messages.ts

1/**2 * messages.ts — the only background message handler.3 *4 * All `chrome.runtime.onMessage` handling for the service worker lives here.5 * Do not handle messages inline in entry.ts, alarms.ts, or any other6 * background file. Every background-bound MessageType in shared/types.ts7 * must have a case below. Content-script-bound message types (PING,8 * SUMMON_AUTOFILL, VAULT_LOCKED) are documented in shared/types.ts and9 * intentionally have no case here — they are sent *to* content scripts.10 */1112import { copyToClipboard, getEffectiveClearSeconds } from "./clipboard";13import { getPendingSyncAlerts, clearPendingSyncAlerts } from "./sync-alerts";14import { extractDomain } from "../shared/domain";15import {16  getPendingVouchedDevice,17  listPendingVouchedDevices,18  removePendingVouchedDevice,19} from "./pending-vouched-devices";20import {21  clearRecoveryConfirmPending,22  isRecoveryConfirmPending,23  setRecoveryConfirmPending,24} from "./recovery-pending";25import { setupAutoLock, touchAutoLock } from "./alarms";26import { runSelfTest } from "./self-test";27import * as vault from "./vault";28import {29  handleEstimateCodexPages,30  handleGetCodexVaultData,31  handleRestoreFromCodex,32} from "./codex-handlers";33import type { CodexRestorePayload } from "../shared/codex-types";34import {35  activateLicense,36  deactivateLicense,37  getLicenseInfo,38  getLicenseKey,39  isProUser,40  markCelebrationPlayed,41  shouldPlayCelebration,42} from "./license";43import {44  completeFirefoxPasskeyCreate,45  getPasskeyProviderState,46  getPendingPasskeyRequest,47  handleFirefoxPasskeyCreate,48  handleFirefoxPasskeyGet,49  handlePasskeyHasCredentials,50  initiateFirefoxPasskeyCreate,51  isPasskeyOfferDeclined,52  onVaultUnlocked,53  recordPasskeyOfferDecline,54  resolvePendingPasskeyRequest,55  setPasskeyProviderEnabled,56} from "./passkey";57import { buildAdvancedHealthReport } from "./health";58import { storageClear } from "../shared/storage";59import { findInvalidWords } from "../shared/recovery-words";60import type {61  Message,62  MessageResponse,63  MessageType,64  ProFeature,65  VaultEntry,66} from "../shared/types";67import { isPasskeyOnly } from "../shared/types";68import { generateTOTP } from "../crypto/totp";69import { isValidRpId } from "../shared/passkey-utils";70import { predictBatch as mlPredictBatch } from "./ml";71import type { MLFieldFeatures } from "../shared/ml";72import {73  buildLocalIdentity,74  getOrCreateDeviceId,75  setDeviceName as setDeviceNameV3,76} from "./device-identity";77import {78  isDeviceRevoked,79  listPairedDevices as listPairedDevicesV3,80  renamePairedDevice as renamePairedDeviceV3,81  revokeDeviceById as revokeDeviceByIdV3,82  upsertPairedDevice as upsertPairedDeviceV3,83} from "./paired-devices";84// Sync and pairing are imported statically, never with `await import()`.85// `import()` throws `TypeError: import() is disallowed on86// ServiceWorkerGlobalScope` at runtime in MV3, and Vite's preload helper87// reports the failure through `window.dispatchEvent`, which does not exist in88// a worker either — so the real reason was replaced by "window is not defined"89// and the pairing UI just stopped. scripts/check-sw-static-imports.mjs fails90// the build if a runtime import() reappears anywhere in the worker's graph.91import {92  cancelRelayAdoptionSource,93  isRelayAdoptionSourceInFlight,94  resolveSourceSasConfirmation,95  startRelayAdoptionReceiver,96  startRelayAdoptionSource,97} from "./relay-adoption-bg";98import {99  getSyncSettings,100  setRelayUrl,101  setSyncMode,102  type SyncMode,103} from "./sync-settings";104import {105  getSyncState,106  triggerSyncIfReachable,107} from "./sync-trigger";108import { isMessageSenderAllowed } from "./message-policy";109110const SUMMON_CAPABILITY_TTL_MS = 30_000;111type SummonCapability = { tabId: number; frameId: number; origin: string; operation: "inventory" | "fill"; expiresAt: number };112const summonCapabilities = new Map<string, SummonCapability>();113114export function createSummonCapability(tabId: number, origin: string, frameId = 0): string {115  const token = crypto.randomUUID();116  summonCapabilities.set(token, { tabId, frameId, origin, operation: "inventory", expiresAt: Date.now() + SUMMON_CAPABILITY_TTL_MS });117  return token;118}119120function consumeSummonCapability(token: unknown, sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender>, operation: "inventory" | "fill"): boolean {121  if (typeof token !== "string") return false;122  const cap = summonCapabilities.get(token);123  if (!cap) return false;124  if (cap.expiresAt <= Date.now()) {125    summonCapabilities.delete(token);126    return false;127  }128  if (sender.tab?.id !== cap.tabId || (sender.frameId ?? 0) !== cap.frameId || attestedSenderOrigin(sender) !== cap.origin) return false;129  if (cap.operation !== operation) return false;130  if (operation === "inventory") cap.operation = "fill";131  else summonCapabilities.delete(token);132  return true;133}134135// Compile-time E2E flag, folded to a literal by Vite's `define` (false in136// every production build — verified in the bundled output). Mirrors the137// create-path bypass in passkey.ts so the Playwright passkey smoke can enable138// the provider without a real Pro licence; the gate is fully intact for users.139declare const __PEACH_E2E_PASSKEYS__: boolean;140const PASSKEY_E2E_PRO_BYPASS = __PEACH_E2E_PASSKEYS__ === true;141142function unhexBytes(hex: string): Uint8Array {143  if (hex.length % 2 !== 0) throw new Error("invalid hex");144  const out = new Uint8Array(hex.length / 2);145  for (let i = 0; i < out.length; i++) {146    out[i] = parseInt(hex.slice(i * 2, i * 2 + 2), 16);147  }148  return out;149}150151/**152 * The single Pro gate. Every gated handler calls this first; the broadcast153 * lets the popup react (navigate to the License section, highlight the154 * relevant feature). Background never touches the popup view directly —155 * the popup owns navigation. See Projects.md "Pro gate rule".156 */157async function requirePro(158  feature: ProFeature,159  trigger: "user" | "background" = "user"160): Promise<{ allowed: boolean }> {161  if (PASSKEY_E2E_PRO_BYPASS && feature === "passkeys") return { allowed: true };162  if (await isProUser()) return { allowed: true };163164  if (trigger === "user") {165    // User deliberately triggered this feature — redirect the popup immediately.166    chrome.runtime167      .sendMessage({ type: "PRO_GATE_TRIGGERED", payload: { feature } })168      .catch(() => {169        // Popup may be closed — the gate signal is best-effort.170      });171  } else {172    // Background trigger (e.g. passive sync initiation) — no popup is open.173    // Queue a notice so the next popup open shows a soft banner instead of174    // silently failing.175    if (chrome.storage.session) {176      chrome.storage.session177        .set({ pendingProNotice: { feature, triggeredAt: Date.now() } })178        .catch(() => {});179    }180  }181182  return { allowed: false };183}184185// LV-3: minimum interval between non-test canary pings per webhook+entry.186const CANARY_MIN_INTERVAL_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000; // 1 hour187188const PRIVATE_IPV4_RANGES = [189  { prefix: "10." },190  { prefix: "127." },191  { prefix: "169.254." },192  { prefix: "192.168." },193];194195export function setupMessageHandler(): void {196  chrome.runtime.onMessage.addListener(197    (msg: unknown, sender, sendResponse) => {198      if (!isMessage(msg)) {199        sendResponse({ ok: false, error: "invalid_message" });200        return true;201      }202      handleMessage(msg, sender)203        .then(sendResponse)204        .catch((err) =>205          sendResponse({206            ok: false,207            error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),208          })209        );210      return true;211    }212  );213}214215function isMessage(m: unknown): m is Message {216  return typeof m === "object" && m !== null && "type" in m;217}218219/**220 * The browser-attested origin of the page that originated this message. A web221 * page cannot call chrome.runtime.sendMessage directly (no externally_connectable),222 * so every page-driven message arrives via the content-script relay and the223 * browser stamps `sender.origin`/`sender.url` with the real frame origin — a224 * value the page cannot forge. This is the ONLY trustworthy origin for passkey225 * rpId<->origin enforcement; payload-supplied origins are attacker-controlled.226 */227function attestedSenderOrigin(sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender>): string | undefined {228  if (sender.origin) return sender.origin;229  if (sender.url) {230    try { return new URL(sender.url).origin; } catch { return undefined; }231  }232  return undefined;233}234235function isExtensionPageSender(sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender>): boolean {236  return sender.url?.startsWith("chrome-extension://") === true ||237    sender.url?.startsWith("moz-extension://") === true;238}239240/** True when the message came from a page frame rather than extension UI. */241function isPageSender(sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender>): boolean {242  return !isExtensionPageSender(sender) &&243    (sender.tab !== undefined || sender.url !== undefined);244}245246function entryDomains(url: unknown, additionalUrls: unknown): Set<string> {247  const domains = new Set<string>();248  const primary = typeof url === "string" ? extractDomain(url) : null;249  if (primary) domains.add(primary);250  if (Array.isArray(additionalUrls)) {251    for (const extra of additionalUrls) {252      if (typeof extra !== "string") continue;253      const domain = extractDomain(extra);254      if (domain) domains.add(domain);255    }256  }257  return domains;258}259260/**261 * PB-26-106: the autofill read path re-validates the frame origin against the262 * entry's domains on every request, so an unbound write path would let a263 * content script repoint an entry at its own origin and then read the264 * credential through a read path that is behaving correctly.265 *266 * Creating an entry: a page may only bind it to itself. Mutating one: a page267 * may never GROW the domain set — only shrink it, and never below its own268 * attested origin.269 *270 * Self-binding on mutation was considered and is not enough: the content271 * script on a foreign origin IS the attacker in the reported chain, so letting272 * it attach "its own" origin lets it mint the very capability the read path273 * exists to withhold. The legitimate flow that needs a new domain — the inline274 * "remember this site" toast — therefore asks the popup instead275 * (REQUEST_REMEMBER_SITE), which is an extension page and exempt here.276 *277 * Extension pages are exempt: the popup edits entries for sites it is not on.278 */279function senderMayBindEntryDomains(280  sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender>,281  domains: Set<string>,282): boolean {283  if (isExtensionPageSender(sender)) return true;284  const domain = attestedSenderDomain(sender);285  if (domain === null) return false;286  for (const candidate of domains) {287    if (candidate !== domain) return false;288  }289  return true;290}291292function senderMayMutateEntryDomains(293  sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender>,294  before: Set<string>,295  after: Set<string>,296): boolean {297  if (isExtensionPageSender(sender)) return true;298  const domain = attestedSenderDomain(sender);299  if (domain === null || !after.has(domain)) return false;300  for (const kept of after) {301    if (!before.has(kept)) return false;302  }303  return true;304}305306/**307 * Null for extension pages (which the callers exempt), for senders with no308 * attested origin at all, and for unparseable frame urls.309 */310function attestedSenderDomain(sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender>): string | null {311  if (sender.tab === undefined && sender.url === undefined) return null;312  const origin = attestedSenderOrigin(sender);313  if (!origin) return null;314  try { return extractDomain(new URL(origin).hostname); } catch { return null; }315}316317function patchChangesEntryOrigin(patch: object): boolean {318  return Object.hasOwn(patch, "url") || Object.hasOwn(patch, "additionalUrls");319}320321/** The entry's domain-bearing fields as the patch would leave them. */322function patchedUrlShape(323  patch: object,324  existing: Pick<VaultEntry, "url" | "additionalUrls">,325): { url: unknown; additionalUrls: unknown } {326  const candidate = patch as { url?: unknown; additionalUrls?: unknown };327  return {328    url: Object.hasOwn(patch, "url") ? candidate.url : existing.url,329    additionalUrls: Object.hasOwn(patch, "additionalUrls")330      ? candidate.additionalUrls331      : existing.additionalUrls,332  };333}334// Resolves once restoreFromSession() has run, so handlers see the correct335// post-restore unlock state. entry.ts registers this BEFORE the message336// handler so the onMessage listener is added synchronously at SW startup337// (MV3 requirement) while unlock-dependent handlers still wait for restore.338let restoreReady: Promise<void> = Promise.resolve();339340/** Called by entry.ts at startup with the in-flight restoreFromSession promise. */341export function setRestoreReady(p: Promise<unknown>): void {342  restoreReady = p.then(() => undefined, () => undefined);343}344345export async function handleMessage(346  msg: Message,347  sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender> = {}348): Promise<MessageResponse> {349  try {350    // Wait for session-restore to finish before reading any unlock/vault state.351    // On a cold SW start the popup's first message arrives while restore is352    // still in flight; without this gate IS_UNLOCKED would report locked (a353    // spurious lock screen) and the storage reads could race. The onMessage354    // listener itself is registered synchronously (entry.ts) so this gate, not355    // listener registration, is what absorbs the cold-start window.356    await restoreReady;357    // Validate sender — only allow messages from our extension pages/scripts.358    // `sender.id` is undefined for messages originating from extension UI359    // (popup/options), which is legitimate; reject only when it is defined360    // and does not match our extension id.361    if (362      sender.id !== undefined &&363      sender.id !== chrome.runtime.id364    ) {365      return { ok: false, error: "invalid_sender" };366    }367368    // PB-26-016: sender authorization is an exhaustive policy, not a369    // hand-maintained privileged denylist. A missing/unknown policy entry or a370    // background-only message fails closed before any handler runs.371    // Extension UI messages may legitimately omit sender.url. Resolve the372    // browser-attested extension origin only when a URL is present; this also373    // keeps test/runtime shims without getURL fail-closed for URL-bearing374    // senders instead of throwing before policy evaluation.375    const extensionOrigin = sender.url && typeof chrome.runtime.getURL === "function"376      ? chrome.runtime.getURL("")377      : "";378    if (!isMessageSenderAllowed(msg.type, sender, chrome.runtime.id, extensionOrigin)) {379      return { ok: false, error: "invalid_sender" };380    }381382    if (shouldRefreshAutoLock(msg.type) && vault.isUnlocked()) {383      touchAutoLock();384    }385386    switch (msg.type) {387      case "CREATE_VAULT": {388        const { password } = msg.payload as { password: string };389        // Refuse to create a vault under an empty master password — the derived390        // key would be publicly known and the at-rest AES-GCM protection void391        // (audit HIGH; the CSV-import path previously passed ""). Length/strength392        // policy lives in the onboarding UI; this is the non-negotiable floor.393        if (typeof password !== "string" || password.length === 0) {394          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };395        }396        await vault.createVault(password);397        await setupAutoLock();398        broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });399        onVaultUnlocked();400        return { ok: true };401      }402      case "CREATE_VAULT_FROM_ROOT_KEY": {403        const { password, rootKeyHex } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {404          password?: unknown;405          rootKeyHex?: unknown;406        };407        if (typeof password !== "string" || password.length === 0 || typeof rootKeyHex !== "string") {408          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };409        }410411        try {412          const { vaultId } = await vault.createVaultFromRootKey(password, rootKeyHex);413          await setupAutoLock();414          broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });415          onVaultUnlocked();416          return { ok: true, vaultId };417        } catch (err) {418          return { ok: false, error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err) };419        }420      }421      case "UNLOCK": {422        const { password } = msg.payload as { password: string };423        const ok = await vault.unlock(password);424        if (ok) {425          // KAT: verify the WebCrypto stack is healthy before the user relies on it.426          // Runs after unlock so latency is hidden behind the vault-load time.427          const kat = await runSelfTest();428          if (!kat.ok) {429            console.error("[Peach] Crypto self-test FAILED:", kat.error);430            await vault.lock();431            return { ok: false, error: "self_test_failed" };432          }433          await vault.updateSettings({ pinPreferred: false });434          await setupAutoLock();435          broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });436          onVaultUnlocked();437          return { ok: true };438        }439        // Distinguish corruption from wrong password so the popup can offer440        // a history-restore path instead of falsely accusing the user of441        // mistyping (M7/COR-007).442        const failure = vault.consumeLastUnlockFailureReason();443        if (failure) {444          return {445            ok: false,446            error: "vault_corrupted",447            canRestoreFromHistory: true,448          } as MessageResponse;449        }450        return { ok: false };451      }452      case "UNLOCK_WITH_PIN": {453        const { pin } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { pin?: unknown };454        if (typeof pin !== "string") return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };455        const ok = await vault.unlockWithPin(pin);456        if (!ok) {457          const status = await vault.getPinUnlockStatus();458          if (status.configured && !status.available) {459            return {460              ok: false,461              error: status.attemptsRemaining === 0462                ? "pin_attempts_exceeded"463                : "pin_session_expired",464            };465          }466          return { ok: false };467        }468        const kat = await runSelfTest();469        if (!kat.ok) {470          await vault.lock();471          return { ok: false, error: "self_test_failed" };472        }473        await vault.updateSettings({ pinPreferred: true });474        await setupAutoLock();475        broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });476        onVaultUnlocked();477        return { ok: true };478      }479      case "GET_PIN_STATUS":480        return { ok: true, data: await vault.getPinUnlockStatus() };481      case "VALIDATE_RECOVERY_WORDS": {482        const { words } = msg.payload as { words: string[] };483        const invalid = findInvalidWords(words);484        return { ok: true, data: { valid: invalid.length === 0, invalid } };485      }486      case "GET_RECOVERY_WORDS": {487        // Must be unlocked and have recovery set up (vault must be v2.12+).488        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };489        // LV-4: the recovery words re-derive the ROOT KEY — the highest-490        // value secret in the vault. A session unlock (which may be hours491        // old on a shared machine) is not enough; require a fresh password492        // proof, matching the 1Password/Bitwarden pattern for revealing493        // escrow material. EXEMPTION: the create-vault / rotation confirmation494        // window (peach_recovery_pending) shows the words immediately after495        // the user authenticated, and that confirmation UI has no password to496        // resend — skip the re-auth there only.497        if (!(await isRecoveryConfirmPending())) {498          const { password } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { password?: string };499          if (typeof password !== "string" || !password) {500            return { ok: false, error: "password_required" };501          }502          if (!(await vault.verifyMainPassword(password))) {503            return { ok: false, error: "wrong_password" };504          }505        }506        try {507          const words = await vault.getRecoveryWords();508          return { ok: true, data: words };509        } catch {510          return { ok: false, error: "recovery_not_setup" };511        }512      }513      case "GET_RECOVERY_CONFIRM_PENDING":514        return { ok: true, data: await isRecoveryConfirmPending() };515      case "SET_RECOVERY_CONFIRM_PENDING":516        await setRecoveryConfirmPending();517        return { ok: true };518      case "CLEAR_RECOVERY_CONFIRM_PENDING":519        await clearRecoveryConfirmPending();520        return { ok: true };521      case "RECOVER_WITH_WORDS": {522        // User has lost their password but has their 12 recovery words.523        // We: (1) validate the words, (2) re-encrypt vault with new password.524        const { words, newPassword } = msg.payload as {525          words: string[];526          newPassword: string;527        };528        const stored = await vault.loadSlotA();529        if (!stored) return { ok: false, error: "no_vault" };530        if (!stored.recovery_salt || !stored.recovery_wrapped_root_key) {531          return { ok: false, error: "recovery_not_setup" };532        }533        // Unwrap the root key from the recovery escrow.534        try {535          await vault.unwrapRootKeyForRecovery(536            stored.recovery_wrapped_root_key,537            stored.recovery_nonce ?? "",538            stored.recovery_tag ?? "",539            stored.recovery_salt,540            words541          );542        } catch {543          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_recovery_words" };544        }545        // Re-key: derive fresh salt + key from new password.546        const newSalt = vault.generateSalt();547        const newKey = await vault.deriveKey(newPassword, newSalt);548        // Re-wrap root key under the new password's derived key so the same549        // recovery words continue to work after the password change.550        await vault.rewrapRootKeyForPassword(newKey, newSalt);551        // Re-encrypt vault entries with the new key.552        await vault.changePasswordWithNewKey(newSalt, newKey);553        await setupAutoLock();554        broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });555        return { ok: true };556      }557      case "LOCK":558        vault.lock();559        return { ok: true };560      case "IS_UNLOCKED":561        return { ok: true, data: vault.isUnlocked() };562      case "GET_VAULT_STATUS":563        return { ok: true, unlocked: vault.isUnlocked() };564      case "HAS_VAULT":565        return { ok: true, data: await vault.hasVault() };566      case "GET_ENTRIES":567        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };568        return { ok: true, data: vault.getEntries() };569      case "ADD_ENTRY": {570        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };571        const payload = msg.payload;572        if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) {573          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };574        }575        // PB-26-106: a page may only create an entry bound to itself. Entries576        // carrying no url have no domain surface to bind, so they are exempt.577        if (isPageSender(sender)) {578          const draft = payload as { url?: unknown; additionalUrls?: unknown };579          const domains = entryDomains(draft.url, draft.additionalUrls);580          if (domains.size > 0 && !senderMayBindEntryDomains(sender, domains)) {581            return { ok: false, error: "origin_binding_required" };582          }583        }584        const entry = await vault.addEntry(payload as Parameters<typeof vault.addEntry>[0]);585        return { ok: true, data: entry };586      }587      case "BATCH_ADD_ENTRIES": {588        const payload = msg.payload as { entries?: unknown } | null | undefined;589        if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) {590          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };591        }592        if (!Array.isArray(payload.entries)) {593          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };594        }595        const added = await vault.batchAddEntries(payload.entries as Parameters<typeof vault.batchAddEntries>[0]);596        return { ok: true, data: added };597      }598      case "RESTORE_ENTRIES": {599        const payload = msg.payload as600          | { entries?: unknown; mode?: unknown; settings?: unknown }601          | null602          | undefined;603        if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) {604          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };605        }606        if (!Array.isArray(payload.entries)) {607          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };608        }609        if (payload.mode !== "replace" && payload.mode !== "merge") {610          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };611        }612        const summary = await vault.restoreEntries(613          payload.entries as Parameters<typeof vault.restoreEntries>[0],614          payload.mode615        );616        if (payload.settings && typeof payload.settings === "object" && !Array.isArray(payload.settings)) {617          await vault.updateSettings(payload.settings as vault.VaultSettings);618        }619        return { ok: true, data: summary };620      }621      case "CLEAR_VAULT_ENTRIES": {622        await vault.clearVaultEntries("REPLACE_ALL");623        return { ok: true };624      }625      case "GET_VAULT_HISTORY": {626        const snapshots = await vault.getVaultHistory();627        return { ok: true, data: snapshots };628      }629      case "RESTORE_VAULT_SNAPSHOT": {630        const { snapshotId } = msg.payload as { snapshotId: string };631        const result = await vault.restoreVaultSnapshot(snapshotId);632        if (!result.ok) return { ok: false, error: result.error };633        broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_LOCKED" });634        return { ok: true };635      }636      case "COUNT_DUPLICATES": {637        return { ok: true, data: vault.countDuplicates() };638      }639      case "DEDUPLICATE_ENTRIES": {640        const removed = await vault.deduplicateEntries();641        return { ok: true, data: removed };642      }643      case "UPDATE_ENTRY": {644        const payload = msg.payload as { id?: unknown; patch?: unknown } | null | undefined;645        if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) {646          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };647        }648        const { id, patch } = payload;649        if (typeof id !== "string" || !id || !patch || typeof patch !== "object" || Array.isArray(patch)) {650          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };651        }652        const existingEntry = vault.getEntryById(id);653        if (!existingEntry) return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };654        if (patchChangesEntryOrigin(patch) || isPageSender(sender)) {655          const before = entryDomains(existingEntry.url, existingEntry.additionalUrls);656          const after = patchedUrlShape(patch, existingEntry);657          if (!senderMayMutateEntryDomains(658            sender,659            before,660            entryDomains(after.url, after.additionalUrls),661          )) {662            return { ok: false, error: "origin_binding_required" };663          }664        }665        // Single enforcement point for the Canary Entries Pro gate. Only666        // gates the transition into a canary entry — clearing/disabling a667        // canary (`canary: undefined`) is always allowed, so existing668        // canary entries remain manageable.669        const incomingCanary = (patch as { canary?: unknown }).canary;670        if (incomingCanary && typeof incomingCanary === "object") {671          const existing = vault.getEntryById(id);672          if (!existing?.canary) {673            const gate = await requirePro("canary_entry");674            if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };675          }676        }677        await vault.updateEntry(id, patch as Parameters<typeof vault.updateEntry>[1]);678        return { ok: true };679      }680      case "ADD_ADDITIONAL_URL": {681        const { id, url } = msg.payload as { id: string; url: string };682        const trimmed = typeof url === "string" ? url.trim() : "";683        if (!trimmed) return { ok: false, error: "url_required" };684        const existing = vault.getEntryById(id);685        if (!existing) return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };686        const merged = [...(existing.additionalUrls ?? []), trimmed];687        if (!senderMayMutateEntryDomains(688          sender,689          entryDomains(existing.url, existing.additionalUrls),690          entryDomains(existing.url, merged),691        )) {692          return { ok: false, error: "origin_binding_required" };693        }694        if (existing.type !== "login") return { ok: false, error: "login_entries_only" };695        await vault.updateEntry(id, { additionalUrls: merged });696        return { ok: true };697      }698      case "REQUEST_REMEMBER_SITE": {699        // PB-26-106: growing an entry's domain set needs a decision the page700        // cannot make for itself, so the page asks and the popup confirms. A701        // page may only ask about its own attested origin — otherwise this702        // becomes the same unbound write under a friendlier name.703        const { id, url } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { id?: unknown; url?: unknown };704        if (typeof id !== "string" || !id) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };705        const trimmed = typeof url === "string" ? url.trim() : "";706        if (!trimmed) return { ok: false, error: "url_required" };707        if (!senderMayBindEntryDomains(sender, entryDomains(trimmed, undefined))) {708          return { ok: false, error: "origin_binding_required" };709        }710        if (!vault.getEntryById(id)) return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };711        if (chrome.storage.session) {712          await chrome.storage.session.set({ pendingRememberSite: { entryId: id, url: trimmed } });713        }714        try { await chrome.action.openPopup(); } catch { /* user opens via toolbar */ }715        return { ok: true };716      }717      case "DELETE_ENTRY": {718        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };719        await vault.deleteEntry(id);720        return { ok: true };721      }722      case "GET_DELETED_ENTRIES":723        return { ok: true, data: vault.getDeletedEntries() };724      case "RESTORE_ENTRY": {725        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };726        await vault.restoreEntry(id);727        return { ok: true };728      }729      case "PURGE_ENTRY": {730        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };731        await vault.purgeEntry(id);732        return { ok: true };733      }734      case "PURGE_EXPIRED_TRASH": {735        const { retentionMs } = msg.payload as { retentionMs: number };736        const purged = await vault.purgeExpiredTrash(retentionMs);737        return { ok: true, data: purged };738      }739      case "SAVE_NOTE": {740        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };741        const { id, title, body } = msg.payload as { id?: string; title: string; body: string };742        const now = Date.now();743        if (id) {744          const existing = vault.getEntryById(id);745          if (!existing) return { ok: false, error: "not_found" };746          await vault.updateEntry(id, { title: title || "Untitled", notes: body, modifiedAt: now });747          return { ok: true, data: vault.getEntryById(id) };748        } else {749          // PCH-01-026 #10: addEntry stamps its own createdAt/modifiedAt750          // (EntryDraft omits both), so passing them was the only reason the751          // `as any` cast existed. Dropping them makes the call type-check.752          const entry = await vault.addEntry({753            type: "note",754            title: title || "Untitled",755            notes: body,756          });757          return { ok: true, data: entry };758        }759      }760      case "DELETE_NOTE": {761        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };762        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };763        await vault.deleteEntry(id);764        return { ok: true };765      }766      case "GET_NOTES": {767        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };768        const notes = vault.getEntries().filter(769          (e) => e.type === "note" && !e.deletedAt770        );771        return { ok: true, data: notes } as MessageResponse;772      }773      case "SEARCH_VAULT": {774        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };775        // AUD-002: shape-validate the payload before calling string methods.776        // A raw cast lets a malformed message crash the handler with TypeError.777        const { query } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { query?: unknown };778        if (typeof query !== "string") {779          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };780        }781        const q = query.toLowerCase();782        const searchResults = vault.getEntries().filter(783          (e) =>784            !e.deletedAt &&785            (e.title.toLowerCase().includes(q) ||786              e.notes?.toLowerCase().includes(q) ||787              e.username?.toLowerCase().includes(q))788        );789        return { ok: true, data: searchResults } as MessageResponse;790      }791      case "AUTOFILL_QUERY": {792        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) {793          return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };794        }795        const { domain, kind, capability } = msg.payload as {796          domain: string;797          kind?: "login" | "card" | "totp";798          capability?: string;799        };800        const includeAll = consumeSummonCapability(capability, sender, "inventory");801        if (capability !== undefined && !includeAll) {802          return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };803        }804        // kind="card": return saved cards as compact summaries for the805        // inline card silver platter. Cards are not domain-scoped — every806        // saved card is a candidate on every checkout page — so domain is807        // ignored when kind === "card".808        if (kind === "card") {809          if (!includeAll) return { ok: true, data: [] };810          const cards = vault.getEntries().filter((e) => e.type === "card");811          return {812            ok: true,813            data: cards.map((e) => ({814              id: e.id,815              title: e.cardNickname || e.title,816              cardholderName: e.cardholderName,817              last4: e.last4,818              expMonth: e.expMonth,819              expYear: e.expYear,820              network: e.network,821            })),822          };823        }824        const scopedDomain = isPageSender(sender)825          ? attestedSenderDomain(sender)826          : typeof domain === "string"827            ? extractDomain(domain)828            : null;829        if (!includeAll && !scopedDomain) {830          return isPageSender(sender)831            ? { ok: false, error: "origin_unverified" }832            : { ok: true, data: [] };833        }834        if (kind === "totp") {835          const matches = (836            includeAll837              ? vault.getEntries().filter((entry) => entry.type !== "note" && entry.type !== "card")838              : vault.queryDomain(scopedDomain!)839          ).filter((entry) => !isPasskeyOnly(entry) && Boolean(entry.totp));840          return {841            ok: true,842            data: matches.map((e) => ({843              id: e.id,844              title: e.title,845              username: e.username,846              email: e.email,847              url: e.url,848              hasTotp: true,849            })),850          };851        }852        // The inline selector fills username+password into a form. Passkey-853        // only entries have no password to fill; sign-in for those goes854        // through the WebAuthn path instead. Filter them out everywhere so855        // the user doesn't see four "GitHub" rows that mostly do nothing.856        // Notes and cards never belonged here either.857        const matches = (858          includeAll859            ? vault860                .getEntries()861                .filter((entry) => entry.type !== "note" && entry.type !== "card")862            : vault.queryDomain(scopedDomain!)863        ).filter((entry) => !isPasskeyOnly(entry));864        return {865          ok: true,866          data: matches.map((e) =>867            includeAll868              ? {869                  id: e.id,870                  title: e.title,871                  // username/email/url shipped so the inline popup's search872                  // affordance can match on them, not just titles. No secrets873                  // cross the boundary — same shape as the domain-matched874                  // response below minus hasTotp (which the search list875                  // doesn't surface).876                  username: e.username,877                  email: e.email,878                  url: e.url,879                  hasPasskey: e.passkey !== undefined,880                }881              : {882                  id: e.id,883                  title: e.title,884                  username: e.username,885                  email: e.email,886                  url: e.url,887                  hasTotp: Boolean(e.totp),888                  hasPasskey: e.passkey !== undefined,889                }890          ),891        };892      }893      case "GET_ENTRY_FOR_FILL": {894        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };895        const { id, capability } = msg.payload as {896          id: string;897          capability?: string;898        };899        const capabilityAuthorized = capability !== undefined && consumeSummonCapability(capability, sender, "fill");900        const senderDomain = isPageSender(sender) ? attestedSenderDomain(sender) : null;901        if (isPageSender(sender) && !senderDomain) {902          return { ok: false, error: "origin_unverified" };903        }904        const entry = vault.getEntryById(id);905        if (!entry) return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };906907        // MV-1: re-validate the entry against the requesting frame's origin.908        // sender.url / sender.tab.url are browser-attested — a page cannot909        // forge them. PB-26-005: the FRAME url (sender.url) is authoritative910        // for an all_frames content script; the top-frame tab.url would911        // misattribute a cross-origin iframe's request to the top page. When912        // the request does not come from a tab at all (popup surfaces use913        // GET_ENTRY_FOR_EDIT, not this), refuse.914        if (senderDomain && !capabilityAuthorized) {915          if (!entryDomains(entry.url, entry.additionalUrls).has(senderDomain)) {916            // Domain mismatch — refuse silently (no oracle about which ids exist).917            return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };918          }919        }920        // Passkey-only entries (passkey credential, no password) cannot be921        // filled into a form — sign-in goes through the WebAuthn path. A922        // login that ALSO has a passkey is still fillable for its password.923        if (isPasskeyOnly(entry)) return { ok: false, error: "passkey_not_fillable" };924        // Strip the passkey credential AND the raw base32 TOTP seed from the925        // response. Content scripts never need either: the private key is the926        // authenticator's, and handing over the TOTP seed would let a927        // compromised content script mint valid codes indefinitely (SEV-3-C).928        // Generate the *current* 6-digit code here in the background and send929        // only that, plus the seconds left so the UI can render a countdown.930        // Also drop passwordHistory: filling needs only the *current* password.931        // Handing every past password to a content script during passive932        // autofill on an arbitrary page would widen the blast radius of a933        // compromised page far beyond the one credential being filled.934        const {935          passkey: _strippedPasskey,936          totp: seed,937          totpAlgorithm,938          totpDigits,939          totpPeriod,940          passwordHistory: _ph,941          ...safeEntry942        } = entry;943        let totpCode: string | undefined;944        let totpRemaining: number | undefined;945        if (seed) {946          try {947            // PCH-01-019: honour stored algorithm/digits/period (defaults apply948            // when these are undefined, i.e. RFC-default bare-seed entries).949            const generated = generateTOTP(seed, totpAlgorithm, totpDigits, totpPeriod);950            totpCode = generated.code;951            totpRemaining = generated.remaining;952          } catch {953            totpCode = undefined;954          }955        }956        return { ok: true, data: { ...safeEntry, totpCode, totpRemaining } };957      }958      // Trusted full-entry fetch for extension-owned edit surfaces. Content959      // scripts route editing to the popup and cannot call this message.960      case "GET_ENTRY_FOR_EDIT": {961        if (isPageSender(sender)) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_sender" };962        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };963        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };964        const entry = vault.getEntryById(id);965        if (!entry) return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };966967        const { passkey: _passkey, ...safeEntry } = entry;968        return { ok: true, data: safeEntry };969      }970      case "COPY": {971        // AUD-002: shape-validate the payload before passing to the clipboard972        // helper. A raw cast lets a malformed message reach the clipboard API973        // with a non-string and throw.974        const { text, label, alreadyWritten } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {975          text?: unknown;976          label?: unknown;977          alreadyWritten?: unknown;978        };979        if (typeof text !== "string" || typeof label !== "string") {980          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };981        }982        await copyToClipboard(text, label, Boolean(alreadyWritten));983        return { ok: true, clearSeconds: getEffectiveClearSeconds() };984      }985      case "CHECK_ALL_BREACHES": {986        const allEntries = vault.getEntries();987        const results: Record<string, number> = {};988        for (const entry of allEntries) {989          if (entry.type === "note") continue;990          if (!entry.password) continue;991          results[entry.id] = await vault.checkBreach(entry.password);992          // Small delay — be a good citizen to the HIBP API993          await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 200));994        }995        // Persist any non-zero counts back to entries996        for (const [id, count] of Object.entries(results)) {997          const entry = vault.getEntryById(id);998          if (entry && (entry.breach ?? 0) !== count) {999            await vault.updateEntry(id, { breach: count > 0 ? count : undefined });1000          }1001        }1002        return { ok: true, data: results };1003      }1004      case "GET_SETTINGS":1005        return { ok: true, data: await vault.ensureSettingsLoaded() };1006      case "UPDATE_SETTINGS": {1007        const patch = msg.payload;1008        if (!patch || typeof patch !== "object" || Array.isArray(patch)) {1009          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1010        }1011        await vault.updateSettings(patch as vault.VaultSettings);1012        if (typeof (patch as Record<string, unknown>).autoLockMinutes === "number") {1013          await setupAutoLock();1014          if (vault.isUnlocked()) touchAutoLock();1015        }1016        return { ok: true };1017      }1018      case "SETUP_PIN": {1019        const { currentPassword, pin } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1020          currentPassword?: unknown;1021          pin?: unknown;1022        };1023        if (typeof currentPassword !== "string" || typeof pin !== "string") {1024          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1025        }1026        return (await vault.setupPinUnlock(currentPassword, pin))1027          ? { ok: true }1028          : { ok: false, error: "incorrect_current_password" };1029      }1030      case "DISABLE_PIN": {1031        const { currentPassword } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { currentPassword?: unknown };1032        if (typeof currentPassword !== "string") return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1033        return (await vault.disablePinUnlock(currentPassword))1034          ? { ok: true }1035          : { ok: false, error: "incorrect_current_password" };1036      }1037      case "GET_PENDING_PASSKEY":1038        return { ok: true, data: await getPendingPasskeyRequest() };1039      case "APPROVE_PASSKEY": {1040        const { requestId } = msg.payload as { requestId: number };1041        await resolvePendingPasskeyRequest(requestId, true);1042        return { ok: true };1043      }1044      case "DENY_PASSKEY": {1045        const { requestId } = msg.payload as { requestId: number };1046        await resolvePendingPasskeyRequest(requestId, false);1047        return { ok: true };1048      }1049      case "GET_PASSKEY_PROVIDER_STATE":1050        return { ok: true, data: await getPasskeyProviderState() };1051      case "SET_PASSKEY_PROVIDER_ENABLED": {1052        const { enabled } = msg.payload as { enabled: boolean };1053        // Disabling is always free; gating fires only when a free user is1054        // trying to turn passkey interception on.1055        if (enabled) {1056          const gate = await requirePro("passkeys");1057          if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1058        }1059        return { ok: true, data: await setPasskeyProviderEnabled(enabled) };1060      }1061      // AUD-003: this handler POSTs `entryTitle` to a user-configured HTTPS1062      // endpoint. Intentional product behavior — users configure their own1063      // dead-man's-switch. isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl blocks localhost, private1064      // IPs, and non-HTTPS schemes, but cannot defend against every DNS-1065      // rebinding case. The UI under CanarySection (Entry.tsx) discloses to1066      // users that the entry title leaves the device when the canary fires.1067      case "FIRE_CANARY_PING": {1068        // Canary alert fires unconditionally for any entry with canary: true.1069        // The Pro gate only governs creation/flagging of canary entries; once1070        // an entry is flagged, the alert path is a security property and must1071        // never be license-gated.1072        const { webhookUrl, entryTitle, trigger } = msg.payload as {1073          webhookUrl: string;1074          entryTitle: string;1075          trigger: "password_copied" | "username_copied" | "autofilled" | "submitted" | "test";1076        };1077        if (!isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl(webhookUrl)) {1078          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_webhook_url" };1079        }1080        // LV-3: debounce non-test pings per (webhook, entry) so a page that1081        // strobes focus/fill events can't turn the canary into a request1082        // firehose at the user's endpoint. Test pings are exempt — they are1083        // explicit user clicks in the settings UI and are awaited for1084        // feedback. The FIRST ping in a window always goes out, so the1085        // dead-man's-switch property (canary fires on access) is preserved;1086        // only repeats within the window are coalesced.1087        if (trigger !== "test") {1088          const rlKey = `canary-last-fetch:${webhookUrl}:${entryTitle}`;1089          const stored = await chrome.storage.local.get(rlKey);1090          const last = (stored as Record<string, unknown>)[rlKey];1091          if (typeof last === "number" && Date.now() - last < CANARY_MIN_INTERVAL_MS) {1092            return { ok: true, data: { rateLimited: true } };1093          }1094          await chrome.storage.local.set({ [rlKey]: Date.now() });1095        }1096        const body = JSON.stringify({1097          event: trigger === "test" ? "peach_canary_test" : "peach_canary_accessed",1098          entry: entryTitle,1099          trigger,1100          timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),1101          source: "peach-extension",1102        });1103        if (trigger === "test") {1104          // Permitted outbound fetch: user-configured canary alert endpoint1105          // (validated by isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl above). This is the1106          // only non-HIBP outbound call in the extension — see1107          // Projects.md §3.7. Test pings are awaited so the UI can show1108          // success/failure.1109          try {1110            const res = await fetch(webhookUrl, {1111              method: "POST",1112              headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },1113              body,1114            });1115            return { ok: res.ok, error: res.ok ? undefined : `HTTP ${res.status}` };1116          } catch (err) {1117            return { ok: false, error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : "network_error" };1118          }1119        }1120        // Non-test triggers are fire-and-forget1121        fetch(webhookUrl, {1122          method: "POST",1123          headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },1124          body,1125        }).catch(() => {});1126        return { ok: true };1127      }1128      case "ACTIVATE_LICENSE": {1129        const { key } = msg.payload as { key: string };1130        const licenseInfo = await activateLicense(key);1131        return { ok: true, data: licenseInfo };1132      }1133      case "GET_LICENSE": {1134        const licenseInfo = await getLicenseInfo();1135        return { ok: true, data: licenseInfo };1136      }1137      case "GET_LICENSE_KEY": {1138        const key = await getLicenseKey();1139        return { ok: true, data: key };1140      }1141      case "DEACTIVATE_LICENSE": {1142        await deactivateLicense();1143        return { ok: true };1144      }1145      case "SHOULD_PLAY_CELEBRATION": {1146        const should = await shouldPlayCelebration();1147        return { ok: true, data: should };1148      }1149      case "MARK_CELEBRATION_PLAYED": {1150        await markCelebrationPlayed();1151        return { ok: true };1152      }1153      case "GET_CODEX_VAULT_DATA": {1154        // Pro-gated. requirePro broadcasts PRO_GATE_TRIGGERED on miss so the1155        // popup navigates to the License section without further coordination.1156        // Also privileged-page-gated (PB-26-001), and recoveryWords inside the1157        // snapshot additionally require a fresh master-password proof.1158        const gate = await requirePro("codex");1159        if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1160        const { password } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { password?: string };1161        return await handleGetCodexVaultData(password);1162      }1163      case "ESTIMATE_CODEX_PAGES": {1164        const gate = await requirePro("codex");1165        if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1166        return await handleEstimateCodexPages();1167      }1168      case "RESTORE_FROM_CODEX": {1169        // !! IMPORTANT: intentionally NOT Pro-gated. A free device must still1170        // be able to restore a vault that was printed by a Pro user.1171        // DO NOT add a Pro gate here.1172        const payload = msg.payload as CodexRestorePayload;1173        return await handleRestoreFromCodex(payload);1174      }1175      case "OPEN_PRO_GATE": {1176        // Content script requests: open popup and navigate to License section.1177        const { feature } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { feature?: string };1178        if (chrome.storage.session) {1179          await chrome.storage.session.set({ pendingProGate: { feature: feature ?? "passkeys" } });1180        }1181        try { await chrome.action.openPopup(); } catch { /* badge fallback */ }1182        return { ok: true };1183      }1184      case "OPEN_POPUP": {1185        // Content script asks to open the trusted extension popup — used by the1186        // inline locked bubble so the master password is entered in the popup,1187        // never in page-hosted DOM (audit HIGH). Best-effort: openPopup needs a1188        // user gesture + Chrome 127+/Firefox; on failure the user clicks the1189        // toolbar icon. The badge already signals Peach needs attention.1190        //1191        // Set a session flag so the popup knows it was opened for inline unlock1192        // and should close itself once the vault is unlocked (returning the user1193        // to the inline autofill selector on the page).1194        const { entryId } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { entryId?: unknown };1195        if (entryId !== undefined && (typeof entryId !== "string" || entryId.length === 0 || entryId.length > 64)) {1196          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1197        }1198        if (chrome.storage.session) {1199          if (typeof entryId === "string") {1200            await chrome.storage.session.set({ peach_open_entry: entryId });1201          } else {1202            await chrome.storage.session.set({ peach_inline_unlock: true });1203          }1204        }1205        try { await chrome.action.openPopup(); } catch { /* user opens via toolbar */ }1206        return { ok: true };1207      }1208      case "OPEN_DETACHED_POPUP": {1209        // A window created by the action popup and then orphaned with1210        // window.close() is cascaded shut by Chrome, so the file-picker1211        // flows (OS dialogs that dismiss the popup on focus loss) ask the SW1212        // to open the standalone window instead — the SW has no window to be1213        // associated with. The query string is allowlisted so this can never1214        // open an arbitrary URL.1215        const { route } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { route?: string };1216        const search = route === "peachscript"1217          ? "?restore=peachscript"1218          : route === "csv"1219            ? "?restore=csv"1220            : route === "codex-pdf"1221              ? "?codex=pdf"1222              : null;1223        if (!search) return { ok: false, error: "bad_route" };1224        try {1225          const popupHtml =1226            chrome.runtime.getManifest().action?.default_popup ?? "src/popup/index.html";1227          await chrome.windows.create({1228            url: chrome.runtime.getURL(`${popupHtml}${search}`),1229            type: "popup",1230            width: 320,1231            height: 550,1232          });1233          return { ok: true, data: { detached: true } };1234        } catch {1235          return { ok: false };1236        }1237      }1238      case "GET_IDENTITIES": {1239        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1240        return { ok: true, data: vault.getIdentities() };1241      }1242      case "TOUCH_AUTO_LOCK": {1243        // touchAutoLock() is already called by shouldRefreshAutoLock above;1244        // this case just gives the popup a typed message to keep the session alive.1245        return { ok: true };1246      }1247      case "GET_ADVANCED_HEALTH_REPORT": {1248        const gate = await requirePro("advanced_health");1249        if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1250        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1251        const report = await buildAdvancedHealthReport(vault.getEntries());1252        return { ok: true, data: report };1253      }1254      case "IS_DURESS_ENABLED": {1255        const enabled = await vault.isDuressEnabled();1256        return { ok: true, data: enabled };1257      }1258      case "SETUP_DURESS": {1259        // Single enforcement point for the Duress Vault Pro gate. Free users1260        // who somehow reach this handler are rejected here; the popup also1261        // pre-checks isPro() to avoid showing the setup form to free users,1262        // but server-side is the actual security boundary.1263        const gate = await requirePro("duress_vault");1264        if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1265        // MV3 service workers restart after inactivity, losing the in-memory1266        // derived key. Detect this before calling setupDuress so the popup1267        // can show a meaningful prompt to re-lock and re-unlock.1268        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "session_expired" };1269        const { duressPassword } = msg.payload as { duressPassword: string };1270        await vault.setupDuress(duressPassword);1271        return { ok: true };1272      }1273      case "DISABLE_DURESS": {1274        await vault.disableDuress();1275        return { ok: true };1276      }1277      case "VERIFY_MAIN_PASSWORD": {1278        const { password } = msg.payload as { password: string };1279        const ok = await vault.verifyMainPassword(password);1280        return { ok: true, data: ok };1281      }1282      case "CHANGE_PASSWORD": {1283        const { currentPassword, newPassword } = msg.payload as {1284          currentPassword: string;1285          newPassword: string;1286        };1287        const changed = await vault.changePassword(currentPassword, newPassword);1288        return changed1289          ? { ok: true }1290          : { ok: false, error: "incorrect_current_password" };1291      }1292      case "GET_SITE_PASSWORD_POLICY": {1293        const [tab] = await chrome.tabs.query({ active: true, currentWindow: true });1294        if (!tab?.id) return { ok: true, data: null };1295        try {1296          const response = await chrome.tabs.sendMessage(tab.id, {1297            type: "GET_SITE_PASSWORD_POLICY",1298          });1299          return (response as MessageResponse) ?? { ok: true, data: null };1300        } catch {1301          return { ok: true, data: null };1302        }1303      }1304      case "RECORD_MANUAL_SUMMON": {1305        const { domain } = msg.payload as { domain: string };1306        const settings = vault.getSettings();1307        const existing = settings.manualSummonDomains?.[domain];1308        const now = Date.now();1309        await vault.updateSettings({1310          manualSummonDomains: {1311            ...settings.manualSummonDomains,1312            [domain]: {1313              firstSummonedAt: existing?.firstSummonedAt ?? now,1314              summonCount: (existing?.summonCount ?? 0) + 1,1315              lastSummonedAt: now,1316            },1317          },1318        });1319        return { ok: true };1320      }1321      case "DECLINE_CARD_SAVE": {1322        // PB-26-108: the declined-card digest is keyed by root-key material, so1323        // a decline cannot be recorded while locked. Offers are not shown while1324        // locked either, so this is unreachable in practice.1325        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1326        const { last4, expMonth, expYear } = msg.payload as { last4: string; expMonth: string; expYear: string };1327        await vault.declineCardSaveOffer(last4, expMonth, expYear);1328        return { ok: true };1329      }1330      case "IS_CARD_DECLINED": {1331        const { last4, expMonth, expYear } = msg.payload as { last4: string; expMonth: string; expYear: string };1332        const declined = await vault.isCardDeclined(last4, expMonth, expYear);1333        return { ok: true, data: declined };1334      }1335      case "INITIATE_FIREFOX_PASSKEY_CREATE": {1336        const { rpId, rpName, userName, userDisplayName } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1337          rpId?: string;1338          rpName?: string;1339          userName?: string;1340          userDisplayName?: string;1341        };1342        if (!rpId || !userName) return { ok: false, error: "rpid_and_username_required" };1343        return await initiateFirefoxPasskeyCreate({1344          rpId,1345          rpName: rpName ?? rpId,1346          userName,1347          userDisplayName,1348        }, attestedSenderOrigin(sender));1349      }13501351      case "COMPLETE_FIREFOX_PASSKEY_CREATE": {1352        const payload = msg.payload as Parameters<typeof completeFirefoxPasskeyCreate>[0] | undefined;1353        if (!payload) return { ok: false, error: "missing_payload" };1354        return await completeFirefoxPasskeyCreate(payload);1355      }13561357      case "PASSKEY_OFFER_DECLINE": {1358        const { domain } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { domain?: string };1359        const origin = attestedSenderOrigin(sender);1360        if (!domain || !origin || !isValidRpId(domain, origin)) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_domain" };1361        await recordPasskeyOfferDecline(domain);1362        return { ok: true };1363      }13641365      case "GET_PASSKEY_OFFER_DECLINED": {1366        const { domain } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { domain?: string };1367        const origin = attestedSenderOrigin(sender);1368        if (!domain || !origin || !isValidRpId(domain, origin)) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_domain" };1369        return { ok: true, data: await isPasskeyOfferDeclined(domain) };1370      }13711372      case "PASSKEY_HAS_CREDENTIALS": {1373        const payload = msg.payload as {1374          rpId?: string;1375          allowCredentials?: Array<{ id: string; type?: string }>;1376        } | undefined;1377        if (!payload?.rpId) return { ok: false, error: "rpid_required" };1378        return await handlePasskeyHasCredentials({1379          rpId: payload.rpId,1380          allowCredentials: payload.allowCredentials ?? [],1381        }, attestedSenderOrigin(sender));1382      }13831384      case "PASSKEY_CREATE": {1385        const payload = msg.payload as Parameters<typeof handleFirefoxPasskeyCreate>[0] | undefined;1386        if (!payload?.rpId || !payload?.userName) {1387          return { ok: false, error: "rpid_and_username_required" };1388        }1389        return await handleFirefoxPasskeyCreate(payload, attestedSenderOrigin(sender));1390      }13911392      case "PASSKEY_GET": {1393        const payload = msg.payload as Parameters<typeof handleFirefoxPasskeyGet>[0] | undefined;1394        if (!payload?.rpId) return { ok: false, error: "rpid_required" };1395        return await handleFirefoxPasskeyGet(payload, attestedSenderOrigin(sender));1396      }13971398      case "PASSKEY_AUTH_RESPONSE": {1399        const { requestId, approved } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1400          requestId?: string | number;1401          approved?: boolean;1402        };1403        if (requestId === undefined || requestId === null || typeof approved !== 'boolean') {1404          return { ok: false, error: 'requestId and approved required' };1405        }1406        await resolvePendingPasskeyRequest(Number(requestId), approved);1407        return { ok: true };1408      }14091410      case "GET_PASSKEY_FOR_DOMAIN": {1411        const { domain } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { domain?: string };1412        if (!domain) return { ok: false, error: "domain_required" };1413        // Scope to the caller's own origin: a page may only ask about passkeys1414        // for a domain it actually owns, so an arbitrary page cannot enumerate1415        // which sites the user holds passkeys for or read the username (audit MEDIUM).1416        const origin = attestedSenderOrigin(sender);1417        if (!origin || !isValidRpId(domain, origin)) return { ok: true, data: null };1418        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: true, data: null };1419        const match = vault1420          .getEntries()1421          .find((entry) => entry.passkey?.rpId === domain);1422        if (!match || !match.passkey) return { ok: true, data: null };1423        // Slim shape — only the fields State 11 needs. Never expose private1424        // key material, even though this is locked behind isUnlocked.1425        return {1426          ok: true,1427          data: {1428            rpId: match.passkey.rpId,1429            userName: match.passkey.userName,1430            browser: match.passkey.browser,1431          },1432        };1433      }14341435      case "DESTROY_VAULT": {1436        // Irreversible by design. Lock zeroes the derived key + in-memory entries;1437        // storage.local.clear() wipes every Peach key (slots, settings, license,1438        // onboarded flag, history, sync state, declined cards, recall, etc.);1439        // session.clear() wipes pending passkey requests + pro-notice queues.1440        // Caller (Panic.tsx) handles UI navigation back to onboarding.1441        //1442        // The Pro license is the one thing that must survive: the user paid for1443        // it, and destroying a vault (panic wipe, fresh start) is not a refund.1444        // Capture it before the clear and restore it after. peach_pro_celebrated1445        // rides along so the Pro celebration doesn't replay on the next unlock.1446        const preserved = await chrome.storage.local.get([1447          "peach_license",1448          "peach_pro_celebrated",1449        ]);1450        vault.lock();1451        await storageClear();1452        await vault.clearVaultHistory();1453        const toRestore: Record<string, unknown> = {};1454        if (preserved.peach_license !== undefined) toRestore.peach_license = preserved.peach_license;1455        if (preserved.peach_pro_celebrated !== undefined) toRestore.peach_pro_celebrated = preserved.peach_pro_celebrated;1456        if (Object.keys(toRestore).length > 0) {1457          await chrome.storage.local.set(toRestore);1458        }1459        if (chrome.storage.session) {1460          await chrome.storage.session.clear();1461        }1462        await clearRecoveryConfirmPending();1463        return { ok: true };1464      }14651466      case "GET_IDENTITY_SUGGESTIONS": {1467        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1468        const entries = vault.getEntries();1469        const suggestions = buildIdentitySuggestions(entries);1470        return { ok: true, data: { suggestions } };1471      }1472      case "ML_INIT":1473        return { ok: true };14741475      case "ML_PREDICT_BATCH": {1476        // AUD-002: shape-validate before forwarding to the ML helper.1477        const { featuresArray } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { featuresArray?: unknown };1478        if (!Array.isArray(featuresArray)) {1479          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1480        }1481        return { ok: true, data: mlPredictBatch(featuresArray as MLFieldFeatures[]) };1482      }14831484      // ── Vault sync (v3) ───────────────────────────────────────────────1485      // Returns the public-facing local identity needed by the popup to1486      // drive Phase-1 audio pairing. The private long-term key never1487      // leaves the background.1488      case "GET_LOCAL_IDENTITY": {1489        // Not Pro-gated: a free device may attempt to pair so it can RECEIVE a1490        // Pro license from an already-Pro peer (at least one device must be Pro).1491        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1492        // Identity derives from the stable root key, not the password-derived1493        // key, so pairing survives a master-password change (SEV-2-B).1494        const masterKeyHex = vault.getRootKeyHex();1495        if (!masterKeyHex) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1496        const masterKey = unhexBytes(masterKeyHex);1497        try {1498          const identity = await buildLocalIdentity(masterKey);1499          // If this device is Pro, advertise the signed license so the peer can1500          // activate it after SAS confirmation — pairing carries Pro across.1501          if (await isProUser()) {1502            const license = await getLicenseKey();1503            if (license) (identity as { license?: string }).license = license;1504          }1505          return { ok: true, data: identity };1506        } finally {1507          masterKey.fill(0);1508        }1509      }15101511      case "LIST_PAIRED_DEVICES": {1512        const devices = await listPairedDevicesV3();1513        return { ok: true, data: { devices } };1514      }15151516      case "RENAME_PAIRED_DEVICE": {1517        const { deviceId, name } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { deviceId?: string; name?: string };1518        if (typeof deviceId !== "string" || !deviceId || typeof name !== "string") {1519          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1520        }1521        await renamePairedDeviceV3(deviceId, name);1522        return { ok: true };1523      }15241525      case "UNPAIR_DEVICE": {1526        const { deviceId } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { deviceId?: string };1527        if (typeof deviceId !== "string" || !deviceId) {1528          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1529        }1530        // Removing a device REVOKES it rather than just dropping the local1531        // row: a plain removal is undone the moment any other peer vouches it1532        // back through a manifest, which is exactly what the relay makes easy.1533        await revokeDeviceByIdV3(deviceId, await getOrCreateDeviceId());1534        // Sync against the remaining hosts — the unpaired device no longer1535        // matters but the next alarm tick is up to ten minutes away.1536        void triggerSyncIfReachable({ reason: "device_list_changed" }).catch(() => undefined);1537        return { ok: true };1538      }15391540      case "RENAME_LOCAL_DEVICE": {1541        const { name } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { name?: string };1542        if (typeof name !== "string") return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1543        await setDeviceNameV3(name);1544        return { ok: true };1545      }15461547      // ── Relay pairing ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────1548      // Not Pro-gated (a free device may pair to receive Pro/sync). The whole NK1549      // session runs in the background; the SAS and the terminal result reach1550      // the popup as ADOPTION_SOURCE_SAS / ADOPTION_SOURCE_RESULT pushes.1551      case "START_ADOPTION_SOURCE": {1552        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1553        if (isRelayAdoptionSourceInFlight()) {1554          return { ok: false, error: "adoption_source_in_progress" };1555        }1556        try {1557          return { ok: true, data: await startRelayAdoptionSource() };1558        } catch (error) {1559          return {1560            ok: false,1561            error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : "adoption_source_failed",1562          };1563        }1564      }15651566      // Onboarding receiver — empty extension shows a QR, phone scans and1567      // sends the vault. The popup supplies the local-only password here so1568      // the background can wrap the adopted root key at rest without ever1569      // asking the user to retype it.1570      case "START_ADOPTION_RECEIVER": {1571        if (isRelayAdoptionSourceInFlight()) {1572          return { ok: false, error: "adoption_receiver_in_progress" };1573        }1574        const password = (msg.payload as { password?: unknown } | undefined)?.password;1575        if (typeof password !== "string" || password.length === 0) {1576          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1577        }1578        try {1579          return { ok: true, data: await startRelayAdoptionReceiver(password) };1580        } catch (error) {1581          return {1582            ok: false,1583            error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : "adoption_receiver_failed",1584          };1585        }1586      }15871588      // Popup→bg counterpart to ADOPTION_SOURCE_SAS (receiver flow).1589      // The receiver now auto-accepts the SAS (both sides derive it from the1590      // same Noise handshake hash, so the codes match by construction) so1591      // the popup never has a SAS screen to tap on. The id round-trips the1592      // same way so a stale late response can't approve the wrong session.1593      // Popup→bg counterpart for the source flow: Confirm/Cancel on the1594      // source's SAS screen.15951596      // Source-side mirror of RECEIVER_SAS_DECISION: the popup's confirm/cancel1597      // on the source's SAS screen. The id round-trips the same way so a stale1598      // late response can't approve the wrong session.1599      case "SOURCE_SAS_DECISION": {1600        const payload = msg.payload as { id?: unknown; ok?: unknown } | undefined;1601        if (typeof payload?.id !== "string" || typeof payload?.ok !== "boolean") {1602          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1603        }1604        return { ok: resolveSourceSasConfirmation(payload.id, payload.ok) };1605      }16061607      case "CANCEL_ADOPTION_SOURCE": {1608        cancelRelayAdoptionSource();1609        return { ok: true };1610      }16111612      case "TRIGGER_SYNC": {1613        const payload = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1614          reason?: "vault_change" | "foreground" | "manual";1615          force?: boolean;1616        };1617        const reason = payload.reason ?? "foreground";16181619        void triggerSyncIfReachable({ reason, force: payload.force === true });1620        return { ok: true };1621      }16221623      case "GET_SYNC_STATE": {1624        return { ok: true, data: getSyncState() };1625      }16261627      case "GET_SYNC_SETTINGS": {1628        return { ok: true, data: await getSyncSettings() };1629      }16301631      case "SET_SYNC_SETTINGS": {1632        const payload = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1633          mode?: unknown;1634          relayUrl?: unknown;1635        };1636        try {1637          // A custom relay URL implies private mode; Peach's own relay stays1638          // public. See setRelayUrl.1639          if (payload.relayUrl !== undefined) {1640            if (typeof payload.relayUrl !== "string") {1641              return { ok: false, error: "invalid_relay_url" };1642            }1643            return { ok: true, data: await setRelayUrl(payload.relayUrl) };1644          }1645          if (payload.mode !== undefined) {1646            if (payload.mode !== "public" && payload.mode !== "private" && payload.mode !== "off") {1647              return { ok: false, error: "invalid_sync_mode" };1648            }1649            return { ok: true, data: await setSyncMode(payload.mode as SyncMode) };1650          }1651          return { ok: true, data: await getSyncSettings() };1652        } catch (error) {1653          return {1654            ok: false,1655            error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : "invalid_relay_url",1656          };1657        }1658      }16591660      case "GET_SYNC_ALERTS": {1661        const { consume } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { consume?: boolean };1662        const alerts = await getPendingSyncAlerts();1663        // The popup reads on open and acknowledges with consume:true after1664        // rendering, so a popup crash between read and render doesn't lose1665        // the alerts.1666        if (consume) await clearPendingSyncAlerts();1667        return { ok: true, data: alerts };1668      }16691670      case "GET_PENDING_VOUCHED_DEVICES": {1671        return { ok: true, data: await listPendingVouchedDevices() };1672      }1673      case "CONFIRM_VOUCHED_DEVICE": {1674        const { deviceId } = msg.payload as { deviceId: string };1675        const pending = await getPendingVouchedDevice(deviceId);1676        if (!pending) return { ok: false, error: "not_pending" };1677        // Last gate before a vouched device becomes a sync peer. A queue entry1678        // can predate the revocation that names it, so revocation is re-checked1679        // here rather than trusted to have swept the queue.1680        if (await isDeviceRevoked(pending.deviceId, pending.longTermPublicKeyHex)) {1681          await removePendingVouchedDevice(deviceId);1682          return { ok: false, error: "device_revoked" };1683        }1684        await upsertPairedDeviceV3({1685          deviceId: pending.deviceId,1686          deviceName: pending.deviceName,1687          deviceType:1688            pending.deviceType as import("../shared/sync-types").PairedDevice["deviceType"],1689          longTermPublicKeyHex: pending.longTermPublicKeyHex,1690          signingPublicKeyHex: pending.signingPublicKeyHex,1691          wsPort: pending.wsPort,1692          pairedAt: pending.pairedAt,1693          trustSource: "vouched",1694        });1695        await removePendingVouchedDevice(deviceId);1696        // Newly confirmed vouched device is now a sync target — kick a round1697        // so the mesh introduction pays off without a 10-minute wait.1698        void triggerSyncIfReachable({ reason: "device_list_changed" }).catch(() => undefined);1699        return { ok: true };1700      }1701      case "REJECT_VOUCHED_DEVICE": {1702        const { deviceId } = msg.payload as { deviceId: string };1703        await removePendingVouchedDevice(deviceId);1704        return { ok: true };1705      }1706      case "ROTATE_SYNC_IDENTITY": {1707        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1708        const result = await vault.rotateSyncIdentity();1709        return result.ok ? { ok: true } : { ok: false, error: result.error };1710      }17111712      default:1713        return { ok: false, error: "unknown_message_type" };1714    }1715  } catch (err) {1716    return {1717      ok: false,1718      error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : "operation_failed",1719    };1720  }1721}17221723// Returns username use-counts from the vault, sorted by frequency. Each row1724// also carries the entry's email so the popup can suggest the email/username1725// pair the user has actually used together.1726function buildIdentitySuggestions(1727  entries: VaultEntry[],1728): Array<{ email: string; username: string; count: number }> {1729  const usernameCounts = new Map<string, number>();1730  const usernameEmail = new Map<string, string>();1731  for (const entry of entries) {1732    const username = entry.username ?? "";1733    const email = (entry as VaultEntry & { email?: string }).email ?? "";1734    if (!username && !email) continue;1735    const key = username || email;1736    usernameCounts.set(key, (usernameCounts.get(key) ?? 0) + 1);1737    if (!usernameEmail.has(key)) usernameEmail.set(key, email);1738  }1739  return Array.from(usernameCounts.entries())1740    .sort((a, b) => b[1] - a[1])1741    .map(([username, count]) => ({1742      email: usernameEmail.get(username) ?? "",1743      username,1744      count,1745    }));1746}17471748/** Notify all content scripts that the vault just became available. */1749function broadcastToContentScripts(message: { type: string }): void {1750  if (!chrome.tabs?.query) return;1751  chrome.tabs.query({}, (tabs) => {1752    for (const tab of tabs) {1753      if (tab.id !== undefined) {1754        chrome.tabs.sendMessage(tab.id, message).catch(() => {1755          // Tab may not have a content script — silently ignore1756        });1757      }1758    }1759  });1760}17611762function shouldRefreshAutoLock(type: MessageType): boolean {1763  return (1764    type !== "HAS_VAULT" &&1765    type !== "IS_UNLOCKED" &&1766    type !== "GET_VAULT_STATUS" &&1767    type !== "LOCK" &&1768    type !== "UPDATE_SETTINGS" &&1769    type !== "GET_PENDING_PASSKEY" &&1770    type !== "GET_PASSKEY_PROVIDER_STATE" &&1771    type !== "DECLINE_CARD_SAVE" &&1772    type !== "IS_CARD_DECLINED" &&1773    type !== "AUTOFILL_QUERY" &&1774    type !== "ML_PREDICT_BATCH"1775  );1776}17771778function isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl(value: string): boolean {1779  try {1780    const url = new URL(value);1781    if (url.protocol !== "https:") return false;17821783    const hostname = url.hostname.toLowerCase();1784    if (1785      hostname === "localhost" ||1786      hostname.endsWith(".localhost") ||1787      isPrivateIpv4(hostname) ||1788      isPrivateIpv6(hostname)1789    ) {1790      return false;1791    }17921793    return true;1794  } catch {1795    return false;1796  }1797}17981799function isPrivateIpv4(hostname: string): boolean {1800  if (PRIVATE_IPV4_RANGES.some((range) => hostname.startsWith(range.prefix))) {1801    return true;1802  }18031804  const octets = hostname.split(".").map((part) => Number(part));1805  if (octets.length !== 4 || octets.some((octet) => !Number.isInteger(octet) || octet < 0 || octet > 255)) {1806    return false;1807  }18081809  return octets[0] === 172 && octets[1] >= 16 && octets[1] <= 31;1810}18111812function isPrivateIpv6(hostname: string): boolean {1813  const normalized = hostname.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "").toLowerCase();1814  // IPv4-mapped IPv6 literals embed a plain IPv4 address that the prefix1815  // list below can never match (WHATWG URL serializes [::ffff:192.168.0.1]1816  // as ::ffff:c0a8:1). Unwrap and test the embedded IPv4; unparseable mapped1817  // tails fail closed. (Codex Security 2026-08-04 LOW,1818  // ssrf.webhook-url-private-ip-filter.) DNS rebinding is out of scope for a1819  // one-shot host check.1820  const mapped = /^::ffff:(.+)$/.exec(normalized);1821  if (mapped) {1822    const tail = mapped[1] ?? "";1823    if (tail.includes(".")) return isPrivateIpv4(tail);1824    const parts = tail.split(":");1825    const [hi, lo] = parts;1826    if (1827      parts.length !== 2 ||1828      !hi ||1829      !lo ||1830      !/^[0-9a-f]{1,4}$/.test(hi) ||1831      !/^[0-9a-f]{1,4}$/.test(lo)1832    ) {1833      return true;1834    }1835    const octets = [1836      (Number.parseInt(hi, 16) >>> 8) & 0xff,1837      Number.parseInt(hi, 16) & 0xff,1838      (Number.parseInt(lo, 16) >>> 8) & 0xff,1839      Number.parseInt(lo, 16) & 0xff,1840    ];1841    return isPrivateIpv4(octets.join("."));1842  }1843  return (1844    normalized === "::1" ||1845    normalized.startsWith("fc") ||1846    normalized.startsWith("fd") ||1847    normalized.startsWith("fe80:")1848  );1849}