passkey.ts

1import { isProUser } from "./license";2import * as vault from "./vault";3import {4  base64urlEncode,5  buildAuthenticatorData,6  buildClientDataJSON,7  createAttestationObject,8  generateCredentialId,9  generatePasskeyKeypair,10  pickPasskeyAlgorithm,11  signPasskeyAssertion,12} from "./passkey-crypto";13import { detectBrowser as detectSharedBrowser, firefoxVersion } from "../shared/browser";14import { FIREFOX_USE_CONTENT_SCRIPT_PROXY } from "../shared/passkey-flags";15import { isValidRpId } from "../shared/passkey-utils";16import type {17  PasskeyData,18  PasskeyProviderState,19  PendingPasskeyRequest,20  VaultEntry,21} from "../shared/types";2223declare const __PEACH_E2E_PASSKEYS__: boolean;2425const PENDING_PREFIX = "passkey_pending_";26const APPROVAL_TIMEOUT_MS = 60_000;2728let listenersRegistered = false;29let attached = false;30let conflict: string | undefined;31const PASSKEY_CREATE_E2E_BYPASS = __PEACH_E2E_PASSKEYS__ === true;3233const approvals = new Map<34  number,35  { resolve: (approved: boolean) => void; timeoutId: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> }36>();3738// Resolvers for GET requests that arrived while the vault was locked and are39// waiting for the user to unlock before the passkey flow can continue.40const unlockWaiters = new Map<number, { resolve: (ok: boolean) => void; timeoutId: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> }>();4142// Tracks requestIds that Chrome cancelled on us (via onRequestCanceled) while43// we were still mid-handler. The complete*Request calls would otherwise reject44// with "Invalid requestId"; the handler checks this set before any work.45const cancelledRequests = new Set<number>();46function markCancelled(requestId: number): void {47  cancelledRequests.add(requestId);48  // Bounded GC — never grow forever. Old IDs that haven't been polled in a49  // long time can be forgotten without harm because the Chrome-side request50  // is already gone.51  if (cancelledRequests.size > 256) {52    const iter = cancelledRequests.values();53    for (let i = 0; i < 128; i += 1) cancelledRequests.delete(iter.next().value as number);54  }55}5657export function onVaultUnlocked(): void {58  for (const { resolve, timeoutId } of unlockWaiters.values()) {59    clearTimeout(timeoutId);60    resolve(true);61  }62  unlockWaiters.clear();63}6465/**66 * Resolve every still-pending passkey request as denied and clear unlock67 * waiters. Called from the popup-disconnect path so a closed popup releases68 * the page-side caller in <200ms instead of leaving it stuck for the full69 * APPROVAL_TIMEOUT_MS (60s) (M8/COR-009).70 */71export async function denyAllPendingPasskeyRequests(): Promise<void> {72  if (approvals.size === 0 && unlockWaiters.size === 0) return;73  for (const [rid, { resolve, timeoutId }] of approvals.entries()) {74    clearTimeout(timeoutId);75    resolve(false);76    approvals.delete(rid);77    await clearPendingRequest(rid).catch(() => {});78  }79  for (const { resolve, timeoutId } of unlockWaiters.values()) {80    clearTimeout(timeoutId);81    resolve(false);82  }83  unlockWaiters.clear();84}8586function isPasskeySupported(): boolean {87  if (typeof chrome.webAuthenticationProxy?.attach === "function") return true;88  // Firefox 150+ exposes navigator.credentials.create/get from the popup89  // context with extension host permissions. Cannot intercept page-side90  // calls (no equivalent of webAuthenticationProxy), but registration via91  // Peach's own popup-driven flow works.92  if (detectSharedBrowser() === "firefox") {93    const ver = firefoxVersion();94    if (Number.isFinite(ver) && ver >= 150) return true;95  }96  return false;97}9899export const detectBrowser = detectSharedBrowser;100101function getBrowserLabel(): string {102  const ua = navigator.userAgent;103  if (/Firefox\/(\d+)/.test(ua)) {104    const version = ua.match(/Firefox\/(\d+)/)?.[1];105    return version ? `Firefox ${version}` : "Firefox";106  }107  const version = ua.match(/Chrome\/(\d+)/)?.[1];108  return version ? `Chrome ${version}` : "Chromium";109}110111function pendingStorageKey(requestId: number): string {112  return `${PENDING_PREFIX}${requestId}`;113}114115function randomRequestId(): number {116  // 53-bit crypto-random integer — unbrute-forceable, unlike the old117  // Date.now()+Math.random synthetic id (~10-20 bits). Fits a JS safe118  // integer so it round-trips through String/Number for the toast path.119  // (Audit 2026-08-20 #1/#10.)120  const u = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint32Array(2));121  return u[0] * 0x200000 + (u[1] >>> 11);122}123124function originFromRpId(rpId: string): string {125  return /^(localhost|127\.0\.0\.1|\[::1\])$/i.test(rpId)126    ? `http://${rpId}`127    : `https://${rpId}`;128}129130/**131 * The clientDataJSON sent back to the RP must contain the page's actual132 * origin — not a synthesized one. `chrome.webAuthenticationProxy` does not133 * surface the requesting origin in CreateRequest/GetRequest, so we read it134 * from the active tab and validate that its hostname is a registrable135 * suffix match for the rpId. WebAuthn requires this relationship anyway, so136 * a mismatch indicates either a stale active tab or a hostile environment;137 * we fall back to https://<rpId> in that case to avoid silently signing the138 * wrong origin.139 *140 * Without this, a passkey created on https://myaccount.google.com gets141 * clientDataJSON.origin = "https://google.com", and Google's RP rejects the142 * attestation with "Something went wrong" because the origin hash doesn't143 * match what its own JS captured at create time.144 */145async function resolvePageOrigin(rpId: string): Promise<string> {146  try {147    const tabs = await new Promise<chrome.tabs.Tab[]>((resolve) =>148      chrome.tabs.query({ active: true, lastFocusedWindow: true }, resolve)149    );150    const url = tabs[0]?.url;151    if (url) {152      const parsed = new URL(url);153      const host = parsed.hostname.toLowerCase();154      const rp = rpId.toLowerCase();155      if (host === rp || host.endsWith(`.${rp}`)) {156        return parsed.origin;157      }158    }159  } catch {160    // fall through to rpId-derived origin161  }162  return originFromRpId(rpId);163}164165async function setBadge(text: string): Promise<void> {166  if (!chrome.action?.setBadgeText) return;167  await chrome.action.setBadgeText({ text });168  if (text) {169    await chrome.action.setBadgeBackgroundColor({ color: "#E5805C" });170  }171}172173async function clearPendingRequest(requestId: number): Promise<void> {174  if (chrome.storage.session) {175    await chrome.storage.session.remove(pendingStorageKey(requestId));176  }177  await setBadge("");178}179180async function openApprovalPopup(): Promise<void> {181  try {182    await chrome.action.openPopup();183  } catch {184    await setBadge("PK");185  }186}187188/**189 * Some ceremonies — especially conditional-UI `navigator.credentials.get`190 * calls — get cancelled by Chrome before we finish processing. Calling191 * complete*Request on a cancelled requestId rejects with "Invalid192 * requestId". That is expected, not exceptional: swallow it. Re-throwing193 * would surface an uncaught promise rejection in the SW and cascade through194 * the catch wrappers in setupPasskeyProxy.195 */196function isInvalidRequestIdError(err: unknown): boolean {197  return err instanceof Error && /invalid requestid/i.test(err.message);198}199200/**201 * Chrome throws "Missing GetResponseDetails.responseJson" when202 * completeGetRequest is called with no responseJson and no error (the203 * pass-through signal). The throw is a Chrome API quirk — the request IS204 * routed to the platform authenticator — but if we let it propagate, the205 * outer catch calls rejectGet, which sends a second completeGetRequest with206 * an error that cancels the pass-through and shows "Something went wrong" on207 * the page. Swallow it exactly as we swallow "Invalid requestId".208 */209function isMissingResponseJsonError(err: unknown): boolean {210  return err instanceof Error && /missing getresponsedetails/i.test(err.message);211}212213async function rejectCreate(214  requestId: number,215  name: string,216  message = ""217): Promise<void> {218  try {219    await chrome.webAuthenticationProxy.completeCreateRequest({220      requestId,221      error: { name, message },222    });223  } catch (err) {224    if (isInvalidRequestIdError(err)) {225      return;226    }227    throw err;228  }229}230231async function rejectGet(232  requestId: number,233  name: string,234  message = ""235): Promise<void> {236  try {237    await chrome.webAuthenticationProxy.completeGetRequest({238      requestId,239      error: { name, message },240    });241  } catch (err) {242    if (isInvalidRequestIdError(err)) {243      return;244    }245    throw err;246  }247}248249export async function getPendingPasskeyRequest(): Promise<PendingPasskeyRequest | null> {250  if (!chrome.storage.session) return null; // Firefox <132 / unsupported contexts251  const stored = (await chrome.storage.session.get(null)) as Record<string, unknown>;252  const key = Object.keys(stored).find((item) => item.startsWith(PENDING_PREFIX));253  if (!key) return null;254  const pending = stored[key];255  return pending && typeof pending === "object"256    ? (pending as PendingPasskeyRequest)257    : null;258}259260export async function resolvePendingPasskeyRequest(261  requestId: number,262  approved: boolean263): Promise<void> {264  const pending = approvals.get(requestId);265  if (!pending) {266    // Either the request expired (Chrome) or this is a Firefox-driven267    // pending where the popup performs the navigator.credentials call268    // directly. Clear both possible session keys so getPendingPasskeyRequest()269    // doesn't surface stale state on the next popup open.270    await clearPendingRequest(requestId);271    if (chrome.storage.session) {272      await chrome.storage.session.remove(FIREFOX_PENDING_KEY);273    }274    return;275  }276277  clearTimeout(pending.timeoutId);278  approvals.delete(requestId);279  await clearPendingRequest(requestId);280  pending.resolve(approved);281}282283async function promptUserApproval(request: PendingPasskeyRequest): Promise<boolean> {284  if (chrome.storage.session) {285    await chrome.storage.session.set({ [pendingStorageKey(request.requestId)]: request });286  }287  await openApprovalPopup();288289  return new Promise<boolean>((resolve) => {290    const timeoutId = setTimeout(async () => {291      approvals.delete(request.requestId);292      await clearPendingRequest(request.requestId);293      resolve(false);294    }, APPROVAL_TIMEOUT_MS);295296    approvals.set(request.requestId, { resolve, timeoutId });297  });298}299300export async function getPasskeyProviderState(): Promise<PasskeyProviderState> {301  const settings = await vault.ensureSettingsLoaded();302  const supported = isPasskeySupported();303  const enabled = settings.passkeyProviderEnabled === true;304  return {305    supported,306    enabled,307    attached: supported && attached,308    browserLabel: getBrowserLabel(),309    statusLabel: !supported310      ? "Interception unavailable"311      : attached312        ? "Active"313        : conflict314          ? "Another provider is active"315          : enabled316            ? "Inactive"317            : "Disabled",318    conflict,319  };320}321322async function attachPasskeyProxy(): Promise<void> {323  if (!isPasskeySupported()) {324    attached = false;325    conflict = "This browser does not expose chrome.webAuthenticationProxy.";326    return;327  }328329  // Firefox path: no chrome.webAuthenticationProxy exists. The popup-context330  // navigator.credentials creator is always ready once the user enables the331  // provider. Treat enabled = attached for state reporting purposes.332  if (detectSharedBrowser() === "firefox") {333    attached = true;334    conflict = undefined;335    return;336  }337338  if (attached) return;339340  try {341    await chrome.webAuthenticationProxy.attach();342    attached = true;343    conflict = undefined;344  } catch (error) {345    attached = false;346    conflict = error instanceof Error ? error.message : "Another provider is active.";347    console.warn("[Peach passkey] proxy attach failed", { conflict });348  }349}350351async function detachPasskeyProxy(): Promise<void> {352  if (!isPasskeySupported()) {353    attached = false;354    return;355  }356357  if (detectSharedBrowser() === "firefox") {358    attached = false;359    conflict = undefined;360    return;361  }362363  try {364    await chrome.webAuthenticationProxy.detach();365  } catch {366    // Ignore detach failures; the extension may already be detached.367  }368369  attached = false;370  conflict = undefined;371}372373export async function setPasskeyProviderEnabled(enabled: boolean): Promise<PasskeyProviderState> {374  await vault.updateSettings({ passkeyProviderEnabled: enabled });375  if (enabled) {376    await attachPasskeyProxy();377  } else {378    await detachPasskeyProxy();379  }380  return getPasskeyProviderState();381}382383async function refreshPasskeyProxy(): Promise<void> {384  const settings = await vault.ensureSettingsLoaded();385  if (settings.passkeyProviderEnabled === true) {386    await attachPasskeyProxy();387    return;388  }389  await detachPasskeyProxy();390}391392/**393 * Find the entry that already holds a passkey for the given RP, or the most394 * recently-modified login entry whose URL/additionalUrls match the RP — that395 * entry is the natural attach target when the user adds a passkey to a site396 * they already have a password for. Returns null when there's no candidate;397 * the caller creates a new entry in that case.398 */399function findAttachTarget(rpId: string): VaultEntry | null {400  const all = vault.getEntries();401  const passkeyMatch = all.find(402    (entry) => entry.passkey?.rpId === rpId && !entry.deletedAt403  );404  if (passkeyMatch) return passkeyMatch;405  const loginMatches = vault.queryDomain(rpId).filter((entry) => entry.type === "login" && !entry.passkey);406  if (loginMatches.length === 0) return null;407  // Pick the most recently modified candidate to be deterministic.408  return loginMatches.reduce((best, e) =>409    (e.modifiedAt ?? 0) > (best.modifiedAt ?? 0) ? e : best410  );411}412413async function handleCreateRequest(414  request: chrome.webAuthenticationProxy.CreateRequest415): Promise<void> {416  const options = JSON.parse(request.requestDetailsJson) as PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptionsJSON;417  const rpId = options.rp.id;418  const rpName = options.rp.name ?? options.rp.id;419  const userName = options.user.name;420  const userDisplayName = options.user.displayName ?? options.user.name;421  if (!rpId) {422    console.warn("[Peach passkey] reject: missing rp.id");423    await rejectCreate(request.requestId, "NotSupportedError", "Missing RP ID");424    return;425  }426427  // Capture the page origin NOW — before any popup opens. Once the extension428  // action popup fires, it can steal lastFocusedWindow so the tabs query429  // returns no results and falls back to https://<rpId>. For sites where the430  // page origin is a subdomain of the rpId (e.g. myaccount.google.com vs431  // rpId google.com) that fallback produces the wrong origin and the RP432  // rejects the attestation with "Something went wrong".433  const pageOrigin = await resolvePageOrigin(rpId);434435  if (!PASSKEY_CREATE_E2E_BYPASS && !(await isProUser())) {436    console.warn("[Peach passkey] reject: user is not Pro");437    await rejectCreate(438      request.requestId,439      "NotAllowedError",440      "Passkey creation requires Peach Pro."441    );442    // Show the inline passkey gate so the user knows what happened and can upgrade.443    broadcastPasskeyProGate();444    return;445  }446447  if (!vault.isUnlocked()) {448    // Same wait-for-unlock pattern handleGetRequest uses: summon the inline449    // unlock prompt on the active tab so the user can unlock without leaving450    // the page, then hold the create request open until the vault unlocks or451    // the timeout fires. Immediately rejecting here means Google shows452    // "Something went wrong" the instant the user picks Peach.453    const tabs = await new Promise<chrome.tabs.Tab[]>((resolve) =>454      chrome.tabs.query({ active: true, lastFocusedWindow: true }, resolve)455    );456    const activeTab = tabs[0];457    if (activeTab?.id) {458      chrome.tabs.sendMessage(activeTab.id, {459        type: 'SUMMON_AUTOFILL',460        source: 'passkey-unlock',461      }).catch((err) => {462        console.warn("[Peach passkey] SUMMON_AUTOFILL failed, falling back to popup", err);463        void openApprovalPopup();464      });465    } else {466      await openApprovalPopup();467    }468469    const unlocked = await new Promise<boolean>((resolve) => {470      const timeoutId = setTimeout(() => {471        unlockWaiters.delete(request.requestId);472        resolve(false);473      }, APPROVAL_TIMEOUT_MS);474      unlockWaiters.set(request.requestId, { resolve, timeoutId });475    });476477    if (!unlocked || !vault.isUnlocked()) {478      console.warn("[Peach passkey] reject: unlock timeout");479      await rejectCreate(request.requestId, "NotAllowedError", "Not unlocked in time.");480      return;481    }482    // Vault is now unlocked — fall through to approval.483  }484485  const approved = await promptUserApproval({486    requestId: request.requestId,487    type: "create",488    rpId,489    rpName,490    userName,491    userDisplayName,492  });493  if (!approved) {494    console.warn("[Peach passkey] reject: user denied");495    await rejectCreate(request.requestId, "NotAllowedError", "User denied request.");496    return;497  }498499  const algorithm = pickPasskeyAlgorithm(options.pubKeyCredParams ?? []);500  if (!algorithm) {501    console.warn("[Peach passkey] reject: no supported algorithm", options.pubKeyCredParams);502    await rejectCreate(request.requestId, "NotSupportedError", "No supported algorithm offered.");503    return;504  }505  const credentialIdBytes = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32));506  const { publicKeyCose, publicKeySpki, privateKeyJwk } = await generatePasskeyKeypair(507    algorithm508  );509  const authData = await buildAuthenticatorData({510    rpId,511    flags: 0x4d,512    signCount: 0,513    credentialId: credentialIdBytes,514    publicKeyCose,515  });516  const attestationObject = createAttestationObject(authData);517  const clientDataJSON = buildClientDataJSON(518    "webauthn.create",519    options.challenge,520    pageOrigin521  );522523  const passkey: PasskeyData = {524    rpId,525    rpName,526    credentialId: base64urlEncode(credentialIdBytes),527    publicKeyCose: base64urlEncode(publicKeyCose),528    privateKeyJwk,529    userHandle: options.user.id,530    userName,531    userDisplayName,532    algorithm,533    signCount: 0,534    aaguid: base64urlEncode(new Uint8Array(16)),535    backupEligible: false,536    backupState: false,537    browser: "chrome",538    transports: ["internal"],539    createdAt: Date.now(),540  };541542  // Attach to an existing login (same domain) when one exists; otherwise543  // create a fresh login entry that exists solely to hold the passkey.544  const target = findAttachTarget(rpId);545  if (target) {546    await vault.updateEntry(target.id, { passkey });547  } else {548    await vault.addEntry({549      type: "login",550      title: rpName,551      url: `https://${rpId}`,552      username: userName,553      passkey,554    });555  }556  // Merge any same-domain TOTP-only entries into the passkey entry right now557  // so the user sees one consolidated entry rather than waiting until next558  // unlock for the decodePayload merge pass to run.559  await vault.consolidatePasskeyEntries();560561  try {562    await chrome.webAuthenticationProxy.completeCreateRequest({563      requestId: request.requestId,564      responseJson: JSON.stringify({565        id: passkey.credentialId,566        rawId: passkey.credentialId,567        type: "public-key",568        response: {569          clientDataJSON: base64urlEncode(clientDataJSON),570          authenticatorData: base64urlEncode(authData),571          attestationObject: base64urlEncode(attestationObject),572          transports: ["internal"],573          publicKey: base64urlEncode(publicKeySpki),574          publicKeyAlgorithm: algorithm,575        },576        authenticatorAttachment: "platform",577        clientExtensionResults: {},578      }),579    });580  } catch (err) {581    if (isInvalidRequestIdError(err)) {582      return;583    }584    throw err;585  }586}587588function broadcastPasskeyProGate(): void {589  chrome.tabs.query({}, (tabs) => {590    for (const tab of tabs) {591      if (tab.id !== undefined) {592        chrome.tabs.sendMessage(tab.id, { type: "PASSKEY_PRO_GATE" }).catch(() => {});593      }594    }595  });596}597598async function promptViaToast(request: PendingPasskeyRequest): Promise<boolean> {599  if (chrome.storage.session) {600    await chrome.storage.session.set({ [pendingStorageKey(request.requestId)]: request });601  }602603  const tabs = await new Promise<chrome.tabs.Tab[]>((resolve) => {604    chrome.tabs.query({ active: true, currentWindow: true }, resolve);605  });606  const tab = tabs[0];607608  if (tab?.id) {609    chrome.tabs.sendMessage(tab.id, {610      type: 'SHOW_PASSKEY_TOAST',611      payload: {612        site: request.rpId,613        displayName: request.userDisplayName ?? request.userName,614        username: request.userName,615        requestId: String(request.requestId),616      },617    }).catch(() => {});618  } else {619    await openApprovalPopup();620  }621622  return new Promise<boolean>((resolve) => {623    const timeoutId = setTimeout(async () => {624      approvals.delete(request.requestId);625      await clearPendingRequest(request.requestId);626      resolve(false);627    }, APPROVAL_TIMEOUT_MS);628629    approvals.set(request.requestId, { resolve, timeoutId });630  });631}632633async function handleGetRequest(634  request: chrome.webAuthenticationProxy.GetRequest635): Promise<void> {636  const options = JSON.parse(request.requestDetailsJson) as PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptionsJSON;637  if (!vault.isUnlocked()) {638    // Summon the inline unlock prompt on the active tab so the user can unlock639    // without leaving the page. Fall back to the popup if the content script640    // is unavailable (e.g. restricted URL, script not yet injected).641    const tabs = await new Promise<chrome.tabs.Tab[]>((resolve) =>642      chrome.tabs.query({ active: true, currentWindow: true }, resolve)643    );644    const activeTab = tabs[0];645    if (activeTab?.id) {646      chrome.tabs.sendMessage(activeTab.id, {647        type: 'SUMMON_AUTOFILL',648        source: 'passkey-unlock',649      }).catch(() => { void openApprovalPopup(); });650    } else {651      await openApprovalPopup();652    }653654    // Hold the request open until the vault unlocks or the timeout fires.655    const unlocked = await new Promise<boolean>((resolve) => {656      const timeoutId = setTimeout(() => {657        unlockWaiters.delete(request.requestId);658        resolve(false);659      }, APPROVAL_TIMEOUT_MS);660      unlockWaiters.set(request.requestId, { resolve, timeoutId });661    });662663    if (!unlocked || !vault.isUnlocked()) {664      await rejectGet(request.requestId, "NotAllowedError", "Not unlocked in time.");665      return;666    }667    // Vault is now unlocked — fall through to authenticate.668  }669670  if (!PASSKEY_CREATE_E2E_BYPASS && !(await isProUser())) {671    await rejectGet(request.requestId, "NotAllowedError", "Passkey use requires Peach Pro.");672    broadcastPasskeyProGate();673    return;674  }675676  const passkeyBearing = vault.getEntries().filter((entry): entry is VaultEntry & { passkey: PasskeyData } =>677    entry.passkey !== undefined && !entry.deletedAt678  );679  const allowedCredentialIds = (options.allowCredentials ?? []).map((descriptor) => descriptor.id);680681  const match = passkeyBearing.find((entry) => {682    // PB-26-015: a credential-ID match must still belong to the requesting683    // RP — the assertion later signs with the stored rpId, so a foreign-RP684    // request must never select a credential from a different rpId.685    if (options.rpId && entry.passkey.rpId !== options.rpId) return false;686    if (allowedCredentialIds.length > 0) {687      return allowedCredentialIds.includes(entry.passkey.credentialId);688    }689    if (!options.rpId) return false;690    return entry.passkey.rpId === options.rpId;691  });692693  if (!match) {694    // No Peach passkey for this RP — pass through to the platform authenticator.695    // completeGetRequest with no error and no responseJson is the webAuthenticationProxy696    // signal for "I'm not handling this"; Chrome routes the request to the next697    // authenticator in the chain (the built-in browser passkey manager etc.).698    // Rejecting with NotAllowedError would propagate as an error to the page and699    // break RPs (e.g. Google) that issue a GET as part of their create-passkey flow.700    try {701      await chrome.webAuthenticationProxy.completeGetRequest({ requestId: request.requestId });702    } catch (err) {703      if (isInvalidRequestIdError(err)) return;704      if (isMissingResponseJsonError(err)) return;705      throw err;706    }707    return;708  }709710  const credential = match.passkey;711  // Chrome's webAuthenticationProxy path requires Peach-held private key material.712  // Passkeys created on Firefox have no privateKeyJwk — pass through so Chrome713  // can route to a capable authenticator instead of surfacing an error to the page.714  if (!credential.privateKeyJwk) {715    try {716      await chrome.webAuthenticationProxy.completeGetRequest({ requestId: request.requestId });717    } catch (err) {718      if (isInvalidRequestIdError(err)) return;719      if (isMissingResponseJsonError(err)) return;720      throw err;721    }722    return;723  }724725  const approved = await promptViaToast({726    requestId: request.requestId,727    type: "get",728    rpId: credential.rpId,729    rpName: credential.rpName,730    userName: credential.userName,731    userDisplayName: credential.userDisplayName,732  });733  if (!approved) {734    await rejectGet(request.requestId, "NotAllowedError", "User denied request.");735    return;736  }737738  const nextSignCount = credential.signCount + 1;739  const flags = 0x05 | (credential.backupEligible ? 0x08 : 0) | (credential.backupState ? 0x10 : 0);740  const authData = await buildAuthenticatorData({741    rpId: credential.rpId,742    flags,743    signCount: nextSignCount,744  });745  const clientDataJSON = buildClientDataJSON(746    "webauthn.get",747    options.challenge,748    await resolvePageOrigin(credential.rpId)749  );750  const clientDataHash = new Uint8Array(751    await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", new Uint8Array(clientDataJSON))752  );753  const signature = await signPasskeyAssertion(754    credential.privateKeyJwk,755    credential.algorithm,756    authData,757    clientDataHash758  );759760  await vault.updateEntry(match.id, {761    passkey: {762      ...credential,763      signCount: nextSignCount,764      lastUsedAt: Date.now(),765    },766  });767768  const responseJson = JSON.stringify({769    id: credential.credentialId,770    rawId: credential.credentialId,771    type: "public-key",772    response: {773      clientDataJSON: base64urlEncode(clientDataJSON),774      authenticatorData: base64urlEncode(authData),775      signature: base64urlEncode(signature),776      userHandle: credential.userHandle,777    },778    authenticatorAttachment: "platform",779    clientExtensionResults: {},780  });781782  try {783    await chrome.webAuthenticationProxy.completeGetRequest({784      requestId: request.requestId,785      responseJson,786    });787  } catch (err) {788    if (isInvalidRequestIdError(err)) {789      return;790    }791    throw err;792  }793}794795// ── Firefox path ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────796//797// Firefox 150+ permits extensions to call navigator.credentials.create/get798// from the popup context with their host-permitted RP IDs. Peach uses that799// surface to register passkeys on behalf of the user. The page's own800// navigator.credentials call is observed via the MAIN-world detector801// (src/content/passkeys-firefox.ts) but never blocked or replaced; Peach's802// flow is parallel and explicit (the user must engage with Peach's button).803804const FIREFOX_PENDING_KEY = "passkey_pending_firefox";805const FIREFOX_DECLINE_PREFIX = "peach_passkey_offer_declined:";806const FIREFOX_DECLINE_TTL_MS = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000; // 30 days807808export async function initiateFirefoxPasskeyCreate(args: {809  rpId: string;810  rpName: string;811  userName: string;812  userDisplayName?: string;813}, callerOrigin?: string): Promise<{ ok: boolean; error?: string }> {814  // The rpId must belong to the calling page's registrable domain; without815  // this, a page could initiate a ceremony for a foreign site and the816  // approval popup would display an attacker-chosen rpId. Origin is the817  // browser-attested sender origin from messages.ts, never page payload.818  // (Codex Security 2026-08-04, passkey-ceremony-approval sibling.)819  if (!callerOrigin || !isValidRpId(args.rpId, callerOrigin)) {820    return { ok: false, error: "rpid_origin_mismatch" };821  }822  if (!(await isProUser())) {823    broadcastPasskeyProGate();824    return { ok: false, error: "passkey creation requires Peach Pro" };825  }826  if (!vault.isUnlocked()) {827    await openApprovalPopup();828    return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };829  }830  if (!chrome.storage.session) {831    return { ok: false, error: "session storage unavailable" };832  }833834  const requestId = randomRequestId();835  const challenge = base64urlEncode(crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32)));836  const userHandle = base64urlEncode(crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32)));837838  const pending: PendingPasskeyRequest = {839    requestId,840    type: "create",841    rpId: args.rpId,842    rpName: args.rpName,843    userName: args.userName,844    userDisplayName: args.userDisplayName,845    browser: "firefox",846    challenge,847    userHandle,848  };849850  await chrome.storage.session.set({ [FIREFOX_PENDING_KEY]: pending });851  await openApprovalPopup();852  return { ok: true };853}854855export async function completeFirefoxPasskeyCreate(payload: {856  requestId: number;857  rpId: string;858  rpName: string;859  userName: string;860  userDisplayName?: string;861  userHandle: string;862  credentialId: string;863  publicKeyCose: string;864  algorithm: -7 | -8;865  aaguid?: string;866  transports?: string[];867  backupEligible?: boolean;868  backupState?: boolean;869}): Promise<{ ok: boolean; error?: string }> {870  if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };871872  // Bind completion to the pending ceremony: requestId, rpId, challenge, and873  // userHandle are minted by the background at INITIATE time and only ever874  // leave extension context through the approval popup, so a page (or anything875  // replaying relayed messages) cannot synthesize a matching completion for an876  // rpId it does not own. (Codex Security 2026-08-04 MEDIUM,877  // broken-access-control.passkey-ceremony-approval.)878  const pending = chrome.storage.session879    ? ((await chrome.storage.session.get(FIREFOX_PENDING_KEY))[FIREFOX_PENDING_KEY] as880        | PendingPasskeyRequest881        | undefined)882    : undefined;883  if (884    !pending ||885    pending.requestId !== payload.requestId ||886    pending.rpId !== payload.rpId ||887    pending.userHandle !== payload.userHandle888  ) {889    return { ok: false, error: "no_pending_request" };890  }891892  const passkey: PasskeyData = {893    rpId: payload.rpId,894    rpName: payload.rpName,895    credentialId: payload.credentialId,896    publicKeyCose: payload.publicKeyCose,897    userHandle: payload.userHandle,898    userName: payload.userName,899    userDisplayName: payload.userDisplayName ?? payload.userName,900    algorithm: payload.algorithm,901    signCount: 0,902    aaguid: payload.aaguid ?? base64urlEncode(new Uint8Array(16)),903    backupEligible: payload.backupEligible ?? false,904    backupState: payload.backupState ?? false,905    browser: "firefox",906    transports: payload.transports ?? ["internal"],907    createdAt: Date.now(),908  };909910  // Same attach-or-create flow as the Chrome path: prefer attaching to an911  // existing login entry for the same domain so the user ends up with one912  // entry per site, not two (a login + a passkey-only).913  const target = findAttachTarget(payload.rpId);914  if (target) {915    await vault.updateEntry(target.id, { passkey });916  } else {917    await vault.addEntry({918      type: "login",919      title: payload.rpName || payload.rpId,920      url: `https://${payload.rpId}`,921      username: payload.userName,922      passkey,923    });924  }925  await vault.consolidatePasskeyEntries();926927  if (chrome.storage.session) {928    await chrome.storage.session.remove(FIREFOX_PENDING_KEY);929  }930  return { ok: true };931}932933const MAX_DECLINE_DOMAIN_LENGTH = 253;934935function normaliseDeclineDomain(domain: string): string | null {936  if (!domain || domain.length > MAX_DECLINE_DOMAIN_LENGTH) return null;937  try {938    const url = new URL(`https://${domain}`);939    return isValidRpId(url.hostname, url.origin) ? url.hostname : null;940  } catch {941    return null;942  }943}944945function declineKey(domain: string): string {946  return `${FIREFOX_DECLINE_PREFIX}${domain}`;947}948949export async function recordPasskeyOfferDecline(domain: string): Promise<void> {950  const validDomain = normaliseDeclineDomain(domain);951  if (!validDomain) return;952  await chrome.storage.local.set({ [declineKey(validDomain)]: Date.now() });953}954955export async function isPasskeyOfferDeclined(domain: string): Promise<boolean> {956  const validDomain = normaliseDeclineDomain(domain);957  if (!validDomain) return false;958  const key = declineKey(validDomain);959960  const stored = (await chrome.storage.local.get(key)) as Record<string, number | undefined>;961  const at = stored[key];962  if (typeof at !== "number") return false;963  if (Date.now() - at > FIREFOX_DECLINE_TTL_MS) {964    await chrome.storage.local.remove(key);965    return false;966  }967  return true;968}969970// ── Firefox content-script proxy path (v2.12.0) ────────────────────────971//972// The MAIN-world monkey-patch in src/content/passkeys-firefox.ts replaces973// navigator.credentials.create / .get on every Firefox page. It builds a974// clientDataJSON whose `origin` is the PAGE's origin (not moz-extension://),975// then hands every ceremony to the background via PASSKEY_HAS_CREDENTIALS,976// PASSKEY_CREATE, and PASSKEY_GET. The handlers below own those messages.977//978// Removal: when Firefox ships chrome.webAuthenticationProxy, the runtime flag979// FIREFOX_USE_CONTENT_SCRIPT_PROXY in src/shared/passkey-flags.ts evaluates980// to false and these handlers short-circuit. The full removal checklist is981// in that file — the deletion is purely subtractive.982983interface FirefoxAllowCredential {984  id: string;985  type?: string;986}987988interface FirefoxPubKeyCredParam {989  type?: string;990  alg: number;991}992993export interface FirefoxPasskeyHasCredentialsPayload {994  rpId: string;995  allowCredentials: FirefoxAllowCredential[];996}997998export interface FirefoxPasskeyCreatePayload {999  rpId: string;1000  rpName?: string;1001  userId: string;1002  userName: string;1003  userDisplayName?: string;1004  challenge: string;1005  clientDataJSON: number[];1006  origin: string;1007  pubKeyCredParams?: FirefoxPubKeyCredParam[];1008  authenticatorSelection?: Record<string, unknown>;1009  timeout?: number;1010  attestation?: string;1011}10121013export interface FirefoxPasskeyGetPayload {1014  rpId: string;1015  challenge: string;1016  clientDataJSON: number[];1017  origin: string;1018  allowCredentials: FirefoxAllowCredential[];1019  userVerification?: string;1020}10211022interface FirefoxCreateCredentialResponse {1023  type: "create";1024  id: string;1025  clientDataJSON: number[];1026  attestationObject: string;1027  authenticatorData: string;1028  publicKey: string;1029  algorithm: -7 | -8;1030}10311032interface FirefoxGetCredentialResponse {1033  type: "get";1034  id: string;1035  clientDataJSON: number[];1036  authenticatorData: string;1037  signature: string;1038  userHandle: string;1039}10401041type FirefoxPasskeyResult<T> =1042  | { ok: true; credential: T }1043  | { ok: false; error: "pro_required" | "user_cancelled" | "no_credentials" | "vault_locked" | "not_applicable" | "internal_error"; message?: string };10441045function listPasskeyEntries(): Array<VaultEntry & { passkey: PasskeyData }> {1046  return vault.getEntries().filter(1047    (entry): entry is VaultEntry & { passkey: PasskeyData } =>1048      entry.passkey !== undefined && !entry.deletedAt1049  );1050}10511052/** Decode the `origin` field out of a WebAuthn clientDataJSON byte array. */1053function clientDataJsonOrigin(bytes: number[] | undefined): string | null {1054  if (!Array.isArray(bytes)) return null;1055  try {1056    const obj = JSON.parse(new TextDecoder().decode(new Uint8Array(bytes))) as { origin?: unknown };1057    return typeof obj.origin === "string" ? obj.origin : null;1058  } catch {1059    return null;1060  }1061}10621063/**1064 * Enforce the WebAuthn rpId<->origin relationship on the Firefox proxy path,1065 * where Peach is the authenticator. The ONLY trustworthy origin is the one the1066 * browser attested for the calling page (`callerOrigin`, derived from the1067 * message sender in messages.ts) — NEVER `payload.origin`, which the page1068 * controls and can set to match any rpId (SEV-1-A / audit CRITICAL). Also1069 * refuse to sign a clientDataJSON whose embedded origin disagrees with the1070 * attested origin, so a forged ceremony can't smuggle a foreign origin into1071 * the signed bytes the RP verifies.1072 */1073function assertOriginOwnsRpId(1074  rpId: string,1075  callerOrigin: string | undefined,1076  clientDataJSON?: number[],1077): void {1078  if (!callerOrigin || !isValidRpId(rpId, callerOrigin)) {1079    throw new DOMException(1080      `SecurityError: relying party ID "${rpId}" is not a registrable domain ` +1081        `suffix of the calling origin "${callerOrigin ?? "(unknown)"}".`,1082      "SecurityError",1083    );1084  }1085  const cdjOrigin = clientDataJsonOrigin(clientDataJSON);1086  if (cdjOrigin !== null && cdjOrigin !== callerOrigin) {1087    throw new DOMException(1088      `SecurityError: clientDataJSON origin "${cdjOrigin}" does not match the ` +1089        `attested calling origin "${callerOrigin}".`,1090      "SecurityError",1091    );1092  }1093}10941095export async function handlePasskeyHasCredentials(1096  payload: FirefoxPasskeyHasCredentialsPayload,1097  callerOrigin?: string,1098): Promise<{ ok: true; hasCredentials: boolean } | { ok: false; error: string }> {1099  if (!FIREFOX_USE_CONTENT_SCRIPT_PROXY) {1100    return { ok: false, error: "not_applicable" };1101  }1102  // Scope the existence check to the caller's own origin so an arbitrary page1103  // cannot enumerate which sites the user holds passkeys for (audit MEDIUM).1104  // A false answer is indistinguishable from "no credential" to the page.1105  if (!callerOrigin || !isValidRpId(payload.rpId, callerOrigin)) {1106    return { ok: true, hasCredentials: false };1107  }1108  if (!vault.isUnlocked()) {1109    // Cannot enumerate without the vault key. The MAIN-world proxy treats a1110    // false answer as "fall through to the platform" — exactly the right1111    // outcome when Peach is locked: the user gets the native UI instead.1112    return { ok: true, hasCredentials: false };1113  }1114  const passkeys = listPasskeyEntries().filter(1115    (entry) => entry.passkey.rpId === payload.rpId1116  );1117  if (passkeys.length === 0) return { ok: true, hasCredentials: false };11181119  const allow = payload.allowCredentials ?? [];1120  if (allow.length === 0) return { ok: true, hasCredentials: true };11211122  const hasMatch = passkeys.some((entry) =>1123    allow.some((ac) => ac.id === entry.passkey.credentialId)1124  );1125  return { ok: true, hasCredentials: hasMatch };1126}11271128/**1129 * Approval prompt for the Firefox proxy ceremonies. Reuses the existing1130 * pending-passkey channel (badge + popup + 60s timeout) — the same approval1131 * UI Chrome ceremonies use, so the popup's State 11/12 view doesn't need1132 * any new code path. The page-side proxy never sees the request id; the1133 * background mints one and discards it after resolution.1134 */1135async function requestFirefoxApproval(args: {1136  type: "create" | "get";1137  rpId: string;1138  rpName?: string;1139  userName: string;1140  userDisplayName?: string;1141}): Promise<boolean> {1142  // Synthetic request id — the Firefox proxy path doesn't have a1143  // chrome.webAuthenticationProxy request to tie back to.1144  const requestId = randomRequestId();1145  return promptUserApproval({1146    requestId,1147    type: args.type,1148    rpId: args.rpId,1149    rpName: args.rpName ?? args.rpId,1150    userName: args.userName,1151    userDisplayName: args.userDisplayName,1152  });1153}11541155export async function handleFirefoxPasskeyCreate(1156  payload: FirefoxPasskeyCreatePayload,1157  callerOrigin?: string,1158): Promise<FirefoxPasskeyResult<FirefoxCreateCredentialResponse>> {1159  if (!FIREFOX_USE_CONTENT_SCRIPT_PROXY) {1160    return { ok: false, error: "not_applicable" };1161  }1162  // WebAuthn §7.1 step 6 — the requested rpId must be owned by the page's1163  // browser-ATTESTED origin (threaded in as callerOrigin from the message1164  // sender), NOT the page-supplied payload.origin which an attacker controls.1165  // On the Firefox proxy path Peach is the authenticator and must enforce this1166  // before minting anything (audit CRITICAL — origin spoofing).1167  assertOriginOwnsRpId(payload.rpId, callerOrigin, payload.clientDataJSON);1168  if (!(await isProUser())) {1169    broadcastPasskeyProGate();1170    return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1171  }1172  if (!vault.isUnlocked()) {1173    await openApprovalPopup();1174    return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1175  }11761177  const algorithm = pickPasskeyAlgorithm(payload.pubKeyCredParams ?? []);1178  if (!algorithm) {1179    return { ok: false, error: "internal_error", message: "No supported algorithm offered" };1180  }11811182  const approved = await requestFirefoxApproval({1183    type: "create",1184    rpId: payload.rpId,1185    rpName: payload.rpName,1186    userName: payload.userName,1187    userDisplayName: payload.userDisplayName,1188  });1189  if (!approved) return { ok: false, error: "user_cancelled" };11901191  const { bytes: credentialIdBytes, base64url: credentialId } = generateCredentialId();1192  const { publicKeyCose, publicKeySpki, privateKeyJwk } = await generatePasskeyKeypair(algorithm);11931194  // 0x45 = UP|UV|AT  (user-present + user-verified + attested-credential-data).1195  // Matches Chrome's create flag set in handleCreateRequest above.1196  const authenticatorData = await buildAuthenticatorData({1197    rpId: payload.rpId,1198    flags: 0x45,1199    signCount: 0,1200    credentialId: credentialIdBytes,1201    publicKeyCose,1202  });1203  const attestationObject = createAttestationObject(authenticatorData);12041205  const passkey: PasskeyData = {1206    rpId: payload.rpId,1207    rpName: payload.rpName ?? payload.rpId,1208    credentialId,1209    publicKeyCose: base64urlEncode(publicKeyCose),1210    privateKeyJwk,1211    userHandle: payload.userId,1212    userName: payload.userName,1213    userDisplayName: payload.userDisplayName ?? payload.userName,1214    algorithm,1215    signCount: 0,1216    aaguid: base64urlEncode(new Uint8Array(16)),1217    backupEligible: false,1218    backupState: false,1219    browser: "firefox",1220    transports: ["internal"],1221    createdAt: Date.now(),1222  };12231224  const target = findAttachTarget(payload.rpId);1225  if (target) {1226    await vault.updateEntry(target.id, { passkey });1227  } else {1228    await vault.addEntry({1229      type: "login",1230      title: payload.rpName || payload.rpId,1231      url: `https://${payload.rpId}`,1232      username: payload.userName,1233      passkey,1234    });1235  }1236  await vault.consolidatePasskeyEntries();12371238  return {1239    ok: true,1240    credential: {1241      type: "create",1242      id: credentialId,1243      // The content script already encoded clientDataJSON with the page1244      // origin; round-trip the exact bytes back so the RP sees the same1245      // hash it computes locally.1246      clientDataJSON: payload.clientDataJSON,1247      attestationObject: base64urlEncode(attestationObject),1248      authenticatorData: base64urlEncode(authenticatorData),1249      publicKey: base64urlEncode(publicKeySpki),1250      algorithm,1251    },1252  };1253}12541255export async function handleFirefoxPasskeyGet(1256  payload: FirefoxPasskeyGetPayload,1257  callerOrigin?: string,1258): Promise<FirefoxPasskeyResult<FirefoxGetCredentialResponse>> {1259  if (!FIREFOX_USE_CONTENT_SCRIPT_PROXY) {1260    return { ok: false, error: "not_applicable" };1261  }1262  // WebAuthn §7.2 step 8 — the rpId must be owned by the page's browser-attested1263  // origin (callerOrigin from the message sender), NOT the page-supplied1264  // payload.origin. Both rpId and payload.origin are attacker-controlled, so1265  // validating one against the other is no protection; a cross-origin page must1266  // not be able to coax Peach into signing an assertion scoped to another site1267  // (audit CRITICAL — assertion forgery).1268  assertOriginOwnsRpId(payload.rpId, callerOrigin, payload.clientDataJSON);1269  if (!(await isProUser())) {1270    broadcastPasskeyProGate();1271    return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1272  }1273  if (!vault.isUnlocked()) {1274    await openApprovalPopup();1275    return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1276  }12771278  const allow = payload.allowCredentials ?? [];1279  const candidates = listPasskeyEntries().filter((entry) => {1280    if (entry.passkey.rpId !== payload.rpId) return false;1281    if (allow.length === 0) return true;1282    return allow.some((ac) => ac.id === entry.passkey.credentialId);1283  });12841285  if (candidates.length === 0) return { ok: false, error: "no_credentials" };12861287  // Most-recently-used wins when several credentials match. A future1288  // multi-account selector goes here; for now this matches the Chrome path's1289  // behavior for the common one-passkey-per-rp case.1290  candidates.sort((a, b) => (b.passkey.lastUsedAt ?? 0) - (a.passkey.lastUsedAt ?? 0));1291  const match = candidates[0]!;1292  const credential = match.passkey;12931294  if (!credential.privateKeyJwk) {1295    // Pre-v2.12.0 Firefox passkeys delegated to the platform authenticator1296    // — no Peach-held private key to sign with. The MAIN-world proxy treats1297    // no_credentials as a fall-through, which routes to the platform UI.1298    return { ok: false, error: "no_credentials" };1299  }13001301  const approved = await requestFirefoxApproval({1302    type: "get",1303    rpId: credential.rpId,1304    rpName: credential.rpName,1305    userName: credential.userName,1306    userDisplayName: credential.userDisplayName,1307  });1308  if (!approved) return { ok: false, error: "user_cancelled" };13091310  const nextSignCount = credential.signCount + 1;1311  // 0x05 = UP|UV. backup bits track whatever was set at registration time1312  // (consistent with the Chrome path).1313  const flags =1314    0x05 |1315    (credential.backupEligible ? 0x08 : 0) |1316    (credential.backupState ? 0x10 : 0);1317  const authenticatorData = await buildAuthenticatorData({1318    rpId: credential.rpId,1319    flags,1320    signCount: nextSignCount,1321  });13221323  // The content script supplied clientDataJSON bytes built with the page1324  // origin. SHA-256 those bytes verbatim — never re-serialize, or the hash1325  // diverges from what the RP computes.1326  const clientDataBytes = new Uint8Array(payload.clientDataJSON);1327  const clientDataHash = new Uint8Array(1328    await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", clientDataBytes)1329  );1330  const signature = await signPasskeyAssertion(1331    credential.privateKeyJwk,1332    credential.algorithm,1333    authenticatorData,1334    clientDataHash1335  );13361337  await vault.updateEntry(match.id, {1338    passkey: {1339      ...credential,1340      signCount: nextSignCount,1341      lastUsedAt: Date.now(),1342    },1343  });13441345  return {1346    ok: true,1347    credential: {1348      type: "get",1349      id: credential.credentialId,1350      clientDataJSON: payload.clientDataJSON,1351      authenticatorData: base64urlEncode(authenticatorData),1352      signature: base64urlEncode(signature),1353      userHandle: credential.userHandle,1354    },1355  };1356}13571358export async function setupPasskeyProxy(): Promise<void> {1359  if (!isPasskeySupported()) {1360    return;1361  }13621363  // Firefox doesn't expose chrome.webAuthenticationProxy listeners. The1364  // popup-context credential creator is the entry point; nothing to wire here.1365  if (detectSharedBrowser() === "firefox") {1366    await refreshPasskeyProxy();1367    return;1368  }13691370  if (!listenersRegistered) {1371    chrome.webAuthenticationProxy.onIsUvpaaRequest.addListener((requestInfo) => {1372      // Peach is a user-verifying platform authenticator whenever the proxy1373      // is attached. The lock state is irrelevant here — the create/get1374      // handlers prompt for unlock when needed. Returning false while locked1375      // makes Google (and any RP that checks isUvpaa as a precondition) show1376      // "A passkey can't be created on this device" before the user even1377      // gets a chance to start the ceremony.1378      void chrome.webAuthenticationProxy.completeIsUvpaaRequest({1379        requestId: requestInfo.requestId,1380        isUvpaa: true,1381      });1382    });1383    chrome.webAuthenticationProxy.onCreateRequest.addListener((requestInfo) => {1384      void handleCreateRequest(requestInfo).catch(async (error) => {1385        // "Invalid requestId" means Chrome already cancelled — handlers will1386        // short-circuit, but if it propagates out from a still-in-flight branch,1387        // don't double-complete.1388        if (isInvalidRequestIdError(error)) {1389          return;1390        }1391        console.error("Peach passkey create failed", error);1392        await rejectCreate(1393          requestInfo.requestId,1394          "UnknownError",1395          error instanceof Error ? error.message : "Passkey creation failed."1396        );1397      });1398    });1399    chrome.webAuthenticationProxy.onGetRequest.addListener((requestInfo) => {1400      void handleGetRequest(requestInfo).catch(async (error) => {1401        if (isInvalidRequestIdError(error)) {1402          return;1403        }1404        console.error("Peach passkey get failed", error);1405        await rejectGet(1406          requestInfo.requestId,1407          "UnknownError",1408          error instanceof Error ? error.message : "Passkey authentication failed."1409        );1410      });1411    });1412    chrome.webAuthenticationProxy.onRequestCanceled.addListener((requestId) => {1413      markCancelled(requestId);1414      // Release any unlock waiter parked for this request.1415      const waiter = unlockWaiters.get(requestId);1416      if (waiter) {1417        clearTimeout(waiter.timeoutId);1418        waiter.resolve(false);1419        unlockWaiters.delete(requestId);1420      }1421      void resolvePendingPasskeyRequest(requestId, false);1422    });1423    listenersRegistered = true;1424  }14251426  await refreshPasskeyProxy();1427}