messages.ts

1/**2 * messages.ts — the only background message handler.3 *4 * All `chrome.runtime.onMessage` handling for the service worker lives here.5 * Do not handle messages inline in entry.ts, alarms.ts, or any other6 * background file. Every background-bound MessageType in shared/types.ts7 * must have a case below. Content-script-bound message types (PING,8 * SUMMON_AUTOFILL, VAULT_LOCKED) are documented in shared/types.ts and9 * intentionally have no case here — they are sent *to* content scripts.10 */1112import { copyToClipboard, getEffectiveClearSeconds } from "./clipboard";13import { getPendingSyncAlerts, clearPendingSyncAlerts } from "./sync-alerts";14import { extractDomain } from "../shared/domain";15import { computeVaultId } from "../shared/sync-identity";16import {17  getPendingVouchedDevice,18  listPendingVouchedDevices,19  removePendingVouchedDevice,20} from "./pending-vouched-devices";21import { isRecoveryConfirmPending } from "./recovery-pending";22import { setupAutoLock, touchAutoLock } from "./alarms";23import { runSelfTest } from "./self-test";24import * as vault from "./vault";25import {26  handleEstimateCodexPages,27  handleGetCodexVaultData,28  handleRestoreFromCodex,29} from "./codex-handlers";30import type { CodexRestorePayload } from "../shared/codex-types";31import {32  activateLicense,33  deactivateLicense,34  getLicenseInfo,35  getLicenseKey,36  isProUser,37  markCelebrationPlayed,38  shouldPlayCelebration,39} from "./license";40import {41  completeFirefoxPasskeyCreate,42  getPasskeyProviderState,43  getPendingPasskeyRequest,44  handleFirefoxPasskeyCreate,45  handleFirefoxPasskeyGet,46  handlePasskeyHasCredentials,47  initiateFirefoxPasskeyCreate,48  isPasskeyOfferDeclined,49  onVaultUnlocked,50  recordPasskeyOfferDecline,51  resolvePendingPasskeyRequest,52  setPasskeyProviderEnabled,53} from "./passkey";54import { buildAdvancedHealthReport } from "./health";55import { storageClear } from "../shared/storage";56import { findInvalidWords } from "../shared/recovery-words";57import type {58  Message,59  MessageResponse,60  MessageType,61  ProFeature,62  VaultEntry,63} from "../shared/types";64import { isPasskeyOnly } from "../shared/types";65import { generateTOTP } from "../crypto/totp";66import { isValidRpId } from "../shared/passkey-utils";67import { isNativePlatform, nativePlugin } from "../shared/native";68import { predictBatch as mlPredictBatch } from "./ml";69import type { MLFieldFeatures } from "../shared/ml";70import {71  buildLocalIdentity,72  getOrCreateDeviceId,73  setDeviceName as setDeviceNameV3,74} from "./device-identity";75import {76  listPairedDevices as listPairedDevicesV3,77  revokeDeviceById as revokeDeviceByIdV3,78  upsertPairedDevice as upsertPairedDeviceV3,79} from "./paired-devices";80// Sync and pairing are imported statically, never with `await import()`.81// `import()` throws `TypeError: import() is disallowed on82// ServiceWorkerGlobalScope` at runtime in MV3, and Vite's preload helper83// reports the failure through `window.dispatchEvent`, which does not exist in84// a worker either — so the real reason was replaced by "window is not defined"85// and the pairing UI just stopped. scripts/check-sw-static-imports.mjs fails86// the build if a runtime import() reappears anywhere in the worker's graph.87import { parsePairingCode } from "../shared/pairing-code";88import {89  isCodePairingInFlight,90  resolveCodePairingConfirm,91  startCodePairing,92} from "./code-pairing-bg";93import {94  cancelRelayAdoptionSource,95  confirmRelayAdoptionSource,96  isRelayAdoptionSourceInFlight,97  startRelayAdoptionSource,98} from "./relay-adoption-source-bg";99import {100  getRelaySettings,101  setLanOnly,102  setRelayUrl,103} from "./relay-settings";104import {105  getSyncState,106  hydratePersistedSyncState,107  setSyncRunner,108  triggerSyncIfReachable,109} from "./sync-trigger";110import { productionSyncRunner } from "./sync-runner";111112// Compile-time E2E flag, folded to a literal by Vite's `define` (false in113// every production build — verified in the bundled output). Mirrors the114// create-path bypass in passkey.ts so the Playwright passkey smoke can enable115// the provider without a real Pro licence; the gate is fully intact for users.116declare const __PEACH_E2E_PASSKEYS__: boolean;117const PASSKEY_E2E_PRO_BYPASS = __PEACH_E2E_PASSKEYS__ === true;118119let nativeSyncRunnerBootstrapped = false;120121function unhexBytes(hex: string): Uint8Array {122  if (hex.length % 2 !== 0) throw new Error("invalid hex");123  const out = new Uint8Array(hex.length / 2);124  for (let i = 0; i < out.length; i++) {125    out[i] = parseInt(hex.slice(i * 2, i * 2 + 2), 16);126  }127  return out;128}129130/**131 * The single Pro gate. Every gated handler calls this first; the broadcast132 * lets the popup react (navigate to the License section, highlight the133 * relevant feature). Background never touches the popup view directly —134 * the popup owns navigation. See Projects.md "Pro gate rule".135 */136async function requirePro(137  feature: ProFeature,138  trigger: "user" | "background" = "user"139): Promise<{ allowed: boolean }> {140  if (PASSKEY_E2E_PRO_BYPASS && feature === "passkeys") return { allowed: true };141  if (await isProUser()) return { allowed: true };142143  if (trigger === "user") {144    // User deliberately triggered this feature — redirect the popup immediately.145    chrome.runtime146      .sendMessage({ type: "PRO_GATE_TRIGGERED", payload: { feature } })147      .catch(() => {148        // Popup may be closed — the gate signal is best-effort.149      });150  } else {151    // Background trigger (e.g. passive sync initiation) — no popup is open.152    // Queue a notice so the next popup open shows a soft banner instead of153    // silently failing.154    if (chrome.storage.session) {155      chrome.storage.session156        .set({ pendingProNotice: { feature, triggeredAt: Date.now() } })157        .catch(() => {});158    }159  }160161  return { allowed: false };162}163164// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------165// Feedback submission target. Empty disables network submission while the UI166// continues to function as a no-op (the handler returns ok:true without167// calling fetch). When set, the URL is validated by168// `isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl` before any request.169// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------170171const FEEDBACK_ENDPOINT = "";172173// PCH-01-018: operations that irreversibly destroy or replace vault contents.174// These are gated to trusted extension-page senders in handleMessage; the175// confirmation UX otherwise lives only in the popup. Keep this in sync when176// adding new destructive handlers.177const DESTRUCTIVE_MESSAGE_TYPES: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([178  "DESTROY_VAULT",179  "CLEAR_VAULT_ENTRIES",180  "RESTORE_VAULT_SNAPSHOT",181  "RESTORE_FROM_CODEX",182]);183184// LV-3: minimum interval between non-test canary pings per webhook+entry.185const CANARY_MIN_INTERVAL_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000; // 1 hour186187const PRIVATE_IPV4_RANGES = [188  { prefix: "10." },189  { prefix: "127." },190  { prefix: "169.254." },191  { prefix: "192.168." },192];193194export function setupMessageHandler(): void {195  chrome.runtime.onMessage.addListener(196    (msg: unknown, sender, sendResponse) => {197      if (!isMessage(msg)) {198        sendResponse({ ok: false, error: "invalid_message" });199        return true;200      }201      handleMessage(msg, sender)202        .then(sendResponse)203        .catch((err) =>204          sendResponse({205            ok: false,206            error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),207          })208        );209      return true;210    }211  );212213  // Android: the chrome shim queues sendMessage calls until this handler is214  // registered. Without this hookup, every message hangs on Capacitor builds.215  // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any216  const reg = (globalThis as any).__peachRegisterMessageHandler;217  if (typeof reg === "function") {218    reg(async (m: unknown) => {219      if (!isMessage(m)) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_message" };220      try {221        return await handleMessage(m);222      } catch (err) {223        return {224          ok: false,225          error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),226        };227      }228    });229  }230  if (isNativePlatform()) {231    void bootstrapNativeSyncRunner();232  }233}234235async function bootstrapNativeSyncRunner(): Promise<void> {236  if (nativeSyncRunnerBootstrapped) return;237  nativeSyncRunnerBootstrapped = true;238  try {239    setSyncRunner(productionSyncRunner);240    await hydratePersistedSyncState();241  } catch (err) {242    nativeSyncRunnerBootstrapped = false;243    console.warn("[Peach] failed to bootstrap native sync runner:", err);244  }245}246247function isMessage(m: unknown): m is Message {248  return typeof m === "object" && m !== null && "type" in m;249}250251/**252 * The browser-attested origin of the page that originated this message. A web253 * page cannot call chrome.runtime.sendMessage directly (no externally_connectable),254 * so every page-driven message arrives via the content-script relay and the255 * browser stamps `sender.origin`/`sender.url` with the real frame origin — a256 * value the page cannot forge. This is the ONLY trustworthy origin for passkey257 * rpId<->origin enforcement; payload-supplied origins are attacker-controlled.258 */259function attestedSenderOrigin(sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender>): string | undefined {260  if (sender.origin) return sender.origin;261  if (sender.url) {262    try { return new URL(sender.url).origin; } catch { return undefined; }263  }264  return undefined;265}266267// Resolves once restoreFromSession() has run, so handlers see the correct268// post-restore unlock state. entry.ts registers this BEFORE the message269// handler so the onMessage listener is added synchronously at SW startup270// (MV3 requirement) while unlock-dependent handlers still wait for restore.271let restoreReady: Promise<void> = Promise.resolve();272273/** Called by entry.ts at startup with the in-flight restoreFromSession promise. */274export function setRestoreReady(p: Promise<unknown>): void {275  restoreReady = p.then(() => undefined, () => undefined);276}277278export async function handleMessage(279  msg: Message,280  sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender> = {}281): Promise<MessageResponse> {282  try {283    // Wait for session-restore to finish before reading any unlock/vault state.284    // On a cold SW start the popup's first message arrives while restore is285    // still in flight; without this gate IS_UNLOCKED would report locked (a286    // spurious lock screen) and the storage reads could race. The onMessage287    // listener itself is registered synchronously (entry.ts) so this gate, not288    // listener registration, is what absorbs the cold-start window.289    await restoreReady;290    // Validate sender — only allow messages from our extension pages/scripts.291    // `sender.id` is undefined for messages originating from extension UI292    // (popup/options), which is legitimate; reject only when it is defined293    // and does not match our extension id.294    if (295      sender.id !== undefined &&296      sender.id !== chrome.runtime.id297    ) {298      return { ok: false, error: "invalid_sender" };299    }300301    // PCH-01-018: irreversible operations must originate from a trusted extension302    // page (popup/options), never from a content script. The sender.id check above303    // only proves the message came from *our* extension — a content script injected304    // into an attacker page passes it. A single XSS-class bug in the injected UI305    // would otherwise escalate to vault destruction. Extension pages carry an306    // extension-origin sender.url; content scripts carry a page URL.307    if (DESTRUCTIVE_MESSAGE_TYPES.has(msg.type)) {308      const extensionOrigin = chrome.runtime.getURL("");309      if (!sender.url?.startsWith(extensionOrigin)) {310        return { ok: false, error: "invalid_sender" };311      }312    }313314    if (shouldRefreshAutoLock(msg.type) && vault.isUnlocked()) {315      touchAutoLock();316    }317318    switch (msg.type) {319      case "CREATE_VAULT": {320        const { password } = msg.payload as { password: string };321        // Refuse to create a vault under an empty master password — the derived322        // key would be publicly known and the at-rest AES-GCM protection void323        // (audit HIGH; the CSV-import path previously passed ""). Length/strength324        // policy lives in the onboarding UI; this is the non-negotiable floor.325        if (typeof password !== "string" || password.length === 0) {326          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };327        }328        await vault.createVault(password);329        await setupAutoLock();330        broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });331        onVaultUnlocked();332        return { ok: true };333      }334      case "CREATE_VAULT_FROM_ROOT_KEY": {335        const { password, rootKeyHex } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {336          password?: unknown;337          rootKeyHex?: unknown;338        };339        if (typeof password !== "string" || password.length === 0 || typeof rootKeyHex !== "string") {340          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };341        }342343        try {344          const { vaultId } = await vault.createVaultFromRootKey(password, rootKeyHex);345          await setupAutoLock();346          broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });347          onVaultUnlocked();348          return { ok: true, vaultId };349        } catch (err) {350          return { ok: false, error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err) };351        }352      }353      case "UNLOCK": {354        const { password } = msg.payload as { password: string };355        const ok = await vault.unlock(password);356        if (ok) {357          // KAT: verify the WebCrypto stack is healthy before the user relies on it.358          // Runs after unlock so latency is hidden behind the vault-load time.359          const kat = await runSelfTest();360          if (!kat.ok) {361            console.error("[Peach] Crypto self-test FAILED:", kat.error);362            await vault.lock();363            return { ok: false, error: "self_test_failed" };364          }365          await setupAutoLock();366          broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });367          onVaultUnlocked();368          if (isNativePlatform()) await publishInMemoryVault(vault.getEntries());369          return { ok: true };370        }371        // Distinguish corruption from wrong password so the popup can offer372        // a history-restore path instead of falsely accusing the user of373        // mistyping (M7/COR-007).374        const failure = vault.consumeLastUnlockFailureReason();375        if (failure) {376          return {377            ok: false,378            error: "vault_corrupted",379            canRestoreFromHistory: true,380          } as MessageResponse;381        }382        return { ok: false };383      }384      case "VALIDATE_RECOVERY_WORDS": {385        const { words } = msg.payload as { words: string[] };386        const invalid = findInvalidWords(words);387        return { ok: true, data: { valid: invalid.length === 0, invalid } };388      }389      case "GET_RECOVERY_WORDS": {390        // Must be unlocked and have recovery set up (vault must be v2.12+).391        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };392        // LV-4: the recovery words re-derive the ROOT KEY — the highest-393        // value secret in the vault. A session unlock (which may be hours394        // old on a shared machine) is not enough; require a fresh password395        // proof, matching the 1Password/Bitwarden pattern for revealing396        // escrow material. EXEMPTION: the create-vault / rotation confirmation397        // window (peach_recovery_pending) shows the words immediately after398        // the user authenticated, and that confirmation UI has no password to399        // resend — skip the re-auth there only.400        if (!(await isRecoveryConfirmPending())) {401          const { password } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { password?: string };402          if (typeof password !== "string" || !password) {403            return { ok: false, error: "password_required" };404          }405          if (!(await vault.verifyMainPassword(password))) {406            return { ok: false, error: "wrong_password" };407          }408        }409        try {410          const words = await vault.getRecoveryWords();411          return { ok: true, data: words };412        } catch (e) {413          // pre-v2.12 vault that hasn't migrated414          return { ok: false, error: "recovery_not_setup" };415        }416      }417      case "RECOVER_WITH_WORDS": {418        // User has lost their password but has their 12 recovery words.419        // We: (1) validate the words, (2) re-encrypt vault with new password.420        const { words, newPassword } = msg.payload as {421          words: string[];422          newPassword: string;423        };424        const stored = await vault.loadSlotA();425        if (!stored) return { ok: false, error: "no_vault" };426        if (!stored.recovery_salt || !stored.recovery_wrapped_root_key) {427          return { ok: false, error: "recovery_not_setup" };428        }429        // Unwrap the root key from the recovery escrow.430        try {431          await vault.unwrapRootKeyForRecovery(432            stored.recovery_wrapped_root_key,433            stored.recovery_nonce ?? "",434            stored.recovery_tag ?? "",435            stored.recovery_salt,436            words437          );438        } catch {439          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_recovery_words" };440        }441        // Re-key: derive fresh salt + key from new password.442        const newSalt = vault.generateSalt();443        const newKey = await vault.deriveKey(newPassword, newSalt);444        // Re-wrap root key under the new password's derived key so the same445        // recovery words continue to work after the password change.446        await vault.rewrapRootKeyForPassword(newKey, newSalt);447        // Re-encrypt vault entries with the new key.448        await vault.changePasswordWithNewKey(newSalt, newKey);449        await setupAutoLock();450        broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });451        return { ok: true };452      }453      case "LOCK":454        vault.lock();455        if (isNativePlatform()) await clearInMemoryVault();456        return { ok: true };457      case "IS_UNLOCKED":458        return { ok: true, data: vault.isUnlocked() };459      case "GET_VAULT_STATUS":460        return { ok: true, unlocked: vault.isUnlocked() };461      case "HAS_VAULT":462        return { ok: true, data: await vault.hasVault() };463      case "GET_ENTRIES":464        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };465        return { ok: true, data: vault.getEntries() };466      case "ADD_ENTRY": {467        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };468        const payload = msg.payload;469        if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) {470          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };471        }472        const entry = await vault.addEntry(payload as Parameters<typeof vault.addEntry>[0]);473        return { ok: true, data: entry };474      }475      case "BATCH_ADD_ENTRIES": {476        const payload = msg.payload as { entries?: unknown } | null | undefined;477        if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) {478          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };479        }480        if (!Array.isArray(payload.entries)) {481          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };482        }483        const added = await vault.batchAddEntries(payload.entries as Parameters<typeof vault.batchAddEntries>[0]);484        return { ok: true, data: added };485      }486      case "RESTORE_ENTRIES": {487        const payload = msg.payload as488          | { entries?: unknown; mode?: unknown; settings?: unknown }489          | null490          | undefined;491        if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) {492          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };493        }494        if (!Array.isArray(payload.entries)) {495          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };496        }497        if (payload.mode !== "replace" && payload.mode !== "merge") {498          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };499        }500        const summary = await vault.restoreEntries(501          payload.entries as Parameters<typeof vault.restoreEntries>[0],502          payload.mode503        );504        if (payload.settings && typeof payload.settings === "object" && !Array.isArray(payload.settings)) {505          await vault.updateSettings(payload.settings as vault.VaultSettings);506        }507        return { ok: true, data: summary };508      }509      case "CLEAR_VAULT_ENTRIES": {510        await vault.clearVaultEntries("REPLACE_ALL");511        return { ok: true };512      }513      case "GET_VAULT_HISTORY": {514        const snapshots = await vault.getVaultHistory();515        return { ok: true, data: snapshots };516      }517      case "RESTORE_VAULT_SNAPSHOT": {518        const { snapshotId } = msg.payload as { snapshotId: string };519        const result = await vault.restoreVaultSnapshot(snapshotId);520        if (!result.ok) return { ok: false, error: result.error };521        broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_LOCKED" });522        return { ok: true };523      }524      case "COUNT_DUPLICATES": {525        return { ok: true, data: vault.countDuplicates() };526      }527      case "DEDUPLICATE_ENTRIES": {528        const removed = await vault.deduplicateEntries();529        return { ok: true, data: removed };530      }531      case "UPDATE_ENTRY": {532        const payload = msg.payload as { id?: unknown; patch?: unknown } | null | undefined;533        if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) {534          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };535        }536        const { id, patch } = payload;537        if (typeof id !== "string" || !id || !patch || typeof patch !== "object" || Array.isArray(patch)) {538          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };539        }540        // Single enforcement point for the Canary Entries Pro gate. Only541        // gates the transition into a canary entry — clearing/disabling a542        // canary (`canary: undefined`) is always allowed, so existing543        // canary entries remain manageable.544        const incomingCanary = (patch as { canary?: unknown }).canary;545        if (incomingCanary && typeof incomingCanary === "object") {546          const existing = vault.getEntryById(id);547          if (!existing?.canary) {548            const gate = await requirePro("canary_entry");549            if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };550          }551        }552        await vault.updateEntry(id, patch as Parameters<typeof vault.updateEntry>[1]);553        return { ok: true };554      }555      case "ADD_ADDITIONAL_URL": {556        const { id, url } = msg.payload as { id: string; url: string };557        const trimmed = typeof url === "string" ? url.trim() : "";558        if (!trimmed) return { ok: false, error: "url_required" };559        const existing = vault.getEntryById(id);560        if (!existing) return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };561        if (existing.type !== "login") return { ok: false, error: "login_entries_only" };562        const merged = [...(existing.additionalUrls ?? []), trimmed];563        await vault.updateEntry(id, { additionalUrls: merged });564        return { ok: true };565      }566      case "DELETE_ENTRY": {567        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };568        await vault.deleteEntry(id);569        return { ok: true };570      }571      case "GET_DELETED_ENTRIES":572        return { ok: true, data: vault.getDeletedEntries() };573      case "RESTORE_ENTRY": {574        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };575        await vault.restoreEntry(id);576        return { ok: true };577      }578      case "PURGE_ENTRY": {579        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };580        await vault.purgeEntry(id);581        return { ok: true };582      }583      case "PURGE_EXPIRED_TRASH": {584        const { retentionMs } = msg.payload as { retentionMs: number };585        const purged = await vault.purgeExpiredTrash(retentionMs);586        return { ok: true, data: purged };587      }588      case "SAVE_NOTE": {589        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };590        const { id, title, body } = msg.payload as { id?: string; title: string; body: string };591        const now = Date.now();592        if (id) {593          const existing = vault.getEntryById(id);594          if (!existing) return { ok: false, error: "not_found" };595          await vault.updateEntry(id, { title: title || "Untitled", notes: body, modifiedAt: now });596          return { ok: true, data: vault.getEntryById(id) };597        } else {598          // PCH-01-026 #10: addEntry stamps its own createdAt/modifiedAt599          // (EntryDraft omits both), so passing them was the only reason the600          // `as any` cast existed. Dropping them makes the call type-check.601          const entry = await vault.addEntry({602            type: "note",603            title: title || "Untitled",604            notes: body,605          });606          return { ok: true, data: entry };607        }608      }609      case "DELETE_NOTE": {610        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };611        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };612        await vault.deleteEntry(id);613        return { ok: true };614      }615      case "GET_NOTES": {616        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };617        const notes = vault.getEntries().filter(618          (e) => e.type === "note" && !e.deletedAt619        );620        return { ok: true, data: notes } as MessageResponse;621      }622      case "SEARCH_VAULT": {623        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };624        // AUD-002: shape-validate the payload before calling string methods.625        // A raw cast lets a malformed message crash the handler with TypeError.626        const { query } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { query?: unknown };627        if (typeof query !== "string") {628          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };629        }630        const q = query.toLowerCase();631        const searchResults = vault.getEntries().filter(632          (e) =>633            !e.deletedAt &&634            (e.title.toLowerCase().includes(q) ||635              e.notes?.toLowerCase().includes(q) ||636              e.username?.toLowerCase().includes(q))637        );638        return { ok: true, data: searchResults } as MessageResponse;639      }640      case "AUTOFILL_QUERY": {641        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) {642          return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };643        }644        let { includeAll } = msg.payload as { includeAll?: boolean };645        const { domain, kind, userGesture } = msg.payload as {646          domain: string;647          kind?: "login" | "card" | "totp";648          userGesture?: boolean;649        };650        // MV-2: the vault-wide inventory (every title/username/email/url)651        // may only leave the background on an explicit user gesture — the652        // user opening the search affordance — never on passive form focus.653        // userGesture is self-declared by our own content script; the value654        // of this gate is that PASSIVE code paths (which never set it)655        // cannot ship the inventory, shrinking what a compromised page that656        // merely triggers focus events can observe.657        if (includeAll && userGesture !== true) {658          includeAll = false;659        }660        // kind="card": return saved cards as compact summaries for the661        // inline card silver platter. Cards are not domain-scoped — every662        // saved card is a candidate on every checkout page — so domain is663        // ignored when kind === "card".664        if (kind === "card") {665          const cards = vault.getEntries().filter((e) => e.type === "card");666          return {667            ok: true,668            data: cards.map((e) => ({669              id: e.id,670              title: e.cardNickname || e.title,671              cardholderName: e.cardholderName,672              last4: e.last4,673              expMonth: e.expMonth,674              expYear: e.expYear,675              network: e.network,676            })),677          };678        }679        if (kind === "totp") {680          const matches = (681            includeAll682              ? vault.getEntries().filter((entry) => entry.type !== "note" && entry.type !== "card")683              : vault.queryDomain(domain)684          ).filter((entry) => !isPasskeyOnly(entry) && Boolean(entry.totp));685          return {686            ok: true,687            data: matches.map((e) => ({688              id: e.id,689              title: e.title,690              username: e.username,691              email: e.email,692              url: e.url,693              hasTotp: true,694            })),695          };696        }697        // The inline selector fills username+password into a form. Passkey-698        // only entries have no password to fill; sign-in for those goes699        // through the WebAuthn path instead. Filter them out everywhere so700        // the user doesn't see four "GitHub" rows that mostly do nothing.701        // Notes and cards never belonged here either.702        const matches = (703          includeAll704            ? vault705                .getEntries()706                .filter((entry) => entry.type !== "note" && entry.type !== "card")707            : vault.queryDomain(domain)708        ).filter((entry) => !isPasskeyOnly(entry));709        return {710          ok: true,711          data: matches.map((e) =>712            includeAll713              ? {714                  id: e.id,715                  title: e.title,716                  // username/email/url shipped so the inline popup's search717                  // affordance can match on them, not just titles. No secrets718                  // cross the boundary — same shape as the domain-matched719                  // response below minus hasTotp (which the search list720                  // doesn't surface).721                  username: e.username,722                  email: e.email,723                  url: e.url,724                  hasPasskey: e.passkey !== undefined,725                }726              : {727                  id: e.id,728                  title: e.title,729                  username: e.username,730                  email: e.email,731                  url: e.url,732                  hasTotp: Boolean(e.totp),733                  hasPasskey: e.passkey !== undefined,734                }735          ),736        };737      }738      case "GET_ENTRY_FOR_FILL": {739        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };740        const { id, explicitSummon } = msg.payload as {741          id: string;742          explicitSummon?: boolean;743        };744        const entry = vault.getEntryById(id);745        if (!entry) return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };746        // Passkey-only entries (passkey credential, no password) cannot be747        // filled into a form — sign-in goes through the WebAuthn path. A748        // login that ALSO has a passkey is still fillable for its password.749        if (isPasskeyOnly(entry)) return { ok: false, error: "passkey_not_fillable" };750751        // MV-1: re-validate the entry against the requesting tab's origin.752        // sender.tab.url is browser-attested — a page cannot forge it. When753        // the request does not come from a tab at all (popup surfaces use754        // GET_ENTRY_FOR_EDIT, not this), refuse.755        if (sender.tab !== undefined || sender.url !== undefined) {756          let senderDomain: string | null = null;757          try {758            const rawUrl = sender.tab?.url ?? sender.url ?? "";759            senderDomain = rawUrl ? extractDomain(new URL(rawUrl).hostname) : null;760          } catch {761            senderDomain = null;762          }763          if (!senderDomain) return { ok: false, error: "origin_unverified" };764765          const entryDomains = new Set<string>();766          const primary = extractDomain(entry.url ?? "");767          if (primary) entryDomains.add(primary);768          for (const extra of entry.additionalUrls ?? []) {769            const d = extractDomain(extra);770            if (d) entryDomains.add(d);771          }772773          // explicitSummon=true means the user actively picked this entry774          // from the cross-domain search affordance — an intentional775          // off-domain fill. Passive fill paths must stay domain-bound.776          if (explicitSummon !== true && !entryDomains.has(senderDomain)) {777            // Domain mismatch — refuse silently (no oracle about which ids exist).778            return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };779          }780        }781        // Strip the passkey credential AND the raw base32 TOTP seed from the782        // response. Content scripts never need either: the private key is the783        // authenticator's, and handing over the TOTP seed would let a784        // compromised content script mint valid codes indefinitely (SEV-3-C).785        // Generate the *current* 6-digit code here in the background and send786        // only that, plus the seconds left so the UI can render a countdown.787        // Also drop passwordHistory: filling needs only the *current* password.788        // Handing every past password to a content script during passive789        // autofill on an arbitrary page would widen the blast radius of a790        // compromised page far beyond the one credential being filled.791        const {792          passkey: _strippedPasskey,793          totp: seed,794          totpAlgorithm,795          totpDigits,796          totpPeriod,797          passwordHistory: _ph,798          ...safeEntry799        } = entry;800        let totpCode: string | undefined;801        let totpRemaining: number | undefined;802        if (seed) {803          try {804            // PCH-01-019: honour stored algorithm/digits/period (defaults apply805            // when these are undefined, i.e. legacy bare-seed entries).806            const generated = generateTOTP(seed, totpAlgorithm, totpDigits, totpPeriod);807            totpCode = generated.code;808            totpRemaining = generated.remaining;809          } catch {810            totpCode = undefined;811          }812        }813        return { ok: true, data: { ...safeEntry, totpCode, totpRemaining } };814      }815      // Trusted full-entry fetch for Peach's own inline-popup surfaces that816      // genuinely need the raw TOTP seed: the edit form (which re-saves the817      // seed and would otherwise wipe it) and nothing else. Unlike818      // GET_ENTRY_FOR_FILL this fires only on an explicit user action inside819      // the inline popup, never during passive autofill on an arbitrary page.820      // The passkey credential is still stripped — the edit form never touches it.821      case "GET_ENTRY_FOR_EDIT": {822        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };823        const { id, explicitSummon } = msg.payload as {824          id: string;825          explicitSummon?: boolean;826        };827        const entry = vault.getEntryById(id);828        if (!entry) return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };829830        // PCH-01-006: re-validate the browser-attested sender origin, mirroring831        // GET_ENTRY_FOR_FILL (MV-1). The edit channel ships the raw TOTP seed and832        // full password history — at least as sensitive as the fill response — so833        // the boundary must be enforced here, not only by UI reachability. Today834        // the sole caller is the popup (no sender.tab, so this is a structural835        // no-op), but a future tab-context caller or an id leak would otherwise836        // inherit a full-credential oracle. Unlike the fill path we SKIP (not837        // refuse) when no sender domain resolves, to keep the popup caller working.838        if (sender.tab !== undefined || sender.url !== undefined) {839          let senderDomain: string | null = null;840          try {841            const rawUrl = sender.tab?.url ?? sender.url ?? "";842            senderDomain = rawUrl ? extractDomain(new URL(rawUrl).hostname) : null;843          } catch {844            senderDomain = null;845          }846          if (senderDomain) {847            const entryDomains = new Set<string>();848            const primary = extractDomain(entry.url ?? "");849            if (primary) entryDomains.add(primary);850            for (const extra of entry.additionalUrls ?? []) {851              const d = extractDomain(extra);852              if (d) entryDomains.add(d);853            }854            if (explicitSummon !== true && !entryDomains.has(senderDomain)) {855              return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" }; // no id oracle856            }857          }858        }859860        const { passkey: _passkey, ...safeEntry } = entry;861        return { ok: true, data: safeEntry };862      }863      case "COPY": {864        // AUD-002: shape-validate the payload before passing to the clipboard865        // helper. A raw cast lets a malformed message reach the clipboard API866        // with a non-string and throw.867        const { text, label, alreadyWritten } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {868          text?: unknown;869          label?: unknown;870          alreadyWritten?: unknown;871        };872        if (typeof text !== "string" || typeof label !== "string") {873          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };874        }875        await copyToClipboard(text, label, Boolean(alreadyWritten));876        return { ok: true, clearSeconds: getEffectiveClearSeconds() };877      }878      case "CHECK_ALL_BREACHES": {879        const allEntries = vault.getEntries();880        const results: Record<string, number> = {};881        for (const entry of allEntries) {882          if (entry.type === "note") continue;883          if (!entry.password) continue;884          results[entry.id] = await vault.checkBreach(entry.password);885          // Small delay — be a good citizen to the HIBP API886          await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 200));887        }888        // Persist any non-zero counts back to entries889        for (const [id, count] of Object.entries(results)) {890          const entry = vault.getEntryById(id);891          if (entry && (entry.breach ?? 0) !== count) {892            await vault.updateEntry(id, { breach: count > 0 ? count : undefined });893          }894        }895        return { ok: true, data: results };896      }897      case "GET_SETTINGS":898        return { ok: true, data: await vault.ensureSettingsLoaded() };899      case "UPDATE_SETTINGS": {900        const patch = msg.payload;901        if (!patch || typeof patch !== "object" || Array.isArray(patch)) {902          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };903        }904        await vault.updateSettings(patch as vault.VaultSettings);905        if (typeof (patch as Record<string, unknown>).autoLockMinutes === "number") {906          await setupAutoLock();907          if (vault.isUnlocked()) touchAutoLock();908        }909        return { ok: true };910      }911      case "GET_PENDING_PASSKEY":912        return { ok: true, data: await getPendingPasskeyRequest() };913      case "APPROVE_PASSKEY": {914        const { requestId } = msg.payload as { requestId: number };915        await resolvePendingPasskeyRequest(requestId, true);916        return { ok: true };917      }918      case "DENY_PASSKEY": {919        const { requestId } = msg.payload as { requestId: number };920        await resolvePendingPasskeyRequest(requestId, false);921        return { ok: true };922      }923      case "GET_PASSKEY_PROVIDER_STATE":924        return { ok: true, data: await getPasskeyProviderState() };925      case "SET_PASSKEY_PROVIDER_ENABLED": {926        const { enabled } = msg.payload as { enabled: boolean };927        // Disabling is always free; gating fires only when a free user is928        // trying to turn passkey interception on.929        if (enabled) {930          const gate = await requirePro("passkeys");931          if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };932        }933        return { ok: true, data: await setPasskeyProviderEnabled(enabled) };934      }935      // AUD-003: this handler POSTs `entryTitle` to a user-configured HTTPS936      // endpoint. Intentional product behavior — users configure their own937      // dead-man's-switch. isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl blocks localhost, private938      // IPs, and non-HTTPS schemes, but cannot defend against every DNS-939      // rebinding case. The UI under CanarySection (Entry.tsx) discloses to940      // users that the entry title leaves the device when the canary fires.941      case "FIRE_CANARY_PING": {942        // Canary alert fires unconditionally for any entry with canary: true.943        // The Pro gate only governs creation/flagging of canary entries; once944        // an entry is flagged, the alert path is a security property and must945        // never be license-gated.946        const { webhookUrl, entryTitle, trigger } = msg.payload as {947          webhookUrl: string;948          entryTitle: string;949          trigger: "password_copied" | "username_copied" | "autofilled" | "submitted" | "test";950        };951        if (!isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl(webhookUrl)) {952          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_webhook_url" };953        }954        // LV-3: debounce non-test pings per (webhook, entry) so a page that955        // strobes focus/fill events can't turn the canary into a request956        // firehose at the user's endpoint. Test pings are exempt — they are957        // explicit user clicks in the settings UI and are awaited for958        // feedback. The FIRST ping in a window always goes out, so the959        // dead-man's-switch property (canary fires on access) is preserved;960        // only repeats within the window are coalesced.961        if (trigger !== "test") {962          const rlKey = `canary-last-fetch:${webhookUrl}:${entryTitle}`;963          const stored = await chrome.storage.local.get(rlKey);964          const last = (stored as Record<string, unknown>)[rlKey];965          if (typeof last === "number" && Date.now() - last < CANARY_MIN_INTERVAL_MS) {966            return { ok: true, data: { rateLimited: true } };967          }968          await chrome.storage.local.set({ [rlKey]: Date.now() });969        }970        const body = JSON.stringify({971          event: trigger === "test" ? "peach_canary_test" : "peach_canary_accessed",972          entry: entryTitle,973          trigger,974          timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),975          source: "peach-extension",976        });977        if (trigger === "test") {978          // Permitted outbound fetch: user-configured canary alert endpoint979          // (validated by isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl above). This is the980          // only non-HIBP outbound call in the extension — see981          // Projects.md §3.7. Test pings are awaited so the UI can show982          // success/failure.983          try {984            const res = await fetch(webhookUrl, {985              method: "POST",986              headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },987              body,988            });989            return { ok: res.ok, error: res.ok ? undefined : `HTTP ${res.status}` };990          } catch (err) {991            return { ok: false, error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : "network_error" };992          }993        }994        // Non-test triggers are fire-and-forget995        fetch(webhookUrl, {996          method: "POST",997          headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },998          body,999        }).catch(() => {});1000        return { ok: true };1001      }1002      case "ACTIVATE_LICENSE": {1003        const { key } = msg.payload as { key: string };1004        const licenseInfo = await activateLicense(key);1005        return { ok: true, data: licenseInfo };1006      }1007      case "GET_LICENSE": {1008        const licenseInfo = await getLicenseInfo();1009        return { ok: true, data: licenseInfo };1010      }1011      case "GET_LICENSE_KEY": {1012        const key = await getLicenseKey();1013        return { ok: true, data: key };1014      }1015      case "DEACTIVATE_LICENSE": {1016        await deactivateLicense();1017        return { ok: true };1018      }1019      case "SHOULD_PLAY_CELEBRATION": {1020        const should = await shouldPlayCelebration();1021        return { ok: true, data: should };1022      }1023      case "MARK_CELEBRATION_PLAYED": {1024        await markCelebrationPlayed();1025        return { ok: true };1026      }1027      case "GET_CODEX_VAULT_DATA": {1028        // Pro-gated. requirePro broadcasts PRO_GATE_TRIGGERED on miss so the1029        // popup navigates to the License section without further coordination.1030        const gate = await requirePro("codex");1031        if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1032        return await handleGetCodexVaultData();1033      }1034      case "ESTIMATE_CODEX_PAGES": {1035        const gate = await requirePro("codex");1036        if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1037        return await handleEstimateCodexPages();1038      }1039      case "RESTORE_FROM_CODEX": {1040        // !! IMPORTANT: intentionally NOT Pro-gated. A free device must still1041        // be able to restore a vault that was printed by a Pro user.1042        // DO NOT add a Pro gate here.1043        const payload = msg.payload as CodexRestorePayload;1044        return await handleRestoreFromCodex(payload);1045      }1046      case "OPEN_PRO_GATE": {1047        // Content script requests: open popup and navigate to License section.1048        const { feature } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { feature?: string };1049        if (chrome.storage.session) {1050          await chrome.storage.session.set({ pendingProGate: { feature: feature ?? "passkeys" } });1051        }1052        try { await chrome.action.openPopup(); } catch { /* badge fallback */ }1053        return { ok: true };1054      }1055      case "OPEN_POPUP": {1056        // Content script asks to open the trusted extension popup — used by the1057        // inline locked bubble so the master password is entered in the popup,1058        // never in page-hosted DOM (audit HIGH). Best-effort: openPopup needs a1059        // user gesture + Chrome 127+/Firefox; on failure the user clicks the1060        // toolbar icon. The badge already signals Peach needs attention.1061        //1062        // Set a session flag so the popup knows it was opened for inline unlock1063        // and should close itself once the vault is unlocked (returning the user1064        // to the inline autofill selector on the page).1065        if (chrome.storage.session) {1066          await chrome.storage.session.set({ peach_inline_unlock: true });1067        }1068        try { await chrome.action.openPopup(); } catch { /* user opens via toolbar */ }1069        return { ok: true };1070      }1071      case "GET_IDENTITIES": {1072        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1073        return { ok: true, data: vault.getIdentities() };1074      }1075      case "TOUCH_AUTO_LOCK": {1076        // touchAutoLock() is already called by shouldRefreshAutoLock above;1077        // this case just gives the popup a typed message to keep the session alive.1078        return { ok: true };1079      }1080      case "GET_ADVANCED_HEALTH_REPORT": {1081        const gate = await requirePro("advanced_health");1082        if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1083        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1084        const report = await buildAdvancedHealthReport(vault.getEntries());1085        return { ok: true, data: report };1086      }1087      case "IS_DURESS_ENABLED": {1088        const enabled = await vault.isDuressEnabled();1089        return { ok: true, data: enabled };1090      }1091      case "SETUP_DURESS": {1092        // Single enforcement point for the Duress Vault Pro gate. Free users1093        // who somehow reach this handler are rejected here; the popup also1094        // pre-checks isPro() to avoid showing the setup form to free users,1095        // but server-side is the actual security boundary.1096        const gate = await requirePro("duress_vault");1097        if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1098        // MV3 service workers restart after inactivity, losing the in-memory1099        // derived key. Detect this before calling setupDuress so the popup1100        // can show a meaningful prompt to re-lock and re-unlock.1101        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "session_expired" };1102        const { duressPassword } = msg.payload as { duressPassword: string };1103        await vault.setupDuress(duressPassword);1104        return { ok: true };1105      }1106      case "DISABLE_DURESS": {1107        await vault.disableDuress();1108        return { ok: true };1109      }1110      case "VERIFY_MAIN_PASSWORD": {1111        const { password } = msg.payload as { password: string };1112        const ok = await vault.verifyMainPassword(password);1113        return { ok: true, data: ok };1114      }1115      case "CHANGE_PASSWORD": {1116        const { currentPassword, newPassword } = msg.payload as {1117          currentPassword: string;1118          newPassword: string;1119        };1120        const changed = await vault.changePassword(currentPassword, newPassword);1121        return changed1122          ? { ok: true }1123          : { ok: false, error: "incorrect_current_password" };1124      }1125      case "GET_SITE_PASSWORD_POLICY": {1126        const [tab] = await chrome.tabs.query({ active: true, currentWindow: true });1127        if (!tab?.id) return { ok: true, data: null };1128        try {1129          const response = await chrome.tabs.sendMessage(tab.id, {1130            type: "GET_SITE_PASSWORD_POLICY",1131          });1132          return (response as MessageResponse) ?? { ok: true, data: null };1133        } catch {1134          return { ok: true, data: null };1135        }1136      }1137      case "RECORD_MANUAL_SUMMON": {1138        const { domain } = msg.payload as { domain: string };1139        const settings = vault.getSettings();1140        const existing = settings.manualSummonDomains?.[domain];1141        const now = Date.now();1142        await vault.updateSettings({1143          manualSummonDomains: {1144            ...settings.manualSummonDomains,1145            [domain]: {1146              firstSummonedAt: existing?.firstSummonedAt ?? now,1147              summonCount: (existing?.summonCount ?? 0) + 1,1148              lastSummonedAt: now,1149            },1150          },1151        });1152        return { ok: true };1153      }1154      case "DECLINE_CARD_SAVE": {1155        const { last4, expMonth, expYear } = msg.payload as { last4: string; expMonth: string; expYear: string };1156        await vault.declineCardSaveOffer(last4, expMonth, expYear);1157        return { ok: true };1158      }1159      case "IS_CARD_DECLINED": {1160        const { last4, expMonth, expYear } = msg.payload as { last4: string; expMonth: string; expYear: string };1161        const declined = await vault.isCardDeclined(last4, expMonth, expYear);1162        return { ok: true, data: declined };1163      }1164      case "INITIATE_FIREFOX_PASSKEY_CREATE": {1165        const { rpId, rpName, userName, userDisplayName } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1166          rpId?: string;1167          rpName?: string;1168          userName?: string;1169          userDisplayName?: string;1170        };1171        if (!rpId || !userName) return { ok: false, error: "rpid_and_username_required" };1172        return await initiateFirefoxPasskeyCreate({1173          rpId,1174          rpName: rpName ?? rpId,1175          userName,1176          userDisplayName,1177        });1178      }11791180      case "COMPLETE_FIREFOX_PASSKEY_CREATE": {1181        const payload = msg.payload as Parameters<typeof completeFirefoxPasskeyCreate>[0] | undefined;1182        if (!payload) return { ok: false, error: "missing_payload" };1183        return await completeFirefoxPasskeyCreate(payload);1184      }11851186      case "PASSKEY_OFFER_DECLINE": {1187        const { domain } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { domain?: string };1188        if (!domain) return { ok: false, error: "domain_required" };1189        await recordPasskeyOfferDecline(domain);1190        return { ok: true };1191      }11921193      case "GET_PASSKEY_OFFER_DECLINED": {1194        const { domain } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { domain?: string };1195        if (!domain) return { ok: false, error: "domain_required" };1196        return { ok: true, data: await isPasskeyOfferDeclined(domain) };1197      }11981199      case "PASSKEY_HAS_CREDENTIALS": {1200        const payload = msg.payload as {1201          rpId?: string;1202          allowCredentials?: Array<{ id: string; type?: string }>;1203        } | undefined;1204        if (!payload?.rpId) return { ok: false, error: "rpid_required" };1205        return await handlePasskeyHasCredentials({1206          rpId: payload.rpId,1207          allowCredentials: payload.allowCredentials ?? [],1208        }, attestedSenderOrigin(sender));1209      }12101211      case "PASSKEY_CREATE": {1212        const payload = msg.payload as Parameters<typeof handleFirefoxPasskeyCreate>[0] | undefined;1213        if (!payload?.rpId || !payload?.userName) {1214          return { ok: false, error: "rpid_and_username_required" };1215        }1216        return await handleFirefoxPasskeyCreate(payload, attestedSenderOrigin(sender));1217      }12181219      case "PASSKEY_GET": {1220        const payload = msg.payload as Parameters<typeof handleFirefoxPasskeyGet>[0] | undefined;1221        if (!payload?.rpId) return { ok: false, error: "rpid_required" };1222        return await handleFirefoxPasskeyGet(payload, attestedSenderOrigin(sender));1223      }12241225      case "PASSKEY_AUTH_RESPONSE": {1226        const { requestId, approved } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1227          requestId?: string | number;1228          approved?: boolean;1229        };1230        if (requestId === undefined || requestId === null || typeof approved !== 'boolean') {1231          return { ok: false, error: 'requestId and approved required' };1232        }1233        await resolvePendingPasskeyRequest(Number(requestId), approved);1234        return { ok: true };1235      }12361237      case "GET_PASSKEY_FOR_DOMAIN": {1238        const { domain } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { domain?: string };1239        if (!domain) return { ok: false, error: "domain_required" };1240        // Scope to the caller's own origin: a page may only ask about passkeys1241        // for a domain it actually owns, so an arbitrary page cannot enumerate1242        // which sites the user holds passkeys for or read the username (audit MEDIUM).1243        const origin = attestedSenderOrigin(sender);1244        if (!origin || !isValidRpId(domain, origin)) return { ok: true, data: null };1245        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: true, data: null };1246        const match = vault1247          .getEntries()1248          .find((entry) => entry.passkey?.rpId === domain);1249        if (!match || !match.passkey) return { ok: true, data: null };1250        // Slim shape — only the fields State 11 needs. Never expose private1251        // key material, even though this is locked behind isUnlocked.1252        return {1253          ok: true,1254          data: {1255            rpId: match.passkey.rpId,1256            userName: match.passkey.userName,1257            browser: match.passkey.browser,1258          },1259        };1260      }12611262      case "DESTROY_VAULT": {1263        // Irreversible by design. Lock zeroes the derived key + in-memory entries;1264        // storage.local.clear() wipes every Peach key (slots, settings, license,1265        // onboarded flag, history, sync state, declined cards, recall, etc.);1266        // session.clear() wipes pending passkey requests + pro-notice queues.1267        // Caller (Panic.tsx) handles UI navigation back to onboarding.1268        //1269        // The Pro license is the one thing that must survive: the user paid for1270        // it, and destroying a vault (panic wipe, fresh start) is not a refund.1271        // Capture it before the clear and restore it after. peach_pro_celebrated1272        // rides along so the Pro celebration doesn't replay on the next unlock.1273        const preserved = await chrome.storage.local.get([1274          "peach_license",1275          "peach_pro_celebrated",1276        ]);1277        vault.lock();1278        await storageClear();1279        await vault.clearVaultHistory();1280        const toRestore: Record<string, unknown> = {};1281        if (preserved.peach_license !== undefined) toRestore.peach_license = preserved.peach_license;1282        if (preserved.peach_pro_celebrated !== undefined) toRestore.peach_pro_celebrated = preserved.peach_pro_celebrated;1283        if (Object.keys(toRestore).length > 0) {1284          await chrome.storage.local.set(toRestore);1285        }1286        if (chrome.storage.session) {1287          await chrome.storage.session.clear();1288        }1289        return { ok: true };1290      }12911292      case "SUBMIT_FEEDBACK": {1293        const { category, message, version, browser } = msg.payload as {1294          category: string;1295          message: string;1296          version: string;1297          browser: string;1298        };1299        if (!message.trim()) return { ok: false, error: "message_empty" };1300        if (!FEEDBACK_ENDPOINT) return { ok: true };1301        if (!isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl(FEEDBACK_ENDPOINT)) {1302          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_feedback_endpoint" };1303        }1304        try {1305          const res = await fetch(FEEDBACK_ENDPOINT, {1306            method: "POST",1307            headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },1308            body: JSON.stringify({ category, message, version, browser, source: "peach-extension" }),1309          });1310          return { ok: res.ok, error: res.ok ? undefined : `HTTP ${res.status}` };1311        } catch (err) {1312          return { ok: false, error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : "network_error" };1313        }1314      }1315      // Android-only: biometric unlock with pre-derived key.1316      case "UNLOCK_WITH_KEY": {1317        const { masterKeyHex } = msg.payload as { masterKeyHex: string };1318        if (!isNativePlatform()) {1319          return { ok: false, error: "desktop_only_uses_password" };1320        }1321        try {1322          const result = await vault.unlockWithKey(masterKeyHex);1323          if (result.ok) {1324            onVaultUnlocked();1325            await publishInMemoryVault(result.entries);1326          }1327          return { ok: result.ok, data: result.ok ? { entries: result.entries } : undefined, error: result.ok ? undefined : result.error };1328        } catch {1329          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };1330        }1331      }1332      // Android: returns current in-memory derived key as hex. Used by biometric enable flow.1333      case "GET_DERIVED_KEY": {1334        if (!isNativePlatform()) {1335          return { ok: false, error: "android_only" };1336        }1337        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) {1338          return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1339        }1340        return { ok: true, data: { masterKeyHex: vault.getDerivedKeyHex() } };1341      }1342      case "GET_IDENTITY_SUGGESTIONS": {1343        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1344        const entries = vault.getEntries();1345        const suggestions = buildIdentitySuggestions(entries);1346        return { ok: true, data: { suggestions } };1347      }1348      case "POPULATE_INLINE_VAULT": {1349        if (!isNativePlatform()) return { ok: false };1350        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1351        const entries = vault.getEntries();1352        await publishInMemoryVault(entries);1353        return { ok: true };1354      }1355      case "ML_INIT":1356        return { ok: true };13571358      case "ML_PREDICT_BATCH": {1359        // AUD-002: shape-validate before forwarding to the ML helper.1360        const { featuresArray } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { featuresArray?: unknown };1361        if (!Array.isArray(featuresArray)) {1362          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1363        }1364        return { ok: true, data: mlPredictBatch(featuresArray as MLFieldFeatures[]) };1365      }13661367      // ── Vault sync (v3) ───────────────────────────────────────────────1368      // Returns the public-facing local identity needed by the popup to1369      // drive Phase-1 audio pairing. The private long-term key never1370      // leaves the background.1371      case "GET_LOCAL_IDENTITY": {1372        // Not Pro-gated: a free device may attempt to pair so it can RECEIVE a1373        // Pro license from an already-Pro peer (at least one device must be Pro).1374        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1375        // Identity derives from the stable root key, not the password-derived1376        // key, so pairing survives a master-password change (SEV-2-B).1377        const masterKeyHex = vault.getRootKeyHex();1378        if (!masterKeyHex) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1379        const masterKey = unhexBytes(masterKeyHex);1380        try {1381          const identity = await buildLocalIdentity(masterKey);1382          // If this device is Pro, advertise the signed license so the peer can1383          // activate it after SAS confirmation — pairing carries Pro across.1384          if (await isProUser()) {1385            const license = await getLicenseKey();1386            if (license) (identity as { license?: string }).license = license;1387          }1388          return { ok: true, data: identity };1389        } finally {1390          masterKey.fill(0);1391        }1392      }13931394      case "GET_ADOPTION_MATERIAL": {1395        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1396        const rootKeyHex = vault.getRootKeyHex();1397        if (!rootKeyHex) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1398        const rootKeyBytes = unhexBytes(rootKeyHex);1399        try {1400          const data: { rootKeyHex: string; vaultId: string; license?: string } = {1401            rootKeyHex,1402            vaultId: await computeVaultId(rootKeyBytes),1403          };1404          if (await isProUser()) {1405            const license = await getLicenseKey();1406            if (license) data.license = license;1407          }1408          return { ok: true, data };1409        } finally {1410          rootKeyBytes.fill(0);1411        }1412      }14131414      case "COMPLETE_PAIRING": {1415        // Not Pro-gated — see GET_LOCAL_IDENTITY.1416        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1417        const paired = (msg.payload as { paired?: unknown })?.paired;1418        if (typeof paired !== "object" || paired === null) {1419          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1420        }1421        const candidate = paired as Record<string, unknown>;1422        if (1423          typeof candidate.deviceId !== "string" || !candidate.deviceId ||1424          typeof candidate.deviceName !== "string" || !candidate.deviceName ||1425          typeof candidate.deviceType !== "string" ||1426          typeof candidate.longTermPublicKeyHex !== "string" ||1427          !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(candidate.longTermPublicKeyHex) ||1428          (1429            candidate.signingPublicKeyHex !== undefined &&1430            (1431              typeof candidate.signingPublicKeyHex !== "string" ||1432              !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(candidate.signingPublicKeyHex)1433            )1434          ) ||1435          typeof candidate.pairedAt !== "number"1436        ) {1437          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_paired_device" };1438        }1439        await upsertPairedDeviceV3(candidate as unknown as import("../shared/sync-types").PairedDevice);1440        return { ok: true };1441      }14421443      case "LIST_PAIRED_DEVICES": {1444        const devices = await listPairedDevicesV3();1445        return { ok: true, data: { devices } };1446      }14471448      case "UNPAIR_DEVICE": {1449        const { deviceId } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { deviceId?: string };1450        if (typeof deviceId !== "string" || !deviceId) {1451          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1452        }1453        // Removing a device REVOKES it rather than just dropping the local1454        // row: a plain removal is undone the moment any other peer vouches it1455        // back through a manifest, which is exactly what the relay makes easy.1456        await revokeDeviceByIdV3(deviceId, await getOrCreateDeviceId());1457        return { ok: true };1458      }14591460      case "RENAME_LOCAL_DEVICE": {1461        const { name } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { name?: string };1462        if (typeof name !== "string") return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1463        await setDeviceNameV3(name);1464        return { ok: true };1465      }14661467      // ── Device code pairing ───────────────────────────────────────────────1468      // Not Pro-gated (a free device may pair to receive Pro/sync). The whole NK1469      // pairing runs in the background; the SAS and the terminal result reach the1470      // popup as CODE_PAIR_SAS / CODE_PAIR_RESULT pushes.1471      case "PAIR_WITH_CODE": {1472        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1473        const { code } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { code?: string };1474        if (typeof code !== "string" || parsePairingCode(code) === null) {1475          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1476        }1477        if (isCodePairingInFlight()) return { ok: false, error: "pairing_in_progress" };1478        startCodePairing(code);1479        return { ok: true };1480      }14811482      case "CODE_PAIR_CONFIRM": {1483        const { confirmed } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { confirmed?: boolean };1484        resolveCodePairingConfirm(confirmed === true);1485        return { ok: true };1486      }14871488      case "START_ADOPTION_SOURCE": {1489        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1490        if (isRelayAdoptionSourceInFlight()) {1491          return { ok: false, error: "adoption_source_in_progress" };1492        }1493        try {1494          return { ok: true, data: await startRelayAdoptionSource() };1495        } catch (error) {1496          return {1497            ok: false,1498            error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : "adoption_source_failed",1499          };1500        }1501      }15021503      case "ADOPTION_SOURCE_CONFIRM": {1504        const { password, cancel } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1505          password?: unknown;1506          cancel?: unknown;1507        };1508        if (cancel === true) {1509          return {1510            ok: true,1511            data: await confirmRelayAdoptionSource(null),1512          };1513        }1514        if (typeof password !== "string" || password.length === 0) {1515          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1516        }1517        return {1518          ok: true,1519          data: await confirmRelayAdoptionSource(password),1520        };1521      }15221523      case "CANCEL_ADOPTION_SOURCE": {1524        cancelRelayAdoptionSource();1525        return { ok: true };1526      }15271528      case "TRIGGER_SYNC": {1529        const payload = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1530          reason?: "vault_change" | "foreground" | "manual";1531          force?: boolean;1532        };1533        const reason = payload.reason ?? "foreground";15341535        void triggerSyncIfReachable({ reason, force: payload.force === true });1536        return { ok: true };1537      }15381539      case "GET_SYNC_STATE": {1540        return { ok: true, data: getSyncState() };1541      }15421543      case "GET_RELAY_SETTINGS": {1544        return { ok: true, data: await getRelaySettings() };1545      }15461547      case "SET_RELAY_SETTINGS": {1548        const payload = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1549          relayUrl?: string;1550          lanOnly?: boolean;1551        };1552        try {1553          if (payload.relayUrl !== undefined) {1554            if (typeof payload.relayUrl !== "string") {1555              return { ok: false, error: "invalid_relay_url" };1556            }1557            await setRelayUrl(payload.relayUrl);1558          }1559          if (payload.lanOnly !== undefined) {1560            if (typeof payload.lanOnly !== "boolean") {1561              return { ok: false, error: "invalid_lan_only" };1562            }1563            await setLanOnly(payload.lanOnly);1564          }1565          return { ok: true, data: await getRelaySettings() };1566        } catch {1567          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_relay_url" };1568        }1569      }15701571      case "GET_SYNC_ALERTS": {1572        const { consume } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { consume?: boolean };1573        const alerts = await getPendingSyncAlerts();1574        // The popup reads on open and acknowledges with consume:true after1575        // rendering, so a popup crash between read and render doesn't lose1576        // the alerts.1577        if (consume) await clearPendingSyncAlerts();1578        return { ok: true, data: alerts };1579      }15801581      case "GET_PENDING_VOUCHED_DEVICES": {1582        return { ok: true, data: await listPendingVouchedDevices() };1583      }1584      case "CONFIRM_VOUCHED_DEVICE": {1585        const { deviceId } = msg.payload as { deviceId: string };1586        const pending = await getPendingVouchedDevice(deviceId);1587        if (!pending) return { ok: false, error: "not_pending" };1588        await upsertPairedDeviceV3({1589          deviceId: pending.deviceId,1590          deviceName: pending.deviceName,1591          deviceType:1592            pending.deviceType as import("../shared/sync-types").PairedDevice["deviceType"],1593          longTermPublicKeyHex: pending.longTermPublicKeyHex,1594          signingPublicKeyHex: pending.signingPublicKeyHex,1595          wsPort: pending.wsPort,1596          pairedAt: pending.pairedAt,1597          trustSource: "vouched",1598        });1599        await removePendingVouchedDevice(deviceId);1600        return { ok: true };1601      }1602      case "REJECT_VOUCHED_DEVICE": {1603        const { deviceId } = msg.payload as { deviceId: string };1604        await removePendingVouchedDevice(deviceId);1605        return { ok: true };1606      }1607      case "ROTATE_SYNC_IDENTITY": {1608        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1609        const result = await vault.rotateSyncIdentity();1610        return result.ok ? { ok: true } : { ok: false, error: result.error };1611      }16121613      default:1614        return { ok: false, error: "unknown_message_type" };1615    }1616  } catch (err) {1617    return {1618      ok: false,1619      error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : "operation_failed",1620    };1621  }1622}16231624// --- Mobile platform helpers ---16251626// Android: populates the in-memory vault used by PeachAutofillService.1627async function publishInMemoryVault(entries: VaultEntry[]): Promise<void> {1628  const plugin = nativePlugin<{1629    setEntries?: (args: {1630      entries: Array<{1631        id: string;1632        title: string;1633        username: string;1634        email: string;1635        password: string;1636        url: string;1637        totp: string;1638        additionalUrls: string[];1639      }>;1640    }) => Promise<void>;1641  }>("InMemoryVaultPlugin");1642  if (!plugin?.setEntries) return;1643  await plugin.setEntries({1644    entries: entries.map((e) => ({1645      id: e.id,1646      title: e.title ?? "",1647      username: e.username ?? "",1648      email: (e as VaultEntry & { email?: string }).email ?? "",1649      password: e.password ?? "",1650      url: e.url ?? "",1651      totp: (e as VaultEntry & { totp?: string }).totp ?? "",1652      additionalUrls: (e as VaultEntry & { additionalUrls?: string[] }).additionalUrls ?? [],1653    })),1654  });1655}16561657// Android: clear the autofill in-memory store on lock.1658async function clearInMemoryVault(): Promise<void> {1659  const plugin = nativePlugin<{ clearEntries?: () => Promise<void> }>("InMemoryVaultPlugin");1660  if (!plugin?.clearEntries) return;1661  await plugin.clearEntries();1662}16631664// Returns username use-counts from the vault, sorted by frequency. Each row1665// also carries the entry's email so the popup can suggest the email/username1666// pair the user has actually used together.1667function buildIdentitySuggestions(1668  entries: VaultEntry[],1669): Array<{ email: string; username: string; count: number }> {1670  const usernameCounts = new Map<string, number>();1671  const usernameEmail = new Map<string, string>();1672  for (const entry of entries) {1673    const username = entry.username ?? "";1674    const email = (entry as VaultEntry & { email?: string }).email ?? "";1675    if (!username && !email) continue;1676    const key = username || email;1677    usernameCounts.set(key, (usernameCounts.get(key) ?? 0) + 1);1678    if (!usernameEmail.has(key)) usernameEmail.set(key, email);1679  }1680  return Array.from(usernameCounts.entries())1681    .sort((a, b) => b[1] - a[1])1682    .map(([username, count]) => ({1683      email: usernameEmail.get(username) ?? "",1684      username,1685      count,1686    }));1687}16881689/** Notify all content scripts that the vault just became available. */1690function broadcastToContentScripts(message: { type: string }): void {1691  if (!chrome.tabs?.query) return;1692  chrome.tabs.query({}, (tabs) => {1693    for (const tab of tabs) {1694      if (tab.id !== undefined) {1695        chrome.tabs.sendMessage(tab.id, message).catch(() => {1696          // Tab may not have a content script — silently ignore1697        });1698      }1699    }1700  });1701}17021703function shouldRefreshAutoLock(type: MessageType): boolean {1704  return (1705    type !== "HAS_VAULT" &&1706    type !== "IS_UNLOCKED" &&1707    type !== "GET_VAULT_STATUS" &&1708    type !== "LOCK" &&1709    type !== "UPDATE_SETTINGS" &&1710    type !== "GET_PENDING_PASSKEY" &&1711    type !== "GET_PASSKEY_PROVIDER_STATE" &&1712    type !== "DECLINE_CARD_SAVE" &&1713    type !== "IS_CARD_DECLINED" &&1714    type !== "SUBMIT_FEEDBACK"1715  );1716}17171718function isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl(value: string): boolean {1719  try {1720    const url = new URL(value);1721    if (url.protocol !== "https:") return false;17221723    const hostname = url.hostname.toLowerCase();1724    if (1725      hostname === "localhost" ||1726      hostname.endsWith(".localhost") ||1727      isPrivateIpv4(hostname) ||1728      isPrivateIpv6(hostname)1729    ) {1730      return false;1731    }17321733    return true;1734  } catch {1735    return false;1736  }1737}17381739function isPrivateIpv4(hostname: string): boolean {1740  if (PRIVATE_IPV4_RANGES.some((range) => hostname.startsWith(range.prefix))) {1741    return true;1742  }17431744  const octets = hostname.split(".").map((part) => Number(part));1745  if (octets.length !== 4 || octets.some((octet) => !Number.isInteger(octet) || octet < 0 || octet > 255)) {1746    return false;1747  }17481749  return octets[0] === 172 && octets[1] >= 16 && octets[1] <= 31;1750}17511752function isPrivateIpv6(hostname: string): boolean {1753  const normalized = hostname.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "").toLowerCase();1754  return (1755    normalized === "::1" ||1756    normalized.startsWith("fc") ||1757    normalized.startsWith("fd") ||1758    normalized.startsWith("fe80:")1759  );1760}