messages.ts

1/**2 * messages.ts — the only background message handler.3 *4 * All `chrome.runtime.onMessage` handling for the service worker lives here.5 * Do not handle messages inline in entry.ts, alarms.ts, or any other6 * background file. Every background-bound MessageType in shared/types.ts7 * must have a case below. Content-script-bound message types (PING,8 * SUMMON_AUTOFILL, VAULT_LOCKED) are documented in shared/types.ts and9 * intentionally have no case here — they are sent *to* content scripts.10 */1112import { copyToClipboard } from "./clipboard";13import { getPendingSyncAlerts, clearPendingSyncAlerts } from "./sync-alerts";14import { extractDomain } from "../shared/domain";15import {16  getPendingVouchedDevice,17  listPendingVouchedDevices,18  removePendingVouchedDevice,19} from "./pending-vouched-devices";20import { setupAutoLock, touchAutoLock } from "./alarms";21import { runSelfTest } from "./self-test";22import * as vault from "./vault";23import {24  handleEstimateCodexPages,25  handleGetCodexVaultData,26  handleRestoreFromCodex,27} from "./codex-handlers";28import type { CodexRestorePayload } from "../shared/codex-types";29import {30  activateLicense,31  deactivateLicense,32  getLicenseInfo,33  getLicenseKey,34  isProUser,35  markCelebrationPlayed,36  shouldPlayCelebration,37} from "./license";38import {39  completeFirefoxPasskeyCreate,40  getPasskeyProviderState,41  getPendingPasskeyRequest,42  handleFirefoxPasskeyCreate,43  handleFirefoxPasskeyGet,44  handlePasskeyHasCredentials,45  initiateFirefoxPasskeyCreate,46  isPasskeyOfferDeclined,47  onVaultUnlocked,48  recordPasskeyOfferDecline,49  resolvePendingPasskeyRequest,50  setPasskeyProviderEnabled,51} from "./passkey";52import { buildAdvancedHealthReport } from "./health";53import { storageClear } from "../shared/storage";54import { findInvalidWords } from "../shared/recovery-words";55import type {56  Message,57  MessageResponse,58  MessageType,59  ProFeature,60  VaultEntry,61} from "../shared/types";62import { isPasskeyOnly } from "../shared/types";63import { generateTOTP } from "../crypto/totp";64import { isValidRpId } from "../shared/passkey-utils";65import { isNativePlatform, nativePlugin } from "../shared/native";66import { predictBatch as mlPredictBatch } from "./ml";67import type { MLFieldFeatures } from "../shared/ml";68import { buildLocalIdentity, setDeviceName as setDeviceNameV3 } from "./chirp-identity";69import {70  listPairedDevices as listPairedDevicesV3,71  removePairedDeviceById as removePairedDeviceByIdV3,72  upsertPairedDevice as upsertPairedDeviceV3,73} from "./paired-devices";7475// Compile-time E2E flag, folded to a literal by Vite's `define` (false in76// every production build — verified in the bundled output). Mirrors the77// create-path bypass in passkey.ts so the Playwright passkey smoke can enable78// the provider without a real Pro licence; the gate is fully intact for users.79declare const __PEACH_E2E_PASSKEYS__: boolean;80const PASSKEY_E2E_PRO_BYPASS = __PEACH_E2E_PASSKEYS__ === true;8182let nativeSyncRunnerBootstrapped = false;8384function unhexBytes(hex: string): Uint8Array {85  if (hex.length % 2 !== 0) throw new Error("invalid hex");86  const out = new Uint8Array(hex.length / 2);87  for (let i = 0; i < out.length; i++) {88    out[i] = parseInt(hex.slice(i * 2, i * 2 + 2), 16);89  }90  return out;91}9293/**94 * The single Pro gate. Every gated handler calls this first; the broadcast95 * lets the popup react (navigate to the License section, highlight the96 * relevant feature). Background never touches the popup view directly —97 * the popup owns navigation. See Projects.md "Pro gate rule".98 */99async function requirePro(100  feature: ProFeature,101  trigger: "user" | "background" = "user"102): Promise<{ allowed: boolean }> {103  if (PASSKEY_E2E_PRO_BYPASS && feature === "passkeys") return { allowed: true };104  if (await isProUser()) return { allowed: true };105106  if (trigger === "user") {107    // User deliberately triggered this feature — redirect the popup immediately.108    chrome.runtime109      .sendMessage({ type: "PRO_GATE_TRIGGERED", payload: { feature } })110      .catch(() => {111        // Popup may be closed — the gate signal is best-effort.112      });113  } else {114    // Background trigger (e.g. passive sync initiation) — no popup is open.115    // Queue a notice so the next popup open shows a soft banner instead of116    // silently failing.117    if (chrome.storage.session) {118      chrome.storage.session119        .set({ pendingProNotice: { feature, triggeredAt: Date.now() } })120        .catch(() => {});121    }122  }123124  return { allowed: false };125}126127// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------128// Feedback submission target. Empty disables network submission while the UI129// continues to function as a no-op (the handler returns ok:true without130// calling fetch). When set, the URL is validated by131// `isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl` before any request.132// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------133134const FEEDBACK_ENDPOINT = "";135136// LV-3: minimum interval between non-test canary pings per webhook+entry.137const CANARY_MIN_INTERVAL_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000; // 1 hour138139const PRIVATE_IPV4_RANGES = [140  { prefix: "10." },141  { prefix: "127." },142  { prefix: "169.254." },143  { prefix: "192.168." },144];145146export function setupMessageHandler(): void {147  chrome.runtime.onMessage.addListener(148    (msg: unknown, sender, sendResponse) => {149      if (!isMessage(msg)) {150        sendResponse({ ok: false, error: "invalid_message" });151        return true;152      }153      handleMessage(msg, sender)154        .then(sendResponse)155        .catch((err) =>156          sendResponse({157            ok: false,158            error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),159          })160        );161      return true;162    }163  );164165  // Android: the chrome shim queues sendMessage calls until this handler is166  // registered. Without this hookup, every message hangs on Capacitor builds.167  // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any168  const reg = (globalThis as any).__peachRegisterMessageHandler;169  if (typeof reg === "function") {170    reg(async (m: unknown) => {171      if (!isMessage(m)) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_message" };172      try {173        return await handleMessage(m);174      } catch (err) {175        return {176          ok: false,177          error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),178        };179      }180    });181  }182  if (isNativePlatform()) {183    void bootstrapNativeSyncRunner();184  }185}186187async function bootstrapNativeSyncRunner(): Promise<void> {188  if (nativeSyncRunnerBootstrapped) return;189  nativeSyncRunnerBootstrapped = true;190  try {191    const { setSyncRunner, hydratePersistedSyncState } = await import("./sync-trigger");192    const { productionSyncRunner } = await import("./chirp-sync-runner");193    setSyncRunner(productionSyncRunner);194    await hydratePersistedSyncState();195  } catch (err) {196    nativeSyncRunnerBootstrapped = false;197    console.warn("[Peach] failed to bootstrap native sync runner:", err);198  }199}200201function isMessage(m: unknown): m is Message {202  return typeof m === "object" && m !== null && "type" in m;203}204205/**206 * The browser-attested origin of the page that originated this message. A web207 * page cannot call chrome.runtime.sendMessage directly (no externally_connectable),208 * so every page-driven message arrives via the content-script relay and the209 * browser stamps `sender.origin`/`sender.url` with the real frame origin — a210 * value the page cannot forge. This is the ONLY trustworthy origin for passkey211 * rpId<->origin enforcement; payload-supplied origins are attacker-controlled.212 */213function attestedSenderOrigin(sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender>): string | undefined {214  if (sender.origin) return sender.origin;215  if (sender.url) {216    try { return new URL(sender.url).origin; } catch { return undefined; }217  }218  return undefined;219}220221// Resolves once restoreFromSession() has run, so handlers see the correct222// post-restore unlock state. entry.ts registers this BEFORE the message223// handler so the onMessage listener is added synchronously at SW startup224// (MV3 requirement) while unlock-dependent handlers still wait for restore.225let restoreReady: Promise<void> = Promise.resolve();226227/** Called by entry.ts at startup with the in-flight restoreFromSession promise. */228export function setRestoreReady(p: Promise<unknown>): void {229  restoreReady = p.then(() => undefined, () => undefined);230}231232export async function handleMessage(233  msg: Message,234  sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender> = {}235): Promise<MessageResponse> {236  try {237    // Wait for session-restore to finish before reading any unlock/vault state.238    // On a cold SW start the popup's first message arrives while restore is239    // still in flight; without this gate IS_UNLOCKED would report locked (a240    // spurious lock screen) and the storage reads could race. The onMessage241    // listener itself is registered synchronously (entry.ts) so this gate, not242    // listener registration, is what absorbs the cold-start window.243    await restoreReady;244    // Validate sender — only allow messages from our extension pages/scripts.245    // `sender.id` is undefined for messages originating from extension UI246    // (popup/options), which is legitimate; reject only when it is defined247    // and does not match our extension id.248    if (249      sender.id !== undefined &&250      sender.id !== chrome.runtime.id251    ) {252      return { ok: false, error: "invalid_sender" };253    }254255    if (shouldRefreshAutoLock(msg.type) && vault.isUnlocked()) {256      touchAutoLock();257    }258259    switch (msg.type) {260      case "CREATE_VAULT": {261        const { password } = msg.payload as { password: string };262        // Refuse to create a vault under an empty master password — the derived263        // key would be publicly known and the at-rest AES-GCM protection void264        // (audit HIGH; the CSV-import path previously passed ""). Length/strength265        // policy lives in the onboarding UI; this is the non-negotiable floor.266        if (typeof password !== "string" || password.length === 0) {267          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };268        }269        await vault.createVault(password);270        await setupAutoLock();271        broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });272        onVaultUnlocked();273        return { ok: true };274      }275      case "UNLOCK": {276        const { password } = msg.payload as { password: string };277        const ok = await vault.unlock(password);278        if (ok) {279          // KAT: verify the WebCrypto stack is healthy before the user relies on it.280          // Runs after unlock so latency is hidden behind the vault-load time.281          const kat = await runSelfTest();282          if (!kat.ok) {283            console.error("[Peach] Crypto self-test FAILED:", kat.error);284            await vault.lock();285            return { ok: false, error: "self_test_failed" };286          }287          await setupAutoLock();288          broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });289          onVaultUnlocked();290          if (isNativePlatform()) await publishInMemoryVault(vault.getEntries());291          return { ok: true };292        }293        // Distinguish corruption from wrong password so the popup can offer294        // a history-restore path instead of falsely accusing the user of295        // mistyping (M7/COR-007).296        const failure = vault.consumeLastUnlockFailureReason();297        if (failure) {298          return {299            ok: false,300            error: "vault_corrupted",301            canRestoreFromHistory: true,302          } as MessageResponse;303        }304        return { ok: false };305      }306      case "VALIDATE_RECOVERY_WORDS": {307        const { words } = msg.payload as { words: string[] };308        const invalid = findInvalidWords(words);309        return { ok: true, data: { valid: invalid.length === 0, invalid } };310      }311      case "GET_RECOVERY_WORDS": {312        // Must be unlocked and have recovery set up (vault must be v2.12+).313        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };314        try {315          const words = await vault.getRecoveryWords();316          return { ok: true, data: words };317        } catch (e) {318          // pre-v2.12 vault that hasn't migrated319          return { ok: false, error: "recovery_not_setup" };320        }321      }322      case "RECOVER_WITH_WORDS": {323        // User has lost their password but has their 12 recovery words.324        // We: (1) validate the words, (2) re-encrypt vault with new password.325        const { words, newPassword } = msg.payload as {326          words: string[];327          newPassword: string;328        };329        const stored = await vault.loadSlotA();330        if (!stored) return { ok: false, error: "no_vault" };331        if (!stored.recovery_salt || !stored.recovery_wrapped_root_key) {332          return { ok: false, error: "recovery_not_setup" };333        }334        // Unwrap the root key from the recovery escrow.335        try {336          await vault.unwrapRootKeyForRecovery(337            stored.recovery_wrapped_root_key,338            stored.recovery_nonce ?? "",339            stored.recovery_tag ?? "",340            stored.recovery_salt,341            words342          );343        } catch {344          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_recovery_words" };345        }346        // Re-key: derive fresh salt + key from new password.347        const newSalt = vault.generateSalt();348        const newKey = await vault.deriveKey(newPassword, newSalt);349        // Re-wrap root key under the new password's derived key so the same350        // recovery words continue to work after the password change.351        await vault.rewrapRootKeyForPassword(newKey, newSalt);352        // Re-encrypt vault entries with the new key.353        await vault.changePasswordWithNewKey(newSalt, newKey);354        await setupAutoLock();355        broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });356        return { ok: true };357      }358      case "LOCK":359        vault.lock();360        if (isNativePlatform()) await clearInMemoryVault();361        return { ok: true };362      case "IS_UNLOCKED":363        return { ok: true, data: vault.isUnlocked() };364      case "GET_VAULT_STATUS":365        return { ok: true, unlocked: vault.isUnlocked() };366      case "HAS_VAULT":367        return { ok: true, data: await vault.hasVault() };368      case "GET_ENTRIES":369        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };370        return { ok: true, data: vault.getEntries() };371      case "ADD_ENTRY": {372        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };373        const payload = msg.payload;374        if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) {375          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };376        }377        const entry = await vault.addEntry(payload as Parameters<typeof vault.addEntry>[0]);378        return { ok: true, data: entry };379      }380      case "BATCH_ADD_ENTRIES": {381        const payload = msg.payload as { entries?: unknown } | null | undefined;382        if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) {383          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };384        }385        if (!Array.isArray(payload.entries)) {386          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };387        }388        const added = await vault.batchAddEntries(payload.entries as Parameters<typeof vault.batchAddEntries>[0]);389        return { ok: true, data: added };390      }391      case "RESTORE_ENTRIES": {392        const payload = msg.payload as393          | { entries?: unknown; mode?: unknown; settings?: unknown }394          | null395          | undefined;396        if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) {397          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };398        }399        if (!Array.isArray(payload.entries)) {400          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };401        }402        if (payload.mode !== "replace" && payload.mode !== "merge") {403          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };404        }405        const summary = await vault.restoreEntries(406          payload.entries as Parameters<typeof vault.restoreEntries>[0],407          payload.mode408        );409        if (payload.settings && typeof payload.settings === "object" && !Array.isArray(payload.settings)) {410          await vault.updateSettings(payload.settings as vault.VaultSettings);411        }412        return { ok: true, data: summary };413      }414      case "CLEAR_VAULT_ENTRIES": {415        await vault.clearVaultEntries("REPLACE_ALL");416        return { ok: true };417      }418      case "GET_VAULT_HISTORY": {419        const snapshots = await vault.getVaultHistory();420        return { ok: true, data: snapshots };421      }422      case "RESTORE_VAULT_SNAPSHOT": {423        const { snapshotId } = msg.payload as { snapshotId: string };424        const result = await vault.restoreVaultSnapshot(snapshotId);425        if (!result.ok) return { ok: false, error: result.error };426        broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_LOCKED" });427        return { ok: true };428      }429      case "COUNT_DUPLICATES": {430        return { ok: true, data: vault.countDuplicates() };431      }432      case "DEDUPLICATE_ENTRIES": {433        const removed = await vault.deduplicateEntries();434        return { ok: true, data: removed };435      }436      case "UPDATE_ENTRY": {437        const payload = msg.payload as { id?: unknown; patch?: unknown } | null | undefined;438        if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) {439          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };440        }441        const { id, patch } = payload;442        if (typeof id !== "string" || !id || !patch || typeof patch !== "object" || Array.isArray(patch)) {443          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };444        }445        // Single enforcement point for the Canary Entries Pro gate. Only446        // gates the transition into a canary entry — clearing/disabling a447        // canary (`canary: undefined`) is always allowed, so existing448        // canary entries remain manageable.449        const incomingCanary = (patch as { canary?: unknown }).canary;450        if (incomingCanary && typeof incomingCanary === "object") {451          const existing = vault.getEntryById(id);452          if (!existing?.canary) {453            const gate = await requirePro("canary_entry");454            if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };455          }456        }457        await vault.updateEntry(id, patch as Parameters<typeof vault.updateEntry>[1]);458        return { ok: true };459      }460      case "ADD_ADDITIONAL_URL": {461        const { id, url } = msg.payload as { id: string; url: string };462        const trimmed = typeof url === "string" ? url.trim() : "";463        if (!trimmed) return { ok: false, error: "url_required" };464        const existing = vault.getEntryById(id);465        if (!existing) return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };466        if (existing.type !== "login") return { ok: false, error: "login_entries_only" };467        const merged = [...(existing.additionalUrls ?? []), trimmed];468        await vault.updateEntry(id, { additionalUrls: merged });469        return { ok: true };470      }471      case "DELETE_ENTRY": {472        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };473        await vault.deleteEntry(id);474        return { ok: true };475      }476      case "GET_DELETED_ENTRIES":477        return { ok: true, data: vault.getDeletedEntries() };478      case "RESTORE_ENTRY": {479        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };480        await vault.restoreEntry(id);481        return { ok: true };482      }483      case "PURGE_ENTRY": {484        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };485        await vault.purgeEntry(id);486        return { ok: true };487      }488      case "PURGE_EXPIRED_TRASH": {489        const { retentionMs } = msg.payload as { retentionMs: number };490        const purged = await vault.purgeExpiredTrash(retentionMs);491        return { ok: true, data: purged };492      }493      case "SAVE_NOTE": {494        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };495        const { id, title, body } = msg.payload as { id?: string; title: string; body: string };496        const now = Date.now();497        if (id) {498          const existing = vault.getEntryById(id);499          if (!existing) return { ok: false, error: "not_found" };500          await vault.updateEntry(id, { title: title || "Untitled", notes: body, modifiedAt: now });501          return { ok: true, data: vault.getEntryById(id) };502        } else {503          const entry = await vault.addEntry({504            type: "note",505            title: title || "Untitled",506            notes: body,507            createdAt: now,508            modifiedAt: now,509          } as any);510          return { ok: true, data: entry };511        }512      }513      case "DELETE_NOTE": {514        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };515        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };516        await vault.deleteEntry(id);517        return { ok: true };518      }519      case "GET_NOTES": {520        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };521        const notes = vault.getEntries().filter(522          (e) => e.type === "note" && !e.deletedAt523        );524        return { ok: true, data: notes } as MessageResponse;525      }526      case "SEARCH_VAULT": {527        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };528        // AUD-002: shape-validate the payload before calling string methods.529        // A raw cast lets a malformed message crash the handler with TypeError.530        const { query } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { query?: unknown };531        if (typeof query !== "string") {532          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };533        }534        const q = query.toLowerCase();535        const searchResults = vault.getEntries().filter(536          (e) =>537            !e.deletedAt &&538            (e.title.toLowerCase().includes(q) ||539              e.notes?.toLowerCase().includes(q) ||540              e.username?.toLowerCase().includes(q))541        );542        return { ok: true, data: searchResults } as MessageResponse;543      }544      case "AUTOFILL_QUERY": {545        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) {546          return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };547        }548        let { includeAll } = msg.payload as { includeAll?: boolean };549        const { domain, kind, userGesture } = msg.payload as {550          domain: string;551          kind?: "login" | "card" | "totp";552          userGesture?: boolean;553        };554        // MV-2: the vault-wide inventory (every title/username/email/url)555        // may only leave the background on an explicit user gesture — the556        // user opening the search affordance — never on passive form focus.557        // userGesture is self-declared by our own content script; the value558        // of this gate is that PASSIVE code paths (which never set it)559        // cannot ship the inventory, shrinking what a compromised page that560        // merely triggers focus events can observe.561        if (includeAll && userGesture !== true) {562          includeAll = false;563        }564        // kind="card": return saved cards as compact summaries for the565        // inline card silver platter. Cards are not domain-scoped — every566        // saved card is a candidate on every checkout page — so domain is567        // ignored when kind === "card".568        if (kind === "card") {569          const cards = vault.getEntries().filter((e) => e.type === "card");570          return {571            ok: true,572            data: cards.map((e) => ({573              id: e.id,574              title: e.cardNickname || e.title,575              cardholderName: e.cardholderName,576              last4: e.last4,577              expMonth: e.expMonth,578              expYear: e.expYear,579              network: e.network,580            })),581          };582        }583        if (kind === "totp") {584          const matches = (585            includeAll586              ? vault.getEntries().filter((entry) => entry.type !== "note" && entry.type !== "card")587              : vault.queryDomain(domain)588          ).filter((entry) => !isPasskeyOnly(entry) && Boolean(entry.totp));589          return {590            ok: true,591            data: matches.map((e) => ({592              id: e.id,593              title: e.title,594              username: e.username,595              email: e.email,596              url: e.url,597              hasTotp: true,598            })),599          };600        }601        // The inline selector fills username+password into a form. Passkey-602        // only entries have no password to fill; sign-in for those goes603        // through the WebAuthn path instead. Filter them out everywhere so604        // the user doesn't see four "GitHub" rows that mostly do nothing.605        // Notes and cards never belonged here either.606        const matches = (607          includeAll608            ? vault609                .getEntries()610                .filter((entry) => entry.type !== "note" && entry.type !== "card")611            : vault.queryDomain(domain)612        ).filter((entry) => !isPasskeyOnly(entry));613        return {614          ok: true,615          data: matches.map((e) =>616            includeAll617              ? {618                  id: e.id,619                  title: e.title,620                  // username/email/url shipped so the inline popup's search621                  // affordance can match on them, not just titles. No secrets622                  // cross the boundary — same shape as the domain-matched623                  // response below minus hasTotp (which the search list624                  // doesn't surface).625                  username: e.username,626                  email: e.email,627                  url: e.url,628                  hasPasskey: e.passkey !== undefined,629                }630              : {631                  id: e.id,632                  title: e.title,633                  username: e.username,634                  email: e.email,635                  url: e.url,636                  hasTotp: Boolean(e.totp),637                  hasPasskey: e.passkey !== undefined,638                }639          ),640        };641      }642      case "GET_ENTRY_FOR_FILL": {643        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };644        const { id, explicitSummon } = msg.payload as {645          id: string;646          explicitSummon?: boolean;647        };648        const entry = vault.getEntryById(id);649        if (!entry) return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };650        // Passkey-only entries (passkey credential, no password) cannot be651        // filled into a form — sign-in goes through the WebAuthn path. A652        // login that ALSO has a passkey is still fillable for its password.653        if (isPasskeyOnly(entry)) return { ok: false, error: "passkey_not_fillable" };654655        // MV-1: re-validate the entry against the requesting tab's origin.656        // sender.tab.url is browser-attested — a page cannot forge it. When657        // the request does not come from a tab at all (popup surfaces use658        // GET_ENTRY_FOR_EDIT, not this), refuse.659        if (sender.tab !== undefined || sender.url !== undefined) {660          let senderDomain: string | null = null;661          try {662            const rawUrl = sender.tab?.url ?? sender.url ?? "";663            senderDomain = rawUrl ? extractDomain(new URL(rawUrl).hostname) : null;664          } catch {665            senderDomain = null;666          }667          if (!senderDomain) return { ok: false, error: "origin_unverified" };668669          const entryDomains = new Set<string>();670          const primary = extractDomain(entry.url ?? "");671          if (primary) entryDomains.add(primary);672          for (const extra of entry.additionalUrls ?? []) {673            const d = extractDomain(extra);674            if (d) entryDomains.add(d);675          }676677          // explicitSummon=true means the user actively picked this entry678          // from the cross-domain search affordance — an intentional679          // off-domain fill. Passive fill paths must stay domain-bound.680          if (explicitSummon !== true && !entryDomains.has(senderDomain)) {681            // Domain mismatch — refuse silently (no oracle about which ids exist).682            return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };683          }684        }685        // Strip the passkey credential AND the raw base32 TOTP seed from the686        // response. Content scripts never need either: the private key is the687        // authenticator's, and handing over the TOTP seed would let a688        // compromised content script mint valid codes indefinitely (SEV-3-C).689        // Generate the *current* 6-digit code here in the background and send690        // only that, plus the seconds left so the UI can render a countdown.691        // Also drop passwordHistory: filling needs only the *current* password.692        // Handing every past password to a content script during passive693        // autofill on an arbitrary page would widen the blast radius of a694        // compromised page far beyond the one credential being filled.695        const { passkey: _strippedPasskey, totp: seed, passwordHistory: _ph, ...safeEntry } = entry;696        let totpCode: string | undefined;697        let totpRemaining: number | undefined;698        if (seed) {699          try {700            const generated = generateTOTP(seed);701            totpCode = generated.code;702            totpRemaining = generated.remaining;703          } catch {704            totpCode = undefined;705          }706        }707        return { ok: true, data: { ...safeEntry, totpCode, totpRemaining } };708      }709      // Trusted full-entry fetch for Peach's own inline-popup surfaces that710      // genuinely need the raw TOTP seed: the edit form (which re-saves the711      // seed and would otherwise wipe it) and nothing else. Unlike712      // GET_ENTRY_FOR_FILL this fires only on an explicit user action inside713      // the inline popup, never during passive autofill on an arbitrary page.714      // The passkey credential is still stripped — the edit form never touches it.715      case "GET_ENTRY_FOR_EDIT": {716        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };717        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };718        const entry = vault.getEntryById(id);719        if (!entry) return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };720        const { passkey: _passkey, ...safeEntry } = entry;721        return { ok: true, data: safeEntry };722      }723      case "COPY": {724        // AUD-002: shape-validate the payload before passing to the clipboard725        // helper. A raw cast lets a malformed message reach the clipboard API726        // with a non-string and throw.727        const { text, label, alreadyWritten } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {728          text?: unknown;729          label?: unknown;730          alreadyWritten?: unknown;731        };732        if (typeof text !== "string" || typeof label !== "string") {733          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };734        }735        await copyToClipboard(text, label, Boolean(alreadyWritten));736        return { ok: true };737      }738      case "CHECK_ALL_BREACHES": {739        const allEntries = vault.getEntries();740        const results: Record<string, number> = {};741        for (const entry of allEntries) {742          if (entry.type === "note") continue;743          if (!entry.password) continue;744          results[entry.id] = await vault.checkBreach(entry.password);745          // Small delay — be a good citizen to the HIBP API746          await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 200));747        }748        // Persist any non-zero counts back to entries749        for (const [id, count] of Object.entries(results)) {750          const entry = vault.getEntryById(id);751          if (entry && (entry.breach ?? 0) !== count) {752            await vault.updateEntry(id, { breach: count > 0 ? count : undefined });753          }754        }755        return { ok: true, data: results };756      }757      case "GET_SETTINGS":758        return { ok: true, data: await vault.ensureSettingsLoaded() };759      case "UPDATE_SETTINGS": {760        const patch = msg.payload;761        if (!patch || typeof patch !== "object" || Array.isArray(patch)) {762          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };763        }764        await vault.updateSettings(patch as vault.VaultSettings);765        if (typeof (patch as Record<string, unknown>).autoLockMinutes === "number") {766          await setupAutoLock();767          if (vault.isUnlocked()) touchAutoLock();768        }769        return { ok: true };770      }771      case "GET_PENDING_PASSKEY":772        return { ok: true, data: await getPendingPasskeyRequest() };773      case "APPROVE_PASSKEY": {774        const { requestId } = msg.payload as { requestId: number };775        await resolvePendingPasskeyRequest(requestId, true);776        return { ok: true };777      }778      case "DENY_PASSKEY": {779        const { requestId } = msg.payload as { requestId: number };780        await resolvePendingPasskeyRequest(requestId, false);781        return { ok: true };782      }783      case "GET_PASSKEY_PROVIDER_STATE":784        return { ok: true, data: await getPasskeyProviderState() };785      case "SET_PASSKEY_PROVIDER_ENABLED": {786        const { enabled } = msg.payload as { enabled: boolean };787        // Disabling is always free; gating fires only when a free user is788        // trying to turn passkey interception on.789        if (enabled) {790          const gate = await requirePro("passkeys");791          if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };792        }793        return { ok: true, data: await setPasskeyProviderEnabled(enabled) };794      }795      // AUD-003: this handler POSTs `entryTitle` to a user-configured HTTPS796      // endpoint. Intentional product behavior — users configure their own797      // dead-man's-switch. isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl blocks localhost, private798      // IPs, and non-HTTPS schemes, but cannot defend against every DNS-799      // rebinding case. The UI under CanarySection (Entry.tsx) discloses to800      // users that the entry title leaves the device when the canary fires.801      case "FIRE_CANARY_PING": {802        // Canary alert fires unconditionally for any entry with canary: true.803        // The Pro gate only governs creation/flagging of canary entries; once804        // an entry is flagged, the alert path is a security property and must805        // never be license-gated.806        const { webhookUrl, entryTitle, trigger } = msg.payload as {807          webhookUrl: string;808          entryTitle: string;809          trigger: "password_copied" | "username_copied" | "autofilled" | "submitted" | "test";810        };811        if (!isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl(webhookUrl)) {812          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_webhook_url" };813        }814        // LV-3: debounce non-test pings per (webhook, entry) so a page that815        // strobes focus/fill events can't turn the canary into a request816        // firehose at the user's endpoint. Test pings are exempt — they are817        // explicit user clicks in the settings UI and are awaited for818        // feedback. The FIRST ping in a window always goes out, so the819        // dead-man's-switch property (canary fires on access) is preserved;820        // only repeats within the window are coalesced.821        if (trigger !== "test") {822          const rlKey = `canary-last-fetch:${webhookUrl}:${entryTitle}`;823          const stored = await chrome.storage.local.get(rlKey);824          const last = (stored as Record<string, unknown>)[rlKey];825          if (typeof last === "number" && Date.now() - last < CANARY_MIN_INTERVAL_MS) {826            return { ok: true, data: { rateLimited: true } };827          }828          await chrome.storage.local.set({ [rlKey]: Date.now() });829        }830        const body = JSON.stringify({831          event: trigger === "test" ? "peach_canary_test" : "peach_canary_accessed",832          entry: entryTitle,833          trigger,834          timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),835          source: "peach-extension",836        });837        if (trigger === "test") {838          // Permitted outbound fetch: user-configured canary alert endpoint839          // (validated by isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl above). This is the840          // only non-HIBP outbound call in the extension — see841          // Projects.md §3.7. Test pings are awaited so the UI can show842          // success/failure.843          try {844            const res = await fetch(webhookUrl, {845              method: "POST",846              headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },847              body,848            });849            return { ok: res.ok, error: res.ok ? undefined : `HTTP ${res.status}` };850          } catch (err) {851            return { ok: false, error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : "network_error" };852          }853        }854        // Non-test triggers are fire-and-forget855        fetch(webhookUrl, {856          method: "POST",857          headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },858          body,859        }).catch(() => {});860        return { ok: true };861      }862      case "ACTIVATE_LICENSE": {863        const { key } = msg.payload as { key: string };864        const licenseInfo = await activateLicense(key);865        return { ok: true, data: licenseInfo };866      }867      case "GET_LICENSE": {868        const licenseInfo = await getLicenseInfo();869        return { ok: true, data: licenseInfo };870      }871      case "GET_LICENSE_KEY": {872        const key = await getLicenseKey();873        return { ok: true, data: key };874      }875      case "DEACTIVATE_LICENSE": {876        await deactivateLicense();877        return { ok: true };878      }879      case "SHOULD_PLAY_CELEBRATION": {880        const should = await shouldPlayCelebration();881        return { ok: true, data: should };882      }883      case "MARK_CELEBRATION_PLAYED": {884        await markCelebrationPlayed();885        return { ok: true };886      }887      case "GET_CODEX_VAULT_DATA": {888        // Pro-gated. requirePro broadcasts PRO_GATE_TRIGGERED on miss so the889        // popup navigates to the License section without further coordination.890        const gate = await requirePro("codex");891        if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };892        return await handleGetCodexVaultData();893      }894      case "ESTIMATE_CODEX_PAGES": {895        const gate = await requirePro("codex");896        if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };897        return await handleEstimateCodexPages();898      }899      case "RESTORE_FROM_CODEX": {900        // !! IMPORTANT: intentionally NOT Pro-gated. A free device must still901        // be able to restore a vault that was printed by a Pro user.902        // DO NOT add a Pro gate here.903        const payload = msg.payload as CodexRestorePayload;904        return await handleRestoreFromCodex(payload);905      }906      case "OPEN_PRO_GATE": {907        // Content script requests: open popup and navigate to License section.908        const { feature } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { feature?: string };909        if (chrome.storage.session) {910          await chrome.storage.session.set({ pendingProGate: { feature: feature ?? "passkeys" } });911        }912        try { await chrome.action.openPopup(); } catch { /* badge fallback */ }913        return { ok: true };914      }915      case "OPEN_POPUP": {916        // Content script asks to open the trusted extension popup — used by the917        // inline locked bubble so the master password is entered in the popup,918        // never in page-hosted DOM (audit HIGH). Best-effort: openPopup needs a919        // user gesture + Chrome 127+/Firefox; on failure the user clicks the920        // toolbar icon. The badge already signals Peach needs attention.921        //922        // Set a session flag so the popup knows it was opened for inline unlock923        // and should close itself once the vault is unlocked (returning the user924        // to the inline autofill selector on the page).925        if (chrome.storage.session) {926          await chrome.storage.session.set({ peach_inline_unlock: true });927        }928        try { await chrome.action.openPopup(); } catch { /* user opens via toolbar */ }929        return { ok: true };930      }931      case "GET_IDENTITIES": {932        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };933        return { ok: true, data: vault.getIdentities() };934      }935      case "TOUCH_AUTO_LOCK": {936        // touchAutoLock() is already called by shouldRefreshAutoLock above;937        // this case just gives the popup a typed message to keep the session alive.938        return { ok: true };939      }940      case "GET_ADVANCED_HEALTH_REPORT": {941        const gate = await requirePro("advanced_health");942        if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };943        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };944        const report = await buildAdvancedHealthReport(vault.getEntries());945        return { ok: true, data: report };946      }947      case "IS_DURESS_ENABLED": {948        const enabled = await vault.isDuressEnabled();949        return { ok: true, data: enabled };950      }951      case "SETUP_DURESS": {952        // Single enforcement point for the Duress Vault Pro gate. Free users953        // who somehow reach this handler are rejected here; the popup also954        // pre-checks isPro() to avoid showing the setup form to free users,955        // but server-side is the actual security boundary.956        const gate = await requirePro("duress_vault");957        if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };958        // MV3 service workers restart after inactivity, losing the in-memory959        // derived key. Detect this before calling setupDuress so the popup960        // can show a meaningful prompt to re-lock and re-unlock.961        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "session_expired" };962        const { duressPassword } = msg.payload as { duressPassword: string };963        await vault.setupDuress(duressPassword);964        return { ok: true };965      }966      case "DISABLE_DURESS": {967        await vault.disableDuress();968        return { ok: true };969      }970      case "VERIFY_MAIN_PASSWORD": {971        const { password } = msg.payload as { password: string };972        const ok = await vault.verifyMainPassword(password);973        return { ok: true, data: ok };974      }975      case "CHANGE_PASSWORD": {976        const { currentPassword, newPassword } = msg.payload as {977          currentPassword: string;978          newPassword: string;979        };980        const changed = await vault.changePassword(currentPassword, newPassword);981        return changed982          ? { ok: true }983          : { ok: false, error: "incorrect_current_password" };984      }985      case "GET_SITE_PASSWORD_POLICY": {986        const [tab] = await chrome.tabs.query({ active: true, currentWindow: true });987        if (!tab?.id) return { ok: true, data: null };988        try {989          const response = await chrome.tabs.sendMessage(tab.id, {990            type: "GET_SITE_PASSWORD_POLICY",991          });992          return (response as MessageResponse) ?? { ok: true, data: null };993        } catch {994          return { ok: true, data: null };995        }996      }997      case "RECORD_MANUAL_SUMMON": {998        const { domain } = msg.payload as { domain: string };999        const settings = vault.getSettings();1000        const existing = settings.manualSummonDomains?.[domain];1001        const now = Date.now();1002        await vault.updateSettings({1003          manualSummonDomains: {1004            ...settings.manualSummonDomains,1005            [domain]: {1006              firstSummonedAt: existing?.firstSummonedAt ?? now,1007              summonCount: (existing?.summonCount ?? 0) + 1,1008              lastSummonedAt: now,1009            },1010          },1011        });1012        return { ok: true };1013      }1014      case "DECLINE_CARD_SAVE": {1015        const { last4, expMonth, expYear } = msg.payload as { last4: string; expMonth: string; expYear: string };1016        await vault.declineCardSaveOffer(last4, expMonth, expYear);1017        return { ok: true };1018      }1019      case "IS_CARD_DECLINED": {1020        const { last4, expMonth, expYear } = msg.payload as { last4: string; expMonth: string; expYear: string };1021        const declined = await vault.isCardDeclined(last4, expMonth, expYear);1022        return { ok: true, data: declined };1023      }1024      case "INITIATE_FIREFOX_PASSKEY_CREATE": {1025        const { rpId, rpName, userName, userDisplayName } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1026          rpId?: string;1027          rpName?: string;1028          userName?: string;1029          userDisplayName?: string;1030        };1031        if (!rpId || !userName) return { ok: false, error: "rpid_and_username_required" };1032        return await initiateFirefoxPasskeyCreate({1033          rpId,1034          rpName: rpName ?? rpId,1035          userName,1036          userDisplayName,1037        });1038      }10391040      case "COMPLETE_FIREFOX_PASSKEY_CREATE": {1041        const payload = msg.payload as Parameters<typeof completeFirefoxPasskeyCreate>[0] | undefined;1042        if (!payload) return { ok: false, error: "missing_payload" };1043        return await completeFirefoxPasskeyCreate(payload);1044      }10451046      case "PASSKEY_OFFER_DECLINE": {1047        const { domain } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { domain?: string };1048        if (!domain) return { ok: false, error: "domain_required" };1049        await recordPasskeyOfferDecline(domain);1050        return { ok: true };1051      }10521053      case "GET_PASSKEY_OFFER_DECLINED": {1054        const { domain } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { domain?: string };1055        if (!domain) return { ok: false, error: "domain_required" };1056        return { ok: true, data: await isPasskeyOfferDeclined(domain) };1057      }10581059      case "PASSKEY_HAS_CREDENTIALS": {1060        const payload = msg.payload as {1061          rpId?: string;1062          allowCredentials?: Array<{ id: string; type?: string }>;1063        } | undefined;1064        if (!payload?.rpId) return { ok: false, error: "rpid_required" };1065        return await handlePasskeyHasCredentials({1066          rpId: payload.rpId,1067          allowCredentials: payload.allowCredentials ?? [],1068        }, attestedSenderOrigin(sender));1069      }10701071      case "PASSKEY_CREATE": {1072        const payload = msg.payload as Parameters<typeof handleFirefoxPasskeyCreate>[0] | undefined;1073        if (!payload?.rpId || !payload?.userName) {1074          return { ok: false, error: "rpid_and_username_required" };1075        }1076        return await handleFirefoxPasskeyCreate(payload, attestedSenderOrigin(sender));1077      }10781079      case "PASSKEY_GET": {1080        const payload = msg.payload as Parameters<typeof handleFirefoxPasskeyGet>[0] | undefined;1081        if (!payload?.rpId) return { ok: false, error: "rpid_required" };1082        return await handleFirefoxPasskeyGet(payload, attestedSenderOrigin(sender));1083      }10841085      case "PASSKEY_AUTH_RESPONSE": {1086        const { requestId, approved } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1087          requestId?: string | number;1088          approved?: boolean;1089        };1090        if (requestId === undefined || requestId === null || typeof approved !== 'boolean') {1091          return { ok: false, error: 'requestId and approved required' };1092        }1093        await resolvePendingPasskeyRequest(Number(requestId), approved);1094        return { ok: true };1095      }10961097      case "GET_PASSKEY_FOR_DOMAIN": {1098        const { domain } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { domain?: string };1099        if (!domain) return { ok: false, error: "domain_required" };1100        // Scope to the caller's own origin: a page may only ask about passkeys1101        // for a domain it actually owns, so an arbitrary page cannot enumerate1102        // which sites the user holds passkeys for or read the username (audit MEDIUM).1103        const origin = attestedSenderOrigin(sender);1104        if (!origin || !isValidRpId(domain, origin)) return { ok: true, data: null };1105        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: true, data: null };1106        const match = vault1107          .getEntries()1108          .find((entry) => entry.passkey?.rpId === domain);1109        if (!match || !match.passkey) return { ok: true, data: null };1110        // Slim shape — only the fields State 11 needs. Never expose private1111        // key material, even though this is locked behind isUnlocked.1112        return {1113          ok: true,1114          data: {1115            rpId: match.passkey.rpId,1116            userName: match.passkey.userName,1117            browser: match.passkey.browser,1118          },1119        };1120      }11211122      case "DESTROY_VAULT": {1123        // Irreversible by design. Lock zeroes the derived key + in-memory entries;1124        // storage.local.clear() wipes every Peach key (slots, settings, license,1125        // onboarded flag, history, sync state, declined cards, recall, etc.);1126        // session.clear() wipes pending passkey requests + pro-notice queues.1127        // Caller (Panic.tsx) handles UI navigation back to onboarding.1128        //1129        // The Pro license is the one thing that must survive: the user paid for1130        // it, and destroying a vault (panic wipe, fresh start) is not a refund.1131        // Capture it before the clear and restore it after. peach_pro_celebrated1132        // rides along so the Pro celebration doesn't replay on the next unlock.1133        const preserved = await chrome.storage.local.get([1134          "peach_license",1135          "peach_pro_celebrated",1136        ]);1137        vault.lock();1138        await storageClear();1139        await vault.clearVaultHistory();1140        const toRestore: Record<string, unknown> = {};1141        if (preserved.peach_license !== undefined) toRestore.peach_license = preserved.peach_license;1142        if (preserved.peach_pro_celebrated !== undefined) toRestore.peach_pro_celebrated = preserved.peach_pro_celebrated;1143        if (Object.keys(toRestore).length > 0) {1144          await chrome.storage.local.set(toRestore);1145        }1146        if (chrome.storage.session) {1147          await chrome.storage.session.clear();1148        }1149        return { ok: true };1150      }11511152      case "SUBMIT_FEEDBACK": {1153        const { category, message, version, browser } = msg.payload as {1154          category: string;1155          message: string;1156          version: string;1157          browser: string;1158        };1159        if (!message.trim()) return { ok: false, error: "message_empty" };1160        if (!FEEDBACK_ENDPOINT) return { ok: true };1161        if (!isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl(FEEDBACK_ENDPOINT)) {1162          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_feedback_endpoint" };1163        }1164        try {1165          const res = await fetch(FEEDBACK_ENDPOINT, {1166            method: "POST",1167            headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },1168            body: JSON.stringify({ category, message, version, browser, source: "peach-extension" }),1169          });1170          return { ok: res.ok, error: res.ok ? undefined : `HTTP ${res.status}` };1171        } catch (err) {1172          return { ok: false, error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : "network_error" };1173        }1174      }1175      // Android-only: biometric unlock with pre-derived key.1176      case "UNLOCK_WITH_KEY": {1177        const { masterKeyHex } = msg.payload as { masterKeyHex: string };1178        if (!isNativePlatform()) {1179          return { ok: false, error: "desktop_only_uses_password" };1180        }1181        try {1182          const result = await vault.unlockWithKey(masterKeyHex);1183          if (result.ok) {1184            onVaultUnlocked();1185            await publishInMemoryVault(result.entries);1186          }1187          return { ok: result.ok, data: result.ok ? { entries: result.entries } : undefined, error: result.ok ? undefined : result.error };1188        } catch {1189          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };1190        }1191      }1192      // Android: returns current in-memory derived key as hex. Used by biometric enable flow.1193      case "GET_DERIVED_KEY": {1194        if (!isNativePlatform()) {1195          return { ok: false, error: "android_only" };1196        }1197        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) {1198          return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1199        }1200        return { ok: true, data: { masterKeyHex: vault.getDerivedKeyHex() } };1201      }1202      case "GET_IDENTITY_SUGGESTIONS": {1203        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1204        const entries = vault.getEntries();1205        const suggestions = buildIdentitySuggestions(entries);1206        return { ok: true, data: { suggestions } };1207      }1208      case "POPULATE_INLINE_VAULT": {1209        if (!isNativePlatform()) return { ok: false };1210        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1211        const entries = vault.getEntries();1212        await publishInMemoryVault(entries);1213        return { ok: true };1214      }1215      case "ML_INIT":1216        return { ok: true };12171218      case "ML_PREDICT_BATCH": {1219        // AUD-002: shape-validate before forwarding to the ML helper.1220        const { featuresArray } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { featuresArray?: unknown };1221        if (!Array.isArray(featuresArray)) {1222          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1223        }1224        return { ok: true, data: mlPredictBatch(featuresArray as MLFieldFeatures[]) };1225      }12261227      // ── Chirp Sync (v3) ───────────────────────────────────────────────1228      // Returns the public-facing local identity needed by the popup to1229      // drive Phase-1 audio pairing. The private long-term key never1230      // leaves the background.1231      case "CHIRP_GET_LOCAL_IDENTITY": {1232        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1233        const proCheck = await requirePro("sync");1234        if (!proCheck.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1235        // Identity derives from the stable root key, not the password-derived1236        // key, so pairing survives a master-password change (SEV-2-B).1237        const masterKeyHex = vault.getRootKeyHex();1238        if (!masterKeyHex) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1239        const masterKey = unhexBytes(masterKeyHex);1240        try {1241          const identity = await buildLocalIdentity(masterKey);1242          return { ok: true, data: identity };1243        } finally {1244          masterKey.fill(0);1245        }1246      }12471248      case "CHIRP_COMPLETE_PAIRING": {1249        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1250        const proCheck = await requirePro("sync");1251        if (!proCheck.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1252        const paired = (msg.payload as { paired?: unknown })?.paired;1253        if (typeof paired !== "object" || paired === null) {1254          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1255        }1256        const candidate = paired as Record<string, unknown>;1257        if (1258          typeof candidate.deviceId !== "string" || !candidate.deviceId ||1259          typeof candidate.deviceName !== "string" || !candidate.deviceName ||1260          typeof candidate.deviceType !== "string" ||1261          typeof candidate.longTermPublicKeyHex !== "string" ||1262          !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(candidate.longTermPublicKeyHex) ||1263          (1264            candidate.signingPublicKeyHex !== undefined &&1265            (1266              typeof candidate.signingPublicKeyHex !== "string" ||1267              !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(candidate.signingPublicKeyHex)1268            )1269          ) ||1270          typeof candidate.pairedAt !== "number"1271        ) {1272          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_paired_device" };1273        }1274        await upsertPairedDeviceV3(candidate as unknown as import("../shared/sync-types").PairedDevice);1275        return { ok: true };1276      }12771278      case "CHIRP_LIST_PAIRED_DEVICES": {1279        const devices = await listPairedDevicesV3();1280        return { ok: true, data: { devices } };1281      }12821283      case "CHIRP_UNPAIR_DEVICE": {1284        const { deviceId } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { deviceId?: string };1285        if (typeof deviceId !== "string" || !deviceId) {1286          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1287        }1288        await removePairedDeviceByIdV3(deviceId);1289        return { ok: true };1290      }12911292      case "CHIRP_RENAME_LOCAL_DEVICE": {1293        const { name } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { name?: string };1294        if (typeof name !== "string") return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1295        await setDeviceNameV3(name);1296        return { ok: true };1297      }12981299      case "TRIGGER_SYNC": {1300        const payload = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1301          reason?: "vault_change" | "foreground" | "manual" | "mdns";1302          force?: boolean;1303          deviceId?: string;1304          discoveredIp?: string;1305          discoveredPort?: number;1306        };1307        const reason = payload.reason ?? "foreground";13081309        // mDNS discovery delivers a fresh (ip, port) resolved by the native1310        // side. Update the cached address before the sync runner tries to1311        // connect — avoids a subnet probe on the very next round.1312        if (1313          reason === "mdns" &&1314          typeof payload.deviceId === "string" &&1315          typeof payload.discoveredIp === "string"1316        ) {1317          const { findPairedDeviceById, setLastKnownIp } = await import("./paired-devices");1318          const device = await findPairedDeviceById(payload.deviceId);1319          if (device?.longTermPublicKeyHex) {1320            await setLastKnownIp(device.longTermPublicKeyHex, payload.discoveredIp).catch(() => undefined);1321          }1322        }13231324        const { triggerSyncIfReachable } = await import("./sync-trigger");1325        void triggerSyncIfReachable({ reason, force: payload.force === true });1326        return { ok: true };1327      }13281329      case "GET_SYNC_STATE": {1330        const { getSyncState } = await import("./sync-trigger");1331        return { ok: true, data: getSyncState() };1332      }13331334      case "GET_SYNC_ALERTS": {1335        const { consume } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { consume?: boolean };1336        const alerts = await getPendingSyncAlerts();1337        // The popup reads on open and acknowledges with consume:true after1338        // rendering, so a popup crash between read and render doesn't lose1339        // the alerts.1340        if (consume) await clearPendingSyncAlerts();1341        return { ok: true, data: alerts };1342      }13431344      case "GET_PENDING_VOUCHED_DEVICES": {1345        return { ok: true, data: await listPendingVouchedDevices() };1346      }1347      case "CONFIRM_VOUCHED_DEVICE": {1348        const { deviceId } = msg.payload as { deviceId: string };1349        const pending = await getPendingVouchedDevice(deviceId);1350        if (!pending) return { ok: false, error: "not_pending" };1351        await upsertPairedDeviceV3({1352          deviceId: pending.deviceId,1353          deviceName: pending.deviceName,1354          deviceType:1355            pending.deviceType as import("../shared/sync-types").PairedDevice["deviceType"],1356          longTermPublicKeyHex: pending.longTermPublicKeyHex,1357          signingPublicKeyHex: pending.signingPublicKeyHex,1358          wsPort: pending.wsPort,1359          pairedAt: pending.pairedAt,1360          trustSource: "vouched",1361        });1362        await removePendingVouchedDevice(deviceId);1363        return { ok: true };1364      }1365      case "REJECT_VOUCHED_DEVICE": {1366        const { deviceId } = msg.payload as { deviceId: string };1367        await removePendingVouchedDevice(deviceId);1368        return { ok: true };1369      }1370      case "ROTATE_SYNC_IDENTITY": {1371        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1372        const result = await vault.rotateSyncIdentity();1373        return result.ok ? { ok: true } : { ok: false, error: result.error };1374      }13751376      default:1377        return { ok: false, error: "unknown_message_type" };1378    }1379  } catch (err) {1380    return {1381      ok: false,1382      error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : "operation_failed",1383    };1384  }1385}13861387// --- Mobile platform helpers ---13881389// Android: populates the in-memory vault used by PeachAutofillService.1390async function publishInMemoryVault(entries: VaultEntry[]): Promise<void> {1391  const plugin = nativePlugin<{1392    setEntries?: (args: {1393      entries: Array<{1394        id: string;1395        title: string;1396        username: string;1397        email: string;1398        password: string;1399        url: string;1400        totp: string;1401        additionalUrls: string[];1402      }>;1403    }) => Promise<void>;1404  }>("InMemoryVaultPlugin");1405  if (!plugin?.setEntries) return;1406  await plugin.setEntries({1407    entries: entries.map((e) => ({1408      id: e.id,1409      title: e.title ?? "",1410      username: e.username ?? "",1411      email: (e as VaultEntry & { email?: string }).email ?? "",1412      password: e.password ?? "",1413      url: e.url ?? "",1414      totp: (e as VaultEntry & { totp?: string }).totp ?? "",1415      additionalUrls: (e as VaultEntry & { additionalUrls?: string[] }).additionalUrls ?? [],1416    })),1417  });1418}14191420// Android: clear the autofill in-memory store on lock.1421async function clearInMemoryVault(): Promise<void> {1422  const plugin = nativePlugin<{ clearEntries?: () => Promise<void> }>("InMemoryVaultPlugin");1423  if (!plugin?.clearEntries) return;1424  await plugin.clearEntries();1425}14261427// Returns username use-counts from the vault, sorted by frequency. Each row1428// also carries the entry's email so the popup can suggest the email/username1429// pair the user has actually used together.1430function buildIdentitySuggestions(1431  entries: VaultEntry[],1432): Array<{ email: string; username: string; count: number }> {1433  const usernameCounts = new Map<string, number>();1434  const usernameEmail = new Map<string, string>();1435  for (const entry of entries) {1436    const username = entry.username ?? "";1437    const email = (entry as VaultEntry & { email?: string }).email ?? "";1438    if (!username && !email) continue;1439    const key = username || email;1440    usernameCounts.set(key, (usernameCounts.get(key) ?? 0) + 1);1441    if (!usernameEmail.has(key)) usernameEmail.set(key, email);1442  }1443  return Array.from(usernameCounts.entries())1444    .sort((a, b) => b[1] - a[1])1445    .map(([username, count]) => ({1446      email: usernameEmail.get(username) ?? "",1447      username,1448      count,1449    }));1450}14511452/** Notify all content scripts that the vault just became available. */1453function broadcastToContentScripts(message: { type: string }): void {1454  if (!chrome.tabs?.query) return;1455  chrome.tabs.query({}, (tabs) => {1456    for (const tab of tabs) {1457      if (tab.id !== undefined) {1458        chrome.tabs.sendMessage(tab.id, message).catch(() => {1459          // Tab may not have a content script — silently ignore1460        });1461      }1462    }1463  });1464}14651466function shouldRefreshAutoLock(type: MessageType): boolean {1467  return (1468    type !== "HAS_VAULT" &&1469    type !== "IS_UNLOCKED" &&1470    type !== "GET_VAULT_STATUS" &&1471    type !== "LOCK" &&1472    type !== "UPDATE_SETTINGS" &&1473    type !== "GET_PENDING_PASSKEY" &&1474    type !== "GET_PASSKEY_PROVIDER_STATE" &&1475    type !== "DECLINE_CARD_SAVE" &&1476    type !== "IS_CARD_DECLINED" &&1477    type !== "SUBMIT_FEEDBACK"1478  );1479}14801481function isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl(value: string): boolean {1482  try {1483    const url = new URL(value);1484    if (url.protocol !== "https:") return false;14851486    const hostname = url.hostname.toLowerCase();1487    if (1488      hostname === "localhost" ||1489      hostname.endsWith(".localhost") ||1490      isPrivateIpv4(hostname) ||1491      isPrivateIpv6(hostname)1492    ) {1493      return false;1494    }14951496    return true;1497  } catch {1498    return false;1499  }1500}15011502function isPrivateIpv4(hostname: string): boolean {1503  if (PRIVATE_IPV4_RANGES.some((range) => hostname.startsWith(range.prefix))) {1504    return true;1505  }15061507  const octets = hostname.split(".").map((part) => Number(part));1508  if (octets.length !== 4 || octets.some((octet) => !Number.isInteger(octet) || octet < 0 || octet > 255)) {1509    return false;1510  }15111512  return octets[0] === 172 && octets[1] >= 16 && octets[1] <= 31;1513}15141515function isPrivateIpv6(hostname: string): boolean {1516  const normalized = hostname.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "").toLowerCase();1517  return (1518    normalized === "::1" ||1519    normalized.startsWith("fc") ||1520    normalized.startsWith("fd") ||1521    normalized.startsWith("fe80:")1522  );1523}