messages.ts

1/**2 * messages.ts — the only background message handler.3 *4 * All `chrome.runtime.onMessage` handling for the service worker lives here.5 * Do not handle messages inline in entry.ts, alarms.ts, or any other6 * background file. Every background-bound MessageType in shared/types.ts7 * must have a case below. Content-script-bound message types (PING,8 * SUMMON_AUTOFILL, VAULT_LOCKED) are documented in shared/types.ts and9 * intentionally have no case here — they are sent *to* content scripts.10 */1112import { copyToClipboard, getEffectiveClearSeconds } from "./clipboard";13import { getPendingSyncAlerts, clearPendingSyncAlerts } from "./sync-alerts";14import { extractDomain } from "../shared/domain";15import { computeVaultId } from "../shared/sync-identity";16import {17  getPendingVouchedDevice,18  listPendingVouchedDevices,19  removePendingVouchedDevice,20} from "./pending-vouched-devices";21import { isRecoveryConfirmPending } from "./recovery-pending";22import { setupAutoLock, touchAutoLock } from "./alarms";23import { runSelfTest } from "./self-test";24import * as vault from "./vault";25import {26  handleEstimateCodexPages,27  handleGetCodexVaultData,28  handleRestoreFromCodex,29} from "./codex-handlers";30import type { CodexRestorePayload } from "../shared/codex-types";31import {32  activateLicense,33  deactivateLicense,34  getLicenseInfo,35  getLicenseKey,36  isProUser,37  markCelebrationPlayed,38  shouldPlayCelebration,39} from "./license";40import {41  completeFirefoxPasskeyCreate,42  getPasskeyProviderState,43  getPendingPasskeyRequest,44  handleFirefoxPasskeyCreate,45  handleFirefoxPasskeyGet,46  handlePasskeyHasCredentials,47  initiateFirefoxPasskeyCreate,48  isPasskeyOfferDeclined,49  onVaultUnlocked,50  recordPasskeyOfferDecline,51  resolvePendingPasskeyRequest,52  setPasskeyProviderEnabled,53} from "./passkey";54import { buildAdvancedHealthReport } from "./health";55import { storageClear } from "../shared/storage";56import { findInvalidWords } from "../shared/recovery-words";57import type {58  Message,59  MessageResponse,60  MessageType,61  ProFeature,62  VaultEntry,63} from "../shared/types";64import { isPasskeyOnly } from "../shared/types";65import { generateTOTP } from "../crypto/totp";66import { isValidRpId } from "../shared/passkey-utils";67import { isNativePlatform, nativePlugin } from "../shared/native";68import { predictBatch as mlPredictBatch } from "./ml";69import type { MLFieldFeatures } from "../shared/ml";70import {71  buildLocalIdentity,72  getOrCreateDeviceId,73  setDeviceName as setDeviceNameV3,74} from "./device-identity";75import {76  clearDeviceRevocation,77  isDeviceRevoked,78  listPairedDevices as listPairedDevicesV3,79  revokeDeviceById as revokeDeviceByIdV3,80  upsertPairedDevice as upsertPairedDeviceV3,81} from "./paired-devices";82// Sync and pairing are imported statically, never with `await import()`.83// `import()` throws `TypeError: import() is disallowed on84// ServiceWorkerGlobalScope` at runtime in MV3, and Vite's preload helper85// reports the failure through `window.dispatchEvent`, which does not exist in86// a worker either — so the real reason was replaced by "window is not defined"87// and the pairing UI just stopped. scripts/check-sw-static-imports.mjs fails88// the build if a runtime import() reappears anywhere in the worker's graph.89import {90  cancelRelayAdoptionSource,91  isRelayAdoptionSourceInFlight,92  resolveSourceSasConfirmation,93  startRelayAdoptionReceiver,94  startRelayAdoptionSource,95} from "./relay-adoption-bg";96import {97  getSyncSettings,98  setRelayUrl,99  setSyncMode,100  type SyncMode,101} from "./sync-settings";102import {103  getSyncState,104  hydratePersistedSyncState,105  setSyncRunner,106  triggerSyncIfReachable,107} from "./sync-trigger";108import { productionSyncRunner } from "./sync-runner";109110// Compile-time E2E flag, folded to a literal by Vite's `define` (false in111// every production build — verified in the bundled output). Mirrors the112// create-path bypass in passkey.ts so the Playwright passkey smoke can enable113// the provider without a real Pro licence; the gate is fully intact for users.114declare const __PEACH_E2E_PASSKEYS__: boolean;115const PASSKEY_E2E_PRO_BYPASS = __PEACH_E2E_PASSKEYS__ === true;116117let nativeSyncRunnerBootstrapped = false;118119function unhexBytes(hex: string): Uint8Array {120  if (hex.length % 2 !== 0) throw new Error("invalid hex");121  const out = new Uint8Array(hex.length / 2);122  for (let i = 0; i < out.length; i++) {123    out[i] = parseInt(hex.slice(i * 2, i * 2 + 2), 16);124  }125  return out;126}127128/**129 * The single Pro gate. Every gated handler calls this first; the broadcast130 * lets the popup react (navigate to the License section, highlight the131 * relevant feature). Background never touches the popup view directly —132 * the popup owns navigation. See Projects.md "Pro gate rule".133 */134async function requirePro(135  feature: ProFeature,136  trigger: "user" | "background" = "user"137): Promise<{ allowed: boolean }> {138  if (PASSKEY_E2E_PRO_BYPASS && feature === "passkeys") return { allowed: true };139  if (await isProUser()) return { allowed: true };140141  if (trigger === "user") {142    // User deliberately triggered this feature — redirect the popup immediately.143    chrome.runtime144      .sendMessage({ type: "PRO_GATE_TRIGGERED", payload: { feature } })145      .catch(() => {146        // Popup may be closed — the gate signal is best-effort.147      });148  } else {149    // Background trigger (e.g. passive sync initiation) — no popup is open.150    // Queue a notice so the next popup open shows a soft banner instead of151    // silently failing.152    if (chrome.storage.session) {153      chrome.storage.session154        .set({ pendingProNotice: { feature, triggeredAt: Date.now() } })155        .catch(() => {});156    }157  }158159  return { allowed: false };160}161162// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------163// PCH-01-018: operations that irreversibly destroy or replace vault contents.164// These are gated to trusted extension-page senders in handleMessage; the165// confirmation UX otherwise lives only in the popup. Keep this in sync when166// adding new destructive handlers.167const DESTRUCTIVE_MESSAGE_TYPES: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([168  "DESTROY_VAULT",169  "CLEAR_VAULT_ENTRIES",170  "RESTORE_VAULT_SNAPSHOT",171  "RESTORE_FROM_CODEX",172]);173174// LV-3: minimum interval between non-test canary pings per webhook+entry.175const CANARY_MIN_INTERVAL_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000; // 1 hour176177const PRIVATE_IPV4_RANGES = [178  { prefix: "10." },179  { prefix: "127." },180  { prefix: "169.254." },181  { prefix: "192.168." },182];183184export function setupMessageHandler(): void {185  chrome.runtime.onMessage.addListener(186    (msg: unknown, sender, sendResponse) => {187      if (!isMessage(msg)) {188        sendResponse({ ok: false, error: "invalid_message" });189        return true;190      }191      handleMessage(msg, sender)192        .then(sendResponse)193        .catch((err) =>194          sendResponse({195            ok: false,196            error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),197          })198        );199      return true;200    }201  );202203  // Android: the chrome shim queues sendMessage calls until this handler is204  // registered. Without this hookup, every message hangs on Capacitor builds.205  // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any206  const reg = (globalThis as any).__peachRegisterMessageHandler;207  if (typeof reg === "function") {208    reg(async (m: unknown) => {209      if (!isMessage(m)) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_message" };210      try {211        return await handleMessage(m);212      } catch (err) {213        return {214          ok: false,215          error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),216        };217      }218    });219  }220  if (isNativePlatform()) {221    void bootstrapNativeSyncRunner();222  }223}224225async function bootstrapNativeSyncRunner(): Promise<void> {226  if (nativeSyncRunnerBootstrapped) return;227  nativeSyncRunnerBootstrapped = true;228  try {229    setSyncRunner(productionSyncRunner);230    await hydratePersistedSyncState();231  } catch (err) {232    nativeSyncRunnerBootstrapped = false;233    console.warn("[Peach] failed to bootstrap native sync runner:", err);234  }235}236237function isMessage(m: unknown): m is Message {238  return typeof m === "object" && m !== null && "type" in m;239}240241/**242 * The browser-attested origin of the page that originated this message. A web243 * page cannot call chrome.runtime.sendMessage directly (no externally_connectable),244 * so every page-driven message arrives via the content-script relay and the245 * browser stamps `sender.origin`/`sender.url` with the real frame origin — a246 * value the page cannot forge. This is the ONLY trustworthy origin for passkey247 * rpId<->origin enforcement; payload-supplied origins are attacker-controlled.248 */249function attestedSenderOrigin(sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender>): string | undefined {250  if (sender.origin) return sender.origin;251  if (sender.url) {252    try { return new URL(sender.url).origin; } catch { return undefined; }253  }254  return undefined;255}256257// Resolves once restoreFromSession() has run, so handlers see the correct258// post-restore unlock state. entry.ts registers this BEFORE the message259// handler so the onMessage listener is added synchronously at SW startup260// (MV3 requirement) while unlock-dependent handlers still wait for restore.261let restoreReady: Promise<void> = Promise.resolve();262263/** Called by entry.ts at startup with the in-flight restoreFromSession promise. */264export function setRestoreReady(p: Promise<unknown>): void {265  restoreReady = p.then(() => undefined, () => undefined);266}267268export async function handleMessage(269  msg: Message,270  sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender> = {}271): Promise<MessageResponse> {272  try {273    // Wait for session-restore to finish before reading any unlock/vault state.274    // On a cold SW start the popup's first message arrives while restore is275    // still in flight; without this gate IS_UNLOCKED would report locked (a276    // spurious lock screen) and the storage reads could race. The onMessage277    // listener itself is registered synchronously (entry.ts) so this gate, not278    // listener registration, is what absorbs the cold-start window.279    await restoreReady;280    // Validate sender — only allow messages from our extension pages/scripts.281    // `sender.id` is undefined for messages originating from extension UI282    // (popup/options), which is legitimate; reject only when it is defined283    // and does not match our extension id.284    if (285      sender.id !== undefined &&286      sender.id !== chrome.runtime.id287    ) {288      return { ok: false, error: "invalid_sender" };289    }290291    // PCH-01-018: irreversible operations must originate from a trusted extension292    // page (popup/options), never from a content script. The sender.id check above293    // only proves the message came from *our* extension — a content script injected294    // into an attacker page passes it. A single XSS-class bug in the injected UI295    // would otherwise escalate to vault destruction. Extension pages carry an296    // extension-origin sender.url; content scripts carry a page URL.297    if (DESTRUCTIVE_MESSAGE_TYPES.has(msg.type)) {298      const extensionOrigin = chrome.runtime.getURL("");299      if (!sender.url?.startsWith(extensionOrigin)) {300        return { ok: false, error: "invalid_sender" };301      }302    }303304    if (shouldRefreshAutoLock(msg.type) && vault.isUnlocked()) {305      touchAutoLock();306    }307308    switch (msg.type) {309      case "CREATE_VAULT": {310        const { password } = msg.payload as { password: string };311        // Refuse to create a vault under an empty master password — the derived312        // key would be publicly known and the at-rest AES-GCM protection void313        // (audit HIGH; the CSV-import path previously passed ""). Length/strength314        // policy lives in the onboarding UI; this is the non-negotiable floor.315        if (typeof password !== "string" || password.length === 0) {316          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };317        }318        await vault.createVault(password);319        await setupAutoLock();320        broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });321        onVaultUnlocked();322        return { ok: true };323      }324      case "CREATE_VAULT_FROM_ROOT_KEY": {325        console.log("[Peach diag] CREATE_VAULT_FROM_ROOT_KEY handler entered");326        const { password, rootKeyHex } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {327          password?: unknown;328          rootKeyHex?: unknown;329        };330        console.log("[Peach diag] payload types:", typeof password, typeof rootKeyHex, "lengths:", (password as string)?.length, (rootKeyHex as string)?.length);331        if (typeof password !== "string" || password.length === 0 || typeof rootKeyHex !== "string") {332          console.log("[Peach diag] payload invalid, returning invalid_payload");333          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };334        }335336        try {337          console.log("[Peach diag] calling vault.createVaultFromRootKey");338          const { vaultId } = await vault.createVaultFromRootKey(password, rootKeyHex);339          console.log("[Peach diag] createVaultFromRootKey returned vaultId", vaultId);340          await setupAutoLock();341          console.log("[Peach diag] setupAutoLock done");342          broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });343          onVaultUnlocked();344          console.log("[Peach diag] handler completing successfully");345          return { ok: true, vaultId };346        } catch (err) {347          console.error("[Peach diag] handler caught error:", err);348          return { ok: false, error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err) };349        }350      }351      case "UNLOCK": {352        const { password } = msg.payload as { password: string };353        const ok = await vault.unlock(password);354        if (ok) {355          // KAT: verify the WebCrypto stack is healthy before the user relies on it.356          // Runs after unlock so latency is hidden behind the vault-load time.357          const kat = await runSelfTest();358          if (!kat.ok) {359            console.error("[Peach] Crypto self-test FAILED:", kat.error);360            await vault.lock();361            return { ok: false, error: "self_test_failed" };362          }363          await setupAutoLock();364          broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });365          onVaultUnlocked();366          if (isNativePlatform()) await publishInMemoryVault(vault.getEntries());367          return { ok: true };368        }369        // Distinguish corruption from wrong password so the popup can offer370        // a history-restore path instead of falsely accusing the user of371        // mistyping (M7/COR-007).372        const failure = vault.consumeLastUnlockFailureReason();373        if (failure) {374          return {375            ok: false,376            error: "vault_corrupted",377            canRestoreFromHistory: true,378          } as MessageResponse;379        }380        return { ok: false };381      }382      case "VALIDATE_RECOVERY_WORDS": {383        const { words } = msg.payload as { words: string[] };384        const invalid = findInvalidWords(words);385        return { ok: true, data: { valid: invalid.length === 0, invalid } };386      }387      case "GET_RECOVERY_WORDS": {388        // Must be unlocked and have recovery set up (vault must be v2.12+).389        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };390        // LV-4: the recovery words re-derive the ROOT KEY — the highest-391        // value secret in the vault. A session unlock (which may be hours392        // old on a shared machine) is not enough; require a fresh password393        // proof, matching the 1Password/Bitwarden pattern for revealing394        // escrow material. EXEMPTION: the create-vault / rotation confirmation395        // window (peach_recovery_pending) shows the words immediately after396        // the user authenticated, and that confirmation UI has no password to397        // resend — skip the re-auth there only.398        if (!(await isRecoveryConfirmPending())) {399          const { password } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { password?: string };400          if (typeof password !== "string" || !password) {401            return { ok: false, error: "password_required" };402          }403          if (!(await vault.verifyMainPassword(password))) {404            return { ok: false, error: "wrong_password" };405          }406        }407        try {408          const words = await vault.getRecoveryWords();409          return { ok: true, data: words };410        } catch (e) {411          // pre-v2.12 vault that hasn't migrated412          return { ok: false, error: "recovery_not_setup" };413        }414      }415      case "RECOVER_WITH_WORDS": {416        // User has lost their password but has their 12 recovery words.417        // We: (1) validate the words, (2) re-encrypt vault with new password.418        const { words, newPassword } = msg.payload as {419          words: string[];420          newPassword: string;421        };422        const stored = await vault.loadSlotA();423        if (!stored) return { ok: false, error: "no_vault" };424        if (!stored.recovery_salt || !stored.recovery_wrapped_root_key) {425          return { ok: false, error: "recovery_not_setup" };426        }427        // Unwrap the root key from the recovery escrow.428        try {429          await vault.unwrapRootKeyForRecovery(430            stored.recovery_wrapped_root_key,431            stored.recovery_nonce ?? "",432            stored.recovery_tag ?? "",433            stored.recovery_salt,434            words435          );436        } catch {437          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_recovery_words" };438        }439        // Re-key: derive fresh salt + key from new password.440        const newSalt = vault.generateSalt();441        const newKey = await vault.deriveKey(newPassword, newSalt);442        // Re-wrap root key under the new password's derived key so the same443        // recovery words continue to work after the password change.444        await vault.rewrapRootKeyForPassword(newKey, newSalt);445        // Re-encrypt vault entries with the new key.446        await vault.changePasswordWithNewKey(newSalt, newKey);447        await setupAutoLock();448        broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });449        return { ok: true };450      }451      case "LOCK":452        vault.lock();453        if (isNativePlatform()) await clearInMemoryVault();454        return { ok: true };455      case "IS_UNLOCKED":456        return { ok: true, data: vault.isUnlocked() };457      case "GET_VAULT_STATUS":458        return { ok: true, unlocked: vault.isUnlocked() };459      case "HAS_VAULT":460        return { ok: true, data: await vault.hasVault() };461      case "GET_ENTRIES":462        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };463        return { ok: true, data: vault.getEntries() };464      case "ADD_ENTRY": {465        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };466        const payload = msg.payload;467        if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) {468          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };469        }470        const entry = await vault.addEntry(payload as Parameters<typeof vault.addEntry>[0]);471        return { ok: true, data: entry };472      }473      case "BATCH_ADD_ENTRIES": {474        const payload = msg.payload as { entries?: unknown } | null | undefined;475        if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) {476          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };477        }478        if (!Array.isArray(payload.entries)) {479          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };480        }481        const added = await vault.batchAddEntries(payload.entries as Parameters<typeof vault.batchAddEntries>[0]);482        return { ok: true, data: added };483      }484      case "RESTORE_ENTRIES": {485        const payload = msg.payload as486          | { entries?: unknown; mode?: unknown; settings?: unknown }487          | null488          | undefined;489        if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) {490          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };491        }492        if (!Array.isArray(payload.entries)) {493          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };494        }495        if (payload.mode !== "replace" && payload.mode !== "merge") {496          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };497        }498        const summary = await vault.restoreEntries(499          payload.entries as Parameters<typeof vault.restoreEntries>[0],500          payload.mode501        );502        if (payload.settings && typeof payload.settings === "object" && !Array.isArray(payload.settings)) {503          await vault.updateSettings(payload.settings as vault.VaultSettings);504        }505        return { ok: true, data: summary };506      }507      case "CLEAR_VAULT_ENTRIES": {508        await vault.clearVaultEntries("REPLACE_ALL");509        return { ok: true };510      }511      case "GET_VAULT_HISTORY": {512        const snapshots = await vault.getVaultHistory();513        return { ok: true, data: snapshots };514      }515      case "RESTORE_VAULT_SNAPSHOT": {516        const { snapshotId } = msg.payload as { snapshotId: string };517        const result = await vault.restoreVaultSnapshot(snapshotId);518        if (!result.ok) return { ok: false, error: result.error };519        broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_LOCKED" });520        return { ok: true };521      }522      case "COUNT_DUPLICATES": {523        return { ok: true, data: vault.countDuplicates() };524      }525      case "DEDUPLICATE_ENTRIES": {526        const removed = await vault.deduplicateEntries();527        return { ok: true, data: removed };528      }529      case "UPDATE_ENTRY": {530        const payload = msg.payload as { id?: unknown; patch?: unknown } | null | undefined;531        if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) {532          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };533        }534        const { id, patch } = payload;535        if (typeof id !== "string" || !id || !patch || typeof patch !== "object" || Array.isArray(patch)) {536          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };537        }538        // Single enforcement point for the Canary Entries Pro gate. Only539        // gates the transition into a canary entry — clearing/disabling a540        // canary (`canary: undefined`) is always allowed, so existing541        // canary entries remain manageable.542        const incomingCanary = (patch as { canary?: unknown }).canary;543        if (incomingCanary && typeof incomingCanary === "object") {544          const existing = vault.getEntryById(id);545          if (!existing?.canary) {546            const gate = await requirePro("canary_entry");547            if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };548          }549        }550        await vault.updateEntry(id, patch as Parameters<typeof vault.updateEntry>[1]);551        return { ok: true };552      }553      case "ADD_ADDITIONAL_URL": {554        const { id, url } = msg.payload as { id: string; url: string };555        const trimmed = typeof url === "string" ? url.trim() : "";556        if (!trimmed) return { ok: false, error: "url_required" };557        const existing = vault.getEntryById(id);558        if (!existing) return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };559        if (existing.type !== "login") return { ok: false, error: "login_entries_only" };560        const merged = [...(existing.additionalUrls ?? []), trimmed];561        await vault.updateEntry(id, { additionalUrls: merged });562        return { ok: true };563      }564      case "DELETE_ENTRY": {565        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };566        await vault.deleteEntry(id);567        return { ok: true };568      }569      case "GET_DELETED_ENTRIES":570        return { ok: true, data: vault.getDeletedEntries() };571      case "RESTORE_ENTRY": {572        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };573        await vault.restoreEntry(id);574        return { ok: true };575      }576      case "PURGE_ENTRY": {577        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };578        await vault.purgeEntry(id);579        return { ok: true };580      }581      case "PURGE_EXPIRED_TRASH": {582        const { retentionMs } = msg.payload as { retentionMs: number };583        const purged = await vault.purgeExpiredTrash(retentionMs);584        return { ok: true, data: purged };585      }586      case "SAVE_NOTE": {587        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };588        const { id, title, body } = msg.payload as { id?: string; title: string; body: string };589        const now = Date.now();590        if (id) {591          const existing = vault.getEntryById(id);592          if (!existing) return { ok: false, error: "not_found" };593          await vault.updateEntry(id, { title: title || "Untitled", notes: body, modifiedAt: now });594          return { ok: true, data: vault.getEntryById(id) };595        } else {596          // PCH-01-026 #10: addEntry stamps its own createdAt/modifiedAt597          // (EntryDraft omits both), so passing them was the only reason the598          // `as any` cast existed. Dropping them makes the call type-check.599          const entry = await vault.addEntry({600            type: "note",601            title: title || "Untitled",602            notes: body,603          });604          return { ok: true, data: entry };605        }606      }607      case "DELETE_NOTE": {608        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };609        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };610        await vault.deleteEntry(id);611        return { ok: true };612      }613      case "GET_NOTES": {614        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };615        const notes = vault.getEntries().filter(616          (e) => e.type === "note" && !e.deletedAt617        );618        return { ok: true, data: notes } as MessageResponse;619      }620      case "SEARCH_VAULT": {621        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };622        // AUD-002: shape-validate the payload before calling string methods.623        // A raw cast lets a malformed message crash the handler with TypeError.624        const { query } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { query?: unknown };625        if (typeof query !== "string") {626          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };627        }628        const q = query.toLowerCase();629        const searchResults = vault.getEntries().filter(630          (e) =>631            !e.deletedAt &&632            (e.title.toLowerCase().includes(q) ||633              e.notes?.toLowerCase().includes(q) ||634              e.username?.toLowerCase().includes(q))635        );636        return { ok: true, data: searchResults } as MessageResponse;637      }638      case "AUTOFILL_QUERY": {639        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) {640          return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };641        }642        let { includeAll } = msg.payload as { includeAll?: boolean };643        const { domain, kind, userGesture } = msg.payload as {644          domain: string;645          kind?: "login" | "card" | "totp";646          userGesture?: boolean;647        };648        // MV-2: the vault-wide inventory (every title/username/email/url)649        // may only leave the background on an explicit user gesture — the650        // user opening the search affordance — never on passive form focus.651        // userGesture is self-declared by our own content script; the value652        // of this gate is that PASSIVE code paths (which never set it)653        // cannot ship the inventory, shrinking what a compromised page that654        // merely triggers focus events can observe.655        if (includeAll && userGesture !== true) {656          includeAll = false;657        }658        // kind="card": return saved cards as compact summaries for the659        // inline card silver platter. Cards are not domain-scoped — every660        // saved card is a candidate on every checkout page — so domain is661        // ignored when kind === "card".662        if (kind === "card") {663          const cards = vault.getEntries().filter((e) => e.type === "card");664          return {665            ok: true,666            data: cards.map((e) => ({667              id: e.id,668              title: e.cardNickname || e.title,669              cardholderName: e.cardholderName,670              last4: e.last4,671              expMonth: e.expMonth,672              expYear: e.expYear,673              network: e.network,674            })),675          };676        }677        if (kind === "totp") {678          const matches = (679            includeAll680              ? vault.getEntries().filter((entry) => entry.type !== "note" && entry.type !== "card")681              : vault.queryDomain(domain)682          ).filter((entry) => !isPasskeyOnly(entry) && Boolean(entry.totp));683          return {684            ok: true,685            data: matches.map((e) => ({686              id: e.id,687              title: e.title,688              username: e.username,689              email: e.email,690              url: e.url,691              hasTotp: true,692            })),693          };694        }695        // The inline selector fills username+password into a form. Passkey-696        // only entries have no password to fill; sign-in for those goes697        // through the WebAuthn path instead. Filter them out everywhere so698        // the user doesn't see four "GitHub" rows that mostly do nothing.699        // Notes and cards never belonged here either.700        const matches = (701          includeAll702            ? vault703                .getEntries()704                .filter((entry) => entry.type !== "note" && entry.type !== "card")705            : vault.queryDomain(domain)706        ).filter((entry) => !isPasskeyOnly(entry));707        return {708          ok: true,709          data: matches.map((e) =>710            includeAll711              ? {712                  id: e.id,713                  title: e.title,714                  // username/email/url shipped so the inline popup's search715                  // affordance can match on them, not just titles. No secrets716                  // cross the boundary — same shape as the domain-matched717                  // response below minus hasTotp (which the search list718                  // doesn't surface).719                  username: e.username,720                  email: e.email,721                  url: e.url,722                  hasPasskey: e.passkey !== undefined,723                }724              : {725                  id: e.id,726                  title: e.title,727                  username: e.username,728                  email: e.email,729                  url: e.url,730                  hasTotp: Boolean(e.totp),731                  hasPasskey: e.passkey !== undefined,732                }733          ),734        };735      }736      case "GET_ENTRY_FOR_FILL": {737        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };738        const { id, explicitSummon } = msg.payload as {739          id: string;740          explicitSummon?: boolean;741        };742        const entry = vault.getEntryById(id);743        if (!entry) return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };744        // Passkey-only entries (passkey credential, no password) cannot be745        // filled into a form — sign-in goes through the WebAuthn path. A746        // login that ALSO has a passkey is still fillable for its password.747        if (isPasskeyOnly(entry)) return { ok: false, error: "passkey_not_fillable" };748749        // MV-1: re-validate the entry against the requesting tab's origin.750        // sender.tab.url is browser-attested — a page cannot forge it. When751        // the request does not come from a tab at all (popup surfaces use752        // GET_ENTRY_FOR_EDIT, not this), refuse.753        if (sender.tab !== undefined || sender.url !== undefined) {754          let senderDomain: string | null = null;755          try {756            const rawUrl = sender.tab?.url ?? sender.url ?? "";757            senderDomain = rawUrl ? extractDomain(new URL(rawUrl).hostname) : null;758          } catch {759            senderDomain = null;760          }761          if (!senderDomain) return { ok: false, error: "origin_unverified" };762763          const entryDomains = new Set<string>();764          const primary = extractDomain(entry.url ?? "");765          if (primary) entryDomains.add(primary);766          for (const extra of entry.additionalUrls ?? []) {767            const d = extractDomain(extra);768            if (d) entryDomains.add(d);769          }770771          // explicitSummon=true means the user actively picked this entry772          // from the cross-domain search affordance — an intentional773          // off-domain fill. Passive fill paths must stay domain-bound.774          if (explicitSummon !== true && !entryDomains.has(senderDomain)) {775            // Domain mismatch — refuse silently (no oracle about which ids exist).776            return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };777          }778        }779        // Strip the passkey credential AND the raw base32 TOTP seed from the780        // response. Content scripts never need either: the private key is the781        // authenticator's, and handing over the TOTP seed would let a782        // compromised content script mint valid codes indefinitely (SEV-3-C).783        // Generate the *current* 6-digit code here in the background and send784        // only that, plus the seconds left so the UI can render a countdown.785        // Also drop passwordHistory: filling needs only the *current* password.786        // Handing every past password to a content script during passive787        // autofill on an arbitrary page would widen the blast radius of a788        // compromised page far beyond the one credential being filled.789        const {790          passkey: _strippedPasskey,791          totp: seed,792          totpAlgorithm,793          totpDigits,794          totpPeriod,795          passwordHistory: _ph,796          ...safeEntry797        } = entry;798        let totpCode: string | undefined;799        let totpRemaining: number | undefined;800        if (seed) {801          try {802            // PCH-01-019: honour stored algorithm/digits/period (defaults apply803            // when these are undefined, i.e. legacy bare-seed entries).804            const generated = generateTOTP(seed, totpAlgorithm, totpDigits, totpPeriod);805            totpCode = generated.code;806            totpRemaining = generated.remaining;807          } catch {808            totpCode = undefined;809          }810        }811        return { ok: true, data: { ...safeEntry, totpCode, totpRemaining } };812      }813      // Trusted full-entry fetch for Peach's own inline-popup surfaces that814      // genuinely need the raw TOTP seed: the edit form (which re-saves the815      // seed and would otherwise wipe it) and nothing else. Unlike816      // GET_ENTRY_FOR_FILL this fires only on an explicit user action inside817      // the inline popup, never during passive autofill on an arbitrary page.818      // The passkey credential is still stripped — the edit form never touches it.819      case "GET_ENTRY_FOR_EDIT": {820        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };821        const { id, explicitSummon } = msg.payload as {822          id: string;823          explicitSummon?: boolean;824        };825        const entry = vault.getEntryById(id);826        if (!entry) return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };827828        // PCH-01-006: re-validate the browser-attested sender origin, mirroring829        // GET_ENTRY_FOR_FILL (MV-1). The edit channel ships the raw TOTP seed and830        // full password history — at least as sensitive as the fill response — so831        // the boundary must be enforced here, not only by UI reachability. Today832        // the sole caller is the popup (no sender.tab, so this is a structural833        // no-op), but a future tab-context caller or an id leak would otherwise834        // inherit a full-credential oracle. Unlike the fill path we SKIP (not835        // refuse) when no sender domain resolves, to keep the popup caller working.836        if (sender.tab !== undefined || sender.url !== undefined) {837          let senderDomain: string | null = null;838          try {839            const rawUrl = sender.tab?.url ?? sender.url ?? "";840            senderDomain = rawUrl ? extractDomain(new URL(rawUrl).hostname) : null;841          } catch {842            senderDomain = null;843          }844          if (senderDomain) {845            const entryDomains = new Set<string>();846            const primary = extractDomain(entry.url ?? "");847            if (primary) entryDomains.add(primary);848            for (const extra of entry.additionalUrls ?? []) {849              const d = extractDomain(extra);850              if (d) entryDomains.add(d);851            }852            if (explicitSummon !== true && !entryDomains.has(senderDomain)) {853              return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" }; // no id oracle854            }855          }856        }857858        const { passkey: _passkey, ...safeEntry } = entry;859        return { ok: true, data: safeEntry };860      }861      case "COPY": {862        // AUD-002: shape-validate the payload before passing to the clipboard863        // helper. A raw cast lets a malformed message reach the clipboard API864        // with a non-string and throw.865        const { text, label, alreadyWritten } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {866          text?: unknown;867          label?: unknown;868          alreadyWritten?: unknown;869        };870        if (typeof text !== "string" || typeof label !== "string") {871          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };872        }873        await copyToClipboard(text, label, Boolean(alreadyWritten));874        return { ok: true, clearSeconds: getEffectiveClearSeconds() };875      }876      case "CHECK_ALL_BREACHES": {877        const allEntries = vault.getEntries();878        const results: Record<string, number> = {};879        for (const entry of allEntries) {880          if (entry.type === "note") continue;881          if (!entry.password) continue;882          results[entry.id] = await vault.checkBreach(entry.password);883          // Small delay — be a good citizen to the HIBP API884          await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 200));885        }886        // Persist any non-zero counts back to entries887        for (const [id, count] of Object.entries(results)) {888          const entry = vault.getEntryById(id);889          if (entry && (entry.breach ?? 0) !== count) {890            await vault.updateEntry(id, { breach: count > 0 ? count : undefined });891          }892        }893        return { ok: true, data: results };894      }895      case "GET_SETTINGS":896        return { ok: true, data: await vault.ensureSettingsLoaded() };897      case "UPDATE_SETTINGS": {898        const patch = msg.payload;899        if (!patch || typeof patch !== "object" || Array.isArray(patch)) {900          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };901        }902        await vault.updateSettings(patch as vault.VaultSettings);903        if (typeof (patch as Record<string, unknown>).autoLockMinutes === "number") {904          await setupAutoLock();905          if (vault.isUnlocked()) touchAutoLock();906        }907        return { ok: true };908      }909      case "GET_PENDING_PASSKEY":910        return { ok: true, data: await getPendingPasskeyRequest() };911      case "APPROVE_PASSKEY": {912        const { requestId } = msg.payload as { requestId: number };913        await resolvePendingPasskeyRequest(requestId, true);914        return { ok: true };915      }916      case "DENY_PASSKEY": {917        const { requestId } = msg.payload as { requestId: number };918        await resolvePendingPasskeyRequest(requestId, false);919        return { ok: true };920      }921      case "GET_PASSKEY_PROVIDER_STATE":922        return { ok: true, data: await getPasskeyProviderState() };923      case "SET_PASSKEY_PROVIDER_ENABLED": {924        const { enabled } = msg.payload as { enabled: boolean };925        // Disabling is always free; gating fires only when a free user is926        // trying to turn passkey interception on.927        if (enabled) {928          const gate = await requirePro("passkeys");929          if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };930        }931        return { ok: true, data: await setPasskeyProviderEnabled(enabled) };932      }933      // AUD-003: this handler POSTs `entryTitle` to a user-configured HTTPS934      // endpoint. Intentional product behavior — users configure their own935      // dead-man's-switch. isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl blocks localhost, private936      // IPs, and non-HTTPS schemes, but cannot defend against every DNS-937      // rebinding case. The UI under CanarySection (Entry.tsx) discloses to938      // users that the entry title leaves the device when the canary fires.939      case "FIRE_CANARY_PING": {940        // Canary alert fires unconditionally for any entry with canary: true.941        // The Pro gate only governs creation/flagging of canary entries; once942        // an entry is flagged, the alert path is a security property and must943        // never be license-gated.944        const { webhookUrl, entryTitle, trigger } = msg.payload as {945          webhookUrl: string;946          entryTitle: string;947          trigger: "password_copied" | "username_copied" | "autofilled" | "submitted" | "test";948        };949        if (!isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl(webhookUrl)) {950          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_webhook_url" };951        }952        // LV-3: debounce non-test pings per (webhook, entry) so a page that953        // strobes focus/fill events can't turn the canary into a request954        // firehose at the user's endpoint. Test pings are exempt — they are955        // explicit user clicks in the settings UI and are awaited for956        // feedback. The FIRST ping in a window always goes out, so the957        // dead-man's-switch property (canary fires on access) is preserved;958        // only repeats within the window are coalesced.959        if (trigger !== "test") {960          const rlKey = `canary-last-fetch:${webhookUrl}:${entryTitle}`;961          const stored = await chrome.storage.local.get(rlKey);962          const last = (stored as Record<string, unknown>)[rlKey];963          if (typeof last === "number" && Date.now() - last < CANARY_MIN_INTERVAL_MS) {964            return { ok: true, data: { rateLimited: true } };965          }966          await chrome.storage.local.set({ [rlKey]: Date.now() });967        }968        const body = JSON.stringify({969          event: trigger === "test" ? "peach_canary_test" : "peach_canary_accessed",970          entry: entryTitle,971          trigger,972          timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),973          source: "peach-extension",974        });975        if (trigger === "test") {976          // Permitted outbound fetch: user-configured canary alert endpoint977          // (validated by isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl above). This is the978          // only non-HIBP outbound call in the extension — see979          // Projects.md §3.7. Test pings are awaited so the UI can show980          // success/failure.981          try {982            const res = await fetch(webhookUrl, {983              method: "POST",984              headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },985              body,986            });987            return { ok: res.ok, error: res.ok ? undefined : `HTTP ${res.status}` };988          } catch (err) {989            return { ok: false, error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : "network_error" };990          }991        }992        // Non-test triggers are fire-and-forget993        fetch(webhookUrl, {994          method: "POST",995          headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },996          body,997        }).catch(() => {});998        return { ok: true };999      }1000      case "ACTIVATE_LICENSE": {1001        const { key } = msg.payload as { key: string };1002        const licenseInfo = await activateLicense(key);1003        return { ok: true, data: licenseInfo };1004      }1005      case "GET_LICENSE": {1006        const licenseInfo = await getLicenseInfo();1007        return { ok: true, data: licenseInfo };1008      }1009      case "GET_LICENSE_KEY": {1010        const key = await getLicenseKey();1011        return { ok: true, data: key };1012      }1013      case "DEACTIVATE_LICENSE": {1014        await deactivateLicense();1015        return { ok: true };1016      }1017      case "SHOULD_PLAY_CELEBRATION": {1018        const should = await shouldPlayCelebration();1019        return { ok: true, data: should };1020      }1021      case "MARK_CELEBRATION_PLAYED": {1022        await markCelebrationPlayed();1023        return { ok: true };1024      }1025      case "GET_CODEX_VAULT_DATA": {1026        // Pro-gated. requirePro broadcasts PRO_GATE_TRIGGERED on miss so the1027        // popup navigates to the License section without further coordination.1028        const gate = await requirePro("codex");1029        if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1030        return await handleGetCodexVaultData();1031      }1032      case "ESTIMATE_CODEX_PAGES": {1033        const gate = await requirePro("codex");1034        if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1035        return await handleEstimateCodexPages();1036      }1037      case "RESTORE_FROM_CODEX": {1038        // !! IMPORTANT: intentionally NOT Pro-gated. A free device must still1039        // be able to restore a vault that was printed by a Pro user.1040        // DO NOT add a Pro gate here.1041        const payload = msg.payload as CodexRestorePayload;1042        return await handleRestoreFromCodex(payload);1043      }1044      case "OPEN_PRO_GATE": {1045        // Content script requests: open popup and navigate to License section.1046        const { feature } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { feature?: string };1047        if (chrome.storage.session) {1048          await chrome.storage.session.set({ pendingProGate: { feature: feature ?? "passkeys" } });1049        }1050        try { await chrome.action.openPopup(); } catch { /* badge fallback */ }1051        return { ok: true };1052      }1053      case "OPEN_POPUP": {1054        // Content script asks to open the trusted extension popup — used by the1055        // inline locked bubble so the master password is entered in the popup,1056        // never in page-hosted DOM (audit HIGH). Best-effort: openPopup needs a1057        // user gesture + Chrome 127+/Firefox; on failure the user clicks the1058        // toolbar icon. The badge already signals Peach needs attention.1059        //1060        // Set a session flag so the popup knows it was opened for inline unlock1061        // and should close itself once the vault is unlocked (returning the user1062        // to the inline autofill selector on the page).1063        if (chrome.storage.session) {1064          await chrome.storage.session.set({ peach_inline_unlock: true });1065        }1066        try { await chrome.action.openPopup(); } catch { /* user opens via toolbar */ }1067        return { ok: true };1068      }1069      case "GET_IDENTITIES": {1070        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1071        return { ok: true, data: vault.getIdentities() };1072      }1073      case "TOUCH_AUTO_LOCK": {1074        // touchAutoLock() is already called by shouldRefreshAutoLock above;1075        // this case just gives the popup a typed message to keep the session alive.1076        return { ok: true };1077      }1078      case "GET_ADVANCED_HEALTH_REPORT": {1079        const gate = await requirePro("advanced_health");1080        if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1081        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1082        const report = await buildAdvancedHealthReport(vault.getEntries());1083        return { ok: true, data: report };1084      }1085      case "IS_DURESS_ENABLED": {1086        const enabled = await vault.isDuressEnabled();1087        return { ok: true, data: enabled };1088      }1089      case "SETUP_DURESS": {1090        // Single enforcement point for the Duress Vault Pro gate. Free users1091        // who somehow reach this handler are rejected here; the popup also1092        // pre-checks isPro() to avoid showing the setup form to free users,1093        // but server-side is the actual security boundary.1094        const gate = await requirePro("duress_vault");1095        if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1096        // MV3 service workers restart after inactivity, losing the in-memory1097        // derived key. Detect this before calling setupDuress so the popup1098        // can show a meaningful prompt to re-lock and re-unlock.1099        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "session_expired" };1100        const { duressPassword } = msg.payload as { duressPassword: string };1101        await vault.setupDuress(duressPassword);1102        return { ok: true };1103      }1104      case "DISABLE_DURESS": {1105        await vault.disableDuress();1106        return { ok: true };1107      }1108      case "VERIFY_MAIN_PASSWORD": {1109        const { password } = msg.payload as { password: string };1110        const ok = await vault.verifyMainPassword(password);1111        return { ok: true, data: ok };1112      }1113      case "CHANGE_PASSWORD": {1114        const { currentPassword, newPassword } = msg.payload as {1115          currentPassword: string;1116          newPassword: string;1117        };1118        const changed = await vault.changePassword(currentPassword, newPassword);1119        return changed1120          ? { ok: true }1121          : { ok: false, error: "incorrect_current_password" };1122      }1123      case "GET_SITE_PASSWORD_POLICY": {1124        const [tab] = await chrome.tabs.query({ active: true, currentWindow: true });1125        if (!tab?.id) return { ok: true, data: null };1126        try {1127          const response = await chrome.tabs.sendMessage(tab.id, {1128            type: "GET_SITE_PASSWORD_POLICY",1129          });1130          return (response as MessageResponse) ?? { ok: true, data: null };1131        } catch {1132          return { ok: true, data: null };1133        }1134      }1135      case "RECORD_MANUAL_SUMMON": {1136        const { domain } = msg.payload as { domain: string };1137        const settings = vault.getSettings();1138        const existing = settings.manualSummonDomains?.[domain];1139        const now = Date.now();1140        await vault.updateSettings({1141          manualSummonDomains: {1142            ...settings.manualSummonDomains,1143            [domain]: {1144              firstSummonedAt: existing?.firstSummonedAt ?? now,1145              summonCount: (existing?.summonCount ?? 0) + 1,1146              lastSummonedAt: now,1147            },1148          },1149        });1150        return { ok: true };1151      }1152      case "DECLINE_CARD_SAVE": {1153        const { last4, expMonth, expYear } = msg.payload as { last4: string; expMonth: string; expYear: string };1154        await vault.declineCardSaveOffer(last4, expMonth, expYear);1155        return { ok: true };1156      }1157      case "IS_CARD_DECLINED": {1158        const { last4, expMonth, expYear } = msg.payload as { last4: string; expMonth: string; expYear: string };1159        const declined = await vault.isCardDeclined(last4, expMonth, expYear);1160        return { ok: true, data: declined };1161      }1162      case "INITIATE_FIREFOX_PASSKEY_CREATE": {1163        const { rpId, rpName, userName, userDisplayName } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1164          rpId?: string;1165          rpName?: string;1166          userName?: string;1167          userDisplayName?: string;1168        };1169        if (!rpId || !userName) return { ok: false, error: "rpid_and_username_required" };1170        return await initiateFirefoxPasskeyCreate({1171          rpId,1172          rpName: rpName ?? rpId,1173          userName,1174          userDisplayName,1175        });1176      }11771178      case "COMPLETE_FIREFOX_PASSKEY_CREATE": {1179        const payload = msg.payload as Parameters<typeof completeFirefoxPasskeyCreate>[0] | undefined;1180        if (!payload) return { ok: false, error: "missing_payload" };1181        return await completeFirefoxPasskeyCreate(payload);1182      }11831184      case "PASSKEY_OFFER_DECLINE": {1185        const { domain } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { domain?: string };1186        if (!domain) return { ok: false, error: "domain_required" };1187        await recordPasskeyOfferDecline(domain);1188        return { ok: true };1189      }11901191      case "GET_PASSKEY_OFFER_DECLINED": {1192        const { domain } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { domain?: string };1193        if (!domain) return { ok: false, error: "domain_required" };1194        return { ok: true, data: await isPasskeyOfferDeclined(domain) };1195      }11961197      case "PASSKEY_HAS_CREDENTIALS": {1198        const payload = msg.payload as {1199          rpId?: string;1200          allowCredentials?: Array<{ id: string; type?: string }>;1201        } | undefined;1202        if (!payload?.rpId) return { ok: false, error: "rpid_required" };1203        return await handlePasskeyHasCredentials({1204          rpId: payload.rpId,1205          allowCredentials: payload.allowCredentials ?? [],1206        }, attestedSenderOrigin(sender));1207      }12081209      case "PASSKEY_CREATE": {1210        const payload = msg.payload as Parameters<typeof handleFirefoxPasskeyCreate>[0] | undefined;1211        if (!payload?.rpId || !payload?.userName) {1212          return { ok: false, error: "rpid_and_username_required" };1213        }1214        return await handleFirefoxPasskeyCreate(payload, attestedSenderOrigin(sender));1215      }12161217      case "PASSKEY_GET": {1218        const payload = msg.payload as Parameters<typeof handleFirefoxPasskeyGet>[0] | undefined;1219        if (!payload?.rpId) return { ok: false, error: "rpid_required" };1220        return await handleFirefoxPasskeyGet(payload, attestedSenderOrigin(sender));1221      }12221223      case "PASSKEY_AUTH_RESPONSE": {1224        const { requestId, approved } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1225          requestId?: string | number;1226          approved?: boolean;1227        };1228        if (requestId === undefined || requestId === null || typeof approved !== 'boolean') {1229          return { ok: false, error: 'requestId and approved required' };1230        }1231        await resolvePendingPasskeyRequest(Number(requestId), approved);1232        return { ok: true };1233      }12341235      case "GET_PASSKEY_FOR_DOMAIN": {1236        const { domain } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { domain?: string };1237        if (!domain) return { ok: false, error: "domain_required" };1238        // Scope to the caller's own origin: a page may only ask about passkeys1239        // for a domain it actually owns, so an arbitrary page cannot enumerate1240        // which sites the user holds passkeys for or read the username (audit MEDIUM).1241        const origin = attestedSenderOrigin(sender);1242        if (!origin || !isValidRpId(domain, origin)) return { ok: true, data: null };1243        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: true, data: null };1244        const match = vault1245          .getEntries()1246          .find((entry) => entry.passkey?.rpId === domain);1247        if (!match || !match.passkey) return { ok: true, data: null };1248        // Slim shape — only the fields State 11 needs. Never expose private1249        // key material, even though this is locked behind isUnlocked.1250        return {1251          ok: true,1252          data: {1253            rpId: match.passkey.rpId,1254            userName: match.passkey.userName,1255            browser: match.passkey.browser,1256          },1257        };1258      }12591260      case "DESTROY_VAULT": {1261        // Irreversible by design. Lock zeroes the derived key + in-memory entries;1262        // storage.local.clear() wipes every Peach key (slots, settings, license,1263        // onboarded flag, history, sync state, declined cards, recall, etc.);1264        // session.clear() wipes pending passkey requests + pro-notice queues.1265        // Caller (Panic.tsx) handles UI navigation back to onboarding.1266        //1267        // The Pro license is the one thing that must survive: the user paid for1268        // it, and destroying a vault (panic wipe, fresh start) is not a refund.1269        // Capture it before the clear and restore it after. peach_pro_celebrated1270        // rides along so the Pro celebration doesn't replay on the next unlock.1271        const preserved = await chrome.storage.local.get([1272          "peach_license",1273          "peach_pro_celebrated",1274        ]);1275        vault.lock();1276        await storageClear();1277        await vault.clearVaultHistory();1278        const toRestore: Record<string, unknown> = {};1279        if (preserved.peach_license !== undefined) toRestore.peach_license = preserved.peach_license;1280        if (preserved.peach_pro_celebrated !== undefined) toRestore.peach_pro_celebrated = preserved.peach_pro_celebrated;1281        if (Object.keys(toRestore).length > 0) {1282          await chrome.storage.local.set(toRestore);1283        }1284        if (chrome.storage.session) {1285          await chrome.storage.session.clear();1286        }1287        return { ok: true };1288      }12891290      // Android-only: biometric unlock with pre-derived key.1291      case "UNLOCK_WITH_KEY": {1292        const { masterKeyHex } = msg.payload as { masterKeyHex: string };1293        if (!isNativePlatform()) {1294          return { ok: false, error: "desktop_only_uses_password" };1295        }1296        try {1297          const result = await vault.unlockWithKey(masterKeyHex);1298          if (result.ok) {1299            onVaultUnlocked();1300            await publishInMemoryVault(result.entries);1301          }1302          return { ok: result.ok, data: result.ok ? { entries: result.entries } : undefined, error: result.ok ? undefined : result.error };1303        } catch {1304          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };1305        }1306      }1307      // Android: returns current in-memory derived key as hex. Used by biometric enable flow.1308      case "GET_DERIVED_KEY": {1309        if (!isNativePlatform()) {1310          return { ok: false, error: "android_only" };1311        }1312        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) {1313          return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1314        }1315        return { ok: true, data: { masterKeyHex: vault.getDerivedKeyHex() } };1316      }1317      case "GET_IDENTITY_SUGGESTIONS": {1318        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1319        const entries = vault.getEntries();1320        const suggestions = buildIdentitySuggestions(entries);1321        return { ok: true, data: { suggestions } };1322      }1323      case "POPULATE_INLINE_VAULT": {1324        if (!isNativePlatform()) return { ok: false };1325        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1326        const entries = vault.getEntries();1327        await publishInMemoryVault(entries);1328        return { ok: true };1329      }1330      case "ML_INIT":1331        return { ok: true };13321333      case "ML_PREDICT_BATCH": {1334        // AUD-002: shape-validate before forwarding to the ML helper.1335        const { featuresArray } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { featuresArray?: unknown };1336        if (!Array.isArray(featuresArray)) {1337          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1338        }1339        return { ok: true, data: mlPredictBatch(featuresArray as MLFieldFeatures[]) };1340      }13411342      // ── Vault sync (v3) ───────────────────────────────────────────────1343      // Returns the public-facing local identity needed by the popup to1344      // drive Phase-1 audio pairing. The private long-term key never1345      // leaves the background.1346      case "GET_LOCAL_IDENTITY": {1347        // Not Pro-gated: a free device may attempt to pair so it can RECEIVE a1348        // Pro license from an already-Pro peer (at least one device must be Pro).1349        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1350        // Identity derives from the stable root key, not the password-derived1351        // key, so pairing survives a master-password change (SEV-2-B).1352        const masterKeyHex = vault.getRootKeyHex();1353        if (!masterKeyHex) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1354        const masterKey = unhexBytes(masterKeyHex);1355        try {1356          const identity = await buildLocalIdentity(masterKey);1357          // If this device is Pro, advertise the signed license so the peer can1358          // activate it after SAS confirmation — pairing carries Pro across.1359          if (await isProUser()) {1360            const license = await getLicenseKey();1361            if (license) (identity as { license?: string }).license = license;1362          }1363          return { ok: true, data: identity };1364        } finally {1365          masterKey.fill(0);1366        }1367      }13681369      case "GET_ADOPTION_MATERIAL": {1370        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1371        const rootKeyHex = vault.getRootKeyHex();1372        if (!rootKeyHex) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1373        const rootKeyBytes = unhexBytes(rootKeyHex);1374        try {1375          const data: { rootKeyHex: string; vaultId: string; license?: string } = {1376            rootKeyHex,1377            vaultId: await computeVaultId(rootKeyBytes),1378          };1379          if (await isProUser()) {1380            const license = await getLicenseKey();1381            if (license) data.license = license;1382          }1383          return { ok: true, data };1384        } finally {1385          rootKeyBytes.fill(0);1386        }1387      }13881389      case "COMPLETE_PAIRING": {1390        // Not Pro-gated — see GET_LOCAL_IDENTITY.1391        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1392        const paired = (msg.payload as { paired?: unknown })?.paired;1393        if (typeof paired !== "object" || paired === null) {1394          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1395        }1396        const candidate = paired as Record<string, unknown>;1397        if (1398          typeof candidate.deviceId !== "string" || !candidate.deviceId ||1399          typeof candidate.deviceName !== "string" || !candidate.deviceName ||1400          typeof candidate.deviceType !== "string" ||1401          typeof candidate.longTermPublicKeyHex !== "string" ||1402          !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(candidate.longTermPublicKeyHex) ||1403          (1404            candidate.signingPublicKeyHex !== undefined &&1405            (1406              typeof candidate.signingPublicKeyHex !== "string" ||1407              !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(candidate.signingPublicKeyHex)1408            )1409          ) ||1410          typeof candidate.pairedAt !== "number"1411        ) {1412          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_paired_device" };1413        }1414        // A fresh SAS-confirmed direct pairing is the one operation allowed to1415        // lift an old terminal revocation. Without this, re-pairing recreated1416        // an impossible state where the same device was both paired and1417        // revoked, and a later Remove became a permanent no-op.1418        await clearDeviceRevocation(candidate.deviceId);1419        await upsertPairedDeviceV3(candidate as unknown as import("../shared/sync-types").PairedDevice);1420        // Newly paired device → kick a sync so it gets its first round1421        // without waiting for the next 10-minute alarm tick. Fire-and-forget;1422        // the in-flight guard handles overlap with any other trigger.1423        void triggerSyncIfReachable({ reason: "device_list_changed" }).catch(() => undefined);1424        return { ok: true };1425      }14261427      case "LIST_PAIRED_DEVICES": {1428        const devices = await listPairedDevicesV3();1429        return { ok: true, data: { devices } };1430      }14311432      case "UNPAIR_DEVICE": {1433        const { deviceId } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { deviceId?: string };1434        if (typeof deviceId !== "string" || !deviceId) {1435          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1436        }1437        // Removing a device REVOKES it rather than just dropping the local1438        // row: a plain removal is undone the moment any other peer vouches it1439        // back through a manifest, which is exactly what the relay makes easy.1440        await revokeDeviceByIdV3(deviceId, await getOrCreateDeviceId());1441        // Sync against the remaining hosts — the unpaired device no longer1442        // matters but the next alarm tick is up to ten minutes away.1443        void triggerSyncIfReachable({ reason: "device_list_changed" }).catch(() => undefined);1444        return { ok: true };1445      }14461447      case "RENAME_LOCAL_DEVICE": {1448        const { name } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { name?: string };1449        if (typeof name !== "string") return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1450        await setDeviceNameV3(name);1451        return { ok: true };1452      }14531454      // ── Relay pairing ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────1455      // Not Pro-gated (a free device may pair to receive Pro/sync). The whole NK1456      // session runs in the background; the SAS and the terminal result reach1457      // the popup as ADOPTION_SOURCE_SAS / ADOPTION_SOURCE_RESULT pushes.1458      case "START_ADOPTION_SOURCE": {1459        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1460        if (isRelayAdoptionSourceInFlight()) {1461          return { ok: false, error: "adoption_source_in_progress" };1462        }1463        try {1464          return { ok: true, data: await startRelayAdoptionSource() };1465        } catch (error) {1466          return {1467            ok: false,1468            error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : "adoption_source_failed",1469          };1470        }1471      }14721473      // Onboarding receiver — empty extension shows a QR, phone scans and1474      // sends the vault. The popup supplies the local-only password here so1475      // the background can wrap the adopted root key at rest without ever1476      // asking the user to retype it.1477      case "START_ADOPTION_RECEIVER": {1478        if (isRelayAdoptionSourceInFlight()) {1479          return { ok: false, error: "adoption_receiver_in_progress" };1480        }1481        const password = (msg.payload as { password?: unknown } | undefined)?.password;1482        if (typeof password !== "string" || password.length === 0) {1483          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1484        }1485        try {1486          return { ok: true, data: await startRelayAdoptionReceiver(password) };1487        } catch (error) {1488          return {1489            ok: false,1490            error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : "adoption_receiver_failed",1491          };1492        }1493      }14941495      // Popup→bg counterpart to ADOPTION_SOURCE_SAS (receiver flow).1496      // The receiver now auto-accepts the SAS (both sides derive it from the1497      // same Noise handshake hash, so the codes match by construction) so1498      // the popup never has a SAS screen to tap on. The id round-trips the1499      // same way so a stale late response can't approve the wrong session.1500      // Popup→bg counterpart for the source flow: Confirm/Cancel on the1501      // source's SAS screen.15021503      // Source-side mirror of RECEIVER_SAS_DECISION: the popup's confirm/cancel1504      // on the source's SAS screen. The id round-trips the same way so a stale1505      // late response can't approve the wrong session.1506      case "SOURCE_SAS_DECISION": {1507        const payload = msg.payload as { id?: unknown; ok?: unknown } | undefined;1508        if (typeof payload?.id !== "string" || typeof payload?.ok !== "boolean") {1509          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1510        }1511        return { ok: resolveSourceSasConfirmation(payload.id, payload.ok) };1512      }15131514      case "CANCEL_ADOPTION_SOURCE": {1515        cancelRelayAdoptionSource();1516        return { ok: true };1517      }15181519      case "TRIGGER_SYNC": {1520        const payload = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1521          reason?: "vault_change" | "foreground" | "manual";1522          force?: boolean;1523        };1524        const reason = payload.reason ?? "foreground";15251526        void triggerSyncIfReachable({ reason, force: payload.force === true });1527        return { ok: true };1528      }15291530      case "GET_SYNC_STATE": {1531        return { ok: true, data: getSyncState() };1532      }15331534      case "GET_SYNC_SETTINGS": {1535        return { ok: true, data: await getSyncSettings() };1536      }15371538      case "SET_SYNC_SETTINGS": {1539        const payload = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1540          mode?: unknown;1541          relayUrl?: unknown;1542        };1543        try {1544          // A custom relay URL implies private mode; Peach's own relay stays1545          // public. See setRelayUrl.1546          if (payload.relayUrl !== undefined) {1547            if (typeof payload.relayUrl !== "string") {1548              return { ok: false, error: "invalid_relay_url" };1549            }1550            return { ok: true, data: await setRelayUrl(payload.relayUrl) };1551          }1552          if (payload.mode !== undefined) {1553            if (payload.mode !== "public" && payload.mode !== "private" && payload.mode !== "off") {1554              return { ok: false, error: "invalid_sync_mode" };1555            }1556            return { ok: true, data: await setSyncMode(payload.mode as SyncMode) };1557          }1558          return { ok: true, data: await getSyncSettings() };1559        } catch (error) {1560          return {1561            ok: false,1562            error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : "invalid_relay_url",1563          };1564        }1565      }15661567      case "GET_SYNC_ALERTS": {1568        const { consume } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { consume?: boolean };1569        const alerts = await getPendingSyncAlerts();1570        // The popup reads on open and acknowledges with consume:true after1571        // rendering, so a popup crash between read and render doesn't lose1572        // the alerts.1573        if (consume) await clearPendingSyncAlerts();1574        return { ok: true, data: alerts };1575      }15761577      case "GET_PENDING_VOUCHED_DEVICES": {1578        return { ok: true, data: await listPendingVouchedDevices() };1579      }1580      case "CONFIRM_VOUCHED_DEVICE": {1581        const { deviceId } = msg.payload as { deviceId: string };1582        const pending = await getPendingVouchedDevice(deviceId);1583        if (!pending) return { ok: false, error: "not_pending" };1584        // Last gate before a vouched device becomes a sync peer. A queue entry1585        // can predate the revocation that names it, so revocation is re-checked1586        // here rather than trusted to have swept the queue.1587        if (await isDeviceRevoked(pending.deviceId, pending.longTermPublicKeyHex)) {1588          await removePendingVouchedDevice(deviceId);1589          return { ok: false, error: "device_revoked" };1590        }1591        await upsertPairedDeviceV3({1592          deviceId: pending.deviceId,1593          deviceName: pending.deviceName,1594          deviceType:1595            pending.deviceType as import("../shared/sync-types").PairedDevice["deviceType"],1596          longTermPublicKeyHex: pending.longTermPublicKeyHex,1597          signingPublicKeyHex: pending.signingPublicKeyHex,1598          wsPort: pending.wsPort,1599          pairedAt: pending.pairedAt,1600          trustSource: "vouched",1601        });1602        await removePendingVouchedDevice(deviceId);1603        // Newly confirmed vouched device is now a sync target — kick a round1604        // so the mesh introduction pays off without a 10-minute wait.1605        void triggerSyncIfReachable({ reason: "device_list_changed" }).catch(() => undefined);1606        return { ok: true };1607      }1608      case "REJECT_VOUCHED_DEVICE": {1609        const { deviceId } = msg.payload as { deviceId: string };1610        await removePendingVouchedDevice(deviceId);1611        return { ok: true };1612      }1613      case "ROTATE_SYNC_IDENTITY": {1614        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1615        const result = await vault.rotateSyncIdentity();1616        return result.ok ? { ok: true } : { ok: false, error: result.error };1617      }16181619      default:1620        return { ok: false, error: "unknown_message_type" };1621    }1622  } catch (err) {1623    return {1624      ok: false,1625      error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : "operation_failed",1626    };1627  }1628}16291630// --- Mobile platform helpers ---16311632// Android: populates the in-memory vault used by PeachAutofillService.1633async function publishInMemoryVault(entries: VaultEntry[]): Promise<void> {1634  const plugin = nativePlugin<{1635    setEntries?: (args: {1636      entries: Array<{1637        id: string;1638        title: string;1639        username: string;1640        email: string;1641        password: string;1642        url: string;1643        totp: string;1644        additionalUrls: string[];1645      }>;1646    }) => Promise<void>;1647  }>("InMemoryVaultPlugin");1648  if (!plugin?.setEntries) return;1649  await plugin.setEntries({1650    entries: entries.map((e) => ({1651      id: e.id,1652      title: e.title ?? "",1653      username: e.username ?? "",1654      email: (e as VaultEntry & { email?: string }).email ?? "",1655      password: e.password ?? "",1656      url: e.url ?? "",1657      totp: (e as VaultEntry & { totp?: string }).totp ?? "",1658      additionalUrls: (e as VaultEntry & { additionalUrls?: string[] }).additionalUrls ?? [],1659    })),1660  });1661}16621663// Android: clear the autofill in-memory store on lock.1664async function clearInMemoryVault(): Promise<void> {1665  const plugin = nativePlugin<{ clearEntries?: () => Promise<void> }>("InMemoryVaultPlugin");1666  if (!plugin?.clearEntries) return;1667  await plugin.clearEntries();1668}16691670// Returns username use-counts from the vault, sorted by frequency. Each row1671// also carries the entry's email so the popup can suggest the email/username1672// pair the user has actually used together.1673function buildIdentitySuggestions(1674  entries: VaultEntry[],1675): Array<{ email: string; username: string; count: number }> {1676  const usernameCounts = new Map<string, number>();1677  const usernameEmail = new Map<string, string>();1678  for (const entry of entries) {1679    const username = entry.username ?? "";1680    const email = (entry as VaultEntry & { email?: string }).email ?? "";1681    if (!username && !email) continue;1682    const key = username || email;1683    usernameCounts.set(key, (usernameCounts.get(key) ?? 0) + 1);1684    if (!usernameEmail.has(key)) usernameEmail.set(key, email);1685  }1686  return Array.from(usernameCounts.entries())1687    .sort((a, b) => b[1] - a[1])1688    .map(([username, count]) => ({1689      email: usernameEmail.get(username) ?? "",1690      username,1691      count,1692    }));1693}16941695/** Notify all content scripts that the vault just became available. */1696function broadcastToContentScripts(message: { type: string }): void {1697  if (!chrome.tabs?.query) return;1698  chrome.tabs.query({}, (tabs) => {1699    for (const tab of tabs) {1700      if (tab.id !== undefined) {1701        chrome.tabs.sendMessage(tab.id, message).catch(() => {1702          // Tab may not have a content script — silently ignore1703        });1704      }1705    }1706  });1707}17081709function shouldRefreshAutoLock(type: MessageType): boolean {1710  return (1711    type !== "HAS_VAULT" &&1712    type !== "IS_UNLOCKED" &&1713    type !== "GET_VAULT_STATUS" &&1714    type !== "LOCK" &&1715    type !== "UPDATE_SETTINGS" &&1716    type !== "GET_PENDING_PASSKEY" &&1717    type !== "GET_PASSKEY_PROVIDER_STATE" &&1718    type !== "DECLINE_CARD_SAVE" &&1719    type !== "IS_CARD_DECLINED"1720  );1721}17221723function isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl(value: string): boolean {1724  try {1725    const url = new URL(value);1726    if (url.protocol !== "https:") return false;17271728    const hostname = url.hostname.toLowerCase();1729    if (1730      hostname === "localhost" ||1731      hostname.endsWith(".localhost") ||1732      isPrivateIpv4(hostname) ||1733      isPrivateIpv6(hostname)1734    ) {1735      return false;1736    }17371738    return true;1739  } catch {1740    return false;1741  }1742}17431744function isPrivateIpv4(hostname: string): boolean {1745  if (PRIVATE_IPV4_RANGES.some((range) => hostname.startsWith(range.prefix))) {1746    return true;1747  }17481749  const octets = hostname.split(".").map((part) => Number(part));1750  if (octets.length !== 4 || octets.some((octet) => !Number.isInteger(octet) || octet < 0 || octet > 255)) {1751    return false;1752  }17531754  return octets[0] === 172 && octets[1] >= 16 && octets[1] <= 31;1755}17561757function isPrivateIpv6(hostname: string): boolean {1758  const normalized = hostname.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "").toLowerCase();1759  return (1760    normalized === "::1" ||1761    normalized.startsWith("fc") ||1762    normalized.startsWith("fd") ||1763    normalized.startsWith("fe80:")1764  );1765}