messages.ts

1/**2 * messages.ts — the only background message handler.3 *4 * All `chrome.runtime.onMessage` handling for the service worker lives here.5 * Do not handle messages inline in entry.ts, alarms.ts, or any other6 * background file. Every background-bound MessageType in shared/types.ts7 * must have a case below. Content-script-bound message types (PING,8 * SUMMON_AUTOFILL, VAULT_LOCKED) are documented in shared/types.ts and9 * intentionally have no case here — they are sent *to* content scripts.10 */1112import { copyToClipboard, getEffectiveClearSeconds } from "./clipboard";13import { getPendingSyncAlerts, clearPendingSyncAlerts } from "./sync-alerts";14import { extractDomain } from "../shared/domain";15import {16  getPendingVouchedDevice,17  listPendingVouchedDevices,18  removePendingVouchedDevice,19} from "./pending-vouched-devices";20import {21  clearRecoveryConfirmPending,22  isRecoveryConfirmPending,23  setRecoveryConfirmPending,24} from "./recovery-pending";25import { setupAutoLock, touchAutoLock } from "./alarms";26import { runSelfTest } from "./self-test";27import * as vault from "./vault";28import {29  handleEstimateCodexPages,30  handleGetCodexVaultData,31  handleRestoreFromCodex,32} from "./codex-handlers";33import type { CodexRestorePayload } from "../shared/codex-types";34import {35  activateLicense,36  deactivateLicense,37  getLicenseInfo,38  getLicenseKey,39  isProUser,40  markCelebrationPlayed,41  shouldPlayCelebration,42} from "./license";43import {44  completeFirefoxPasskeyCreate,45  getPasskeyProviderState,46  getPendingPasskeyRequest,47  handleFirefoxPasskeyCreate,48  handleFirefoxPasskeyGet,49  handlePasskeyHasCredentials,50  initiateFirefoxPasskeyCreate,51  isPasskeyOfferDeclined,52  onVaultUnlocked,53  recordPasskeyOfferDecline,54  resolvePendingPasskeyRequest,55  setPasskeyProviderEnabled,56} from "./passkey";57import { buildAdvancedHealthReport } from "./health";58import { storageClear } from "../shared/storage";59import { findInvalidWords } from "../shared/recovery-words";60import type {61  Message,62  MessageResponse,63  MessageType,64  ProFeature,65  VaultEntry,66} from "../shared/types";67import { isPasskeyOnly } from "../shared/types";68import { generateTOTP } from "../crypto/totp";69import { isValidRpId } from "../shared/passkey-utils";70import { isValidMLFeatureBatch, predictBatch as mlPredictBatch } from "./ml";71import {72  buildLocalIdentity,73  getOrCreateDeviceId,74  setDeviceName as setDeviceNameV3,75  type LocalDeviceIdentity,76} from "./device-identity";77import {78  isDeviceRevoked,79  listPairedDevices as listPairedDevicesV3,80  renamePairedDevice as renamePairedDeviceV3,81  revokeDeviceById as revokeDeviceByIdV3,82  upsertPairedDevice as upsertPairedDeviceV3,83} from "./paired-devices";84import { dropPairSecret } from "./pair-secrets";85// Sync and pairing are imported statically, never with `await import()`.86// `import()` throws `TypeError: import() is disallowed on87// ServiceWorkerGlobalScope` at runtime in MV3, and Vite's preload helper88// reports the failure through `window.dispatchEvent`, which does not exist in89// a worker either — so the real reason was replaced by "window is not defined"90// and the pairing UI just stopped. scripts/check-sw-static-imports.mjs fails91// the build if a runtime import() reappears anywhere in the worker's graph.92import {93  cancelRelayAdoptionSource,94  isRelayAdoptionSourceInFlight,95  resolveReceiverSasConfirmation,96  resolveSourceSasConfirmation,97  startRelayAdoptionReceiver,98  startRelayAdoptionSource,99} from "./relay-adoption-bg";100import {101  listPendingAdoptionHolders,102  removePendingAdoptionHolder,103} from "./pending-adoption-holder";104import {105  getSyncSettings,106  setRelayUrl,107  setSyncMode,108  type SyncMode,109} from "./sync-settings";110import {111  getSyncState,112  triggerSyncIfReachable,113} from "./sync-trigger";114import {115  browserGenerationIo,116  confirmSecureReset,117  enterResetRequired,118  resolveGeneration,119} from "./sync-generation";120import { isMessageSenderAllowed } from "./message-policy";121122const SUMMON_CAPABILITY_TTL_MS = 30_000;123type SummonCapability = { tabId: number; frameId: number; origin: string; operation: "inventory" | "fill"; expiresAt: number };124const summonCapabilities = new Map<string, SummonCapability>();125126export function createSummonCapability(tabId: number, origin: string, frameId = 0): string {127  const token = crypto.randomUUID();128  summonCapabilities.set(token, { tabId, frameId, origin, operation: "inventory", expiresAt: Date.now() + SUMMON_CAPABILITY_TTL_MS });129  return token;130}131132function consumeSummonCapability(token: unknown, sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender>, operation: "inventory" | "fill"): boolean {133  if (typeof token !== "string") return false;134  const cap = summonCapabilities.get(token);135  if (!cap) return false;136  if (cap.expiresAt <= Date.now()) {137    summonCapabilities.delete(token);138    return false;139  }140  if (sender.tab?.id !== cap.tabId || (sender.frameId ?? 0) !== cap.frameId || attestedSenderOrigin(sender) !== cap.origin) return false;141  if (cap.operation !== operation) return false;142  if (operation === "inventory") cap.operation = "fill";143  else summonCapabilities.delete(token);144  return true;145}146147// Compile-time E2E flag, folded to a literal by Vite's `define` (false in148// every production build — verified in the bundled output). Mirrors the149// create-path bypass in passkey.ts so the Playwright passkey smoke can enable150// the provider without a real Pro licence; the gate is fully intact for users.151declare const __PEACH_E2E_PASSKEYS__: boolean;152const PASSKEY_E2E_PRO_BYPASS = __PEACH_E2E_PASSKEYS__ === true;153154function unhexBytes(hex: string): Uint8Array {155  if (hex.length % 2 !== 0) throw new Error("invalid hex");156  const out = new Uint8Array(hex.length / 2);157  for (let i = 0; i < out.length; i++) {158    out[i] = parseInt(hex.slice(i * 2, i * 2 + 2), 16);159  }160  return out;161}162163/**164 * The single Pro gate. Every gated handler calls this first; the broadcast165 * lets the popup react (navigate to the License section, highlight the166 * relevant feature). Background never touches the popup view directly —167 * the popup owns navigation. See Projects.md "Pro gate rule".168 */169async function requirePro(170  feature: ProFeature,171  trigger: "user" | "background" = "user"172): Promise<{ allowed: boolean }> {173  if (PASSKEY_E2E_PRO_BYPASS && feature === "passkeys") return { allowed: true };174  if (await isProUser()) return { allowed: true };175176  if (trigger === "user") {177    // User deliberately triggered this feature — redirect the popup immediately.178    chrome.runtime179      .sendMessage({ type: "PRO_GATE_TRIGGERED", payload: { feature } })180      .catch(() => {181        // Popup may be closed — the gate signal is best-effort.182      });183  } else {184    // Background trigger (e.g. passive sync initiation) — no popup is open.185    // Queue a notice so the next popup open shows a soft banner instead of186    // silently failing.187    if (chrome.storage.session) {188      chrome.storage.session189        .set({ pendingProNotice: { feature, triggeredAt: Date.now() } })190        .catch(() => {});191    }192  }193194  return { allowed: false };195}196197// LV-3: minimum interval between non-test canary pings per webhook+entry.198const CANARY_MIN_INTERVAL_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000; // 1 hour199200const PRIVATE_IPV4_RANGES = [201  { prefix: "10." },202  { prefix: "127." },203  { prefix: "169.254." },204  { prefix: "192.168." },205];206207export function setupMessageHandler(): void {208  chrome.runtime.onMessage.addListener(209    (msg: unknown, sender, sendResponse) => {210      if (!isMessage(msg)) {211        sendResponse({ ok: false, error: "invalid_message" });212        return true;213      }214      handleMessage(msg, sender)215        .then(sendResponse)216        .catch((err) =>217          sendResponse({218            ok: false,219            error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),220          })221        );222      return true;223    }224  );225}226227function isMessage(m: unknown): m is Message {228  return typeof m === "object" && m !== null && "type" in m;229}230231/**232 * The browser-attested origin of the page that originated this message. A web233 * page cannot call chrome.runtime.sendMessage directly (no externally_connectable),234 * so every page-driven message arrives via the content-script relay and the235 * browser stamps `sender.origin`/`sender.url` with the real frame origin — a236 * value the page cannot forge. This is the ONLY trustworthy origin for passkey237 * rpId<->origin enforcement; payload-supplied origins are attacker-controlled.238 */239function attestedSenderOrigin(sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender>): string | undefined {240  if (sender.origin) return sender.origin;241  if (sender.url) {242    try { return new URL(sender.url).origin; } catch { return undefined; }243  }244  return undefined;245}246247function isExtensionPageSender(sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender>): boolean {248  return sender.url?.startsWith("chrome-extension://") === true ||249    sender.url?.startsWith("moz-extension://") === true;250}251252/** True when the message came from a page frame rather than extension UI. */253function isPageSender(sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender>): boolean {254  return !isExtensionPageSender(sender) &&255    (sender.tab !== undefined || sender.url !== undefined);256}257258function entryDomains(url: unknown, additionalUrls: unknown): Set<string> {259  const domains = new Set<string>();260  const primary = typeof url === "string" ? extractDomain(url) : null;261  if (primary) domains.add(primary);262  if (Array.isArray(additionalUrls)) {263    for (const extra of additionalUrls) {264      if (typeof extra !== "string") continue;265      const domain = extractDomain(extra);266      if (domain) domains.add(domain);267    }268  }269  return domains;270}271272/**273 * PB-26-106: the autofill read path re-validates the frame origin against the274 * entry's domains on every request, so an unbound write path would let a275 * content script repoint an entry at its own origin and then read the276 * credential through a read path that is behaving correctly.277 *278 * Creating an entry: a page may only bind it to itself. Mutating one: a page279 * may never GROW the domain set — only shrink it, and never below its own280 * attested origin.281 *282 * Self-binding on mutation was considered and is not enough: the content283 * script on a foreign origin IS the attacker in the reported chain, so letting284 * it attach "its own" origin lets it mint the very capability the read path285 * exists to withhold. The legitimate flow that needs a new domain — the inline286 * "remember this site" toast — therefore asks the popup instead287 * (REQUEST_REMEMBER_SITE), which is an extension page and exempt here.288 *289 * Extension pages are exempt: the popup edits entries for sites it is not on.290 */291function senderMayBindEntryDomains(292  sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender>,293  domains: Set<string>,294): boolean {295  if (isExtensionPageSender(sender)) return true;296  const domain = attestedSenderDomain(sender);297  if (domain === null) return false;298  for (const candidate of domains) {299    if (candidate !== domain) return false;300  }301  return true;302}303304function senderMayMutateEntryDomains(305  sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender>,306  before: Set<string>,307  after: Set<string>,308): boolean {309  if (isExtensionPageSender(sender)) return true;310  const domain = attestedSenderDomain(sender);311  if (domain === null || !after.has(domain)) return false;312  for (const kept of after) {313    if (!before.has(kept)) return false;314  }315  return true;316}317318/**319 * Null for extension pages (which the callers exempt), for senders with no320 * attested origin at all, and for unparseable frame urls.321 */322function attestedSenderDomain(sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender>): string | null {323  if (sender.tab === undefined && sender.url === undefined) return null;324  const origin = attestedSenderOrigin(sender);325  if (!origin) return null;326  try { return extractDomain(new URL(origin).hostname); } catch { return null; }327}328329function patchChangesEntryOrigin(patch: object): boolean {330  return Object.hasOwn(patch, "url") || Object.hasOwn(patch, "additionalUrls");331}332333/** The entry's domain-bearing fields as the patch would leave them. */334function patchedUrlShape(335  patch: object,336  existing: Pick<VaultEntry, "url" | "additionalUrls">,337): { url: unknown; additionalUrls: unknown } {338  const candidate = patch as { url?: unknown; additionalUrls?: unknown };339  return {340    url: Object.hasOwn(patch, "url") ? candidate.url : existing.url,341    additionalUrls: Object.hasOwn(patch, "additionalUrls")342      ? candidate.additionalUrls343      : existing.additionalUrls,344  };345}346// Resolves once restoreFromSession() has run, so handlers see the correct347// post-restore unlock state. entry.ts registers this BEFORE the message348// handler so the onMessage listener is added synchronously at SW startup349// (MV3 requirement) while unlock-dependent handlers still wait for restore.350let restoreReady: Promise<void> = Promise.resolve();351const MAX_ML_BATCH_FIELDS = 128;352const MAX_ML_FIELDS_PER_SECOND = 256;353const mlWorkBySender = new Map<string, { startedAt: number; fields: number }>();354355function claimMLWork(sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender>, fields: number): boolean {356  if (fields === 0) return true;357  const now = Date.now();358  for (const [key, value] of mlWorkBySender) {359    if (now - value.startedAt >= 1_000) mlWorkBySender.delete(key);360  }361  const key = `${sender.tab?.id ?? "ui"}:${sender.frameId ?? 0}:${attestedSenderOrigin(sender) ?? "extension"}`;362  const current = mlWorkBySender.get(key);363  if (!current) {364    mlWorkBySender.set(key, { startedAt: now, fields });365    return fields <= MAX_ML_FIELDS_PER_SECOND;366  }367  if (current.fields + fields > MAX_ML_FIELDS_PER_SECOND) return false;368  current.fields += fields;369  return true;370}371372/** Called by entry.ts at startup with the in-flight restoreFromSession promise. */373export function setRestoreReady(p: Promise<unknown>): void {374  restoreReady = p.then(() => undefined, () => undefined);375}376377export async function handleMessage(378  msg: Message,379  sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender> = {}380): Promise<MessageResponse> {381  try {382    // Wait for session-restore to finish before reading any unlock/vault state.383    // On a cold SW start the popup's first message arrives while restore is384    // still in flight; without this gate IS_UNLOCKED would report locked (a385    // spurious lock screen) and the storage reads could race. The onMessage386    // listener itself is registered synchronously (entry.ts) so this gate, not387    // listener registration, is what absorbs the cold-start window.388    await restoreReady;389    // Validate sender — only allow messages from our extension pages/scripts.390    // `sender.id` is undefined for messages originating from extension UI391    // (popup/options), which is legitimate; reject only when it is defined392    // and does not match our extension id.393    if (394      sender.id !== undefined &&395      sender.id !== chrome.runtime.id396    ) {397      return { ok: false, error: "invalid_sender" };398    }399400    // PB-26-016: sender authorization is an exhaustive policy, not a401    // hand-maintained privileged denylist. A missing/unknown policy entry or a402    // background-only message fails closed before any handler runs.403    // Extension UI messages may legitimately omit sender.url. Resolve the404    // browser-attested extension origin only when a URL is present; this also405    // keeps test/runtime shims without getURL fail-closed for URL-bearing406    // senders instead of throwing before policy evaluation.407    const extensionOrigin = sender.url && typeof chrome.runtime.getURL === "function"408      ? chrome.runtime.getURL("")409      : "";410    if (!isMessageSenderAllowed(msg.type, sender, chrome.runtime.id, extensionOrigin)) {411      return { ok: false, error: "invalid_sender" };412    }413414    if (shouldRefreshAutoLock(msg.type, sender) && vault.isUnlocked()) {415      touchAutoLock();416    }417418    switch (msg.type) {419      case "CREATE_VAULT": {420        const { password } = msg.payload as { password: string };421        // Refuse to create a vault under an empty master password — the derived422        // key would be publicly known and the at-rest AES-GCM protection void423        // (audit HIGH; the CSV-import path previously passed ""). Length/strength424        // policy lives in the onboarding UI; this is the non-negotiable floor.425        if (typeof password !== "string" || password.length === 0) {426          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };427        }428        await vault.createVault(password);429        await setupAutoLock();430        broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });431        onVaultUnlocked();432        return { ok: true };433      }434      case "CREATE_VAULT_FROM_ROOT_KEY": {435        const { password, rootKeyHex } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {436          password?: unknown;437          rootKeyHex?: unknown;438        };439        if (typeof password !== "string" || password.length === 0 || typeof rootKeyHex !== "string") {440          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };441        }442443        try {444          const { vaultId } = await vault.createVaultFromRootKey(password, rootKeyHex);445          await setupAutoLock();446          broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });447          onVaultUnlocked();448          return { ok: true, vaultId };449        } catch (err) {450          return { ok: false, error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err) };451        }452      }453      case "UNLOCK": {454        const { password } = msg.payload as { password: string };455        const ok = await vault.unlock(password);456        if (ok) {457          // KAT: verify the WebCrypto stack is healthy before the user relies on it.458          // Runs after unlock so latency is hidden behind the vault-load time.459          const kat = await runSelfTest();460          if (!kat.ok) {461            console.error("[Peach] Crypto self-test FAILED:", kat.error);462            await vault.lock();463            return { ok: false, error: "self_test_failed" };464          }465          await vault.updateSettings({ pinPreferred: false });466          await setupAutoLock();467          broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });468          onVaultUnlocked();469          return { ok: true };470        }471        // Distinguish corruption from wrong password so the popup can offer472        // a history-restore path instead of falsely accusing the user of473        // mistyping (M7/COR-007).474        const failure = vault.consumeLastUnlockFailureReason();475        if (failure) {476          return {477            ok: false,478            error: "vault_corrupted",479            canRestoreFromHistory: true,480          } as MessageResponse;481        }482        return { ok: false };483      }484      case "UNLOCK_WITH_PIN": {485        const { pin } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { pin?: unknown };486        if (typeof pin !== "string") return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };487        const ok = await vault.unlockWithPin(pin);488        if (!ok) {489          const status = await vault.getPinUnlockStatus();490          if (status.configured && !status.available) {491            return {492              ok: false,493              error: status.attemptsRemaining === 0494                ? "pin_attempts_exceeded"495                : "pin_session_expired",496            };497          }498          return { ok: false };499        }500        const kat = await runSelfTest();501        if (!kat.ok) {502          await vault.lock();503          return { ok: false, error: "self_test_failed" };504        }505        await vault.updateSettings({ pinPreferred: true });506        await setupAutoLock();507        broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });508        onVaultUnlocked();509        return { ok: true };510      }511      case "GET_PIN_STATUS":512        return { ok: true, data: await vault.getPinUnlockStatus() };513      case "VALIDATE_RECOVERY_WORDS": {514        const { words } = msg.payload as { words: string[] };515        const invalid = findInvalidWords(words);516        return { ok: true, data: { valid: invalid.length === 0, invalid } };517      }518      case "GET_RECOVERY_WORDS": {519        // Must be unlocked and have recovery set up (vault must be v2.12+).520        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };521        // LV-4: the recovery words re-derive the ROOT KEY — the highest-522        // value secret in the vault. A session unlock (which may be hours523        // old on a shared machine) is not enough; require a fresh password524        // proof, matching the 1Password/Bitwarden pattern for revealing525        // escrow material. EXEMPTION: the create-vault / rotation confirmation526        // window (peach_recovery_pending) shows the words immediately after527        // the user authenticated, and that confirmation UI has no password to528        // resend — skip the re-auth there only.529        if (!(await isRecoveryConfirmPending())) {530          const { password } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { password?: string };531          if (typeof password !== "string" || !password) {532            return { ok: false, error: "password_required" };533          }534          if (!(await vault.verifyMainPassword(password))) {535            return { ok: false, error: "wrong_password" };536          }537        }538        try {539          const words = await vault.getRecoveryWords();540          return { ok: true, data: words };541        } catch {542          return { ok: false, error: "recovery_not_setup" };543        }544      }545      case "GET_RECOVERY_CONFIRM_PENDING":546        return { ok: true, data: await isRecoveryConfirmPending() };547      case "SET_RECOVERY_CONFIRM_PENDING":548        await setRecoveryConfirmPending();549        return { ok: true };550      case "CLEAR_RECOVERY_CONFIRM_PENDING":551        await clearRecoveryConfirmPending();552        return { ok: true };553      case "RECOVER_WITH_WORDS": {554        // User has lost their password but has their 12 recovery words.555        // We: (1) validate the words, (2) re-encrypt vault with new password.556        const { words, newPassword } = msg.payload as {557          words: string[];558          newPassword: string;559        };560        const stored = await vault.loadSlotA();561        if (!stored) return { ok: false, error: "no_vault" };562        if (!stored.recovery_salt || !stored.recovery_wrapped_root_key) {563          return { ok: false, error: "recovery_not_setup" };564        }565        // Unwrap the root key from the recovery escrow.566        try {567          await vault.unwrapRootKeyForRecovery(568            stored.recovery_wrapped_root_key,569            stored.recovery_nonce ?? "",570            stored.recovery_tag ?? "",571            stored.recovery_salt,572            words573          );574        } catch {575          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_recovery_words" };576        }577        // Re-key: derive fresh salt + key from new password.578        const newSalt = vault.generateSalt();579        const newKey = await vault.deriveKey(newPassword, newSalt);580        // Re-wrap root key under the new password's derived key so the same581        // recovery words continue to work after the password change.582        await vault.rewrapRootKeyForPassword(newKey);583        // Re-encrypt vault entries with the new key.584        await vault.changePasswordWithNewKey(newSalt, newKey);585        await setupAutoLock();586        broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });587        return { ok: true };588      }589      case "LOCK":590        await vault.lock();591        return { ok: true };592      case "IS_UNLOCKED":593        return { ok: true, data: vault.isUnlocked() };594      case "GET_VAULT_STATUS":595        return { ok: true, unlocked: vault.isUnlocked() };596      case "HAS_VAULT":597        return { ok: true, data: await vault.hasVault() };598      case "GET_ENTRIES":599        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };600        return { ok: true, data: vault.getEntries() };601      case "EXPORT_ENTRIES": {602        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };603        const { password } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { password?: unknown };604        if (typeof password !== "string" || !password) {605          return { ok: false, error: "password_required" };606        }607        if (!(await vault.verifyMainPassword(password))) {608          return { ok: false, error: "wrong_password" };609        }610        return { ok: true, data: vault.getEntries() };611      }612      case "ADD_ENTRY": {613        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };614        const payload = msg.payload;615        if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) {616          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };617        }618        // PB-26-106: a page may only create an entry bound to itself. Entries619        // carrying no url have no domain surface to bind, so they are exempt.620        if (isPageSender(sender)) {621          const draft = payload as { url?: unknown; additionalUrls?: unknown };622          const domains = entryDomains(draft.url, draft.additionalUrls);623          if (domains.size > 0 && !senderMayBindEntryDomains(sender, domains)) {624            return { ok: false, error: "origin_binding_required" };625          }626        }627        const entry = await vault.addEntry(payload as Parameters<typeof vault.addEntry>[0]);628        return { ok: true, data: entry };629      }630      case "BATCH_ADD_ENTRIES": {631        const payload = msg.payload as { entries?: unknown } | null | undefined;632        if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) {633          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };634        }635        if (!Array.isArray(payload.entries)) {636          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };637        }638        const added = await vault.batchAddEntries(payload.entries as Parameters<typeof vault.batchAddEntries>[0]);639        return { ok: true, data: added };640      }641      case "RESTORE_ENTRIES": {642        const payload = msg.payload as643          | { entries?: unknown; mode?: unknown; settings?: unknown }644          | null645          | undefined;646        if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) {647          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };648        }649        if (!Array.isArray(payload.entries)) {650          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };651        }652        if (payload.mode !== "replace" && payload.mode !== "merge") {653          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };654        }655        const summary = await vault.restoreEntries(656          payload.entries as Parameters<typeof vault.restoreEntries>[0],657          payload.mode658        );659        if (payload.settings && typeof payload.settings === "object" && !Array.isArray(payload.settings)) {660          await vault.updateSettings(payload.settings as vault.VaultSettings);661        }662        return { ok: true, data: summary };663      }664      case "CLEAR_VAULT_ENTRIES": {665        await vault.clearVaultEntries("REPLACE_ALL");666        return { ok: true };667      }668      case "GET_VAULT_HISTORY": {669        const snapshots = await vault.getVaultHistory();670        return { ok: true, data: snapshots };671      }672      case "RESTORE_VAULT_SNAPSHOT": {673        const { snapshotId } = msg.payload as { snapshotId: string };674        const result = await vault.restoreVaultSnapshot(snapshotId);675        if (!result.ok) return { ok: false, error: result.error };676        broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_LOCKED" });677        return { ok: true };678      }679      case "COUNT_DUPLICATES": {680        return { ok: true, data: vault.countDuplicates() };681      }682      case "DEDUPLICATE_ENTRIES": {683        const removed = await vault.deduplicateEntries();684        return { ok: true, data: removed };685      }686      case "UPDATE_ENTRY": {687        const payload = msg.payload as { id?: unknown; patch?: unknown } | null | undefined;688        if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) {689          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };690        }691        const { id, patch } = payload;692        if (typeof id !== "string" || !id || !patch || typeof patch !== "object" || Array.isArray(patch)) {693          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };694        }695        const existingEntry = vault.getEntryById(id);696        if (!existingEntry) return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };697        if (patchChangesEntryOrigin(patch) || isPageSender(sender)) {698          const before = entryDomains(existingEntry.url, existingEntry.additionalUrls);699          const after = patchedUrlShape(patch, existingEntry);700          if (!senderMayMutateEntryDomains(701            sender,702            before,703            entryDomains(after.url, after.additionalUrls),704          )) {705            return { ok: false, error: "origin_binding_required" };706          }707        }708        // Single enforcement point for the Canary Entries Pro gate. Only709        // gates the transition into a canary entry — clearing/disabling a710        // canary (`canary: undefined`) is always allowed, so existing711        // canary entries remain manageable.712        const incomingCanary = (patch as { canary?: unknown }).canary;713        if (incomingCanary && typeof incomingCanary === "object") {714          const existing = vault.getEntryById(id);715          if (!existing?.canary) {716            const gate = await requirePro("canary_entry");717            if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };718          }719        }720        await vault.updateEntry(id, patch as Parameters<typeof vault.updateEntry>[1]);721        return { ok: true };722      }723      case "ADD_ADDITIONAL_URL": {724        const { id, url } = msg.payload as { id: string; url: string };725        const trimmed = typeof url === "string" ? url.trim() : "";726        if (!trimmed) return { ok: false, error: "url_required" };727        const existing = vault.getEntryById(id);728        if (!existing) return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };729        const merged = [...(existing.additionalUrls ?? []), trimmed];730        if (!senderMayMutateEntryDomains(731          sender,732          entryDomains(existing.url, existing.additionalUrls),733          entryDomains(existing.url, merged),734        )) {735          return { ok: false, error: "origin_binding_required" };736        }737        if (existing.type !== "login") return { ok: false, error: "login_entries_only" };738        await vault.updateEntry(id, { additionalUrls: merged });739        return { ok: true };740      }741      case "REQUEST_REMEMBER_SITE": {742        // PB-26-106: growing an entry's domain set needs a decision the page743        // cannot make for itself, so the page asks and the popup confirms. A744        // page may only ask about its own attested origin — otherwise this745        // becomes the same unbound write under a friendlier name.746        const { id, url } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { id?: unknown; url?: unknown };747        if (typeof id !== "string" || !id) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };748        const trimmed = typeof url === "string" ? url.trim() : "";749        if (!trimmed) return { ok: false, error: "url_required" };750        if (!senderMayBindEntryDomains(sender, entryDomains(trimmed, undefined))) {751          return { ok: false, error: "origin_binding_required" };752        }753        if (!vault.getEntryById(id)) return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };754        if (chrome.storage.session) {755          await chrome.storage.session.set({ pendingRememberSite: { entryId: id, url: trimmed } });756        }757        try { await chrome.action.openPopup(); } catch { /* user opens via toolbar */ }758        return { ok: true };759      }760      case "DELETE_ENTRY": {761        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };762        await vault.deleteEntry(id);763        return { ok: true };764      }765      case "GET_DELETED_ENTRIES":766        return { ok: true, data: vault.getDeletedEntries() };767      case "RESTORE_ENTRY": {768        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };769        await vault.restoreEntry(id);770        return { ok: true };771      }772      case "PURGE_ENTRY": {773        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };774        await vault.purgeEntry(id);775        return { ok: true };776      }777      case "PURGE_EXPIRED_TRASH": {778        const { retentionMs } = msg.payload as { retentionMs: number };779        const purged = await vault.purgeExpiredTrash(retentionMs);780        return { ok: true, data: purged };781      }782      case "SAVE_NOTE": {783        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };784        const { id, title, body } = msg.payload as { id?: string; title: string; body: string };785        const now = Date.now();786        if (id) {787          const existing = vault.getEntryById(id);788          if (!existing) return { ok: false, error: "not_found" };789          await vault.updateEntry(id, { title: title || "Untitled", notes: body, modifiedAt: now });790          return { ok: true, data: vault.getEntryById(id) };791        } else {792          // PCH-01-026 #10: addEntry stamps its own createdAt/modifiedAt793          // (EntryDraft omits both), so passing them was the only reason the794          // `as any` cast existed. Dropping them makes the call type-check.795          const entry = await vault.addEntry({796            type: "note",797            title: title || "Untitled",798            notes: body,799          });800          return { ok: true, data: entry };801        }802      }803      case "DELETE_NOTE": {804        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };805        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };806        await vault.deleteEntry(id);807        return { ok: true };808      }809      case "GET_NOTES": {810        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };811        const notes = vault.getEntries().filter(812          (e) => e.type === "note" && !e.deletedAt813        );814        return { ok: true, data: notes } as MessageResponse;815      }816      case "SEARCH_VAULT": {817        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };818        // AUD-002: shape-validate the payload before calling string methods.819        // A raw cast lets a malformed message crash the handler with TypeError.820        const { query } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { query?: unknown };821        if (typeof query !== "string") {822          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };823        }824        const q = query.toLowerCase();825        const searchResults = vault.getEntries().filter(826          (e) =>827            !e.deletedAt &&828            (e.title.toLowerCase().includes(q) ||829              e.notes?.toLowerCase().includes(q) ||830              e.username?.toLowerCase().includes(q))831        );832        return { ok: true, data: searchResults } as MessageResponse;833      }834      case "AUTOFILL_QUERY": {835        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) {836          return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };837        }838        const { domain, kind, capability } = msg.payload as {839          domain: string;840          kind?: "login" | "card" | "totp";841          capability?: string;842        };843        const includeAll = consumeSummonCapability(capability, sender, "inventory");844        if (capability !== undefined && !includeAll) {845          return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };846        }847        // kind="card": return saved cards as compact summaries for the848        // inline card silver platter. Cards are not domain-scoped — every849        // saved card is a candidate on every checkout page — so domain is850        // ignored when kind === "card".851        if (kind === "card") {852          if (!includeAll) return { ok: true, data: [] };853          const cards = vault.getEntries().filter((e) => e.type === "card");854          return {855            ok: true,856            data: cards.map((e) => ({857              id: e.id,858              title: e.cardNickname || e.title,859              cardholderName: e.cardholderName,860              last4: e.last4,861              expMonth: e.expMonth,862              expYear: e.expYear,863              network: e.network,864            })),865          };866        }867        const scopedDomain = isPageSender(sender)868          ? attestedSenderDomain(sender)869          : typeof domain === "string"870            ? extractDomain(domain)871            : null;872        if (!includeAll && !scopedDomain) {873          return isPageSender(sender)874            ? { ok: false, error: "origin_unverified" }875            : { ok: true, data: [] };876        }877        if (kind === "totp") {878          const matches = (879            includeAll880              ? vault.getEntries().filter((entry) => entry.type !== "note" && entry.type !== "card")881              : vault.queryDomain(scopedDomain!)882          ).filter((entry) => !isPasskeyOnly(entry) && Boolean(entry.totp));883          return {884            ok: true,885            data: matches.map((e) => ({886              id: e.id,887              title: e.title,888              username: e.username,889              email: e.email,890              url: e.url,891              hasTotp: true,892            })),893          };894        }895        // The inline selector fills username+password into a form. Passkey-896        // only entries have no password to fill; sign-in for those goes897        // through the WebAuthn path instead. Filter them out everywhere so898        // the user doesn't see four "GitHub" rows that mostly do nothing.899        // Notes and cards never belonged here either.900        const matches = (901          includeAll902            ? vault903                .getEntries()904                .filter((entry) => entry.type !== "note" && entry.type !== "card")905            : vault.queryDomain(scopedDomain!)906        ).filter((entry) => !isPasskeyOnly(entry));907        return {908          ok: true,909          data: matches.map((e) =>910            includeAll911              ? {912                  id: e.id,913                  title: e.title,914                  // username/email/url shipped so the inline popup's search915                  // affordance can match on them, not just titles. No secrets916                  // cross the boundary — same shape as the domain-matched917                  // response below minus hasTotp (which the search list918                  // doesn't surface).919                  username: e.username,920                  email: e.email,921                  url: e.url,922                  hasPasskey: e.passkey !== undefined,923                }924              : {925                  id: e.id,926                  title: e.title,927                  username: e.username,928                  email: e.email,929                  url: e.url,930                  hasTotp: Boolean(e.totp),931                  hasPasskey: e.passkey !== undefined,932                }933          ),934        };935      }936      case "GET_ENTRY_FOR_FILL": {937        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };938        const { id, capability } = msg.payload as {939          id: string;940          capability?: string;941        };942        const capabilityAuthorized = capability !== undefined && consumeSummonCapability(capability, sender, "fill");943        const senderDomain = isPageSender(sender) ? attestedSenderDomain(sender) : null;944        if (isPageSender(sender) && !senderDomain) {945          return { ok: false, error: "origin_unverified" };946        }947        const entry = vault.getEntryById(id);948        if (!entry) return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };949950        // MV-1: re-validate the entry against the requesting frame's origin.951        // sender.url / sender.tab.url are browser-attested — a page cannot952        // forge them. PB-26-005: the FRAME url (sender.url) is authoritative953        // for an all_frames content script; the top-frame tab.url would954        // misattribute a cross-origin iframe's request to the top page. When955        // the request does not come from a tab at all (popup surfaces use956        // GET_ENTRY_FOR_EDIT, not this), refuse.957        if (senderDomain && !capabilityAuthorized) {958          if (!entryDomains(entry.url, entry.additionalUrls).has(senderDomain)) {959            // Domain mismatch — refuse silently (no oracle about which ids exist).960            return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };961          }962        }963        // Passkey-only entries (passkey credential, no password) cannot be964        // filled into a form — sign-in goes through the WebAuthn path. A965        // login that ALSO has a passkey is still fillable for its password.966        if (isPasskeyOnly(entry)) return { ok: false, error: "passkey_not_fillable" };967        // Strip the passkey credential AND the raw base32 TOTP seed from the968        // response. Content scripts never need either: the private key is the969        // authenticator's, and handing over the TOTP seed would let a970        // compromised content script mint valid codes indefinitely (SEV-3-C).971        // Generate the *current* 6-digit code here in the background and send972        // only that, plus the seconds left so the UI can render a countdown.973        // Also drop passwordHistory: filling needs only the *current* password.974        // Handing every past password to a content script during passive975        // autofill on an arbitrary page would widen the blast radius of a976        // compromised page far beyond the one credential being filled.977        const {978          passkey: _strippedPasskey,979          totp: seed,980          totpAlgorithm,981          totpDigits,982          totpPeriod,983          passwordHistory: _ph,984          ...safeEntry985        } = entry;986        let totpCode: string | undefined;987        let totpRemaining: number | undefined;988        if (seed) {989          try {990            // PCH-01-019: honour stored algorithm/digits/period (defaults apply991            // when these are undefined, i.e. RFC-default bare-seed entries).992            const generated = generateTOTP(seed, totpAlgorithm, totpDigits, totpPeriod);993            totpCode = generated.code;994            totpRemaining = generated.remaining;995          } catch {996            totpCode = undefined;997          }998        }999        if (isPageSender(sender) && vault.isUnlocked()) touchAutoLock();1000        return { ok: true, data: { ...safeEntry, totpCode, totpRemaining } };1001      }1002      // Trusted full-entry fetch for extension-owned edit surfaces. Content1003      // scripts route editing to the popup and cannot call this message.1004      case "GET_ENTRY_FOR_EDIT": {1005        if (isPageSender(sender)) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_sender" };1006        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1007        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };1008        const entry = vault.getEntryById(id);1009        if (!entry) return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };10101011        const { passkey: _passkey, ...safeEntry } = entry;1012        return { ok: true, data: safeEntry };1013      }1014      case "COPY": {1015        // AUD-002: shape-validate the payload before passing to the clipboard1016        // helper. A raw cast lets a malformed message reach the clipboard API1017        // with a non-string and throw.1018        const { text, label, alreadyWritten } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1019          text?: unknown;1020          label?: unknown;1021          alreadyWritten?: unknown;1022        };1023        if (typeof text !== "string" || typeof label !== "string") {1024          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1025        }1026        await copyToClipboard(text, label, Boolean(alreadyWritten));1027        return { ok: true, clearSeconds: getEffectiveClearSeconds() };1028      }1029      case "CHECK_ALL_BREACHES": {1030        const allEntries = vault.getEntries();1031        const results: Record<string, number> = {};1032        for (const entry of allEntries) {1033          if (entry.type === "note") continue;1034          if (!entry.password) continue;1035          results[entry.id] = await vault.checkBreach(entry.password);1036          // Small delay — be a good citizen to the HIBP API1037          await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 200));1038        }1039        // Persist any non-zero counts back to entries1040        for (const [id, count] of Object.entries(results)) {1041          const entry = vault.getEntryById(id);1042          if (entry && (entry.breach ?? 0) !== count) {1043            await vault.updateEntry(id, { breach: count > 0 ? count : undefined });1044          }1045        }1046        return { ok: true, data: results };1047      }1048      case "GET_SETTINGS": {1049        const settings = await vault.ensureSettingsLoaded();1050        if (!isPageSender(sender)) return { ok: true, data: settings };10511052        const safeSettings: Pick<vault.VaultSettings, "accentColor" | "theme"> & {1053          manualSummonDomains?: NonNullable<vault.VaultSettings["manualSummonDomains"]>;1054        } = {1055          accentColor: settings.accentColor,1056          theme: settings.theme,1057        };1058        const domain = attestedSenderDomain(sender);1059        const ownSummon = domain ? settings.manualSummonDomains?.[domain] : undefined;1060        if (domain && ownSummon) safeSettings.manualSummonDomains = { [domain]: ownSummon };1061        return { ok: true, data: safeSettings };1062      }1063      case "UPDATE_SETTINGS": {1064        const patch = msg.payload;1065        if (!patch || typeof patch !== "object" || Array.isArray(patch)) {1066          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1067        }1068        await vault.updateSettings(patch as vault.VaultSettings);1069        if (typeof (patch as Record<string, unknown>).autoLockMinutes === "number") {1070          await setupAutoLock();1071          if (vault.isUnlocked()) touchAutoLock();1072        }1073        return { ok: true };1074      }1075      case "SETUP_PIN": {1076        const { currentPassword, pin } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1077          currentPassword?: unknown;1078          pin?: unknown;1079        };1080        if (typeof currentPassword !== "string" || typeof pin !== "string") {1081          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1082        }1083        return (await vault.setupPinUnlock(currentPassword, pin))1084          ? { ok: true }1085          : { ok: false, error: "incorrect_current_password" };1086      }1087      case "DISABLE_PIN": {1088        const { currentPassword } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { currentPassword?: unknown };1089        if (typeof currentPassword !== "string") return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1090        return (await vault.disablePinUnlock(currentPassword))1091          ? { ok: true }1092          : { ok: false, error: "incorrect_current_password" };1093      }1094      case "GET_PENDING_PASSKEY":1095        return { ok: true, data: await getPendingPasskeyRequest() };1096      case "APPROVE_PASSKEY": {1097        const { requestId } = msg.payload as { requestId: number };1098        await resolvePendingPasskeyRequest(requestId, true);1099        return { ok: true };1100      }1101      case "DENY_PASSKEY": {1102        const { requestId } = msg.payload as { requestId: number };1103        await resolvePendingPasskeyRequest(requestId, false);1104        return { ok: true };1105      }1106      case "GET_PASSKEY_PROVIDER_STATE":1107        return { ok: true, data: await getPasskeyProviderState() };1108      case "SET_PASSKEY_PROVIDER_ENABLED": {1109        const { enabled } = msg.payload as { enabled: boolean };1110        // Disabling is always free; gating fires only when a free user is1111        // trying to turn passkey interception on.1112        if (enabled) {1113          const gate = await requirePro("passkeys");1114          if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1115        }1116        return { ok: true, data: await setPasskeyProviderEnabled(enabled) };1117      }1118      // AUD-003: this handler POSTs `entryTitle` to a user-configured HTTPS1119      // endpoint. Intentional product behavior — users configure their own1120      // dead-man's-switch. isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl blocks localhost, private1121      // IPs, and non-HTTPS schemes, but cannot defend against every DNS-1122      // rebinding case. The UI under CanarySection (Entry.tsx) discloses to1123      // users that the entry title leaves the device when the canary fires.1124      case "FIRE_CANARY_PING": {1125        // Canary alert fires unconditionally for any entry with canary: true.1126        // The Pro gate only governs creation/flagging of canary entries; once1127        // an entry is flagged, the alert path is a security property and must1128        // never be license-gated.1129        const { webhookUrl, entryTitle, trigger } = msg.payload as {1130          webhookUrl: string;1131          entryTitle: string;1132          trigger: "password_copied" | "username_copied" | "autofilled" | "submitted" | "test";1133        };1134        if (trigger === "test" && !isExtensionPageSender(sender)) {1135          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_sender" };1136        }1137        if (!isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl(webhookUrl)) {1138          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_webhook_url" };1139        }1140        // LV-3: debounce non-test pings per (webhook, entry) so a page that1141        // strobes focus/fill events can't turn the canary into a request1142        // firehose at the user's endpoint. Test pings are exempt — they are1143        // explicit user clicks in the settings UI and are awaited for1144        // feedback. The FIRST ping in a window always goes out, so the1145        // dead-man's-switch property (canary fires on access) is preserved;1146        // only repeats within the window are coalesced.1147        if (trigger !== "test") {1148          const keyDigest = new Uint8Array(1149            await crypto.subtle.digest(1150              "SHA-256",1151              new TextEncoder().encode(`${webhookUrl}:${entryTitle}`),1152            ),1153          );1154          const keySuffix = Array.from(keyDigest)1155            .map((byte) => byte.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))1156            .join("");1157          const rlKey = `canary-last-fetch:${keySuffix}`;1158          const legacyRlKey = `canary-last-fetch:${webhookUrl}:${entryTitle}`;1159          const stored = await chrome.storage.local.get(rlKey);1160          await chrome.storage.local.remove(legacyRlKey);1161          const last = (stored as Record<string, unknown>)[rlKey];1162          if (typeof last === "number" && Date.now() - last < CANARY_MIN_INTERVAL_MS) {1163            return { ok: true, data: { rateLimited: true } };1164          }1165          await chrome.storage.local.set({ [rlKey]: Date.now() });1166        }1167        const body = JSON.stringify({1168          event: trigger === "test" ? "peach_canary_test" : "peach_canary_accessed",1169          entry: entryTitle,1170          trigger,1171          timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),1172          source: "peach-extension",1173        });1174        if (trigger === "test") {1175          // Permitted outbound fetch: user-configured canary alert endpoint1176          // (validated by isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl above). This is the1177          // only non-HIBP outbound call in the extension — see1178          // Projects.md §3.7. Test pings are awaited so the UI can show1179          // success/failure.1180          try {1181            const res = await fetch(webhookUrl, {1182              method: "POST",1183              headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },1184              body,1185            });1186            return { ok: res.ok, error: res.ok ? undefined : `HTTP ${res.status}` };1187          } catch (err) {1188            return { ok: false, error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : "network_error" };1189          }1190        }1191        // Non-test triggers are fire-and-forget1192        fetch(webhookUrl, {1193          method: "POST",1194          headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },1195          body,1196        }).catch(() => {});1197        return { ok: true };1198      }1199      case "ACTIVATE_LICENSE": {1200        const { key } = msg.payload as { key: string };1201        const licenseInfo = await activateLicense(key);1202        return { ok: true, data: licenseInfo };1203      }1204      case "GET_LICENSE": {1205        const licenseInfo = await getLicenseInfo();1206        return { ok: true, data: licenseInfo };1207      }1208      case "GET_LICENSE_KEY": {1209        const key = await getLicenseKey();1210        return { ok: true, data: key };1211      }1212      case "DEACTIVATE_LICENSE": {1213        await deactivateLicense();1214        return { ok: true };1215      }1216      case "SHOULD_PLAY_CELEBRATION": {1217        const should = await shouldPlayCelebration();1218        return { ok: true, data: should };1219      }1220      case "MARK_CELEBRATION_PLAYED": {1221        await markCelebrationPlayed();1222        return { ok: true };1223      }1224      case "GET_CODEX_VAULT_DATA": {1225        // Pro-gated. requirePro broadcasts PRO_GATE_TRIGGERED on miss so the1226        // popup navigates to the License section without further coordination.1227        // Also privileged-page-gated (PB-26-001), and recoveryWords inside the1228        // snapshot additionally require a fresh master-password proof.1229        const gate = await requirePro("codex");1230        if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1231        const { password } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { password?: string };1232        return await handleGetCodexVaultData(password);1233      }1234      case "ESTIMATE_CODEX_PAGES": {1235        const gate = await requirePro("codex");1236        if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1237        return await handleEstimateCodexPages();1238      }1239      case "RESTORE_FROM_CODEX": {1240        // !! IMPORTANT: intentionally NOT Pro-gated. A free device must still1241        // be able to restore a vault that was printed by a Pro user.1242        // DO NOT add a Pro gate here.1243        const payload = msg.payload as CodexRestorePayload;1244        return await handleRestoreFromCodex(payload);1245      }1246      case "OPEN_PRO_GATE": {1247        // Content script requests: open popup and navigate to License section.1248        const { feature } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { feature?: string };1249        if (chrome.storage.session) {1250          await chrome.storage.session.set({ pendingProGate: { feature: feature ?? "passkeys" } });1251        }1252        try { await chrome.action.openPopup(); } catch { /* badge fallback */ }1253        return { ok: true };1254      }1255      case "OPEN_POPUP": {1256        // Content script asks to open the trusted extension popup — used by the1257        // inline locked bubble so the master password is entered in the popup,1258        // never in page-hosted DOM (audit HIGH). Best-effort: openPopup needs a1259        // user gesture + Chrome 127+/Firefox; on failure the user clicks the1260        // toolbar icon. The badge already signals Peach needs attention.1261        //1262        // Set a session flag so the popup knows it was opened for inline unlock1263        // and should close itself once the vault is unlocked (returning the user1264        // to the inline autofill selector on the page).1265        const { entryId } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { entryId?: unknown };1266        if (entryId !== undefined && (typeof entryId !== "string" || entryId.length === 0 || entryId.length > 64)) {1267          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1268        }1269        if (chrome.storage.session) {1270          if (typeof entryId === "string") {1271            await chrome.storage.session.set({ peach_open_entry: entryId });1272          } else {1273            await chrome.storage.session.set({ peach_inline_unlock: true });1274          }1275        }1276        try { await chrome.action.openPopup(); } catch { /* user opens via toolbar */ }1277        return { ok: true };1278      }1279      case "OPEN_DETACHED_POPUP": {1280        // A window created by the action popup and then orphaned with1281        // window.close() is cascaded shut by Chrome, so the file-picker1282        // flows (OS dialogs that dismiss the popup on focus loss) ask the SW1283        // to open the standalone window instead — the SW has no window to be1284        // associated with. The query string is allowlisted so this can never1285        // open an arbitrary URL.1286        const { route } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { route?: string };1287        const search = route === "peachscript"1288          ? "?restore=peachscript"1289          : route === "csv"1290            ? "?restore=csv"1291            : route === "codex-pdf"1292              ? "?codex=pdf"1293              : null;1294        if (!search) return { ok: false, error: "bad_route" };1295        try {1296          const popupHtml =1297            chrome.runtime.getManifest().action?.default_popup ?? "src/popup/index.html";1298          await chrome.windows.create({1299            url: chrome.runtime.getURL(`${popupHtml}${search}`),1300            type: "popup",1301            width: 320,1302            height: 550,1303          });1304          return { ok: true, data: { detached: true } };1305        } catch {1306          return { ok: false };1307        }1308      }1309      case "GET_IDENTITIES": {1310        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1311        return { ok: true, data: vault.getIdentities() };1312      }1313      case "TOUCH_AUTO_LOCK": {1314        // touchAutoLock() is already called by shouldRefreshAutoLock above;1315        // this case just gives the popup a typed message to keep the session alive.1316        return { ok: true };1317      }1318      case "GET_ADVANCED_HEALTH_REPORT": {1319        const gate = await requirePro("advanced_health");1320        if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1321        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1322        const report = await buildAdvancedHealthReport(vault.getEntries());1323        return { ok: true, data: report };1324      }1325      case "IS_DURESS_ENABLED": {1326        const enabled = await vault.isDuressEnabled();1327        return { ok: true, data: enabled };1328      }1329      case "SETUP_DURESS": {1330        // Single enforcement point for the Duress Vault Pro gate. Free users1331        // who somehow reach this handler are rejected here; the popup also1332        // pre-checks isPro() to avoid showing the setup form to free users,1333        // but server-side is the actual security boundary.1334        const gate = await requirePro("duress_vault");1335        if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1336        // MV3 service workers restart after inactivity, losing the in-memory1337        // derived key. Detect this before calling setupDuress so the popup1338        // can show a meaningful prompt to re-lock and re-unlock.1339        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "session_expired" };1340        const { duressPassword } = msg.payload as { duressPassword: string };1341        await vault.setupDuress(duressPassword);1342        return { ok: true };1343      }1344      case "DISABLE_DURESS": {1345        await vault.disableDuress();1346        return { ok: true };1347      }1348      case "VERIFY_MAIN_PASSWORD": {1349        const { password } = msg.payload as { password: string };1350        const ok = await vault.verifyMainPassword(password);1351        return { ok: true, data: ok };1352      }1353      case "CHANGE_PASSWORD": {1354        const { currentPassword, newPassword } = msg.payload as {1355          currentPassword: string;1356          newPassword: string;1357        };1358        const changed = await vault.changePassword(currentPassword, newPassword);1359        return changed1360          ? { ok: true }1361          : { ok: false, error: "incorrect_current_password" };1362      }1363      case "GET_SITE_PASSWORD_POLICY": {1364        const [tab] = await chrome.tabs.query({ active: true, currentWindow: true });1365        if (!tab?.id) return { ok: true, data: null };1366        try {1367          const response = await chrome.tabs.sendMessage(tab.id, {1368            type: "GET_SITE_PASSWORD_POLICY",1369          });1370          return (response as MessageResponse) ?? { ok: true, data: null };1371        } catch {1372          return { ok: true, data: null };1373        }1374      }1375      case "RECORD_MANUAL_SUMMON": {1376        const { domain } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { domain?: unknown };1377        const origin = attestedSenderOrigin(sender);1378        let senderDomain: string | null = null;1379        if (origin) {1380          try {1381            const hostname = new URL(origin).hostname;1382            senderDomain = extractDomain(hostname) ?? hostname;1383          } catch {1384            senderDomain = null;1385          }1386        }1387        if (typeof domain !== "string" || domain.length > 253 || domain !== senderDomain) {1388          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_domain" };1389        }1390        const settings = vault.getSettings();1391        const existing = settings.manualSummonDomains?.[domain];1392        const now = Date.now();1393        await vault.updateSettings({1394          manualSummonDomains: {1395            ...settings.manualSummonDomains,1396            [domain]: {1397              firstSummonedAt: existing?.firstSummonedAt ?? now,1398              summonCount: (existing?.summonCount ?? 0) + 1,1399              lastSummonedAt: now,1400            },1401          },1402        });1403        return { ok: true };1404      }1405      case "DECLINE_CARD_SAVE": {1406        // PB-26-108: the declined-card digest is keyed by root-key material, so1407        // a decline cannot be recorded while locked. Offers are not shown while1408        // locked either, so this is unreachable in practice.1409        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1410        const { last4, expMonth, expYear } = msg.payload as { last4: string; expMonth: string; expYear: string };1411        await vault.declineCardSaveOffer(last4, expMonth, expYear);1412        return { ok: true };1413      }1414      case "IS_CARD_DECLINED": {1415        const { last4, expMonth, expYear } = msg.payload as { last4: string; expMonth: string; expYear: string };1416        const declined = await vault.isCardDeclined(last4, expMonth, expYear);1417        return { ok: true, data: declined };1418      }1419      case "INITIATE_FIREFOX_PASSKEY_CREATE": {1420        const { rpId, rpName, userName, userDisplayName } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1421          rpId?: string;1422          rpName?: string;1423          userName?: string;1424          userDisplayName?: string;1425        };1426        if (!rpId || !userName) return { ok: false, error: "rpid_and_username_required" };1427        return await initiateFirefoxPasskeyCreate({1428          rpId,1429          rpName: rpName ?? rpId,1430          userName,1431          userDisplayName,1432        }, attestedSenderOrigin(sender));1433      }14341435      case "COMPLETE_FIREFOX_PASSKEY_CREATE": {1436        const payload = msg.payload as Parameters<typeof completeFirefoxPasskeyCreate>[0] | undefined;1437        if (!payload) return { ok: false, error: "missing_payload" };1438        return await completeFirefoxPasskeyCreate(payload);1439      }14401441      case "PASSKEY_OFFER_DECLINE": {1442        const { domain } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { domain?: string };1443        const origin = attestedSenderOrigin(sender);1444        if (!domain || !origin || !isValidRpId(domain, origin)) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_domain" };1445        await recordPasskeyOfferDecline(domain);1446        return { ok: true };1447      }14481449      case "GET_PASSKEY_OFFER_DECLINED": {1450        const { domain } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { domain?: string };1451        const origin = attestedSenderOrigin(sender);1452        if (!domain || !origin || !isValidRpId(domain, origin)) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_domain" };1453        return { ok: true, data: await isPasskeyOfferDeclined(domain) };1454      }14551456      case "PASSKEY_HAS_CREDENTIALS": {1457        const payload = msg.payload as {1458          rpId?: string;1459          allowCredentials?: Array<{ id: string; type?: string }>;1460        } | undefined;1461        if (!payload?.rpId) return { ok: false, error: "rpid_required" };1462        return await handlePasskeyHasCredentials({1463          rpId: payload.rpId,1464          allowCredentials: payload.allowCredentials ?? [],1465        }, attestedSenderOrigin(sender));1466      }14671468      case "PASSKEY_CREATE": {1469        const payload = msg.payload as Parameters<typeof handleFirefoxPasskeyCreate>[0] | undefined;1470        if (!payload?.rpId || !payload?.userName) {1471          return { ok: false, error: "rpid_and_username_required" };1472        }1473        return await handleFirefoxPasskeyCreate(payload, attestedSenderOrigin(sender));1474      }14751476      case "PASSKEY_GET": {1477        const payload = msg.payload as Parameters<typeof handleFirefoxPasskeyGet>[0] | undefined;1478        if (!payload?.rpId) return { ok: false, error: "rpid_required" };1479        return await handleFirefoxPasskeyGet(payload, attestedSenderOrigin(sender));1480      }14811482      case "PASSKEY_AUTH_RESPONSE": {1483        const { requestId, approved } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1484          requestId?: string | number;1485          approved?: boolean;1486        };1487        if (requestId === undefined || requestId === null || typeof approved !== 'boolean') {1488          return { ok: false, error: 'requestId and approved required' };1489        }1490        const pending = await getPendingPasskeyRequest();1491        const senderOrigin = attestedSenderOrigin(sender);1492        if (1493          (pending && pending.requestId !== Number(requestId)) ||1494          (pending?.tabId !== undefined && sender.tab?.id !== pending.tabId) ||1495          (pending?.origin !== undefined && senderOrigin !== pending.origin)1496        ) {1497          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_passkey_approval_sender" };1498        }1499        await resolvePendingPasskeyRequest(Number(requestId), approved);1500        return { ok: true };1501      }15021503      case "GET_PASSKEY_FOR_DOMAIN": {1504        const { domain } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { domain?: string };1505        if (!domain) return { ok: false, error: "domain_required" };1506        // Scope to the caller's own origin: a page may only ask about passkeys1507        // for a domain it actually owns, so an arbitrary page cannot enumerate1508        // which sites the user holds passkeys for or read the username (audit MEDIUM).1509        const origin = attestedSenderOrigin(sender);1510        if (!origin || !isValidRpId(domain, origin)) return { ok: true, data: null };1511        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: true, data: null };1512        const match = vault1513          .getEntries()1514          .find((entry) => entry.passkey?.rpId === domain);1515        if (!match || !match.passkey) return { ok: true, data: null };1516        // Slim shape — only the fields State 11 needs. Never expose private1517        // key material, even though this is locked behind isUnlocked.1518        // bannerShown is the per-domain "already surfaced" flag, kept in1519        // trusted background session storage so content scripts never touch1520        // chrome.storage.session directly (PB-26-203).1521        let bannerShown = false;1522        if (chrome.storage.session) {1523          const flag = await chrome.storage.session.get(`peach_state11_shown:${domain}`);1524          bannerShown = Boolean((flag as Record<string, unknown>)[`peach_state11_shown:${domain}`]);1525        }1526        return {1527          ok: true,1528          data: {1529            rpId: match.passkey.rpId,1530            userName: match.passkey.userName,1531            browser: match.passkey.browser,1532            bannerShown,1533          },1534        };1535      }15361537      case "MARK_PASSKEY_BANNER_SHOWN": {1538        const { domain } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { domain?: string };1539        if (typeof domain !== "string" || !domain) return { ok: false, error: "domain_required" };1540        // Same origin binding as the read path: a page may only mark its own1541        // domain, and the flag reveals nothing either way.1542        const origin = attestedSenderOrigin(sender);1543        if (!origin || !isValidRpId(domain, origin)) return { ok: true };1544        if (chrome.storage.session) {1545          await chrome.storage.session.set({ [`peach_state11_shown:${domain}`]: Date.now() });1546        }1547        return { ok: true };1548      }15491550      case "DESTROY_VAULT": {1551        // Irreversible by design. Lock zeroes the derived key + in-memory entries;1552        // storage.local.clear() wipes every Peach key (slots, settings, license,1553        // onboarded flag, history, sync state, declined cards, recall, etc.);1554        // session.clear() wipes pending passkey requests + pro-notice queues.1555        // Caller (Panic.tsx) handles UI navigation back to onboarding.1556        //1557        // The Pro license is the one thing that must survive: the user paid for1558        // it, and destroying a vault (panic wipe, fresh start) is not a refund.1559        // Capture it before the clear and restore it after. peach_pro_celebrated1560        // rides along so the Pro celebration doesn't replay on the next unlock.1561        const preserved = await chrome.storage.local.get([1562          "peach_license",1563          "peach_pro_celebrated",1564        ]);1565        await vault.lock();1566        await storageClear();1567        await vault.clearVaultHistory();1568        const toRestore: Record<string, unknown> = {};1569        if (preserved.peach_license !== undefined) toRestore.peach_license = preserved.peach_license;1570        if (preserved.peach_pro_celebrated !== undefined) toRestore.peach_pro_celebrated = preserved.peach_pro_celebrated;1571        if (Object.keys(toRestore).length > 0) {1572          await chrome.storage.local.set(toRestore);1573        }1574        if (chrome.storage.session) {1575          await chrome.storage.session.clear();1576        }1577        await clearRecoveryConfirmPending();1578        return { ok: true };1579      }15801581      case "GET_IDENTITY_SUGGESTIONS": {1582        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1583        const entries = vault.getEntries();1584        const suggestions = buildIdentitySuggestions(entries);1585        return { ok: true, data: { suggestions } };1586      }1587      case "ML_INIT":1588        return { ok: true };15891590      case "ML_PREDICT_BATCH": {1591        const { featuresArray } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { featuresArray?: unknown };1592        if (!isValidMLFeatureBatch(featuresArray, MAX_ML_BATCH_FIELDS)) {1593          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1594        }1595        if (!claimMLWork(sender, featuresArray.length)) {1596          return { ok: false, error: "rate_limited" };1597        }1598        return { ok: true, data: mlPredictBatch(featuresArray) };1599      }16001601      // ── Vault sync (v3) ───────────────────────────────────────────────1602      // Returns the public-facing local identity needed by the popup to1603      // drive Phase-1 audio pairing. The private long-term key never1604      // leaves the background.1605      case "GET_LOCAL_IDENTITY": {1606        // Not Pro-gated: a free device may attempt to pair so it can RECEIVE a1607        // Pro license from an already-Pro peer (at least one device must be Pro).1608        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1609        // The identity is sealed under its own key rather than derived from the1610        // root, so pairing survives a master-password change (SEV-2-B).1611        const identity: LocalDeviceIdentity & { license?: string } = await buildLocalIdentity();1612        // If this device is Pro, advertise the signed license so the peer can1613        // activate it after SAS confirmation — pairing carries Pro across.1614        if (await isProUser()) {1615          const license = await getLicenseKey();1616          if (license) identity.license = license;1617        }1618        return { ok: true, data: identity };1619      }16201621      case "LIST_PAIRED_DEVICES": {1622        if (vault.isDecoyMode()) return { ok: true, data: { devices: [] } };1623        const devices = await listPairedDevicesV3();1624        return { ok: true, data: { devices } };1625      }16261627      case "RENAME_PAIRED_DEVICE": {1628        if (vault.isDecoyMode()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1629        const { deviceId, name } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { deviceId?: string; name?: string };1630        if (typeof deviceId !== "string" || !deviceId || typeof name !== "string") {1631          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1632        }1633        await renamePairedDeviceV3(deviceId, name);1634        return { ok: true };1635      }16361637      case "UNPAIR_DEVICE": {1638        if (vault.isDecoyMode()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1639        const { deviceId } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { deviceId?: string };1640        if (typeof deviceId !== "string" || !deviceId) {1641          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1642        }1643        // Removing a device REVOKES it rather than just dropping the local1644        // row: a plain removal is undone the moment any other peer vouches it1645        // back through a manifest, which is exactly what the relay makes easy.1646        await revokeDeviceByIdV3(deviceId, await getOrCreateDeviceId());1647        // PB-26-213: forget the secret now so no further dial can use it.1648        // Removals that happen while locked leave orphans for the next1649        // unlock's reconcile to prune.1650        const unpairRootHex = vault.getRootKeyHex();1651        if (unpairRootHex) {1652          const unpairRoot = unhexBytes(unpairRootHex);1653          try {1654            await dropPairSecret(deviceId, unpairRoot);1655          } finally {1656            unpairRoot.fill(0);1657          }1658        } else {1659          await dropPairSecret(deviceId, null);1660        }1661        // Sync against the remaining hosts — the unpaired device no longer1662        // matters but the next alarm tick is up to ten minutes away.1663        void triggerSyncIfReachable({ reason: "device_list_changed" }).catch(() => undefined);1664        return { ok: true };1665      }16661667      case "RENAME_LOCAL_DEVICE": {1668        if (vault.isDecoyMode()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1669        const { name } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { name?: string };1670        if (typeof name !== "string") return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1671        await setDeviceNameV3(name);1672        return { ok: true };1673      }16741675      // ── Relay pairing ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────1676      // Not Pro-gated (a free device may pair to receive Pro/sync). The whole NK1677      // session runs in the background; the SAS and the terminal result reach1678      // the popup as ADOPTION_SOURCE_SAS / ADOPTION_SOURCE_RESULT pushes.1679      case "START_ADOPTION_SOURCE": {1680        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1681        if (isRelayAdoptionSourceInFlight()) {1682          return { ok: false, error: "adoption_source_in_progress" };1683        }1684        try {1685          return { ok: true, data: await startRelayAdoptionSource() };1686        } catch (error) {1687          return {1688            ok: false,1689            error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : "adoption_source_failed",1690          };1691        }1692      }16931694      // Onboarding receiver — empty extension shows a QR, phone scans and1695      // sends the vault. The popup supplies the local-only password here so1696      // the background can wrap the adopted root key at rest without ever1697      // asking the user to retype it.1698      case "START_ADOPTION_RECEIVER": {1699        if (isRelayAdoptionSourceInFlight()) {1700          return { ok: false, error: "adoption_receiver_in_progress" };1701        }1702        const password = (msg.payload as { password?: unknown } | undefined)?.password;1703        if (typeof password !== "string" || password.length === 0) {1704          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1705        }1706        try {1707          return { ok: true, data: await startRelayAdoptionReceiver(password) };1708        } catch (error) {1709          return {1710            ok: false,1711            error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : "adoption_receiver_failed",1712          };1713        }1714      }17151716      // Source-side mirror of RECEIVER_SAS_DECISION: the popup's confirm/cancel1717      // on the source's SAS screen. The id round-trips the same way so a stale1718      // late response can't approve the wrong session.1719      case "RECEIVER_SAS_DECISION": {1720        const payload = msg.payload as { id?: unknown; sas?: unknown; ok?: unknown } | undefined;1721        if (typeof payload?.id !== "string" || typeof payload.sas !== "string" || typeof payload.ok !== "boolean") {1722          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1723        }1724        return { ok: resolveReceiverSasConfirmation(payload.id, payload.sas, payload.ok) };1725      }17261727      case "SOURCE_SAS_DECISION": {1728        const payload = msg.payload as { id?: unknown; ok?: unknown } | undefined;1729        if (typeof payload?.id !== "string" || typeof payload?.ok !== "boolean") {1730          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1731        }1732        return { ok: resolveSourceSasConfirmation(payload.id, payload.ok) };1733      }1734      case "LIST_PENDING_ADOPTION_HOLDERS": {1735        return { ok: true, data: await listPendingAdoptionHolders() };1736      }17371738      case "REMOVE_PENDING_ADOPTION_HOLDER": {1739        await removePendingAdoptionHolder();1740        return { ok: true };1741      }174217431744      case "CANCEL_ADOPTION_SOURCE": {1745        cancelRelayAdoptionSource();1746        return { ok: true };1747      }17481749      case "TRIGGER_SYNC": {1750        if (vault.isDecoyMode()) return { ok: true };1751        const payload = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1752          reason?: "vault_change" | "foreground" | "manual";1753          force?: boolean;1754        };1755        const reason = payload.reason ?? "foreground";17561757        void triggerSyncIfReachable({ reason, force: payload.force === true });1758        return { ok: true };1759      }17601761      case "GET_SYNC_STATE": {1762        if (vault.isDecoyMode()) return { ok: true, data: { status: "idle" } };1763        return { ok: true, data: getSyncState() };1764      }17651766      // §11. The generation state carries no secret — it is a version and a1767      // state name — so the panel can read it while the vault is locked.1768      case "GET_SYNC_GENERATION": {1769        return { ok: true, data: await resolveGeneration(browserGenerationIo) };1770      }17711772      case "SECURE_RESET": {1773        if (vault.isDecoyMode()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1774        const payload = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { password?: unknown };1775        if (typeof payload.password !== "string" || payload.password.length === 0) {1776          return { ok: false, error: "Enter your master password" };1777        }1778        if (!(await vault.verifyMainPassword(payload.password))) {1779          return { ok: false, error: "Incorrect master password" };1780        }1781        // Enter the blocking state first: a crash between these two calls then1782        // leaves the device refusing sync rather than mid-reset over live1783        // trust. Both are idempotent, so a retry is safe.1784        await enterResetRequired(browserGenerationIo);1785        const result = await confirmSecureReset(browserGenerationIo, {1786          nowMs: Date.now(),1787        });1788        return result === "V2_ANCHOR"1789          ? { ok: true, data: await resolveGeneration(browserGenerationIo) }1790          : {1791              ok: false,1792              error: "The reset did not complete — nothing was lost, try again",1793            };1794      }17951796      case "GET_SYNC_SETTINGS": {1797        if (vault.isDecoyMode()) return { ok: true, data: { mode: "off", relayUrl: "" } };1798        return { ok: true, data: await getSyncSettings() };1799      }18001801      case "SET_SYNC_SETTINGS": {1802        if (vault.isDecoyMode()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1803        const payload = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1804          mode?: unknown;1805          relayUrl?: unknown;1806        };1807        try {1808          // A custom relay URL implies private mode; Peach's own relay stays1809          // public. See setRelayUrl.1810          if (payload.relayUrl !== undefined) {1811            if (typeof payload.relayUrl !== "string") {1812              return { ok: false, error: "invalid_relay_url" };1813            }1814            return { ok: true, data: await setRelayUrl(payload.relayUrl) };1815          }1816          if (payload.mode !== undefined) {1817            if (payload.mode !== "public" && payload.mode !== "private" && payload.mode !== "off") {1818              return { ok: false, error: "invalid_sync_mode" };1819            }1820            return { ok: true, data: await setSyncMode(payload.mode as SyncMode) };1821          }1822          return { ok: true, data: await getSyncSettings() };1823        } catch (error) {1824          return {1825            ok: false,1826            error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : "invalid_relay_url",1827          };1828        }1829      }183018311832      case "GET_SYNC_ALERTS": {1833        if (vault.isDecoyMode()) return { ok: true, data: [] };1834        const { consume } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { consume?: boolean };1835        const alerts = await getPendingSyncAlerts();1836        // The popup reads on open and acknowledges with consume:true after1837        // rendering, so a popup crash between read and render doesn't lose1838        // the alerts.1839        if (consume) await clearPendingSyncAlerts();1840        return { ok: true, data: alerts };1841      }18421843      case "GET_PENDING_VOUCHED_DEVICES": {1844        if (vault.isDecoyMode()) return { ok: true, data: [] };1845        return { ok: true, data: await listPendingVouchedDevices() };1846      }1847      case "CONFIRM_VOUCHED_DEVICE": {1848        if (vault.isDecoyMode()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1849        const { deviceId } = msg.payload as { deviceId: string };1850        const pending = await getPendingVouchedDevice(deviceId);1851        if (!pending) return { ok: false, error: "not_pending" };1852        // Last gate before a vouched device becomes a sync peer. A queue entry1853        // can predate the revocation that names it, so revocation is re-checked1854        // here rather than trusted to have swept the queue.1855        if (await isDeviceRevoked(pending.deviceId, pending.longTermPublicKeyHex)) {1856          await removePendingVouchedDevice(deviceId);1857          return { ok: false, error: "device_revoked" };1858        }1859        await upsertPairedDeviceV3({1860          deviceId: pending.deviceId,1861          deviceName: pending.deviceName,1862          deviceType:1863            pending.deviceType as import("../shared/sync-types").PairedDevice["deviceType"],1864          longTermPublicKeyHex: pending.longTermPublicKeyHex,1865          signingPublicKeyHex: pending.signingPublicKeyHex,1866          wsPort: pending.wsPort,1867          pairedAt: pending.pairedAt,1868          trustSource: "vouched",1869        });1870        await removePendingVouchedDevice(deviceId);1871        // Newly confirmed vouched device is now a sync target — kick a round1872        // so the mesh introduction pays off without a 10-minute wait.1873        void triggerSyncIfReachable({ reason: "device_list_changed" }).catch(() => undefined);1874        return { ok: true };1875      }1876      case "REJECT_VOUCHED_DEVICE": {1877        if (vault.isDecoyMode()) return { ok: true };1878        const { deviceId } = msg.payload as { deviceId: string };1879        await removePendingVouchedDevice(deviceId);1880        return { ok: true };1881      }18821883      case "ROTATE_SYNC_IDENTITY": {1884        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1885        const result = await vault.rotateSyncIdentity();1886        return result.ok ? { ok: true } : { ok: false, error: result.error };1887      }18881889      default:1890        return { ok: false, error: "unknown_message_type" };1891    }1892  } catch (err) {1893    return {1894      ok: false,1895      error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : "operation_failed",1896    };1897  }1898}18991900// Returns username use-counts from the vault, sorted by frequency. Each row1901// also carries the entry's email so the popup can suggest the email/username1902// pair the user has actually used together.1903function buildIdentitySuggestions(1904  entries: VaultEntry[],1905): Array<{ email: string; username: string; count: number }> {1906  const usernameCounts = new Map<string, number>();1907  const usernameEmail = new Map<string, string>();1908  for (const entry of entries) {1909    const username = entry.username ?? "";1910    const email = (entry as VaultEntry & { email?: string }).email ?? "";1911    if (!username && !email) continue;1912    const key = username || email;1913    usernameCounts.set(key, (usernameCounts.get(key) ?? 0) + 1);1914    if (!usernameEmail.has(key)) usernameEmail.set(key, email);1915  }1916  return Array.from(usernameCounts.entries())1917    .sort((a, b) => b[1] - a[1])1918    .map(([username, count]) => ({1919      email: usernameEmail.get(username) ?? "",1920      username,1921      count,1922    }));1923}19241925/** Notify all content scripts that the vault just became available. */1926function broadcastToContentScripts(message: { type: string }): void {1927  if (!chrome.tabs?.query) return;1928  chrome.tabs.query({}, (tabs) => {1929    for (const tab of tabs) {1930      if (tab.id !== undefined) {1931        chrome.tabs.sendMessage(tab.id, message).catch(() => {1932          // Tab may not have a content script — silently ignore1933        });1934      }1935    }1936  });1937}19381939function shouldRefreshAutoLock(1940  type: MessageType,1941  sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender>,1942): boolean {1943  if (!isExtensionPageSender(sender)) return false;1944  return (1945    type !== "HAS_VAULT" &&1946    type !== "IS_UNLOCKED" &&1947    type !== "GET_VAULT_STATUS" &&1948    type !== "LOCK" &&1949    type !== "UPDATE_SETTINGS" &&1950    type !== "GET_PENDING_PASSKEY" &&1951    type !== "GET_PASSKEY_PROVIDER_STATE" &&1952    type !== "DECLINE_CARD_SAVE" &&1953    type !== "IS_CARD_DECLINED" &&1954    type !== "AUTOFILL_QUERY" &&1955    type !== "ML_PREDICT_BATCH"1956  );1957}19581959function isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl(value: string): boolean {1960  try {1961    const url = new URL(value);1962    if (url.protocol !== "https:") return false;19631964    const hostname = url.hostname.toLowerCase();1965    if (1966      hostname === "localhost" ||1967      hostname.endsWith(".localhost") ||1968      isPrivateIpv4(hostname) ||1969      isPrivateIpv6(hostname)1970    ) {1971      return false;1972    }19731974    return true;1975  } catch {1976    return false;1977  }1978}19791980function isPrivateIpv4(hostname: string): boolean {1981  if (PRIVATE_IPV4_RANGES.some((range) => hostname.startsWith(range.prefix))) {1982    return true;1983  }19841985  const octets = hostname.split(".").map((part) => Number(part));1986  if (octets.length !== 4 || octets.some((octet) => !Number.isInteger(octet) || octet < 0 || octet > 255)) {1987    return false;1988  }19891990  return octets[0] === 172 && octets[1] >= 16 && octets[1] <= 31;1991}19921993function isPrivateIpv6(hostname: string): boolean {1994  const normalized = hostname.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "").toLowerCase();1995  // IPv4-mapped IPv6 literals embed a plain IPv4 address that the prefix1996  // list below can never match (WHATWG URL serializes [::ffff:192.168.0.1]1997  // as ::ffff:c0a8:1). Unwrap and test the embedded IPv4; unparseable mapped1998  // tails fail closed. (Codex Security 2026-08-04 LOW,1999  // ssrf.webhook-url-private-ip-filter.) DNS rebinding is out of scope for a2000  // one-shot host check.2001  const mapped = /^::ffff:(.+)$/.exec(normalized);2002  if (mapped) {2003    const tail = mapped[1] ?? "";2004    if (tail.includes(".")) return isPrivateIpv4(tail);2005    const parts = tail.split(":");2006    const [hi, lo] = parts;2007    if (2008      parts.length !== 2 ||2009      !hi ||2010      !lo ||2011      !/^[0-9a-f]{1,4}$/.test(hi) ||2012      !/^[0-9a-f]{1,4}$/.test(lo)2013    ) {2014      return true;2015    }2016    const octets = [2017      (Number.parseInt(hi, 16) >>> 8) & 0xff,2018      Number.parseInt(hi, 16) & 0xff,2019      (Number.parseInt(lo, 16) >>> 8) & 0xff,2020      Number.parseInt(lo, 16) & 0xff,2021    ];2022    return isPrivateIpv4(octets.join("."));2023  }2024  return (2025    normalized === "::1" ||2026    normalized.startsWith("fc") ||2027    normalized.startsWith("fd") ||2028    normalized.startsWith("fe80:")2029  );2030}