messages.ts

1/**2 * messages.ts — the only background message handler.3 *4 * All `chrome.runtime.onMessage` handling for the service worker lives here.5 * Do not handle messages inline in entry.ts, alarms.ts, or any other6 * background file. Every background-bound MessageType in shared/types.ts7 * must have a case below. Content-script-bound message types (PING,8 * SUMMON_AUTOFILL, VAULT_LOCKED) are documented in shared/types.ts and9 * intentionally have no case here — they are sent *to* content scripts.10 */1112import { copyToClipboard, getEffectiveClearSeconds } from "./clipboard";13import { getPendingSyncAlerts, clearPendingSyncAlerts } from "./sync-alerts";14import { extractDomain } from "../shared/domain";15import { computeVaultId } from "../shared/sync-identity";16import {17  getPendingVouchedDevice,18  listPendingVouchedDevices,19  removePendingVouchedDevice,20} from "./pending-vouched-devices";21import { isRecoveryConfirmPending } from "./recovery-pending";22import { setupAutoLock, touchAutoLock } from "./alarms";23import { runSelfTest } from "./self-test";24import * as vault from "./vault";25import {26  handleEstimateCodexPages,27  handleGetCodexVaultData,28  handleRestoreFromCodex,29} from "./codex-handlers";30import type { CodexRestorePayload } from "../shared/codex-types";31import {32  activateLicense,33  deactivateLicense,34  getLicenseInfo,35  getLicenseKey,36  isProUser,37  markCelebrationPlayed,38  shouldPlayCelebration,39} from "./license";40import {41  completeFirefoxPasskeyCreate,42  getPasskeyProviderState,43  getPendingPasskeyRequest,44  handleFirefoxPasskeyCreate,45  handleFirefoxPasskeyGet,46  handlePasskeyHasCredentials,47  initiateFirefoxPasskeyCreate,48  isPasskeyOfferDeclined,49  onVaultUnlocked,50  recordPasskeyOfferDecline,51  resolvePendingPasskeyRequest,52  setPasskeyProviderEnabled,53} from "./passkey";54import { buildAdvancedHealthReport } from "./health";55import { storageClear } from "../shared/storage";56import { findInvalidWords } from "../shared/recovery-words";57import type {58  Message,59  MessageResponse,60  MessageType,61  ProFeature,62  VaultEntry,63} from "../shared/types";64import { isPasskeyOnly } from "../shared/types";65import { generateTOTP } from "../crypto/totp";66import { isValidRpId } from "../shared/passkey-utils";67import { isNativePlatform, nativePlugin } from "../shared/native";68import { predictBatch as mlPredictBatch } from "./ml";69import type { MLFieldFeatures } from "../shared/ml";70import {71  buildLocalIdentity,72  getOrCreateDeviceId,73  setDeviceName as setDeviceNameV3,74} from "./device-identity";75import {76  clearDeviceRevocation,77  isDeviceRevoked,78  listPairedDevices as listPairedDevicesV3,79  revokeDeviceById as revokeDeviceByIdV3,80  upsertPairedDevice as upsertPairedDeviceV3,81} from "./paired-devices";82// Sync and pairing are imported statically, never with `await import()`.83// `import()` throws `TypeError: import() is disallowed on84// ServiceWorkerGlobalScope` at runtime in MV3, and Vite's preload helper85// reports the failure through `window.dispatchEvent`, which does not exist in86// a worker either — so the real reason was replaced by "window is not defined"87// and the pairing UI just stopped. scripts/check-sw-static-imports.mjs fails88// the build if a runtime import() reappears anywhere in the worker's graph.89import {90  cancelRelayAdoptionSource,91  isRelayAdoptionSourceInFlight,92  resolveSourceSasConfirmation,93  startRelayAdoptionReceiver,94  startRelayAdoptionSource,95} from "./relay-adoption-source-bg";96import {97  getSyncSettings,98  setRelayUrl,99  setSyncMode,100  type SyncMode,101} from "./sync-settings";102import {103  getSyncState,104  hydratePersistedSyncState,105  setSyncRunner,106  triggerSyncIfReachable,107} from "./sync-trigger";108import { productionSyncRunner } from "./sync-runner";109110// Compile-time E2E flag, folded to a literal by Vite's `define` (false in111// every production build — verified in the bundled output). Mirrors the112// create-path bypass in passkey.ts so the Playwright passkey smoke can enable113// the provider without a real Pro licence; the gate is fully intact for users.114declare const __PEACH_E2E_PASSKEYS__: boolean;115const PASSKEY_E2E_PRO_BYPASS = __PEACH_E2E_PASSKEYS__ === true;116117let nativeSyncRunnerBootstrapped = false;118119function unhexBytes(hex: string): Uint8Array {120  if (hex.length % 2 !== 0) throw new Error("invalid hex");121  const out = new Uint8Array(hex.length / 2);122  for (let i = 0; i < out.length; i++) {123    out[i] = parseInt(hex.slice(i * 2, i * 2 + 2), 16);124  }125  return out;126}127128/**129 * The single Pro gate. Every gated handler calls this first; the broadcast130 * lets the popup react (navigate to the License section, highlight the131 * relevant feature). Background never touches the popup view directly —132 * the popup owns navigation. See Projects.md "Pro gate rule".133 */134async function requirePro(135  feature: ProFeature,136  trigger: "user" | "background" = "user"137): Promise<{ allowed: boolean }> {138  if (PASSKEY_E2E_PRO_BYPASS && feature === "passkeys") return { allowed: true };139  if (await isProUser()) return { allowed: true };140141  if (trigger === "user") {142    // User deliberately triggered this feature — redirect the popup immediately.143    chrome.runtime144      .sendMessage({ type: "PRO_GATE_TRIGGERED", payload: { feature } })145      .catch(() => {146        // Popup may be closed — the gate signal is best-effort.147      });148  } else {149    // Background trigger (e.g. passive sync initiation) — no popup is open.150    // Queue a notice so the next popup open shows a soft banner instead of151    // silently failing.152    if (chrome.storage.session) {153      chrome.storage.session154        .set({ pendingProNotice: { feature, triggeredAt: Date.now() } })155        .catch(() => {});156    }157  }158159  return { allowed: false };160}161162// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------163// PCH-01-018: operations that irreversibly destroy or replace vault contents.164// These are gated to trusted extension-page senders in handleMessage; the165// confirmation UX otherwise lives only in the popup. Keep this in sync when166// adding new destructive handlers.167const DESTRUCTIVE_MESSAGE_TYPES: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([168  "DESTROY_VAULT",169  "CLEAR_VAULT_ENTRIES",170  "RESTORE_VAULT_SNAPSHOT",171  "RESTORE_FROM_CODEX",172]);173174// LV-3: minimum interval between non-test canary pings per webhook+entry.175const CANARY_MIN_INTERVAL_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000; // 1 hour176177const PRIVATE_IPV4_RANGES = [178  { prefix: "10." },179  { prefix: "127." },180  { prefix: "169.254." },181  { prefix: "192.168." },182];183184export function setupMessageHandler(): void {185  chrome.runtime.onMessage.addListener(186    (msg: unknown, sender, sendResponse) => {187      if (!isMessage(msg)) {188        sendResponse({ ok: false, error: "invalid_message" });189        return true;190      }191      handleMessage(msg, sender)192        .then(sendResponse)193        .catch((err) =>194          sendResponse({195            ok: false,196            error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),197          })198        );199      return true;200    }201  );202203  // Android: the chrome shim queues sendMessage calls until this handler is204  // registered. Without this hookup, every message hangs on Capacitor builds.205  // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any206  const reg = (globalThis as any).__peachRegisterMessageHandler;207  if (typeof reg === "function") {208    reg(async (m: unknown) => {209      if (!isMessage(m)) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_message" };210      try {211        return await handleMessage(m);212      } catch (err) {213        return {214          ok: false,215          error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),216        };217      }218    });219  }220  if (isNativePlatform()) {221    void bootstrapNativeSyncRunner();222  }223}224225async function bootstrapNativeSyncRunner(): Promise<void> {226  if (nativeSyncRunnerBootstrapped) return;227  nativeSyncRunnerBootstrapped = true;228  try {229    setSyncRunner(productionSyncRunner);230    await hydratePersistedSyncState();231  } catch (err) {232    nativeSyncRunnerBootstrapped = false;233    console.warn("[Peach] failed to bootstrap native sync runner:", err);234  }235}236237function isMessage(m: unknown): m is Message {238  return typeof m === "object" && m !== null && "type" in m;239}240241/**242 * The browser-attested origin of the page that originated this message. A web243 * page cannot call chrome.runtime.sendMessage directly (no externally_connectable),244 * so every page-driven message arrives via the content-script relay and the245 * browser stamps `sender.origin`/`sender.url` with the real frame origin — a246 * value the page cannot forge. This is the ONLY trustworthy origin for passkey247 * rpId<->origin enforcement; payload-supplied origins are attacker-controlled.248 */249function attestedSenderOrigin(sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender>): string | undefined {250  if (sender.origin) return sender.origin;251  if (sender.url) {252    try { return new URL(sender.url).origin; } catch { return undefined; }253  }254  return undefined;255}256257// Resolves once restoreFromSession() has run, so handlers see the correct258// post-restore unlock state. entry.ts registers this BEFORE the message259// handler so the onMessage listener is added synchronously at SW startup260// (MV3 requirement) while unlock-dependent handlers still wait for restore.261let restoreReady: Promise<void> = Promise.resolve();262263/** Called by entry.ts at startup with the in-flight restoreFromSession promise. */264export function setRestoreReady(p: Promise<unknown>): void {265  restoreReady = p.then(() => undefined, () => undefined);266}267268export async function handleMessage(269  msg: Message,270  sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender> = {}271): Promise<MessageResponse> {272  try {273    // Wait for session-restore to finish before reading any unlock/vault state.274    // On a cold SW start the popup's first message arrives while restore is275    // still in flight; without this gate IS_UNLOCKED would report locked (a276    // spurious lock screen) and the storage reads could race. The onMessage277    // listener itself is registered synchronously (entry.ts) so this gate, not278    // listener registration, is what absorbs the cold-start window.279    await restoreReady;280    // Validate sender — only allow messages from our extension pages/scripts.281    // `sender.id` is undefined for messages originating from extension UI282    // (popup/options), which is legitimate; reject only when it is defined283    // and does not match our extension id.284    if (285      sender.id !== undefined &&286      sender.id !== chrome.runtime.id287    ) {288      return { ok: false, error: "invalid_sender" };289    }290291    // PCH-01-018: irreversible operations must originate from a trusted extension292    // page (popup/options), never from a content script. The sender.id check above293    // only proves the message came from *our* extension — a content script injected294    // into an attacker page passes it. A single XSS-class bug in the injected UI295    // would otherwise escalate to vault destruction. Extension pages carry an296    // extension-origin sender.url; content scripts carry a page URL.297    if (DESTRUCTIVE_MESSAGE_TYPES.has(msg.type)) {298      const extensionOrigin = chrome.runtime.getURL("");299      if (!sender.url?.startsWith(extensionOrigin)) {300        return { ok: false, error: "invalid_sender" };301      }302    }303304    if (shouldRefreshAutoLock(msg.type) && vault.isUnlocked()) {305      touchAutoLock();306    }307308    switch (msg.type) {309      case "CREATE_VAULT": {310        const { password } = msg.payload as { password: string };311        // Refuse to create a vault under an empty master password — the derived312        // key would be publicly known and the at-rest AES-GCM protection void313        // (audit HIGH; the CSV-import path previously passed ""). Length/strength314        // policy lives in the onboarding UI; this is the non-negotiable floor.315        if (typeof password !== "string" || password.length === 0) {316          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };317        }318        await vault.createVault(password);319        await setupAutoLock();320        broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });321        onVaultUnlocked();322        return { ok: true };323      }324      case "CREATE_VAULT_FROM_ROOT_KEY": {325        const { password, rootKeyHex } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {326          password?: unknown;327          rootKeyHex?: unknown;328        };329        if (typeof password !== "string" || password.length === 0 || typeof rootKeyHex !== "string") {330          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };331        }332333        try {334          const { vaultId } = await vault.createVaultFromRootKey(password, rootKeyHex);335          await setupAutoLock();336          broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });337          onVaultUnlocked();338          return { ok: true, vaultId };339        } catch (err) {340          return { ok: false, error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err) };341        }342      }343      case "UNLOCK": {344        const { password } = msg.payload as { password: string };345        const ok = await vault.unlock(password);346        if (ok) {347          // KAT: verify the WebCrypto stack is healthy before the user relies on it.348          // Runs after unlock so latency is hidden behind the vault-load time.349          const kat = await runSelfTest();350          if (!kat.ok) {351            console.error("[Peach] Crypto self-test FAILED:", kat.error);352            await vault.lock();353            return { ok: false, error: "self_test_failed" };354          }355          await setupAutoLock();356          broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });357          onVaultUnlocked();358          if (isNativePlatform()) await publishInMemoryVault(vault.getEntries());359          return { ok: true };360        }361        // Distinguish corruption from wrong password so the popup can offer362        // a history-restore path instead of falsely accusing the user of363        // mistyping (M7/COR-007).364        const failure = vault.consumeLastUnlockFailureReason();365        if (failure) {366          return {367            ok: false,368            error: "vault_corrupted",369            canRestoreFromHistory: true,370          } as MessageResponse;371        }372        return { ok: false };373      }374      case "VALIDATE_RECOVERY_WORDS": {375        const { words } = msg.payload as { words: string[] };376        const invalid = findInvalidWords(words);377        return { ok: true, data: { valid: invalid.length === 0, invalid } };378      }379      case "GET_RECOVERY_WORDS": {380        // Must be unlocked and have recovery set up (vault must be v2.12+).381        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };382        // LV-4: the recovery words re-derive the ROOT KEY — the highest-383        // value secret in the vault. A session unlock (which may be hours384        // old on a shared machine) is not enough; require a fresh password385        // proof, matching the 1Password/Bitwarden pattern for revealing386        // escrow material. EXEMPTION: the create-vault / rotation confirmation387        // window (peach_recovery_pending) shows the words immediately after388        // the user authenticated, and that confirmation UI has no password to389        // resend — skip the re-auth there only.390        if (!(await isRecoveryConfirmPending())) {391          const { password } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { password?: string };392          if (typeof password !== "string" || !password) {393            return { ok: false, error: "password_required" };394          }395          if (!(await vault.verifyMainPassword(password))) {396            return { ok: false, error: "wrong_password" };397          }398        }399        try {400          const words = await vault.getRecoveryWords();401          return { ok: true, data: words };402        } catch (e) {403          // pre-v2.12 vault that hasn't migrated404          return { ok: false, error: "recovery_not_setup" };405        }406      }407      case "RECOVER_WITH_WORDS": {408        // User has lost their password but has their 12 recovery words.409        // We: (1) validate the words, (2) re-encrypt vault with new password.410        const { words, newPassword } = msg.payload as {411          words: string[];412          newPassword: string;413        };414        const stored = await vault.loadSlotA();415        if (!stored) return { ok: false, error: "no_vault" };416        if (!stored.recovery_salt || !stored.recovery_wrapped_root_key) {417          return { ok: false, error: "recovery_not_setup" };418        }419        // Unwrap the root key from the recovery escrow.420        try {421          await vault.unwrapRootKeyForRecovery(422            stored.recovery_wrapped_root_key,423            stored.recovery_nonce ?? "",424            stored.recovery_tag ?? "",425            stored.recovery_salt,426            words427          );428        } catch {429          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_recovery_words" };430        }431        // Re-key: derive fresh salt + key from new password.432        const newSalt = vault.generateSalt();433        const newKey = await vault.deriveKey(newPassword, newSalt);434        // Re-wrap root key under the new password's derived key so the same435        // recovery words continue to work after the password change.436        await vault.rewrapRootKeyForPassword(newKey, newSalt);437        // Re-encrypt vault entries with the new key.438        await vault.changePasswordWithNewKey(newSalt, newKey);439        await setupAutoLock();440        broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });441        return { ok: true };442      }443      case "LOCK":444        vault.lock();445        if (isNativePlatform()) await clearInMemoryVault();446        return { ok: true };447      case "IS_UNLOCKED":448        return { ok: true, data: vault.isUnlocked() };449      case "GET_VAULT_STATUS":450        return { ok: true, unlocked: vault.isUnlocked() };451      case "HAS_VAULT":452        return { ok: true, data: await vault.hasVault() };453      case "GET_ENTRIES":454        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };455        return { ok: true, data: vault.getEntries() };456      case "ADD_ENTRY": {457        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };458        const payload = msg.payload;459        if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) {460          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };461        }462        const entry = await vault.addEntry(payload as Parameters<typeof vault.addEntry>[0]);463        return { ok: true, data: entry };464      }465      case "BATCH_ADD_ENTRIES": {466        const payload = msg.payload as { entries?: unknown } | null | undefined;467        if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) {468          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };469        }470        if (!Array.isArray(payload.entries)) {471          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };472        }473        const added = await vault.batchAddEntries(payload.entries as Parameters<typeof vault.batchAddEntries>[0]);474        return { ok: true, data: added };475      }476      case "RESTORE_ENTRIES": {477        const payload = msg.payload as478          | { entries?: unknown; mode?: unknown; settings?: unknown }479          | null480          | undefined;481        if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) {482          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };483        }484        if (!Array.isArray(payload.entries)) {485          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };486        }487        if (payload.mode !== "replace" && payload.mode !== "merge") {488          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };489        }490        const summary = await vault.restoreEntries(491          payload.entries as Parameters<typeof vault.restoreEntries>[0],492          payload.mode493        );494        if (payload.settings && typeof payload.settings === "object" && !Array.isArray(payload.settings)) {495          await vault.updateSettings(payload.settings as vault.VaultSettings);496        }497        return { ok: true, data: summary };498      }499      case "CLEAR_VAULT_ENTRIES": {500        await vault.clearVaultEntries("REPLACE_ALL");501        return { ok: true };502      }503      case "GET_VAULT_HISTORY": {504        const snapshots = await vault.getVaultHistory();505        return { ok: true, data: snapshots };506      }507      case "RESTORE_VAULT_SNAPSHOT": {508        const { snapshotId } = msg.payload as { snapshotId: string };509        const result = await vault.restoreVaultSnapshot(snapshotId);510        if (!result.ok) return { ok: false, error: result.error };511        broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_LOCKED" });512        return { ok: true };513      }514      case "COUNT_DUPLICATES": {515        return { ok: true, data: vault.countDuplicates() };516      }517      case "DEDUPLICATE_ENTRIES": {518        const removed = await vault.deduplicateEntries();519        return { ok: true, data: removed };520      }521      case "UPDATE_ENTRY": {522        const payload = msg.payload as { id?: unknown; patch?: unknown } | null | undefined;523        if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) {524          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };525        }526        const { id, patch } = payload;527        if (typeof id !== "string" || !id || !patch || typeof patch !== "object" || Array.isArray(patch)) {528          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };529        }530        // Single enforcement point for the Canary Entries Pro gate. Only531        // gates the transition into a canary entry — clearing/disabling a532        // canary (`canary: undefined`) is always allowed, so existing533        // canary entries remain manageable.534        const incomingCanary = (patch as { canary?: unknown }).canary;535        if (incomingCanary && typeof incomingCanary === "object") {536          const existing = vault.getEntryById(id);537          if (!existing?.canary) {538            const gate = await requirePro("canary_entry");539            if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };540          }541        }542        await vault.updateEntry(id, patch as Parameters<typeof vault.updateEntry>[1]);543        return { ok: true };544      }545      case "ADD_ADDITIONAL_URL": {546        const { id, url } = msg.payload as { id: string; url: string };547        const trimmed = typeof url === "string" ? url.trim() : "";548        if (!trimmed) return { ok: false, error: "url_required" };549        const existing = vault.getEntryById(id);550        if (!existing) return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };551        if (existing.type !== "login") return { ok: false, error: "login_entries_only" };552        const merged = [...(existing.additionalUrls ?? []), trimmed];553        await vault.updateEntry(id, { additionalUrls: merged });554        return { ok: true };555      }556      case "DELETE_ENTRY": {557        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };558        await vault.deleteEntry(id);559        return { ok: true };560      }561      case "GET_DELETED_ENTRIES":562        return { ok: true, data: vault.getDeletedEntries() };563      case "RESTORE_ENTRY": {564        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };565        await vault.restoreEntry(id);566        return { ok: true };567      }568      case "PURGE_ENTRY": {569        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };570        await vault.purgeEntry(id);571        return { ok: true };572      }573      case "PURGE_EXPIRED_TRASH": {574        const { retentionMs } = msg.payload as { retentionMs: number };575        const purged = await vault.purgeExpiredTrash(retentionMs);576        return { ok: true, data: purged };577      }578      case "SAVE_NOTE": {579        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };580        const { id, title, body } = msg.payload as { id?: string; title: string; body: string };581        const now = Date.now();582        if (id) {583          const existing = vault.getEntryById(id);584          if (!existing) return { ok: false, error: "not_found" };585          await vault.updateEntry(id, { title: title || "Untitled", notes: body, modifiedAt: now });586          return { ok: true, data: vault.getEntryById(id) };587        } else {588          // PCH-01-026 #10: addEntry stamps its own createdAt/modifiedAt589          // (EntryDraft omits both), so passing them was the only reason the590          // `as any` cast existed. Dropping them makes the call type-check.591          const entry = await vault.addEntry({592            type: "note",593            title: title || "Untitled",594            notes: body,595          });596          return { ok: true, data: entry };597        }598      }599      case "DELETE_NOTE": {600        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };601        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };602        await vault.deleteEntry(id);603        return { ok: true };604      }605      case "GET_NOTES": {606        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };607        const notes = vault.getEntries().filter(608          (e) => e.type === "note" && !e.deletedAt609        );610        return { ok: true, data: notes } as MessageResponse;611      }612      case "SEARCH_VAULT": {613        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };614        // AUD-002: shape-validate the payload before calling string methods.615        // A raw cast lets a malformed message crash the handler with TypeError.616        const { query } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { query?: unknown };617        if (typeof query !== "string") {618          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };619        }620        const q = query.toLowerCase();621        const searchResults = vault.getEntries().filter(622          (e) =>623            !e.deletedAt &&624            (e.title.toLowerCase().includes(q) ||625              e.notes?.toLowerCase().includes(q) ||626              e.username?.toLowerCase().includes(q))627        );628        return { ok: true, data: searchResults } as MessageResponse;629      }630      case "AUTOFILL_QUERY": {631        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) {632          return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };633        }634        let { includeAll } = msg.payload as { includeAll?: boolean };635        const { domain, kind, userGesture } = msg.payload as {636          domain: string;637          kind?: "login" | "card" | "totp";638          userGesture?: boolean;639        };640        // MV-2: the vault-wide inventory (every title/username/email/url)641        // may only leave the background on an explicit user gesture — the642        // user opening the search affordance — never on passive form focus.643        // userGesture is self-declared by our own content script; the value644        // of this gate is that PASSIVE code paths (which never set it)645        // cannot ship the inventory, shrinking what a compromised page that646        // merely triggers focus events can observe.647        if (includeAll && userGesture !== true) {648          includeAll = false;649        }650        // kind="card": return saved cards as compact summaries for the651        // inline card silver platter. Cards are not domain-scoped — every652        // saved card is a candidate on every checkout page — so domain is653        // ignored when kind === "card".654        if (kind === "card") {655          const cards = vault.getEntries().filter((e) => e.type === "card");656          return {657            ok: true,658            data: cards.map((e) => ({659              id: e.id,660              title: e.cardNickname || e.title,661              cardholderName: e.cardholderName,662              last4: e.last4,663              expMonth: e.expMonth,664              expYear: e.expYear,665              network: e.network,666            })),667          };668        }669        if (kind === "totp") {670          const matches = (671            includeAll672              ? vault.getEntries().filter((entry) => entry.type !== "note" && entry.type !== "card")673              : vault.queryDomain(domain)674          ).filter((entry) => !isPasskeyOnly(entry) && Boolean(entry.totp));675          return {676            ok: true,677            data: matches.map((e) => ({678              id: e.id,679              title: e.title,680              username: e.username,681              email: e.email,682              url: e.url,683              hasTotp: true,684            })),685          };686        }687        // The inline selector fills username+password into a form. Passkey-688        // only entries have no password to fill; sign-in for those goes689        // through the WebAuthn path instead. Filter them out everywhere so690        // the user doesn't see four "GitHub" rows that mostly do nothing.691        // Notes and cards never belonged here either.692        const matches = (693          includeAll694            ? vault695                .getEntries()696                .filter((entry) => entry.type !== "note" && entry.type !== "card")697            : vault.queryDomain(domain)698        ).filter((entry) => !isPasskeyOnly(entry));699        return {700          ok: true,701          data: matches.map((e) =>702            includeAll703              ? {704                  id: e.id,705                  title: e.title,706                  // username/email/url shipped so the inline popup's search707                  // affordance can match on them, not just titles. No secrets708                  // cross the boundary — same shape as the domain-matched709                  // response below minus hasTotp (which the search list710                  // doesn't surface).711                  username: e.username,712                  email: e.email,713                  url: e.url,714                  hasPasskey: e.passkey !== undefined,715                }716              : {717                  id: e.id,718                  title: e.title,719                  username: e.username,720                  email: e.email,721                  url: e.url,722                  hasTotp: Boolean(e.totp),723                  hasPasskey: e.passkey !== undefined,724                }725          ),726        };727      }728      case "GET_ENTRY_FOR_FILL": {729        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };730        const { id, explicitSummon } = msg.payload as {731          id: string;732          explicitSummon?: boolean;733        };734        const entry = vault.getEntryById(id);735        if (!entry) return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };736        // Passkey-only entries (passkey credential, no password) cannot be737        // filled into a form — sign-in goes through the WebAuthn path. A738        // login that ALSO has a passkey is still fillable for its password.739        if (isPasskeyOnly(entry)) return { ok: false, error: "passkey_not_fillable" };740741        // MV-1: re-validate the entry against the requesting tab's origin.742        // sender.tab.url is browser-attested — a page cannot forge it. When743        // the request does not come from a tab at all (popup surfaces use744        // GET_ENTRY_FOR_EDIT, not this), refuse.745        if (sender.tab !== undefined || sender.url !== undefined) {746          let senderDomain: string | null = null;747          try {748            const rawUrl = sender.tab?.url ?? sender.url ?? "";749            senderDomain = rawUrl ? extractDomain(new URL(rawUrl).hostname) : null;750          } catch {751            senderDomain = null;752          }753          if (!senderDomain) return { ok: false, error: "origin_unverified" };754755          const entryDomains = new Set<string>();756          const primary = extractDomain(entry.url ?? "");757          if (primary) entryDomains.add(primary);758          for (const extra of entry.additionalUrls ?? []) {759            const d = extractDomain(extra);760            if (d) entryDomains.add(d);761          }762763          // explicitSummon=true means the user actively picked this entry764          // from the cross-domain search affordance — an intentional765          // off-domain fill. Passive fill paths must stay domain-bound.766          if (explicitSummon !== true && !entryDomains.has(senderDomain)) {767            // Domain mismatch — refuse silently (no oracle about which ids exist).768            return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };769          }770        }771        // Strip the passkey credential AND the raw base32 TOTP seed from the772        // response. Content scripts never need either: the private key is the773        // authenticator's, and handing over the TOTP seed would let a774        // compromised content script mint valid codes indefinitely (SEV-3-C).775        // Generate the *current* 6-digit code here in the background and send776        // only that, plus the seconds left so the UI can render a countdown.777        // Also drop passwordHistory: filling needs only the *current* password.778        // Handing every past password to a content script during passive779        // autofill on an arbitrary page would widen the blast radius of a780        // compromised page far beyond the one credential being filled.781        const {782          passkey: _strippedPasskey,783          totp: seed,784          totpAlgorithm,785          totpDigits,786          totpPeriod,787          passwordHistory: _ph,788          ...safeEntry789        } = entry;790        let totpCode: string | undefined;791        let totpRemaining: number | undefined;792        if (seed) {793          try {794            // PCH-01-019: honour stored algorithm/digits/period (defaults apply795            // when these are undefined, i.e. legacy bare-seed entries).796            const generated = generateTOTP(seed, totpAlgorithm, totpDigits, totpPeriod);797            totpCode = generated.code;798            totpRemaining = generated.remaining;799          } catch {800            totpCode = undefined;801          }802        }803        return { ok: true, data: { ...safeEntry, totpCode, totpRemaining } };804      }805      // Trusted full-entry fetch for Peach's own inline-popup surfaces that806      // genuinely need the raw TOTP seed: the edit form (which re-saves the807      // seed and would otherwise wipe it) and nothing else. Unlike808      // GET_ENTRY_FOR_FILL this fires only on an explicit user action inside809      // the inline popup, never during passive autofill on an arbitrary page.810      // The passkey credential is still stripped — the edit form never touches it.811      case "GET_ENTRY_FOR_EDIT": {812        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };813        const { id, explicitSummon } = msg.payload as {814          id: string;815          explicitSummon?: boolean;816        };817        const entry = vault.getEntryById(id);818        if (!entry) return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };819820        // PCH-01-006: re-validate the browser-attested sender origin, mirroring821        // GET_ENTRY_FOR_FILL (MV-1). The edit channel ships the raw TOTP seed and822        // full password history — at least as sensitive as the fill response — so823        // the boundary must be enforced here, not only by UI reachability. Today824        // the sole caller is the popup (no sender.tab, so this is a structural825        // no-op), but a future tab-context caller or an id leak would otherwise826        // inherit a full-credential oracle. Unlike the fill path we SKIP (not827        // refuse) when no sender domain resolves, to keep the popup caller working.828        if (sender.tab !== undefined || sender.url !== undefined) {829          let senderDomain: string | null = null;830          try {831            const rawUrl = sender.tab?.url ?? sender.url ?? "";832            senderDomain = rawUrl ? extractDomain(new URL(rawUrl).hostname) : null;833          } catch {834            senderDomain = null;835          }836          if (senderDomain) {837            const entryDomains = new Set<string>();838            const primary = extractDomain(entry.url ?? "");839            if (primary) entryDomains.add(primary);840            for (const extra of entry.additionalUrls ?? []) {841              const d = extractDomain(extra);842              if (d) entryDomains.add(d);843            }844            if (explicitSummon !== true && !entryDomains.has(senderDomain)) {845              return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" }; // no id oracle846            }847          }848        }849850        const { passkey: _passkey, ...safeEntry } = entry;851        return { ok: true, data: safeEntry };852      }853      case "COPY": {854        // AUD-002: shape-validate the payload before passing to the clipboard855        // helper. A raw cast lets a malformed message reach the clipboard API856        // with a non-string and throw.857        const { text, label, alreadyWritten } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {858          text?: unknown;859          label?: unknown;860          alreadyWritten?: unknown;861        };862        if (typeof text !== "string" || typeof label !== "string") {863          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };864        }865        await copyToClipboard(text, label, Boolean(alreadyWritten));866        return { ok: true, clearSeconds: getEffectiveClearSeconds() };867      }868      case "CHECK_ALL_BREACHES": {869        const allEntries = vault.getEntries();870        const results: Record<string, number> = {};871        for (const entry of allEntries) {872          if (entry.type === "note") continue;873          if (!entry.password) continue;874          results[entry.id] = await vault.checkBreach(entry.password);875          // Small delay — be a good citizen to the HIBP API876          await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 200));877        }878        // Persist any non-zero counts back to entries879        for (const [id, count] of Object.entries(results)) {880          const entry = vault.getEntryById(id);881          if (entry && (entry.breach ?? 0) !== count) {882            await vault.updateEntry(id, { breach: count > 0 ? count : undefined });883          }884        }885        return { ok: true, data: results };886      }887      case "GET_SETTINGS":888        return { ok: true, data: await vault.ensureSettingsLoaded() };889      case "UPDATE_SETTINGS": {890        const patch = msg.payload;891        if (!patch || typeof patch !== "object" || Array.isArray(patch)) {892          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };893        }894        await vault.updateSettings(patch as vault.VaultSettings);895        if (typeof (patch as Record<string, unknown>).autoLockMinutes === "number") {896          await setupAutoLock();897          if (vault.isUnlocked()) touchAutoLock();898        }899        return { ok: true };900      }901      case "GET_PENDING_PASSKEY":902        return { ok: true, data: await getPendingPasskeyRequest() };903      case "APPROVE_PASSKEY": {904        const { requestId } = msg.payload as { requestId: number };905        await resolvePendingPasskeyRequest(requestId, true);906        return { ok: true };907      }908      case "DENY_PASSKEY": {909        const { requestId } = msg.payload as { requestId: number };910        await resolvePendingPasskeyRequest(requestId, false);911        return { ok: true };912      }913      case "GET_PASSKEY_PROVIDER_STATE":914        return { ok: true, data: await getPasskeyProviderState() };915      case "SET_PASSKEY_PROVIDER_ENABLED": {916        const { enabled } = msg.payload as { enabled: boolean };917        // Disabling is always free; gating fires only when a free user is918        // trying to turn passkey interception on.919        if (enabled) {920          const gate = await requirePro("passkeys");921          if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };922        }923        return { ok: true, data: await setPasskeyProviderEnabled(enabled) };924      }925      // AUD-003: this handler POSTs `entryTitle` to a user-configured HTTPS926      // endpoint. Intentional product behavior — users configure their own927      // dead-man's-switch. isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl blocks localhost, private928      // IPs, and non-HTTPS schemes, but cannot defend against every DNS-929      // rebinding case. The UI under CanarySection (Entry.tsx) discloses to930      // users that the entry title leaves the device when the canary fires.931      case "FIRE_CANARY_PING": {932        // Canary alert fires unconditionally for any entry with canary: true.933        // The Pro gate only governs creation/flagging of canary entries; once934        // an entry is flagged, the alert path is a security property and must935        // never be license-gated.936        const { webhookUrl, entryTitle, trigger } = msg.payload as {937          webhookUrl: string;938          entryTitle: string;939          trigger: "password_copied" | "username_copied" | "autofilled" | "submitted" | "test";940        };941        if (!isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl(webhookUrl)) {942          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_webhook_url" };943        }944        // LV-3: debounce non-test pings per (webhook, entry) so a page that945        // strobes focus/fill events can't turn the canary into a request946        // firehose at the user's endpoint. Test pings are exempt — they are947        // explicit user clicks in the settings UI and are awaited for948        // feedback. The FIRST ping in a window always goes out, so the949        // dead-man's-switch property (canary fires on access) is preserved;950        // only repeats within the window are coalesced.951        if (trigger !== "test") {952          const rlKey = `canary-last-fetch:${webhookUrl}:${entryTitle}`;953          const stored = await chrome.storage.local.get(rlKey);954          const last = (stored as Record<string, unknown>)[rlKey];955          if (typeof last === "number" && Date.now() - last < CANARY_MIN_INTERVAL_MS) {956            return { ok: true, data: { rateLimited: true } };957          }958          await chrome.storage.local.set({ [rlKey]: Date.now() });959        }960        const body = JSON.stringify({961          event: trigger === "test" ? "peach_canary_test" : "peach_canary_accessed",962          entry: entryTitle,963          trigger,964          timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),965          source: "peach-extension",966        });967        if (trigger === "test") {968          // Permitted outbound fetch: user-configured canary alert endpoint969          // (validated by isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl above). This is the970          // only non-HIBP outbound call in the extension — see971          // Projects.md §3.7. Test pings are awaited so the UI can show972          // success/failure.973          try {974            const res = await fetch(webhookUrl, {975              method: "POST",976              headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },977              body,978            });979            return { ok: res.ok, error: res.ok ? undefined : `HTTP ${res.status}` };980          } catch (err) {981            return { ok: false, error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : "network_error" };982          }983        }984        // Non-test triggers are fire-and-forget985        fetch(webhookUrl, {986          method: "POST",987          headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },988          body,989        }).catch(() => {});990        return { ok: true };991      }992      case "ACTIVATE_LICENSE": {993        const { key } = msg.payload as { key: string };994        const licenseInfo = await activateLicense(key);995        return { ok: true, data: licenseInfo };996      }997      case "GET_LICENSE": {998        const licenseInfo = await getLicenseInfo();999        return { ok: true, data: licenseInfo };1000      }1001      case "GET_LICENSE_KEY": {1002        const key = await getLicenseKey();1003        return { ok: true, data: key };1004      }1005      case "DEACTIVATE_LICENSE": {1006        await deactivateLicense();1007        return { ok: true };1008      }1009      case "SHOULD_PLAY_CELEBRATION": {1010        const should = await shouldPlayCelebration();1011        return { ok: true, data: should };1012      }1013      case "MARK_CELEBRATION_PLAYED": {1014        await markCelebrationPlayed();1015        return { ok: true };1016      }1017      case "GET_CODEX_VAULT_DATA": {1018        // Pro-gated. requirePro broadcasts PRO_GATE_TRIGGERED on miss so the1019        // popup navigates to the License section without further coordination.1020        const gate = await requirePro("codex");1021        if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1022        return await handleGetCodexVaultData();1023      }1024      case "ESTIMATE_CODEX_PAGES": {1025        const gate = await requirePro("codex");1026        if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1027        return await handleEstimateCodexPages();1028      }1029      case "RESTORE_FROM_CODEX": {1030        // !! IMPORTANT: intentionally NOT Pro-gated. A free device must still1031        // be able to restore a vault that was printed by a Pro user.1032        // DO NOT add a Pro gate here.1033        const payload = msg.payload as CodexRestorePayload;1034        return await handleRestoreFromCodex(payload);1035      }1036      case "OPEN_PRO_GATE": {1037        // Content script requests: open popup and navigate to License section.1038        const { feature } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { feature?: string };1039        if (chrome.storage.session) {1040          await chrome.storage.session.set({ pendingProGate: { feature: feature ?? "passkeys" } });1041        }1042        try { await chrome.action.openPopup(); } catch { /* badge fallback */ }1043        return { ok: true };1044      }1045      case "OPEN_POPUP": {1046        // Content script asks to open the trusted extension popup — used by the1047        // inline locked bubble so the master password is entered in the popup,1048        // never in page-hosted DOM (audit HIGH). Best-effort: openPopup needs a1049        // user gesture + Chrome 127+/Firefox; on failure the user clicks the1050        // toolbar icon. The badge already signals Peach needs attention.1051        //1052        // Set a session flag so the popup knows it was opened for inline unlock1053        // and should close itself once the vault is unlocked (returning the user1054        // to the inline autofill selector on the page).1055        if (chrome.storage.session) {1056          await chrome.storage.session.set({ peach_inline_unlock: true });1057        }1058        try { await chrome.action.openPopup(); } catch { /* user opens via toolbar */ }1059        return { ok: true };1060      }1061      case "GET_IDENTITIES": {1062        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1063        return { ok: true, data: vault.getIdentities() };1064      }1065      case "TOUCH_AUTO_LOCK": {1066        // touchAutoLock() is already called by shouldRefreshAutoLock above;1067        // this case just gives the popup a typed message to keep the session alive.1068        return { ok: true };1069      }1070      case "GET_ADVANCED_HEALTH_REPORT": {1071        const gate = await requirePro("advanced_health");1072        if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1073        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1074        const report = await buildAdvancedHealthReport(vault.getEntries());1075        return { ok: true, data: report };1076      }1077      case "IS_DURESS_ENABLED": {1078        const enabled = await vault.isDuressEnabled();1079        return { ok: true, data: enabled };1080      }1081      case "SETUP_DURESS": {1082        // Single enforcement point for the Duress Vault Pro gate. Free users1083        // who somehow reach this handler are rejected here; the popup also1084        // pre-checks isPro() to avoid showing the setup form to free users,1085        // but server-side is the actual security boundary.1086        const gate = await requirePro("duress_vault");1087        if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1088        // MV3 service workers restart after inactivity, losing the in-memory1089        // derived key. Detect this before calling setupDuress so the popup1090        // can show a meaningful prompt to re-lock and re-unlock.1091        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "session_expired" };1092        const { duressPassword } = msg.payload as { duressPassword: string };1093        await vault.setupDuress(duressPassword);1094        return { ok: true };1095      }1096      case "DISABLE_DURESS": {1097        await vault.disableDuress();1098        return { ok: true };1099      }1100      case "VERIFY_MAIN_PASSWORD": {1101        const { password } = msg.payload as { password: string };1102        const ok = await vault.verifyMainPassword(password);1103        return { ok: true, data: ok };1104      }1105      case "CHANGE_PASSWORD": {1106        const { currentPassword, newPassword } = msg.payload as {1107          currentPassword: string;1108          newPassword: string;1109        };1110        const changed = await vault.changePassword(currentPassword, newPassword);1111        return changed1112          ? { ok: true }1113          : { ok: false, error: "incorrect_current_password" };1114      }1115      case "GET_SITE_PASSWORD_POLICY": {1116        const [tab] = await chrome.tabs.query({ active: true, currentWindow: true });1117        if (!tab?.id) return { ok: true, data: null };1118        try {1119          const response = await chrome.tabs.sendMessage(tab.id, {1120            type: "GET_SITE_PASSWORD_POLICY",1121          });1122          return (response as MessageResponse) ?? { ok: true, data: null };1123        } catch {1124          return { ok: true, data: null };1125        }1126      }1127      case "RECORD_MANUAL_SUMMON": {1128        const { domain } = msg.payload as { domain: string };1129        const settings = vault.getSettings();1130        const existing = settings.manualSummonDomains?.[domain];1131        const now = Date.now();1132        await vault.updateSettings({1133          manualSummonDomains: {1134            ...settings.manualSummonDomains,1135            [domain]: {1136              firstSummonedAt: existing?.firstSummonedAt ?? now,1137              summonCount: (existing?.summonCount ?? 0) + 1,1138              lastSummonedAt: now,1139            },1140          },1141        });1142        return { ok: true };1143      }1144      case "DECLINE_CARD_SAVE": {1145        const { last4, expMonth, expYear } = msg.payload as { last4: string; expMonth: string; expYear: string };1146        await vault.declineCardSaveOffer(last4, expMonth, expYear);1147        return { ok: true };1148      }1149      case "IS_CARD_DECLINED": {1150        const { last4, expMonth, expYear } = msg.payload as { last4: string; expMonth: string; expYear: string };1151        const declined = await vault.isCardDeclined(last4, expMonth, expYear);1152        return { ok: true, data: declined };1153      }1154      case "INITIATE_FIREFOX_PASSKEY_CREATE": {1155        const { rpId, rpName, userName, userDisplayName } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1156          rpId?: string;1157          rpName?: string;1158          userName?: string;1159          userDisplayName?: string;1160        };1161        if (!rpId || !userName) return { ok: false, error: "rpid_and_username_required" };1162        return await initiateFirefoxPasskeyCreate({1163          rpId,1164          rpName: rpName ?? rpId,1165          userName,1166          userDisplayName,1167        });1168      }11691170      case "COMPLETE_FIREFOX_PASSKEY_CREATE": {1171        const payload = msg.payload as Parameters<typeof completeFirefoxPasskeyCreate>[0] | undefined;1172        if (!payload) return { ok: false, error: "missing_payload" };1173        return await completeFirefoxPasskeyCreate(payload);1174      }11751176      case "PASSKEY_OFFER_DECLINE": {1177        const { domain } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { domain?: string };1178        if (!domain) return { ok: false, error: "domain_required" };1179        await recordPasskeyOfferDecline(domain);1180        return { ok: true };1181      }11821183      case "GET_PASSKEY_OFFER_DECLINED": {1184        const { domain } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { domain?: string };1185        if (!domain) return { ok: false, error: "domain_required" };1186        return { ok: true, data: await isPasskeyOfferDeclined(domain) };1187      }11881189      case "PASSKEY_HAS_CREDENTIALS": {1190        const payload = msg.payload as {1191          rpId?: string;1192          allowCredentials?: Array<{ id: string; type?: string }>;1193        } | undefined;1194        if (!payload?.rpId) return { ok: false, error: "rpid_required" };1195        return await handlePasskeyHasCredentials({1196          rpId: payload.rpId,1197          allowCredentials: payload.allowCredentials ?? [],1198        }, attestedSenderOrigin(sender));1199      }12001201      case "PASSKEY_CREATE": {1202        const payload = msg.payload as Parameters<typeof handleFirefoxPasskeyCreate>[0] | undefined;1203        if (!payload?.rpId || !payload?.userName) {1204          return { ok: false, error: "rpid_and_username_required" };1205        }1206        return await handleFirefoxPasskeyCreate(payload, attestedSenderOrigin(sender));1207      }12081209      case "PASSKEY_GET": {1210        const payload = msg.payload as Parameters<typeof handleFirefoxPasskeyGet>[0] | undefined;1211        if (!payload?.rpId) return { ok: false, error: "rpid_required" };1212        return await handleFirefoxPasskeyGet(payload, attestedSenderOrigin(sender));1213      }12141215      case "PASSKEY_AUTH_RESPONSE": {1216        const { requestId, approved } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1217          requestId?: string | number;1218          approved?: boolean;1219        };1220        if (requestId === undefined || requestId === null || typeof approved !== 'boolean') {1221          return { ok: false, error: 'requestId and approved required' };1222        }1223        await resolvePendingPasskeyRequest(Number(requestId), approved);1224        return { ok: true };1225      }12261227      case "GET_PASSKEY_FOR_DOMAIN": {1228        const { domain } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { domain?: string };1229        if (!domain) return { ok: false, error: "domain_required" };1230        // Scope to the caller's own origin: a page may only ask about passkeys1231        // for a domain it actually owns, so an arbitrary page cannot enumerate1232        // which sites the user holds passkeys for or read the username (audit MEDIUM).1233        const origin = attestedSenderOrigin(sender);1234        if (!origin || !isValidRpId(domain, origin)) return { ok: true, data: null };1235        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: true, data: null };1236        const match = vault1237          .getEntries()1238          .find((entry) => entry.passkey?.rpId === domain);1239        if (!match || !match.passkey) return { ok: true, data: null };1240        // Slim shape — only the fields State 11 needs. Never expose private1241        // key material, even though this is locked behind isUnlocked.1242        return {1243          ok: true,1244          data: {1245            rpId: match.passkey.rpId,1246            userName: match.passkey.userName,1247            browser: match.passkey.browser,1248          },1249        };1250      }12511252      case "DESTROY_VAULT": {1253        // Irreversible by design. Lock zeroes the derived key + in-memory entries;1254        // storage.local.clear() wipes every Peach key (slots, settings, license,1255        // onboarded flag, history, sync state, declined cards, recall, etc.);1256        // session.clear() wipes pending passkey requests + pro-notice queues.1257        // Caller (Panic.tsx) handles UI navigation back to onboarding.1258        //1259        // The Pro license is the one thing that must survive: the user paid for1260        // it, and destroying a vault (panic wipe, fresh start) is not a refund.1261        // Capture it before the clear and restore it after. peach_pro_celebrated1262        // rides along so the Pro celebration doesn't replay on the next unlock.1263        const preserved = await chrome.storage.local.get([1264          "peach_license",1265          "peach_pro_celebrated",1266        ]);1267        vault.lock();1268        await storageClear();1269        await vault.clearVaultHistory();1270        const toRestore: Record<string, unknown> = {};1271        if (preserved.peach_license !== undefined) toRestore.peach_license = preserved.peach_license;1272        if (preserved.peach_pro_celebrated !== undefined) toRestore.peach_pro_celebrated = preserved.peach_pro_celebrated;1273        if (Object.keys(toRestore).length > 0) {1274          await chrome.storage.local.set(toRestore);1275        }1276        if (chrome.storage.session) {1277          await chrome.storage.session.clear();1278        }1279        return { ok: true };1280      }12811282      // Android-only: biometric unlock with pre-derived key.1283      case "UNLOCK_WITH_KEY": {1284        const { masterKeyHex } = msg.payload as { masterKeyHex: string };1285        if (!isNativePlatform()) {1286          return { ok: false, error: "desktop_only_uses_password" };1287        }1288        try {1289          const result = await vault.unlockWithKey(masterKeyHex);1290          if (result.ok) {1291            onVaultUnlocked();1292            await publishInMemoryVault(result.entries);1293          }1294          return { ok: result.ok, data: result.ok ? { entries: result.entries } : undefined, error: result.ok ? undefined : result.error };1295        } catch {1296          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };1297        }1298      }1299      // Android: returns current in-memory derived key as hex. Used by biometric enable flow.1300      case "GET_DERIVED_KEY": {1301        if (!isNativePlatform()) {1302          return { ok: false, error: "android_only" };1303        }1304        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) {1305          return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1306        }1307        return { ok: true, data: { masterKeyHex: vault.getDerivedKeyHex() } };1308      }1309      case "GET_IDENTITY_SUGGESTIONS": {1310        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1311        const entries = vault.getEntries();1312        const suggestions = buildIdentitySuggestions(entries);1313        return { ok: true, data: { suggestions } };1314      }1315      case "POPULATE_INLINE_VAULT": {1316        if (!isNativePlatform()) return { ok: false };1317        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1318        const entries = vault.getEntries();1319        await publishInMemoryVault(entries);1320        return { ok: true };1321      }1322      case "ML_INIT":1323        return { ok: true };13241325      case "ML_PREDICT_BATCH": {1326        // AUD-002: shape-validate before forwarding to the ML helper.1327        const { featuresArray } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { featuresArray?: unknown };1328        if (!Array.isArray(featuresArray)) {1329          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1330        }1331        return { ok: true, data: mlPredictBatch(featuresArray as MLFieldFeatures[]) };1332      }13331334      // ── Vault sync (v3) ───────────────────────────────────────────────1335      // Returns the public-facing local identity needed by the popup to1336      // drive Phase-1 audio pairing. The private long-term key never1337      // leaves the background.1338      case "GET_LOCAL_IDENTITY": {1339        // Not Pro-gated: a free device may attempt to pair so it can RECEIVE a1340        // Pro license from an already-Pro peer (at least one device must be Pro).1341        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1342        // Identity derives from the stable root key, not the password-derived1343        // key, so pairing survives a master-password change (SEV-2-B).1344        const masterKeyHex = vault.getRootKeyHex();1345        if (!masterKeyHex) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1346        const masterKey = unhexBytes(masterKeyHex);1347        try {1348          const identity = await buildLocalIdentity(masterKey);1349          // If this device is Pro, advertise the signed license so the peer can1350          // activate it after SAS confirmation — pairing carries Pro across.1351          if (await isProUser()) {1352            const license = await getLicenseKey();1353            if (license) (identity as { license?: string }).license = license;1354          }1355          return { ok: true, data: identity };1356        } finally {1357          masterKey.fill(0);1358        }1359      }13601361      case "GET_ADOPTION_MATERIAL": {1362        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1363        const rootKeyHex = vault.getRootKeyHex();1364        if (!rootKeyHex) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1365        const rootKeyBytes = unhexBytes(rootKeyHex);1366        try {1367          const data: { rootKeyHex: string; vaultId: string; license?: string } = {1368            rootKeyHex,1369            vaultId: await computeVaultId(rootKeyBytes),1370          };1371          if (await isProUser()) {1372            const license = await getLicenseKey();1373            if (license) data.license = license;1374          }1375          return { ok: true, data };1376        } finally {1377          rootKeyBytes.fill(0);1378        }1379      }13801381      case "COMPLETE_PAIRING": {1382        // Not Pro-gated — see GET_LOCAL_IDENTITY.1383        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1384        const paired = (msg.payload as { paired?: unknown })?.paired;1385        if (typeof paired !== "object" || paired === null) {1386          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1387        }1388        const candidate = paired as Record<string, unknown>;1389        if (1390          typeof candidate.deviceId !== "string" || !candidate.deviceId ||1391          typeof candidate.deviceName !== "string" || !candidate.deviceName ||1392          typeof candidate.deviceType !== "string" ||1393          typeof candidate.longTermPublicKeyHex !== "string" ||1394          !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(candidate.longTermPublicKeyHex) ||1395          (1396            candidate.signingPublicKeyHex !== undefined &&1397            (1398              typeof candidate.signingPublicKeyHex !== "string" ||1399              !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(candidate.signingPublicKeyHex)1400            )1401          ) ||1402          typeof candidate.pairedAt !== "number"1403        ) {1404          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_paired_device" };1405        }1406        // A fresh SAS-confirmed direct pairing is the one operation allowed to1407        // lift an old terminal revocation. Without this, re-pairing recreated1408        // an impossible state where the same device was both paired and1409        // revoked, and a later Remove became a permanent no-op.1410        await clearDeviceRevocation(candidate.deviceId);1411        await upsertPairedDeviceV3(candidate as unknown as import("../shared/sync-types").PairedDevice);1412        // Newly paired device → kick a sync so it gets its first round1413        // without waiting for the next 10-minute alarm tick. Fire-and-forget;1414        // the in-flight guard handles overlap with any other trigger.1415        void triggerSyncIfReachable({ reason: "device_list_changed" }).catch(() => undefined);1416        return { ok: true };1417      }14181419      case "LIST_PAIRED_DEVICES": {1420        const devices = await listPairedDevicesV3();1421        return { ok: true, data: { devices } };1422      }14231424      case "UNPAIR_DEVICE": {1425        const { deviceId } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { deviceId?: string };1426        if (typeof deviceId !== "string" || !deviceId) {1427          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1428        }1429        // Removing a device REVOKES it rather than just dropping the local1430        // row: a plain removal is undone the moment any other peer vouches it1431        // back through a manifest, which is exactly what the relay makes easy.1432        await revokeDeviceByIdV3(deviceId, await getOrCreateDeviceId());1433        // Sync against the remaining hosts — the unpaired device no longer1434        // matters but the next alarm tick is up to ten minutes away.1435        void triggerSyncIfReachable({ reason: "device_list_changed" }).catch(() => undefined);1436        return { ok: true };1437      }14381439      case "RENAME_LOCAL_DEVICE": {1440        const { name } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { name?: string };1441        if (typeof name !== "string") return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1442        await setDeviceNameV3(name);1443        return { ok: true };1444      }14451446      // ── Relay pairing ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────1447      // Not Pro-gated (a free device may pair to receive Pro/sync). The whole NK1448      // session runs in the background; the SAS and the terminal result reach1449      // the popup as ADOPTION_SOURCE_SAS / ADOPTION_SOURCE_RESULT pushes.1450      case "START_ADOPTION_SOURCE": {1451        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1452        if (isRelayAdoptionSourceInFlight()) {1453          return { ok: false, error: "adoption_source_in_progress" };1454        }1455        try {1456          return { ok: true, data: await startRelayAdoptionSource() };1457        } catch (error) {1458          return {1459            ok: false,1460            error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : "adoption_source_failed",1461          };1462        }1463      }14641465      // Onboarding receiver — empty extension shows a QR, phone scans and1466      // sends the vault. The popup supplies the local-only password here so1467      // the background can wrap the adopted root key at rest without ever1468      // asking the user to retype it.1469      case "START_ADOPTION_RECEIVER": {1470        if (isRelayAdoptionSourceInFlight()) {1471          return { ok: false, error: "adoption_receiver_in_progress" };1472        }1473        const password = (msg.payload as { password?: unknown } | undefined)?.password;1474        if (typeof password !== "string" || password.length === 0) {1475          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1476        }1477        try {1478          return { ok: true, data: await startRelayAdoptionReceiver(password) };1479        } catch (error) {1480          return {1481            ok: false,1482            error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : "adoption_receiver_failed",1483          };1484        }1485      }14861487      // Popup→bg counterpart to ADOPTION_SOURCE_SAS (receiver flow).1488      // The receiver now auto-accepts the SAS (both sides derive it from the1489      // same Noise handshake hash, so the codes match by construction) so1490      // the popup never has a SAS screen to tap on. The id round-trips the1491      // same way so a stale late response can't approve the wrong session.1492      // Popup→bg counterpart for the source flow: Confirm/Cancel on the1493      // source's SAS screen.14941495      // Source-side mirror of RECEIVER_SAS_DECISION: the popup's confirm/cancel1496      // on the source's SAS screen. The id round-trips the same way so a stale1497      // late response can't approve the wrong session.1498      case "SOURCE_SAS_DECISION": {1499        const payload = msg.payload as { id?: unknown; ok?: unknown } | undefined;1500        if (typeof payload?.id !== "string" || typeof payload?.ok !== "boolean") {1501          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1502        }1503        return { ok: resolveSourceSasConfirmation(payload.id, payload.ok) };1504      }15051506      case "CANCEL_ADOPTION_SOURCE": {1507        cancelRelayAdoptionSource();1508        return { ok: true };1509      }15101511      case "TRIGGER_SYNC": {1512        const payload = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1513          reason?: "vault_change" | "foreground" | "manual";1514          force?: boolean;1515        };1516        const reason = payload.reason ?? "foreground";15171518        void triggerSyncIfReachable({ reason, force: payload.force === true });1519        return { ok: true };1520      }15211522      case "GET_SYNC_STATE": {1523        return { ok: true, data: getSyncState() };1524      }15251526      case "GET_SYNC_SETTINGS": {1527        return { ok: true, data: await getSyncSettings() };1528      }15291530      case "SET_SYNC_SETTINGS": {1531        const payload = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1532          mode?: unknown;1533          relayUrl?: unknown;1534        };1535        try {1536          // A custom relay URL implies private mode; Peach's own relay stays1537          // public. See setRelayUrl.1538          if (payload.relayUrl !== undefined) {1539            if (typeof payload.relayUrl !== "string") {1540              return { ok: false, error: "invalid_relay_url" };1541            }1542            return { ok: true, data: await setRelayUrl(payload.relayUrl) };1543          }1544          if (payload.mode !== undefined) {1545            if (payload.mode !== "public" && payload.mode !== "private" && payload.mode !== "off") {1546              return { ok: false, error: "invalid_sync_mode" };1547            }1548            return { ok: true, data: await setSyncMode(payload.mode as SyncMode) };1549          }1550          return { ok: true, data: await getSyncSettings() };1551        } catch (error) {1552          return {1553            ok: false,1554            error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : "invalid_relay_url",1555          };1556        }1557      }15581559      case "GET_SYNC_ALERTS": {1560        const { consume } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { consume?: boolean };1561        const alerts = await getPendingSyncAlerts();1562        // The popup reads on open and acknowledges with consume:true after1563        // rendering, so a popup crash between read and render doesn't lose1564        // the alerts.1565        if (consume) await clearPendingSyncAlerts();1566        return { ok: true, data: alerts };1567      }15681569      case "GET_PENDING_VOUCHED_DEVICES": {1570        return { ok: true, data: await listPendingVouchedDevices() };1571      }1572      case "CONFIRM_VOUCHED_DEVICE": {1573        const { deviceId } = msg.payload as { deviceId: string };1574        const pending = await getPendingVouchedDevice(deviceId);1575        if (!pending) return { ok: false, error: "not_pending" };1576        // Last gate before a vouched device becomes a sync peer. A queue entry1577        // can predate the revocation that names it, so revocation is re-checked1578        // here rather than trusted to have swept the queue.1579        if (await isDeviceRevoked(pending.deviceId, pending.longTermPublicKeyHex)) {1580          await removePendingVouchedDevice(deviceId);1581          return { ok: false, error: "device_revoked" };1582        }1583        await upsertPairedDeviceV3({1584          deviceId: pending.deviceId,1585          deviceName: pending.deviceName,1586          deviceType:1587            pending.deviceType as import("../shared/sync-types").PairedDevice["deviceType"],1588          longTermPublicKeyHex: pending.longTermPublicKeyHex,1589          signingPublicKeyHex: pending.signingPublicKeyHex,1590          wsPort: pending.wsPort,1591          pairedAt: pending.pairedAt,1592          trustSource: "vouched",1593        });1594        await removePendingVouchedDevice(deviceId);1595        // Newly confirmed vouched device is now a sync target — kick a round1596        // so the mesh introduction pays off without a 10-minute wait.1597        void triggerSyncIfReachable({ reason: "device_list_changed" }).catch(() => undefined);1598        return { ok: true };1599      }1600      case "REJECT_VOUCHED_DEVICE": {1601        const { deviceId } = msg.payload as { deviceId: string };1602        await removePendingVouchedDevice(deviceId);1603        return { ok: true };1604      }1605      case "ROTATE_SYNC_IDENTITY": {1606        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1607        const result = await vault.rotateSyncIdentity();1608        return result.ok ? { ok: true } : { ok: false, error: result.error };1609      }16101611      default:1612        return { ok: false, error: "unknown_message_type" };1613    }1614  } catch (err) {1615    return {1616      ok: false,1617      error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : "operation_failed",1618    };1619  }1620}16211622// --- Mobile platform helpers ---16231624// Android: populates the in-memory vault used by PeachAutofillService.1625async function publishInMemoryVault(entries: VaultEntry[]): Promise<void> {1626  const plugin = nativePlugin<{1627    setEntries?: (args: {1628      entries: Array<{1629        id: string;1630        title: string;1631        username: string;1632        email: string;1633        password: string;1634        url: string;1635        totp: string;1636        additionalUrls: string[];1637      }>;1638    }) => Promise<void>;1639  }>("InMemoryVaultPlugin");1640  if (!plugin?.setEntries) return;1641  await plugin.setEntries({1642    entries: entries.map((e) => ({1643      id: e.id,1644      title: e.title ?? "",1645      username: e.username ?? "",1646      email: (e as VaultEntry & { email?: string }).email ?? "",1647      password: e.password ?? "",1648      url: e.url ?? "",1649      totp: (e as VaultEntry & { totp?: string }).totp ?? "",1650      additionalUrls: (e as VaultEntry & { additionalUrls?: string[] }).additionalUrls ?? [],1651    })),1652  });1653}16541655// Android: clear the autofill in-memory store on lock.1656async function clearInMemoryVault(): Promise<void> {1657  const plugin = nativePlugin<{ clearEntries?: () => Promise<void> }>("InMemoryVaultPlugin");1658  if (!plugin?.clearEntries) return;1659  await plugin.clearEntries();1660}16611662// Returns username use-counts from the vault, sorted by frequency. Each row1663// also carries the entry's email so the popup can suggest the email/username1664// pair the user has actually used together.1665function buildIdentitySuggestions(1666  entries: VaultEntry[],1667): Array<{ email: string; username: string; count: number }> {1668  const usernameCounts = new Map<string, number>();1669  const usernameEmail = new Map<string, string>();1670  for (const entry of entries) {1671    const username = entry.username ?? "";1672    const email = (entry as VaultEntry & { email?: string }).email ?? "";1673    if (!username && !email) continue;1674    const key = username || email;1675    usernameCounts.set(key, (usernameCounts.get(key) ?? 0) + 1);1676    if (!usernameEmail.has(key)) usernameEmail.set(key, email);1677  }1678  return Array.from(usernameCounts.entries())1679    .sort((a, b) => b[1] - a[1])1680    .map(([username, count]) => ({1681      email: usernameEmail.get(username) ?? "",1682      username,1683      count,1684    }));1685}16861687/** Notify all content scripts that the vault just became available. */1688function broadcastToContentScripts(message: { type: string }): void {1689  if (!chrome.tabs?.query) return;1690  chrome.tabs.query({}, (tabs) => {1691    for (const tab of tabs) {1692      if (tab.id !== undefined) {1693        chrome.tabs.sendMessage(tab.id, message).catch(() => {1694          // Tab may not have a content script — silently ignore1695        });1696      }1697    }1698  });1699}17001701function shouldRefreshAutoLock(type: MessageType): boolean {1702  return (1703    type !== "HAS_VAULT" &&1704    type !== "IS_UNLOCKED" &&1705    type !== "GET_VAULT_STATUS" &&1706    type !== "LOCK" &&1707    type !== "UPDATE_SETTINGS" &&1708    type !== "GET_PENDING_PASSKEY" &&1709    type !== "GET_PASSKEY_PROVIDER_STATE" &&1710    type !== "DECLINE_CARD_SAVE" &&1711    type !== "IS_CARD_DECLINED"1712  );1713}17141715function isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl(value: string): boolean {1716  try {1717    const url = new URL(value);1718    if (url.protocol !== "https:") return false;17191720    const hostname = url.hostname.toLowerCase();1721    if (1722      hostname === "localhost" ||1723      hostname.endsWith(".localhost") ||1724      isPrivateIpv4(hostname) ||1725      isPrivateIpv6(hostname)1726    ) {1727      return false;1728    }17291730    return true;1731  } catch {1732    return false;1733  }1734}17351736function isPrivateIpv4(hostname: string): boolean {1737  if (PRIVATE_IPV4_RANGES.some((range) => hostname.startsWith(range.prefix))) {1738    return true;1739  }17401741  const octets = hostname.split(".").map((part) => Number(part));1742  if (octets.length !== 4 || octets.some((octet) => !Number.isInteger(octet) || octet < 0 || octet > 255)) {1743    return false;1744  }17451746  return octets[0] === 172 && octets[1] >= 16 && octets[1] <= 31;1747}17481749function isPrivateIpv6(hostname: string): boolean {1750  const normalized = hostname.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "").toLowerCase();1751  return (1752    normalized === "::1" ||1753    normalized.startsWith("fc") ||1754    normalized.startsWith("fd") ||1755    normalized.startsWith("fe80:")1756  );1757}