messages.ts

1/**2 * messages.ts — the only background message handler.3 *4 * All `chrome.runtime.onMessage` handling for the service worker lives here.5 * Do not handle messages inline in entry.ts, alarms.ts, or any other6 * background file. Every background-bound MessageType in shared/types.ts7 * must have a case below. Content-script-bound message types (PING,8 * SUMMON_AUTOFILL, VAULT_LOCKED) are documented in shared/types.ts and9 * intentionally have no case here — they are sent *to* content scripts.10 */1112import { copyToClipboard, getEffectiveClearSeconds } from "./clipboard";13import { getPendingSyncAlerts, clearPendingSyncAlerts } from "./sync-alerts";14import { extractDomain } from "../shared/domain";15import {16  getPendingVouchedDevice,17  listPendingVouchedDevices,18  removePendingVouchedDevice,19} from "./pending-vouched-devices";20import {21  clearRecoveryConfirmPending,22  isRecoveryConfirmPending,23  setRecoveryConfirmPending,24} from "./recovery-pending";25import { setupAutoLock, touchAutoLock } from "./alarms";26import { runSelfTest } from "./self-test";27import * as vault from "./vault";28import {29  handleEstimateCodexPages,30  handleGetCodexVaultData,31  handleRestoreFromCodex,32} from "./codex-handlers";33import type { CodexRestorePayload } from "../shared/codex-types";34import {35  activateLicense,36  deactivateLicense,37  getLicenseInfo,38  getLicenseKey,39  isProUser,40  markCelebrationPlayed,41  shouldPlayCelebration,42} from "./license";43import {44  completeFirefoxPasskeyCreate,45  getPasskeyProviderState,46  getPendingPasskeyRequest,47  handleFirefoxPasskeyCreate,48  handleFirefoxPasskeyGet,49  handlePasskeyHasCredentials,50  initiateFirefoxPasskeyCreate,51  isPasskeyOfferDeclined,52  onVaultUnlocked,53  recordPasskeyOfferDecline,54  resolvePendingPasskeyRequest,55  setPasskeyProviderEnabled,56} from "./passkey";57import { buildAdvancedHealthReport } from "./health";58import { storageClear } from "../shared/storage";59import { findInvalidWords } from "../shared/recovery-words";60import type {61  Message,62  MessageResponse,63  MessageType,64  ProFeature,65  VaultEntry,66} from "../shared/types";67import { isPasskeyOnly } from "../shared/types";68import { generateTOTP } from "../crypto/totp";69import { isValidRpId } from "../shared/passkey-utils";70import { predictBatch as mlPredictBatch } from "./ml";71import type { MLFieldFeatures } from "../shared/ml";72import {73  buildLocalIdentity,74  getOrCreateDeviceId,75  setDeviceName as setDeviceNameV3,76} from "./device-identity";77import {78  isDeviceRevoked,79  listPairedDevices as listPairedDevicesV3,80  renamePairedDevice as renamePairedDeviceV3,81  revokeDeviceById as revokeDeviceByIdV3,82  upsertPairedDevice as upsertPairedDeviceV3,83} from "./paired-devices";84import { dropPairSecret } from "./pair-secrets";85// Sync and pairing are imported statically, never with `await import()`.86// `import()` throws `TypeError: import() is disallowed on87// ServiceWorkerGlobalScope` at runtime in MV3, and Vite's preload helper88// reports the failure through `window.dispatchEvent`, which does not exist in89// a worker either — so the real reason was replaced by "window is not defined"90// and the pairing UI just stopped. scripts/check-sw-static-imports.mjs fails91// the build if a runtime import() reappears anywhere in the worker's graph.92import {93  cancelRelayAdoptionSource,94  isRelayAdoptionSourceInFlight,95  resolveReceiverSasConfirmation,96  resolveSourceSasConfirmation,97  startRelayAdoptionReceiver,98  startRelayAdoptionSource,99} from "./relay-adoption-bg";100import {101  getSyncSettings,102  setRelayUrl,103  setSyncMode,104  type SyncMode,105} from "./sync-settings";106import {107  getSyncState,108  triggerSyncIfReachable,109} from "./sync-trigger";110import { isMessageSenderAllowed } from "./message-policy";111112const SUMMON_CAPABILITY_TTL_MS = 30_000;113type SummonCapability = { tabId: number; frameId: number; origin: string; operation: "inventory" | "fill"; expiresAt: number };114const summonCapabilities = new Map<string, SummonCapability>();115116export function createSummonCapability(tabId: number, origin: string, frameId = 0): string {117  const token = crypto.randomUUID();118  summonCapabilities.set(token, { tabId, frameId, origin, operation: "inventory", expiresAt: Date.now() + SUMMON_CAPABILITY_TTL_MS });119  return token;120}121122function consumeSummonCapability(token: unknown, sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender>, operation: "inventory" | "fill"): boolean {123  if (typeof token !== "string") return false;124  const cap = summonCapabilities.get(token);125  if (!cap) return false;126  if (cap.expiresAt <= Date.now()) {127    summonCapabilities.delete(token);128    return false;129  }130  if (sender.tab?.id !== cap.tabId || (sender.frameId ?? 0) !== cap.frameId || attestedSenderOrigin(sender) !== cap.origin) return false;131  if (cap.operation !== operation) return false;132  if (operation === "inventory") cap.operation = "fill";133  else summonCapabilities.delete(token);134  return true;135}136137// Compile-time E2E flag, folded to a literal by Vite's `define` (false in138// every production build — verified in the bundled output). Mirrors the139// create-path bypass in passkey.ts so the Playwright passkey smoke can enable140// the provider without a real Pro licence; the gate is fully intact for users.141declare const __PEACH_E2E_PASSKEYS__: boolean;142const PASSKEY_E2E_PRO_BYPASS = __PEACH_E2E_PASSKEYS__ === true;143144function unhexBytes(hex: string): Uint8Array {145  if (hex.length % 2 !== 0) throw new Error("invalid hex");146  const out = new Uint8Array(hex.length / 2);147  for (let i = 0; i < out.length; i++) {148    out[i] = parseInt(hex.slice(i * 2, i * 2 + 2), 16);149  }150  return out;151}152153/**154 * The single Pro gate. Every gated handler calls this first; the broadcast155 * lets the popup react (navigate to the License section, highlight the156 * relevant feature). Background never touches the popup view directly —157 * the popup owns navigation. See Projects.md "Pro gate rule".158 */159async function requirePro(160  feature: ProFeature,161  trigger: "user" | "background" = "user"162): Promise<{ allowed: boolean }> {163  if (PASSKEY_E2E_PRO_BYPASS && feature === "passkeys") return { allowed: true };164  if (await isProUser()) return { allowed: true };165166  if (trigger === "user") {167    // User deliberately triggered this feature — redirect the popup immediately.168    chrome.runtime169      .sendMessage({ type: "PRO_GATE_TRIGGERED", payload: { feature } })170      .catch(() => {171        // Popup may be closed — the gate signal is best-effort.172      });173  } else {174    // Background trigger (e.g. passive sync initiation) — no popup is open.175    // Queue a notice so the next popup open shows a soft banner instead of176    // silently failing.177    if (chrome.storage.session) {178      chrome.storage.session179        .set({ pendingProNotice: { feature, triggeredAt: Date.now() } })180        .catch(() => {});181    }182  }183184  return { allowed: false };185}186187// LV-3: minimum interval between non-test canary pings per webhook+entry.188const CANARY_MIN_INTERVAL_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000; // 1 hour189190const PRIVATE_IPV4_RANGES = [191  { prefix: "10." },192  { prefix: "127." },193  { prefix: "169.254." },194  { prefix: "192.168." },195];196197export function setupMessageHandler(): void {198  chrome.runtime.onMessage.addListener(199    (msg: unknown, sender, sendResponse) => {200      if (!isMessage(msg)) {201        sendResponse({ ok: false, error: "invalid_message" });202        return true;203      }204      handleMessage(msg, sender)205        .then(sendResponse)206        .catch((err) =>207          sendResponse({208            ok: false,209            error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),210          })211        );212      return true;213    }214  );215}216217function isMessage(m: unknown): m is Message {218  return typeof m === "object" && m !== null && "type" in m;219}220221/**222 * The browser-attested origin of the page that originated this message. A web223 * page cannot call chrome.runtime.sendMessage directly (no externally_connectable),224 * so every page-driven message arrives via the content-script relay and the225 * browser stamps `sender.origin`/`sender.url` with the real frame origin — a226 * value the page cannot forge. This is the ONLY trustworthy origin for passkey227 * rpId<->origin enforcement; payload-supplied origins are attacker-controlled.228 */229function attestedSenderOrigin(sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender>): string | undefined {230  if (sender.origin) return sender.origin;231  if (sender.url) {232    try { return new URL(sender.url).origin; } catch { return undefined; }233  }234  return undefined;235}236237function isExtensionPageSender(sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender>): boolean {238  return sender.url?.startsWith("chrome-extension://") === true ||239    sender.url?.startsWith("moz-extension://") === true;240}241242/** True when the message came from a page frame rather than extension UI. */243function isPageSender(sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender>): boolean {244  return !isExtensionPageSender(sender) &&245    (sender.tab !== undefined || sender.url !== undefined);246}247248function entryDomains(url: unknown, additionalUrls: unknown): Set<string> {249  const domains = new Set<string>();250  const primary = typeof url === "string" ? extractDomain(url) : null;251  if (primary) domains.add(primary);252  if (Array.isArray(additionalUrls)) {253    for (const extra of additionalUrls) {254      if (typeof extra !== "string") continue;255      const domain = extractDomain(extra);256      if (domain) domains.add(domain);257    }258  }259  return domains;260}261262/**263 * PB-26-106: the autofill read path re-validates the frame origin against the264 * entry's domains on every request, so an unbound write path would let a265 * content script repoint an entry at its own origin and then read the266 * credential through a read path that is behaving correctly.267 *268 * Creating an entry: a page may only bind it to itself. Mutating one: a page269 * may never GROW the domain set — only shrink it, and never below its own270 * attested origin.271 *272 * Self-binding on mutation was considered and is not enough: the content273 * script on a foreign origin IS the attacker in the reported chain, so letting274 * it attach "its own" origin lets it mint the very capability the read path275 * exists to withhold. The legitimate flow that needs a new domain — the inline276 * "remember this site" toast — therefore asks the popup instead277 * (REQUEST_REMEMBER_SITE), which is an extension page and exempt here.278 *279 * Extension pages are exempt: the popup edits entries for sites it is not on.280 */281function senderMayBindEntryDomains(282  sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender>,283  domains: Set<string>,284): boolean {285  if (isExtensionPageSender(sender)) return true;286  const domain = attestedSenderDomain(sender);287  if (domain === null) return false;288  for (const candidate of domains) {289    if (candidate !== domain) return false;290  }291  return true;292}293294function senderMayMutateEntryDomains(295  sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender>,296  before: Set<string>,297  after: Set<string>,298): boolean {299  if (isExtensionPageSender(sender)) return true;300  const domain = attestedSenderDomain(sender);301  if (domain === null || !after.has(domain)) return false;302  for (const kept of after) {303    if (!before.has(kept)) return false;304  }305  return true;306}307308/**309 * Null for extension pages (which the callers exempt), for senders with no310 * attested origin at all, and for unparseable frame urls.311 */312function attestedSenderDomain(sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender>): string | null {313  if (sender.tab === undefined && sender.url === undefined) return null;314  const origin = attestedSenderOrigin(sender);315  if (!origin) return null;316  try { return extractDomain(new URL(origin).hostname); } catch { return null; }317}318319function patchChangesEntryOrigin(patch: object): boolean {320  return Object.hasOwn(patch, "url") || Object.hasOwn(patch, "additionalUrls");321}322323/** The entry's domain-bearing fields as the patch would leave them. */324function patchedUrlShape(325  patch: object,326  existing: Pick<VaultEntry, "url" | "additionalUrls">,327): { url: unknown; additionalUrls: unknown } {328  const candidate = patch as { url?: unknown; additionalUrls?: unknown };329  return {330    url: Object.hasOwn(patch, "url") ? candidate.url : existing.url,331    additionalUrls: Object.hasOwn(patch, "additionalUrls")332      ? candidate.additionalUrls333      : existing.additionalUrls,334  };335}336// Resolves once restoreFromSession() has run, so handlers see the correct337// post-restore unlock state. entry.ts registers this BEFORE the message338// handler so the onMessage listener is added synchronously at SW startup339// (MV3 requirement) while unlock-dependent handlers still wait for restore.340let restoreReady: Promise<void> = Promise.resolve();341342/** Called by entry.ts at startup with the in-flight restoreFromSession promise. */343export function setRestoreReady(p: Promise<unknown>): void {344  restoreReady = p.then(() => undefined, () => undefined);345}346347export async function handleMessage(348  msg: Message,349  sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender> = {}350): Promise<MessageResponse> {351  try {352    // Wait for session-restore to finish before reading any unlock/vault state.353    // On a cold SW start the popup's first message arrives while restore is354    // still in flight; without this gate IS_UNLOCKED would report locked (a355    // spurious lock screen) and the storage reads could race. The onMessage356    // listener itself is registered synchronously (entry.ts) so this gate, not357    // listener registration, is what absorbs the cold-start window.358    await restoreReady;359    // Validate sender — only allow messages from our extension pages/scripts.360    // `sender.id` is undefined for messages originating from extension UI361    // (popup/options), which is legitimate; reject only when it is defined362    // and does not match our extension id.363    if (364      sender.id !== undefined &&365      sender.id !== chrome.runtime.id366    ) {367      return { ok: false, error: "invalid_sender" };368    }369370    // PB-26-016: sender authorization is an exhaustive policy, not a371    // hand-maintained privileged denylist. A missing/unknown policy entry or a372    // background-only message fails closed before any handler runs.373    // Extension UI messages may legitimately omit sender.url. Resolve the374    // browser-attested extension origin only when a URL is present; this also375    // keeps test/runtime shims without getURL fail-closed for URL-bearing376    // senders instead of throwing before policy evaluation.377    const extensionOrigin = sender.url && typeof chrome.runtime.getURL === "function"378      ? chrome.runtime.getURL("")379      : "";380    if (!isMessageSenderAllowed(msg.type, sender, chrome.runtime.id, extensionOrigin)) {381      return { ok: false, error: "invalid_sender" };382    }383384    if (shouldRefreshAutoLock(msg.type, sender) && vault.isUnlocked()) {385      touchAutoLock();386    }387388    switch (msg.type) {389      case "CREATE_VAULT": {390        const { password } = msg.payload as { password: string };391        // Refuse to create a vault under an empty master password — the derived392        // key would be publicly known and the at-rest AES-GCM protection void393        // (audit HIGH; the CSV-import path previously passed ""). Length/strength394        // policy lives in the onboarding UI; this is the non-negotiable floor.395        if (typeof password !== "string" || password.length === 0) {396          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };397        }398        await vault.createVault(password);399        await setupAutoLock();400        broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });401        onVaultUnlocked();402        return { ok: true };403      }404      case "CREATE_VAULT_FROM_ROOT_KEY": {405        const { password, rootKeyHex } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {406          password?: unknown;407          rootKeyHex?: unknown;408        };409        if (typeof password !== "string" || password.length === 0 || typeof rootKeyHex !== "string") {410          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };411        }412413        try {414          const { vaultId } = await vault.createVaultFromRootKey(password, rootKeyHex);415          await setupAutoLock();416          broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });417          onVaultUnlocked();418          return { ok: true, vaultId };419        } catch (err) {420          return { ok: false, error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err) };421        }422      }423      case "UNLOCK": {424        const { password } = msg.payload as { password: string };425        const ok = await vault.unlock(password);426        if (ok) {427          // KAT: verify the WebCrypto stack is healthy before the user relies on it.428          // Runs after unlock so latency is hidden behind the vault-load time.429          const kat = await runSelfTest();430          if (!kat.ok) {431            console.error("[Peach] Crypto self-test FAILED:", kat.error);432            await vault.lock();433            return { ok: false, error: "self_test_failed" };434          }435          await vault.updateSettings({ pinPreferred: false });436          await setupAutoLock();437          broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });438          onVaultUnlocked();439          return { ok: true };440        }441        // Distinguish corruption from wrong password so the popup can offer442        // a history-restore path instead of falsely accusing the user of443        // mistyping (M7/COR-007).444        const failure = vault.consumeLastUnlockFailureReason();445        if (failure) {446          return {447            ok: false,448            error: "vault_corrupted",449            canRestoreFromHistory: true,450          } as MessageResponse;451        }452        return { ok: false };453      }454      case "UNLOCK_WITH_PIN": {455        const { pin } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { pin?: unknown };456        if (typeof pin !== "string") return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };457        const ok = await vault.unlockWithPin(pin);458        if (!ok) {459          const status = await vault.getPinUnlockStatus();460          if (status.configured && !status.available) {461            return {462              ok: false,463              error: status.attemptsRemaining === 0464                ? "pin_attempts_exceeded"465                : "pin_session_expired",466            };467          }468          return { ok: false };469        }470        const kat = await runSelfTest();471        if (!kat.ok) {472          await vault.lock();473          return { ok: false, error: "self_test_failed" };474        }475        await vault.updateSettings({ pinPreferred: true });476        await setupAutoLock();477        broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });478        onVaultUnlocked();479        return { ok: true };480      }481      case "GET_PIN_STATUS":482        return { ok: true, data: await vault.getPinUnlockStatus() };483      case "VALIDATE_RECOVERY_WORDS": {484        const { words } = msg.payload as { words: string[] };485        const invalid = findInvalidWords(words);486        return { ok: true, data: { valid: invalid.length === 0, invalid } };487      }488      case "GET_RECOVERY_WORDS": {489        // Must be unlocked and have recovery set up (vault must be v2.12+).490        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };491        // LV-4: the recovery words re-derive the ROOT KEY — the highest-492        // value secret in the vault. A session unlock (which may be hours493        // old on a shared machine) is not enough; require a fresh password494        // proof, matching the 1Password/Bitwarden pattern for revealing495        // escrow material. EXEMPTION: the create-vault / rotation confirmation496        // window (peach_recovery_pending) shows the words immediately after497        // the user authenticated, and that confirmation UI has no password to498        // resend — skip the re-auth there only.499        if (!(await isRecoveryConfirmPending())) {500          const { password } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { password?: string };501          if (typeof password !== "string" || !password) {502            return { ok: false, error: "password_required" };503          }504          if (!(await vault.verifyMainPassword(password))) {505            return { ok: false, error: "wrong_password" };506          }507        }508        try {509          const words = await vault.getRecoveryWords();510          return { ok: true, data: words };511        } catch {512          return { ok: false, error: "recovery_not_setup" };513        }514      }515      case "GET_RECOVERY_CONFIRM_PENDING":516        return { ok: true, data: await isRecoveryConfirmPending() };517      case "SET_RECOVERY_CONFIRM_PENDING":518        await setRecoveryConfirmPending();519        return { ok: true };520      case "CLEAR_RECOVERY_CONFIRM_PENDING":521        await clearRecoveryConfirmPending();522        return { ok: true };523      case "RECOVER_WITH_WORDS": {524        // User has lost their password but has their 12 recovery words.525        // We: (1) validate the words, (2) re-encrypt vault with new password.526        const { words, newPassword } = msg.payload as {527          words: string[];528          newPassword: string;529        };530        const stored = await vault.loadSlotA();531        if (!stored) return { ok: false, error: "no_vault" };532        if (!stored.recovery_salt || !stored.recovery_wrapped_root_key) {533          return { ok: false, error: "recovery_not_setup" };534        }535        // Unwrap the root key from the recovery escrow.536        try {537          await vault.unwrapRootKeyForRecovery(538            stored.recovery_wrapped_root_key,539            stored.recovery_nonce ?? "",540            stored.recovery_tag ?? "",541            stored.recovery_salt,542            words543          );544        } catch {545          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_recovery_words" };546        }547        // Re-key: derive fresh salt + key from new password.548        const newSalt = vault.generateSalt();549        const newKey = await vault.deriveKey(newPassword, newSalt);550        // Re-wrap root key under the new password's derived key so the same551        // recovery words continue to work after the password change.552        await vault.rewrapRootKeyForPassword(newKey, newSalt);553        // Re-encrypt vault entries with the new key.554        await vault.changePasswordWithNewKey(newSalt, newKey);555        await setupAutoLock();556        broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });557        return { ok: true };558      }559      case "LOCK":560        await vault.lock();561        return { ok: true };562      case "IS_UNLOCKED":563        return { ok: true, data: vault.isUnlocked() };564      case "GET_VAULT_STATUS":565        return { ok: true, unlocked: vault.isUnlocked() };566      case "HAS_VAULT":567        return { ok: true, data: await vault.hasVault() };568      case "GET_ENTRIES":569        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };570        return { ok: true, data: vault.getEntries() };571      case "EXPORT_ENTRIES": {572        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };573        const { password } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { password?: unknown };574        if (typeof password !== "string" || !password) {575          return { ok: false, error: "password_required" };576        }577        if (!(await vault.verifyMainPassword(password))) {578          return { ok: false, error: "wrong_password" };579        }580        return { ok: true, data: vault.getEntries() };581      }582      case "ADD_ENTRY": {583        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };584        const payload = msg.payload;585        if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) {586          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };587        }588        // PB-26-106: a page may only create an entry bound to itself. Entries589        // carrying no url have no domain surface to bind, so they are exempt.590        if (isPageSender(sender)) {591          const draft = payload as { url?: unknown; additionalUrls?: unknown };592          const domains = entryDomains(draft.url, draft.additionalUrls);593          if (domains.size > 0 && !senderMayBindEntryDomains(sender, domains)) {594            return { ok: false, error: "origin_binding_required" };595          }596        }597        const entry = await vault.addEntry(payload as Parameters<typeof vault.addEntry>[0]);598        return { ok: true, data: entry };599      }600      case "BATCH_ADD_ENTRIES": {601        const payload = msg.payload as { entries?: unknown } | null | undefined;602        if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) {603          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };604        }605        if (!Array.isArray(payload.entries)) {606          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };607        }608        const added = await vault.batchAddEntries(payload.entries as Parameters<typeof vault.batchAddEntries>[0]);609        return { ok: true, data: added };610      }611      case "RESTORE_ENTRIES": {612        const payload = msg.payload as613          | { entries?: unknown; mode?: unknown; settings?: unknown }614          | null615          | undefined;616        if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) {617          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };618        }619        if (!Array.isArray(payload.entries)) {620          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };621        }622        if (payload.mode !== "replace" && payload.mode !== "merge") {623          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };624        }625        const summary = await vault.restoreEntries(626          payload.entries as Parameters<typeof vault.restoreEntries>[0],627          payload.mode628        );629        if (payload.settings && typeof payload.settings === "object" && !Array.isArray(payload.settings)) {630          await vault.updateSettings(payload.settings as vault.VaultSettings);631        }632        return { ok: true, data: summary };633      }634      case "CLEAR_VAULT_ENTRIES": {635        await vault.clearVaultEntries("REPLACE_ALL");636        return { ok: true };637      }638      case "GET_VAULT_HISTORY": {639        const snapshots = await vault.getVaultHistory();640        return { ok: true, data: snapshots };641      }642      case "RESTORE_VAULT_SNAPSHOT": {643        const { snapshotId } = msg.payload as { snapshotId: string };644        const result = await vault.restoreVaultSnapshot(snapshotId);645        if (!result.ok) return { ok: false, error: result.error };646        broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_LOCKED" });647        return { ok: true };648      }649      case "COUNT_DUPLICATES": {650        return { ok: true, data: vault.countDuplicates() };651      }652      case "DEDUPLICATE_ENTRIES": {653        const removed = await vault.deduplicateEntries();654        return { ok: true, data: removed };655      }656      case "UPDATE_ENTRY": {657        const payload = msg.payload as { id?: unknown; patch?: unknown } | null | undefined;658        if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) {659          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };660        }661        const { id, patch } = payload;662        if (typeof id !== "string" || !id || !patch || typeof patch !== "object" || Array.isArray(patch)) {663          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };664        }665        const existingEntry = vault.getEntryById(id);666        if (!existingEntry) return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };667        if (patchChangesEntryOrigin(patch) || isPageSender(sender)) {668          const before = entryDomains(existingEntry.url, existingEntry.additionalUrls);669          const after = patchedUrlShape(patch, existingEntry);670          if (!senderMayMutateEntryDomains(671            sender,672            before,673            entryDomains(after.url, after.additionalUrls),674          )) {675            return { ok: false, error: "origin_binding_required" };676          }677        }678        // Single enforcement point for the Canary Entries Pro gate. Only679        // gates the transition into a canary entry — clearing/disabling a680        // canary (`canary: undefined`) is always allowed, so existing681        // canary entries remain manageable.682        const incomingCanary = (patch as { canary?: unknown }).canary;683        if (incomingCanary && typeof incomingCanary === "object") {684          const existing = vault.getEntryById(id);685          if (!existing?.canary) {686            const gate = await requirePro("canary_entry");687            if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };688          }689        }690        await vault.updateEntry(id, patch as Parameters<typeof vault.updateEntry>[1]);691        return { ok: true };692      }693      case "ADD_ADDITIONAL_URL": {694        const { id, url } = msg.payload as { id: string; url: string };695        const trimmed = typeof url === "string" ? url.trim() : "";696        if (!trimmed) return { ok: false, error: "url_required" };697        const existing = vault.getEntryById(id);698        if (!existing) return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };699        const merged = [...(existing.additionalUrls ?? []), trimmed];700        if (!senderMayMutateEntryDomains(701          sender,702          entryDomains(existing.url, existing.additionalUrls),703          entryDomains(existing.url, merged),704        )) {705          return { ok: false, error: "origin_binding_required" };706        }707        if (existing.type !== "login") return { ok: false, error: "login_entries_only" };708        await vault.updateEntry(id, { additionalUrls: merged });709        return { ok: true };710      }711      case "REQUEST_REMEMBER_SITE": {712        // PB-26-106: growing an entry's domain set needs a decision the page713        // cannot make for itself, so the page asks and the popup confirms. A714        // page may only ask about its own attested origin — otherwise this715        // becomes the same unbound write under a friendlier name.716        const { id, url } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { id?: unknown; url?: unknown };717        if (typeof id !== "string" || !id) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };718        const trimmed = typeof url === "string" ? url.trim() : "";719        if (!trimmed) return { ok: false, error: "url_required" };720        if (!senderMayBindEntryDomains(sender, entryDomains(trimmed, undefined))) {721          return { ok: false, error: "origin_binding_required" };722        }723        if (!vault.getEntryById(id)) return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };724        if (chrome.storage.session) {725          await chrome.storage.session.set({ pendingRememberSite: { entryId: id, url: trimmed } });726        }727        try { await chrome.action.openPopup(); } catch { /* user opens via toolbar */ }728        return { ok: true };729      }730      case "DELETE_ENTRY": {731        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };732        await vault.deleteEntry(id);733        return { ok: true };734      }735      case "GET_DELETED_ENTRIES":736        return { ok: true, data: vault.getDeletedEntries() };737      case "RESTORE_ENTRY": {738        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };739        await vault.restoreEntry(id);740        return { ok: true };741      }742      case "PURGE_ENTRY": {743        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };744        await vault.purgeEntry(id);745        return { ok: true };746      }747      case "PURGE_EXPIRED_TRASH": {748        const { retentionMs } = msg.payload as { retentionMs: number };749        const purged = await vault.purgeExpiredTrash(retentionMs);750        return { ok: true, data: purged };751      }752      case "SAVE_NOTE": {753        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };754        const { id, title, body } = msg.payload as { id?: string; title: string; body: string };755        const now = Date.now();756        if (id) {757          const existing = vault.getEntryById(id);758          if (!existing) return { ok: false, error: "not_found" };759          await vault.updateEntry(id, { title: title || "Untitled", notes: body, modifiedAt: now });760          return { ok: true, data: vault.getEntryById(id) };761        } else {762          // PCH-01-026 #10: addEntry stamps its own createdAt/modifiedAt763          // (EntryDraft omits both), so passing them was the only reason the764          // `as any` cast existed. Dropping them makes the call type-check.765          const entry = await vault.addEntry({766            type: "note",767            title: title || "Untitled",768            notes: body,769          });770          return { ok: true, data: entry };771        }772      }773      case "DELETE_NOTE": {774        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };775        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };776        await vault.deleteEntry(id);777        return { ok: true };778      }779      case "GET_NOTES": {780        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };781        const notes = vault.getEntries().filter(782          (e) => e.type === "note" && !e.deletedAt783        );784        return { ok: true, data: notes } as MessageResponse;785      }786      case "SEARCH_VAULT": {787        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };788        // AUD-002: shape-validate the payload before calling string methods.789        // A raw cast lets a malformed message crash the handler with TypeError.790        const { query } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { query?: unknown };791        if (typeof query !== "string") {792          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };793        }794        const q = query.toLowerCase();795        const searchResults = vault.getEntries().filter(796          (e) =>797            !e.deletedAt &&798            (e.title.toLowerCase().includes(q) ||799              e.notes?.toLowerCase().includes(q) ||800              e.username?.toLowerCase().includes(q))801        );802        return { ok: true, data: searchResults } as MessageResponse;803      }804      case "AUTOFILL_QUERY": {805        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) {806          return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };807        }808        const { domain, kind, capability } = msg.payload as {809          domain: string;810          kind?: "login" | "card" | "totp";811          capability?: string;812        };813        const includeAll = consumeSummonCapability(capability, sender, "inventory");814        if (capability !== undefined && !includeAll) {815          return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };816        }817        // kind="card": return saved cards as compact summaries for the818        // inline card silver platter. Cards are not domain-scoped — every819        // saved card is a candidate on every checkout page — so domain is820        // ignored when kind === "card".821        if (kind === "card") {822          if (!includeAll) return { ok: true, data: [] };823          const cards = vault.getEntries().filter((e) => e.type === "card");824          return {825            ok: true,826            data: cards.map((e) => ({827              id: e.id,828              title: e.cardNickname || e.title,829              cardholderName: e.cardholderName,830              last4: e.last4,831              expMonth: e.expMonth,832              expYear: e.expYear,833              network: e.network,834            })),835          };836        }837        const scopedDomain = isPageSender(sender)838          ? attestedSenderDomain(sender)839          : typeof domain === "string"840            ? extractDomain(domain)841            : null;842        if (!includeAll && !scopedDomain) {843          return isPageSender(sender)844            ? { ok: false, error: "origin_unverified" }845            : { ok: true, data: [] };846        }847        if (kind === "totp") {848          const matches = (849            includeAll850              ? vault.getEntries().filter((entry) => entry.type !== "note" && entry.type !== "card")851              : vault.queryDomain(scopedDomain!)852          ).filter((entry) => !isPasskeyOnly(entry) && Boolean(entry.totp));853          return {854            ok: true,855            data: matches.map((e) => ({856              id: e.id,857              title: e.title,858              username: e.username,859              email: e.email,860              url: e.url,861              hasTotp: true,862            })),863          };864        }865        // The inline selector fills username+password into a form. Passkey-866        // only entries have no password to fill; sign-in for those goes867        // through the WebAuthn path instead. Filter them out everywhere so868        // the user doesn't see four "GitHub" rows that mostly do nothing.869        // Notes and cards never belonged here either.870        const matches = (871          includeAll872            ? vault873                .getEntries()874                .filter((entry) => entry.type !== "note" && entry.type !== "card")875            : vault.queryDomain(scopedDomain!)876        ).filter((entry) => !isPasskeyOnly(entry));877        return {878          ok: true,879          data: matches.map((e) =>880            includeAll881              ? {882                  id: e.id,883                  title: e.title,884                  // username/email/url shipped so the inline popup's search885                  // affordance can match on them, not just titles. No secrets886                  // cross the boundary — same shape as the domain-matched887                  // response below minus hasTotp (which the search list888                  // doesn't surface).889                  username: e.username,890                  email: e.email,891                  url: e.url,892                  hasPasskey: e.passkey !== undefined,893                }894              : {895                  id: e.id,896                  title: e.title,897                  username: e.username,898                  email: e.email,899                  url: e.url,900                  hasTotp: Boolean(e.totp),901                  hasPasskey: e.passkey !== undefined,902                }903          ),904        };905      }906      case "GET_ENTRY_FOR_FILL": {907        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };908        const { id, capability } = msg.payload as {909          id: string;910          capability?: string;911        };912        const capabilityAuthorized = capability !== undefined && consumeSummonCapability(capability, sender, "fill");913        const senderDomain = isPageSender(sender) ? attestedSenderDomain(sender) : null;914        if (isPageSender(sender) && !senderDomain) {915          return { ok: false, error: "origin_unverified" };916        }917        const entry = vault.getEntryById(id);918        if (!entry) return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };919920        // MV-1: re-validate the entry against the requesting frame's origin.921        // sender.url / sender.tab.url are browser-attested — a page cannot922        // forge them. PB-26-005: the FRAME url (sender.url) is authoritative923        // for an all_frames content script; the top-frame tab.url would924        // misattribute a cross-origin iframe's request to the top page. When925        // the request does not come from a tab at all (popup surfaces use926        // GET_ENTRY_FOR_EDIT, not this), refuse.927        if (senderDomain && !capabilityAuthorized) {928          if (!entryDomains(entry.url, entry.additionalUrls).has(senderDomain)) {929            // Domain mismatch — refuse silently (no oracle about which ids exist).930            return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };931          }932        }933        // Passkey-only entries (passkey credential, no password) cannot be934        // filled into a form — sign-in goes through the WebAuthn path. A935        // login that ALSO has a passkey is still fillable for its password.936        if (isPasskeyOnly(entry)) return { ok: false, error: "passkey_not_fillable" };937        // Strip the passkey credential AND the raw base32 TOTP seed from the938        // response. Content scripts never need either: the private key is the939        // authenticator's, and handing over the TOTP seed would let a940        // compromised content script mint valid codes indefinitely (SEV-3-C).941        // Generate the *current* 6-digit code here in the background and send942        // only that, plus the seconds left so the UI can render a countdown.943        // Also drop passwordHistory: filling needs only the *current* password.944        // Handing every past password to a content script during passive945        // autofill on an arbitrary page would widen the blast radius of a946        // compromised page far beyond the one credential being filled.947        const {948          passkey: _strippedPasskey,949          totp: seed,950          totpAlgorithm,951          totpDigits,952          totpPeriod,953          passwordHistory: _ph,954          ...safeEntry955        } = entry;956        let totpCode: string | undefined;957        let totpRemaining: number | undefined;958        if (seed) {959          try {960            // PCH-01-019: honour stored algorithm/digits/period (defaults apply961            // when these are undefined, i.e. RFC-default bare-seed entries).962            const generated = generateTOTP(seed, totpAlgorithm, totpDigits, totpPeriod);963            totpCode = generated.code;964            totpRemaining = generated.remaining;965          } catch {966            totpCode = undefined;967          }968        }969        if (isPageSender(sender) && vault.isUnlocked()) touchAutoLock();970        return { ok: true, data: { ...safeEntry, totpCode, totpRemaining } };971      }972      // Trusted full-entry fetch for extension-owned edit surfaces. Content973      // scripts route editing to the popup and cannot call this message.974      case "GET_ENTRY_FOR_EDIT": {975        if (isPageSender(sender)) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_sender" };976        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };977        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };978        const entry = vault.getEntryById(id);979        if (!entry) return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };980981        const { passkey: _passkey, ...safeEntry } = entry;982        return { ok: true, data: safeEntry };983      }984      case "COPY": {985        // AUD-002: shape-validate the payload before passing to the clipboard986        // helper. A raw cast lets a malformed message reach the clipboard API987        // with a non-string and throw.988        const { text, label, alreadyWritten } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {989          text?: unknown;990          label?: unknown;991          alreadyWritten?: unknown;992        };993        if (typeof text !== "string" || typeof label !== "string") {994          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };995        }996        await copyToClipboard(text, label, Boolean(alreadyWritten));997        return { ok: true, clearSeconds: getEffectiveClearSeconds() };998      }999      case "CHECK_ALL_BREACHES": {1000        const allEntries = vault.getEntries();1001        const results: Record<string, number> = {};1002        for (const entry of allEntries) {1003          if (entry.type === "note") continue;1004          if (!entry.password) continue;1005          results[entry.id] = await vault.checkBreach(entry.password);1006          // Small delay — be a good citizen to the HIBP API1007          await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 200));1008        }1009        // Persist any non-zero counts back to entries1010        for (const [id, count] of Object.entries(results)) {1011          const entry = vault.getEntryById(id);1012          if (entry && (entry.breach ?? 0) !== count) {1013            await vault.updateEntry(id, { breach: count > 0 ? count : undefined });1014          }1015        }1016        return { ok: true, data: results };1017      }1018      case "GET_SETTINGS": {1019        const settings = await vault.ensureSettingsLoaded();1020        if (!isPageSender(sender)) return { ok: true, data: settings };10211022        const safeSettings: Pick<vault.VaultSettings, "accentColor" | "theme"> & {1023          manualSummonDomains?: NonNullable<vault.VaultSettings["manualSummonDomains"]>;1024        } = {1025          accentColor: settings.accentColor,1026          theme: settings.theme,1027        };1028        const domain = attestedSenderDomain(sender);1029        const ownSummon = domain ? settings.manualSummonDomains?.[domain] : undefined;1030        if (domain && ownSummon) safeSettings.manualSummonDomains = { [domain]: ownSummon };1031        return { ok: true, data: safeSettings };1032      }1033      case "UPDATE_SETTINGS": {1034        const patch = msg.payload;1035        if (!patch || typeof patch !== "object" || Array.isArray(patch)) {1036          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1037        }1038        await vault.updateSettings(patch as vault.VaultSettings);1039        if (typeof (patch as Record<string, unknown>).autoLockMinutes === "number") {1040          await setupAutoLock();1041          if (vault.isUnlocked()) touchAutoLock();1042        }1043        return { ok: true };1044      }1045      case "SETUP_PIN": {1046        const { currentPassword, pin } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1047          currentPassword?: unknown;1048          pin?: unknown;1049        };1050        if (typeof currentPassword !== "string" || typeof pin !== "string") {1051          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1052        }1053        return (await vault.setupPinUnlock(currentPassword, pin))1054          ? { ok: true }1055          : { ok: false, error: "incorrect_current_password" };1056      }1057      case "DISABLE_PIN": {1058        const { currentPassword } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { currentPassword?: unknown };1059        if (typeof currentPassword !== "string") return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1060        return (await vault.disablePinUnlock(currentPassword))1061          ? { ok: true }1062          : { ok: false, error: "incorrect_current_password" };1063      }1064      case "GET_PENDING_PASSKEY":1065        return { ok: true, data: await getPendingPasskeyRequest() };1066      case "APPROVE_PASSKEY": {1067        const { requestId } = msg.payload as { requestId: number };1068        await resolvePendingPasskeyRequest(requestId, true);1069        return { ok: true };1070      }1071      case "DENY_PASSKEY": {1072        const { requestId } = msg.payload as { requestId: number };1073        await resolvePendingPasskeyRequest(requestId, false);1074        return { ok: true };1075      }1076      case "GET_PASSKEY_PROVIDER_STATE":1077        return { ok: true, data: await getPasskeyProviderState() };1078      case "SET_PASSKEY_PROVIDER_ENABLED": {1079        const { enabled } = msg.payload as { enabled: boolean };1080        // Disabling is always free; gating fires only when a free user is1081        // trying to turn passkey interception on.1082        if (enabled) {1083          const gate = await requirePro("passkeys");1084          if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1085        }1086        return { ok: true, data: await setPasskeyProviderEnabled(enabled) };1087      }1088      // AUD-003: this handler POSTs `entryTitle` to a user-configured HTTPS1089      // endpoint. Intentional product behavior — users configure their own1090      // dead-man's-switch. isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl blocks localhost, private1091      // IPs, and non-HTTPS schemes, but cannot defend against every DNS-1092      // rebinding case. The UI under CanarySection (Entry.tsx) discloses to1093      // users that the entry title leaves the device when the canary fires.1094      case "FIRE_CANARY_PING": {1095        // Canary alert fires unconditionally for any entry with canary: true.1096        // The Pro gate only governs creation/flagging of canary entries; once1097        // an entry is flagged, the alert path is a security property and must1098        // never be license-gated.1099        const { webhookUrl, entryTitle, trigger } = msg.payload as {1100          webhookUrl: string;1101          entryTitle: string;1102          trigger: "password_copied" | "username_copied" | "autofilled" | "submitted" | "test";1103        };1104        if (!isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl(webhookUrl)) {1105          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_webhook_url" };1106        }1107        // LV-3: debounce non-test pings per (webhook, entry) so a page that1108        // strobes focus/fill events can't turn the canary into a request1109        // firehose at the user's endpoint. Test pings are exempt — they are1110        // explicit user clicks in the settings UI and are awaited for1111        // feedback. The FIRST ping in a window always goes out, so the1112        // dead-man's-switch property (canary fires on access) is preserved;1113        // only repeats within the window are coalesced.1114        if (trigger !== "test") {1115          const rlKey = `canary-last-fetch:${webhookUrl}:${entryTitle}`;1116          const stored = await chrome.storage.local.get(rlKey);1117          const last = (stored as Record<string, unknown>)[rlKey];1118          if (typeof last === "number" && Date.now() - last < CANARY_MIN_INTERVAL_MS) {1119            return { ok: true, data: { rateLimited: true } };1120          }1121          await chrome.storage.local.set({ [rlKey]: Date.now() });1122        }1123        const body = JSON.stringify({1124          event: trigger === "test" ? "peach_canary_test" : "peach_canary_accessed",1125          entry: entryTitle,1126          trigger,1127          timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),1128          source: "peach-extension",1129        });1130        if (trigger === "test") {1131          // Permitted outbound fetch: user-configured canary alert endpoint1132          // (validated by isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl above). This is the1133          // only non-HIBP outbound call in the extension — see1134          // Projects.md §3.7. Test pings are awaited so the UI can show1135          // success/failure.1136          try {1137            const res = await fetch(webhookUrl, {1138              method: "POST",1139              headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },1140              body,1141            });1142            return { ok: res.ok, error: res.ok ? undefined : `HTTP ${res.status}` };1143          } catch (err) {1144            return { ok: false, error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : "network_error" };1145          }1146        }1147        // Non-test triggers are fire-and-forget1148        fetch(webhookUrl, {1149          method: "POST",1150          headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },1151          body,1152        }).catch(() => {});1153        return { ok: true };1154      }1155      case "ACTIVATE_LICENSE": {1156        const { key } = msg.payload as { key: string };1157        const licenseInfo = await activateLicense(key);1158        return { ok: true, data: licenseInfo };1159      }1160      case "GET_LICENSE": {1161        const licenseInfo = await getLicenseInfo();1162        return { ok: true, data: licenseInfo };1163      }1164      case "GET_LICENSE_KEY": {1165        const key = await getLicenseKey();1166        return { ok: true, data: key };1167      }1168      case "DEACTIVATE_LICENSE": {1169        await deactivateLicense();1170        return { ok: true };1171      }1172      case "SHOULD_PLAY_CELEBRATION": {1173        const should = await shouldPlayCelebration();1174        return { ok: true, data: should };1175      }1176      case "MARK_CELEBRATION_PLAYED": {1177        await markCelebrationPlayed();1178        return { ok: true };1179      }1180      case "GET_CODEX_VAULT_DATA": {1181        // Pro-gated. requirePro broadcasts PRO_GATE_TRIGGERED on miss so the1182        // popup navigates to the License section without further coordination.1183        // Also privileged-page-gated (PB-26-001), and recoveryWords inside the1184        // snapshot additionally require a fresh master-password proof.1185        const gate = await requirePro("codex");1186        if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1187        const { password } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { password?: string };1188        return await handleGetCodexVaultData(password);1189      }1190      case "ESTIMATE_CODEX_PAGES": {1191        const gate = await requirePro("codex");1192        if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1193        return await handleEstimateCodexPages();1194      }1195      case "RESTORE_FROM_CODEX": {1196        // !! IMPORTANT: intentionally NOT Pro-gated. A free device must still1197        // be able to restore a vault that was printed by a Pro user.1198        // DO NOT add a Pro gate here.1199        const payload = msg.payload as CodexRestorePayload;1200        return await handleRestoreFromCodex(payload);1201      }1202      case "OPEN_PRO_GATE": {1203        // Content script requests: open popup and navigate to License section.1204        const { feature } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { feature?: string };1205        if (chrome.storage.session) {1206          await chrome.storage.session.set({ pendingProGate: { feature: feature ?? "passkeys" } });1207        }1208        try { await chrome.action.openPopup(); } catch { /* badge fallback */ }1209        return { ok: true };1210      }1211      case "OPEN_POPUP": {1212        // Content script asks to open the trusted extension popup — used by the1213        // inline locked bubble so the master password is entered in the popup,1214        // never in page-hosted DOM (audit HIGH). Best-effort: openPopup needs a1215        // user gesture + Chrome 127+/Firefox; on failure the user clicks the1216        // toolbar icon. The badge already signals Peach needs attention.1217        //1218        // Set a session flag so the popup knows it was opened for inline unlock1219        // and should close itself once the vault is unlocked (returning the user1220        // to the inline autofill selector on the page).1221        const { entryId } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { entryId?: unknown };1222        if (entryId !== undefined && (typeof entryId !== "string" || entryId.length === 0 || entryId.length > 64)) {1223          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1224        }1225        if (chrome.storage.session) {1226          if (typeof entryId === "string") {1227            await chrome.storage.session.set({ peach_open_entry: entryId });1228          } else {1229            await chrome.storage.session.set({ peach_inline_unlock: true });1230          }1231        }1232        try { await chrome.action.openPopup(); } catch { /* user opens via toolbar */ }1233        return { ok: true };1234      }1235      case "OPEN_DETACHED_POPUP": {1236        // A window created by the action popup and then orphaned with1237        // window.close() is cascaded shut by Chrome, so the file-picker1238        // flows (OS dialogs that dismiss the popup on focus loss) ask the SW1239        // to open the standalone window instead — the SW has no window to be1240        // associated with. The query string is allowlisted so this can never1241        // open an arbitrary URL.1242        const { route } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { route?: string };1243        const search = route === "peachscript"1244          ? "?restore=peachscript"1245          : route === "csv"1246            ? "?restore=csv"1247            : route === "codex-pdf"1248              ? "?codex=pdf"1249              : null;1250        if (!search) return { ok: false, error: "bad_route" };1251        try {1252          const popupHtml =1253            chrome.runtime.getManifest().action?.default_popup ?? "src/popup/index.html";1254          await chrome.windows.create({1255            url: chrome.runtime.getURL(`${popupHtml}${search}`),1256            type: "popup",1257            width: 320,1258            height: 550,1259          });1260          return { ok: true, data: { detached: true } };1261        } catch {1262          return { ok: false };1263        }1264      }1265      case "GET_IDENTITIES": {1266        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1267        return { ok: true, data: vault.getIdentities() };1268      }1269      case "TOUCH_AUTO_LOCK": {1270        // touchAutoLock() is already called by shouldRefreshAutoLock above;1271        // this case just gives the popup a typed message to keep the session alive.1272        return { ok: true };1273      }1274      case "GET_ADVANCED_HEALTH_REPORT": {1275        const gate = await requirePro("advanced_health");1276        if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1277        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1278        const report = await buildAdvancedHealthReport(vault.getEntries());1279        return { ok: true, data: report };1280      }1281      case "IS_DURESS_ENABLED": {1282        const enabled = await vault.isDuressEnabled();1283        return { ok: true, data: enabled };1284      }1285      case "SETUP_DURESS": {1286        // Single enforcement point for the Duress Vault Pro gate. Free users1287        // who somehow reach this handler are rejected here; the popup also1288        // pre-checks isPro() to avoid showing the setup form to free users,1289        // but server-side is the actual security boundary.1290        const gate = await requirePro("duress_vault");1291        if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1292        // MV3 service workers restart after inactivity, losing the in-memory1293        // derived key. Detect this before calling setupDuress so the popup1294        // can show a meaningful prompt to re-lock and re-unlock.1295        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "session_expired" };1296        const { duressPassword } = msg.payload as { duressPassword: string };1297        await vault.setupDuress(duressPassword);1298        return { ok: true };1299      }1300      case "DISABLE_DURESS": {1301        await vault.disableDuress();1302        return { ok: true };1303      }1304      case "VERIFY_MAIN_PASSWORD": {1305        const { password } = msg.payload as { password: string };1306        const ok = await vault.verifyMainPassword(password);1307        return { ok: true, data: ok };1308      }1309      case "CHANGE_PASSWORD": {1310        const { currentPassword, newPassword } = msg.payload as {1311          currentPassword: string;1312          newPassword: string;1313        };1314        const changed = await vault.changePassword(currentPassword, newPassword);1315        return changed1316          ? { ok: true }1317          : { ok: false, error: "incorrect_current_password" };1318      }1319      case "GET_SITE_PASSWORD_POLICY": {1320        const [tab] = await chrome.tabs.query({ active: true, currentWindow: true });1321        if (!tab?.id) return { ok: true, data: null };1322        try {1323          const response = await chrome.tabs.sendMessage(tab.id, {1324            type: "GET_SITE_PASSWORD_POLICY",1325          });1326          return (response as MessageResponse) ?? { ok: true, data: null };1327        } catch {1328          return { ok: true, data: null };1329        }1330      }1331      case "RECORD_MANUAL_SUMMON": {1332        const { domain } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { domain?: unknown };1333        const origin = attestedSenderOrigin(sender);1334        let senderDomain: string | null = null;1335        if (origin) {1336          try {1337            const hostname = new URL(origin).hostname;1338            senderDomain = extractDomain(hostname) ?? hostname;1339          } catch {1340            senderDomain = null;1341          }1342        }1343        if (typeof domain !== "string" || domain.length > 253 || domain !== senderDomain) {1344          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_domain" };1345        }1346        const settings = vault.getSettings();1347        const existing = settings.manualSummonDomains?.[domain];1348        const now = Date.now();1349        await vault.updateSettings({1350          manualSummonDomains: {1351            ...settings.manualSummonDomains,1352            [domain]: {1353              firstSummonedAt: existing?.firstSummonedAt ?? now,1354              summonCount: (existing?.summonCount ?? 0) + 1,1355              lastSummonedAt: now,1356            },1357          },1358        });1359        return { ok: true };1360      }1361      case "DECLINE_CARD_SAVE": {1362        // PB-26-108: the declined-card digest is keyed by root-key material, so1363        // a decline cannot be recorded while locked. Offers are not shown while1364        // locked either, so this is unreachable in practice.1365        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1366        const { last4, expMonth, expYear } = msg.payload as { last4: string; expMonth: string; expYear: string };1367        await vault.declineCardSaveOffer(last4, expMonth, expYear);1368        return { ok: true };1369      }1370      case "IS_CARD_DECLINED": {1371        const { last4, expMonth, expYear } = msg.payload as { last4: string; expMonth: string; expYear: string };1372        const declined = await vault.isCardDeclined(last4, expMonth, expYear);1373        return { ok: true, data: declined };1374      }1375      case "INITIATE_FIREFOX_PASSKEY_CREATE": {1376        const { rpId, rpName, userName, userDisplayName } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1377          rpId?: string;1378          rpName?: string;1379          userName?: string;1380          userDisplayName?: string;1381        };1382        if (!rpId || !userName) return { ok: false, error: "rpid_and_username_required" };1383        return await initiateFirefoxPasskeyCreate({1384          rpId,1385          rpName: rpName ?? rpId,1386          userName,1387          userDisplayName,1388        }, attestedSenderOrigin(sender));1389      }13901391      case "COMPLETE_FIREFOX_PASSKEY_CREATE": {1392        const payload = msg.payload as Parameters<typeof completeFirefoxPasskeyCreate>[0] | undefined;1393        if (!payload) return { ok: false, error: "missing_payload" };1394        return await completeFirefoxPasskeyCreate(payload);1395      }13961397      case "PASSKEY_OFFER_DECLINE": {1398        const { domain } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { domain?: string };1399        const origin = attestedSenderOrigin(sender);1400        if (!domain || !origin || !isValidRpId(domain, origin)) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_domain" };1401        await recordPasskeyOfferDecline(domain);1402        return { ok: true };1403      }14041405      case "GET_PASSKEY_OFFER_DECLINED": {1406        const { domain } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { domain?: string };1407        const origin = attestedSenderOrigin(sender);1408        if (!domain || !origin || !isValidRpId(domain, origin)) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_domain" };1409        return { ok: true, data: await isPasskeyOfferDeclined(domain) };1410      }14111412      case "PASSKEY_HAS_CREDENTIALS": {1413        const payload = msg.payload as {1414          rpId?: string;1415          allowCredentials?: Array<{ id: string; type?: string }>;1416        } | undefined;1417        if (!payload?.rpId) return { ok: false, error: "rpid_required" };1418        return await handlePasskeyHasCredentials({1419          rpId: payload.rpId,1420          allowCredentials: payload.allowCredentials ?? [],1421        }, attestedSenderOrigin(sender));1422      }14231424      case "PASSKEY_CREATE": {1425        const payload = msg.payload as Parameters<typeof handleFirefoxPasskeyCreate>[0] | undefined;1426        if (!payload?.rpId || !payload?.userName) {1427          return { ok: false, error: "rpid_and_username_required" };1428        }1429        return await handleFirefoxPasskeyCreate(payload, attestedSenderOrigin(sender));1430      }14311432      case "PASSKEY_GET": {1433        const payload = msg.payload as Parameters<typeof handleFirefoxPasskeyGet>[0] | undefined;1434        if (!payload?.rpId) return { ok: false, error: "rpid_required" };1435        return await handleFirefoxPasskeyGet(payload, attestedSenderOrigin(sender));1436      }14371438      case "PASSKEY_AUTH_RESPONSE": {1439        const { requestId, approved } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1440          requestId?: string | number;1441          approved?: boolean;1442        };1443        if (requestId === undefined || requestId === null || typeof approved !== 'boolean') {1444          return { ok: false, error: 'requestId and approved required' };1445        }1446        const pending = await getPendingPasskeyRequest();1447        const senderOrigin = attestedSenderOrigin(sender);1448        if (1449          (pending && pending.requestId !== Number(requestId)) ||1450          (pending?.tabId !== undefined && sender.tab?.id !== pending.tabId) ||1451          (pending?.origin !== undefined && senderOrigin !== pending.origin)1452        ) {1453          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_passkey_approval_sender" };1454        }1455        await resolvePendingPasskeyRequest(Number(requestId), approved);1456        return { ok: true };1457      }14581459      case "GET_PASSKEY_FOR_DOMAIN": {1460        const { domain } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { domain?: string };1461        if (!domain) return { ok: false, error: "domain_required" };1462        // Scope to the caller's own origin: a page may only ask about passkeys1463        // for a domain it actually owns, so an arbitrary page cannot enumerate1464        // which sites the user holds passkeys for or read the username (audit MEDIUM).1465        const origin = attestedSenderOrigin(sender);1466        if (!origin || !isValidRpId(domain, origin)) return { ok: true, data: null };1467        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: true, data: null };1468        const match = vault1469          .getEntries()1470          .find((entry) => entry.passkey?.rpId === domain);1471        if (!match || !match.passkey) return { ok: true, data: null };1472        // Slim shape — only the fields State 11 needs. Never expose private1473        // key material, even though this is locked behind isUnlocked.1474        // bannerShown is the per-domain "already surfaced" flag, kept in1475        // trusted background session storage so content scripts never touch1476        // chrome.storage.session directly (PB-26-203).1477        let bannerShown = false;1478        if (chrome.storage.session) {1479          const flag = await chrome.storage.session.get(`peach_state11_shown:${domain}`);1480          bannerShown = Boolean((flag as Record<string, unknown>)[`peach_state11_shown:${domain}`]);1481        }1482        return {1483          ok: true,1484          data: {1485            rpId: match.passkey.rpId,1486            userName: match.passkey.userName,1487            browser: match.passkey.browser,1488            bannerShown,1489          },1490        };1491      }14921493      case "MARK_PASSKEY_BANNER_SHOWN": {1494        const { domain } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { domain?: string };1495        if (typeof domain !== "string" || !domain) return { ok: false, error: "domain_required" };1496        // Same origin binding as the read path: a page may only mark its own1497        // domain, and the flag reveals nothing either way.1498        const origin = attestedSenderOrigin(sender);1499        if (!origin || !isValidRpId(domain, origin)) return { ok: true };1500        if (chrome.storage.session) {1501          await chrome.storage.session.set({ [`peach_state11_shown:${domain}`]: Date.now() });1502        }1503        return { ok: true };1504      }15051506      case "DESTROY_VAULT": {1507        // Irreversible by design. Lock zeroes the derived key + in-memory entries;1508        // storage.local.clear() wipes every Peach key (slots, settings, license,1509        // onboarded flag, history, sync state, declined cards, recall, etc.);1510        // session.clear() wipes pending passkey requests + pro-notice queues.1511        // Caller (Panic.tsx) handles UI navigation back to onboarding.1512        //1513        // The Pro license is the one thing that must survive: the user paid for1514        // it, and destroying a vault (panic wipe, fresh start) is not a refund.1515        // Capture it before the clear and restore it after. peach_pro_celebrated1516        // rides along so the Pro celebration doesn't replay on the next unlock.1517        const preserved = await chrome.storage.local.get([1518          "peach_license",1519          "peach_pro_celebrated",1520        ]);1521        await vault.lock();1522        await storageClear();1523        await vault.clearVaultHistory();1524        const toRestore: Record<string, unknown> = {};1525        if (preserved.peach_license !== undefined) toRestore.peach_license = preserved.peach_license;1526        if (preserved.peach_pro_celebrated !== undefined) toRestore.peach_pro_celebrated = preserved.peach_pro_celebrated;1527        if (Object.keys(toRestore).length > 0) {1528          await chrome.storage.local.set(toRestore);1529        }1530        if (chrome.storage.session) {1531          await chrome.storage.session.clear();1532        }1533        await clearRecoveryConfirmPending();1534        return { ok: true };1535      }15361537      case "GET_IDENTITY_SUGGESTIONS": {1538        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1539        const entries = vault.getEntries();1540        const suggestions = buildIdentitySuggestions(entries);1541        return { ok: true, data: { suggestions } };1542      }1543      case "ML_INIT":1544        return { ok: true };15451546      case "ML_PREDICT_BATCH": {1547        // AUD-002: shape-validate before forwarding to the ML helper.1548        const { featuresArray } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { featuresArray?: unknown };1549        if (!Array.isArray(featuresArray)) {1550          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1551        }1552        return { ok: true, data: mlPredictBatch(featuresArray as MLFieldFeatures[]) };1553      }15541555      // ── Vault sync (v3) ───────────────────────────────────────────────1556      // Returns the public-facing local identity needed by the popup to1557      // drive Phase-1 audio pairing. The private long-term key never1558      // leaves the background.1559      case "GET_LOCAL_IDENTITY": {1560        // Not Pro-gated: a free device may attempt to pair so it can RECEIVE a1561        // Pro license from an already-Pro peer (at least one device must be Pro).1562        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1563        // Identity derives from the stable root key, not the password-derived1564        // key, so pairing survives a master-password change (SEV-2-B).1565        const masterKeyHex = vault.getRootKeyHex();1566        if (!masterKeyHex) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1567        const masterKey = unhexBytes(masterKeyHex);1568        try {1569          const identity = await buildLocalIdentity(masterKey);1570          // If this device is Pro, advertise the signed license so the peer can1571          // activate it after SAS confirmation — pairing carries Pro across.1572          if (await isProUser()) {1573            const license = await getLicenseKey();1574            if (license) (identity as { license?: string }).license = license;1575          }1576          return { ok: true, data: identity };1577        } finally {1578          masterKey.fill(0);1579        }1580      }15811582      case "LIST_PAIRED_DEVICES": {1583        const devices = await listPairedDevicesV3();1584        return { ok: true, data: { devices } };1585      }15861587      case "RENAME_PAIRED_DEVICE": {1588        const { deviceId, name } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { deviceId?: string; name?: string };1589        if (typeof deviceId !== "string" || !deviceId || typeof name !== "string") {1590          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1591        }1592        await renamePairedDeviceV3(deviceId, name);1593        return { ok: true };1594      }15951596      case "UNPAIR_DEVICE": {1597        const { deviceId } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { deviceId?: string };1598        if (typeof deviceId !== "string" || !deviceId) {1599          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1600        }1601        // Removing a device REVOKES it rather than just dropping the local1602        // row: a plain removal is undone the moment any other peer vouches it1603        // back through a manifest, which is exactly what the relay makes easy.1604        await revokeDeviceByIdV3(deviceId, await getOrCreateDeviceId());1605        // PB-26-213: forget the secret now so no further dial can use it.1606        // Removals that happen while locked leave orphans for the next1607        // unlock's reconcile to prune.1608        const unpairRootHex = vault.getRootKeyHex();1609        if (unpairRootHex) {1610          const unpairRoot = unhexBytes(unpairRootHex);1611          try {1612            await dropPairSecret(deviceId, unpairRoot);1613          } finally {1614            unpairRoot.fill(0);1615          }1616        } else {1617          await dropPairSecret(deviceId, null);1618        }1619        // Sync against the remaining hosts — the unpaired device no longer1620        // matters but the next alarm tick is up to ten minutes away.1621        void triggerSyncIfReachable({ reason: "device_list_changed" }).catch(() => undefined);1622        return { ok: true };1623      }16241625      case "RENAME_LOCAL_DEVICE": {1626        const { name } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { name?: string };1627        if (typeof name !== "string") return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1628        await setDeviceNameV3(name);1629        return { ok: true };1630      }16311632      // ── Relay pairing ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────1633      // Not Pro-gated (a free device may pair to receive Pro/sync). The whole NK1634      // session runs in the background; the SAS and the terminal result reach1635      // the popup as ADOPTION_SOURCE_SAS / ADOPTION_SOURCE_RESULT pushes.1636      case "START_ADOPTION_SOURCE": {1637        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1638        if (isRelayAdoptionSourceInFlight()) {1639          return { ok: false, error: "adoption_source_in_progress" };1640        }1641        try {1642          return { ok: true, data: await startRelayAdoptionSource() };1643        } catch (error) {1644          return {1645            ok: false,1646            error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : "adoption_source_failed",1647          };1648        }1649      }16501651      // Onboarding receiver — empty extension shows a QR, phone scans and1652      // sends the vault. The popup supplies the local-only password here so1653      // the background can wrap the adopted root key at rest without ever1654      // asking the user to retype it.1655      case "START_ADOPTION_RECEIVER": {1656        if (isRelayAdoptionSourceInFlight()) {1657          return { ok: false, error: "adoption_receiver_in_progress" };1658        }1659        const password = (msg.payload as { password?: unknown } | undefined)?.password;1660        if (typeof password !== "string" || password.length === 0) {1661          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1662        }1663        try {1664          return { ok: true, data: await startRelayAdoptionReceiver(password) };1665        } catch (error) {1666          return {1667            ok: false,1668            error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : "adoption_receiver_failed",1669          };1670        }1671      }16721673      // Source-side mirror of RECEIVER_SAS_DECISION: the popup's confirm/cancel1674      // on the source's SAS screen. The id round-trips the same way so a stale1675      // late response can't approve the wrong session.1676      case "RECEIVER_SAS_DECISION": {1677        const payload = msg.payload as { id?: unknown; sas?: unknown; ok?: unknown } | undefined;1678        if (typeof payload?.id !== "string" || typeof payload.sas !== "string" || typeof payload.ok !== "boolean") {1679          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1680        }1681        return { ok: resolveReceiverSasConfirmation(payload.id, payload.sas, payload.ok) };1682      }16831684      case "SOURCE_SAS_DECISION": {1685        const payload = msg.payload as { id?: unknown; ok?: unknown } | undefined;1686        if (typeof payload?.id !== "string" || typeof payload?.ok !== "boolean") {1687          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1688        }1689        return { ok: resolveSourceSasConfirmation(payload.id, payload.ok) };1690      }16911692      case "CANCEL_ADOPTION_SOURCE": {1693        cancelRelayAdoptionSource();1694        return { ok: true };1695      }16961697      case "TRIGGER_SYNC": {1698        const payload = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1699          reason?: "vault_change" | "foreground" | "manual";1700          force?: boolean;1701        };1702        const reason = payload.reason ?? "foreground";17031704        void triggerSyncIfReachable({ reason, force: payload.force === true });1705        return { ok: true };1706      }17071708      case "GET_SYNC_STATE": {1709        return { ok: true, data: getSyncState() };1710      }17111712      case "GET_SYNC_SETTINGS": {1713        return { ok: true, data: await getSyncSettings() };1714      }17151716      case "SET_SYNC_SETTINGS": {1717        const payload = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1718          mode?: unknown;1719          relayUrl?: unknown;1720        };1721        try {1722          // A custom relay URL implies private mode; Peach's own relay stays1723          // public. See setRelayUrl.1724          if (payload.relayUrl !== undefined) {1725            if (typeof payload.relayUrl !== "string") {1726              return { ok: false, error: "invalid_relay_url" };1727            }1728            return { ok: true, data: await setRelayUrl(payload.relayUrl) };1729          }1730          if (payload.mode !== undefined) {1731            if (payload.mode !== "public" && payload.mode !== "private" && payload.mode !== "off") {1732              return { ok: false, error: "invalid_sync_mode" };1733            }1734            return { ok: true, data: await setSyncMode(payload.mode as SyncMode) };1735          }1736          return { ok: true, data: await getSyncSettings() };1737        } catch (error) {1738          return {1739            ok: false,1740            error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : "invalid_relay_url",1741          };1742        }1743      }17441745      case "GET_SYNC_ALERTS": {1746        const { consume } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { consume?: boolean };1747        const alerts = await getPendingSyncAlerts();1748        // The popup reads on open and acknowledges with consume:true after1749        // rendering, so a popup crash between read and render doesn't lose1750        // the alerts.1751        if (consume) await clearPendingSyncAlerts();1752        return { ok: true, data: alerts };1753      }17541755      case "GET_PENDING_VOUCHED_DEVICES": {1756        return { ok: true, data: await listPendingVouchedDevices() };1757      }1758      case "CONFIRM_VOUCHED_DEVICE": {1759        const { deviceId } = msg.payload as { deviceId: string };1760        const pending = await getPendingVouchedDevice(deviceId);1761        if (!pending) return { ok: false, error: "not_pending" };1762        // Last gate before a vouched device becomes a sync peer. A queue entry1763        // can predate the revocation that names it, so revocation is re-checked1764        // here rather than trusted to have swept the queue.1765        if (await isDeviceRevoked(pending.deviceId, pending.longTermPublicKeyHex)) {1766          await removePendingVouchedDevice(deviceId);1767          return { ok: false, error: "device_revoked" };1768        }1769        await upsertPairedDeviceV3({1770          deviceId: pending.deviceId,1771          deviceName: pending.deviceName,1772          deviceType:1773            pending.deviceType as import("../shared/sync-types").PairedDevice["deviceType"],1774          longTermPublicKeyHex: pending.longTermPublicKeyHex,1775          signingPublicKeyHex: pending.signingPublicKeyHex,1776          wsPort: pending.wsPort,1777          pairedAt: pending.pairedAt,1778          trustSource: "vouched",1779        });1780        await removePendingVouchedDevice(deviceId);1781        // Newly confirmed vouched device is now a sync target — kick a round1782        // so the mesh introduction pays off without a 10-minute wait.1783        void triggerSyncIfReachable({ reason: "device_list_changed" }).catch(() => undefined);1784        return { ok: true };1785      }1786      case "REJECT_VOUCHED_DEVICE": {1787        const { deviceId } = msg.payload as { deviceId: string };1788        await removePendingVouchedDevice(deviceId);1789        return { ok: true };1790      }1791      case "ROTATE_SYNC_IDENTITY": {1792        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1793        const result = await vault.rotateSyncIdentity();1794        return result.ok ? { ok: true } : { ok: false, error: result.error };1795      }17961797      default:1798        return { ok: false, error: "unknown_message_type" };1799    }1800  } catch (err) {1801    return {1802      ok: false,1803      error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : "operation_failed",1804    };1805  }1806}18071808// Returns username use-counts from the vault, sorted by frequency. Each row1809// also carries the entry's email so the popup can suggest the email/username1810// pair the user has actually used together.1811function buildIdentitySuggestions(1812  entries: VaultEntry[],1813): Array<{ email: string; username: string; count: number }> {1814  const usernameCounts = new Map<string, number>();1815  const usernameEmail = new Map<string, string>();1816  for (const entry of entries) {1817    const username = entry.username ?? "";1818    const email = (entry as VaultEntry & { email?: string }).email ?? "";1819    if (!username && !email) continue;1820    const key = username || email;1821    usernameCounts.set(key, (usernameCounts.get(key) ?? 0) + 1);1822    if (!usernameEmail.has(key)) usernameEmail.set(key, email);1823  }1824  return Array.from(usernameCounts.entries())1825    .sort((a, b) => b[1] - a[1])1826    .map(([username, count]) => ({1827      email: usernameEmail.get(username) ?? "",1828      username,1829      count,1830    }));1831}18321833/** Notify all content scripts that the vault just became available. */1834function broadcastToContentScripts(message: { type: string }): void {1835  if (!chrome.tabs?.query) return;1836  chrome.tabs.query({}, (tabs) => {1837    for (const tab of tabs) {1838      if (tab.id !== undefined) {1839        chrome.tabs.sendMessage(tab.id, message).catch(() => {1840          // Tab may not have a content script — silently ignore1841        });1842      }1843    }1844  });1845}18461847function shouldRefreshAutoLock(1848  type: MessageType,1849  sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender>,1850): boolean {1851  if (!isExtensionPageSender(sender)) return false;1852  return (1853    type !== "HAS_VAULT" &&1854    type !== "IS_UNLOCKED" &&1855    type !== "GET_VAULT_STATUS" &&1856    type !== "LOCK" &&1857    type !== "UPDATE_SETTINGS" &&1858    type !== "GET_PENDING_PASSKEY" &&1859    type !== "GET_PASSKEY_PROVIDER_STATE" &&1860    type !== "DECLINE_CARD_SAVE" &&1861    type !== "IS_CARD_DECLINED" &&1862    type !== "AUTOFILL_QUERY" &&1863    type !== "ML_PREDICT_BATCH"1864  );1865}18661867function isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl(value: string): boolean {1868  try {1869    const url = new URL(value);1870    if (url.protocol !== "https:") return false;18711872    const hostname = url.hostname.toLowerCase();1873    if (1874      hostname === "localhost" ||1875      hostname.endsWith(".localhost") ||1876      isPrivateIpv4(hostname) ||1877      isPrivateIpv6(hostname)1878    ) {1879      return false;1880    }18811882    return true;1883  } catch {1884    return false;1885  }1886}18871888function isPrivateIpv4(hostname: string): boolean {1889  if (PRIVATE_IPV4_RANGES.some((range) => hostname.startsWith(range.prefix))) {1890    return true;1891  }18921893  const octets = hostname.split(".").map((part) => Number(part));1894  if (octets.length !== 4 || octets.some((octet) => !Number.isInteger(octet) || octet < 0 || octet > 255)) {1895    return false;1896  }18971898  return octets[0] === 172 && octets[1] >= 16 && octets[1] <= 31;1899}19001901function isPrivateIpv6(hostname: string): boolean {1902  const normalized = hostname.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "").toLowerCase();1903  // IPv4-mapped IPv6 literals embed a plain IPv4 address that the prefix1904  // list below can never match (WHATWG URL serializes [::ffff:192.168.0.1]1905  // as ::ffff:c0a8:1). Unwrap and test the embedded IPv4; unparseable mapped1906  // tails fail closed. (Codex Security 2026-08-04 LOW,1907  // ssrf.webhook-url-private-ip-filter.) DNS rebinding is out of scope for a1908  // one-shot host check.1909  const mapped = /^::ffff:(.+)$/.exec(normalized);1910  if (mapped) {1911    const tail = mapped[1] ?? "";1912    if (tail.includes(".")) return isPrivateIpv4(tail);1913    const parts = tail.split(":");1914    const [hi, lo] = parts;1915    if (1916      parts.length !== 2 ||1917      !hi ||1918      !lo ||1919      !/^[0-9a-f]{1,4}$/.test(hi) ||1920      !/^[0-9a-f]{1,4}$/.test(lo)1921    ) {1922      return true;1923    }1924    const octets = [1925      (Number.parseInt(hi, 16) >>> 8) & 0xff,1926      Number.parseInt(hi, 16) & 0xff,1927      (Number.parseInt(lo, 16) >>> 8) & 0xff,1928      Number.parseInt(lo, 16) & 0xff,1929    ];1930    return isPrivateIpv4(octets.join("."));1931  }1932  return (1933    normalized === "::1" ||1934    normalized.startsWith("fc") ||1935    normalized.startsWith("fd") ||1936    normalized.startsWith("fe80:")1937  );1938}