peach-browser / src / background @ 9369069f7f73

messages.ts

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1/**2 * messages.ts — the only background message handler.3 *4 * All `chrome.runtime.onMessage` handling for the service worker lives here.5 * Do not handle messages inline in entry.ts, alarms.ts, or any other6 * background file. Every background-bound MessageType in shared/types.ts7 * must have a case below. Content-script-bound message types (PING,8 * SUMMON_AUTOFILL, VAULT_LOCKED) are documented in shared/types.ts and9 * intentionally have no case here — they are sent *to* content scripts.10 */1112import { copyToClipboard, getEffectiveClearSeconds } from "./clipboard";13import { getPendingSyncAlerts, clearPendingSyncAlerts } from "./sync-alerts";14import { extractDomain } from "../shared/domain";15import { computeVaultId } from "../shared/sync-identity";16import {17  getPendingVouchedDevice,18  listPendingVouchedDevices,19  removePendingVouchedDevice,20} from "./pending-vouched-devices";21import { isRecoveryConfirmPending } from "./recovery-pending";22import { setupAutoLock, touchAutoLock } from "./alarms";23import { runSelfTest } from "./self-test";24import * as vault from "./vault";25import {26  handleEstimateCodexPages,27  handleGetCodexVaultData,28  handleRestoreFromCodex,29} from "./codex-handlers";30import type { CodexRestorePayload } from "../shared/codex-types";31import {32  activateLicense,33  deactivateLicense,34  getLicenseInfo,35  getLicenseKey,36  isProUser,37  markCelebrationPlayed,38  shouldPlayCelebration,39} from "./license";40import {41  completeFirefoxPasskeyCreate,42  getPasskeyProviderState,43  getPendingPasskeyRequest,44  handleFirefoxPasskeyCreate,45  handleFirefoxPasskeyGet,46  handlePasskeyHasCredentials,47  initiateFirefoxPasskeyCreate,48  isPasskeyOfferDeclined,49  onVaultUnlocked,50  recordPasskeyOfferDecline,51  resolvePendingPasskeyRequest,52  setPasskeyProviderEnabled,53} from "./passkey";54import { buildAdvancedHealthReport } from "./health";55import { storageClear } from "../shared/storage";56import { findInvalidWords } from "../shared/recovery-words";57import type {58  Message,59  MessageResponse,60  MessageType,61  ProFeature,62  VaultEntry,63} from "../shared/types";64import { isPasskeyOnly } from "../shared/types";65import { generateTOTP } from "../crypto/totp";66import { isValidRpId } from "../shared/passkey-utils";67import { isNativePlatform, nativePlugin } from "../shared/native";68import { predictBatch as mlPredictBatch } from "./ml";69import type { MLFieldFeatures } from "../shared/ml";70import {71  buildLocalIdentity,72  getOrCreateDeviceId,73  setDeviceName as setDeviceNameV3,74} from "./device-identity";75import {76  listPairedDevices as listPairedDevicesV3,77  revokeDeviceById as revokeDeviceByIdV3,78  upsertPairedDevice as upsertPairedDeviceV3,79} from "./paired-devices";80// Sync and pairing are imported statically, never with `await import()`.81// `import()` throws `TypeError: import() is disallowed on82// ServiceWorkerGlobalScope` at runtime in MV3, and Vite's preload helper83// reports the failure through `window.dispatchEvent`, which does not exist in84// a worker either — so the real reason was replaced by "window is not defined"85// and the pairing UI just stopped. scripts/check-sw-static-imports.mjs fails86// the build if a runtime import() reappears anywhere in the worker's graph.87import {88  cancelRelayAdoptionSource,89  confirmRelayAdoptionSource,90  isRelayAdoptionSourceInFlight,91  startRelayAdoptionSource,92} from "./relay-adoption-source-bg";93import {94  getSyncSettings,95  setRelayUrl,96  setSyncMode,97  type SyncMode,98} from "./sync-settings";99import {100  getSyncState,101  hydratePersistedSyncState,102  setSyncRunner,103  triggerSyncIfReachable,104} from "./sync-trigger";105import { productionSyncRunner } from "./sync-runner";106107// Compile-time E2E flag, folded to a literal by Vite's `define` (false in108// every production build — verified in the bundled output). Mirrors the109// create-path bypass in passkey.ts so the Playwright passkey smoke can enable110// the provider without a real Pro licence; the gate is fully intact for users.111declare const __PEACH_E2E_PASSKEYS__: boolean;112const PASSKEY_E2E_PRO_BYPASS = __PEACH_E2E_PASSKEYS__ === true;113114let nativeSyncRunnerBootstrapped = false;115116function unhexBytes(hex: string): Uint8Array {117  if (hex.length % 2 !== 0) throw new Error("invalid hex");118  const out = new Uint8Array(hex.length / 2);119  for (let i = 0; i < out.length; i++) {120    out[i] = parseInt(hex.slice(i * 2, i * 2 + 2), 16);121  }122  return out;123}124125/**126 * The single Pro gate. Every gated handler calls this first; the broadcast127 * lets the popup react (navigate to the License section, highlight the128 * relevant feature). Background never touches the popup view directly —129 * the popup owns navigation. See Projects.md "Pro gate rule".130 */131async function requirePro(132  feature: ProFeature,133  trigger: "user" | "background" = "user"134): Promise<{ allowed: boolean }> {135  if (PASSKEY_E2E_PRO_BYPASS && feature === "passkeys") return { allowed: true };136  if (await isProUser()) return { allowed: true };137138  if (trigger === "user") {139    // User deliberately triggered this feature — redirect the popup immediately.140    chrome.runtime141      .sendMessage({ type: "PRO_GATE_TRIGGERED", payload: { feature } })142      .catch(() => {143        // Popup may be closed — the gate signal is best-effort.144      });145  } else {146    // Background trigger (e.g. passive sync initiation) — no popup is open.147    // Queue a notice so the next popup open shows a soft banner instead of148    // silently failing.149    if (chrome.storage.session) {150      chrome.storage.session151        .set({ pendingProNotice: { feature, triggeredAt: Date.now() } })152        .catch(() => {});153    }154  }155156  return { allowed: false };157}158159// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------160// Feedback submission target. Empty disables network submission while the UI161// continues to function as a no-op (the handler returns ok:true without162// calling fetch). When set, the URL is validated by163// `isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl` before any request.164// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------165166const FEEDBACK_ENDPOINT = "";167168// PCH-01-018: operations that irreversibly destroy or replace vault contents.169// These are gated to trusted extension-page senders in handleMessage; the170// confirmation UX otherwise lives only in the popup. Keep this in sync when171// adding new destructive handlers.172const DESTRUCTIVE_MESSAGE_TYPES: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([173  "DESTROY_VAULT",174  "CLEAR_VAULT_ENTRIES",175  "RESTORE_VAULT_SNAPSHOT",176  "RESTORE_FROM_CODEX",177]);178179// LV-3: minimum interval between non-test canary pings per webhook+entry.180const CANARY_MIN_INTERVAL_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000; // 1 hour181182const PRIVATE_IPV4_RANGES = [183  { prefix: "10." },184  { prefix: "127." },185  { prefix: "169.254." },186  { prefix: "192.168." },187];188189export function setupMessageHandler(): void {190  chrome.runtime.onMessage.addListener(191    (msg: unknown, sender, sendResponse) => {192      if (!isMessage(msg)) {193        sendResponse({ ok: false, error: "invalid_message" });194        return true;195      }196      handleMessage(msg, sender)197        .then(sendResponse)198        .catch((err) =>199          sendResponse({200            ok: false,201            error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),202          })203        );204      return true;205    }206  );207208  // Android: the chrome shim queues sendMessage calls until this handler is209  // registered. Without this hookup, every message hangs on Capacitor builds.210  // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any211  const reg = (globalThis as any).__peachRegisterMessageHandler;212  if (typeof reg === "function") {213    reg(async (m: unknown) => {214      if (!isMessage(m)) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_message" };215      try {216        return await handleMessage(m);217      } catch (err) {218        return {219          ok: false,220          error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),221        };222      }223    });224  }225  if (isNativePlatform()) {226    void bootstrapNativeSyncRunner();227  }228}229230async function bootstrapNativeSyncRunner(): Promise<void> {231  if (nativeSyncRunnerBootstrapped) return;232  nativeSyncRunnerBootstrapped = true;233  try {234    setSyncRunner(productionSyncRunner);235    await hydratePersistedSyncState();236  } catch (err) {237    nativeSyncRunnerBootstrapped = false;238    console.warn("[Peach] failed to bootstrap native sync runner:", err);239  }240}241242function isMessage(m: unknown): m is Message {243  return typeof m === "object" && m !== null && "type" in m;244}245246/**247 * The browser-attested origin of the page that originated this message. A web248 * page cannot call chrome.runtime.sendMessage directly (no externally_connectable),249 * so every page-driven message arrives via the content-script relay and the250 * browser stamps `sender.origin`/`sender.url` with the real frame origin — a251 * value the page cannot forge. This is the ONLY trustworthy origin for passkey252 * rpId<->origin enforcement; payload-supplied origins are attacker-controlled.253 */254function attestedSenderOrigin(sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender>): string | undefined {255  if (sender.origin) return sender.origin;256  if (sender.url) {257    try { return new URL(sender.url).origin; } catch { return undefined; }258  }259  return undefined;260}261262// Resolves once restoreFromSession() has run, so handlers see the correct263// post-restore unlock state. entry.ts registers this BEFORE the message264// handler so the onMessage listener is added synchronously at SW startup265// (MV3 requirement) while unlock-dependent handlers still wait for restore.266let restoreReady: Promise<void> = Promise.resolve();267268/** Called by entry.ts at startup with the in-flight restoreFromSession promise. */269export function setRestoreReady(p: Promise<unknown>): void {270  restoreReady = p.then(() => undefined, () => undefined);271}272273export async function handleMessage(274  msg: Message,275  sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender> = {}276): Promise<MessageResponse> {277  try {278    // Wait for session-restore to finish before reading any unlock/vault state.279    // On a cold SW start the popup's first message arrives while restore is280    // still in flight; without this gate IS_UNLOCKED would report locked (a281    // spurious lock screen) and the storage reads could race. The onMessage282    // listener itself is registered synchronously (entry.ts) so this gate, not283    // listener registration, is what absorbs the cold-start window.284    await restoreReady;285    // Validate sender — only allow messages from our extension pages/scripts.286    // `sender.id` is undefined for messages originating from extension UI287    // (popup/options), which is legitimate; reject only when it is defined288    // and does not match our extension id.289    if (290      sender.id !== undefined &&291      sender.id !== chrome.runtime.id292    ) {293      return { ok: false, error: "invalid_sender" };294    }295296    // PCH-01-018: irreversible operations must originate from a trusted extension297    // page (popup/options), never from a content script. The sender.id check above298    // only proves the message came from *our* extension — a content script injected299    // into an attacker page passes it. A single XSS-class bug in the injected UI300    // would otherwise escalate to vault destruction. Extension pages carry an301    // extension-origin sender.url; content scripts carry a page URL.302    if (DESTRUCTIVE_MESSAGE_TYPES.has(msg.type)) {303      const extensionOrigin = chrome.runtime.getURL("");304      if (!sender.url?.startsWith(extensionOrigin)) {305        return { ok: false, error: "invalid_sender" };306      }307    }308309    if (shouldRefreshAutoLock(msg.type) && vault.isUnlocked()) {310      touchAutoLock();311    }312313    switch (msg.type) {314      case "CREATE_VAULT": {315        const { password } = msg.payload as { password: string };316        // Refuse to create a vault under an empty master password — the derived317        // key would be publicly known and the at-rest AES-GCM protection void318        // (audit HIGH; the CSV-import path previously passed ""). Length/strength319        // policy lives in the onboarding UI; this is the non-negotiable floor.320        if (typeof password !== "string" || password.length === 0) {321          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };322        }323        await vault.createVault(password);324        await setupAutoLock();325        broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });326        onVaultUnlocked();327        return { ok: true };328      }329      case "CREATE_VAULT_FROM_ROOT_KEY": {330        const { password, rootKeyHex } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {331          password?: unknown;332          rootKeyHex?: unknown;333        };334        if (typeof password !== "string" || password.length === 0 || typeof rootKeyHex !== "string") {335          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };336        }337338        try {339          const { vaultId } = await vault.createVaultFromRootKey(password, rootKeyHex);340          await setupAutoLock();341          broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });342          onVaultUnlocked();343          return { ok: true, vaultId };344        } catch (err) {345          return { ok: false, error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err) };346        }347      }348      case "UNLOCK": {349        const { password } = msg.payload as { password: string };350        const ok = await vault.unlock(password);351        if (ok) {352          // KAT: verify the WebCrypto stack is healthy before the user relies on it.353          // Runs after unlock so latency is hidden behind the vault-load time.354          const kat = await runSelfTest();355          if (!kat.ok) {356            console.error("[Peach] Crypto self-test FAILED:", kat.error);357            await vault.lock();358            return { ok: false, error: "self_test_failed" };359          }360          await setupAutoLock();361          broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });362          onVaultUnlocked();363          if (isNativePlatform()) await publishInMemoryVault(vault.getEntries());364          return { ok: true };365        }366        // Distinguish corruption from wrong password so the popup can offer367        // a history-restore path instead of falsely accusing the user of368        // mistyping (M7/COR-007).369        const failure = vault.consumeLastUnlockFailureReason();370        if (failure) {371          return {372            ok: false,373            error: "vault_corrupted",374            canRestoreFromHistory: true,375          } as MessageResponse;376        }377        return { ok: false };378      }379      case "VALIDATE_RECOVERY_WORDS": {380        const { words } = msg.payload as { words: string[] };381        const invalid = findInvalidWords(words);382        return { ok: true, data: { valid: invalid.length === 0, invalid } };383      }384      case "GET_RECOVERY_WORDS": {385        // Must be unlocked and have recovery set up (vault must be v2.12+).386        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };387        // LV-4: the recovery words re-derive the ROOT KEY — the highest-388        // value secret in the vault. A session unlock (which may be hours389        // old on a shared machine) is not enough; require a fresh password390        // proof, matching the 1Password/Bitwarden pattern for revealing391        // escrow material. EXEMPTION: the create-vault / rotation confirmation392        // window (peach_recovery_pending) shows the words immediately after393        // the user authenticated, and that confirmation UI has no password to394        // resend — skip the re-auth there only.395        if (!(await isRecoveryConfirmPending())) {396          const { password } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { password?: string };397          if (typeof password !== "string" || !password) {398            return { ok: false, error: "password_required" };399          }400          if (!(await vault.verifyMainPassword(password))) {401            return { ok: false, error: "wrong_password" };402          }403        }404        try {405          const words = await vault.getRecoveryWords();406          return { ok: true, data: words };407        } catch (e) {408          // pre-v2.12 vault that hasn't migrated409          return { ok: false, error: "recovery_not_setup" };410        }411      }412      case "RECOVER_WITH_WORDS": {413        // User has lost their password but has their 12 recovery words.414        // We: (1) validate the words, (2) re-encrypt vault with new password.415        const { words, newPassword } = msg.payload as {416          words: string[];417          newPassword: string;418        };419        const stored = await vault.loadSlotA();420        if (!stored) return { ok: false, error: "no_vault" };421        if (!stored.recovery_salt || !stored.recovery_wrapped_root_key) {422          return { ok: false, error: "recovery_not_setup" };423        }424        // Unwrap the root key from the recovery escrow.425        try {426          await vault.unwrapRootKeyForRecovery(427            stored.recovery_wrapped_root_key,428            stored.recovery_nonce ?? "",429            stored.recovery_tag ?? "",430            stored.recovery_salt,431            words432          );433        } catch {434          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_recovery_words" };435        }436        // Re-key: derive fresh salt + key from new password.437        const newSalt = vault.generateSalt();438        const newKey = await vault.deriveKey(newPassword, newSalt);439        // Re-wrap root key under the new password's derived key so the same440        // recovery words continue to work after the password change.441        await vault.rewrapRootKeyForPassword(newKey, newSalt);442        // Re-encrypt vault entries with the new key.443        await vault.changePasswordWithNewKey(newSalt, newKey);444        await setupAutoLock();445        broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });446        return { ok: true };447      }448      case "LOCK":449        vault.lock();450        if (isNativePlatform()) await clearInMemoryVault();451        return { ok: true };452      case "IS_UNLOCKED":453        return { ok: true, data: vault.isUnlocked() };454      case "GET_VAULT_STATUS":455        return { ok: true, unlocked: vault.isUnlocked() };456      case "HAS_VAULT":457        return { ok: true, data: await vault.hasVault() };458      case "GET_ENTRIES":459        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };460        return { ok: true, data: vault.getEntries() };461      case "ADD_ENTRY": {462        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };463        const payload = msg.payload;464        if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) {465          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };466        }467        const entry = await vault.addEntry(payload as Parameters<typeof vault.addEntry>[0]);468        return { ok: true, data: entry };469      }470      case "BATCH_ADD_ENTRIES": {471        const payload = msg.payload as { entries?: unknown } | null | undefined;472        if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) {473          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };474        }475        if (!Array.isArray(payload.entries)) {476          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };477        }478        const added = await vault.batchAddEntries(payload.entries as Parameters<typeof vault.batchAddEntries>[0]);479        return { ok: true, data: added };480      }481      case "RESTORE_ENTRIES": {482        const payload = msg.payload as483          | { entries?: unknown; mode?: unknown; settings?: unknown }484          | null485          | undefined;486        if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) {487          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };488        }489        if (!Array.isArray(payload.entries)) {490          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };491        }492        if (payload.mode !== "replace" && payload.mode !== "merge") {493          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };494        }495        const summary = await vault.restoreEntries(496          payload.entries as Parameters<typeof vault.restoreEntries>[0],497          payload.mode498        );499        if (payload.settings && typeof payload.settings === "object" && !Array.isArray(payload.settings)) {500          await vault.updateSettings(payload.settings as vault.VaultSettings);501        }502        return { ok: true, data: summary };503      }504      case "CLEAR_VAULT_ENTRIES": {505        await vault.clearVaultEntries("REPLACE_ALL");506        return { ok: true };507      }508      case "GET_VAULT_HISTORY": {509        const snapshots = await vault.getVaultHistory();510        return { ok: true, data: snapshots };511      }512      case "RESTORE_VAULT_SNAPSHOT": {513        const { snapshotId } = msg.payload as { snapshotId: string };514        const result = await vault.restoreVaultSnapshot(snapshotId);515        if (!result.ok) return { ok: false, error: result.error };516        broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_LOCKED" });517        return { ok: true };518      }519      case "COUNT_DUPLICATES": {520        return { ok: true, data: vault.countDuplicates() };521      }522      case "DEDUPLICATE_ENTRIES": {523        const removed = await vault.deduplicateEntries();524        return { ok: true, data: removed };525      }526      case "UPDATE_ENTRY": {527        const payload = msg.payload as { id?: unknown; patch?: unknown } | null | undefined;528        if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) {529          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };530        }531        const { id, patch } = payload;532        if (typeof id !== "string" || !id || !patch || typeof patch !== "object" || Array.isArray(patch)) {533          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };534        }535        // Single enforcement point for the Canary Entries Pro gate. Only536        // gates the transition into a canary entry — clearing/disabling a537        // canary (`canary: undefined`) is always allowed, so existing538        // canary entries remain manageable.539        const incomingCanary = (patch as { canary?: unknown }).canary;540        if (incomingCanary && typeof incomingCanary === "object") {541          const existing = vault.getEntryById(id);542          if (!existing?.canary) {543            const gate = await requirePro("canary_entry");544            if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };545          }546        }547        await vault.updateEntry(id, patch as Parameters<typeof vault.updateEntry>[1]);548        return { ok: true };549      }550      case "ADD_ADDITIONAL_URL": {551        const { id, url } = msg.payload as { id: string; url: string };552        const trimmed = typeof url === "string" ? url.trim() : "";553        if (!trimmed) return { ok: false, error: "url_required" };554        const existing = vault.getEntryById(id);555        if (!existing) return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };556        if (existing.type !== "login") return { ok: false, error: "login_entries_only" };557        const merged = [...(existing.additionalUrls ?? []), trimmed];558        await vault.updateEntry(id, { additionalUrls: merged });559        return { ok: true };560      }561      case "DELETE_ENTRY": {562        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };563        await vault.deleteEntry(id);564        return { ok: true };565      }566      case "GET_DELETED_ENTRIES":567        return { ok: true, data: vault.getDeletedEntries() };568      case "RESTORE_ENTRY": {569        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };570        await vault.restoreEntry(id);571        return { ok: true };572      }573      case "PURGE_ENTRY": {574        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };575        await vault.purgeEntry(id);576        return { ok: true };577      }578      case "PURGE_EXPIRED_TRASH": {579        const { retentionMs } = msg.payload as { retentionMs: number };580        const purged = await vault.purgeExpiredTrash(retentionMs);581        return { ok: true, data: purged };582      }583      case "SAVE_NOTE": {584        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };585        const { id, title, body } = msg.payload as { id?: string; title: string; body: string };586        const now = Date.now();587        if (id) {588          const existing = vault.getEntryById(id);589          if (!existing) return { ok: false, error: "not_found" };590          await vault.updateEntry(id, { title: title || "Untitled", notes: body, modifiedAt: now });591          return { ok: true, data: vault.getEntryById(id) };592        } else {593          // PCH-01-026 #10: addEntry stamps its own createdAt/modifiedAt594          // (EntryDraft omits both), so passing them was the only reason the595          // `as any` cast existed. Dropping them makes the call type-check.596          const entry = await vault.addEntry({597            type: "note",598            title: title || "Untitled",599            notes: body,600          });601          return { ok: true, data: entry };602        }603      }604      case "DELETE_NOTE": {605        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };606        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };607        await vault.deleteEntry(id);608        return { ok: true };609      }610      case "GET_NOTES": {611        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };612        const notes = vault.getEntries().filter(613          (e) => e.type === "note" && !e.deletedAt614        );615        return { ok: true, data: notes } as MessageResponse;616      }617      case "SEARCH_VAULT": {618        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };619        // AUD-002: shape-validate the payload before calling string methods.620        // A raw cast lets a malformed message crash the handler with TypeError.621        const { query } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { query?: unknown };622        if (typeof query !== "string") {623          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };624        }625        const q = query.toLowerCase();626        const searchResults = vault.getEntries().filter(627          (e) =>628            !e.deletedAt &&629            (e.title.toLowerCase().includes(q) ||630              e.notes?.toLowerCase().includes(q) ||631              e.username?.toLowerCase().includes(q))632        );633        return { ok: true, data: searchResults } as MessageResponse;634      }635      case "AUTOFILL_QUERY": {636        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) {637          return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };638        }639        let { includeAll } = msg.payload as { includeAll?: boolean };640        const { domain, kind, userGesture } = msg.payload as {641          domain: string;642          kind?: "login" | "card" | "totp";643          userGesture?: boolean;644        };645        // MV-2: the vault-wide inventory (every title/username/email/url)646        // may only leave the background on an explicit user gesture — the647        // user opening the search affordance — never on passive form focus.648        // userGesture is self-declared by our own content script; the value649        // of this gate is that PASSIVE code paths (which never set it)650        // cannot ship the inventory, shrinking what a compromised page that651        // merely triggers focus events can observe.652        if (includeAll && userGesture !== true) {653          includeAll = false;654        }655        // kind="card": return saved cards as compact summaries for the656        // inline card silver platter. Cards are not domain-scoped — every657        // saved card is a candidate on every checkout page — so domain is658        // ignored when kind === "card".659        if (kind === "card") {660          const cards = vault.getEntries().filter((e) => e.type === "card");661          return {662            ok: true,663            data: cards.map((e) => ({664              id: e.id,665              title: e.cardNickname || e.title,666              cardholderName: e.cardholderName,667              last4: e.last4,668              expMonth: e.expMonth,669              expYear: e.expYear,670              network: e.network,671            })),672          };673        }674        if (kind === "totp") {675          const matches = (676            includeAll677              ? vault.getEntries().filter((entry) => entry.type !== "note" && entry.type !== "card")678              : vault.queryDomain(domain)679          ).filter((entry) => !isPasskeyOnly(entry) && Boolean(entry.totp));680          return {681            ok: true,682            data: matches.map((e) => ({683              id: e.id,684              title: e.title,685              username: e.username,686              email: e.email,687              url: e.url,688              hasTotp: true,689            })),690          };691        }692        // The inline selector fills username+password into a form. Passkey-693        // only entries have no password to fill; sign-in for those goes694        // through the WebAuthn path instead. Filter them out everywhere so695        // the user doesn't see four "GitHub" rows that mostly do nothing.696        // Notes and cards never belonged here either.697        const matches = (698          includeAll699            ? vault700                .getEntries()701                .filter((entry) => entry.type !== "note" && entry.type !== "card")702            : vault.queryDomain(domain)703        ).filter((entry) => !isPasskeyOnly(entry));704        return {705          ok: true,706          data: matches.map((e) =>707            includeAll708              ? {709                  id: e.id,710                  title: e.title,711                  // username/email/url shipped so the inline popup's search712                  // affordance can match on them, not just titles. No secrets713                  // cross the boundary — same shape as the domain-matched714                  // response below minus hasTotp (which the search list715                  // doesn't surface).716                  username: e.username,717                  email: e.email,718                  url: e.url,719                  hasPasskey: e.passkey !== undefined,720                }721              : {722                  id: e.id,723                  title: e.title,724                  username: e.username,725                  email: e.email,726                  url: e.url,727                  hasTotp: Boolean(e.totp),728                  hasPasskey: e.passkey !== undefined,729                }730          ),731        };732      }733      case "GET_ENTRY_FOR_FILL": {734        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };735        const { id, explicitSummon } = msg.payload as {736          id: string;737          explicitSummon?: boolean;738        };739        const entry = vault.getEntryById(id);740        if (!entry) return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };741        // Passkey-only entries (passkey credential, no password) cannot be742        // filled into a form — sign-in goes through the WebAuthn path. A743        // login that ALSO has a passkey is still fillable for its password.744        if (isPasskeyOnly(entry)) return { ok: false, error: "passkey_not_fillable" };745746        // MV-1: re-validate the entry against the requesting tab's origin.747        // sender.tab.url is browser-attested — a page cannot forge it. When748        // the request does not come from a tab at all (popup surfaces use749        // GET_ENTRY_FOR_EDIT, not this), refuse.750        if (sender.tab !== undefined || sender.url !== undefined) {751          let senderDomain: string | null = null;752          try {753            const rawUrl = sender.tab?.url ?? sender.url ?? "";754            senderDomain = rawUrl ? extractDomain(new URL(rawUrl).hostname) : null;755          } catch {756            senderDomain = null;757          }758          if (!senderDomain) return { ok: false, error: "origin_unverified" };759760          const entryDomains = new Set<string>();761          const primary = extractDomain(entry.url ?? "");762          if (primary) entryDomains.add(primary);763          for (const extra of entry.additionalUrls ?? []) {764            const d = extractDomain(extra);765            if (d) entryDomains.add(d);766          }767768          // explicitSummon=true means the user actively picked this entry769          // from the cross-domain search affordance — an intentional770          // off-domain fill. Passive fill paths must stay domain-bound.771          if (explicitSummon !== true && !entryDomains.has(senderDomain)) {772            // Domain mismatch — refuse silently (no oracle about which ids exist).773            return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };774          }775        }776        // Strip the passkey credential AND the raw base32 TOTP seed from the777        // response. Content scripts never need either: the private key is the778        // authenticator's, and handing over the TOTP seed would let a779        // compromised content script mint valid codes indefinitely (SEV-3-C).780        // Generate the *current* 6-digit code here in the background and send781        // only that, plus the seconds left so the UI can render a countdown.782        // Also drop passwordHistory: filling needs only the *current* password.783        // Handing every past password to a content script during passive784        // autofill on an arbitrary page would widen the blast radius of a785        // compromised page far beyond the one credential being filled.786        const {787          passkey: _strippedPasskey,788          totp: seed,789          totpAlgorithm,790          totpDigits,791          totpPeriod,792          passwordHistory: _ph,793          ...safeEntry794        } = entry;795        let totpCode: string | undefined;796        let totpRemaining: number | undefined;797        if (seed) {798          try {799            // PCH-01-019: honour stored algorithm/digits/period (defaults apply800            // when these are undefined, i.e. legacy bare-seed entries).801            const generated = generateTOTP(seed, totpAlgorithm, totpDigits, totpPeriod);802            totpCode = generated.code;803            totpRemaining = generated.remaining;804          } catch {805            totpCode = undefined;806          }807        }808        return { ok: true, data: { ...safeEntry, totpCode, totpRemaining } };809      }810      // Trusted full-entry fetch for Peach's own inline-popup surfaces that811      // genuinely need the raw TOTP seed: the edit form (which re-saves the812      // seed and would otherwise wipe it) and nothing else. Unlike813      // GET_ENTRY_FOR_FILL this fires only on an explicit user action inside814      // the inline popup, never during passive autofill on an arbitrary page.815      // The passkey credential is still stripped — the edit form never touches it.816      case "GET_ENTRY_FOR_EDIT": {817        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };818        const { id, explicitSummon } = msg.payload as {819          id: string;820          explicitSummon?: boolean;821        };822        const entry = vault.getEntryById(id);823        if (!entry) return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };824825        // PCH-01-006: re-validate the browser-attested sender origin, mirroring826        // GET_ENTRY_FOR_FILL (MV-1). The edit channel ships the raw TOTP seed and827        // full password history — at least as sensitive as the fill response — so828        // the boundary must be enforced here, not only by UI reachability. Today829        // the sole caller is the popup (no sender.tab, so this is a structural830        // no-op), but a future tab-context caller or an id leak would otherwise831        // inherit a full-credential oracle. Unlike the fill path we SKIP (not832        // refuse) when no sender domain resolves, to keep the popup caller working.833        if (sender.tab !== undefined || sender.url !== undefined) {834          let senderDomain: string | null = null;835          try {836            const rawUrl = sender.tab?.url ?? sender.url ?? "";837            senderDomain = rawUrl ? extractDomain(new URL(rawUrl).hostname) : null;838          } catch {839            senderDomain = null;840          }841          if (senderDomain) {842            const entryDomains = new Set<string>();843            const primary = extractDomain(entry.url ?? "");844            if (primary) entryDomains.add(primary);845            for (const extra of entry.additionalUrls ?? []) {846              const d = extractDomain(extra);847              if (d) entryDomains.add(d);848            }849            if (explicitSummon !== true && !entryDomains.has(senderDomain)) {850              return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" }; // no id oracle851            }852          }853        }854855        const { passkey: _passkey, ...safeEntry } = entry;856        return { ok: true, data: safeEntry };857      }858      case "COPY": {859        // AUD-002: shape-validate the payload before passing to the clipboard860        // helper. A raw cast lets a malformed message reach the clipboard API861        // with a non-string and throw.862        const { text, label, alreadyWritten } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {863          text?: unknown;864          label?: unknown;865          alreadyWritten?: unknown;866        };867        if (typeof text !== "string" || typeof label !== "string") {868          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };869        }870        await copyToClipboard(text, label, Boolean(alreadyWritten));871        return { ok: true, clearSeconds: getEffectiveClearSeconds() };872      }873      case "CHECK_ALL_BREACHES": {874        const allEntries = vault.getEntries();875        const results: Record<string, number> = {};876        for (const entry of allEntries) {877          if (entry.type === "note") continue;878          if (!entry.password) continue;879          results[entry.id] = await vault.checkBreach(entry.password);880          // Small delay — be a good citizen to the HIBP API881          await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 200));882        }883        // Persist any non-zero counts back to entries884        for (const [id, count] of Object.entries(results)) {885          const entry = vault.getEntryById(id);886          if (entry && (entry.breach ?? 0) !== count) {887            await vault.updateEntry(id, { breach: count > 0 ? count : undefined });888          }889        }890        return { ok: true, data: results };891      }892      case "GET_SETTINGS":893        return { ok: true, data: await vault.ensureSettingsLoaded() };894      case "UPDATE_SETTINGS": {895        const patch = msg.payload;896        if (!patch || typeof patch !== "object" || Array.isArray(patch)) {897          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };898        }899        await vault.updateSettings(patch as vault.VaultSettings);900        if (typeof (patch as Record<string, unknown>).autoLockMinutes === "number") {901          await setupAutoLock();902          if (vault.isUnlocked()) touchAutoLock();903        }904        return { ok: true };905      }906      case "GET_PENDING_PASSKEY":907        return { ok: true, data: await getPendingPasskeyRequest() };908      case "APPROVE_PASSKEY": {909        const { requestId } = msg.payload as { requestId: number };910        await resolvePendingPasskeyRequest(requestId, true);911        return { ok: true };912      }913      case "DENY_PASSKEY": {914        const { requestId } = msg.payload as { requestId: number };915        await resolvePendingPasskeyRequest(requestId, false);916        return { ok: true };917      }918      case "GET_PASSKEY_PROVIDER_STATE":919        return { ok: true, data: await getPasskeyProviderState() };920      case "SET_PASSKEY_PROVIDER_ENABLED": {921        const { enabled } = msg.payload as { enabled: boolean };922        // Disabling is always free; gating fires only when a free user is923        // trying to turn passkey interception on.924        if (enabled) {925          const gate = await requirePro("passkeys");926          if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };927        }928        return { ok: true, data: await setPasskeyProviderEnabled(enabled) };929      }930      // AUD-003: this handler POSTs `entryTitle` to a user-configured HTTPS931      // endpoint. Intentional product behavior — users configure their own932      // dead-man's-switch. isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl blocks localhost, private933      // IPs, and non-HTTPS schemes, but cannot defend against every DNS-934      // rebinding case. The UI under CanarySection (Entry.tsx) discloses to935      // users that the entry title leaves the device when the canary fires.936      case "FIRE_CANARY_PING": {937        // Canary alert fires unconditionally for any entry with canary: true.938        // The Pro gate only governs creation/flagging of canary entries; once939        // an entry is flagged, the alert path is a security property and must940        // never be license-gated.941        const { webhookUrl, entryTitle, trigger } = msg.payload as {942          webhookUrl: string;943          entryTitle: string;944          trigger: "password_copied" | "username_copied" | "autofilled" | "submitted" | "test";945        };946        if (!isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl(webhookUrl)) {947          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_webhook_url" };948        }949        // LV-3: debounce non-test pings per (webhook, entry) so a page that950        // strobes focus/fill events can't turn the canary into a request951        // firehose at the user's endpoint. Test pings are exempt — they are952        // explicit user clicks in the settings UI and are awaited for953        // feedback. The FIRST ping in a window always goes out, so the954        // dead-man's-switch property (canary fires on access) is preserved;955        // only repeats within the window are coalesced.956        if (trigger !== "test") {957          const rlKey = `canary-last-fetch:${webhookUrl}:${entryTitle}`;958          const stored = await chrome.storage.local.get(rlKey);959          const last = (stored as Record<string, unknown>)[rlKey];960          if (typeof last === "number" && Date.now() - last < CANARY_MIN_INTERVAL_MS) {961            return { ok: true, data: { rateLimited: true } };962          }963          await chrome.storage.local.set({ [rlKey]: Date.now() });964        }965        const body = JSON.stringify({966          event: trigger === "test" ? "peach_canary_test" : "peach_canary_accessed",967          entry: entryTitle,968          trigger,969          timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),970          source: "peach-extension",971        });972        if (trigger === "test") {973          // Permitted outbound fetch: user-configured canary alert endpoint974          // (validated by isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl above). This is the975          // only non-HIBP outbound call in the extension — see976          // Projects.md §3.7. Test pings are awaited so the UI can show977          // success/failure.978          try {979            const res = await fetch(webhookUrl, {980              method: "POST",981              headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },982              body,983            });984            return { ok: res.ok, error: res.ok ? undefined : `HTTP ${res.status}` };985          } catch (err) {986            return { ok: false, error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : "network_error" };987          }988        }989        // Non-test triggers are fire-and-forget990        fetch(webhookUrl, {991          method: "POST",992          headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },993          body,994        }).catch(() => {});995        return { ok: true };996      }997      case "ACTIVATE_LICENSE": {998        const { key } = msg.payload as { key: string };999        const licenseInfo = await activateLicense(key);1000        return { ok: true, data: licenseInfo };1001      }1002      case "GET_LICENSE": {1003        const licenseInfo = await getLicenseInfo();1004        return { ok: true, data: licenseInfo };1005      }1006      case "GET_LICENSE_KEY": {1007        const key = await getLicenseKey();1008        return { ok: true, data: key };1009      }1010      case "DEACTIVATE_LICENSE": {1011        await deactivateLicense();1012        return { ok: true };1013      }1014      case "SHOULD_PLAY_CELEBRATION": {1015        const should = await shouldPlayCelebration();1016        return { ok: true, data: should };1017      }1018      case "MARK_CELEBRATION_PLAYED": {1019        await markCelebrationPlayed();1020        return { ok: true };1021      }1022      case "GET_CODEX_VAULT_DATA": {1023        // Pro-gated. requirePro broadcasts PRO_GATE_TRIGGERED on miss so the1024        // popup navigates to the License section without further coordination.1025        const gate = await requirePro("codex");1026        if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1027        return await handleGetCodexVaultData();1028      }1029      case "ESTIMATE_CODEX_PAGES": {1030        const gate = await requirePro("codex");1031        if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1032        return await handleEstimateCodexPages();1033      }1034      case "RESTORE_FROM_CODEX": {1035        // !! IMPORTANT: intentionally NOT Pro-gated. A free device must still1036        // be able to restore a vault that was printed by a Pro user.1037        // DO NOT add a Pro gate here.1038        const payload = msg.payload as CodexRestorePayload;1039        return await handleRestoreFromCodex(payload);1040      }1041      case "OPEN_PRO_GATE": {1042        // Content script requests: open popup and navigate to License section.1043        const { feature } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { feature?: string };1044        if (chrome.storage.session) {1045          await chrome.storage.session.set({ pendingProGate: { feature: feature ?? "passkeys" } });1046        }1047        try { await chrome.action.openPopup(); } catch { /* badge fallback */ }1048        return { ok: true };1049      }1050      case "OPEN_POPUP": {1051        // Content script asks to open the trusted extension popup — used by the1052        // inline locked bubble so the master password is entered in the popup,1053        // never in page-hosted DOM (audit HIGH). Best-effort: openPopup needs a1054        // user gesture + Chrome 127+/Firefox; on failure the user clicks the1055        // toolbar icon. The badge already signals Peach needs attention.1056        //1057        // Set a session flag so the popup knows it was opened for inline unlock1058        // and should close itself once the vault is unlocked (returning the user1059        // to the inline autofill selector on the page).1060        if (chrome.storage.session) {1061          await chrome.storage.session.set({ peach_inline_unlock: true });1062        }1063        try { await chrome.action.openPopup(); } catch { /* user opens via toolbar */ }1064        return { ok: true };1065      }1066      case "GET_IDENTITIES": {1067        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1068        return { ok: true, data: vault.getIdentities() };1069      }1070      case "TOUCH_AUTO_LOCK": {1071        // touchAutoLock() is already called by shouldRefreshAutoLock above;1072        // this case just gives the popup a typed message to keep the session alive.1073        return { ok: true };1074      }1075      case "GET_ADVANCED_HEALTH_REPORT": {1076        const gate = await requirePro("advanced_health");1077        if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1078        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1079        const report = await buildAdvancedHealthReport(vault.getEntries());1080        return { ok: true, data: report };1081      }1082      case "IS_DURESS_ENABLED": {1083        const enabled = await vault.isDuressEnabled();1084        return { ok: true, data: enabled };1085      }1086      case "SETUP_DURESS": {1087        // Single enforcement point for the Duress Vault Pro gate. Free users1088        // who somehow reach this handler are rejected here; the popup also1089        // pre-checks isPro() to avoid showing the setup form to free users,1090        // but server-side is the actual security boundary.1091        const gate = await requirePro("duress_vault");1092        if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1093        // MV3 service workers restart after inactivity, losing the in-memory1094        // derived key. Detect this before calling setupDuress so the popup1095        // can show a meaningful prompt to re-lock and re-unlock.1096        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "session_expired" };1097        const { duressPassword } = msg.payload as { duressPassword: string };1098        await vault.setupDuress(duressPassword);1099        return { ok: true };1100      }1101      case "DISABLE_DURESS": {1102        await vault.disableDuress();1103        return { ok: true };1104      }1105      case "VERIFY_MAIN_PASSWORD": {1106        const { password } = msg.payload as { password: string };1107        const ok = await vault.verifyMainPassword(password);1108        return { ok: true, data: ok };1109      }1110      case "CHANGE_PASSWORD": {1111        const { currentPassword, newPassword } = msg.payload as {1112          currentPassword: string;1113          newPassword: string;1114        };1115        const changed = await vault.changePassword(currentPassword, newPassword);1116        return changed1117          ? { ok: true }1118          : { ok: false, error: "incorrect_current_password" };1119      }1120      case "GET_SITE_PASSWORD_POLICY": {1121        const [tab] = await chrome.tabs.query({ active: true, currentWindow: true });1122        if (!tab?.id) return { ok: true, data: null };1123        try {1124          const response = await chrome.tabs.sendMessage(tab.id, {1125            type: "GET_SITE_PASSWORD_POLICY",1126          });1127          return (response as MessageResponse) ?? { ok: true, data: null };1128        } catch {1129          return { ok: true, data: null };1130        }1131      }1132      case "RECORD_MANUAL_SUMMON": {1133        const { domain } = msg.payload as { domain: string };1134        const settings = vault.getSettings();1135        const existing = settings.manualSummonDomains?.[domain];1136        const now = Date.now();1137        await vault.updateSettings({1138          manualSummonDomains: {1139            ...settings.manualSummonDomains,1140            [domain]: {1141              firstSummonedAt: existing?.firstSummonedAt ?? now,1142              summonCount: (existing?.summonCount ?? 0) + 1,1143              lastSummonedAt: now,1144            },1145          },1146        });1147        return { ok: true };1148      }1149      case "DECLINE_CARD_SAVE": {1150        const { last4, expMonth, expYear } = msg.payload as { last4: string; expMonth: string; expYear: string };1151        await vault.declineCardSaveOffer(last4, expMonth, expYear);1152        return { ok: true };1153      }1154      case "IS_CARD_DECLINED": {1155        const { last4, expMonth, expYear } = msg.payload as { last4: string; expMonth: string; expYear: string };1156        const declined = await vault.isCardDeclined(last4, expMonth, expYear);1157        return { ok: true, data: declined };1158      }1159      case "INITIATE_FIREFOX_PASSKEY_CREATE": {1160        const { rpId, rpName, userName, userDisplayName } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1161          rpId?: string;1162          rpName?: string;1163          userName?: string;1164          userDisplayName?: string;1165        };1166        if (!rpId || !userName) return { ok: false, error: "rpid_and_username_required" };1167        return await initiateFirefoxPasskeyCreate({1168          rpId,1169          rpName: rpName ?? rpId,1170          userName,1171          userDisplayName,1172        });1173      }11741175      case "COMPLETE_FIREFOX_PASSKEY_CREATE": {1176        const payload = msg.payload as Parameters<typeof completeFirefoxPasskeyCreate>[0] | undefined;1177        if (!payload) return { ok: false, error: "missing_payload" };1178        return await completeFirefoxPasskeyCreate(payload);1179      }11801181      case "PASSKEY_OFFER_DECLINE": {1182        const { domain } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { domain?: string };1183        if (!domain) return { ok: false, error: "domain_required" };1184        await recordPasskeyOfferDecline(domain);1185        return { ok: true };1186      }11871188      case "GET_PASSKEY_OFFER_DECLINED": {1189        const { domain } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { domain?: string };1190        if (!domain) return { ok: false, error: "domain_required" };1191        return { ok: true, data: await isPasskeyOfferDeclined(domain) };1192      }11931194      case "PASSKEY_HAS_CREDENTIALS": {1195        const payload = msg.payload as {1196          rpId?: string;1197          allowCredentials?: Array<{ id: string; type?: string }>;1198        } | undefined;1199        if (!payload?.rpId) return { ok: false, error: "rpid_required" };1200        return await handlePasskeyHasCredentials({1201          rpId: payload.rpId,1202          allowCredentials: payload.allowCredentials ?? [],1203        }, attestedSenderOrigin(sender));1204      }12051206      case "PASSKEY_CREATE": {1207        const payload = msg.payload as Parameters<typeof handleFirefoxPasskeyCreate>[0] | undefined;1208        if (!payload?.rpId || !payload?.userName) {1209          return { ok: false, error: "rpid_and_username_required" };1210        }1211        return await handleFirefoxPasskeyCreate(payload, attestedSenderOrigin(sender));1212      }12131214      case "PASSKEY_GET": {1215        const payload = msg.payload as Parameters<typeof handleFirefoxPasskeyGet>[0] | undefined;1216        if (!payload?.rpId) return { ok: false, error: "rpid_required" };1217        return await handleFirefoxPasskeyGet(payload, attestedSenderOrigin(sender));1218      }12191220      case "PASSKEY_AUTH_RESPONSE": {1221        const { requestId, approved } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1222          requestId?: string | number;1223          approved?: boolean;1224        };1225        if (requestId === undefined || requestId === null || typeof approved !== 'boolean') {1226          return { ok: false, error: 'requestId and approved required' };1227        }1228        await resolvePendingPasskeyRequest(Number(requestId), approved);1229        return { ok: true };1230      }12311232      case "GET_PASSKEY_FOR_DOMAIN": {1233        const { domain } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { domain?: string };1234        if (!domain) return { ok: false, error: "domain_required" };1235        // Scope to the caller's own origin: a page may only ask about passkeys1236        // for a domain it actually owns, so an arbitrary page cannot enumerate1237        // which sites the user holds passkeys for or read the username (audit MEDIUM).1238        const origin = attestedSenderOrigin(sender);1239        if (!origin || !isValidRpId(domain, origin)) return { ok: true, data: null };1240        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: true, data: null };1241        const match = vault1242          .getEntries()1243          .find((entry) => entry.passkey?.rpId === domain);1244        if (!match || !match.passkey) return { ok: true, data: null };1245        // Slim shape — only the fields State 11 needs. Never expose private1246        // key material, even though this is locked behind isUnlocked.1247        return {1248          ok: true,1249          data: {1250            rpId: match.passkey.rpId,1251            userName: match.passkey.userName,1252            browser: match.passkey.browser,1253          },1254        };1255      }12561257      case "DESTROY_VAULT": {1258        // Irreversible by design. Lock zeroes the derived key + in-memory entries;1259        // storage.local.clear() wipes every Peach key (slots, settings, license,1260        // onboarded flag, history, sync state, declined cards, recall, etc.);1261        // session.clear() wipes pending passkey requests + pro-notice queues.1262        // Caller (Panic.tsx) handles UI navigation back to onboarding.1263        //1264        // The Pro license is the one thing that must survive: the user paid for1265        // it, and destroying a vault (panic wipe, fresh start) is not a refund.1266        // Capture it before the clear and restore it after. peach_pro_celebrated1267        // rides along so the Pro celebration doesn't replay on the next unlock.1268        const preserved = await chrome.storage.local.get([1269          "peach_license",1270          "peach_pro_celebrated",1271        ]);1272        vault.lock();1273        await storageClear();1274        await vault.clearVaultHistory();1275        const toRestore: Record<string, unknown> = {};1276        if (preserved.peach_license !== undefined) toRestore.peach_license = preserved.peach_license;1277        if (preserved.peach_pro_celebrated !== undefined) toRestore.peach_pro_celebrated = preserved.peach_pro_celebrated;1278        if (Object.keys(toRestore).length > 0) {1279          await chrome.storage.local.set(toRestore);1280        }1281        if (chrome.storage.session) {1282          await chrome.storage.session.clear();1283        }1284        return { ok: true };1285      }12861287      case "SUBMIT_FEEDBACK": {1288        const { category, message, version, browser } = msg.payload as {1289          category: string;1290          message: string;1291          version: string;1292          browser: string;1293        };1294        if (!message.trim()) return { ok: false, error: "message_empty" };1295        if (!FEEDBACK_ENDPOINT) return { ok: true };1296        if (!isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl(FEEDBACK_ENDPOINT)) {1297          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_feedback_endpoint" };1298        }1299        try {1300          const res = await fetch(FEEDBACK_ENDPOINT, {1301            method: "POST",1302            headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },1303            body: JSON.stringify({ category, message, version, browser, source: "peach-extension" }),1304          });1305          return { ok: res.ok, error: res.ok ? undefined : `HTTP ${res.status}` };1306        } catch (err) {1307          return { ok: false, error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : "network_error" };1308        }1309      }1310      // Android-only: biometric unlock with pre-derived key.1311      case "UNLOCK_WITH_KEY": {1312        const { masterKeyHex } = msg.payload as { masterKeyHex: string };1313        if (!isNativePlatform()) {1314          return { ok: false, error: "desktop_only_uses_password" };1315        }1316        try {1317          const result = await vault.unlockWithKey(masterKeyHex);1318          if (result.ok) {1319            onVaultUnlocked();1320            await publishInMemoryVault(result.entries);1321          }1322          return { ok: result.ok, data: result.ok ? { entries: result.entries } : undefined, error: result.ok ? undefined : result.error };1323        } catch {1324          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };1325        }1326      }1327      // Android: returns current in-memory derived key as hex. Used by biometric enable flow.1328      case "GET_DERIVED_KEY": {1329        if (!isNativePlatform()) {1330          return { ok: false, error: "android_only" };1331        }1332        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) {1333          return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1334        }1335        return { ok: true, data: { masterKeyHex: vault.getDerivedKeyHex() } };1336      }1337      case "GET_IDENTITY_SUGGESTIONS": {1338        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1339        const entries = vault.getEntries();1340        const suggestions = buildIdentitySuggestions(entries);1341        return { ok: true, data: { suggestions } };1342      }1343      case "POPULATE_INLINE_VAULT": {1344        if (!isNativePlatform()) return { ok: false };1345        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1346        const entries = vault.getEntries();1347        await publishInMemoryVault(entries);1348        return { ok: true };1349      }1350      case "ML_INIT":1351        return { ok: true };13521353      case "ML_PREDICT_BATCH": {1354        // AUD-002: shape-validate before forwarding to the ML helper.1355        const { featuresArray } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { featuresArray?: unknown };1356        if (!Array.isArray(featuresArray)) {1357          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1358        }1359        return { ok: true, data: mlPredictBatch(featuresArray as MLFieldFeatures[]) };1360      }13611362      // ── Vault sync (v3) ───────────────────────────────────────────────1363      // Returns the public-facing local identity needed by the popup to1364      // drive Phase-1 audio pairing. The private long-term key never1365      // leaves the background.1366      case "GET_LOCAL_IDENTITY": {1367        // Not Pro-gated: a free device may attempt to pair so it can RECEIVE a1368        // Pro license from an already-Pro peer (at least one device must be Pro).1369        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1370        // Identity derives from the stable root key, not the password-derived1371        // key, so pairing survives a master-password change (SEV-2-B).1372        const masterKeyHex = vault.getRootKeyHex();1373        if (!masterKeyHex) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1374        const masterKey = unhexBytes(masterKeyHex);1375        try {1376          const identity = await buildLocalIdentity(masterKey);1377          // If this device is Pro, advertise the signed license so the peer can1378          // activate it after SAS confirmation — pairing carries Pro across.1379          if (await isProUser()) {1380            const license = await getLicenseKey();1381            if (license) (identity as { license?: string }).license = license;1382          }1383          return { ok: true, data: identity };1384        } finally {1385          masterKey.fill(0);1386        }1387      }13881389      case "GET_ADOPTION_MATERIAL": {1390        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1391        const rootKeyHex = vault.getRootKeyHex();1392        if (!rootKeyHex) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1393        const rootKeyBytes = unhexBytes(rootKeyHex);1394        try {1395          const data: { rootKeyHex: string; vaultId: string; license?: string } = {1396            rootKeyHex,1397            vaultId: await computeVaultId(rootKeyBytes),1398          };1399          if (await isProUser()) {1400            const license = await getLicenseKey();1401            if (license) data.license = license;1402          }1403          return { ok: true, data };1404        } finally {1405          rootKeyBytes.fill(0);1406        }1407      }14081409      case "COMPLETE_PAIRING": {1410        // Not Pro-gated — see GET_LOCAL_IDENTITY.1411        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1412        const paired = (msg.payload as { paired?: unknown })?.paired;1413        if (typeof paired !== "object" || paired === null) {1414          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1415        }1416        const candidate = paired as Record<string, unknown>;1417        if (1418          typeof candidate.deviceId !== "string" || !candidate.deviceId ||1419          typeof candidate.deviceName !== "string" || !candidate.deviceName ||1420          typeof candidate.deviceType !== "string" ||1421          typeof candidate.longTermPublicKeyHex !== "string" ||1422          !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(candidate.longTermPublicKeyHex) ||1423          (1424            candidate.signingPublicKeyHex !== undefined &&1425            (1426              typeof candidate.signingPublicKeyHex !== "string" ||1427              !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(candidate.signingPublicKeyHex)1428            )1429          ) ||1430          typeof candidate.pairedAt !== "number"1431        ) {1432          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_paired_device" };1433        }1434        await upsertPairedDeviceV3(candidate as unknown as import("../shared/sync-types").PairedDevice);1435        return { ok: true };1436      }14371438      case "LIST_PAIRED_DEVICES": {1439        const devices = await listPairedDevicesV3();1440        return { ok: true, data: { devices } };1441      }14421443      case "UNPAIR_DEVICE": {1444        const { deviceId } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { deviceId?: string };1445        if (typeof deviceId !== "string" || !deviceId) {1446          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1447        }1448        // Removing a device REVOKES it rather than just dropping the local1449        // row: a plain removal is undone the moment any other peer vouches it1450        // back through a manifest, which is exactly what the relay makes easy.1451        await revokeDeviceByIdV3(deviceId, await getOrCreateDeviceId());1452        return { ok: true };1453      }14541455      case "RENAME_LOCAL_DEVICE": {1456        const { name } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { name?: string };1457        if (typeof name !== "string") return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1458        await setDeviceNameV3(name);1459        return { ok: true };1460      }14611462      // ── Relay pairing ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────1463      // Not Pro-gated (a free device may pair to receive Pro/sync). The whole NK1464      // session runs in the background; the SAS and the terminal result reach1465      // the popup as ADOPTION_SOURCE_SAS / ADOPTION_SOURCE_RESULT pushes.1466      case "START_ADOPTION_SOURCE": {1467        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1468        if (isRelayAdoptionSourceInFlight()) {1469          return { ok: false, error: "adoption_source_in_progress" };1470        }1471        try {1472          return { ok: true, data: await startRelayAdoptionSource() };1473        } catch (error) {1474          return {1475            ok: false,1476            error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : "adoption_source_failed",1477          };1478        }1479      }14801481      case "ADOPTION_SOURCE_CONFIRM": {1482        const { password, cancel } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1483          password?: unknown;1484          cancel?: unknown;1485        };1486        if (cancel === true) {1487          return {1488            ok: true,1489            data: await confirmRelayAdoptionSource(null),1490          };1491        }1492        if (typeof password !== "string" || password.length === 0) {1493          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1494        }1495        return {1496          ok: true,1497          data: await confirmRelayAdoptionSource(password),1498        };1499      }15001501      case "CANCEL_ADOPTION_SOURCE": {1502        cancelRelayAdoptionSource();1503        return { ok: true };1504      }15051506      case "TRIGGER_SYNC": {1507        const payload = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1508          reason?: "vault_change" | "foreground" | "manual";1509          force?: boolean;1510        };1511        const reason = payload.reason ?? "foreground";15121513        void triggerSyncIfReachable({ reason, force: payload.force === true });1514        return { ok: true };1515      }15161517      case "GET_SYNC_STATE": {1518        return { ok: true, data: getSyncState() };1519      }15201521      case "GET_SYNC_SETTINGS": {1522        return { ok: true, data: await getSyncSettings() };1523      }15241525      case "SET_SYNC_SETTINGS": {1526        const payload = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1527          mode?: unknown;1528          relayUrl?: unknown;1529        };1530        try {1531          // A custom relay URL implies private mode; Peach's own relay stays1532          // public. See setRelayUrl.1533          if (payload.relayUrl !== undefined) {1534            if (typeof payload.relayUrl !== "string") {1535              return { ok: false, error: "invalid_relay_url" };1536            }1537            return { ok: true, data: await setRelayUrl(payload.relayUrl) };1538          }1539          if (payload.mode !== undefined) {1540            if (payload.mode !== "public" && payload.mode !== "private" && payload.mode !== "off") {1541              return { ok: false, error: "invalid_sync_mode" };1542            }1543            return { ok: true, data: await setSyncMode(payload.mode as SyncMode) };1544          }1545          return { ok: true, data: await getSyncSettings() };1546        } catch (error) {1547          return {1548            ok: false,1549            error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : "invalid_relay_url",1550          };1551        }1552      }15531554      case "GET_SYNC_ALERTS": {1555        const { consume } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { consume?: boolean };1556        const alerts = await getPendingSyncAlerts();1557        // The popup reads on open and acknowledges with consume:true after1558        // rendering, so a popup crash between read and render doesn't lose1559        // the alerts.1560        if (consume) await clearPendingSyncAlerts();1561        return { ok: true, data: alerts };1562      }15631564      case "GET_PENDING_VOUCHED_DEVICES": {1565        return { ok: true, data: await listPendingVouchedDevices() };1566      }1567      case "CONFIRM_VOUCHED_DEVICE": {1568        const { deviceId } = msg.payload as { deviceId: string };1569        const pending = await getPendingVouchedDevice(deviceId);1570        if (!pending) return { ok: false, error: "not_pending" };1571        await upsertPairedDeviceV3({1572          deviceId: pending.deviceId,1573          deviceName: pending.deviceName,1574          deviceType:1575            pending.deviceType as import("../shared/sync-types").PairedDevice["deviceType"],1576          longTermPublicKeyHex: pending.longTermPublicKeyHex,1577          signingPublicKeyHex: pending.signingPublicKeyHex,1578          wsPort: pending.wsPort,1579          pairedAt: pending.pairedAt,1580          trustSource: "vouched",1581        });1582        await removePendingVouchedDevice(deviceId);1583        return { ok: true };1584      }1585      case "REJECT_VOUCHED_DEVICE": {1586        const { deviceId } = msg.payload as { deviceId: string };1587        await removePendingVouchedDevice(deviceId);1588        return { ok: true };1589      }1590      case "ROTATE_SYNC_IDENTITY": {1591        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1592        const result = await vault.rotateSyncIdentity();1593        return result.ok ? { ok: true } : { ok: false, error: result.error };1594      }15951596      default:1597        return { ok: false, error: "unknown_message_type" };1598    }1599  } catch (err) {1600    return {1601      ok: false,1602      error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : "operation_failed",1603    };1604  }1605}16061607// --- Mobile platform helpers ---16081609// Android: populates the in-memory vault used by PeachAutofillService.1610async function publishInMemoryVault(entries: VaultEntry[]): Promise<void> {1611  const plugin = nativePlugin<{1612    setEntries?: (args: {1613      entries: Array<{1614        id: string;1615        title: string;1616        username: string;1617        email: string;1618        password: string;1619        url: string;1620        totp: string;1621        additionalUrls: string[];1622      }>;1623    }) => Promise<void>;1624  }>("InMemoryVaultPlugin");1625  if (!plugin?.setEntries) return;1626  await plugin.setEntries({1627    entries: entries.map((e) => ({1628      id: e.id,1629      title: e.title ?? "",1630      username: e.username ?? "",1631      email: (e as VaultEntry & { email?: string }).email ?? "",1632      password: e.password ?? "",1633      url: e.url ?? "",1634      totp: (e as VaultEntry & { totp?: string }).totp ?? "",1635      additionalUrls: (e as VaultEntry & { additionalUrls?: string[] }).additionalUrls ?? [],1636    })),1637  });1638}16391640// Android: clear the autofill in-memory store on lock.1641async function clearInMemoryVault(): Promise<void> {1642  const plugin = nativePlugin<{ clearEntries?: () => Promise<void> }>("InMemoryVaultPlugin");1643  if (!plugin?.clearEntries) return;1644  await plugin.clearEntries();1645}16461647// Returns username use-counts from the vault, sorted by frequency. Each row1648// also carries the entry's email so the popup can suggest the email/username1649// pair the user has actually used together.1650function buildIdentitySuggestions(1651  entries: VaultEntry[],1652): Array<{ email: string; username: string; count: number }> {1653  const usernameCounts = new Map<string, number>();1654  const usernameEmail = new Map<string, string>();1655  for (const entry of entries) {1656    const username = entry.username ?? "";1657    const email = (entry as VaultEntry & { email?: string }).email ?? "";1658    if (!username && !email) continue;1659    const key = username || email;1660    usernameCounts.set(key, (usernameCounts.get(key) ?? 0) + 1);1661    if (!usernameEmail.has(key)) usernameEmail.set(key, email);1662  }1663  return Array.from(usernameCounts.entries())1664    .sort((a, b) => b[1] - a[1])1665    .map(([username, count]) => ({1666      email: usernameEmail.get(username) ?? "",1667      username,1668      count,1669    }));1670}16711672/** Notify all content scripts that the vault just became available. */1673function broadcastToContentScripts(message: { type: string }): void {1674  if (!chrome.tabs?.query) return;1675  chrome.tabs.query({}, (tabs) => {1676    for (const tab of tabs) {1677      if (tab.id !== undefined) {1678        chrome.tabs.sendMessage(tab.id, message).catch(() => {1679          // Tab may not have a content script — silently ignore1680        });1681      }1682    }1683  });1684}16851686function shouldRefreshAutoLock(type: MessageType): boolean {1687  return (1688    type !== "HAS_VAULT" &&1689    type !== "IS_UNLOCKED" &&1690    type !== "GET_VAULT_STATUS" &&1691    type !== "LOCK" &&1692    type !== "UPDATE_SETTINGS" &&1693    type !== "GET_PENDING_PASSKEY" &&1694    type !== "GET_PASSKEY_PROVIDER_STATE" &&1695    type !== "DECLINE_CARD_SAVE" &&1696    type !== "IS_CARD_DECLINED" &&1697    type !== "SUBMIT_FEEDBACK"1698  );1699}17001701function isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl(value: string): boolean {1702  try {1703    const url = new URL(value);1704    if (url.protocol !== "https:") return false;17051706    const hostname = url.hostname.toLowerCase();1707    if (1708      hostname === "localhost" ||1709      hostname.endsWith(".localhost") ||1710      isPrivateIpv4(hostname) ||1711      isPrivateIpv6(hostname)1712    ) {1713      return false;1714    }17151716    return true;1717  } catch {1718    return false;1719  }1720}17211722function isPrivateIpv4(hostname: string): boolean {1723  if (PRIVATE_IPV4_RANGES.some((range) => hostname.startsWith(range.prefix))) {1724    return true;1725  }17261727  const octets = hostname.split(".").map((part) => Number(part));1728  if (octets.length !== 4 || octets.some((octet) => !Number.isInteger(octet) || octet < 0 || octet > 255)) {1729    return false;1730  }17311732  return octets[0] === 172 && octets[1] >= 16 && octets[1] <= 31;1733}17341735function isPrivateIpv6(hostname: string): boolean {1736  const normalized = hostname.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "").toLowerCase();1737  return (1738    normalized === "::1" ||1739    normalized.startsWith("fc") ||1740    normalized.startsWith("fd") ||1741    normalized.startsWith("fe80:")1742  );1743}