0) !== count) {863            await vault.updateEntry(id, { breach: count > 0 ? count : undefined });864          }865        }866        return { ok: true, data: results };867      }868      case "GET_SETTINGS":869        return { ok: true, data: await vault.ensureSettingsLoaded() };870      case "UPDATE_SETTINGS": {871        const patch = msg.payload;872        if (!patch || typeof patch !== "object" || Array.isArray(patch)) {873          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };874        }875        await vault.updateSettings(patch as vault.VaultSettings);876        if (typeof (patch as Record<string, unknown>).autoLockMinutes === "number") {877          await setupAutoLock();878          if (vault.isUnlocked()) touchAutoLock();879        }880        return { ok: true };881      }882      case "GET_PENDING_PASSKEY":883        return { ok: true, data: await getPendingPasskeyRequest() };884      case "APPROVE_PASSKEY": {885        const { requestId } = msg.payload as { requestId: number };886        await resolvePendingPasskeyRequest(requestId, true);887        return { ok: true };888      }889      case "DENY_PASSKEY": {890        const { requestId } = msg.payload as { requestId: number };891        await resolvePendingPasskeyRequest(requestId, false);892        return { ok: true };893      }894      case "GET_PASSKEY_PROVIDER_STATE":895        return { ok: true, data: await getPasskeyProviderState() };896      case "SET_PASSKEY_PROVIDER_ENABLED": {897        const { enabled } = msg.payload as { enabled: boolean };898        // Disabling is always free; gating fires only when a free user is899        // trying to turn passkey interception on.900        if (enabled) {901          const gate = await requirePro("passkeys");902          if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };903        }904        return { ok: true, data: await setPasskeyProviderEnabled(enabled) };905      }906      // AUD-003: this handler POSTs `entryTitle` to a user-configured HTTPS907      // endpoint. Intentional product behavior — users configure their own908      // dead-man's-switch. isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl blocks localhost, private909      // IPs, and non-HTTPS schemes, but cannot defend against every DNS-910      // rebinding case. The UI under CanarySection (Entry.tsx) discloses to911      // users that the entry title leaves the device when the canary fires.912      case "FIRE_CANARY_PING": {913        // Canary alert fires unconditionally for any entry with canary: true.914        // The Pro gate only governs creation/flagging of canary entries; once915        // an entry is flagged, the alert path is a security property and must916        // never be license-gated.917        const { webhookUrl, entryTitle, trigger } = msg.payload as {918          webhookUrl: string;919          entryTitle: string;920          trigger: "password_copied" | "username_copied" | "autofilled" | "submitted" | "test";921        };922        if (!isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl(webhookUrl)) {923          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_webhook_url" };924        }925        // LV-3: debounce non-test pings per (webhook, entry) so a page that926        // strobes focus/fill events can't turn the canary into a request927        // firehose at the user's endpoint. Test pings are exempt — they are928        // explicit user clicks in the settings UI and are awaited for929        // feedback. The FIRST ping in a window always goes out, so the930        // dead-man's-switch property (canary fires on access) is preserved;931        // only repeats within the window are coalesced.932        if (trigger !== "test") {933          const rlKey = `canary-last-fetch:${webhookUrl}:${entryTitle}`;934          const stored = await chrome.storage.local.get(rlKey);935          const last = (stored as Record<string, unknown>)[rlKey];936          if (typeof last === "number" && Date.now() - last < CANARY_MIN_INTERVAL_MS) {937            return { ok: true, data: { rateLimited: true } };938          }939          await chrome.storage.local.set({ [rlKey]: Date.now() });940        }941        const body = JSON.stringify({942          event: trigger === "test" ? "peach_canary_test" : "peach_canary_accessed",943          entry: entryTitle,944          trigger,945          timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),946          source: "peach-extension",947        });948        if (trigger === "test") {949          // Permitted outbound fetch: user-configured canary alert endpoint950          // (validated by isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl above). This is the951          // only non-HIBP outbound call in the extension — see952          // Projects.md §3.7. Test pings are awaited so the UI can show953          // success/failure.954          try {955            const res = await fetch(webhookUrl, {956              method: "POST",957              headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },958              body,959            });960            return { ok: res.ok, error: res.ok ? undefined : `HTTP ${res.status}` };961          } catch (err) {962            return { ok: false, error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : "network_error" };963          }964        }965        // Non-test triggers are fire-and-forget966        fetch(webhookUrl, {967          method: "POST",968          headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },969          body,970        }).catch(() => {});971        return { ok: true };972      }973      case "ACTIVATE_LICENSE": {974        const { key } = msg.payload as { key: string };975        const licenseInfo = await activateLicense(key);976        return { ok: true, data: licenseInfo };977      }978      case "GET_LICENSE": {979        const licenseInfo = await getLicenseInfo();980        return { ok: true, data: licenseInfo };981      }982      case "GET_LICENSE_KEY": {983        const key = await getLicenseKey();984        return { ok: true, data: key };985      }986      case "DEACTIVATE_LICENSE": {987        await deactivateLicense();988        return { ok: true };989      }990      case "SHOULD_PLAY_CELEBRATION": {991        const should = await shouldPlayCelebration();992        return { ok: true, data: should };993      }994      case "MARK_CELEBRATION_PLAYED": {995        await markCelebrationPlayed();996        return { ok: true };997      }998      case "GET_CODEX_VAULT_DATA": {999        // Pro-gated. requirePro broadcasts PRO_GATE_TRIGGERED on miss so the1000        // popup navigates to the License section without further coordination.1001        const gate = await requirePro("codex");1002        if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1003        return await handleGetCodexVaultData();1004      }1005      case "ESTIMATE_CODEX_PAGES": {1006        const gate = await requirePro("codex");1007        if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1008        return await handleEstimateCodexPages();1009      }1010      case "RESTORE_FROM_CODEX": {1011        // !! IMPORTANT: intentionally NOT Pro-gated. A free device must still1012        // be able to restore a vault that was printed by a Pro user.1013        // DO NOT add a Pro gate here.1014        const payload = msg.payload as CodexRestorePayload;1015        return await handleRestoreFromCodex(payload);1016      }1017      case "OPEN_PRO_GATE": {1018        // Content script requests: open popup and navigate to License section.1019        const { feature } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { feature?: string };1020        if (chrome.storage.session) {1021          await chrome.storage.session.set({ pendingProGate: { feature: feature ?? "passkeys" } });1022        }1023        try { await chrome.action.openPopup(); } catch { /* badge fallback */ }1024        return { ok: true };1025      }1026      case "OPEN_POPUP": {1027        // Content script asks to open the trusted extension popup — used by the1028        // inline locked bubble so the master password is entered in the popup,1029        // never in page-hosted DOM (audit HIGH). Best-effort: openPopup needs a1030        // user gesture + Chrome 127+/Firefox; on failure the user clicks the1031        // toolbar icon. The badge already signals Peach needs attention.1032        //1033        // Set a session flag so the popup knows it was opened for inline unlock1034        // and should close itself once the vault is unlocked (returning the user1035        // to the inline autofill selector on the page).1036        if (chrome.storage.session) {1037          await chrome.storage.session.set({ peach_inline_unlock: true });1038        }1039        try { await chrome.action.openPopup(); } catch { /* user opens via toolbar */ }1040        return { ok: true };1041      }1042      case "GET_IDENTITIES": {1043        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1044        return { ok: true, data: vault.getIdentities() };1045      }1046      case "TOUCH_AUTO_LOCK": {1047        // touchAutoLock() is already called by shouldRefreshAutoLock above;1048        // this case just gives the popup a typed message to keep the session alive.1049        return { ok: true };1050      }1051      case "GET_ADVANCED_HEALTH_REPORT": {1052        const gate = await requirePro("advanced_health");1053        if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1054        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1055        const report = await buildAdvancedHealthReport(vault.getEntries());1056        return { ok: true, data: report };1057      }1058      case "IS_DURESS_ENABLED": {1059        const enabled = await vault.isDuressEnabled();1060        return { ok: true, data: enabled };1061      }1062      case "SETUP_DURESS": {1063        // Single enforcement point for the Duress Vault Pro gate. Free users1064        // who somehow reach this handler are rejected here; the popup also1065        // pre-checks isPro() to avoid showing the setup form to free users,1066        // but server-side is the actual security boundary.1067        const gate = await requirePro("duress_vault");1068        if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1069        // MV3 service workers restart after inactivity, losing the in-memory1070        // derived key. Detect this before calling setupDuress so the popup1071        // can show a meaningful prompt to re-lock and re-unlock.1072        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "session_expired" };1073        const { duressPassword } = msg.payload as { duressPassword: string };1074        await vault.setupDuress(duressPassword);1075        return { ok: true };1076      }1077      case "DISABLE_DURESS": {1078        await vault.disableDuress();1079        return { ok: true };1080      }1081      case "VERIFY_MAIN_PASSWORD": {1082        const { password } = msg.payload as { password: string };1083        const ok = await vault.verifyMainPassword(password);1084        return { ok: true, data: ok };1085      }1086      case "CHANGE_PASSWORD": {1087        const { currentPassword, newPassword } = msg.payload as {1088          currentPassword: string;1089          newPassword: string;1090        };1091        const changed = await vault.changePassword(currentPassword, newPassword);1092        return changed1093          ? { ok: true }1094          : { ok: false, error: "incorrect_current_password" };1095      }1096      case "GET_SITE_PASSWORD_POLICY": {1097        const [tab] = await chrome.tabs.query({ active: true, currentWindow: true });1098        if (!tab?.id) return { ok: true, data: null };1099        try {1100          const response = await chrome.tabs.sendMessage(tab.id, {1101            type: "GET_SITE_PASSWORD_POLICY",1102          });1103          return (response as MessageResponse) ?? { ok: true, data: null };1104        } catch {1105          return { ok: true, data: null };1106        }1107      }1108      case "RECORD_MANUAL_SUMMON": {1109        const { domain } = msg.payload as { domain: string };1110        const settings = vault.getSettings();1111        const existing = settings.manualSummonDomains?.[domain];1112        const now = Date.now();1113        await vault.updateSettings({1114          manualSummonDomains: {1115            ...settings.manualSummonDomains,1116            [domain]: {1117              firstSummonedAt: existing?.firstSummonedAt ?? now,1118              summonCount: (existing?.summonCount ?? 0) + 1,1119              lastSummonedAt: now,1120            },1121          },1122        });1123        return { ok: true };1124      }1125      case "DECLINE_CARD_SAVE": {1126        const { last4, expMonth, expYear } = msg.payload as { last4: string; expMonth: string; expYear: string };1127        await vault.declineCardSaveOffer(last4, expMonth, expYear);1128        return { ok: true };1129      }1130      case "IS_CARD_DECLINED": {1131        const { last4, expMonth, expYear } = msg.payload as { last4: string; expMonth: string; expYear: string };1132        const declined = await vault.isCardDeclined(last4, expMonth, expYear);1133        return { ok: true, data: declined };1134      }1135      case "INITIATE_FIREFOX_PASSKEY_CREATE": {1136        const { rpId, rpName, userName, userDisplayName } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1137          rpId?: string;1138          rpName?: string;1139          userName?: string;1140          userDisplayName?: string;1141        };1142        if (!rpId || !userName) return { ok: false, error: "rpid_and_username_required" };1143        return await initiateFirefoxPasskeyCreate({1144          rpId,1145          rpName: rpName ?? rpId,1146          userName,1147          userDisplayName,1148        });1149      }11501151      case "COMPLETE_FIREFOX_PASSKEY_CREATE": {1152        const payload = msg.payload as Parameters<typeof completeFirefoxPasskeyCreate>[0] | undefined;1153        if (!payload) return { ok: false, error: "missing_payload" };1154        return await completeFirefoxPasskeyCreate(payload);1155      }11561157      case "PASSKEY_OFFER_DECLINE": {1158        const { domain } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { domain?: string };1159        if (!domain) return { ok: false, error: "domain_required" };1160        await recordPasskeyOfferDecline(domain);1161        return { ok: true };1162      }11631164      case "GET_PASSKEY_OFFER_DECLINED": {1165        const { domain } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { domain?: string };1166        if (!domain) return { ok: false, error: "domain_required" };1167        return { ok: true, data: await isPasskeyOfferDeclined(domain) };1168      }11691170      case "PASSKEY_HAS_CREDENTIALS": {1171        const payload = msg.payload as {1172          rpId?: string;1173          allowCredentials?: Array<{ id: string; type?: string }>;1174        } | undefined;1175        if (!payload?.rpId) return { ok: false, error: "rpid_required" };1176        return await handlePasskeyHasCredentials({1177          rpId: payload.rpId,1178          allowCredentials: payload.allowCredentials ?? [],1179        }, attestedSenderOrigin(sender));1180      }11811182      case "PASSKEY_CREATE": {1183        const payload = msg.payload as Parameters<typeof handleFirefoxPasskeyCreate>[0] | undefined;1184        if (!payload?.rpId || !payload?.userName) {1185          return { ok: false, error: "rpid_and_username_required" };1186        }1187        return await handleFirefoxPasskeyCreate(payload, attestedSenderOrigin(sender));1188      }11891190      case "PASSKEY_GET": {1191        const payload = msg.payload as Parameters<typeof handleFirefoxPasskeyGet>[0] | undefined;1192        if (!payload?.rpId) return { ok: false, error: "rpid_required" };1193        return await handleFirefoxPasskeyGet(payload, attestedSenderOrigin(sender));1194      }11951196      case "PASSKEY_AUTH_RESPONSE": {1197        const { requestId, approved } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1198          requestId?: string | number;1199          approved?: boolean;1200        };1201        if (requestId === undefined || requestId === null || typeof approved !== 'boolean') {1202          return { ok: false, error: 'requestId and approved required' };1203        }1204        await resolvePendingPasskeyRequest(Number(requestId), approved);1205        return { ok: true };1206      }12071208      case "GET_PASSKEY_FOR_DOMAIN": {1209        const { domain } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { domain?: string };1210        if (!domain) return { ok: false, error: "domain_required" };1211        // Scope to the caller's own origin: a page may only ask about passkeys1212        // for a domain it actually owns, so an arbitrary page cannot enumerate1213        // which sites the user holds passkeys for or read the username (audit MEDIUM).1214        const origin = attestedSenderOrigin(sender);1215        if (!origin || !isValidRpId(domain, origin)) return { ok: true, data: null };1216        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: true, data: null };1217        const match = vault1218          .getEntries()1219          .find((entry) => entry.passkey?.rpId === domain);1220        if (!match || !match.passkey) return { ok: true, data: null };1221        // Slim shape — only the fields State 11 needs. Never expose private1222        // key material, even though this is locked behind isUnlocked.1223        return {1224          ok: true,1225          data: {1226            rpId: match.passkey.rpId,1227            userName: match.passkey.userName,1228            browser: match.passkey.browser,1229          },1230        };1231      }12321233      case "DESTROY_VAULT": {1234        // Irreversible by design. Lock zeroes the derived key + in-memory entries;1235        // storage.local.clear() wipes every Peach key (slots, settings, license,1236        // onboarded flag, history, sync state, declined cards, recall, etc.);1237        // session.clear() wipes pending passkey requests + pro-notice queues.1238        // Caller (Panic.tsx) handles UI navigation back to onboarding.1239        //1240        // The Pro license is the one thing that must survive: the user paid for1241        // it, and destroying a vault (panic wipe, fresh start) is not a refund.1242        // Capture it before the clear and restore it after. peach_pro_celebrated1243        // rides along so the Pro celebration doesn't replay on the next unlock.1244        const preserved = await chrome.storage.local.get([1245          "peach_license",1246          "peach_pro_celebrated",1247        ]);1248        vault.lock();1249        await storageClear();1250        await vault.clearVaultHistory();1251        const toRestore: Record<string, unknown> = {};1252        if (preserved.peach_license !== undefined) toRestore.peach_license = preserved.peach_license;1253        if (preserved.peach_pro_celebrated !== undefined) toRestore.peach_pro_celebrated = preserved.peach_pro_celebrated;1254        if (Object.keys(toRestore).length > 0) {1255          await chrome.storage.local.set(toRestore);1256        }1257        if (chrome.storage.session) {1258          await chrome.storage.session.clear();1259        }1260        return { ok: true };1261      }12621263      case "SUBMIT_FEEDBACK": {1264        const { category, message, version, browser } = msg.payload as {1265          category: string;1266          message: string;1267          version: string;1268          browser: string;1269        };1270        if (!message.trim()) return { ok: false, error: "message_empty" };1271        if (!FEEDBACK_ENDPOINT) return { ok: true };1272        if (!isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl(FEEDBACK_ENDPOINT)) {1273          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_feedback_endpoint" };1274        }1275        try {1276          const res = await fetch(FEEDBACK_ENDPOINT, {1277            method: "POST",1278            headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },1279            body: JSON.stringify({ category, message, version, browser, source: "peach-extension" }),1280          });1281          return { ok: res.ok, error: res.ok ? undefined : `HTTP ${res.status}` };1282        } catch (err) {1283          return { ok: false, error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : "network_error" };1284        }1285      }1286      // Android-only: biometric unlock with pre-derived key.1287      case "UNLOCK_WITH_KEY": {1288        const { masterKeyHex } = msg.payload as { masterKeyHex: string };1289        if (!isNativePlatform()) {1290          return { ok: false, error: "desktop_only_uses_password" };1291        }1292        try {1293          const result = await vault.unlockWithKey(masterKeyHex);1294          if (result.ok) {1295            onVaultUnlocked();1296            await publishInMemoryVault(result.entries);1297          }1298          return { ok: result.ok, data: result.ok ? { entries: result.entries } : undefined, error: result.ok ? undefined : result.error };1299        } catch {1300          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };1301        }1302      }1303      // Android: returns current in-memory derived key as hex. Used by biometric enable flow.1304      case "GET_DERIVED_KEY": {1305        if (!isNativePlatform()) {1306          return { ok: false, error: "android_only" };1307        }1308        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) {1309          return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1310        }1311        return { ok: true, data: { masterKeyHex: vault.getDerivedKeyHex() } };1312      }1313      case "GET_IDENTITY_SUGGESTIONS": {1314        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1315        const entries = vault.getEntries();1316        const suggestions = buildIdentitySuggestions(entries);1317        return { ok: true, data: { suggestions } };1318      }1319      case "POPULATE_INLINE_VAULT": {1320        if (!isNativePlatform()) return { ok: false };1321        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1322        const entries = vault.getEntries();1323        await publishInMemoryVault(entries);1324        return { ok: true };1325      }1326      case "ML_INIT":1327        return { ok: true };13281329      case "ML_PREDICT_BATCH": {1330        // AUD-002: shape-validate before forwarding to the ML helper.1331        const { featuresArray } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { featuresArray?: unknown };1332        if (!Array.isArray(featuresArray)) {1333          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1334        }1335        return { ok: true, data: mlPredictBatch(featuresArray as MLFieldFeatures[]) };1336      }13371338      // ── Vault sync (v3) ───────────────────────────────────────────────1339      // Returns the public-facing local identity needed by the popup to1340      // drive Phase-1 audio pairing. The private long-term key never1341      // leaves the background.1342      case "GET_LOCAL_IDENTITY": {1343        // Not Pro-gated: a free device may attempt to pair so it can RECEIVE a1344        // Pro license from an already-Pro peer (at least one device must be Pro).1345        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1346        // Identity derives from the stable root key, not the password-derived1347        // key, so pairing survives a master-password change (SEV-2-B).1348        const masterKeyHex = vault.getRootKeyHex();1349        if (!masterKeyHex) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1350        const masterKey = unhexBytes(masterKeyHex);1351        try {1352          const identity = await buildLocalIdentity(masterKey);1353          // If this device is Pro, advertise the signed license so the peer can1354          // activate it after SAS confirmation — pairing carries Pro across.1355          if (await isProUser()) {1356            const license = await getLicenseKey();1357            if (license) (identity as { license?: string }).license = license;1358          }1359          return { ok: true, data: identity };1360        } finally {1361          masterKey.fill(0);1362        }1363      }13641365      case "GET_ADOPTION_MATERIAL": {1366        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1367        const rootKeyHex = vault.getRootKeyHex();1368        if (!rootKeyHex) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1369        const rootKeyBytes = unhexBytes(rootKeyHex);1370        try {1371          const data: { rootKeyHex: string; vaultId: string; license?: string } = {1372            rootKeyHex,1373            vaultId: await computeVaultId(rootKeyBytes),1374          };1375          if (await isProUser()) {1376            const license = await getLicenseKey();1377            if (license) data.license = license;1378          }1379          return { ok: true, data };1380        } finally {1381          rootKeyBytes.fill(0);1382        }1383      }13841385      case "COMPLETE_PAIRING": {1386        // Not Pro-gated — see GET_LOCAL_IDENTITY.1387        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1388        const paired = (msg.payload as { paired?: unknown })?.paired;1389        if (typeof paired !== "object" || paired === null) {1390          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1391        }1392        const candidate = paired as Record<string, unknown>;1393        if (1394          typeof candidate.deviceId !== "string" || !candidate.deviceId ||1395          typeof candidate.deviceName !== "string" || !candidate.deviceName ||1396          typeof candidate.deviceType !== "string" ||1397          typeof candidate.longTermPublicKeyHex !== "string" ||1398          !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(candidate.longTermPublicKeyHex) ||1399          (1400            candidate.signingPublicKeyHex !== undefined &&1401            (1402              typeof candidate.signingPublicKeyHex !== "string" ||1403              !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(candidate.signingPublicKeyHex)1404            )1405          ) ||1406          typeof candidate.pairedAt !== "number"1407        ) {1408          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_paired_device" };1409        }1410        await upsertPairedDeviceV3(candidate as unknown as import("../shared/sync-types").PairedDevice);1411        return { ok: true };1412      }14131414      case "LIST_PAIRED_DEVICES": {1415        const devices = await listPairedDevicesV3();1416        return { ok: true, data: { devices } };1417      }14181419      case "UNPAIR_DEVICE": {1420        const { deviceId } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { deviceId?: string };1421        if (typeof deviceId !== "string" || !deviceId) {1422          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1423        }1424        // Removing a device REVOKES it rather than just dropping the local1425        // row: a plain removal is undone the moment any other peer vouches it1426        // back through a manifest, which is exactly what the relay makes easy.1427        await revokeDeviceByIdV3(deviceId, await getOrCreateDeviceId());1428        return { ok: true };1429      }14301431      case "RENAME_LOCAL_DEVICE": {1432        const { name } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { name?: string };1433        if (typeof name !== "string") return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1434        await setDeviceNameV3(name);1435        return { ok: true };1436      }14371438      // ── Device code pairing ───────────────────────────────────────────────1439      // Not Pro-gated (a free device may pair to receive Pro/sync). The whole NK1440      // pairing runs in the background; the SAS and the terminal result reach the1441      // popup as CODE_PAIR_SAS / CODE_PAIR_RESULT pushes.1442      case "PAIR_WITH_CODE": {1443        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1444        const { code } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { code?: string };1445        const { parsePairingCode } = await import("../shared/pairing-code");1446        if (typeof code !== "string" || parsePairingCode(code) === null) {1447          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1448        }1449        const { startCodePairing, isCodePairingInFlight } = await import(1450          "./code-pairing-bg"1451        );1452        if (isCodePairingInFlight()) return { ok: false, error: "pairing_in_progress" };1453        startCodePairing(code);1454        return { ok: true };1455      }14561457      case "CODE_PAIR_CONFIRM": {1458        const { confirmed } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { confirmed?: boolean };1459        const { resolveCodePairingConfirm } = await import("./code-pairing-bg");1460        resolveCodePairingConfirm(confirmed === true);1461        return { ok: true };1462      }14631464      case "START_ADOPTION_SOURCE": {1465        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1466        const {1467          isRelayAdoptionSourceInFlight,1468          startRelayAdoptionSource,1469        } = await import("./relay-adoption-source-bg");1470        if (isRelayAdoptionSourceInFlight()) {1471          return { ok: false, error: "adoption_source_in_progress" };1472        }1473        try {1474          return { ok: true, data: await startRelayAdoptionSource() };1475        } catch (error) {1476          return {1477            ok: false,1478            error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : "adoption_source_failed",1479          };1480        }1481      }14821483      case "ADOPTION_SOURCE_CONFIRM": {1484        const { password, cancel } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1485          password?: unknown;1486          cancel?: unknown;1487        };1488        const { confirmRelayAdoptionSource } = await import(1489          "./relay-adoption-source-bg"1490        );1491        if (cancel === true) {1492          return {1493            ok: true,1494            data: await confirmRelayAdoptionSource(null),1495          };1496        }1497        if (typeof password !== "string" || password.length === 0) {1498          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1499        }1500        return {1501          ok: true,1502          data: await confirmRelayAdoptionSource(password),1503        };1504      }15051506      case "CANCEL_ADOPTION_SOURCE": {1507        const { cancelRelayAdoptionSource } = await import(1508          "./relay-adoption-source-bg"1509        );1510        cancelRelayAdoptionSource();1511        return { ok: true };1512      }15131514      case "TRIGGER_SYNC": {1515        const payload = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1516          reason?: "vault_change" | "foreground" | "manual";1517          force?: boolean;1518        };1519        const reason = payload.reason ?? "foreground";15201521        const { triggerSyncIfReachable } = await import("./sync-trigger");1522        void triggerSyncIfReachable({ reason, force: payload.force === true });1523        return { ok: true };1524      }15251526      case "GET_SYNC_STATE": {1527        const { getSyncState } = await import("./sync-trigger");1528        return { ok: true, data: getSyncState() };1529      }15301531      case "GET_RELAY_SETTINGS": {1532        const { getRelaySettings } = await import("./relay-settings");1533        return { ok: true, data: await getRelaySettings() };1534      }15351536      case "SET_RELAY_SETTINGS": {1537        const payload = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1538          relayUrl?: string;1539          lanOnly?: boolean;1540        };1541        const { getRelaySettings, setLanOnly, setRelayUrl } = await import("./relay-settings");1542        try {1543          if (payload.relayUrl !== undefined) {1544            if (typeof payload.relayUrl !== "string") {1545              return { ok: false, error: "invalid_relay_url" };1546            }1547            await setRelayUrl(payload.relayUrl);1548          }1549          if (payload.lanOnly !== undefined) {1550            if (typeof payload.lanOnly !== "boolean") {1551              return { ok: false, error: "invalid_lan_only" };1552            }1553            await setLanOnly(payload.lanOnly);1554          }1555          return { ok: true, data: await getRelaySettings() };1556        } catch {1557          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_relay_url" };1558        }1559      }15601561      case "GET_SYNC_ALERTS": {1562        const { consume } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { consume?: boolean };1563        const alerts = await getPendingSyncAlerts();1564        // The popup reads on open and acknowledges with consume:true after1565        // rendering, so a popup crash between read and render doesn't lose1566        // the alerts.1567        if (consume) await clearPendingSyncAlerts();1568        return { ok: true, data: alerts };1569      }15701571      case "GET_PENDING_VOUCHED_DEVICES": {1572        return { ok: true, data: await listPendingVouchedDevices() };1573      }1574      case "CONFIRM_VOUCHED_DEVICE": {1575        const { deviceId } = msg.payload as { deviceId: string };1576        const pending = await getPendingVouchedDevice(deviceId);1577        if (!pending) return { ok: false, error: "not_pending" };1578        await upsertPairedDeviceV3({1579          deviceId: pending.deviceId,1580          deviceName: pending.deviceName,1581          deviceType:1582            pending.deviceType as import("../shared/sync-types").PairedDevice["deviceType"],1583          longTermPublicKeyHex: pending.longTermPublicKeyHex,1584          signingPublicKeyHex: pending.signingPublicKeyHex,1585          wsPort: pending.wsPort,1586          pairedAt: pending.pairedAt,1587          trustSource: "vouched",1588        });1589        await removePendingVouchedDevice(deviceId);1590        return { ok: true };1591      }1592      case "REJECT_VOUCHED_DEVICE": {1593        const { deviceId } = msg.payload as { deviceId: string };1594        await removePendingVouchedDevice(deviceId);1595        return { ok: true };1596      }1597      case "ROTATE_SYNC_IDENTITY": {1598        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1599        const result = await vault.rotateSyncIdentity();1600        return result.ok ? { ok: true } : { ok: false, error: result.error };1601      }16021603      default:1604        return { ok: false, error: "unknown_message_type" };1605    }1606  } catch (err) {1607    return {1608      ok: false,1609      error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : "operation_failed",1610    };1611  }1612}16131614// --- Mobile platform helpers ---16151616// Android: populates the in-memory vault used by PeachAutofillService.1617async function publishInMemoryVault(entries: VaultEntry[]): Promise<void> {1618  const plugin = nativePlugin<{1619    setEntries?: (args: {1620      entries: Array<{1621        id: string;1622        title: string;1623        username: string;1624        email: string;1625        password: string;1626        url: string;1627        totp: string;1628        additionalUrls: string[];1629      }>;1630    }) => Promise<void>;1631  }>("InMemoryVaultPlugin");1632  if (!plugin?.setEntries) return;1633  await plugin.setEntries({1634    entries: entries.map((e) => ({1635      id: e.id,1636      title: e.title ?? "",1637      username: e.username ?? "",1638      email: (e as VaultEntry & { email?: string }).email ?? "",1639      password: e.password ?? "",1640      url: e.url ?? "",1641      totp: (e as VaultEntry & { totp?: string }).totp ?? "",1642      additionalUrls: (e as VaultEntry & { additionalUrls?: string[] }).additionalUrls ?? [],1643    })),1644  });1645}16461647// Android: clear the autofill in-memory store on lock.1648async function clearInMemoryVault(): Promise<void> {1649  const plugin = nativePlugin<{ clearEntries?: () => Promise<void> }>("InMemoryVaultPlugin");1650  if (!plugin?.clearEntries) return;1651  await plugin.clearEntries();1652}16531654// Returns username use-counts from the vault, sorted by frequency. Each row1655// also carries the entry's email so the popup can suggest the email/username1656// pair the user has actually used together.1657function buildIdentitySuggestions(1658  entries: VaultEntry[],1659): Array<{ email: string; username: string; count: number }> {1660  const usernameCounts = new Map<string, number>();1661  const usernameEmail = new Map<string, string>();1662  for (const entry of entries) {1663    const username = entry.username ?? "";1664    const email = (entry as VaultEntry & { email?: string }).email ?? "";1665    if (!username && !email) continue;1666    const key = username || email;1667    usernameCounts.set(key, (usernameCounts.get(key) ?? 0) + 1);1668    if (!usernameEmail.has(key)) usernameEmail.set(key, email);1669  }1670  return Array.from(usernameCounts.entries())1671    .sort((a, b) => b[1] - a[1])1672    .map(([username, count]) => ({1673      email: usernameEmail.get(username) ?? "",1674      username,1675      count,1676    }));1677}16781679/** Notify all content scripts that the vault just became available. */1680function broadcastToContentScripts(message: { type: string }): void {1681  if (!chrome.tabs?.query) return;1682  chrome.tabs.query({}, (tabs) => {1683    for (const tab of tabs) {1684      if (tab.id !== undefined) {1685        chrome.tabs.sendMessage(tab.id, message).catch(() => {1686          // Tab may not have a content script — silently ignore1687        });1688      }1689    }1690  });1691}16921693function shouldRefreshAutoLock(type: MessageType): boolean {1694  return (1695    type !== "HAS_VAULT" &&1696    type !== "IS_UNLOCKED" &&1697    type !== "GET_VAULT_STATUS" &&1698    type !== "LOCK" &&1699    type !== "UPDATE_SETTINGS" &&1700    type !== "GET_PENDING_PASSKEY" &&1701    type !== "GET_PASSKEY_PROVIDER_STATE" &&1702    type !== "DECLINE_CARD_SAVE" &&1703    type !== "IS_CARD_DECLINED" &&1704    type !== "SUBMIT_FEEDBACK"1705  );1706}17071708function isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl(value: string): boolean {1709  try {1710    const url = new URL(value);1711    if (url.protocol !== "https:") return false;17121713    const hostname = url.hostname.toLowerCase();1714    if (1715      hostname === "localhost" ||1716      hostname.endsWith(".localhost") ||1717      isPrivateIpv4(hostname) ||1718      isPrivateIpv6(hostname)1719    ) {1720      return false;1721    }17221723    return true;1724  } catch {1725    return false;1726  }1727}17281729function isPrivateIpv4(hostname: string): boolean {1730  if (PRIVATE_IPV4_RANGES.some((range) => hostname.startsWith(range.prefix))) {1731    return true;1732  }17331734  const octets = hostname.split(".").map((part) => Number(part));1735  if (octets.length !== 4 || octets.some((octet) => !Number.isInteger(octet) || octet < 0 || octet > 255)) {1736    return false;1737  }17381739  return octets[0] === 172 && octets[1] >= 16 && octets[1] <= 31;1740}17411742function isPrivateIpv6(hostname: string): boolean {1743  const normalized = hostname.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "").toLowerCase();1744  return (1745    normalized === "::1" ||1746    normalized.startsWith("fc") ||1747    normalized.startsWith("fd") ||1748    normalized.startsWith("fe80:")1749  );1750}