messages.ts

1/**2 * messages.ts — the only background message handler.3 *4 * All `chrome.runtime.onMessage` handling for the service worker lives here.5 * Do not handle messages inline in entry.ts, alarms.ts, or any other6 * background file. Every background-bound MessageType in shared/types.ts7 * must have a case below. Content-script-bound message types (PING,8 * SUMMON_AUTOFILL, VAULT_LOCKED) are documented in shared/types.ts and9 * intentionally have no case here — they are sent *to* content scripts.10 */1112import { copyToClipboard, getEffectiveClearSeconds } from "./clipboard";13import { getPendingSyncAlerts, clearPendingSyncAlerts } from "./sync-alerts";14import { extractDomain } from "../shared/domain";15import { computeVaultId } from "../shared/sync-identity";16import {17  getPendingVouchedDevice,18  listPendingVouchedDevices,19  removePendingVouchedDevice,20} from "./pending-vouched-devices";21import { isRecoveryConfirmPending } from "./recovery-pending";22import { setupAutoLock, touchAutoLock } from "./alarms";23import { runSelfTest } from "./self-test";24import * as vault from "./vault";25import {26  handleEstimateCodexPages,27  handleGetCodexVaultData,28  handleRestoreFromCodex,29} from "./codex-handlers";30import type { CodexRestorePayload } from "../shared/codex-types";31import {32  activateLicense,33  deactivateLicense,34  getLicenseInfo,35  getLicenseKey,36  isProUser,37  markCelebrationPlayed,38  shouldPlayCelebration,39} from "./license";40import {41  completeFirefoxPasskeyCreate,42  getPasskeyProviderState,43  getPendingPasskeyRequest,44  handleFirefoxPasskeyCreate,45  handleFirefoxPasskeyGet,46  handlePasskeyHasCredentials,47  initiateFirefoxPasskeyCreate,48  isPasskeyOfferDeclined,49  onVaultUnlocked,50  recordPasskeyOfferDecline,51  resolvePendingPasskeyRequest,52  setPasskeyProviderEnabled,53} from "./passkey";54import { buildAdvancedHealthReport } from "./health";55import { storageClear } from "../shared/storage";56import { findInvalidWords } from "../shared/recovery-words";57import type {58  Message,59  MessageResponse,60  MessageType,61  ProFeature,62  VaultEntry,63} from "../shared/types";64import { isPasskeyOnly } from "../shared/types";65import { generateTOTP } from "../crypto/totp";66import { isValidRpId } from "../shared/passkey-utils";67import { isNativePlatform, nativePlugin } from "../shared/native";68import { predictBatch as mlPredictBatch } from "./ml";69import type { MLFieldFeatures } from "../shared/ml";70import {71  buildLocalIdentity,72  getOrCreateDeviceId,73  setDeviceName as setDeviceNameV3,74} from "./device-identity";75import {76  clearDeviceRevocation,77  isDeviceRevoked,78  listPairedDevices as listPairedDevicesV3,79  revokeDeviceById as revokeDeviceByIdV3,80  upsertPairedDevice as upsertPairedDeviceV3,81} from "./paired-devices";82// Sync and pairing are imported statically, never with `await import()`.83// `import()` throws `TypeError: import() is disallowed on84// ServiceWorkerGlobalScope` at runtime in MV3, and Vite's preload helper85// reports the failure through `window.dispatchEvent`, which does not exist in86// a worker either — so the real reason was replaced by "window is not defined"87// and the pairing UI just stopped. scripts/check-sw-static-imports.mjs fails88// the build if a runtime import() reappears anywhere in the worker's graph.89import {90  cancelRelayAdoptionSource,91  isRelayAdoptionSourceInFlight,92  resolveReceiverSasConfirmation,93  resolveSourceSasConfirmation,94  startRelayAdoptionReceiver,95  startRelayAdoptionSource,96} from "./relay-adoption-source-bg";97import {98  getSyncSettings,99  setRelayUrl,100  setSyncMode,101  type SyncMode,102} from "./sync-settings";103import {104  getSyncState,105  hydratePersistedSyncState,106  setSyncRunner,107  triggerSyncIfReachable,108} from "./sync-trigger";109import { productionSyncRunner } from "./sync-runner";110111// Compile-time E2E flag, folded to a literal by Vite's `define` (false in112// every production build — verified in the bundled output). Mirrors the113// create-path bypass in passkey.ts so the Playwright passkey smoke can enable114// the provider without a real Pro licence; the gate is fully intact for users.115declare const __PEACH_E2E_PASSKEYS__: boolean;116const PASSKEY_E2E_PRO_BYPASS = __PEACH_E2E_PASSKEYS__ === true;117118let nativeSyncRunnerBootstrapped = false;119120function unhexBytes(hex: string): Uint8Array {121  if (hex.length % 2 !== 0) throw new Error("invalid hex");122  const out = new Uint8Array(hex.length / 2);123  for (let i = 0; i < out.length; i++) {124    out[i] = parseInt(hex.slice(i * 2, i * 2 + 2), 16);125  }126  return out;127}128129/**130 * The single Pro gate. Every gated handler calls this first; the broadcast131 * lets the popup react (navigate to the License section, highlight the132 * relevant feature). Background never touches the popup view directly —133 * the popup owns navigation. See Projects.md "Pro gate rule".134 */135async function requirePro(136  feature: ProFeature,137  trigger: "user" | "background" = "user"138): Promise<{ allowed: boolean }> {139  if (PASSKEY_E2E_PRO_BYPASS && feature === "passkeys") return { allowed: true };140  if (await isProUser()) return { allowed: true };141142  if (trigger === "user") {143    // User deliberately triggered this feature — redirect the popup immediately.144    chrome.runtime145      .sendMessage({ type: "PRO_GATE_TRIGGERED", payload: { feature } })146      .catch(() => {147        // Popup may be closed — the gate signal is best-effort.148      });149  } else {150    // Background trigger (e.g. passive sync initiation) — no popup is open.151    // Queue a notice so the next popup open shows a soft banner instead of152    // silently failing.153    if (chrome.storage.session) {154      chrome.storage.session155        .set({ pendingProNotice: { feature, triggeredAt: Date.now() } })156        .catch(() => {});157    }158  }159160  return { allowed: false };161}162163// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------164// PCH-01-018: operations that irreversibly destroy or replace vault contents.165// These are gated to trusted extension-page senders in handleMessage; the166// confirmation UX otherwise lives only in the popup. Keep this in sync when167// adding new destructive handlers.168const DESTRUCTIVE_MESSAGE_TYPES: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([169  "DESTROY_VAULT",170  "CLEAR_VAULT_ENTRIES",171  "RESTORE_VAULT_SNAPSHOT",172  "RESTORE_FROM_CODEX",173]);174175// LV-3: minimum interval between non-test canary pings per webhook+entry.176const CANARY_MIN_INTERVAL_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000; // 1 hour177178const PRIVATE_IPV4_RANGES = [179  { prefix: "10." },180  { prefix: "127." },181  { prefix: "169.254." },182  { prefix: "192.168." },183];184185export function setupMessageHandler(): void {186  chrome.runtime.onMessage.addListener(187    (msg: unknown, sender, sendResponse) => {188      if (!isMessage(msg)) {189        sendResponse({ ok: false, error: "invalid_message" });190        return true;191      }192      handleMessage(msg, sender)193        .then(sendResponse)194        .catch((err) =>195          sendResponse({196            ok: false,197            error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),198          })199        );200      return true;201    }202  );203204  // Android: the chrome shim queues sendMessage calls until this handler is205  // registered. Without this hookup, every message hangs on Capacitor builds.206  // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any207  const reg = (globalThis as any).__peachRegisterMessageHandler;208  if (typeof reg === "function") {209    reg(async (m: unknown) => {210      if (!isMessage(m)) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_message" };211      try {212        return await handleMessage(m);213      } catch (err) {214        return {215          ok: false,216          error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),217        };218      }219    });220  }221  if (isNativePlatform()) {222    void bootstrapNativeSyncRunner();223  }224}225226async function bootstrapNativeSyncRunner(): Promise<void> {227  if (nativeSyncRunnerBootstrapped) return;228  nativeSyncRunnerBootstrapped = true;229  try {230    setSyncRunner(productionSyncRunner);231    await hydratePersistedSyncState();232  } catch (err) {233    nativeSyncRunnerBootstrapped = false;234    console.warn("[Peach] failed to bootstrap native sync runner:", err);235  }236}237238function isMessage(m: unknown): m is Message {239  return typeof m === "object" && m !== null && "type" in m;240}241242/**243 * The browser-attested origin of the page that originated this message. A web244 * page cannot call chrome.runtime.sendMessage directly (no externally_connectable),245 * so every page-driven message arrives via the content-script relay and the246 * browser stamps `sender.origin`/`sender.url` with the real frame origin — a247 * value the page cannot forge. This is the ONLY trustworthy origin for passkey248 * rpId<->origin enforcement; payload-supplied origins are attacker-controlled.249 */250function attestedSenderOrigin(sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender>): string | undefined {251  if (sender.origin) return sender.origin;252  if (sender.url) {253    try { return new URL(sender.url).origin; } catch { return undefined; }254  }255  return undefined;256}257258// Resolves once restoreFromSession() has run, so handlers see the correct259// post-restore unlock state. entry.ts registers this BEFORE the message260// handler so the onMessage listener is added synchronously at SW startup261// (MV3 requirement) while unlock-dependent handlers still wait for restore.262let restoreReady: Promise<void> = Promise.resolve();263264/** Called by entry.ts at startup with the in-flight restoreFromSession promise. */265export function setRestoreReady(p: Promise<unknown>): void {266  restoreReady = p.then(() => undefined, () => undefined);267}268269export async function handleMessage(270  msg: Message,271  sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender> = {}272): Promise<MessageResponse> {273  try {274    // Wait for session-restore to finish before reading any unlock/vault state.275    // On a cold SW start the popup's first message arrives while restore is276    // still in flight; without this gate IS_UNLOCKED would report locked (a277    // spurious lock screen) and the storage reads could race. The onMessage278    // listener itself is registered synchronously (entry.ts) so this gate, not279    // listener registration, is what absorbs the cold-start window.280    await restoreReady;281    // Validate sender — only allow messages from our extension pages/scripts.282    // `sender.id` is undefined for messages originating from extension UI283    // (popup/options), which is legitimate; reject only when it is defined284    // and does not match our extension id.285    if (286      sender.id !== undefined &&287      sender.id !== chrome.runtime.id288    ) {289      return { ok: false, error: "invalid_sender" };290    }291292    // PCH-01-018: irreversible operations must originate from a trusted extension293    // page (popup/options), never from a content script. The sender.id check above294    // only proves the message came from *our* extension — a content script injected295    // into an attacker page passes it. A single XSS-class bug in the injected UI296    // would otherwise escalate to vault destruction. Extension pages carry an297    // extension-origin sender.url; content scripts carry a page URL.298    if (DESTRUCTIVE_MESSAGE_TYPES.has(msg.type)) {299      const extensionOrigin = chrome.runtime.getURL("");300      if (!sender.url?.startsWith(extensionOrigin)) {301        return { ok: false, error: "invalid_sender" };302      }303    }304305    if (shouldRefreshAutoLock(msg.type) && vault.isUnlocked()) {306      touchAutoLock();307    }308309    switch (msg.type) {310      case "CREATE_VAULT": {311        const { password } = msg.payload as { password: string };312        // Refuse to create a vault under an empty master password — the derived313        // key would be publicly known and the at-rest AES-GCM protection void314        // (audit HIGH; the CSV-import path previously passed ""). Length/strength315        // policy lives in the onboarding UI; this is the non-negotiable floor.316        if (typeof password !== "string" || password.length === 0) {317          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };318        }319        await vault.createVault(password);320        await setupAutoLock();321        broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });322        onVaultUnlocked();323        return { ok: true };324      }325      case "CREATE_VAULT_FROM_ROOT_KEY": {326        const { password, rootKeyHex } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {327          password?: unknown;328          rootKeyHex?: unknown;329        };330        if (typeof password !== "string" || password.length === 0 || typeof rootKeyHex !== "string") {331          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };332        }333334        try {335          const { vaultId } = await vault.createVaultFromRootKey(password, rootKeyHex);336          await setupAutoLock();337          broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });338          onVaultUnlocked();339          return { ok: true, vaultId };340        } catch (err) {341          return { ok: false, error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err) };342        }343      }344      case "UNLOCK": {345        const { password } = msg.payload as { password: string };346        const ok = await vault.unlock(password);347        if (ok) {348          // KAT: verify the WebCrypto stack is healthy before the user relies on it.349          // Runs after unlock so latency is hidden behind the vault-load time.350          const kat = await runSelfTest();351          if (!kat.ok) {352            console.error("[Peach] Crypto self-test FAILED:", kat.error);353            await vault.lock();354            return { ok: false, error: "self_test_failed" };355          }356          await setupAutoLock();357          broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });358          onVaultUnlocked();359          if (isNativePlatform()) await publishInMemoryVault(vault.getEntries());360          return { ok: true };361        }362        // Distinguish corruption from wrong password so the popup can offer363        // a history-restore path instead of falsely accusing the user of364        // mistyping (M7/COR-007).365        const failure = vault.consumeLastUnlockFailureReason();366        if (failure) {367          return {368            ok: false,369            error: "vault_corrupted",370            canRestoreFromHistory: true,371          } as MessageResponse;372        }373        return { ok: false };374      }375      case "VALIDATE_RECOVERY_WORDS": {376        const { words } = msg.payload as { words: string[] };377        const invalid = findInvalidWords(words);378        return { ok: true, data: { valid: invalid.length === 0, invalid } };379      }380      case "GET_RECOVERY_WORDS": {381        // Must be unlocked and have recovery set up (vault must be v2.12+).382        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };383        // LV-4: the recovery words re-derive the ROOT KEY — the highest-384        // value secret in the vault. A session unlock (which may be hours385        // old on a shared machine) is not enough; require a fresh password386        // proof, matching the 1Password/Bitwarden pattern for revealing387        // escrow material. EXEMPTION: the create-vault / rotation confirmation388        // window (peach_recovery_pending) shows the words immediately after389        // the user authenticated, and that confirmation UI has no password to390        // resend — skip the re-auth there only.391        if (!(await isRecoveryConfirmPending())) {392          const { password } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { password?: string };393          if (typeof password !== "string" || !password) {394            return { ok: false, error: "password_required" };395          }396          if (!(await vault.verifyMainPassword(password))) {397            return { ok: false, error: "wrong_password" };398          }399        }400        try {401          const words = await vault.getRecoveryWords();402          return { ok: true, data: words };403        } catch (e) {404          // pre-v2.12 vault that hasn't migrated405          return { ok: false, error: "recovery_not_setup" };406        }407      }408      case "RECOVER_WITH_WORDS": {409        // User has lost their password but has their 12 recovery words.410        // We: (1) validate the words, (2) re-encrypt vault with new password.411        const { words, newPassword } = msg.payload as {412          words: string[];413          newPassword: string;414        };415        const stored = await vault.loadSlotA();416        if (!stored) return { ok: false, error: "no_vault" };417        if (!stored.recovery_salt || !stored.recovery_wrapped_root_key) {418          return { ok: false, error: "recovery_not_setup" };419        }420        // Unwrap the root key from the recovery escrow.421        try {422          await vault.unwrapRootKeyForRecovery(423            stored.recovery_wrapped_root_key,424            stored.recovery_nonce ?? "",425            stored.recovery_tag ?? "",426            stored.recovery_salt,427            words428          );429        } catch {430          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_recovery_words" };431        }432        // Re-key: derive fresh salt + key from new password.433        const newSalt = vault.generateSalt();434        const newKey = await vault.deriveKey(newPassword, newSalt);435        // Re-wrap root key under the new password's derived key so the same436        // recovery words continue to work after the password change.437        await vault.rewrapRootKeyForPassword(newKey, newSalt);438        // Re-encrypt vault entries with the new key.439        await vault.changePasswordWithNewKey(newSalt, newKey);440        await setupAutoLock();441        broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });442        return { ok: true };443      }444      case "LOCK":445        vault.lock();446        if (isNativePlatform()) await clearInMemoryVault();447        return { ok: true };448      case "IS_UNLOCKED":449        return { ok: true, data: vault.isUnlocked() };450      case "GET_VAULT_STATUS":451        return { ok: true, unlocked: vault.isUnlocked() };452      case "HAS_VAULT":453        return { ok: true, data: await vault.hasVault() };454      case "GET_ENTRIES":455        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };456        return { ok: true, data: vault.getEntries() };457      case "ADD_ENTRY": {458        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };459        const payload = msg.payload;460        if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) {461          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };462        }463        const entry = await vault.addEntry(payload as Parameters<typeof vault.addEntry>[0]);464        return { ok: true, data: entry };465      }466      case "BATCH_ADD_ENTRIES": {467        const payload = msg.payload as { entries?: unknown } | null | undefined;468        if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) {469          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };470        }471        if (!Array.isArray(payload.entries)) {472          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };473        }474        const added = await vault.batchAddEntries(payload.entries as Parameters<typeof vault.batchAddEntries>[0]);475        return { ok: true, data: added };476      }477      case "RESTORE_ENTRIES": {478        const payload = msg.payload as479          | { entries?: unknown; mode?: unknown; settings?: unknown }480          | null481          | undefined;482        if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) {483          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };484        }485        if (!Array.isArray(payload.entries)) {486          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };487        }488        if (payload.mode !== "replace" && payload.mode !== "merge") {489          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };490        }491        const summary = await vault.restoreEntries(492          payload.entries as Parameters<typeof vault.restoreEntries>[0],493          payload.mode494        );495        if (payload.settings && typeof payload.settings === "object" && !Array.isArray(payload.settings)) {496          await vault.updateSettings(payload.settings as vault.VaultSettings);497        }498        return { ok: true, data: summary };499      }500      case "CLEAR_VAULT_ENTRIES": {501        await vault.clearVaultEntries("REPLACE_ALL");502        return { ok: true };503      }504      case "GET_VAULT_HISTORY": {505        const snapshots = await vault.getVaultHistory();506        return { ok: true, data: snapshots };507      }508      case "RESTORE_VAULT_SNAPSHOT": {509        const { snapshotId } = msg.payload as { snapshotId: string };510        const result = await vault.restoreVaultSnapshot(snapshotId);511        if (!result.ok) return { ok: false, error: result.error };512        broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_LOCKED" });513        return { ok: true };514      }515      case "COUNT_DUPLICATES": {516        return { ok: true, data: vault.countDuplicates() };517      }518      case "DEDUPLICATE_ENTRIES": {519        const removed = await vault.deduplicateEntries();520        return { ok: true, data: removed };521      }522      case "UPDATE_ENTRY": {523        const payload = msg.payload as { id?: unknown; patch?: unknown } | null | undefined;524        if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) {525          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };526        }527        const { id, patch } = payload;528        if (typeof id !== "string" || !id || !patch || typeof patch !== "object" || Array.isArray(patch)) {529          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };530        }531        // Single enforcement point for the Canary Entries Pro gate. Only532        // gates the transition into a canary entry — clearing/disabling a533        // canary (`canary: undefined`) is always allowed, so existing534        // canary entries remain manageable.535        const incomingCanary = (patch as { canary?: unknown }).canary;536        if (incomingCanary && typeof incomingCanary === "object") {537          const existing = vault.getEntryById(id);538          if (!existing?.canary) {539            const gate = await requirePro("canary_entry");540            if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };541          }542        }543        await vault.updateEntry(id, patch as Parameters<typeof vault.updateEntry>[1]);544        return { ok: true };545      }546      case "ADD_ADDITIONAL_URL": {547        const { id, url } = msg.payload as { id: string; url: string };548        const trimmed = typeof url === "string" ? url.trim() : "";549        if (!trimmed) return { ok: false, error: "url_required" };550        const existing = vault.getEntryById(id);551        if (!existing) return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };552        if (existing.type !== "login") return { ok: false, error: "login_entries_only" };553        const merged = [...(existing.additionalUrls ?? []), trimmed];554        await vault.updateEntry(id, { additionalUrls: merged });555        return { ok: true };556      }557      case "DELETE_ENTRY": {558        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };559        await vault.deleteEntry(id);560        return { ok: true };561      }562      case "GET_DELETED_ENTRIES":563        return { ok: true, data: vault.getDeletedEntries() };564      case "RESTORE_ENTRY": {565        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };566        await vault.restoreEntry(id);567        return { ok: true };568      }569      case "PURGE_ENTRY": {570        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };571        await vault.purgeEntry(id);572        return { ok: true };573      }574      case "PURGE_EXPIRED_TRASH": {575        const { retentionMs } = msg.payload as { retentionMs: number };576        const purged = await vault.purgeExpiredTrash(retentionMs);577        return { ok: true, data: purged };578      }579      case "SAVE_NOTE": {580        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };581        const { id, title, body } = msg.payload as { id?: string; title: string; body: string };582        const now = Date.now();583        if (id) {584          const existing = vault.getEntryById(id);585          if (!existing) return { ok: false, error: "not_found" };586          await vault.updateEntry(id, { title: title || "Untitled", notes: body, modifiedAt: now });587          return { ok: true, data: vault.getEntryById(id) };588        } else {589          // PCH-01-026 #10: addEntry stamps its own createdAt/modifiedAt590          // (EntryDraft omits both), so passing them was the only reason the591          // `as any` cast existed. Dropping them makes the call type-check.592          const entry = await vault.addEntry({593            type: "note",594            title: title || "Untitled",595            notes: body,596          });597          return { ok: true, data: entry };598        }599      }600      case "DELETE_NOTE": {601        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };602        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };603        await vault.deleteEntry(id);604        return { ok: true };605      }606      case "GET_NOTES": {607        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };608        const notes = vault.getEntries().filter(609          (e) => e.type === "note" && !e.deletedAt610        );611        return { ok: true, data: notes } as MessageResponse;612      }613      case "SEARCH_VAULT": {614        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };615        // AUD-002: shape-validate the payload before calling string methods.616        // A raw cast lets a malformed message crash the handler with TypeError.617        const { query } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { query?: unknown };618        if (typeof query !== "string") {619          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };620        }621        const q = query.toLowerCase();622        const searchResults = vault.getEntries().filter(623          (e) =>624            !e.deletedAt &&625            (e.title.toLowerCase().includes(q) ||626              e.notes?.toLowerCase().includes(q) ||627              e.username?.toLowerCase().includes(q))628        );629        return { ok: true, data: searchResults } as MessageResponse;630      }631      case "AUTOFILL_QUERY": {632        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) {633          return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };634        }635        let { includeAll } = msg.payload as { includeAll?: boolean };636        const { domain, kind, userGesture } = msg.payload as {637          domain: string;638          kind?: "login" | "card" | "totp";639          userGesture?: boolean;640        };641        // MV-2: the vault-wide inventory (every title/username/email/url)642        // may only leave the background on an explicit user gesture — the643        // user opening the search affordance — never on passive form focus.644        // userGesture is self-declared by our own content script; the value645        // of this gate is that PASSIVE code paths (which never set it)646        // cannot ship the inventory, shrinking what a compromised page that647        // merely triggers focus events can observe.648        if (includeAll && userGesture !== true) {649          includeAll = false;650        }651        // kind="card": return saved cards as compact summaries for the652        // inline card silver platter. Cards are not domain-scoped — every653        // saved card is a candidate on every checkout page — so domain is654        // ignored when kind === "card".655        if (kind === "card") {656          const cards = vault.getEntries().filter((e) => e.type === "card");657          return {658            ok: true,659            data: cards.map((e) => ({660              id: e.id,661              title: e.cardNickname || e.title,662              cardholderName: e.cardholderName,663              last4: e.last4,664              expMonth: e.expMonth,665              expYear: e.expYear,666              network: e.network,667            })),668          };669        }670        if (kind === "totp") {671          const matches = (672            includeAll673              ? vault.getEntries().filter((entry) => entry.type !== "note" && entry.type !== "card")674              : vault.queryDomain(domain)675          ).filter((entry) => !isPasskeyOnly(entry) && Boolean(entry.totp));676          return {677            ok: true,678            data: matches.map((e) => ({679              id: e.id,680              title: e.title,681              username: e.username,682              email: e.email,683              url: e.url,684              hasTotp: true,685            })),686          };687        }688        // The inline selector fills username+password into a form. Passkey-689        // only entries have no password to fill; sign-in for those goes690        // through the WebAuthn path instead. Filter them out everywhere so691        // the user doesn't see four "GitHub" rows that mostly do nothing.692        // Notes and cards never belonged here either.693        const matches = (694          includeAll695            ? vault696                .getEntries()697                .filter((entry) => entry.type !== "note" && entry.type !== "card")698            : vault.queryDomain(domain)699        ).filter((entry) => !isPasskeyOnly(entry));700        return {701          ok: true,702          data: matches.map((e) =>703            includeAll704              ? {705                  id: e.id,706                  title: e.title,707                  // username/email/url shipped so the inline popup's search708                  // affordance can match on them, not just titles. No secrets709                  // cross the boundary — same shape as the domain-matched710                  // response below minus hasTotp (which the search list711                  // doesn't surface).712                  username: e.username,713                  email: e.email,714                  url: e.url,715                  hasPasskey: e.passkey !== undefined,716                }717              : {718                  id: e.id,719                  title: e.title,720                  username: e.username,721                  email: e.email,722                  url: e.url,723                  hasTotp: Boolean(e.totp),724                  hasPasskey: e.passkey !== undefined,725                }726          ),727        };728      }729      case "GET_ENTRY_FOR_FILL": {730        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };731        const { id, explicitSummon } = msg.payload as {732          id: string;733          explicitSummon?: boolean;734        };735        const entry = vault.getEntryById(id);736        if (!entry) return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };737        // Passkey-only entries (passkey credential, no password) cannot be738        // filled into a form — sign-in goes through the WebAuthn path. A739        // login that ALSO has a passkey is still fillable for its password.740        if (isPasskeyOnly(entry)) return { ok: false, error: "passkey_not_fillable" };741742        // MV-1: re-validate the entry against the requesting tab's origin.743        // sender.tab.url is browser-attested — a page cannot forge it. When744        // the request does not come from a tab at all (popup surfaces use745        // GET_ENTRY_FOR_EDIT, not this), refuse.746        if (sender.tab !== undefined || sender.url !== undefined) {747          let senderDomain: string | null = null;748          try {749            const rawUrl = sender.tab?.url ?? sender.url ?? "";750            senderDomain = rawUrl ? extractDomain(new URL(rawUrl).hostname) : null;751          } catch {752            senderDomain = null;753          }754          if (!senderDomain) return { ok: false, error: "origin_unverified" };755756          const entryDomains = new Set<string>();757          const primary = extractDomain(entry.url ?? "");758          if (primary) entryDomains.add(primary);759          for (const extra of entry.additionalUrls ?? []) {760            const d = extractDomain(extra);761            if (d) entryDomains.add(d);762          }763764          // explicitSummon=true means the user actively picked this entry765          // from the cross-domain search affordance — an intentional766          // off-domain fill. Passive fill paths must stay domain-bound.767          if (explicitSummon !== true && !entryDomains.has(senderDomain)) {768            // Domain mismatch — refuse silently (no oracle about which ids exist).769            return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };770          }771        }772        // Strip the passkey credential AND the raw base32 TOTP seed from the773        // response. Content scripts never need either: the private key is the774        // authenticator's, and handing over the TOTP seed would let a775        // compromised content script mint valid codes indefinitely (SEV-3-C).776        // Generate the *current* 6-digit code here in the background and send777        // only that, plus the seconds left so the UI can render a countdown.778        // Also drop passwordHistory: filling needs only the *current* password.779        // Handing every past password to a content script during passive780        // autofill on an arbitrary page would widen the blast radius of a781        // compromised page far beyond the one credential being filled.782        const {783          passkey: _strippedPasskey,784          totp: seed,785          totpAlgorithm,786          totpDigits,787          totpPeriod,788          passwordHistory: _ph,789          ...safeEntry790        } = entry;791        let totpCode: string | undefined;792        let totpRemaining: number | undefined;793        if (seed) {794          try {795            // PCH-01-019: honour stored algorithm/digits/period (defaults apply796            // when these are undefined, i.e. legacy bare-seed entries).797            const generated = generateTOTP(seed, totpAlgorithm, totpDigits, totpPeriod);798            totpCode = generated.code;799            totpRemaining = generated.remaining;800          } catch {801            totpCode = undefined;802          }803        }804        return { ok: true, data: { ...safeEntry, totpCode, totpRemaining } };805      }806      // Trusted full-entry fetch for Peach's own inline-popup surfaces that807      // genuinely need the raw TOTP seed: the edit form (which re-saves the808      // seed and would otherwise wipe it) and nothing else. Unlike809      // GET_ENTRY_FOR_FILL this fires only on an explicit user action inside810      // the inline popup, never during passive autofill on an arbitrary page.811      // The passkey credential is still stripped — the edit form never touches it.812      case "GET_ENTRY_FOR_EDIT": {813        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };814        const { id, explicitSummon } = msg.payload as {815          id: string;816          explicitSummon?: boolean;817        };818        const entry = vault.getEntryById(id);819        if (!entry) return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };820821        // PCH-01-006: re-validate the browser-attested sender origin, mirroring822        // GET_ENTRY_FOR_FILL (MV-1). The edit channel ships the raw TOTP seed and823        // full password history — at least as sensitive as the fill response — so824        // the boundary must be enforced here, not only by UI reachability. Today825        // the sole caller is the popup (no sender.tab, so this is a structural826        // no-op), but a future tab-context caller or an id leak would otherwise827        // inherit a full-credential oracle. Unlike the fill path we SKIP (not828        // refuse) when no sender domain resolves, to keep the popup caller working.829        if (sender.tab !== undefined || sender.url !== undefined) {830          let senderDomain: string | null = null;831          try {832            const rawUrl = sender.tab?.url ?? sender.url ?? "";833            senderDomain = rawUrl ? extractDomain(new URL(rawUrl).hostname) : null;834          } catch {835            senderDomain = null;836          }837          if (senderDomain) {838            const entryDomains = new Set<string>();839            const primary = extractDomain(entry.url ?? "");840            if (primary) entryDomains.add(primary);841            for (const extra of entry.additionalUrls ?? []) {842              const d = extractDomain(extra);843              if (d) entryDomains.add(d);844            }845            if (explicitSummon !== true && !entryDomains.has(senderDomain)) {846              return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" }; // no id oracle847            }848          }849        }850851        const { passkey: _passkey, ...safeEntry } = entry;852        return { ok: true, data: safeEntry };853      }854      case "COPY": {855        // AUD-002: shape-validate the payload before passing to the clipboard856        // helper. A raw cast lets a malformed message reach the clipboard API857        // with a non-string and throw.858        const { text, label, alreadyWritten } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {859          text?: unknown;860          label?: unknown;861          alreadyWritten?: unknown;862        };863        if (typeof text !== "string" || typeof label !== "string") {864          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };865        }866        await copyToClipboard(text, label, Boolean(alreadyWritten));867        return { ok: true, clearSeconds: getEffectiveClearSeconds() };868      }869      case "CHECK_ALL_BREACHES": {870        const allEntries = vault.getEntries();871        const results: Record<string, number> = {};872        for (const entry of allEntries) {873          if (entry.type === "note") continue;874          if (!entry.password) continue;875          results[entry.id] = await vault.checkBreach(entry.password);876          // Small delay — be a good citizen to the HIBP API877          await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 200));878        }879        // Persist any non-zero counts back to entries880        for (const [id, count] of Object.entries(results)) {881          const entry = vault.getEntryById(id);882          if (entry && (entry.breach ?? 0) !== count) {883            await vault.updateEntry(id, { breach: count > 0 ? count : undefined });884          }885        }886        return { ok: true, data: results };887      }888      case "GET_SETTINGS":889        return { ok: true, data: await vault.ensureSettingsLoaded() };890      case "UPDATE_SETTINGS": {891        const patch = msg.payload;892        if (!patch || typeof patch !== "object" || Array.isArray(patch)) {893          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };894        }895        await vault.updateSettings(patch as vault.VaultSettings);896        if (typeof (patch as Record<string, unknown>).autoLockMinutes === "number") {897          await setupAutoLock();898          if (vault.isUnlocked()) touchAutoLock();899        }900        return { ok: true };901      }902      case "GET_PENDING_PASSKEY":903        return { ok: true, data: await getPendingPasskeyRequest() };904      case "APPROVE_PASSKEY": {905        const { requestId } = msg.payload as { requestId: number };906        await resolvePendingPasskeyRequest(requestId, true);907        return { ok: true };908      }909      case "DENY_PASSKEY": {910        const { requestId } = msg.payload as { requestId: number };911        await resolvePendingPasskeyRequest(requestId, false);912        return { ok: true };913      }914      case "GET_PASSKEY_PROVIDER_STATE":915        return { ok: true, data: await getPasskeyProviderState() };916      case "SET_PASSKEY_PROVIDER_ENABLED": {917        const { enabled } = msg.payload as { enabled: boolean };918        // Disabling is always free; gating fires only when a free user is919        // trying to turn passkey interception on.920        if (enabled) {921          const gate = await requirePro("passkeys");922          if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };923        }924        return { ok: true, data: await setPasskeyProviderEnabled(enabled) };925      }926      // AUD-003: this handler POSTs `entryTitle` to a user-configured HTTPS927      // endpoint. Intentional product behavior — users configure their own928      // dead-man's-switch. isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl blocks localhost, private929      // IPs, and non-HTTPS schemes, but cannot defend against every DNS-930      // rebinding case. The UI under CanarySection (Entry.tsx) discloses to931      // users that the entry title leaves the device when the canary fires.932      case "FIRE_CANARY_PING": {933        // Canary alert fires unconditionally for any entry with canary: true.934        // The Pro gate only governs creation/flagging of canary entries; once935        // an entry is flagged, the alert path is a security property and must936        // never be license-gated.937        const { webhookUrl, entryTitle, trigger } = msg.payload as {938          webhookUrl: string;939          entryTitle: string;940          trigger: "password_copied" | "username_copied" | "autofilled" | "submitted" | "test";941        };942        if (!isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl(webhookUrl)) {943          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_webhook_url" };944        }945        // LV-3: debounce non-test pings per (webhook, entry) so a page that946        // strobes focus/fill events can't turn the canary into a request947        // firehose at the user's endpoint. Test pings are exempt — they are948        // explicit user clicks in the settings UI and are awaited for949        // feedback. The FIRST ping in a window always goes out, so the950        // dead-man's-switch property (canary fires on access) is preserved;951        // only repeats within the window are coalesced.952        if (trigger !== "test") {953          const rlKey = `canary-last-fetch:${webhookUrl}:${entryTitle}`;954          const stored = await chrome.storage.local.get(rlKey);955          const last = (stored as Record<string, unknown>)[rlKey];956          if (typeof last === "number" && Date.now() - last < CANARY_MIN_INTERVAL_MS) {957            return { ok: true, data: { rateLimited: true } };958          }959          await chrome.storage.local.set({ [rlKey]: Date.now() });960        }961        const body = JSON.stringify({962          event: trigger === "test" ? "peach_canary_test" : "peach_canary_accessed",963          entry: entryTitle,964          trigger,965          timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),966          source: "peach-extension",967        });968        if (trigger === "test") {969          // Permitted outbound fetch: user-configured canary alert endpoint970          // (validated by isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl above). This is the971          // only non-HIBP outbound call in the extension — see972          // Projects.md §3.7. Test pings are awaited so the UI can show973          // success/failure.974          try {975            const res = await fetch(webhookUrl, {976              method: "POST",977              headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },978              body,979            });980            return { ok: res.ok, error: res.ok ? undefined : `HTTP ${res.status}` };981          } catch (err) {982            return { ok: false, error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : "network_error" };983          }984        }985        // Non-test triggers are fire-and-forget986        fetch(webhookUrl, {987          method: "POST",988          headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },989          body,990        }).catch(() => {});991        return { ok: true };992      }993      case "ACTIVATE_LICENSE": {994        const { key } = msg.payload as { key: string };995        const licenseInfo = await activateLicense(key);996        return { ok: true, data: licenseInfo };997      }998      case "GET_LICENSE": {999        const licenseInfo = await getLicenseInfo();1000        return { ok: true, data: licenseInfo };1001      }1002      case "GET_LICENSE_KEY": {1003        const key = await getLicenseKey();1004        return { ok: true, data: key };1005      }1006      case "DEACTIVATE_LICENSE": {1007        await deactivateLicense();1008        return { ok: true };1009      }1010      case "SHOULD_PLAY_CELEBRATION": {1011        const should = await shouldPlayCelebration();1012        return { ok: true, data: should };1013      }1014      case "MARK_CELEBRATION_PLAYED": {1015        await markCelebrationPlayed();1016        return { ok: true };1017      }1018      case "GET_CODEX_VAULT_DATA": {1019        // Pro-gated. requirePro broadcasts PRO_GATE_TRIGGERED on miss so the1020        // popup navigates to the License section without further coordination.1021        const gate = await requirePro("codex");1022        if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1023        return await handleGetCodexVaultData();1024      }1025      case "ESTIMATE_CODEX_PAGES": {1026        const gate = await requirePro("codex");1027        if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1028        return await handleEstimateCodexPages();1029      }1030      case "RESTORE_FROM_CODEX": {1031        // !! IMPORTANT: intentionally NOT Pro-gated. A free device must still1032        // be able to restore a vault that was printed by a Pro user.1033        // DO NOT add a Pro gate here.1034        const payload = msg.payload as CodexRestorePayload;1035        return await handleRestoreFromCodex(payload);1036      }1037      case "OPEN_PRO_GATE": {1038        // Content script requests: open popup and navigate to License section.1039        const { feature } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { feature?: string };1040        if (chrome.storage.session) {1041          await chrome.storage.session.set({ pendingProGate: { feature: feature ?? "passkeys" } });1042        }1043        try { await chrome.action.openPopup(); } catch { /* badge fallback */ }1044        return { ok: true };1045      }1046      case "OPEN_POPUP": {1047        // Content script asks to open the trusted extension popup — used by the1048        // inline locked bubble so the master password is entered in the popup,1049        // never in page-hosted DOM (audit HIGH). Best-effort: openPopup needs a1050        // user gesture + Chrome 127+/Firefox; on failure the user clicks the1051        // toolbar icon. The badge already signals Peach needs attention.1052        //1053        // Set a session flag so the popup knows it was opened for inline unlock1054        // and should close itself once the vault is unlocked (returning the user1055        // to the inline autofill selector on the page).1056        if (chrome.storage.session) {1057          await chrome.storage.session.set({ peach_inline_unlock: true });1058        }1059        try { await chrome.action.openPopup(); } catch { /* user opens via toolbar */ }1060        return { ok: true };1061      }1062      case "GET_IDENTITIES": {1063        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1064        return { ok: true, data: vault.getIdentities() };1065      }1066      case "TOUCH_AUTO_LOCK": {1067        // touchAutoLock() is already called by shouldRefreshAutoLock above;1068        // this case just gives the popup a typed message to keep the session alive.1069        return { ok: true };1070      }1071      case "GET_ADVANCED_HEALTH_REPORT": {1072        const gate = await requirePro("advanced_health");1073        if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1074        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1075        const report = await buildAdvancedHealthReport(vault.getEntries());1076        return { ok: true, data: report };1077      }1078      case "IS_DURESS_ENABLED": {1079        const enabled = await vault.isDuressEnabled();1080        return { ok: true, data: enabled };1081      }1082      case "SETUP_DURESS": {1083        // Single enforcement point for the Duress Vault Pro gate. Free users1084        // who somehow reach this handler are rejected here; the popup also1085        // pre-checks isPro() to avoid showing the setup form to free users,1086        // but server-side is the actual security boundary.1087        const gate = await requirePro("duress_vault");1088        if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1089        // MV3 service workers restart after inactivity, losing the in-memory1090        // derived key. Detect this before calling setupDuress so the popup1091        // can show a meaningful prompt to re-lock and re-unlock.1092        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "session_expired" };1093        const { duressPassword } = msg.payload as { duressPassword: string };1094        await vault.setupDuress(duressPassword);1095        return { ok: true };1096      }1097      case "DISABLE_DURESS": {1098        await vault.disableDuress();1099        return { ok: true };1100      }1101      case "VERIFY_MAIN_PASSWORD": {1102        const { password } = msg.payload as { password: string };1103        const ok = await vault.verifyMainPassword(password);1104        return { ok: true, data: ok };1105      }1106      case "CHANGE_PASSWORD": {1107        const { currentPassword, newPassword } = msg.payload as {1108          currentPassword: string;1109          newPassword: string;1110        };1111        const changed = await vault.changePassword(currentPassword, newPassword);1112        return changed1113          ? { ok: true }1114          : { ok: false, error: "incorrect_current_password" };1115      }1116      case "GET_SITE_PASSWORD_POLICY": {1117        const [tab] = await chrome.tabs.query({ active: true, currentWindow: true });1118        if (!tab?.id) return { ok: true, data: null };1119        try {1120          const response = await chrome.tabs.sendMessage(tab.id, {1121            type: "GET_SITE_PASSWORD_POLICY",1122          });1123          return (response as MessageResponse) ?? { ok: true, data: null };1124        } catch {1125          return { ok: true, data: null };1126        }1127      }1128      case "RECORD_MANUAL_SUMMON": {1129        const { domain } = msg.payload as { domain: string };1130        const settings = vault.getSettings();1131        const existing = settings.manualSummonDomains?.[domain];1132        const now = Date.now();1133        await vault.updateSettings({1134          manualSummonDomains: {1135            ...settings.manualSummonDomains,1136            [domain]: {1137              firstSummonedAt: existing?.firstSummonedAt ?? now,1138              summonCount: (existing?.summonCount ?? 0) + 1,1139              lastSummonedAt: now,1140            },1141          },1142        });1143        return { ok: true };1144      }1145      case "DECLINE_CARD_SAVE": {1146        const { last4, expMonth, expYear } = msg.payload as { last4: string; expMonth: string; expYear: string };1147        await vault.declineCardSaveOffer(last4, expMonth, expYear);1148        return { ok: true };1149      }1150      case "IS_CARD_DECLINED": {1151        const { last4, expMonth, expYear } = msg.payload as { last4: string; expMonth: string; expYear: string };1152        const declined = await vault.isCardDeclined(last4, expMonth, expYear);1153        return { ok: true, data: declined };1154      }1155      case "INITIATE_FIREFOX_PASSKEY_CREATE": {1156        const { rpId, rpName, userName, userDisplayName } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1157          rpId?: string;1158          rpName?: string;1159          userName?: string;1160          userDisplayName?: string;1161        };1162        if (!rpId || !userName) return { ok: false, error: "rpid_and_username_required" };1163        return await initiateFirefoxPasskeyCreate({1164          rpId,1165          rpName: rpName ?? rpId,1166          userName,1167          userDisplayName,1168        });1169      }11701171      case "COMPLETE_FIREFOX_PASSKEY_CREATE": {1172        const payload = msg.payload as Parameters<typeof completeFirefoxPasskeyCreate>[0] | undefined;1173        if (!payload) return { ok: false, error: "missing_payload" };1174        return await completeFirefoxPasskeyCreate(payload);1175      }11761177      case "PASSKEY_OFFER_DECLINE": {1178        const { domain } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { domain?: string };1179        if (!domain) return { ok: false, error: "domain_required" };1180        await recordPasskeyOfferDecline(domain);1181        return { ok: true };1182      }11831184      case "GET_PASSKEY_OFFER_DECLINED": {1185        const { domain } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { domain?: string };1186        if (!domain) return { ok: false, error: "domain_required" };1187        return { ok: true, data: await isPasskeyOfferDeclined(domain) };1188      }11891190      case "PASSKEY_HAS_CREDENTIALS": {1191        const payload = msg.payload as {1192          rpId?: string;1193          allowCredentials?: Array<{ id: string; type?: string }>;1194        } | undefined;1195        if (!payload?.rpId) return { ok: false, error: "rpid_required" };1196        return await handlePasskeyHasCredentials({1197          rpId: payload.rpId,1198          allowCredentials: payload.allowCredentials ?? [],1199        }, attestedSenderOrigin(sender));1200      }12011202      case "PASSKEY_CREATE": {1203        const payload = msg.payload as Parameters<typeof handleFirefoxPasskeyCreate>[0] | undefined;1204        if (!payload?.rpId || !payload?.userName) {1205          return { ok: false, error: "rpid_and_username_required" };1206        }1207        return await handleFirefoxPasskeyCreate(payload, attestedSenderOrigin(sender));1208      }12091210      case "PASSKEY_GET": {1211        const payload = msg.payload as Parameters<typeof handleFirefoxPasskeyGet>[0] | undefined;1212        if (!payload?.rpId) return { ok: false, error: "rpid_required" };1213        return await handleFirefoxPasskeyGet(payload, attestedSenderOrigin(sender));1214      }12151216      case "PASSKEY_AUTH_RESPONSE": {1217        const { requestId, approved } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1218          requestId?: string | number;1219          approved?: boolean;1220        };1221        if (requestId === undefined || requestId === null || typeof approved !== 'boolean') {1222          return { ok: false, error: 'requestId and approved required' };1223        }1224        await resolvePendingPasskeyRequest(Number(requestId), approved);1225        return { ok: true };1226      }12271228      case "GET_PASSKEY_FOR_DOMAIN": {1229        const { domain } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { domain?: string };1230        if (!domain) return { ok: false, error: "domain_required" };1231        // Scope to the caller's own origin: a page may only ask about passkeys1232        // for a domain it actually owns, so an arbitrary page cannot enumerate1233        // which sites the user holds passkeys for or read the username (audit MEDIUM).1234        const origin = attestedSenderOrigin(sender);1235        if (!origin || !isValidRpId(domain, origin)) return { ok: true, data: null };1236        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: true, data: null };1237        const match = vault1238          .getEntries()1239          .find((entry) => entry.passkey?.rpId === domain);1240        if (!match || !match.passkey) return { ok: true, data: null };1241        // Slim shape — only the fields State 11 needs. Never expose private1242        // key material, even though this is locked behind isUnlocked.1243        return {1244          ok: true,1245          data: {1246            rpId: match.passkey.rpId,1247            userName: match.passkey.userName,1248            browser: match.passkey.browser,1249          },1250        };1251      }12521253      case "DESTROY_VAULT": {1254        // Irreversible by design. Lock zeroes the derived key + in-memory entries;1255        // storage.local.clear() wipes every Peach key (slots, settings, license,1256        // onboarded flag, history, sync state, declined cards, recall, etc.);1257        // session.clear() wipes pending passkey requests + pro-notice queues.1258        // Caller (Panic.tsx) handles UI navigation back to onboarding.1259        //1260        // The Pro license is the one thing that must survive: the user paid for1261        // it, and destroying a vault (panic wipe, fresh start) is not a refund.1262        // Capture it before the clear and restore it after. peach_pro_celebrated1263        // rides along so the Pro celebration doesn't replay on the next unlock.1264        const preserved = await chrome.storage.local.get([1265          "peach_license",1266          "peach_pro_celebrated",1267        ]);1268        vault.lock();1269        await storageClear();1270        await vault.clearVaultHistory();1271        const toRestore: Record<string, unknown> = {};1272        if (preserved.peach_license !== undefined) toRestore.peach_license = preserved.peach_license;1273        if (preserved.peach_pro_celebrated !== undefined) toRestore.peach_pro_celebrated = preserved.peach_pro_celebrated;1274        if (Object.keys(toRestore).length > 0) {1275          await chrome.storage.local.set(toRestore);1276        }1277        if (chrome.storage.session) {1278          await chrome.storage.session.clear();1279        }1280        return { ok: true };1281      }12821283      // Android-only: biometric unlock with pre-derived key.1284      case "UNLOCK_WITH_KEY": {1285        const { masterKeyHex } = msg.payload as { masterKeyHex: string };1286        if (!isNativePlatform()) {1287          return { ok: false, error: "desktop_only_uses_password" };1288        }1289        try {1290          const result = await vault.unlockWithKey(masterKeyHex);1291          if (result.ok) {1292            onVaultUnlocked();1293            await publishInMemoryVault(result.entries);1294          }1295          return { ok: result.ok, data: result.ok ? { entries: result.entries } : undefined, error: result.ok ? undefined : result.error };1296        } catch {1297          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };1298        }1299      }1300      // Android: returns current in-memory derived key as hex. Used by biometric enable flow.1301      case "GET_DERIVED_KEY": {1302        if (!isNativePlatform()) {1303          return { ok: false, error: "android_only" };1304        }1305        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) {1306          return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1307        }1308        return { ok: true, data: { masterKeyHex: vault.getDerivedKeyHex() } };1309      }1310      case "GET_IDENTITY_SUGGESTIONS": {1311        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1312        const entries = vault.getEntries();1313        const suggestions = buildIdentitySuggestions(entries);1314        return { ok: true, data: { suggestions } };1315      }1316      case "POPULATE_INLINE_VAULT": {1317        if (!isNativePlatform()) return { ok: false };1318        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1319        const entries = vault.getEntries();1320        await publishInMemoryVault(entries);1321        return { ok: true };1322      }1323      case "ML_INIT":1324        return { ok: true };13251326      case "ML_PREDICT_BATCH": {1327        // AUD-002: shape-validate before forwarding to the ML helper.1328        const { featuresArray } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { featuresArray?: unknown };1329        if (!Array.isArray(featuresArray)) {1330          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1331        }1332        return { ok: true, data: mlPredictBatch(featuresArray as MLFieldFeatures[]) };1333      }13341335      // ── Vault sync (v3) ───────────────────────────────────────────────1336      // Returns the public-facing local identity needed by the popup to1337      // drive Phase-1 audio pairing. The private long-term key never1338      // leaves the background.1339      case "GET_LOCAL_IDENTITY": {1340        // Not Pro-gated: a free device may attempt to pair so it can RECEIVE a1341        // Pro license from an already-Pro peer (at least one device must be Pro).1342        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1343        // Identity derives from the stable root key, not the password-derived1344        // key, so pairing survives a master-password change (SEV-2-B).1345        const masterKeyHex = vault.getRootKeyHex();1346        if (!masterKeyHex) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1347        const masterKey = unhexBytes(masterKeyHex);1348        try {1349          const identity = await buildLocalIdentity(masterKey);1350          // If this device is Pro, advertise the signed license so the peer can1351          // activate it after SAS confirmation — pairing carries Pro across.1352          if (await isProUser()) {1353            const license = await getLicenseKey();1354            if (license) (identity as { license?: string }).license = license;1355          }1356          return { ok: true, data: identity };1357        } finally {1358          masterKey.fill(0);1359        }1360      }13611362      case "GET_ADOPTION_MATERIAL": {1363        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1364        const rootKeyHex = vault.getRootKeyHex();1365        if (!rootKeyHex) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1366        const rootKeyBytes = unhexBytes(rootKeyHex);1367        try {1368          const data: { rootKeyHex: string; vaultId: string; license?: string } = {1369            rootKeyHex,1370            vaultId: await computeVaultId(rootKeyBytes),1371          };1372          if (await isProUser()) {1373            const license = await getLicenseKey();1374            if (license) data.license = license;1375          }1376          return { ok: true, data };1377        } finally {1378          rootKeyBytes.fill(0);1379        }1380      }13811382      case "COMPLETE_PAIRING": {1383        // Not Pro-gated — see GET_LOCAL_IDENTITY.1384        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1385        const paired = (msg.payload as { paired?: unknown })?.paired;1386        if (typeof paired !== "object" || paired === null) {1387          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1388        }1389        const candidate = paired as Record<string, unknown>;1390        if (1391          typeof candidate.deviceId !== "string" || !candidate.deviceId ||1392          typeof candidate.deviceName !== "string" || !candidate.deviceName ||1393          typeof candidate.deviceType !== "string" ||1394          typeof candidate.longTermPublicKeyHex !== "string" ||1395          !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(candidate.longTermPublicKeyHex) ||1396          (1397            candidate.signingPublicKeyHex !== undefined &&1398            (1399              typeof candidate.signingPublicKeyHex !== "string" ||1400              !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(candidate.signingPublicKeyHex)1401            )1402          ) ||1403          typeof candidate.pairedAt !== "number"1404        ) {1405          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_paired_device" };1406        }1407        // A fresh SAS-confirmed direct pairing is the one operation allowed to1408        // lift an old terminal revocation. Without this, re-pairing recreated1409        // an impossible state where the same device was both paired and1410        // revoked, and a later Remove became a permanent no-op.1411        await clearDeviceRevocation(candidate.deviceId);1412        await upsertPairedDeviceV3(candidate as unknown as import("../shared/sync-types").PairedDevice);1413        // Newly paired device → kick a sync so it gets its first round1414        // without waiting for the next 10-minute alarm tick. Fire-and-forget;1415        // the in-flight guard handles overlap with any other trigger.1416        void triggerSyncIfReachable({ reason: "device_list_changed" }).catch(() => undefined);1417        return { ok: true };1418      }14191420      case "LIST_PAIRED_DEVICES": {1421        const devices = await listPairedDevicesV3();1422        return { ok: true, data: { devices } };1423      }14241425      case "UNPAIR_DEVICE": {1426        const { deviceId } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { deviceId?: string };1427        if (typeof deviceId !== "string" || !deviceId) {1428          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1429        }1430        // Removing a device REVOKES it rather than just dropping the local1431        // row: a plain removal is undone the moment any other peer vouches it1432        // back through a manifest, which is exactly what the relay makes easy.1433        await revokeDeviceByIdV3(deviceId, await getOrCreateDeviceId());1434        // Sync against the remaining hosts — the unpaired device no longer1435        // matters but the next alarm tick is up to ten minutes away.1436        void triggerSyncIfReachable({ reason: "device_list_changed" }).catch(() => undefined);1437        return { ok: true };1438      }14391440      case "RENAME_LOCAL_DEVICE": {1441        const { name } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { name?: string };1442        if (typeof name !== "string") return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1443        await setDeviceNameV3(name);1444        return { ok: true };1445      }14461447      // ── Relay pairing ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────1448      // Not Pro-gated (a free device may pair to receive Pro/sync). The whole NK1449      // session runs in the background; the SAS and the terminal result reach1450      // the popup as ADOPTION_SOURCE_SAS / ADOPTION_SOURCE_RESULT pushes.1451      case "START_ADOPTION_SOURCE": {1452        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1453        if (isRelayAdoptionSourceInFlight()) {1454          return { ok: false, error: "adoption_source_in_progress" };1455        }1456        try {1457          return { ok: true, data: await startRelayAdoptionSource() };1458        } catch (error) {1459          return {1460            ok: false,1461            error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : "adoption_source_failed",1462          };1463        }1464      }14651466      // Onboarding receiver — empty extension shows a QR, phone scans and1467      // sends the vault. The popup supplies the local-only password here so1468      // the background can wrap the adopted root key at rest without ever1469      // asking the user to retype it.1470      case "START_ADOPTION_RECEIVER": {1471        if (isRelayAdoptionSourceInFlight()) {1472          return { ok: false, error: "adoption_receiver_in_progress" };1473        }1474        const password = (msg.payload as { password?: unknown } | undefined)?.password;1475        if (typeof password !== "string" || password.length === 0) {1476          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1477        }1478        try {1479          return { ok: true, data: await startRelayAdoptionReceiver(password) };1480        } catch (error) {1481          return {1482            ok: false,1483            error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : "adoption_receiver_failed",1484          };1485        }1486      }14871488      // Popup→bg counterpart to ADOPTION_SOURCE_SAS: the user tapped1489      // Confirm/Cancel on the receiver's SAS screen. The id round-trips1490      // through the SAS push so a late response can't approve the wrong1491      // session. Unknown ids (the session already ended) are a no-op.1492      case "RECEIVER_SAS_DECISION": {1493        const payload = msg.payload as { id?: unknown; ok?: unknown } | undefined;1494        if (typeof payload?.id !== "string" || typeof payload?.ok !== "boolean") {1495          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1496        }1497        return { ok: resolveReceiverSasConfirmation(payload.id, payload.ok) };1498      }14991500      // Source-side mirror of RECEIVER_SAS_DECISION: the popup's confirm/cancel1501      // on the source's SAS screen. The id round-trips the same way so a stale1502      // late response can't approve the wrong session.1503      case "SOURCE_SAS_DECISION": {1504        const payload = msg.payload as { id?: unknown; ok?: unknown } | undefined;1505        if (typeof payload?.id !== "string" || typeof payload?.ok !== "boolean") {1506          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1507        }1508        return { ok: resolveSourceSasConfirmation(payload.id, payload.ok) };1509      }15101511      case "CANCEL_ADOPTION_SOURCE": {1512        cancelRelayAdoptionSource();1513        return { ok: true };1514      }15151516      case "TRIGGER_SYNC": {1517        const payload = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1518          reason?: "vault_change" | "foreground" | "manual";1519          force?: boolean;1520        };1521        const reason = payload.reason ?? "foreground";15221523        void triggerSyncIfReachable({ reason, force: payload.force === true });1524        return { ok: true };1525      }15261527      case "GET_SYNC_STATE": {1528        return { ok: true, data: getSyncState() };1529      }15301531      case "GET_SYNC_SETTINGS": {1532        return { ok: true, data: await getSyncSettings() };1533      }15341535      case "SET_SYNC_SETTINGS": {1536        const payload = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1537          mode?: unknown;1538          relayUrl?: unknown;1539        };1540        try {1541          // A custom relay URL implies private mode; Peach's own relay stays1542          // public. See setRelayUrl.1543          if (payload.relayUrl !== undefined) {1544            if (typeof payload.relayUrl !== "string") {1545              return { ok: false, error: "invalid_relay_url" };1546            }1547            return { ok: true, data: await setRelayUrl(payload.relayUrl) };1548          }1549          if (payload.mode !== undefined) {1550            if (payload.mode !== "public" && payload.mode !== "private" && payload.mode !== "off") {1551              return { ok: false, error: "invalid_sync_mode" };1552            }1553            return { ok: true, data: await setSyncMode(payload.mode as SyncMode) };1554          }1555          return { ok: true, data: await getSyncSettings() };1556        } catch (error) {1557          return {1558            ok: false,1559            error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : "invalid_relay_url",1560          };1561        }1562      }15631564      case "GET_SYNC_ALERTS": {1565        const { consume } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { consume?: boolean };1566        const alerts = await getPendingSyncAlerts();1567        // The popup reads on open and acknowledges with consume:true after1568        // rendering, so a popup crash between read and render doesn't lose1569        // the alerts.1570        if (consume) await clearPendingSyncAlerts();1571        return { ok: true, data: alerts };1572      }15731574      case "GET_PENDING_VOUCHED_DEVICES": {1575        return { ok: true, data: await listPendingVouchedDevices() };1576      }1577      case "CONFIRM_VOUCHED_DEVICE": {1578        const { deviceId } = msg.payload as { deviceId: string };1579        const pending = await getPendingVouchedDevice(deviceId);1580        if (!pending) return { ok: false, error: "not_pending" };1581        // Last gate before a vouched device becomes a sync peer. A queue entry1582        // can predate the revocation that names it, so revocation is re-checked1583        // here rather than trusted to have swept the queue.1584        if (await isDeviceRevoked(pending.deviceId, pending.longTermPublicKeyHex)) {1585          await removePendingVouchedDevice(deviceId);1586          return { ok: false, error: "device_revoked" };1587        }1588        await upsertPairedDeviceV3({1589          deviceId: pending.deviceId,1590          deviceName: pending.deviceName,1591          deviceType:1592            pending.deviceType as import("../shared/sync-types").PairedDevice["deviceType"],1593          longTermPublicKeyHex: pending.longTermPublicKeyHex,1594          signingPublicKeyHex: pending.signingPublicKeyHex,1595          wsPort: pending.wsPort,1596          pairedAt: pending.pairedAt,1597          trustSource: "vouched",1598        });1599        await removePendingVouchedDevice(deviceId);1600        // Newly confirmed vouched device is now a sync target — kick a round1601        // so the mesh introduction pays off without a 10-minute wait.1602        void triggerSyncIfReachable({ reason: "device_list_changed" }).catch(() => undefined);1603        return { ok: true };1604      }1605      case "REJECT_VOUCHED_DEVICE": {1606        const { deviceId } = msg.payload as { deviceId: string };1607        await removePendingVouchedDevice(deviceId);1608        return { ok: true };1609      }1610      case "ROTATE_SYNC_IDENTITY": {1611        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1612        const result = await vault.rotateSyncIdentity();1613        return result.ok ? { ok: true } : { ok: false, error: result.error };1614      }16151616      default:1617        return { ok: false, error: "unknown_message_type" };1618    }1619  } catch (err) {1620    return {1621      ok: false,1622      error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : "operation_failed",1623    };1624  }1625}16261627// --- Mobile platform helpers ---16281629// Android: populates the in-memory vault used by PeachAutofillService.1630async function publishInMemoryVault(entries: VaultEntry[]): Promise<void> {1631  const plugin = nativePlugin<{1632    setEntries?: (args: {1633      entries: Array<{1634        id: string;1635        title: string;1636        username: string;1637        email: string;1638        password: string;1639        url: string;1640        totp: string;1641        additionalUrls: string[];1642      }>;1643    }) => Promise<void>;1644  }>("InMemoryVaultPlugin");1645  if (!plugin?.setEntries) return;1646  await plugin.setEntries({1647    entries: entries.map((e) => ({1648      id: e.id,1649      title: e.title ?? "",1650      username: e.username ?? "",1651      email: (e as VaultEntry & { email?: string }).email ?? "",1652      password: e.password ?? "",1653      url: e.url ?? "",1654      totp: (e as VaultEntry & { totp?: string }).totp ?? "",1655      additionalUrls: (e as VaultEntry & { additionalUrls?: string[] }).additionalUrls ?? [],1656    })),1657  });1658}16591660// Android: clear the autofill in-memory store on lock.1661async function clearInMemoryVault(): Promise<void> {1662  const plugin = nativePlugin<{ clearEntries?: () => Promise<void> }>("InMemoryVaultPlugin");1663  if (!plugin?.clearEntries) return;1664  await plugin.clearEntries();1665}16661667// Returns username use-counts from the vault, sorted by frequency. Each row1668// also carries the entry's email so the popup can suggest the email/username1669// pair the user has actually used together.1670function buildIdentitySuggestions(1671  entries: VaultEntry[],1672): Array<{ email: string; username: string; count: number }> {1673  const usernameCounts = new Map<string, number>();1674  const usernameEmail = new Map<string, string>();1675  for (const entry of entries) {1676    const username = entry.username ?? "";1677    const email = (entry as VaultEntry & { email?: string }).email ?? "";1678    if (!username && !email) continue;1679    const key = username || email;1680    usernameCounts.set(key, (usernameCounts.get(key) ?? 0) + 1);1681    if (!usernameEmail.has(key)) usernameEmail.set(key, email);1682  }1683  return Array.from(usernameCounts.entries())1684    .sort((a, b) => b[1] - a[1])1685    .map(([username, count]) => ({1686      email: usernameEmail.get(username) ?? "",1687      username,1688      count,1689    }));1690}16911692/** Notify all content scripts that the vault just became available. */1693function broadcastToContentScripts(message: { type: string }): void {1694  if (!chrome.tabs?.query) return;1695  chrome.tabs.query({}, (tabs) => {1696    for (const tab of tabs) {1697      if (tab.id !== undefined) {1698        chrome.tabs.sendMessage(tab.id, message).catch(() => {1699          // Tab may not have a content script — silently ignore1700        });1701      }1702    }1703  });1704}17051706function shouldRefreshAutoLock(type: MessageType): boolean {1707  return (1708    type !== "HAS_VAULT" &&1709    type !== "IS_UNLOCKED" &&1710    type !== "GET_VAULT_STATUS" &&1711    type !== "LOCK" &&1712    type !== "UPDATE_SETTINGS" &&1713    type !== "GET_PENDING_PASSKEY" &&1714    type !== "GET_PASSKEY_PROVIDER_STATE" &&1715    type !== "DECLINE_CARD_SAVE" &&1716    type !== "IS_CARD_DECLINED"1717  );1718}17191720function isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl(value: string): boolean {1721  try {1722    const url = new URL(value);1723    if (url.protocol !== "https:") return false;17241725    const hostname = url.hostname.toLowerCase();1726    if (1727      hostname === "localhost" ||1728      hostname.endsWith(".localhost") ||1729      isPrivateIpv4(hostname) ||1730      isPrivateIpv6(hostname)1731    ) {1732      return false;1733    }17341735    return true;1736  } catch {1737    return false;1738  }1739}17401741function isPrivateIpv4(hostname: string): boolean {1742  if (PRIVATE_IPV4_RANGES.some((range) => hostname.startsWith(range.prefix))) {1743    return true;1744  }17451746  const octets = hostname.split(".").map((part) => Number(part));1747  if (octets.length !== 4 || octets.some((octet) => !Number.isInteger(octet) || octet < 0 || octet > 255)) {1748    return false;1749  }17501751  return octets[0] === 172 && octets[1] >= 16 && octets[1] <= 31;1752}17531754function isPrivateIpv6(hostname: string): boolean {1755  const normalized = hostname.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "").toLowerCase();1756  return (1757    normalized === "::1" ||1758    normalized.startsWith("fc") ||1759    normalized.startsWith("fd") ||1760    normalized.startsWith("fe80:")1761  );1762}