messages.ts

1/**2 * messages.ts — the only background message handler.3 *4 * All `chrome.runtime.onMessage` handling for the service worker lives here.5 * Do not handle messages inline in entry.ts, alarms.ts, or any other6 * background file. Every background-bound MessageType in shared/types.ts7 * must have a case below. Content-script-bound message types (PING,8 * SUMMON_AUTOFILL, VAULT_LOCKED) are documented in shared/types.ts and9 * intentionally have no case here — they are sent *to* content scripts.10 */1112import { copyToClipboard, getEffectiveClearSeconds } from "./clipboard";13import { dismissPendingSyncAlerts, getPendingSyncAlerts } from "./sync-alerts";14import { extractDomain } from "../shared/domain";15import {16  getPendingVouchedDevice,17  listPendingVouchedDevices,18  removePendingVouchedDevice,19} from "./pending-vouched-devices";20import {21  clearRecoveryConfirmPending,22  isRecoveryConfirmPending,23  setRecoveryConfirmPending,24} from "./recovery-pending";25import { setupAutoLock, touchAutoLock } from "./alarms";26import { runSelfTest } from "./self-test";27import * as vault from "./vault";28import {29  handleEstimateCodexPages,30  handleGetCodexVaultData,31  handleRestoreFromCodex,32} from "./codex-handlers";33import type { CodexRestorePayload } from "../shared/codex-types";34import {35  activateLicense,36  deactivateLicense,37  getLicenseInfo,38  getLicenseKey,39  isProUser,40  markCelebrationPlayed,41  shouldPlayCelebration,42} from "./license";43import {44  completeFirefoxPasskeyCreate,45  getPasskeyProviderState,46  getPendingPasskeyRequest,47  handleFirefoxPasskeyCreate,48  handleFirefoxPasskeyGet,49  handlePasskeyHasCredentials,50  initiateFirefoxPasskeyCreate,51  isPasskeyOfferDeclined,52  onVaultUnlocked,53  recordPasskeyOfferDecline,54  resolvePendingPasskeyRequest,55  setPasskeyProviderEnabled,56} from "./passkey";57import { buildAdvancedHealthReport } from "./health";58import { storageClear } from "../shared/storage";59import { findInvalidWords } from "../shared/recovery-words";60import type {61  Message,62  MessageResponse,63  MessageType,64  ProFeature,65  VaultEntry,66} from "../shared/types";67import { isPasskeyOnly } from "../shared/types";68import { generateTOTP } from "../crypto/totp";69import { isValidRpId } from "../shared/passkey-utils";70import { isValidMLFeatureBatch, predictBatch as mlPredictBatch } from "./ml";71import {72  buildLocalIdentity,73  getOrCreateDeviceId,74  setDeviceName as setDeviceNameV3,75  type LocalDeviceIdentity,76} from "./device-identity";77import { clearLockedSyncPrivateKey } from "./locked-sync-spool";78import {79  isDeviceRevoked,80  listPairedDevices as listPairedDevicesV3,81  renamePairedDevice as renamePairedDeviceV3,82  revokeDeviceById as revokeDeviceByIdV3,83  TrustDataCorruptedError,84  upsertPairedDevice as upsertPairedDeviceV3,85} from "./paired-devices";86import { dropPairSecret } from "./pair-secrets";87// Sync and pairing are imported statically, never with `await import()`.88// `import()` throws `TypeError: import() is disallowed on89// ServiceWorkerGlobalScope` at runtime in MV3, and Vite's preload helper90// reports the failure through `window.dispatchEvent`, which does not exist in91// a worker either — so the real reason was replaced by "window is not defined"92// and the pairing UI just stopped. scripts/check-sw-static-imports.mjs fails93// the build if a runtime import() reappears anywhere in the worker's graph.94import {95  cancelRelayAdoptionSource,96  isRelayAdoptionSourceInFlight,97  resolveReceiverSasConfirmation,98  resolveSourceSasConfirmation,99  startRelayAdoptionReceiver,100  startRelayAdoptionSource,101} from "./relay-adoption-bg";102import {103  listPendingAdoptionHolders,104  removePendingAdoptionHolder,105} from "./pending-adoption-holder";106import {107  getSyncSettings,108  setRelayUrl,109  setSyncMode,110  type SyncMode,111} from "./sync-settings";112import {113  getSyncState,114  triggerSyncIfReachable,115} from "./sync-trigger";116import {117  browserGenerationIo,118  confirmSecureReset,119  enterResetRequired,120  resolveGeneration,121} from "./sync-generation";122import { isMessageSenderAllowed } from "./message-policy";123124const SUMMON_CAPABILITY_TTL_MS = 30_000;125type SummonCapability = { tabId: number; frameId: number; origin: string; operation: "inventory" | "fill"; expiresAt: number };126const summonCapabilities = new Map<string, SummonCapability>();127128export function createSummonCapability(tabId: number, origin: string, frameId = 0): string {129  const token = crypto.randomUUID();130  summonCapabilities.set(token, { tabId, frameId, origin, operation: "inventory", expiresAt: Date.now() + SUMMON_CAPABILITY_TTL_MS });131  return token;132}133134function consumeSummonCapability(token: unknown, sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender>, operation: "inventory" | "fill"): boolean {135  if (typeof token !== "string") return false;136  const cap = summonCapabilities.get(token);137  if (!cap) return false;138  if (cap.expiresAt <= Date.now()) {139    summonCapabilities.delete(token);140    return false;141  }142  if (sender.tab?.id !== cap.tabId || (sender.frameId ?? 0) !== cap.frameId || attestedSenderOrigin(sender) !== cap.origin) return false;143  if (cap.operation !== operation) return false;144  if (operation === "inventory") cap.operation = "fill";145  else summonCapabilities.delete(token);146  return true;147}148149// Compile-time E2E flag, folded to a literal by Vite's `define` (false in150// every production build — verified in the bundled output). Mirrors the151// create-path bypass in passkey.ts so the Playwright passkey smoke can enable152// the provider without a real Pro licence; the gate is fully intact for users.153declare const __PEACH_E2E_PASSKEYS__: boolean;154const PASSKEY_E2E_PRO_BYPASS = __PEACH_E2E_PASSKEYS__ === true;155156function unhexBytes(hex: string): Uint8Array {157  if (hex.length % 2 !== 0) throw new Error("invalid hex");158  const out = new Uint8Array(hex.length / 2);159  for (let i = 0; i < out.length; i++) {160    out[i] = parseInt(hex.slice(i * 2, i * 2 + 2), 16);161  }162  return out;163}164165/**166 * The single Pro gate. Every gated handler calls this first; the broadcast167 * lets the popup react (navigate to the License section, highlight the168 * relevant feature). Background never touches the popup view directly —169 * the popup owns navigation. See Projects.md "Pro gate rule".170 */171async function requirePro(172  feature: ProFeature,173  trigger: "user" | "background" = "user"174): Promise<{ allowed: boolean }> {175  if (PASSKEY_E2E_PRO_BYPASS && feature === "passkeys") return { allowed: true };176  if (await isProUser()) return { allowed: true };177178  if (trigger === "user") {179    // User deliberately triggered this feature — redirect the popup immediately.180    chrome.runtime181      .sendMessage({ type: "PRO_GATE_TRIGGERED", payload: { feature } })182      .catch(() => {183        // Popup may be closed — the gate signal is best-effort.184      });185  } else {186    // Background trigger (e.g. passive sync initiation) — no popup is open.187    // Queue a notice so the next popup open shows a soft banner instead of188    // silently failing.189    if (chrome.storage.session) {190      chrome.storage.session191        .set({ pendingProNotice: { feature, triggeredAt: Date.now() } })192        .catch(() => {});193    }194  }195196  return { allowed: false };197}198199// LV-3: minimum interval between non-test canary pings per webhook+entry.200const CANARY_MIN_INTERVAL_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000; // 1 hour201202const PRIVATE_IPV4_RANGES = [203  { prefix: "10." },204  { prefix: "127." },205  { prefix: "169.254." },206  { prefix: "192.168." },207];208209export function setupMessageHandler(): void {210  chrome.runtime.onMessage.addListener(211    (msg: unknown, sender, sendResponse) => {212      if (!isMessage(msg)) {213        sendResponse({ ok: false, error: "invalid_message" });214        return true;215      }216      handleMessage(msg, sender)217        .then(sendResponse)218        .catch((err) =>219          sendResponse({220            ok: false,221            error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),222          })223        );224      return true;225    }226  );227}228229function isMessage(m: unknown): m is Message {230  return typeof m === "object" && m !== null && "type" in m;231}232233/**234 * The browser-attested origin of the page that originated this message. A web235 * page cannot call chrome.runtime.sendMessage directly (no externally_connectable),236 * so every page-driven message arrives via the content-script relay and the237 * browser stamps `sender.origin`/`sender.url` with the real frame origin — a238 * value the page cannot forge. This is the ONLY trustworthy origin for passkey239 * rpId<->origin enforcement; payload-supplied origins are attacker-controlled.240 */241function attestedSenderOrigin(sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender>): string | undefined {242  if (sender.origin) return sender.origin;243  if (sender.url) {244    try { return new URL(sender.url).origin; } catch { return undefined; }245  }246  return undefined;247}248249function isExtensionPageSender(sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender>): boolean {250  return sender.url?.startsWith("chrome-extension://") === true ||251    sender.url?.startsWith("moz-extension://") === true;252}253254/** True when the message came from a page frame rather than extension UI. */255function isPageSender(sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender>): boolean {256  return !isExtensionPageSender(sender) &&257    (sender.tab !== undefined || sender.url !== undefined);258}259260function entryDomains(url: unknown, additionalUrls: unknown): Set<string> {261  const domains = new Set<string>();262  const primary = typeof url === "string" ? extractDomain(url) : null;263  if (primary) domains.add(primary);264  if (Array.isArray(additionalUrls)) {265    for (const extra of additionalUrls) {266      if (typeof extra !== "string") continue;267      const domain = extractDomain(extra);268      if (domain) domains.add(domain);269    }270  }271  return domains;272}273274/**275 * PB-26-106: the autofill read path re-validates the frame origin against the276 * entry's domains on every request, so an unbound write path would let a277 * content script repoint an entry at its own origin and then read the278 * credential through a read path that is behaving correctly.279 *280 * Creating an entry: a page may only bind it to itself. Mutating one: a page281 * may never GROW the domain set — only shrink it, and never below its own282 * attested origin.283 *284 * Self-binding on mutation was considered and is not enough: the content285 * script on a foreign origin IS the attacker in the reported chain, so letting286 * it attach "its own" origin lets it mint the very capability the read path287 * exists to withhold. The legitimate flow that needs a new domain — the inline288 * "remember this site" toast — therefore asks the popup instead289 * (REQUEST_REMEMBER_SITE), which is an extension page and exempt here.290 *291 * Extension pages are exempt: the popup edits entries for sites it is not on.292 */293function senderMayBindEntryDomains(294  sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender>,295  domains: Set<string>,296): boolean {297  if (isExtensionPageSender(sender)) return true;298  const domain = attestedSenderDomain(sender);299  if (domain === null) return false;300  for (const candidate of domains) {301    if (candidate !== domain) return false;302  }303  return true;304}305306function senderMayMutateEntryDomains(307  sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender>,308  before: Set<string>,309  after: Set<string>,310): boolean {311  if (isExtensionPageSender(sender)) return true;312  const domain = attestedSenderDomain(sender);313  if (domain === null || !after.has(domain)) return false;314  for (const kept of after) {315    if (!before.has(kept)) return false;316  }317  return true;318}319320/**321 * Null for extension pages (which the callers exempt), for senders with no322 * attested origin at all, and for unparseable frame urls.323 */324function attestedSenderDomain(sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender>): string | null {325  if (sender.tab === undefined && sender.url === undefined) return null;326  const origin = attestedSenderOrigin(sender);327  if (!origin) return null;328  try { return extractDomain(new URL(origin).hostname); } catch { return null; }329}330331function patchChangesEntryOrigin(patch: object): boolean {332  return Object.hasOwn(patch, "url") || Object.hasOwn(patch, "additionalUrls");333}334335/** The entry's domain-bearing fields as the patch would leave them. */336function patchedUrlShape(337  patch: object,338  existing: Pick<VaultEntry, "url" | "additionalUrls">,339): { url: unknown; additionalUrls: unknown } {340  const candidate = patch as { url?: unknown; additionalUrls?: unknown };341  return {342    url: Object.hasOwn(patch, "url") ? candidate.url : existing.url,343    additionalUrls: Object.hasOwn(patch, "additionalUrls")344      ? candidate.additionalUrls345      : existing.additionalUrls,346  };347}348// Resolves once restoreFromSession() has run, so handlers see the correct349// post-restore unlock state. entry.ts registers this BEFORE the message350// handler so the onMessage listener is added synchronously at SW startup351// (MV3 requirement) while unlock-dependent handlers still wait for restore.352let restoreReady: Promise<void> = Promise.resolve();353const MAX_ML_BATCH_FIELDS = 128;354const MAX_ML_FIELDS_PER_SECOND = 256;355const mlWorkBySender = new Map<string, { startedAt: number; fields: number }>();356357function claimMLWork(sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender>, fields: number): boolean {358  if (fields === 0) return true;359  const now = Date.now();360  for (const [key, value] of mlWorkBySender) {361    if (now - value.startedAt >= 1_000) mlWorkBySender.delete(key);362  }363  const key = `${sender.tab?.id ?? "ui"}:${sender.frameId ?? 0}:${attestedSenderOrigin(sender) ?? "extension"}`;364  const current = mlWorkBySender.get(key);365  if (!current) {366    mlWorkBySender.set(key, { startedAt: now, fields });367    return fields <= MAX_ML_FIELDS_PER_SECOND;368  }369  if (current.fields + fields > MAX_ML_FIELDS_PER_SECOND) return false;370  current.fields += fields;371  return true;372}373374/** Called by entry.ts at startup with the in-flight restoreFromSession promise. */375export function setRestoreReady(p: Promise<unknown>): void {376  restoreReady = p.then(() => undefined, () => undefined);377}378379export async function handleMessage(380  msg: Message,381  sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender> = {}382): Promise<MessageResponse> {383  try {384    // Wait for session-restore to finish before reading any unlock/vault state.385    // On a cold SW start the popup's first message arrives while restore is386    // still in flight; without this gate IS_UNLOCKED would report locked (a387    // spurious lock screen) and the storage reads could race. The onMessage388    // listener itself is registered synchronously (entry.ts) so this gate, not389    // listener registration, is what absorbs the cold-start window.390    await restoreReady;391    // Validate sender — only allow messages from our extension pages/scripts.392    // `sender.id` is undefined for messages originating from extension UI393    // (popup/options), which is legitimate; reject only when it is defined394    // and does not match our extension id.395    if (396      sender.id !== undefined &&397      sender.id !== chrome.runtime.id398    ) {399      return { ok: false, error: "invalid_sender" };400    }401402    // PB-26-016: sender authorization is an exhaustive policy, not a403    // hand-maintained privileged denylist. A missing/unknown policy entry or a404    // background-only message fails closed before any handler runs.405    // Extension UI messages may legitimately omit sender.url. Resolve the406    // browser-attested extension origin only when a URL is present; this also407    // keeps test/runtime shims without getURL fail-closed for URL-bearing408    // senders instead of throwing before policy evaluation.409    const extensionOrigin = sender.url && typeof chrome.runtime.getURL === "function"410      ? chrome.runtime.getURL("")411      : "";412    if (!isMessageSenderAllowed(msg.type, sender, chrome.runtime.id, extensionOrigin)) {413      return { ok: false, error: "invalid_sender" };414    }415416    if (shouldRefreshAutoLock(msg.type, sender) && vault.isUnlocked()) {417      touchAutoLock();418    }419420    switch (msg.type) {421      case "CREATE_VAULT": {422        const { password } = msg.payload as { password: string };423        // Refuse to create a vault under an empty master password — the derived424        // key would be publicly known and the at-rest AES-GCM protection void425        // (audit HIGH; the CSV-import path previously passed ""). Length/strength426        // policy lives in the onboarding UI; this is the non-negotiable floor.427        if (typeof password !== "string" || password.length === 0) {428          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };429        }430        await vault.createVault(password);431        await setupAutoLock();432        broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });433        onVaultUnlocked();434        return { ok: true };435      }436      case "CREATE_VAULT_FROM_ROOT_KEY": {437        const { password, rootKeyHex } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {438          password?: unknown;439          rootKeyHex?: unknown;440        };441        if (typeof password !== "string" || password.length === 0 || typeof rootKeyHex !== "string") {442          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };443        }444445        try {446          const { vaultId } = await vault.createVaultFromRootKey(password, rootKeyHex);447          await setupAutoLock();448          broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });449          onVaultUnlocked();450          return { ok: true, vaultId };451        } catch (err) {452          return { ok: false, error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err) };453        }454      }455      case "UNLOCK": {456        const { password } = msg.payload as { password: string };457        const ok = await vault.unlock(password);458        if (ok) {459          // KAT: verify the WebCrypto stack is healthy before the user relies on it.460          // Runs after unlock so latency is hidden behind the vault-load time.461          const kat = await runSelfTest();462          if (!kat.ok) {463            console.error("[Peach] Crypto self-test FAILED:", kat.error);464            await vault.lock();465            return { ok: false, error: "self_test_failed" };466          }467          await vault.updateSettings({ pinPreferred: false });468          await setupAutoLock();469          broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });470          onVaultUnlocked();471          return { ok: true };472        }473        // Distinguish corruption from wrong password so the popup can offer474        // a history-restore path instead of falsely accusing the user of475        // mistyping (M7/COR-007).476        const failure = vault.consumeLastUnlockFailureReason();477        if (failure) {478          return {479            ok: false,480            error: "vault_corrupted",481            canRestoreFromHistory: true,482          } as MessageResponse;483        }484        return { ok: false };485      }486      case "UNLOCK_WITH_PIN": {487        const { pin } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { pin?: unknown };488        if (typeof pin !== "string") return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };489        const ok = await vault.unlockWithPin(pin);490        if (!ok) {491          const status = await vault.getPinUnlockStatus();492          if (status.configured && !status.available) {493            return {494              ok: false,495              error: status.attemptsRemaining === 0496                ? "pin_attempts_exceeded"497                : "pin_session_expired",498            };499          }500          return { ok: false };501        }502        const kat = await runSelfTest();503        if (!kat.ok) {504          await vault.lock();505          return { ok: false, error: "self_test_failed" };506        }507        await vault.updateSettings({ pinPreferred: true });508        await setupAutoLock();509        broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });510        onVaultUnlocked();511        return { ok: true };512      }513      case "GET_PIN_STATUS":514        return { ok: true, data: await vault.getPinUnlockStatus() };515      case "VALIDATE_RECOVERY_WORDS": {516        const { words } = msg.payload as { words: string[] };517        const invalid = findInvalidWords(words);518        return { ok: true, data: { valid: invalid.length === 0, invalid } };519      }520      case "GET_RECOVERY_WORDS": {521        // Must be unlocked and have recovery set up (vault must be v2.12+).522        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };523        // LV-4: the recovery words re-derive the ROOT KEY — the highest-524        // value secret in the vault. A session unlock (which may be hours525        // old on a shared machine) is not enough; require a fresh password526        // proof, matching the 1Password/Bitwarden pattern for revealing527        // escrow material. EXEMPTION: the create-vault / rotation confirmation528        // window (peach_recovery_pending) shows the words immediately after529        // the user authenticated, and that confirmation UI has no password to530        // resend — skip the re-auth there only.531        if (!(await isRecoveryConfirmPending())) {532          const { password } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { password?: string };533          if (typeof password !== "string" || !password) {534            return { ok: false, error: "password_required" };535          }536          if (!(await vault.verifyMainPassword(password))) {537            return { ok: false, error: "wrong_password" };538          }539        }540        try {541          const words = await vault.getRecoveryWords();542          return { ok: true, data: words };543        } catch {544          return { ok: false, error: "recovery_not_setup" };545        }546      }547      case "GET_RECOVERY_CONFIRM_PENDING":548        return { ok: true, data: await isRecoveryConfirmPending() };549      case "SET_RECOVERY_CONFIRM_PENDING":550        await setRecoveryConfirmPending();551        return { ok: true };552      case "CLEAR_RECOVERY_CONFIRM_PENDING":553        await clearRecoveryConfirmPending();554        return { ok: true };555      case "RECOVER_WITH_WORDS": {556        // User has lost their password but has their 12 recovery words.557        // We: (1) validate the words, (2) re-encrypt vault with new password.558        const { words, newPassword } = msg.payload as {559          words: string[];560          newPassword: string;561        };562        const stored = await vault.loadSlotA();563        if (!stored) return { ok: false, error: "no_vault" };564        if (!stored.recovery_salt || !stored.recovery_wrapped_root_key) {565          return { ok: false, error: "recovery_not_setup" };566        }567        // Unwrap the root key from the recovery escrow.568        try {569          await vault.unwrapRootKeyForRecovery(570            stored.recovery_wrapped_root_key,571            stored.recovery_nonce ?? "",572            stored.recovery_tag ?? "",573            stored.recovery_salt,574            words575          );576        } catch {577          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_recovery_words" };578        }579        // Re-key: derive fresh salt + key from new password.580        const newSalt = vault.generateSalt();581        const newKey = await vault.deriveKey(newPassword, newSalt);582        // Re-wrap root key under the new password's derived key so the same583        // recovery words continue to work after the password change.584        await vault.rewrapRootKeyForPassword(newKey);585        // Re-encrypt vault entries with the new key.586        await vault.changePasswordWithNewKey(newSalt, newKey);587        await setupAutoLock();588        broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });589        return { ok: true };590      }591      case "LOCK":592        await vault.lock();593        return { ok: true };594      case "IS_UNLOCKED":595        return { ok: true, data: vault.isUnlocked() };596      case "GET_VAULT_STATUS":597        return { ok: true, unlocked: vault.isUnlocked() };598      case "HAS_VAULT":599        return { ok: true, data: await vault.hasVault() };600      case "GET_ENTRIES":601        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };602        return { ok: true, data: vault.getEntries() };603      case "EXPORT_ENTRIES": {604        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };605        const { password } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { password?: unknown };606        if (typeof password !== "string" || !password) {607          return { ok: false, error: "password_required" };608        }609        if (!(await vault.verifyMainPassword(password))) {610          return { ok: false, error: "wrong_password" };611        }612        return { ok: true, data: vault.getEntries() };613      }614      case "ADD_ENTRY": {615        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };616        const payload = msg.payload;617        if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) {618          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };619        }620        // PB-26-106: a page may only create an entry bound to itself. Entries621        // carrying no url have no domain surface to bind, so they are exempt.622        if (isPageSender(sender)) {623          const draft = payload as { url?: unknown; additionalUrls?: unknown };624          const domains = entryDomains(draft.url, draft.additionalUrls);625          if (domains.size > 0 && !senderMayBindEntryDomains(sender, domains)) {626            return { ok: false, error: "origin_binding_required" };627          }628        }629        const entry = await vault.addEntry(payload as Parameters<typeof vault.addEntry>[0]);630        return { ok: true, data: entry };631      }632      case "BATCH_ADD_ENTRIES": {633        const payload = msg.payload as { entries?: unknown } | null | undefined;634        if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) {635          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };636        }637        if (!Array.isArray(payload.entries)) {638          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };639        }640        const added = await vault.batchAddEntries(payload.entries as Parameters<typeof vault.batchAddEntries>[0]);641        return { ok: true, data: added };642      }643      case "RESTORE_ENTRIES": {644        const payload = msg.payload as645          | { entries?: unknown; mode?: unknown; settings?: unknown }646          | null647          | undefined;648        if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) {649          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };650        }651        if (!Array.isArray(payload.entries)) {652          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };653        }654        if (payload.mode !== "replace" && payload.mode !== "merge") {655          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };656        }657        const summary = await vault.restoreEntries(658          payload.entries as Parameters<typeof vault.restoreEntries>[0],659          payload.mode660        );661        if (payload.settings && typeof payload.settings === "object" && !Array.isArray(payload.settings)) {662          await vault.updateSettings(payload.settings as vault.VaultSettings);663        }664        return { ok: true, data: summary };665      }666      case "CLEAR_VAULT_ENTRIES": {667        await vault.clearVaultEntries("REPLACE_ALL");668        return { ok: true };669      }670      case "GET_VAULT_HISTORY": {671        // The history store is real-mode state by construction, so a decoy672        // session must not see it — this is where the duress session would673        // otherwise leak the real vault's activity and size (PB-26-915).674        if (vault.isDecoyMode()) return { ok: true, data: [] };675        const snapshots = await vault.getVaultHistory();676        return { ok: true, data: snapshots };677      }678      case "RESTORE_VAULT_SNAPSHOT": {679        // Same guard on the write side: a coerced session must not be able to680        // roll the real vault backwards onto an earlier snapshot.681        if (vault.isDecoyMode()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };682        const { snapshotId } = msg.payload as { snapshotId: string };683        const result = await vault.restoreVaultSnapshot(snapshotId);684        if (!result.ok) return { ok: false, error: result.error };685        broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_LOCKED" });686        return { ok: true };687      }688      case "COUNT_DUPLICATES": {689        return { ok: true, data: vault.countDuplicates() };690      }691      case "DEDUPLICATE_ENTRIES": {692        const removed = await vault.deduplicateEntries();693        return { ok: true, data: removed };694      }695      case "UPDATE_ENTRY": {696        const payload = msg.payload as { id?: unknown; patch?: unknown } | null | undefined;697        if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) {698          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };699        }700        const { id, patch } = payload;701        if (typeof id !== "string" || !id || !patch || typeof patch !== "object" || Array.isArray(patch)) {702          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };703        }704        const existingEntry = vault.getEntryById(id);705        if (!existingEntry) return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };706        if (patchChangesEntryOrigin(patch) || isPageSender(sender)) {707          const before = entryDomains(existingEntry.url, existingEntry.additionalUrls);708          const after = patchedUrlShape(patch, existingEntry);709          if (!senderMayMutateEntryDomains(710            sender,711            before,712            entryDomains(after.url, after.additionalUrls),713          )) {714            return { ok: false, error: "origin_binding_required" };715          }716        }717        // Single enforcement point for the Canary Entries Pro gate. Only718        // gates the transition into a canary entry — clearing/disabling a719        // canary (`canary: undefined`) is always allowed, so existing720        // canary entries remain manageable.721        const incomingCanary = (patch as { canary?: unknown }).canary;722        if (incomingCanary && typeof incomingCanary === "object") {723          const existing = vault.getEntryById(id);724          if (!existing?.canary) {725            const gate = await requirePro("canary_entry");726            if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };727          }728        }729        await vault.updateEntry(id, patch as Parameters<typeof vault.updateEntry>[1]);730        return { ok: true };731      }732      case "ADD_ADDITIONAL_URL": {733        const { id, url } = msg.payload as { id: string; url: string };734        const trimmed = typeof url === "string" ? url.trim() : "";735        if (!trimmed) return { ok: false, error: "url_required" };736        const existing = vault.getEntryById(id);737        if (!existing) return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };738        const merged = [...(existing.additionalUrls ?? []), trimmed];739        if (!senderMayMutateEntryDomains(740          sender,741          entryDomains(existing.url, existing.additionalUrls),742          entryDomains(existing.url, merged),743        )) {744          return { ok: false, error: "origin_binding_required" };745        }746        if (existing.type !== "login") return { ok: false, error: "login_entries_only" };747        await vault.updateEntry(id, { additionalUrls: merged });748        return { ok: true };749      }750      case "REQUEST_REMEMBER_SITE": {751        // PB-26-106: growing an entry's domain set needs a decision the page752        // cannot make for itself, so the page asks and the popup confirms. A753        // page may only ask about its own attested origin — otherwise this754        // becomes the same unbound write under a friendlier name.755        const { id, url } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { id?: unknown; url?: unknown };756        if (typeof id !== "string" || !id) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };757        const trimmed = typeof url === "string" ? url.trim() : "";758        if (!trimmed) return { ok: false, error: "url_required" };759        if (!senderMayBindEntryDomains(sender, entryDomains(trimmed, undefined))) {760          return { ok: false, error: "origin_binding_required" };761        }762        if (!vault.getEntryById(id)) return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };763        if (chrome.storage.session) {764          await chrome.storage.session.set({ pendingRememberSite: { entryId: id, url: trimmed } });765        }766        try { await chrome.action.openPopup(); } catch { /* user opens via toolbar */ }767        return { ok: true };768      }769      case "DELETE_ENTRY": {770        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };771        await vault.deleteEntry(id);772        return { ok: true };773      }774      case "GET_DELETED_ENTRIES":775        return { ok: true, data: vault.getDeletedEntries() };776      case "RESTORE_ENTRY": {777        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };778        await vault.restoreEntry(id);779        return { ok: true };780      }781      case "PURGE_ENTRY": {782        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };783        await vault.purgeEntry(id);784        return { ok: true };785      }786      case "PURGE_EXPIRED_TRASH": {787        const { retentionMs } = msg.payload as { retentionMs: number };788        const purged = await vault.purgeExpiredTrash(retentionMs);789        return { ok: true, data: purged };790      }791      case "SAVE_NOTE": {792        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };793        const { id, title, body } = msg.payload as { id?: string; title: string; body: string };794        const now = Date.now();795        if (id) {796          const existing = vault.getEntryById(id);797          if (!existing) return { ok: false, error: "not_found" };798          await vault.updateEntry(id, { title: title || "Untitled", notes: body, modifiedAt: now });799          return { ok: true, data: vault.getEntryById(id) };800        } else {801          // PCH-01-026 #10: addEntry stamps its own createdAt/modifiedAt802          // (EntryDraft omits both), so passing them was the only reason the803          // `as any` cast existed. Dropping them makes the call type-check.804          const entry = await vault.addEntry({805            type: "note",806            title: title || "Untitled",807            notes: body,808          });809          return { ok: true, data: entry };810        }811      }812      case "DELETE_NOTE": {813        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };814        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };815        await vault.deleteEntry(id);816        return { ok: true };817      }818      case "GET_NOTES": {819        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };820        const notes = vault.getEntries().filter(821          (e) => e.type === "note" && !e.deletedAt822        );823        return { ok: true, data: notes } as MessageResponse;824      }825      case "SEARCH_VAULT": {826        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };827        // AUD-002: shape-validate the payload before calling string methods.828        // A raw cast lets a malformed message crash the handler with TypeError.829        const { query } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { query?: unknown };830        if (typeof query !== "string") {831          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };832        }833        const q = query.toLowerCase();834        const searchResults = vault.getEntries().filter(835          (e) =>836            !e.deletedAt &&837            (e.title.toLowerCase().includes(q) ||838              e.notes?.toLowerCase().includes(q) ||839              e.username?.toLowerCase().includes(q))840        );841        return { ok: true, data: searchResults } as MessageResponse;842      }843      case "AUTOFILL_QUERY": {844        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) {845          return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };846        }847        const { domain, kind, capability } = msg.payload as {848          domain: string;849          kind?: "login" | "card" | "totp";850          capability?: string;851        };852        const includeAll = consumeSummonCapability(capability, sender, "inventory");853        if (capability !== undefined && !includeAll) {854          return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };855        }856        // kind="card": return saved cards as compact summaries for the857        // inline card silver platter. Cards are not domain-scoped — every858        // saved card is a candidate on every checkout page — so domain is859        // ignored when kind === "card".860        if (kind === "card") {861          if (!includeAll) return { ok: true, data: [] };862          const cards = vault.getEntries().filter((e) => e.type === "card");863          return {864            ok: true,865            data: cards.map((e) => ({866              id: e.id,867              title: e.cardNickname || e.title,868              cardholderName: e.cardholderName,869              last4: e.last4,870              expMonth: e.expMonth,871              expYear: e.expYear,872              network: e.network,873            })),874          };875        }876        const scopedDomain = isPageSender(sender)877          ? attestedSenderDomain(sender)878          : typeof domain === "string"879            ? extractDomain(domain)880            : null;881        if (!includeAll && !scopedDomain) {882          return isPageSender(sender)883            ? { ok: false, error: "origin_unverified" }884            : { ok: true, data: [] };885        }886        if (kind === "totp") {887          const matches = (888            includeAll889              ? vault.getEntries().filter((entry) => entry.type !== "note" && entry.type !== "card")890              : vault.queryDomain(scopedDomain!)891          ).filter((entry) => !isPasskeyOnly(entry) && Boolean(entry.totp));892          return {893            ok: true,894            data: matches.map((e) => ({895              id: e.id,896              title: e.title,897              username: e.username,898              email: e.email,899              url: e.url,900              hasTotp: true,901            })),902          };903        }904        // The inline selector fills username+password into a form. Passkey-905        // only entries have no password to fill; sign-in for those goes906        // through the WebAuthn path instead. Filter them out everywhere so907        // the user doesn't see four "GitHub" rows that mostly do nothing.908        // Notes and cards never belonged here either.909        const matches = (910          includeAll911            ? vault912                .getEntries()913                .filter((entry) => entry.type !== "note" && entry.type !== "card")914            : vault.queryDomain(scopedDomain!)915        ).filter((entry) => !isPasskeyOnly(entry));916        return {917          ok: true,918          data: matches.map((e) =>919            includeAll920              ? {921                  id: e.id,922                  title: e.title,923                  // username/email/url shipped so the inline popup's search924                  // affordance can match on them, not just titles. No secrets925                  // cross the boundary — same shape as the domain-matched926                  // response below minus hasTotp (which the search list927                  // doesn't surface).928                  username: e.username,929                  email: e.email,930                  url: e.url,931                  hasPasskey: e.passkey !== undefined,932                }933              : {934                  id: e.id,935                  title: e.title,936                  username: e.username,937                  email: e.email,938                  url: e.url,939                  hasTotp: Boolean(e.totp),940                  hasPasskey: e.passkey !== undefined,941                }942          ),943        };944      }945      case "GET_ENTRY_FOR_FILL": {946        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };947        const { id, capability } = msg.payload as {948          id: string;949          capability?: string;950        };951        const capabilityAuthorized = capability !== undefined && consumeSummonCapability(capability, sender, "fill");952        const senderDomain = isPageSender(sender) ? attestedSenderDomain(sender) : null;953        if (isPageSender(sender) && !senderDomain) {954          return { ok: false, error: "origin_unverified" };955        }956        const entry = vault.getEntryById(id);957        if (!entry) return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };958959        // MV-1: re-validate the entry against the requesting frame's origin.960        // sender.url / sender.tab.url are browser-attested — a page cannot961        // forge them. PB-26-005: the FRAME url (sender.url) is authoritative962        // for an all_frames content script; the top-frame tab.url would963        // misattribute a cross-origin iframe's request to the top page. When964        // the request does not come from a tab at all (popup surfaces use965        // GET_ENTRY_FOR_EDIT, not this), refuse.966        if (senderDomain && !capabilityAuthorized) {967          if (!entryDomains(entry.url, entry.additionalUrls).has(senderDomain)) {968            // Domain mismatch — refuse silently (no oracle about which ids exist).969            return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };970          }971        }972        // Passkey-only entries (passkey credential, no password) cannot be973        // filled into a form — sign-in goes through the WebAuthn path. A974        // login that ALSO has a passkey is still fillable for its password.975        if (isPasskeyOnly(entry)) return { ok: false, error: "passkey_not_fillable" };976        // Strip the passkey credential AND the raw base32 TOTP seed from the977        // response. Content scripts never need either: the private key is the978        // authenticator's, and handing over the TOTP seed would let a979        // compromised content script mint valid codes indefinitely (SEV-3-C).980        // Generate the *current* 6-digit code here in the background and send981        // only that, plus the seconds left so the UI can render a countdown.982        // Also drop passwordHistory: filling needs only the *current* password.983        // Handing every past password to a content script during passive984        // autofill on an arbitrary page would widen the blast radius of a985        // compromised page far beyond the one credential being filled.986        const {987          passkey: _strippedPasskey,988          totp: seed,989          totpAlgorithm,990          totpDigits,991          totpPeriod,992          passwordHistory: _ph,993          ...safeEntry994        } = entry;995        let totpCode: string | undefined;996        let totpRemaining: number | undefined;997        if (seed) {998          try {999            // PCH-01-019: honour stored algorithm/digits/period (defaults apply1000            // when these are undefined, i.e. RFC-default bare-seed entries).1001            const generated = generateTOTP(seed, totpAlgorithm, totpDigits, totpPeriod);1002            totpCode = generated.code;1003            totpRemaining = generated.remaining;1004          } catch {1005            totpCode = undefined;1006          }1007        }1008        if (isPageSender(sender) && vault.isUnlocked()) touchAutoLock();1009        return { ok: true, data: { ...safeEntry, totpCode, totpRemaining } };1010      }1011      // Trusted full-entry fetch for extension-owned edit surfaces. Content1012      // scripts route editing to the popup and cannot call this message.1013      case "GET_ENTRY_FOR_EDIT": {1014        if (isPageSender(sender)) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_sender" };1015        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1016        const { id } = msg.payload as { id: string };1017        const entry = vault.getEntryById(id);1018        if (!entry) return { ok: false, error: "entry_not_found" };10191020        const { passkey: _passkey, ...safeEntry } = entry;1021        return { ok: true, data: safeEntry };1022      }1023      case "COPY": {1024        // Page relays must carry the browser-attested frame origin, as with1025        // SUMMON/fill. The policy admits content scripts; this binds the1026        // admitted page sender before arming clipboard auto-clear.1027        if (isPageSender(sender) && !attestedSenderOrigin(sender)) {1028          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_sender" };1029        }1030        // AUD-002: shape-validate the payload before passing to the clipboard1031        // helper. A raw cast lets a malformed message reach the clipboard API1032        // with a non-string and throw.1033        const { text, label, alreadyWritten } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1034          text?: unknown;1035          label?: unknown;1036          alreadyWritten?: unknown;1037        };1038        if (typeof text !== "string" || typeof label !== "string") {1039          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1040        }1041        await copyToClipboard(text, label, Boolean(alreadyWritten));1042        return { ok: true, clearSeconds: getEffectiveClearSeconds() };1043      }1044      case "CHECK_ALL_BREACHES": {1045        const allEntries = vault.getEntries();1046        const results: Record<string, number> = {};1047        for (const entry of allEntries) {1048          if (entry.type === "note") continue;1049          if (!entry.password) continue;1050          results[entry.id] = await vault.checkBreach(entry.password);1051          // Small delay — be a good citizen to the HIBP API1052          await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 200));1053        }1054        // Persist any non-zero counts back to entries1055        for (const [id, count] of Object.entries(results)) {1056          const entry = vault.getEntryById(id);1057          if (entry && (entry.breach ?? 0) !== count) {1058            await vault.updateEntry(id, { breach: count > 0 ? count : undefined });1059          }1060        }1061        return { ok: true, data: results };1062      }1063      case "GET_SETTINGS": {1064        const settings = await vault.ensureSettingsLoaded();1065        if (!isPageSender(sender)) return { ok: true, data: settings };10661067        const safeSettings: Pick<vault.VaultSettings, "accentColor" | "theme"> & {1068          manualSummonDomains?: NonNullable<vault.VaultSettings["manualSummonDomains"]>;1069        } = {1070          accentColor: settings.accentColor,1071          theme: settings.theme,1072        };1073        const domain = attestedSenderDomain(sender);1074        const ownSummon = domain ? settings.manualSummonDomains?.[domain] : undefined;1075        if (domain && ownSummon) safeSettings.manualSummonDomains = { [domain]: ownSummon };1076        return { ok: true, data: safeSettings };1077      }1078      case "UPDATE_SETTINGS": {1079        const patch = msg.payload;1080        if (!patch || typeof patch !== "object" || Array.isArray(patch)) {1081          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1082        }1083        await vault.updateSettings(patch as vault.VaultSettings);1084        if ((patch as Record<string, unknown>).lockedSyncRequiresUnlock === true) {1085          await clearLockedSyncPrivateKey();1086        }1087        if (typeof (patch as Record<string, unknown>).autoLockMinutes === "number") {1088          await setupAutoLock();1089          if (vault.isUnlocked()) touchAutoLock();1090        }1091        return { ok: true };1092      }1093      case "SETUP_PIN": {1094        const { currentPassword, pin } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1095          currentPassword?: unknown;1096          pin?: unknown;1097        };1098        if (typeof currentPassword !== "string" || typeof pin !== "string") {1099          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1100        }1101        return (await vault.setupPinUnlock(currentPassword, pin))1102          ? { ok: true }1103          : { ok: false, error: "incorrect_current_password" };1104      }1105      case "DISABLE_PIN": {1106        const { currentPassword } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { currentPassword?: unknown };1107        if (typeof currentPassword !== "string") return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1108        return (await vault.disablePinUnlock(currentPassword))1109          ? { ok: true }1110          : { ok: false, error: "incorrect_current_password" };1111      }1112      case "GET_PENDING_PASSKEY":1113        return { ok: true, data: await getPendingPasskeyRequest() };1114      case "APPROVE_PASSKEY": {1115        const { requestId } = msg.payload as { requestId: number };1116        await resolvePendingPasskeyRequest(requestId, true);1117        return { ok: true };1118      }1119      case "DENY_PASSKEY": {1120        const { requestId } = msg.payload as { requestId: number };1121        await resolvePendingPasskeyRequest(requestId, false);1122        return { ok: true };1123      }1124      case "GET_PASSKEY_PROVIDER_STATE":1125        return { ok: true, data: await getPasskeyProviderState() };1126      case "SET_PASSKEY_PROVIDER_ENABLED": {1127        const { enabled } = msg.payload as { enabled: boolean };1128        // Disabling is always free; gating fires only when a free user is1129        // trying to turn passkey interception on.1130        if (enabled) {1131          const gate = await requirePro("passkeys");1132          if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1133        }1134        return { ok: true, data: await setPasskeyProviderEnabled(enabled) };1135      }1136      // AUD-003: this handler POSTs `entryTitle` to a user-configured HTTPS1137      // endpoint. Intentional product behavior — users configure their own1138      // dead-man's-switch. isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl blocks localhost, private1139      // IPs, and non-HTTPS schemes, but cannot defend against every DNS-1140      // rebinding case. The UI under CanarySection (Entry.tsx) discloses to1141      // users that the entry title leaves the device when the canary fires.1142      case "FIRE_CANARY_PING": {1143        // Canary alert fires unconditionally for any entry with canary: true.1144        // The Pro gate only governs creation/flagging of canary entries; once1145        // an entry is flagged, the alert path is a security property and must1146        // never be license-gated.1147        const { webhookUrl, entryTitle, trigger } = msg.payload as {1148          webhookUrl: string;1149          entryTitle: string;1150          trigger: "password_copied" | "username_copied" | "autofilled" | "submitted" | "test";1151        };1152        if (trigger === "test" && !isExtensionPageSender(sender)) {1153          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_sender" };1154        }1155        if (!isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl(webhookUrl)) {1156          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_webhook_url" };1157        }1158        // LV-3: debounce non-test pings per (webhook, entry) so a page that1159        // strobes focus/fill events can't turn the canary into a request1160        // firehose at the user's endpoint. Test pings are exempt — they are1161        // explicit user clicks in the settings UI and are awaited for1162        // feedback. The FIRST ping in a window always goes out, so the1163        // dead-man's-switch property (canary fires on access) is preserved;1164        // only repeats within the window are coalesced.1165        if (trigger !== "test") {1166          const keyDigest = new Uint8Array(1167            await crypto.subtle.digest(1168              "SHA-256",1169              new TextEncoder().encode(`${webhookUrl}:${entryTitle}`),1170            ),1171          );1172          const keySuffix = Array.from(keyDigest)1173            .map((byte) => byte.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))1174            .join("");1175          const rlKey = `canary-last-fetch:${keySuffix}`;1176          const legacyRlKey = `canary-last-fetch:${webhookUrl}:${entryTitle}`;1177          const stored = await chrome.storage.local.get(rlKey);1178          await chrome.storage.local.remove(legacyRlKey);1179          const last = (stored as Record<string, unknown>)[rlKey];1180          if (typeof last === "number" && Date.now() - last < CANARY_MIN_INTERVAL_MS) {1181            return { ok: true, data: { rateLimited: true } };1182          }1183          await chrome.storage.local.set({ [rlKey]: Date.now() });1184        }1185        const body = JSON.stringify({1186          event: trigger === "test" ? "peach_canary_test" : "peach_canary_accessed",1187          entry: entryTitle,1188          trigger,1189          timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),1190          source: "peach-extension",1191        });1192        if (trigger === "test") {1193          // Permitted outbound fetch: user-configured canary alert endpoint1194          // (validated by isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl above). This is the1195          // only non-HIBP outbound call in the extension — see1196          // Projects.md §3.7. Test pings are awaited so the UI can show1197          // success/failure.1198          try {1199            const res = await fetch(webhookUrl, {1200              method: "POST",1201              headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },1202              body,1203            });1204            return { ok: res.ok, error: res.ok ? undefined : `HTTP ${res.status}` };1205          } catch (err) {1206            return { ok: false, error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : "network_error" };1207          }1208        }1209        // Non-test triggers are fire-and-forget1210        fetch(webhookUrl, {1211          method: "POST",1212          headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },1213          body,1214        }).catch(() => {});1215        return { ok: true };1216      }1217      case "ACTIVATE_LICENSE": {1218        const { key } = msg.payload as { key: string };1219        const licenseInfo = await activateLicense(key);1220        return { ok: true, data: licenseInfo };1221      }1222      case "GET_LICENSE": {1223        const licenseInfo = await getLicenseInfo();1224        return { ok: true, data: licenseInfo };1225      }1226      case "GET_LICENSE_KEY": {1227        const key = await getLicenseKey();1228        return { ok: true, data: key };1229      }1230      case "DEACTIVATE_LICENSE": {1231        await deactivateLicense();1232        return { ok: true };1233      }1234      case "SHOULD_PLAY_CELEBRATION": {1235        const should = await shouldPlayCelebration();1236        return { ok: true, data: should };1237      }1238      case "MARK_CELEBRATION_PLAYED": {1239        await markCelebrationPlayed();1240        return { ok: true };1241      }1242      case "GET_CODEX_VAULT_DATA": {1243        // Pro-gated. requirePro broadcasts PRO_GATE_TRIGGERED on miss so the1244        // popup navigates to the License section without further coordination.1245        // Also privileged-page-gated (PB-26-001), and recoveryWords inside the1246        // snapshot additionally require a fresh master-password proof.1247        const gate = await requirePro("codex");1248        if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1249        const { password } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { password?: string };1250        return await handleGetCodexVaultData(password);1251      }1252      case "ESTIMATE_CODEX_PAGES": {1253        const gate = await requirePro("codex");1254        if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1255        return await handleEstimateCodexPages();1256      }1257      case "RESTORE_FROM_CODEX": {1258        // !! IMPORTANT: intentionally NOT Pro-gated. A free device must still1259        // be able to restore a vault that was printed by a Pro user.1260        // DO NOT add a Pro gate here.1261        // A decoy session, though, holds no real-mode authority: this path1262        // writes SLOT_A/SLOT_B and snapshots history, so it carries the same1263        // guard its thirteen neighbours do (PB-26-915).1264        if (vault.isDecoyMode()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1265        const payload = msg.payload as CodexRestorePayload;1266        return await handleRestoreFromCodex(payload);1267      }1268      case "OPEN_PRO_GATE": {1269        // Content script requests: open popup and navigate to License section.1270        const { feature } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { feature?: string };1271        if (chrome.storage.session) {1272          await chrome.storage.session.set({ pendingProGate: { feature: feature ?? "passkeys" } });1273        }1274        try { await chrome.action.openPopup(); } catch { /* badge fallback */ }1275        return { ok: true };1276      }1277      case "OPEN_POPUP": {1278        // Content script asks to open the trusted extension popup — used by the1279        // inline locked bubble so the master password is entered in the popup,1280        // never in page-hosted DOM (audit HIGH). Best-effort: openPopup needs a1281        // user gesture + Chrome 127+/Firefox; on failure the user clicks the1282        // toolbar icon. The badge already signals Peach needs attention.1283        //1284        // Set a session flag so the popup knows it was opened for inline unlock1285        // and should close itself once the vault is unlocked (returning the user1286        // to the inline autofill selector on the page).1287        const { entryId } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { entryId?: unknown };1288        if (entryId !== undefined && (typeof entryId !== "string" || entryId.length === 0 || entryId.length > 64)) {1289          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1290        }1291        if (chrome.storage.session) {1292          if (typeof entryId === "string") {1293            await chrome.storage.session.set({ peach_open_entry: entryId });1294          } else {1295            await chrome.storage.session.set({ peach_inline_unlock: true });1296          }1297        }1298        try { await chrome.action.openPopup(); } catch { /* user opens via toolbar */ }1299        return { ok: true };1300      }1301      case "OPEN_DETACHED_POPUP": {1302        // A window created by the action popup and then orphaned with1303        // window.close() is cascaded shut by Chrome, so the file-picker1304        // flows (OS dialogs that dismiss the popup on focus loss) ask the SW1305        // to open the standalone window instead — the SW has no window to be1306        // associated with. The query string is allowlisted so this can never1307        // open an arbitrary URL.1308        const { route } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { route?: string };1309        const search = route === "peachscript"1310          ? "?restore=peachscript"1311          : route === "csv"1312            ? "?restore=csv"1313            : route === "codex-pdf"1314              ? "?codex=pdf"1315              : null;1316        if (!search) return { ok: false, error: "bad_route" };1317        try {1318          const popupHtml =1319            chrome.runtime.getManifest().action?.default_popup ?? "src/popup/index.html";1320          await chrome.windows.create({1321            url: chrome.runtime.getURL(`${popupHtml}${search}`),1322            type: "popup",1323            width: 320,1324            height: 550,1325          });1326          return { ok: true, data: { detached: true } };1327        } catch {1328          return { ok: false };1329        }1330      }1331      case "GET_IDENTITIES": {1332        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1333        return { ok: true, data: vault.getIdentities() };1334      }1335      case "TOUCH_AUTO_LOCK": {1336        // touchAutoLock() is already called by shouldRefreshAutoLock above;1337        // this case just gives the popup a typed message to keep the session alive.1338        return { ok: true };1339      }1340      case "GET_ADVANCED_HEALTH_REPORT": {1341        const gate = await requirePro("advanced_health");1342        if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1343        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1344        const report = await buildAdvancedHealthReport(vault.getEntries());1345        return { ok: true, data: report };1346      }1347      case "IS_DURESS_ENABLED": {1348        const enabled = await vault.isDuressEnabled();1349        return { ok: true, data: enabled };1350      }1351      case "SETUP_DURESS": {1352        // Single enforcement point for the Duress Vault Pro gate. Free users1353        // who somehow reach this handler are rejected here; the popup also1354        // pre-checks isPro() to avoid showing the setup form to free users,1355        // but server-side is the actual security boundary.1356        const gate = await requirePro("duress_vault");1357        if (!gate.allowed) return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1358        // MV3 service workers restart after inactivity, losing the in-memory1359        // derived key. Detect this before calling setupDuress so the popup1360        // can show a meaningful prompt to re-lock and re-unlock.1361        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "session_expired" };1362        const { duressPassword } = msg.payload as { duressPassword: string };1363        await vault.setupDuress(duressPassword);1364        return { ok: true };1365      }1366      case "DISABLE_DURESS": {1367        await vault.disableDuress();1368        return { ok: true };1369      }1370      case "VERIFY_MAIN_PASSWORD": {1371        const { password } = msg.payload as { password: string };1372        const ok = await vault.verifyMainPassword(password);1373        return { ok: true, data: ok };1374      }1375      case "CHANGE_PASSWORD": {1376        const { currentPassword, newPassword } = msg.payload as {1377          currentPassword: string;1378          newPassword: string;1379        };1380        const changed = await vault.changePassword(currentPassword, newPassword);1381        return changed1382          ? { ok: true }1383          : { ok: false, error: "incorrect_current_password" };1384      }1385      case "GET_SITE_PASSWORD_POLICY": {1386        const [tab] = await chrome.tabs.query({ active: true, currentWindow: true });1387        if (!tab?.id) return { ok: true, data: null };1388        try {1389          const response = await chrome.tabs.sendMessage(tab.id, {1390            type: "GET_SITE_PASSWORD_POLICY",1391          });1392          return (response as MessageResponse) ?? { ok: true, data: null };1393        } catch {1394          return { ok: true, data: null };1395        }1396      }1397      case "RECORD_MANUAL_SUMMON": {1398        const { domain } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { domain?: unknown };1399        const origin = attestedSenderOrigin(sender);1400        let senderDomain: string | null = null;1401        if (origin) {1402          try {1403            const hostname = new URL(origin).hostname;1404            senderDomain = extractDomain(hostname) ?? hostname;1405          } catch {1406            senderDomain = null;1407          }1408        }1409        if (typeof domain !== "string" || domain.length > 253 || domain !== senderDomain) {1410          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_domain" };1411        }1412        const settings = vault.getSettings();1413        const existing = settings.manualSummonDomains?.[domain];1414        const now = Date.now();1415        await vault.updateSettings({1416          manualSummonDomains: {1417            ...settings.manualSummonDomains,1418            [domain]: {1419              firstSummonedAt: existing?.firstSummonedAt ?? now,1420              summonCount: (existing?.summonCount ?? 0) + 1,1421              lastSummonedAt: now,1422            },1423          },1424        });1425        return { ok: true };1426      }1427      case "DECLINE_CARD_SAVE": {1428        // PB-26-108: the declined-card digest is keyed by root-key material, so1429        // a decline cannot be recorded while locked. Offers are not shown while1430        // locked either, so this is unreachable in practice.1431        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1432        const { last4, expMonth, expYear } = msg.payload as { last4: string; expMonth: string; expYear: string };1433        await vault.declineCardSaveOffer(last4, expMonth, expYear);1434        return { ok: true };1435      }1436      case "IS_CARD_DECLINED": {1437        const { last4, expMonth, expYear } = msg.payload as { last4: string; expMonth: string; expYear: string };1438        const declined = await vault.isCardDeclined(last4, expMonth, expYear);1439        return { ok: true, data: declined };1440      }1441      case "INITIATE_FIREFOX_PASSKEY_CREATE": {1442        const { rpId, rpName, userName, userDisplayName } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1443          rpId?: string;1444          rpName?: string;1445          userName?: string;1446          userDisplayName?: string;1447        };1448        if (!rpId || !userName) return { ok: false, error: "rpid_and_username_required" };1449        return await initiateFirefoxPasskeyCreate({1450          rpId,1451          rpName: rpName ?? rpId,1452          userName,1453          userDisplayName,1454        }, attestedSenderOrigin(sender));1455      }14561457      case "COMPLETE_FIREFOX_PASSKEY_CREATE": {1458        const payload = msg.payload as Parameters<typeof completeFirefoxPasskeyCreate>[0] | undefined;1459        if (!payload) return { ok: false, error: "missing_payload" };1460        return await completeFirefoxPasskeyCreate(payload);1461      }14621463      case "PASSKEY_OFFER_DECLINE": {1464        const { domain } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { domain?: string };1465        const origin = attestedSenderOrigin(sender);1466        if (!domain || !origin || !isValidRpId(domain, origin)) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_domain" };1467        await recordPasskeyOfferDecline(domain);1468        return { ok: true };1469      }14701471      case "GET_PASSKEY_OFFER_DECLINED": {1472        const { domain } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { domain?: string };1473        const origin = attestedSenderOrigin(sender);1474        if (!domain || !origin || !isValidRpId(domain, origin)) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_domain" };1475        return { ok: true, data: await isPasskeyOfferDeclined(domain) };1476      }14771478      case "PASSKEY_HAS_CREDENTIALS": {1479        const payload = msg.payload as {1480          rpId?: string;1481          allowCredentials?: Array<{ id: string; type?: string }>;1482        } | undefined;1483        if (!payload?.rpId) return { ok: false, error: "rpid_required" };1484        return await handlePasskeyHasCredentials({1485          rpId: payload.rpId,1486          allowCredentials: payload.allowCredentials ?? [],1487        }, attestedSenderOrigin(sender));1488      }14891490      case "PASSKEY_CREATE": {1491        const payload = msg.payload as Parameters<typeof handleFirefoxPasskeyCreate>[0] | undefined;1492        if (!payload?.rpId || !payload?.userName) {1493          return { ok: false, error: "rpid_and_username_required" };1494        }1495        return await handleFirefoxPasskeyCreate(payload, attestedSenderOrigin(sender));1496      }14971498      case "PASSKEY_GET": {1499        const payload = msg.payload as Parameters<typeof handleFirefoxPasskeyGet>[0] | undefined;1500        if (!payload?.rpId) return { ok: false, error: "rpid_required" };1501        return await handleFirefoxPasskeyGet(payload, attestedSenderOrigin(sender));1502      }15031504      case "PASSKEY_AUTH_RESPONSE": {1505        const { requestId, approved } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1506          requestId?: string | number;1507          approved?: boolean;1508        };1509        if (requestId === undefined || requestId === null || typeof approved !== 'boolean') {1510          return { ok: false, error: 'requestId and approved required' };1511        }1512        const pending = await getPendingPasskeyRequest();1513        const senderOrigin = attestedSenderOrigin(sender);1514        if (1515          (pending && pending.requestId !== Number(requestId)) ||1516          (pending?.tabId !== undefined && sender.tab?.id !== pending.tabId) ||1517          (pending?.origin !== undefined && senderOrigin !== pending.origin)1518        ) {1519          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_passkey_approval_sender" };1520        }1521        await resolvePendingPasskeyRequest(Number(requestId), approved);1522        return { ok: true };1523      }15241525      case "GET_PASSKEY_FOR_DOMAIN": {1526        const { domain } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { domain?: string };1527        if (!domain) return { ok: false, error: "domain_required" };1528        // Scope to the caller's own origin: a page may only ask about passkeys1529        // for a domain it actually owns, so an arbitrary page cannot enumerate1530        // which sites the user holds passkeys for or read the username (audit MEDIUM).1531        const origin = attestedSenderOrigin(sender);1532        if (!origin || !isValidRpId(domain, origin)) return { ok: true, data: null };1533        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: true, data: null };1534        const match = vault1535          .getEntries()1536          .find((entry) => entry.passkey?.rpId === domain);1537        if (!match || !match.passkey) return { ok: true, data: null };1538        // Slim shape — only the fields State 11 needs. Never expose private1539        // key material, even though this is locked behind isUnlocked.1540        // bannerShown is the per-domain "already surfaced" flag, kept in1541        // trusted background session storage so content scripts never touch1542        // chrome.storage.session directly (PB-26-203).1543        let bannerShown = false;1544        if (chrome.storage.session) {1545          const flag = await chrome.storage.session.get(`peach_state11_shown:${domain}`);1546          bannerShown = Boolean((flag as Record<string, unknown>)[`peach_state11_shown:${domain}`]);1547        }1548        return {1549          ok: true,1550          data: {1551            rpId: match.passkey.rpId,1552            userName: match.passkey.userName,1553            browser: match.passkey.browser,1554            bannerShown,1555          },1556        };1557      }15581559      case "MARK_PASSKEY_BANNER_SHOWN": {1560        const { domain } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { domain?: string };1561        if (typeof domain !== "string" || !domain) return { ok: false, error: "domain_required" };1562        // Same origin binding as the read path: a page may only mark its own1563        // domain, and the flag reveals nothing either way.1564        const origin = attestedSenderOrigin(sender);1565        if (!origin || !isValidRpId(domain, origin)) return { ok: true };1566        if (chrome.storage.session) {1567          await chrome.storage.session.set({ [`peach_state11_shown:${domain}`]: Date.now() });1568        }1569        return { ok: true };1570      }15711572      case "DESTROY_VAULT": {1573        // Irreversible by design. Lock zeroes the derived key + in-memory entries;1574        // storage.local.clear() wipes every Peach key (slots, settings, license,1575        // onboarded flag, history, sync state, declined cards, recall, etc.);1576        // session.clear() wipes pending passkey requests + pro-notice queues.1577        // Caller (Panic.tsx) handles UI navigation back to onboarding.1578        //1579        // The Pro license is the one thing that must survive: the user paid for1580        // it, and destroying a vault (panic wipe, fresh start) is not a refund.1581        // Capture it before the clear and restore it after. peach_pro_celebrated1582        // rides along so the Pro celebration doesn't replay on the next unlock.1583        const preserved = await chrome.storage.local.get([1584          "peach_license",1585          "peach_pro_celebrated",1586        ]);1587        await vault.lock();1588        await storageClear();1589        await vault.clearVaultHistory();1590        const toRestore: Record<string, unknown> = {};1591        if (preserved.peach_license !== undefined) toRestore.peach_license = preserved.peach_license;1592        if (preserved.peach_pro_celebrated !== undefined) toRestore.peach_pro_celebrated = preserved.peach_pro_celebrated;1593        if (Object.keys(toRestore).length > 0) {1594          await chrome.storage.local.set(toRestore);1595        }1596        if (chrome.storage.session) {1597          await chrome.storage.session.clear();1598        }1599        await clearRecoveryConfirmPending();1600        return { ok: true };1601      }16021603      case "GET_IDENTITY_SUGGESTIONS": {1604        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1605        const entries = vault.getEntries();1606        const suggestions = buildIdentitySuggestions(entries);1607        return { ok: true, data: { suggestions } };1608      }1609      case "ML_INIT":1610        return { ok: true };16111612      case "ML_PREDICT_BATCH": {1613        const { featuresArray } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { featuresArray?: unknown };1614        if (!isValidMLFeatureBatch(featuresArray, MAX_ML_BATCH_FIELDS)) {1615          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1616        }1617        if (!claimMLWork(sender, featuresArray.length)) {1618          return { ok: false, error: "rate_limited" };1619        }1620        return { ok: true, data: mlPredictBatch(featuresArray) };1621      }16221623      // ── Vault sync (v3) ───────────────────────────────────────────────1624      // Returns the public-facing local identity needed by the popup to1625      // drive Phase-1 audio pairing. The private long-term key never1626      // leaves the background.1627      case "GET_LOCAL_IDENTITY": {1628        // Not Pro-gated: a free device may attempt to pair so it can RECEIVE a1629        // Pro license from an already-Pro peer (at least one device must be Pro).1630        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1631        // The identity is sealed under its own key rather than derived from the1632        // root, so pairing survives a master-password change (SEV-2-B).1633        const identity: LocalDeviceIdentity & { license?: string } = await buildLocalIdentity();1634        // If this device is Pro, advertise the signed license so the peer can1635        // activate it after SAS confirmation — pairing carries Pro across.1636        if (await isProUser()) {1637          const license = await getLicenseKey();1638          if (license) identity.license = license;1639        }1640        return { ok: true, data: identity };1641      }16421643      case "LIST_PAIRED_DEVICES": {1644        if (vault.isDecoyMode()) return { ok: true, data: { devices: [] } };1645        try {1646          const devices = await listPairedDevicesV3();1647          return { ok: true, data: { devices } };1648        } catch (err) {1649          if (err instanceof TrustDataCorruptedError) {1650            return { ok: false, error: "trust_data_corrupted" };1651          }1652          throw err;1653        }1654      }16551656      case "RENAME_PAIRED_DEVICE": {1657        if (vault.isDecoyMode()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1658        const { deviceId, name } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { deviceId?: string; name?: string };1659        if (typeof deviceId !== "string" || !deviceId || typeof name !== "string") {1660          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1661        }1662        await renamePairedDeviceV3(deviceId, name);1663        return { ok: true };1664      }16651666      case "UNPAIR_DEVICE": {1667        if (vault.isDecoyMode()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1668        const { deviceId } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { deviceId?: string };1669        if (typeof deviceId !== "string" || !deviceId) {1670          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1671        }1672        // A damaged legacy identity must not prevent the user from evicting a1673        // peer locally. Sync is already blocked until the secure reset repairs1674        // this installation, so the local issuer marker is sufficient for the1675        // tombstone that will be cleared with the archived generation.1676        let revokedByDeviceId: string;1677        try {1678          revokedByDeviceId = await getOrCreateDeviceId();1679        } catch (error) {1680          if (!(error instanceof Error) || error.message !== "identity_migration_required") throw error;1681          revokedByDeviceId = "local";1682        }1683        await revokeDeviceByIdV3(deviceId, revokedByDeviceId);1684        // PB-26-213: forget the secret now so no further dial can use it.1685        // Removals that happen while locked leave orphans for the next1686        // unlock's reconcile to prune.1687        const unpairRootHex = vault.getRootKeyHex();1688        if (unpairRootHex) {1689          const unpairRoot = unhexBytes(unpairRootHex);1690          try {1691            await dropPairSecret(deviceId, unpairRoot);1692          } finally {1693            unpairRoot.fill(0);1694          }1695        } else {1696          await dropPairSecret(deviceId, null);1697        }1698        // Sync against the remaining hosts — the unpaired device no longer1699        // matters but the next alarm tick is up to ten minutes away.1700        void triggerSyncIfReachable({ reason: "device_list_changed" }).catch(() => undefined);1701        return { ok: true };1702      }17031704      case "RENAME_LOCAL_DEVICE": {1705        if (vault.isDecoyMode()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1706        const { name } = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { name?: string };1707        if (typeof name !== "string") return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1708        await setDeviceNameV3(name);1709        return { ok: true };1710      }17111712      // ── Relay pairing ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────1713      // Not Pro-gated (a free device may pair to receive Pro/sync). The whole NK1714      // session runs in the background; the SAS and the terminal result reach1715      // the popup as ADOPTION_SOURCE_SAS / ADOPTION_SOURCE_RESULT pushes.1716      case "START_ADOPTION_SOURCE": {1717        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1718        if (isRelayAdoptionSourceInFlight()) {1719          return { ok: false, error: "adoption_source_in_progress" };1720        }1721        try {1722          return { ok: true, data: await startRelayAdoptionSource() };1723        } catch (error) {1724          return {1725            ok: false,1726            error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : "adoption_source_failed",1727          };1728        }1729      }17301731      // Onboarding receiver — empty extension shows a QR, phone scans and1732      // sends the vault. The popup supplies the local-only password here so1733      // the background can wrap the adopted root key at rest without ever1734      // asking the user to retype it.1735      case "START_ADOPTION_RECEIVER": {1736        if (isRelayAdoptionSourceInFlight()) {1737          return { ok: false, error: "adoption_receiver_in_progress" };1738        }1739        const password = (msg.payload as { password?: unknown } | undefined)?.password;1740        if (typeof password !== "string" || password.length === 0) {1741          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1742        }1743        try {1744          return { ok: true, data: await startRelayAdoptionReceiver(password) };1745        } catch (error) {1746          return {1747            ok: false,1748            error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : "adoption_receiver_failed",1749          };1750        }1751      }17521753      // Source-side mirror of RECEIVER_SAS_DECISION: the popup's confirm/cancel1754      // on the source's SAS screen. The id round-trips the same way so a stale1755      // late response can't approve the wrong session.1756      case "RECEIVER_SAS_DECISION": {1757        const payload = msg.payload as { id?: unknown; sas?: unknown; ok?: unknown } | undefined;1758        if (typeof payload?.id !== "string" || typeof payload.sas !== "string" || typeof payload.ok !== "boolean") {1759          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1760        }1761        return { ok: resolveReceiverSasConfirmation(payload.id, payload.sas, payload.ok) };1762      }17631764      case "SOURCE_SAS_DECISION": {1765        const payload = msg.payload as { id?: unknown; ok?: unknown } | undefined;1766        if (typeof payload?.id !== "string" || typeof payload?.ok !== "boolean") {1767          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_payload" };1768        }1769        return { ok: resolveSourceSasConfirmation(payload.id, payload.ok) };1770      }1771      case "LIST_PENDING_ADOPTION_HOLDERS": {1772        return { ok: true, data: await listPendingAdoptionHolders() };1773      }17741775      case "REMOVE_PENDING_ADOPTION_HOLDER": {1776        await removePendingAdoptionHolder();1777        return { ok: true };1778      }177917801781      case "CANCEL_ADOPTION_SOURCE": {1782        cancelRelayAdoptionSource();1783        return { ok: true };1784      }17851786      case "TRIGGER_SYNC": {1787        if (vault.isDecoyMode()) return { ok: true };1788        const payload = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1789          reason?: "vault_change" | "foreground" | "manual";1790          force?: boolean;1791        };1792        const reason = payload.reason ?? "foreground";17931794        void triggerSyncIfReachable({ reason, force: payload.force === true });1795        return { ok: true };1796      }17971798      case "GET_SYNC_STATE": {1799        if (vault.isDecoyMode()) return { ok: true, data: { status: "idle" } };1800        return { ok: true, data: getSyncState() };1801      }18021803      // §11. The generation state carries no secret — it is a version and a1804      // state name — so the panel can read it while the vault is locked.1805      case "GET_SYNC_GENERATION": {1806        return { ok: true, data: await resolveGeneration(browserGenerationIo) };1807      }18081809      case "SECURE_RESET": {1810        if (vault.isDecoyMode()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1811        const payload = (msg.payload ?? {}) as { password?: unknown };1812        if (typeof payload.password !== "string" || payload.password.length === 0) {1813          return { ok: false, error: "Enter your master password" };1814        }1815        const wasLocked = !vault.isUnlocked();1816        const passwordValid = wasLocked1817          ? await vault.unlock(payload.password)1818          : await vault.verifyMainPassword(payload.password);1819        if (!passwordValid) {1820          return { ok: false, error: "Incorrect master password" };1821        }1822        if (wasLocked) {1823          await setupAutoLock();1824          broadcastToContentScripts({ type: "VAULT_UNLOCKED" });1825          onVaultUnlocked();1826        }1827        // Identity rotation needs the live vault root key. A password check is1828        // deliberately verification-only, so establish the real session first1829        // when Settings is opened after the vault session expired.1830        // Enter the blocking state before the reset steps: a crash after this1831        // point leaves the device refusing sync rather than mid-reset over live1832        // trust. Both are idempotent, so a retry is safe.1833        await enterResetRequired(browserGenerationIo);1834        const result = await confirmSecureReset(browserGenerationIo, {1835          nowMs: Date.now(),1836        });1837        return result === "V2_ANCHOR"1838          ? { ok: true, data: await resolveGeneration(browserGenerationIo) }1839          : {1840              ok: false,1841              error: "The reset did not complete — nothing was lost, try again",1842            };1843      }18441845      case "GET_SYNC_SETTINGS": {1846        if (vault.isDecoyMode()) return { ok: true, data: { mode: "off", relayUrl: "" } };1847        return { ok: true, data: await getSyncSettings() };1848      }18491850      case "SET_SYNC_SETTINGS": {1851        if (vault.isDecoyMode()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1852        const payload = (msg.payload ?? {}) as {1853          mode?: unknown;1854          relayUrl?: unknown;1855        };1856        try {1857          // A custom relay URL implies private mode; Peach's own relay stays1858          // public. See setRelayUrl.1859          if (payload.relayUrl !== undefined) {1860            if (typeof payload.relayUrl !== "string") {1861              return { ok: false, error: "invalid_relay_url" };1862            }1863            return { ok: true, data: await setRelayUrl(payload.relayUrl) };1864          }1865          if (payload.mode !== undefined) {1866            if (payload.mode !== "public" && payload.mode !== "private" && payload.mode !== "off") {1867              return { ok: false, error: "invalid_sync_mode" };1868            }1869            return { ok: true, data: await setSyncMode(payload.mode as SyncMode) };1870          }1871          return { ok: true, data: await getSyncSettings() };1872        } catch (error) {1873          return {1874            ok: false,1875            error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : "invalid_relay_url",1876          };1877        }1878      }187918801881      case "GET_SYNC_ALERTS": {1882        if (vault.isDecoyMode()) return { ok: true, data: [] };1883        return { ok: true, data: await getPendingSyncAlerts() };1884      }18851886      case "DISMISS_SYNC_ALERTS": {1887        if (vault.isDecoyMode()) return { ok: true };1888        const type = (msg.payload as { type?: unknown } | undefined)?.type;1889        if (type !== "DEVICE_KEY_ROTATED" && type !== "DEVICE_REVOKED") {1890          return { ok: false, error: "invalid_sync_alert_type" };1891        }1892        await dismissPendingSyncAlerts(type);1893        return { ok: true };1894      }18951896      case "GET_PENDING_VOUCHED_DEVICES": {1897        if (vault.isDecoyMode()) return { ok: true, data: [] };1898        return { ok: true, data: await listPendingVouchedDevices() };1899      }1900      case "CONFIRM_VOUCHED_DEVICE": {1901        if (vault.isDecoyMode()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1902        const { deviceId } = msg.payload as { deviceId: string };1903        const pending = await getPendingVouchedDevice(deviceId);1904        if (!pending) return { ok: false, error: "not_pending" };1905        // Last gate before a vouched device becomes a sync peer. A queue entry1906        // can predate the revocation that names it, so revocation is re-checked1907        // here rather than trusted to have swept the queue.1908        if (await isDeviceRevoked(pending.deviceId, pending.longTermPublicKeyHex)) {1909          await removePendingVouchedDevice(deviceId);1910          return { ok: false, error: "device_revoked" };1911        }1912        await upsertPairedDeviceV3({1913          deviceId: pending.deviceId,1914          deviceName: pending.deviceName,1915          deviceType:1916            pending.deviceType as import("../shared/sync-types").PairedDevice["deviceType"],1917          longTermPublicKeyHex: pending.longTermPublicKeyHex,1918          signingPublicKeyHex: pending.signingPublicKeyHex,1919          wsPort: pending.wsPort,1920          pairedAt: pending.pairedAt,1921          trustSource: "vouched",1922        });1923        await removePendingVouchedDevice(deviceId);1924        // Newly confirmed vouched device is now a sync target — kick a round1925        // so the mesh introduction pays off without a 10-minute wait.1926        void triggerSyncIfReachable({ reason: "device_list_changed" }).catch(() => undefined);1927        return { ok: true };1928      }1929      case "REJECT_VOUCHED_DEVICE": {1930        if (vault.isDecoyMode()) return { ok: true };1931        const { deviceId } = msg.payload as { deviceId: string };1932        await removePendingVouchedDevice(deviceId);1933        return { ok: true };1934      }19351936      case "ROTATE_SYNC_IDENTITY": {1937        if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1938        const result = await vault.rotateSyncIdentity();1939        return result.ok ? { ok: true } : { ok: false, error: result.error };1940      }19411942      default:1943        return { ok: false, error: "unknown_message_type" };1944    }1945  } catch (err) {1946    return {1947      ok: false,1948      error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : "operation_failed",1949    };1950  }1951}19521953// Returns username use-counts from the vault, sorted by frequency. Each row1954// also carries the entry's email so the popup can suggest the email/username1955// pair the user has actually used together.1956function buildIdentitySuggestions(1957  entries: VaultEntry[],1958): Array<{ email: string; username: string; count: number }> {1959  const usernameCounts = new Map<string, number>();1960  const usernameEmail = new Map<string, string>();1961  for (const entry of entries) {1962    const username = entry.username ?? "";1963    const email = (entry as VaultEntry & { email?: string }).email ?? "";1964    if (!username && !email) continue;1965    const key = username || email;1966    usernameCounts.set(key, (usernameCounts.get(key) ?? 0) + 1);1967    if (!usernameEmail.has(key)) usernameEmail.set(key, email);1968  }1969  return Array.from(usernameCounts.entries())1970    .sort((a, b) => b[1] - a[1])1971    .map(([username, count]) => ({1972      email: usernameEmail.get(username) ?? "",1973      username,1974      count,1975    }));1976}19771978/** Notify all content scripts that the vault just became available. */1979function broadcastToContentScripts(message: { type: string }): void {1980  if (!chrome.tabs?.query) return;1981  chrome.tabs.query({}, (tabs) => {1982    for (const tab of tabs) {1983      if (tab.id !== undefined) {1984        chrome.tabs.sendMessage(tab.id, message).catch(() => {1985          // Tab may not have a content script — silently ignore1986        });1987      }1988    }1989  });1990}19911992function shouldRefreshAutoLock(1993  type: MessageType,1994  sender: Partial<chrome.runtime.MessageSender>,1995): boolean {1996  if (!isExtensionPageSender(sender)) return false;1997  return (1998    type !== "HAS_VAULT" &&1999    type !== "IS_UNLOCKED" &&2000    type !== "GET_VAULT_STATUS" &&2001    type !== "LOCK" &&2002    type !== "UPDATE_SETTINGS" &&2003    type !== "GET_PENDING_PASSKEY" &&2004    type !== "GET_PASSKEY_PROVIDER_STATE" &&2005    type !== "DECLINE_CARD_SAVE" &&2006    type !== "IS_CARD_DECLINED" &&2007    type !== "AUTOFILL_QUERY" &&2008    type !== "ML_PREDICT_BATCH"2009  );2010}20112012function isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl(value: string): boolean {2013  try {2014    const url = new URL(value);2015    if (url.protocol !== "https:") return false;20162017    const hostname = url.hostname.toLowerCase();2018    if (2019      hostname === "localhost" ||2020      hostname.endsWith(".localhost") ||2021      isPrivateIpv4(hostname) ||2022      isPrivateIpv6(hostname)2023    ) {2024      return false;2025    }20262027    return true;2028  } catch {2029    return false;2030  }2031}20322033function isPrivateIpv4(hostname: string): boolean {2034  if (PRIVATE_IPV4_RANGES.some((range) => hostname.startsWith(range.prefix))) {2035    return true;2036  }20372038  const octets = hostname.split(".").map((part) => Number(part));2039  if (octets.length !== 4 || octets.some((octet) => !Number.isInteger(octet) || octet < 0 || octet > 255)) {2040    return false;2041  }20422043  return octets[0] === 172 && octets[1] >= 16 && octets[1] <= 31;2044}20452046function isPrivateIpv6(hostname: string): boolean {2047  const normalized = hostname.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "").toLowerCase();2048  // IPv4-mapped IPv6 literals embed a plain IPv4 address that the prefix2049  // list below can never match (WHATWG URL serializes [::ffff:192.168.0.1]2050  // as ::ffff:c0a8:1). Unwrap and test the embedded IPv4; unparseable mapped2051  // tails fail closed. (Codex Security 2026-08-04 LOW,2052  // ssrf.webhook-url-private-ip-filter.) DNS rebinding is out of scope for a2053  // one-shot host check.2054  const mapped = /^::ffff:(.+)$/.exec(normalized);2055  if (mapped) {2056    const tail = mapped[1] ?? "";2057    if (tail.includes(".")) return isPrivateIpv4(tail);2058    const parts = tail.split(":");2059    const [hi, lo] = parts;2060    if (2061      parts.length !== 2 ||2062      !hi ||2063      !lo ||2064      !/^[0-9a-f]{1,4}$/.test(hi) ||2065      !/^[0-9a-f]{1,4}$/.test(lo)2066    ) {2067      return true;2068    }2069    const octets = [2070      (Number.parseInt(hi, 16) >>> 8) & 0xff,2071      Number.parseInt(hi, 16) & 0xff,2072      (Number.parseInt(lo, 16) >>> 8) & 0xff,2073      Number.parseInt(lo, 16) & 0xff,2074    ];2075    return isPrivateIpv4(octets.join("."));2076  }2077  return (2078    normalized === "::1" ||2079    normalized.startsWith("fc") ||2080    normalized.startsWith("fd") ||2081    normalized.startsWith("fe80:")2082  );2083}