passkey.ts

1import { isProUser } from "./license";2import * as vault from "./vault";3import {4  base64urlEncode,5  buildAuthenticatorData,6  buildClientDataJSON,7  createAttestationObject,8  generateCredentialId,9  generatePasskeyKeypair,10  pickPasskeyAlgorithm,11  signPasskeyAssertion,12} from "./passkey-crypto";13import { detectBrowser as detectSharedBrowser, firefoxVersion } from "../shared/browser";14import { FIREFOX_USE_CONTENT_SCRIPT_PROXY } from "../shared/passkey-flags";15import { isValidRpId } from "../shared/passkey-utils";16import type {17  PasskeyData,18  PasskeyProviderState,19  PendingPasskeyRequest,20  VaultEntry,21} from "../shared/types";2223declare const __PEACH_E2E_PASSKEYS__: boolean;2425const PENDING_PREFIX = "passkey_pending_";26const APPROVAL_TIMEOUT_MS = 60_000;2728let listenersRegistered = false;29let attached = false;30let conflict: string | undefined;31const PASSKEY_CREATE_E2E_BYPASS = __PEACH_E2E_PASSKEYS__ === true;3233const approvals = new Map<34  number,35  { resolve: (approved: boolean) => void; timeoutId: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> }36>();3738// Resolvers for GET requests that arrived while the vault was locked and are39// waiting for the user to unlock before the passkey flow can continue.40const unlockWaiters = new Map<number, { resolve: (ok: boolean) => void; timeoutId: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> }>();4142// Tracks requestIds that Chrome cancelled on us (via onRequestCanceled) while43// we were still mid-handler. The complete*Request calls would otherwise reject44// with "Invalid requestId"; the handler checks this set before any work.45const cancelledRequests = new Set<number>();46function markCancelled(requestId: number): void {47  cancelledRequests.add(requestId);48  // Bounded GC — never grow forever. Old IDs that haven't been polled in a49  // long time can be forgotten without harm because the Chrome-side request50  // is already gone.51  if (cancelledRequests.size > 256) {52    const iter = cancelledRequests.values();53    for (let i = 0; i < 128; i += 1) cancelledRequests.delete(iter.next().value as number);54  }55}5657export function onVaultUnlocked(): void {58  for (const { resolve, timeoutId } of unlockWaiters.values()) {59    clearTimeout(timeoutId);60    resolve(true);61  }62  unlockWaiters.clear();63}6465/**66 * Resolve every still-pending passkey request as denied and clear unlock67 * waiters. Called from the popup-disconnect path so a closed popup releases68 * the page-side caller in <200ms instead of leaving it stuck for the full69 * APPROVAL_TIMEOUT_MS (60s) (M8/COR-009).70 */71export async function denyAllPendingPasskeyRequests(): Promise<void> {72  if (approvals.size === 0 && unlockWaiters.size === 0) return;73  for (const [rid, { resolve, timeoutId }] of approvals.entries()) {74    clearTimeout(timeoutId);75    resolve(false);76    approvals.delete(rid);77    await clearPendingRequest(rid).catch(() => {});78  }79  for (const { resolve, timeoutId } of unlockWaiters.values()) {80    clearTimeout(timeoutId);81    resolve(false);82  }83  unlockWaiters.clear();84}8586function isPasskeySupported(): boolean {87  if (typeof chrome.webAuthenticationProxy?.attach === "function") return true;88  // Firefox 150+ exposes navigator.credentials.create/get from the popup89  // context with extension host permissions. Cannot intercept page-side90  // calls (no equivalent of webAuthenticationProxy), but registration via91  // Peach's own popup-driven flow works.92  if (detectSharedBrowser() === "firefox") {93    const ver = firefoxVersion();94    if (Number.isFinite(ver) && ver >= 150) return true;95  }96  return false;97}9899export const detectBrowser = detectSharedBrowser;100101function getBrowserLabel(): string {102  const ua = navigator.userAgent;103  if (/Firefox\/(\d+)/.test(ua)) {104    const version = ua.match(/Firefox\/(\d+)/)?.[1];105    return version ? `Firefox ${version}` : "Firefox";106  }107  const version = ua.match(/Chrome\/(\d+)/)?.[1];108  return version ? `Chrome ${version}` : "Chromium";109}110111function pendingStorageKey(requestId: number): string {112  return `${PENDING_PREFIX}${requestId}`;113}114115function randomRequestId(): number {116  // 53-bit crypto-random integer — unbrute-forceable, unlike the old117  // Date.now()+Math.random synthetic id (~10-20 bits). Fits a JS safe118  // integer so it round-trips through String/Number for the toast path.119  // (Audit 2026-08-20 #1/#10.)120  const u = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint32Array(2));121  return u[0] * 0x200000 + (u[1] >>> 11);122}123124function originFromRpId(rpId: string): string {125  return /^(localhost|127\.0\.0\.1|\[::1\])$/i.test(rpId)126    ? `http://${rpId}`127    : `https://${rpId}`;128}129130/**131 * The clientDataJSON sent back to the RP must contain the page's actual132 * origin — not a synthesized one. `chrome.webAuthenticationProxy` does not133 * surface the requesting origin in CreateRequest/GetRequest, so we read it134 * from the active tab and validate that its hostname is a registrable135 * suffix match for the rpId. WebAuthn requires this relationship anyway, so136 * a mismatch indicates either a stale active tab or a hostile environment;137 * we fall back to https://<rpId> in that case to avoid silently signing the138 * wrong origin.139 *140 * Without this, a passkey created on https://myaccount.google.com gets141 * clientDataJSON.origin = "https://google.com", and Google's RP rejects the142 * attestation with "Something went wrong" because the origin hash doesn't143 * match what its own JS captured at create time.144 */145async function resolvePageOrigin(rpId: string): Promise<string> {146  try {147    const tabs = await new Promise<chrome.tabs.Tab[]>((resolve) =>148      chrome.tabs.query({ active: true, lastFocusedWindow: true }, resolve)149    );150    const url = tabs[0]?.url;151    if (url) {152      const parsed = new URL(url);153      const host = parsed.hostname.toLowerCase();154      const rp = rpId.toLowerCase();155      if (host === rp || host.endsWith(`.${rp}`)) {156        return parsed.origin;157      }158    }159  } catch {160    // fall through to rpId-derived origin161  }162  return originFromRpId(rpId);163}164165async function setBadge(text: string): Promise<void> {166  if (!chrome.action?.setBadgeText) return;167  await chrome.action.setBadgeText({ text });168  if (text) {169    await chrome.action.setBadgeBackgroundColor({ color: "#E5805C" });170  }171}172173async function clearPendingRequest(requestId: number): Promise<void> {174  if (chrome.storage.session) {175    await chrome.storage.session.remove(pendingStorageKey(requestId));176  }177  await setBadge("");178}179180async function openApprovalPopup(): Promise<void> {181  try {182    await chrome.action.openPopup();183  } catch {184    await setBadge("PK");185  }186}187188/**189 * Some ceremonies — especially conditional-UI `navigator.credentials.get`190 * calls — get cancelled by Chrome before we finish processing. Calling191 * complete*Request on a cancelled requestId rejects with "Invalid192 * requestId". That is expected, not exceptional: swallow it. Re-throwing193 * would surface an uncaught promise rejection in the SW and cascade through194 * the catch wrappers in setupPasskeyProxy.195 */196function isInvalidRequestIdError(err: unknown): boolean {197  return err instanceof Error && /invalid requestid/i.test(err.message);198}199200/**201 * Chrome throws "Missing GetResponseDetails.responseJson" when202 * completeGetRequest is called with no responseJson and no error (the203 * pass-through signal). The throw is a Chrome API quirk — the request IS204 * routed to the platform authenticator — but if we let it propagate, the205 * outer catch calls rejectGet, which sends a second completeGetRequest with206 * an error that cancels the pass-through and shows "Something went wrong" on207 * the page. Swallow it exactly as we swallow "Invalid requestId".208 */209function isMissingResponseJsonError(err: unknown): boolean {210  return err instanceof Error && /missing getresponsedetails/i.test(err.message);211}212213async function rejectCreate(214  requestId: number,215  name: string,216  message = ""217): Promise<void> {218  try {219    await chrome.webAuthenticationProxy.completeCreateRequest({220      requestId,221      error: { name, message },222    });223  } catch (err) {224    if (isInvalidRequestIdError(err)) {225      return;226    }227    throw err;228  }229}230231async function rejectGet(232  requestId: number,233  name: string,234  message = ""235): Promise<void> {236  try {237    await chrome.webAuthenticationProxy.completeGetRequest({238      requestId,239      error: { name, message },240    });241  } catch (err) {242    if (isInvalidRequestIdError(err)) {243      return;244    }245    throw err;246  }247}248249export async function getPendingPasskeyRequest(): Promise<PendingPasskeyRequest | null> {250  if (!chrome.storage.session) return null; // Firefox <132 / unsupported contexts251  const stored = (await chrome.storage.session.get(null)) as Record<string, unknown>;252  const key = Object.keys(stored).find((item) => item.startsWith(PENDING_PREFIX));253  if (!key) return null;254  const pending = stored[key];255  return pending && typeof pending === "object"256    ? (pending as PendingPasskeyRequest)257    : null;258}259260export async function resolvePendingPasskeyRequest(261  requestId: number,262  approved: boolean263): Promise<void> {264  const pending = approvals.get(requestId);265  if (!pending) {266    // Either the request expired (Chrome) or this is a Firefox-driven267    // pending where the popup performs the navigator.credentials call268    // directly. Clear both possible session keys so getPendingPasskeyRequest()269    // doesn't surface stale state on the next popup open.270    await clearPendingRequest(requestId);271    if (chrome.storage.session) {272      await chrome.storage.session.remove(FIREFOX_PENDING_KEY);273    }274    return;275  }276277  clearTimeout(pending.timeoutId);278  approvals.delete(requestId);279  await clearPendingRequest(requestId);280  pending.resolve(approved);281}282283async function promptUserApproval(request: PendingPasskeyRequest): Promise<boolean> {284  if (chrome.storage.session) {285    await chrome.storage.session.set({ [pendingStorageKey(request.requestId)]: request });286  }287  await openApprovalPopup();288289  return new Promise<boolean>((resolve) => {290    const timeoutId = setTimeout(async () => {291      approvals.delete(request.requestId);292      await clearPendingRequest(request.requestId);293      resolve(false);294    }, APPROVAL_TIMEOUT_MS);295296    approvals.set(request.requestId, { resolve, timeoutId });297  });298}299300export async function getPasskeyProviderState(): Promise<PasskeyProviderState> {301  const settings = await vault.ensureSettingsLoaded();302  const supported = isPasskeySupported();303  const enabled = settings.passkeyProviderEnabled === true;304  return {305    supported,306    enabled,307    attached: supported && attached,308    browserLabel: getBrowserLabel(),309    statusLabel: !supported310      ? "Interception unavailable"311      : attached312        ? "Active"313        : conflict314          ? "Another provider is active"315          : enabled316            ? "Inactive"317            : "Disabled",318    conflict,319  };320}321322async function attachPasskeyProxy(): Promise<void> {323  if (!isPasskeySupported()) {324    attached = false;325    conflict = "This browser does not expose chrome.webAuthenticationProxy.";326    return;327  }328329  // Firefox path: no chrome.webAuthenticationProxy exists. The popup-context330  // navigator.credentials creator is always ready once the user enables the331  // provider. Treat enabled = attached for state reporting purposes.332  if (detectSharedBrowser() === "firefox") {333    attached = true;334    conflict = undefined;335    return;336  }337338  if (attached) return;339340  try {341    await chrome.webAuthenticationProxy.attach();342    attached = true;343    conflict = undefined;344  } catch (error) {345    attached = false;346    conflict = error instanceof Error ? error.message : "Another provider is active.";347    console.warn("[Peach passkey] proxy attach failed", { conflict });348  }349}350351async function detachPasskeyProxy(): Promise<void> {352  if (!isPasskeySupported()) {353    attached = false;354    return;355  }356357  if (detectSharedBrowser() === "firefox") {358    attached = false;359    conflict = undefined;360    return;361  }362363  try {364    await chrome.webAuthenticationProxy.detach();365  } catch {366    // Ignore detach failures; the extension may already be detached.367  }368369  attached = false;370  conflict = undefined;371}372373export async function setPasskeyProviderEnabled(enabled: boolean): Promise<PasskeyProviderState> {374  await vault.updateSettings({ passkeyProviderEnabled: enabled });375  if (enabled) {376    await attachPasskeyProxy();377  } else {378    await detachPasskeyProxy();379  }380  return getPasskeyProviderState();381}382383async function refreshPasskeyProxy(): Promise<void> {384  const settings = await vault.ensureSettingsLoaded();385  if (settings.passkeyProviderEnabled === true) {386    await attachPasskeyProxy();387    return;388  }389  await detachPasskeyProxy();390}391392/**393 * Find the entry that already holds a passkey for the given RP, or the most394 * recently-modified login entry whose URL/additionalUrls match the RP — that395 * entry is the natural attach target when the user adds a passkey to a site396 * they already have a password for. Returns null when there's no candidate;397 * the caller creates a new entry in that case.398 */399function findAttachTarget(rpId: string): VaultEntry | null {400  const all = vault.getEntries();401  const passkeyMatch = all.find(402    (entry) => entry.passkey?.rpId === rpId && !entry.deletedAt403  );404  if (passkeyMatch) return passkeyMatch;405  const loginMatches = vault.queryDomain(rpId).filter((entry) => entry.type === "login" && !entry.passkey);406  if (loginMatches.length === 0) return null;407  // Pick the most recently modified candidate to be deterministic.408  return loginMatches.reduce((best, e) =>409    (e.modifiedAt ?? 0) > (best.modifiedAt ?? 0) ? e : best410  );411}412413async function handleCreateRequest(414  request: chrome.webAuthenticationProxy.CreateRequest415): Promise<void> {416  const options = JSON.parse(request.requestDetailsJson) as PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptionsJSON;417  const rpId = options.rp.id;418  const rpName = options.rp.name ?? options.rp.id;419  const userName = options.user.name;420  const userDisplayName = options.user.displayName ?? options.user.name;421  if (!rpId) {422    console.warn("[Peach passkey] reject: missing rp.id");423    await rejectCreate(request.requestId, "NotSupportedError", "Missing RP ID");424    return;425  }426427  // Capture the page origin NOW — before any popup opens. Once the extension428  // action popup fires, it can steal lastFocusedWindow so the tabs query429  // returns no results and falls back to https://<rpId>. For sites where the430  // page origin is a subdomain of the rpId (e.g. myaccount.google.com vs431  // rpId google.com) that fallback produces the wrong origin and the RP432  // rejects the attestation with "Something went wrong".433  const pageOrigin = await resolvePageOrigin(rpId);434435  if (!PASSKEY_CREATE_E2E_BYPASS && !(await isProUser())) {436    console.warn("[Peach passkey] reject: user is not Pro");437    await rejectCreate(438      request.requestId,439      "NotAllowedError",440      "Passkey creation requires Peach Pro."441    );442    // Show the inline passkey gate so the user knows what happened and can upgrade.443    broadcastPasskeyProGate();444    return;445  }446447  if (!vault.isUnlocked()) {448    // Same wait-for-unlock pattern handleGetRequest uses: summon the inline449    // unlock prompt on the active tab so the user can unlock without leaving450    // the page, then hold the create request open until the vault unlocks or451    // the timeout fires. Immediately rejecting here means Google shows452    // "Something went wrong" the instant the user picks Peach.453    const tabs = await new Promise<chrome.tabs.Tab[]>((resolve) =>454      chrome.tabs.query({ active: true, lastFocusedWindow: true }, resolve)455    );456    const activeTab = tabs[0];457    if (activeTab?.id) {458      chrome.tabs.sendMessage(activeTab.id, {459        type: 'SUMMON_AUTOFILL',460        source: 'passkey-unlock',461      }).catch((err) => {462        console.warn("[Peach passkey] SUMMON_AUTOFILL failed, falling back to popup", err);463        void openApprovalPopup();464      });465    } else {466      await openApprovalPopup();467    }468469    const unlocked = await new Promise<boolean>((resolve) => {470      const timeoutId = setTimeout(() => {471        unlockWaiters.delete(request.requestId);472        resolve(false);473      }, APPROVAL_TIMEOUT_MS);474      unlockWaiters.set(request.requestId, { resolve, timeoutId });475    });476477    if (!unlocked || !vault.isUnlocked()) {478      console.warn("[Peach passkey] reject: unlock timeout");479      await rejectCreate(request.requestId, "NotAllowedError", "Not unlocked in time.");480      return;481    }482    // Vault is now unlocked — fall through to approval.483  }484485  const approved = await promptUserApproval({486    requestId: request.requestId,487    type: "create",488    rpId,489    rpName,490    userName,491    userDisplayName,492  });493  if (!approved) {494    console.warn("[Peach passkey] reject: user denied");495    await rejectCreate(request.requestId, "NotAllowedError", "User denied request.");496    return;497  }498499  const algorithm = pickPasskeyAlgorithm(options.pubKeyCredParams ?? []);500  if (!algorithm) {501    console.warn("[Peach passkey] reject: no supported algorithm", options.pubKeyCredParams);502    await rejectCreate(request.requestId, "NotSupportedError", "No supported algorithm offered.");503    return;504  }505  const credentialIdBytes = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32));506  const { publicKeyCose, publicKeySpki, privateKeyJwk } = await generatePasskeyKeypair(507    algorithm508  );509  const authData = await buildAuthenticatorData({510    rpId,511    flags: 0x4d,512    signCount: 0,513    credentialId: credentialIdBytes,514    publicKeyCose,515  });516  const attestationObject = createAttestationObject(authData);517  const clientDataJSON = buildClientDataJSON(518    "webauthn.create",519    options.challenge,520    pageOrigin521  );522523  const passkey: PasskeyData = {524    rpId,525    rpName,526    credentialId: base64urlEncode(credentialIdBytes),527    publicKeyCose: base64urlEncode(publicKeyCose),528    privateKeyJwk,529    userHandle: options.user.id,530    userName,531    userDisplayName,532    algorithm,533    signCount: 0,534    aaguid: base64urlEncode(new Uint8Array(16)),535    backupEligible: false,536    backupState: false,537    browser: "chrome",538    transports: ["internal"],539    createdAt: Date.now(),540  };541542  // Attach to an existing login (same domain) when one exists; otherwise543  // create a fresh login entry that exists solely to hold the passkey.544  const target = findAttachTarget(rpId);545  if (target) {546    await vault.updateEntry(target.id, { passkey });547  } else {548    await vault.addEntry({549      type: "login",550      title: rpName,551      url: `https://${rpId}`,552      username: userName,553      passkey,554    });555  }556  // Merge any same-domain TOTP-only entries into the passkey entry right now557  // so the user sees one consolidated entry rather than waiting until next558  // unlock for the decodePayload merge pass to run.559  await vault.consolidatePasskeyEntries();560561  try {562    await chrome.webAuthenticationProxy.completeCreateRequest({563      requestId: request.requestId,564      responseJson: JSON.stringify({565        id: passkey.credentialId,566        rawId: passkey.credentialId,567        type: "public-key",568        response: {569          clientDataJSON: base64urlEncode(clientDataJSON),570          authenticatorData: base64urlEncode(authData),571          attestationObject: base64urlEncode(attestationObject),572          transports: ["internal"],573          publicKey: base64urlEncode(publicKeySpki),574          publicKeyAlgorithm: algorithm,575        },576        authenticatorAttachment: "platform",577        clientExtensionResults: {},578      }),579    });580  } catch (err) {581    if (isInvalidRequestIdError(err)) {582      return;583    }584    throw err;585  }586}587588function broadcastPasskeyProGate(): void {589  chrome.tabs.query({}, (tabs) => {590    for (const tab of tabs) {591      if (tab.id !== undefined) {592        chrome.tabs.sendMessage(tab.id, { type: "PASSKEY_PRO_GATE" }).catch(() => {});593      }594    }595  });596}597598async function promptViaToast(request: PendingPasskeyRequest): Promise<boolean> {599  if (chrome.storage.session) {600    await chrome.storage.session.set({ [pendingStorageKey(request.requestId)]: request });601  }602603  const tabs = await new Promise<chrome.tabs.Tab[]>((resolve) => {604    chrome.tabs.query({ active: true, currentWindow: true }, resolve);605  });606  const tab = tabs[0];607608  if (tab?.id) {609    chrome.tabs.sendMessage(tab.id, {610      type: 'SHOW_PASSKEY_TOAST',611      payload: {612        site: request.rpId,613        displayName: request.userDisplayName ?? request.userName,614        username: request.userName,615        requestId: String(request.requestId),616      },617    }).catch(() => {});618  } else {619    await openApprovalPopup();620  }621622  return new Promise<boolean>((resolve) => {623    const timeoutId = setTimeout(async () => {624      approvals.delete(request.requestId);625      await clearPendingRequest(request.requestId);626      resolve(false);627    }, APPROVAL_TIMEOUT_MS);628629    approvals.set(request.requestId, { resolve, timeoutId });630  });631}632633async function handleGetRequest(634  request: chrome.webAuthenticationProxy.GetRequest635): Promise<void> {636  const options = JSON.parse(request.requestDetailsJson) as PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptionsJSON;637  if (!vault.isUnlocked()) {638    // Summon the inline unlock prompt on the active tab so the user can unlock639    // without leaving the page. Fall back to the popup if the content script640    // is unavailable (e.g. restricted URL, script not yet injected).641    const tabs = await new Promise<chrome.tabs.Tab[]>((resolve) =>642      chrome.tabs.query({ active: true, currentWindow: true }, resolve)643    );644    const activeTab = tabs[0];645    if (activeTab?.id) {646      chrome.tabs.sendMessage(activeTab.id, {647        type: 'SUMMON_AUTOFILL',648        source: 'passkey-unlock',649      }).catch(() => { void openApprovalPopup(); });650    } else {651      await openApprovalPopup();652    }653654    // Hold the request open until the vault unlocks or the timeout fires.655    const unlocked = await new Promise<boolean>((resolve) => {656      const timeoutId = setTimeout(() => {657        unlockWaiters.delete(request.requestId);658        resolve(false);659      }, APPROVAL_TIMEOUT_MS);660      unlockWaiters.set(request.requestId, { resolve, timeoutId });661    });662663    if (!unlocked || !vault.isUnlocked()) {664      await rejectGet(request.requestId, "NotAllowedError", "Not unlocked in time.");665      return;666    }667    // Vault is now unlocked — fall through to authenticate.668  }669670  if (!PASSKEY_CREATE_E2E_BYPASS && !(await isProUser())) {671    await rejectGet(request.requestId, "NotAllowedError", "Passkey use requires Peach Pro.");672    broadcastPasskeyProGate();673    return;674  }675676  const passkeyBearing = vault.getEntries().filter((entry): entry is VaultEntry & { passkey: PasskeyData } =>677    entry.passkey !== undefined && !entry.deletedAt678  );679  const allowedCredentialIds = (options.allowCredentials ?? []).map((descriptor) => descriptor.id);680681  const match = passkeyBearing.find((entry) => {682    if (allowedCredentialIds.length > 0) {683      return allowedCredentialIds.includes(entry.passkey.credentialId);684    }685    if (!options.rpId) return false;686    return entry.passkey.rpId === options.rpId;687  });688689  if (!match) {690    // No Peach passkey for this RP — pass through to the platform authenticator.691    // completeGetRequest with no error and no responseJson is the webAuthenticationProxy692    // signal for "I'm not handling this"; Chrome routes the request to the next693    // authenticator in the chain (the built-in browser passkey manager etc.).694    // Rejecting with NotAllowedError would propagate as an error to the page and695    // break RPs (e.g. Google) that issue a GET as part of their create-passkey flow.696    try {697      await chrome.webAuthenticationProxy.completeGetRequest({ requestId: request.requestId });698    } catch (err) {699      if (isInvalidRequestIdError(err)) return;700      if (isMissingResponseJsonError(err)) return;701      throw err;702    }703    return;704  }705706  const credential = match.passkey;707  // Chrome's webAuthenticationProxy path requires Peach-held private key material.708  // Passkeys created on Firefox have no privateKeyJwk — pass through so Chrome709  // can route to a capable authenticator instead of surfacing an error to the page.710  if (!credential.privateKeyJwk) {711    try {712      await chrome.webAuthenticationProxy.completeGetRequest({ requestId: request.requestId });713    } catch (err) {714      if (isInvalidRequestIdError(err)) return;715      if (isMissingResponseJsonError(err)) return;716      throw err;717    }718    return;719  }720721  const approved = await promptViaToast({722    requestId: request.requestId,723    type: "get",724    rpId: credential.rpId,725    rpName: credential.rpName,726    userName: credential.userName,727    userDisplayName: credential.userDisplayName,728  });729  if (!approved) {730    await rejectGet(request.requestId, "NotAllowedError", "User denied request.");731    return;732  }733734  const nextSignCount = credential.signCount + 1;735  const flags = 0x05 | (credential.backupEligible ? 0x08 : 0) | (credential.backupState ? 0x10 : 0);736  const authData = await buildAuthenticatorData({737    rpId: credential.rpId,738    flags,739    signCount: nextSignCount,740  });741  const clientDataJSON = buildClientDataJSON(742    "webauthn.get",743    options.challenge,744    await resolvePageOrigin(credential.rpId)745  );746  const clientDataHash = new Uint8Array(747    await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", new Uint8Array(clientDataJSON))748  );749  const signature = await signPasskeyAssertion(750    credential.privateKeyJwk,751    credential.algorithm,752    authData,753    clientDataHash754  );755756  await vault.updateEntry(match.id, {757    passkey: {758      ...credential,759      signCount: nextSignCount,760      lastUsedAt: Date.now(),761    },762  });763764  const responseJson = JSON.stringify({765    id: credential.credentialId,766    rawId: credential.credentialId,767    type: "public-key",768    response: {769      clientDataJSON: base64urlEncode(clientDataJSON),770      authenticatorData: base64urlEncode(authData),771      signature: base64urlEncode(signature),772      userHandle: credential.userHandle,773    },774    authenticatorAttachment: "platform",775    clientExtensionResults: {},776  });777778  try {779    await chrome.webAuthenticationProxy.completeGetRequest({780      requestId: request.requestId,781      responseJson,782    });783  } catch (err) {784    if (isInvalidRequestIdError(err)) {785      return;786    }787    throw err;788  }789}790791// ── Firefox path ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────792//793// Firefox 150+ permits extensions to call navigator.credentials.create/get794// from the popup context with their host-permitted RP IDs. Peach uses that795// surface to register passkeys on behalf of the user. The page's own796// navigator.credentials call is observed via the MAIN-world detector797// (src/content/passkeys-firefox.ts) but never blocked or replaced; Peach's798// flow is parallel and explicit (the user must engage with Peach's button).799800const FIREFOX_PENDING_KEY = "passkey_pending_firefox";801const FIREFOX_DECLINE_PREFIX = "peach_passkey_offer_declined:";802const FIREFOX_DECLINE_TTL_MS = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000; // 30 days803804export async function initiateFirefoxPasskeyCreate(args: {805  rpId: string;806  rpName: string;807  userName: string;808  userDisplayName?: string;809}, callerOrigin?: string): Promise<{ ok: boolean; error?: string }> {810  // The rpId must belong to the calling page's registrable domain; without811  // this, a page could initiate a ceremony for a foreign site and the812  // approval popup would display an attacker-chosen rpId. Origin is the813  // browser-attested sender origin from messages.ts, never page payload.814  // (Codex Security 2026-08-04, passkey-ceremony-approval sibling.)815  if (!callerOrigin || !isValidRpId(args.rpId, callerOrigin)) {816    return { ok: false, error: "rpid_origin_mismatch" };817  }818  if (!(await isProUser())) {819    broadcastPasskeyProGate();820    return { ok: false, error: "passkey creation requires Peach Pro" };821  }822  if (!vault.isUnlocked()) {823    await openApprovalPopup();824    return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };825  }826  if (!chrome.storage.session) {827    return { ok: false, error: "session storage unavailable" };828  }829830  const requestId = randomRequestId();831  const challenge = base64urlEncode(crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32)));832  const userHandle = base64urlEncode(crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32)));833834  const pending: PendingPasskeyRequest = {835    requestId,836    type: "create",837    rpId: args.rpId,838    rpName: args.rpName,839    userName: args.userName,840    userDisplayName: args.userDisplayName,841    browser: "firefox",842    challenge,843    userHandle,844  };845846  await chrome.storage.session.set({ [FIREFOX_PENDING_KEY]: pending });847  await openApprovalPopup();848  return { ok: true };849}850851export async function completeFirefoxPasskeyCreate(payload: {852  requestId: number;853  rpId: string;854  rpName: string;855  userName: string;856  userDisplayName?: string;857  userHandle: string;858  credentialId: string;859  publicKeyCose: string;860  algorithm: -7 | -8;861  aaguid?: string;862  transports?: string[];863  backupEligible?: boolean;864  backupState?: boolean;865}): Promise<{ ok: boolean; error?: string }> {866  if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };867868  // Bind completion to the pending ceremony: requestId, rpId, challenge, and869  // userHandle are minted by the background at INITIATE time and only ever870  // leave extension context through the approval popup, so a page (or anything871  // replaying relayed messages) cannot synthesize a matching completion for an872  // rpId it does not own. (Codex Security 2026-08-04 MEDIUM,873  // broken-access-control.passkey-ceremony-approval.)874  const pending = chrome.storage.session875    ? ((await chrome.storage.session.get(FIREFOX_PENDING_KEY))[FIREFOX_PENDING_KEY] as876        | PendingPasskeyRequest877        | undefined)878    : undefined;879  if (880    !pending ||881    pending.requestId !== payload.requestId ||882    pending.rpId !== payload.rpId ||883    pending.userHandle !== payload.userHandle884  ) {885    return { ok: false, error: "no_pending_request" };886  }887888  const passkey: PasskeyData = {889    rpId: payload.rpId,890    rpName: payload.rpName,891    credentialId: payload.credentialId,892    publicKeyCose: payload.publicKeyCose,893    userHandle: payload.userHandle,894    userName: payload.userName,895    userDisplayName: payload.userDisplayName ?? payload.userName,896    algorithm: payload.algorithm,897    signCount: 0,898    aaguid: payload.aaguid ?? base64urlEncode(new Uint8Array(16)),899    backupEligible: payload.backupEligible ?? false,900    backupState: payload.backupState ?? false,901    browser: "firefox",902    transports: payload.transports ?? ["internal"],903    createdAt: Date.now(),904  };905906  // Same attach-or-create flow as the Chrome path: prefer attaching to an907  // existing login entry for the same domain so the user ends up with one908  // entry per site, not two (a login + a passkey-only).909  const target = findAttachTarget(payload.rpId);910  if (target) {911    await vault.updateEntry(target.id, { passkey });912  } else {913    await vault.addEntry({914      type: "login",915      title: payload.rpName || payload.rpId,916      url: `https://${payload.rpId}`,917      username: payload.userName,918      passkey,919    });920  }921  await vault.consolidatePasskeyEntries();922923  if (chrome.storage.session) {924    await chrome.storage.session.remove(FIREFOX_PENDING_KEY);925  }926  return { ok: true };927}928929function declineKey(domain: string): string {930  return `${FIREFOX_DECLINE_PREFIX}${domain}`;931}932933export async function recordPasskeyOfferDecline(domain: string): Promise<void> {934  if (!domain) return;935  await chrome.storage.local.set({ [declineKey(domain)]: Date.now() });936}937938export async function isPasskeyOfferDeclined(domain: string): Promise<boolean> {939  if (!domain) return false;940  const key = declineKey(domain);941  const stored = (await chrome.storage.local.get(key)) as Record<string, number | undefined>;942  const at = stored[key];943  if (typeof at !== "number") return false;944  if (Date.now() - at > FIREFOX_DECLINE_TTL_MS) {945    await chrome.storage.local.remove(key);946    return false;947  }948  return true;949}950951// ── Firefox content-script proxy path (v2.12.0) ────────────────────────952//953// The MAIN-world monkey-patch in src/content/passkeys-firefox.ts replaces954// navigator.credentials.create / .get on every Firefox page. It builds a955// clientDataJSON whose `origin` is the PAGE's origin (not moz-extension://),956// then hands every ceremony to the background via PASSKEY_HAS_CREDENTIALS,957// PASSKEY_CREATE, and PASSKEY_GET. The handlers below own those messages.958//959// Removal: when Firefox ships chrome.webAuthenticationProxy, the runtime flag960// FIREFOX_USE_CONTENT_SCRIPT_PROXY in src/shared/passkey-flags.ts evaluates961// to false and these handlers short-circuit. The full removal checklist is962// in that file — the deletion is purely subtractive.963964interface FirefoxAllowCredential {965  id: string;966  type?: string;967}968969interface FirefoxPubKeyCredParam {970  type?: string;971  alg: number;972}973974export interface FirefoxPasskeyHasCredentialsPayload {975  rpId: string;976  allowCredentials: FirefoxAllowCredential[];977}978979export interface FirefoxPasskeyCreatePayload {980  rpId: string;981  rpName?: string;982  userId: string;983  userName: string;984  userDisplayName?: string;985  challenge: string;986  clientDataJSON: number[];987  origin: string;988  pubKeyCredParams?: FirefoxPubKeyCredParam[];989  authenticatorSelection?: Record<string, unknown>;990  timeout?: number;991  attestation?: string;992}993994export interface FirefoxPasskeyGetPayload {995  rpId: string;996  challenge: string;997  clientDataJSON: number[];998  origin: string;999  allowCredentials: FirefoxAllowCredential[];1000  userVerification?: string;1001}10021003interface FirefoxCreateCredentialResponse {1004  type: "create";1005  id: string;1006  clientDataJSON: number[];1007  attestationObject: string;1008  authenticatorData: string;1009  publicKey: string;1010  algorithm: -7 | -8;1011}10121013interface FirefoxGetCredentialResponse {1014  type: "get";1015  id: string;1016  clientDataJSON: number[];1017  authenticatorData: string;1018  signature: string;1019  userHandle: string;1020}10211022type FirefoxPasskeyResult<T> =1023  | { ok: true; credential: T }1024  | { ok: false; error: "pro_required" | "user_cancelled" | "no_credentials" | "vault_locked" | "not_applicable" | "internal_error"; message?: string };10251026function listPasskeyEntries(): Array<VaultEntry & { passkey: PasskeyData }> {1027  return vault.getEntries().filter(1028    (entry): entry is VaultEntry & { passkey: PasskeyData } =>1029      entry.passkey !== undefined && !entry.deletedAt1030  );1031}10321033/** Decode the `origin` field out of a WebAuthn clientDataJSON byte array. */1034function clientDataJsonOrigin(bytes: number[] | undefined): string | null {1035  if (!Array.isArray(bytes)) return null;1036  try {1037    const obj = JSON.parse(new TextDecoder().decode(new Uint8Array(bytes))) as { origin?: unknown };1038    return typeof obj.origin === "string" ? obj.origin : null;1039  } catch {1040    return null;1041  }1042}10431044/**1045 * Enforce the WebAuthn rpId<->origin relationship on the Firefox proxy path,1046 * where Peach is the authenticator. The ONLY trustworthy origin is the one the1047 * browser attested for the calling page (`callerOrigin`, derived from the1048 * message sender in messages.ts) — NEVER `payload.origin`, which the page1049 * controls and can set to match any rpId (SEV-1-A / audit CRITICAL). Also1050 * refuse to sign a clientDataJSON whose embedded origin disagrees with the1051 * attested origin, so a forged ceremony can't smuggle a foreign origin into1052 * the signed bytes the RP verifies.1053 */1054function assertOriginOwnsRpId(1055  rpId: string,1056  callerOrigin: string | undefined,1057  clientDataJSON?: number[],1058): void {1059  if (!callerOrigin || !isValidRpId(rpId, callerOrigin)) {1060    throw new DOMException(1061      `SecurityError: relying party ID "${rpId}" is not a registrable domain ` +1062        `suffix of the calling origin "${callerOrigin ?? "(unknown)"}".`,1063      "SecurityError",1064    );1065  }1066  const cdjOrigin = clientDataJsonOrigin(clientDataJSON);1067  if (cdjOrigin !== null && cdjOrigin !== callerOrigin) {1068    throw new DOMException(1069      `SecurityError: clientDataJSON origin "${cdjOrigin}" does not match the ` +1070        `attested calling origin "${callerOrigin}".`,1071      "SecurityError",1072    );1073  }1074}10751076export async function handlePasskeyHasCredentials(1077  payload: FirefoxPasskeyHasCredentialsPayload,1078  callerOrigin?: string,1079): Promise<{ ok: true; hasCredentials: boolean } | { ok: false; error: string }> {1080  if (!FIREFOX_USE_CONTENT_SCRIPT_PROXY) {1081    return { ok: false, error: "not_applicable" };1082  }1083  // Scope the existence check to the caller's own origin so an arbitrary page1084  // cannot enumerate which sites the user holds passkeys for (audit MEDIUM).1085  // A false answer is indistinguishable from "no credential" to the page.1086  if (!callerOrigin || !isValidRpId(payload.rpId, callerOrigin)) {1087    return { ok: true, hasCredentials: false };1088  }1089  if (!vault.isUnlocked()) {1090    // Cannot enumerate without the vault key. The MAIN-world proxy treats a1091    // false answer as "fall through to the platform" — exactly the right1092    // outcome when Peach is locked: the user gets the native UI instead.1093    return { ok: true, hasCredentials: false };1094  }1095  const passkeys = listPasskeyEntries().filter(1096    (entry) => entry.passkey.rpId === payload.rpId1097  );1098  if (passkeys.length === 0) return { ok: true, hasCredentials: false };10991100  const allow = payload.allowCredentials ?? [];1101  if (allow.length === 0) return { ok: true, hasCredentials: true };11021103  const hasMatch = passkeys.some((entry) =>1104    allow.some((ac) => ac.id === entry.passkey.credentialId)1105  );1106  return { ok: true, hasCredentials: hasMatch };1107}11081109/**1110 * Approval prompt for the Firefox proxy ceremonies. Reuses the existing1111 * pending-passkey channel (badge + popup + 60s timeout) — the same approval1112 * UI Chrome ceremonies use, so the popup's State 11/12 view doesn't need1113 * any new code path. The page-side proxy never sees the request id; the1114 * background mints one and discards it after resolution.1115 */1116async function requestFirefoxApproval(args: {1117  type: "create" | "get";1118  rpId: string;1119  rpName?: string;1120  userName: string;1121  userDisplayName?: string;1122}): Promise<boolean> {1123  // Synthetic request id — the Firefox proxy path doesn't have a1124  // chrome.webAuthenticationProxy request to tie back to.1125  const requestId = randomRequestId();1126  return promptUserApproval({1127    requestId,1128    type: args.type,1129    rpId: args.rpId,1130    rpName: args.rpName ?? args.rpId,1131    userName: args.userName,1132    userDisplayName: args.userDisplayName,1133  });1134}11351136export async function handleFirefoxPasskeyCreate(1137  payload: FirefoxPasskeyCreatePayload,1138  callerOrigin?: string,1139): Promise<FirefoxPasskeyResult<FirefoxCreateCredentialResponse>> {1140  if (!FIREFOX_USE_CONTENT_SCRIPT_PROXY) {1141    return { ok: false, error: "not_applicable" };1142  }1143  // WebAuthn §7.1 step 6 — the requested rpId must be owned by the page's1144  // browser-ATTESTED origin (threaded in as callerOrigin from the message1145  // sender), NOT the page-supplied payload.origin which an attacker controls.1146  // On the Firefox proxy path Peach is the authenticator and must enforce this1147  // before minting anything (audit CRITICAL — origin spoofing).1148  assertOriginOwnsRpId(payload.rpId, callerOrigin, payload.clientDataJSON);1149  if (!(await isProUser())) {1150    broadcastPasskeyProGate();1151    return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1152  }1153  if (!vault.isUnlocked()) {1154    await openApprovalPopup();1155    return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1156  }11571158  const algorithm = pickPasskeyAlgorithm(payload.pubKeyCredParams ?? []);1159  if (!algorithm) {1160    return { ok: false, error: "internal_error", message: "No supported algorithm offered" };1161  }11621163  const approved = await requestFirefoxApproval({1164    type: "create",1165    rpId: payload.rpId,1166    rpName: payload.rpName,1167    userName: payload.userName,1168    userDisplayName: payload.userDisplayName,1169  });1170  if (!approved) return { ok: false, error: "user_cancelled" };11711172  const { bytes: credentialIdBytes, base64url: credentialId } = generateCredentialId();1173  const { publicKeyCose, publicKeySpki, privateKeyJwk } = await generatePasskeyKeypair(algorithm);11741175  // 0x45 = UP|UV|AT  (user-present + user-verified + attested-credential-data).1176  // Matches Chrome's create flag set in handleCreateRequest above.1177  const authenticatorData = await buildAuthenticatorData({1178    rpId: payload.rpId,1179    flags: 0x45,1180    signCount: 0,1181    credentialId: credentialIdBytes,1182    publicKeyCose,1183  });1184  const attestationObject = createAttestationObject(authenticatorData);11851186  const passkey: PasskeyData = {1187    rpId: payload.rpId,1188    rpName: payload.rpName ?? payload.rpId,1189    credentialId,1190    publicKeyCose: base64urlEncode(publicKeyCose),1191    privateKeyJwk,1192    userHandle: payload.userId,1193    userName: payload.userName,1194    userDisplayName: payload.userDisplayName ?? payload.userName,1195    algorithm,1196    signCount: 0,1197    aaguid: base64urlEncode(new Uint8Array(16)),1198    backupEligible: false,1199    backupState: false,1200    browser: "firefox",1201    transports: ["internal"],1202    createdAt: Date.now(),1203  };12041205  const target = findAttachTarget(payload.rpId);1206  if (target) {1207    await vault.updateEntry(target.id, { passkey });1208  } else {1209    await vault.addEntry({1210      type: "login",1211      title: payload.rpName || payload.rpId,1212      url: `https://${payload.rpId}`,1213      username: payload.userName,1214      passkey,1215    });1216  }1217  await vault.consolidatePasskeyEntries();12181219  return {1220    ok: true,1221    credential: {1222      type: "create",1223      id: credentialId,1224      // The content script already encoded clientDataJSON with the page1225      // origin; round-trip the exact bytes back so the RP sees the same1226      // hash it computes locally.1227      clientDataJSON: payload.clientDataJSON,1228      attestationObject: base64urlEncode(attestationObject),1229      authenticatorData: base64urlEncode(authenticatorData),1230      publicKey: base64urlEncode(publicKeySpki),1231      algorithm,1232    },1233  };1234}12351236export async function handleFirefoxPasskeyGet(1237  payload: FirefoxPasskeyGetPayload,1238  callerOrigin?: string,1239): Promise<FirefoxPasskeyResult<FirefoxGetCredentialResponse>> {1240  if (!FIREFOX_USE_CONTENT_SCRIPT_PROXY) {1241    return { ok: false, error: "not_applicable" };1242  }1243  // WebAuthn §7.2 step 8 — the rpId must be owned by the page's browser-attested1244  // origin (callerOrigin from the message sender), NOT the page-supplied1245  // payload.origin. Both rpId and payload.origin are attacker-controlled, so1246  // validating one against the other is no protection; a cross-origin page must1247  // not be able to coax Peach into signing an assertion scoped to another site1248  // (audit CRITICAL — assertion forgery).1249  assertOriginOwnsRpId(payload.rpId, callerOrigin, payload.clientDataJSON);1250  if (!(await isProUser())) {1251    broadcastPasskeyProGate();1252    return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1253  }1254  if (!vault.isUnlocked()) {1255    await openApprovalPopup();1256    return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1257  }12581259  const allow = payload.allowCredentials ?? [];1260  const candidates = listPasskeyEntries().filter((entry) => {1261    if (entry.passkey.rpId !== payload.rpId) return false;1262    if (allow.length === 0) return true;1263    return allow.some((ac) => ac.id === entry.passkey.credentialId);1264  });12651266  if (candidates.length === 0) return { ok: false, error: "no_credentials" };12671268  // Most-recently-used wins when several credentials match. A future1269  // multi-account selector goes here; for now this matches the Chrome path's1270  // behavior for the common one-passkey-per-rp case.1271  candidates.sort((a, b) => (b.passkey.lastUsedAt ?? 0) - (a.passkey.lastUsedAt ?? 0));1272  const match = candidates[0]!;1273  const credential = match.passkey;12741275  if (!credential.privateKeyJwk) {1276    // Pre-v2.12.0 Firefox passkeys delegated to the platform authenticator1277    // — no Peach-held private key to sign with. The MAIN-world proxy treats1278    // no_credentials as a fall-through, which routes to the platform UI.1279    return { ok: false, error: "no_credentials" };1280  }12811282  const approved = await requestFirefoxApproval({1283    type: "get",1284    rpId: credential.rpId,1285    rpName: credential.rpName,1286    userName: credential.userName,1287    userDisplayName: credential.userDisplayName,1288  });1289  if (!approved) return { ok: false, error: "user_cancelled" };12901291  const nextSignCount = credential.signCount + 1;1292  // 0x05 = UP|UV. backup bits track whatever was set at registration time1293  // (consistent with the Chrome path).1294  const flags =1295    0x05 |1296    (credential.backupEligible ? 0x08 : 0) |1297    (credential.backupState ? 0x10 : 0);1298  const authenticatorData = await buildAuthenticatorData({1299    rpId: credential.rpId,1300    flags,1301    signCount: nextSignCount,1302  });13031304  // The content script supplied clientDataJSON bytes built with the page1305  // origin. SHA-256 those bytes verbatim — never re-serialize, or the hash1306  // diverges from what the RP computes.1307  const clientDataBytes = new Uint8Array(payload.clientDataJSON);1308  const clientDataHash = new Uint8Array(1309    await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", clientDataBytes)1310  );1311  const signature = await signPasskeyAssertion(1312    credential.privateKeyJwk,1313    credential.algorithm,1314    authenticatorData,1315    clientDataHash1316  );13171318  await vault.updateEntry(match.id, {1319    passkey: {1320      ...credential,1321      signCount: nextSignCount,1322      lastUsedAt: Date.now(),1323    },1324  });13251326  return {1327    ok: true,1328    credential: {1329      type: "get",1330      id: credential.credentialId,1331      clientDataJSON: payload.clientDataJSON,1332      authenticatorData: base64urlEncode(authenticatorData),1333      signature: base64urlEncode(signature),1334      userHandle: credential.userHandle,1335    },1336  };1337}13381339export async function setupPasskeyProxy(): Promise<void> {1340  if (!isPasskeySupported()) {1341    return;1342  }13431344  // Firefox doesn't expose chrome.webAuthenticationProxy listeners. The1345  // popup-context credential creator is the entry point; nothing to wire here.1346  if (detectSharedBrowser() === "firefox") {1347    await refreshPasskeyProxy();1348    return;1349  }13501351  if (!listenersRegistered) {1352    chrome.webAuthenticationProxy.onIsUvpaaRequest.addListener((requestInfo) => {1353      // Peach is a user-verifying platform authenticator whenever the proxy1354      // is attached. The lock state is irrelevant here — the create/get1355      // handlers prompt for unlock when needed. Returning false while locked1356      // makes Google (and any RP that checks isUvpaa as a precondition) show1357      // "A passkey can't be created on this device" before the user even1358      // gets a chance to start the ceremony.1359      void chrome.webAuthenticationProxy.completeIsUvpaaRequest({1360        requestId: requestInfo.requestId,1361        isUvpaa: true,1362      });1363    });1364    chrome.webAuthenticationProxy.onCreateRequest.addListener((requestInfo) => {1365      void handleCreateRequest(requestInfo).catch(async (error) => {1366        // "Invalid requestId" means Chrome already cancelled — handlers will1367        // short-circuit, but if it propagates out from a still-in-flight branch,1368        // don't double-complete.1369        if (isInvalidRequestIdError(error)) {1370          return;1371        }1372        console.error("Peach passkey create failed", error);1373        await rejectCreate(1374          requestInfo.requestId,1375          "UnknownError",1376          error instanceof Error ? error.message : "Passkey creation failed."1377        );1378      });1379    });1380    chrome.webAuthenticationProxy.onGetRequest.addListener((requestInfo) => {1381      void handleGetRequest(requestInfo).catch(async (error) => {1382        if (isInvalidRequestIdError(error)) {1383          return;1384        }1385        console.error("Peach passkey get failed", error);1386        await rejectGet(1387          requestInfo.requestId,1388          "UnknownError",1389          error instanceof Error ? error.message : "Passkey authentication failed."1390        );1391      });1392    });1393    chrome.webAuthenticationProxy.onRequestCanceled.addListener((requestId) => {1394      markCancelled(requestId);1395      // Release any unlock waiter parked for this request.1396      const waiter = unlockWaiters.get(requestId);1397      if (waiter) {1398        clearTimeout(waiter.timeoutId);1399        waiter.resolve(false);1400        unlockWaiters.delete(requestId);1401      }1402      void resolvePendingPasskeyRequest(requestId, false);1403    });1404    listenersRegistered = true;1405  }14061407  await refreshPasskeyProxy();1408}