passkey.ts

1import { isProUser } from "./license";2import * as vault from "./vault";3import {4  base64urlEncode,5  buildAuthenticatorData,6  buildClientDataJSON,7  createAttestationObject,8  generateCredentialId,9  generatePasskeyKeypair,10  pickPasskeyAlgorithm,11  signPasskeyAssertion,12} from "./passkey-crypto";13import { detectBrowser as detectSharedBrowser, firefoxVersion } from "../shared/browser";14import { FIREFOX_USE_CONTENT_SCRIPT_PROXY } from "../shared/passkey-flags";15import { isValidRpId } from "../shared/passkey-utils";16import type {17  PasskeyData,18  PasskeyProviderState,19  PendingPasskeyRequest,20  VaultEntry,21} from "../shared/types";2223declare const __PEACH_E2E_PASSKEYS__: boolean;2425const PENDING_PREFIX = "passkey_pending_";26const APPROVAL_TIMEOUT_MS = 60_000;2728let listenersRegistered = false;29let attached = false;30let conflict: string | undefined;31const PASSKEY_CREATE_E2E_BYPASS = __PEACH_E2E_PASSKEYS__ === true;3233const approvals = new Map<34  number,35  { resolve: (approved: boolean) => void; timeoutId: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> }36>();3738// Resolvers for GET requests that arrived while the vault was locked and are39// waiting for the user to unlock before the passkey flow can continue.40const unlockWaiters = new Map<number, { resolve: (ok: boolean) => void; timeoutId: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> }>();4142// Tracks requestIds that Chrome cancelled on us (via onRequestCanceled) while43// we were still mid-handler. The complete*Request calls would otherwise reject44// with "Invalid requestId"; the handler checks this set before any work.45const cancelledRequests = new Set<number>();46function markCancelled(requestId: number): void {47  cancelledRequests.add(requestId);48  // Bounded GC — never grow forever. Old IDs that haven't been polled in a49  // long time can be forgotten without harm because the Chrome-side request50  // is already gone.51  if (cancelledRequests.size > 256) {52    const iter = cancelledRequests.values();53    for (let i = 0; i < 128; i += 1) cancelledRequests.delete(iter.next().value as number);54  }55}5657export function onVaultUnlocked(): void {58  for (const { resolve, timeoutId } of unlockWaiters.values()) {59    clearTimeout(timeoutId);60    resolve(true);61  }62  unlockWaiters.clear();63}6465/**66 * Resolve every still-pending passkey request as denied and clear unlock67 * waiters. Called from the popup-disconnect path so a closed popup releases68 * the page-side caller in <200ms instead of leaving it stuck for the full69 * APPROVAL_TIMEOUT_MS (60s) (M8/COR-009).70 */71export async function denyAllPendingPasskeyRequests(): Promise<void> {72  if (approvals.size === 0 && unlockWaiters.size === 0) return;73  for (const [rid, { resolve, timeoutId }] of approvals.entries()) {74    clearTimeout(timeoutId);75    resolve(false);76    approvals.delete(rid);77    await clearPendingRequest(rid).catch(() => {});78  }79  for (const { resolve, timeoutId } of unlockWaiters.values()) {80    clearTimeout(timeoutId);81    resolve(false);82  }83  unlockWaiters.clear();84}8586function isPasskeySupported(): boolean {87  if (typeof chrome.webAuthenticationProxy?.attach === "function") return true;88  // Firefox 150+ exposes navigator.credentials.create/get from the popup89  // context with extension host permissions. Cannot intercept page-side90  // calls (no equivalent of webAuthenticationProxy), but registration via91  // Peach's own popup-driven flow works.92  if (detectSharedBrowser() === "firefox") {93    const ver = firefoxVersion();94    if (Number.isFinite(ver) && ver >= 150) return true;95  }96  return false;97}9899export const detectBrowser = detectSharedBrowser;100101function getBrowserLabel(): string {102  const ua = navigator.userAgent;103  if (/Firefox\/(\d+)/.test(ua)) {104    const version = ua.match(/Firefox\/(\d+)/)?.[1];105    return version ? `Firefox ${version}` : "Firefox";106  }107  const version = ua.match(/Chrome\/(\d+)/)?.[1];108  return version ? `Chrome ${version}` : "Chromium";109}110111function pendingStorageKey(requestId: number): string {112  return `${PENDING_PREFIX}${requestId}`;113}114115function randomRequestId(): number {116  // 53-bit crypto-random integer — unbrute-forceable, unlike the old117  // Date.now()+Math.random synthetic id (~10-20 bits). Fits a JS safe118  // integer so it round-trips through String/Number for the toast path.119  // (Audit 2026-08-20 #1/#10.)120  const u = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint32Array(2));121  return u[0] * 0x200000 + (u[1] >>> 11);122}123124function originFromRpId(rpId: string): string {125  return /^(localhost|127\.0\.0\.1|\[::1\])$/i.test(rpId)126    ? `http://${rpId}`127    : `https://${rpId}`;128}129130/**131 * The clientDataJSON sent back to the RP must contain the page's actual132 * origin — not a synthesized one. `chrome.webAuthenticationProxy` does not133 * surface the requesting origin in CreateRequest/GetRequest, so we read it134 * from the active tab and validate that its hostname is a registrable135 * suffix match for the rpId. WebAuthn requires this relationship anyway, so136 * a mismatch indicates either a stale active tab or a hostile environment;137 * we fall back to https://<rpId> in that case to avoid silently signing the138 * wrong origin.139 *140 * Without this, a passkey created on https://myaccount.google.com gets141 * clientDataJSON.origin = "https://google.com", and Google's RP rejects the142 * attestation with "Something went wrong" because the origin hash doesn't143 * match what its own JS captured at create time.144 */145async function resolvePageOrigin(rpId: string): Promise<string> {146  try {147    const tabs = await new Promise<chrome.tabs.Tab[]>((resolve) =>148      chrome.tabs.query({ active: true, lastFocusedWindow: true }, resolve)149    );150    const url = tabs[0]?.url;151    if (url) {152      const parsed = new URL(url);153      const host = parsed.hostname.toLowerCase();154      const rp = rpId.toLowerCase();155      if (host === rp || host.endsWith(`.${rp}`)) {156        return parsed.origin;157      }158    }159  } catch {160    // fall through to rpId-derived origin161  }162  return originFromRpId(rpId);163}164165async function setBadge(text: string): Promise<void> {166  if (!chrome.action?.setBadgeText) return;167  await chrome.action.setBadgeText({ text });168  if (text) {169    await chrome.action.setBadgeBackgroundColor({ color: "#E5805C" });170  }171}172173async function clearPendingRequest(requestId: number): Promise<void> {174  if (chrome.storage.session) {175    await chrome.storage.session.remove(pendingStorageKey(requestId));176  }177  await setBadge("");178}179180async function openApprovalPopup(): Promise<void> {181  try {182    await chrome.action.openPopup();183  } catch {184    await setBadge("PK");185  }186}187188/**189 * Some ceremonies — especially conditional-UI `navigator.credentials.get`190 * calls — get cancelled by Chrome before we finish processing. Calling191 * complete*Request on a cancelled requestId rejects with "Invalid192 * requestId". That is expected, not exceptional: swallow it. Re-throwing193 * would surface an uncaught promise rejection in the SW and cascade through194 * the catch wrappers in setupPasskeyProxy.195 */196function isInvalidRequestIdError(err: unknown): boolean {197  return err instanceof Error && /invalid requestid/i.test(err.message);198}199200/**201 * Chrome throws "Missing GetResponseDetails.responseJson" when202 * completeGetRequest is called with no responseJson and no error (the203 * pass-through signal). The throw is a Chrome API quirk — the request IS204 * routed to the platform authenticator — but if we let it propagate, the205 * outer catch calls rejectGet, which sends a second completeGetRequest with206 * an error that cancels the pass-through and shows "Something went wrong" on207 * the page. Swallow it exactly as we swallow "Invalid requestId".208 */209function isMissingResponseJsonError(err: unknown): boolean {210  return err instanceof Error && /missing getresponsedetails/i.test(err.message);211}212213async function rejectCreate(214  requestId: number,215  name: string,216  message = ""217): Promise<void> {218  try {219    await chrome.webAuthenticationProxy.completeCreateRequest({220      requestId,221      error: { name, message },222    });223  } catch (err) {224    if (isInvalidRequestIdError(err)) {225      return;226    }227    throw err;228  }229}230231async function rejectGet(232  requestId: number,233  name: string,234  message = ""235): Promise<void> {236  try {237    await chrome.webAuthenticationProxy.completeGetRequest({238      requestId,239      error: { name, message },240    });241  } catch (err) {242    if (isInvalidRequestIdError(err)) {243      return;244    }245    throw err;246  }247}248249export async function getPendingPasskeyRequest(): Promise<PendingPasskeyRequest | null> {250  if (!chrome.storage.session) return null; // Firefox <132 / unsupported contexts251  const stored = (await chrome.storage.session.get(null)) as Record<string, unknown>;252  const key = Object.keys(stored).find((item) => item.startsWith(PENDING_PREFIX));253  if (!key) return null;254  const pending = stored[key];255  return pending && typeof pending === "object"256    ? (pending as PendingPasskeyRequest)257    : null;258}259260export async function resolvePendingPasskeyRequest(261  requestId: number,262  approved: boolean263): Promise<void> {264  const pending = approvals.get(requestId);265  if (!pending) {266    // Either the request expired (Chrome) or this is a Firefox-driven267    // pending where the popup performs the navigator.credentials call268    // directly. Clear both possible session keys so getPendingPasskeyRequest()269    // doesn't surface stale state on the next popup open.270    await clearPendingRequest(requestId);271    if (chrome.storage.session) {272      await chrome.storage.session.remove(FIREFOX_PENDING_KEY);273    }274    return;275  }276277  clearTimeout(pending.timeoutId);278  approvals.delete(requestId);279  await clearPendingRequest(requestId);280  pending.resolve(approved);281}282283async function promptUserApproval(request: PendingPasskeyRequest): Promise<boolean> {284  if (chrome.storage.session) {285    await chrome.storage.session.set({ [pendingStorageKey(request.requestId)]: request });286  }287  await openApprovalPopup();288289  return new Promise<boolean>((resolve) => {290    const timeoutId = setTimeout(async () => {291      approvals.delete(request.requestId);292      await clearPendingRequest(request.requestId);293      resolve(false);294    }, APPROVAL_TIMEOUT_MS);295296    approvals.set(request.requestId, { resolve, timeoutId });297  });298}299300export async function getPasskeyProviderState(): Promise<PasskeyProviderState> {301  const settings = await vault.ensureSettingsLoaded();302  const supported = isPasskeySupported();303  const enabled = settings.passkeyProviderEnabled === true;304  return {305    supported,306    enabled,307    attached: supported && attached,308    browserLabel: getBrowserLabel(),309    statusLabel: !supported310      ? "Interception unavailable"311      : attached312        ? "Active"313        : conflict314          ? "Another provider is active"315          : enabled316            ? "Inactive"317            : "Disabled",318    conflict,319  };320}321322async function attachPasskeyProxy(): Promise<void> {323  if (!isPasskeySupported()) {324    attached = false;325    conflict = "This browser does not expose chrome.webAuthenticationProxy.";326    return;327  }328329  // Firefox path: no chrome.webAuthenticationProxy exists. The popup-context330  // navigator.credentials creator is always ready once the user enables the331  // provider. Treat enabled = attached for state reporting purposes.332  if (detectSharedBrowser() === "firefox") {333    attached = true;334    conflict = undefined;335    return;336  }337338  if (attached) return;339340  try {341    await chrome.webAuthenticationProxy.attach();342    attached = true;343    conflict = undefined;344  } catch (error) {345    attached = false;346    conflict = error instanceof Error ? error.message : "Another provider is active.";347    console.warn("[Peach passkey] proxy attach failed", { conflict });348  }349}350351async function detachPasskeyProxy(): Promise<void> {352  if (!isPasskeySupported()) {353    attached = false;354    return;355  }356357  if (detectSharedBrowser() === "firefox") {358    attached = false;359    conflict = undefined;360    return;361  }362363  try {364    await chrome.webAuthenticationProxy.detach();365  } catch {366    // Ignore detach failures; the extension may already be detached.367  }368369  attached = false;370  conflict = undefined;371}372373export async function setPasskeyProviderEnabled(enabled: boolean): Promise<PasskeyProviderState> {374  await vault.updateSettings({ passkeyProviderEnabled: enabled });375  if (enabled) {376    await attachPasskeyProxy();377  } else {378    await detachPasskeyProxy();379  }380  return getPasskeyProviderState();381}382383async function refreshPasskeyProxy(): Promise<void> {384  const settings = await vault.ensureSettingsLoaded();385  if (settings.passkeyProviderEnabled === true) {386    await attachPasskeyProxy();387    return;388  }389  await detachPasskeyProxy();390}391392/**393 * Find the entry that already holds a passkey for the given RP, or the most394 * recently-modified login entry whose URL/additionalUrls match the RP — that395 * entry is the natural attach target when the user adds a passkey to a site396 * they already have a password for. Returns null when there's no candidate;397 * the caller creates a new entry in that case.398 */399function findAttachTarget(rpId: string): VaultEntry | null {400  const all = vault.getEntries();401  const passkeyMatch = all.find(402    (entry) => entry.passkey?.rpId === rpId && !entry.deletedAt403  );404  if (passkeyMatch) return passkeyMatch;405  const loginMatches = vault.queryDomain(rpId).filter((entry) => entry.type === "login" && !entry.passkey);406  if (loginMatches.length === 0) return null;407  // Pick the most recently modified candidate to be deterministic.408  return loginMatches.reduce((best, e) =>409    (e.modifiedAt ?? 0) > (best.modifiedAt ?? 0) ? e : best410  );411}412413async function handleCreateRequest(414  request: chrome.webAuthenticationProxy.CreateRequest415): Promise<void> {416  const options = JSON.parse(request.requestDetailsJson) as PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptionsJSON;417  const rpId = options.rp.id;418  const rpName = options.rp.name ?? options.rp.id;419  const userName = options.user.name;420  const userDisplayName = options.user.displayName ?? options.user.name;421  if (!rpId) {422    console.warn("[Peach passkey] reject: missing rp.id");423    await rejectCreate(request.requestId, "NotSupportedError", "Missing RP ID");424    return;425  }426427  // Capture the page origin NOW — before any popup opens. Once the extension428  // action popup fires, it can steal lastFocusedWindow so the tabs query429  // returns no results and falls back to https://<rpId>. For sites where the430  // page origin is a subdomain of the rpId (e.g. myaccount.google.com vs431  // rpId google.com) that fallback produces the wrong origin and the RP432  // rejects the attestation with "Something went wrong".433  const pageOrigin = await resolvePageOrigin(rpId);434435  if (!PASSKEY_CREATE_E2E_BYPASS && !(await isProUser())) {436    console.warn("[Peach passkey] reject: user is not Pro");437    await rejectCreate(438      request.requestId,439      "NotAllowedError",440      "Passkey creation requires Peach Pro."441    );442    // Show the inline passkey gate so the user knows what happened and can upgrade.443    broadcastPasskeyProGate();444    return;445  }446447  if (!vault.isUnlocked()) {448    // Same wait-for-unlock pattern handleGetRequest uses: summon the inline449    // unlock prompt on the active tab so the user can unlock without leaving450    // the page, then hold the create request open until the vault unlocks or451    // the timeout fires. Immediately rejecting here means Google shows452    // "Something went wrong" the instant the user picks Peach.453    const tabs = await new Promise<chrome.tabs.Tab[]>((resolve) =>454      chrome.tabs.query({ active: true, lastFocusedWindow: true }, resolve)455    );456    const activeTab = tabs[0];457    if (activeTab?.id) {458      chrome.tabs.sendMessage(activeTab.id, {459        type: 'SUMMON_AUTOFILL',460        source: 'passkey-unlock',461      }).catch((err) => {462        console.warn("[Peach passkey] SUMMON_AUTOFILL failed, falling back to popup", err);463        void openApprovalPopup();464      });465    } else {466      await openApprovalPopup();467    }468469    const unlocked = await new Promise<boolean>((resolve) => {470      const timeoutId = setTimeout(() => {471        unlockWaiters.delete(request.requestId);472        resolve(false);473      }, APPROVAL_TIMEOUT_MS);474      unlockWaiters.set(request.requestId, { resolve, timeoutId });475    });476477    if (!unlocked || !vault.isUnlocked()) {478      console.warn("[Peach passkey] reject: unlock timeout");479      await rejectCreate(request.requestId, "NotAllowedError", "Not unlocked in time.");480      return;481    }482    // Vault is now unlocked — fall through to approval.483  }484485  const approved = await promptUserApproval({486    requestId: request.requestId,487    type: "create",488    rpId,489    rpName,490    userName,491    userDisplayName,492  });493  if (!approved) {494    console.warn("[Peach passkey] reject: user denied");495    await rejectCreate(request.requestId, "NotAllowedError", "User denied request.");496    return;497  }498499  const algorithm = pickPasskeyAlgorithm(options.pubKeyCredParams ?? []);500  if (!algorithm) {501    console.warn("[Peach passkey] reject: no supported algorithm", options.pubKeyCredParams);502    await rejectCreate(request.requestId, "NotSupportedError", "No supported algorithm offered.");503    return;504  }505  const credentialIdBytes = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32));506  const { publicKeyCose, publicKeySpki, privateKeyJwk } = await generatePasskeyKeypair(507    algorithm508  );509  const authData = await buildAuthenticatorData({510    rpId,511    flags: 0x4d,512    signCount: 0,513    credentialId: credentialIdBytes,514    publicKeyCose,515  });516  const attestationObject = createAttestationObject(authData);517  const clientDataJSON = buildClientDataJSON(518    "webauthn.create",519    options.challenge,520    pageOrigin521  );522523  const passkey: PasskeyData = {524    rpId,525    rpName,526    credentialId: base64urlEncode(credentialIdBytes),527    publicKeyCose: base64urlEncode(publicKeyCose),528    privateKeyJwk,529    userHandle: options.user.id,530    userName,531    userDisplayName,532    algorithm,533    signCount: 0,534    aaguid: base64urlEncode(new Uint8Array(16)),535    backupEligible: false,536    backupState: false,537    browser: "chrome",538    transports: ["internal"],539    createdAt: Date.now(),540  };541542  // Attach to an existing login (same domain) when one exists; otherwise543  // create a fresh login entry that exists solely to hold the passkey.544  const target = findAttachTarget(rpId);545  if (target) {546    await vault.updateEntry(target.id, { passkey });547  } else {548    await vault.addEntry({549      type: "login",550      title: rpName,551      url: `https://${rpId}`,552      username: userName,553      passkey,554    });555  }556  // Merge any same-domain TOTP-only entries into the passkey entry right now557  // so the user sees one consolidated entry rather than waiting until next558  // unlock for the decodePayload merge pass to run.559  await vault.consolidatePasskeyEntries();560561  try {562    await chrome.webAuthenticationProxy.completeCreateRequest({563      requestId: request.requestId,564      responseJson: JSON.stringify({565        id: passkey.credentialId,566        rawId: passkey.credentialId,567        type: "public-key",568        response: {569          clientDataJSON: base64urlEncode(clientDataJSON),570          authenticatorData: base64urlEncode(authData),571          attestationObject: base64urlEncode(attestationObject),572          transports: ["internal"],573          publicKey: base64urlEncode(publicKeySpki),574          publicKeyAlgorithm: algorithm,575        },576        authenticatorAttachment: "platform",577        clientExtensionResults: {},578      }),579    });580  } catch (err) {581    if (isInvalidRequestIdError(err)) {582      return;583    }584    throw err;585  }586}587588function broadcastPasskeyProGate(): void {589  chrome.tabs.query({}, (tabs) => {590    for (const tab of tabs) {591      if (tab.id !== undefined) {592        chrome.tabs.sendMessage(tab.id, { type: "PASSKEY_PRO_GATE" }).catch(() => {});593      }594    }595  });596}597598async function promptViaToast(request: PendingPasskeyRequest): Promise<boolean> {599  if (chrome.storage.session) {600    await chrome.storage.session.set({ [pendingStorageKey(request.requestId)]: request });601  }602603  const tabs = await new Promise<chrome.tabs.Tab[]>((resolve) => {604    chrome.tabs.query({ active: true, currentWindow: true }, resolve);605  });606  const tab = tabs[0];607608  if (tab?.id) {609    chrome.tabs.sendMessage(tab.id, {610      type: 'SHOW_PASSKEY_TOAST',611      payload: {612        site: request.rpId,613        displayName: request.userDisplayName ?? request.userName,614        username: request.userName,615        requestId: String(request.requestId),616      },617    }).catch(() => {});618  } else {619    await openApprovalPopup();620  }621622  return new Promise<boolean>((resolve) => {623    const timeoutId = setTimeout(async () => {624      approvals.delete(request.requestId);625      await clearPendingRequest(request.requestId);626      resolve(false);627    }, APPROVAL_TIMEOUT_MS);628629    approvals.set(request.requestId, { resolve, timeoutId });630  });631}632633async function handleGetRequest(634  request: chrome.webAuthenticationProxy.GetRequest635): Promise<void> {636  const options = JSON.parse(request.requestDetailsJson) as PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptionsJSON;637  if (!vault.isUnlocked()) {638    // Summon the inline unlock prompt on the active tab so the user can unlock639    // without leaving the page. Fall back to the popup if the content script640    // is unavailable (e.g. restricted URL, script not yet injected).641    const tabs = await new Promise<chrome.tabs.Tab[]>((resolve) =>642      chrome.tabs.query({ active: true, currentWindow: true }, resolve)643    );644    const activeTab = tabs[0];645    if (activeTab?.id) {646      chrome.tabs.sendMessage(activeTab.id, {647        type: 'SUMMON_AUTOFILL',648        source: 'passkey-unlock',649      }).catch(() => { void openApprovalPopup(); });650    } else {651      await openApprovalPopup();652    }653654    // Hold the request open until the vault unlocks or the timeout fires.655    const unlocked = await new Promise<boolean>((resolve) => {656      const timeoutId = setTimeout(() => {657        unlockWaiters.delete(request.requestId);658        resolve(false);659      }, APPROVAL_TIMEOUT_MS);660      unlockWaiters.set(request.requestId, { resolve, timeoutId });661    });662663    if (!unlocked || !vault.isUnlocked()) {664      await rejectGet(request.requestId, "NotAllowedError", "Not unlocked in time.");665      return;666    }667    // Vault is now unlocked — fall through to authenticate.668  }669670  if (!PASSKEY_CREATE_E2E_BYPASS && !(await isProUser())) {671    await rejectGet(request.requestId, "NotAllowedError", "Passkey use requires Peach Pro.");672    broadcastPasskeyProGate();673    return;674  }675676  const passkeyBearing = vault.getEntries().filter((entry): entry is VaultEntry & { passkey: PasskeyData } =>677    entry.passkey !== undefined && !entry.deletedAt678  );679  const allowedCredentialIds = (options.allowCredentials ?? []).map((descriptor) => descriptor.id);680681  const match = passkeyBearing.find((entry) => {682    // PB-26-015: a credential-ID match must still belong to the requesting683    // RP — the assertion later signs with the stored rpId, so a foreign-RP684    // request must never select a credential from a different rpId.685    if (options.rpId && entry.passkey.rpId !== options.rpId) return false;686    if (allowedCredentialIds.length > 0) {687      return allowedCredentialIds.includes(entry.passkey.credentialId);688    }689    if (!options.rpId) return false;690    return entry.passkey.rpId === options.rpId;691  });692693  if (!match) {694    // No Peach passkey for this RP — pass through to the platform authenticator.695    // completeGetRequest with no error and no responseJson is the webAuthenticationProxy696    // signal for "I'm not handling this"; Chrome routes the request to the next697    // authenticator in the chain (the built-in browser passkey manager etc.).698    // Rejecting with NotAllowedError would propagate as an error to the page and699    // break RPs (e.g. Google) that issue a GET as part of their create-passkey flow.700    try {701      await chrome.webAuthenticationProxy.completeGetRequest({ requestId: request.requestId });702    } catch (err) {703      if (isInvalidRequestIdError(err)) return;704      if (isMissingResponseJsonError(err)) return;705      throw err;706    }707    return;708  }709710  const credential = match.passkey;711  // Chrome's webAuthenticationProxy path requires Peach-held private key material.712  // Passkeys created on Firefox have no privateKeyJwk — pass through so Chrome713  // can route to a capable authenticator instead of surfacing an error to the page.714  if (!credential.privateKeyJwk) {715    try {716      await chrome.webAuthenticationProxy.completeGetRequest({ requestId: request.requestId });717    } catch (err) {718      if (isInvalidRequestIdError(err)) return;719      if (isMissingResponseJsonError(err)) return;720      throw err;721    }722    return;723  }724725  const tabs = await new Promise<chrome.tabs.Tab[]>((resolve) => {726    chrome.tabs.query({ active: true, currentWindow: true }, resolve);727  });728  const approvalBinding = {729    tabId: tabs[0]?.id,730    origin: await resolvePageOrigin(credential.rpId),731  };732  const approved = await promptViaToast({733    requestId: request.requestId,734    type: "get",735    rpId: credential.rpId,736    rpName: credential.rpName,737    userName: credential.userName,738    userDisplayName: credential.userDisplayName,739    ...approvalBinding,740  });741  if (!approved) {742    await rejectGet(request.requestId, "NotAllowedError", "User denied request.");743    return;744  }745746  const nextSignCount = credential.signCount + 1;747  const flags = 0x05 | (credential.backupEligible ? 0x08 : 0) | (credential.backupState ? 0x10 : 0);748  const authData = await buildAuthenticatorData({749    rpId: credential.rpId,750    flags,751    signCount: nextSignCount,752  });753  const clientDataJSON = buildClientDataJSON(754    "webauthn.get",755    options.challenge,756    await resolvePageOrigin(credential.rpId)757  );758  const clientDataHash = new Uint8Array(759    await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", new Uint8Array(clientDataJSON))760  );761  const signature = await signPasskeyAssertion(762    credential.privateKeyJwk,763    credential.algorithm,764    authData,765    clientDataHash766  );767768  await vault.updateEntry(match.id, {769    passkey: {770      ...credential,771      signCount: nextSignCount,772      lastUsedAt: Date.now(),773    },774  });775776  const responseJson = JSON.stringify({777    id: credential.credentialId,778    rawId: credential.credentialId,779    type: "public-key",780    response: {781      clientDataJSON: base64urlEncode(clientDataJSON),782      authenticatorData: base64urlEncode(authData),783      signature: base64urlEncode(signature),784      userHandle: credential.userHandle,785    },786    authenticatorAttachment: "platform",787    clientExtensionResults: {},788  });789790  try {791    await chrome.webAuthenticationProxy.completeGetRequest({792      requestId: request.requestId,793      responseJson,794    });795  } catch (err) {796    if (isInvalidRequestIdError(err)) {797      return;798    }799    throw err;800  }801}802803// ── Firefox path ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────804//805// Firefox 150+ permits extensions to call navigator.credentials.create/get806// from the popup context with their host-permitted RP IDs. Peach uses that807// surface to register passkeys on behalf of the user. The page's own808// navigator.credentials call is observed via the MAIN-world detector809// (src/content/passkeys-firefox.ts) but never blocked or replaced; Peach's810// flow is parallel and explicit (the user must engage with Peach's button).811812const FIREFOX_PENDING_KEY = "passkey_pending_firefox";813const FIREFOX_DECLINE_PREFIX = "peach_passkey_offer_declined:";814const FIREFOX_DECLINE_TTL_MS = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000; // 30 days815816export async function initiateFirefoxPasskeyCreate(args: {817  rpId: string;818  rpName: string;819  userName: string;820  userDisplayName?: string;821}, callerOrigin?: string): Promise<{ ok: boolean; error?: string }> {822  // The rpId must belong to the calling page's registrable domain; without823  // this, a page could initiate a ceremony for a foreign site and the824  // approval popup would display an attacker-chosen rpId. Origin is the825  // browser-attested sender origin from messages.ts, never page payload.826  // (Codex Security 2026-08-04, passkey-ceremony-approval sibling.)827  if (!callerOrigin || !isValidRpId(args.rpId, callerOrigin)) {828    return { ok: false, error: "rpid_origin_mismatch" };829  }830  if (!(await isProUser())) {831    broadcastPasskeyProGate();832    return { ok: false, error: "passkey creation requires Peach Pro" };833  }834  if (!vault.isUnlocked()) {835    await openApprovalPopup();836    return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };837  }838  if (!chrome.storage.session) {839    return { ok: false, error: "session storage unavailable" };840  }841842  const requestId = randomRequestId();843  const challenge = base64urlEncode(crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32)));844  const userHandle = base64urlEncode(crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32)));845846  const pending: PendingPasskeyRequest = {847    requestId,848    type: "create",849    rpId: args.rpId,850    rpName: args.rpName,851    userName: args.userName,852    userDisplayName: args.userDisplayName,853    browser: "firefox",854    challenge,855    userHandle,856  };857858  await chrome.storage.session.set({ [FIREFOX_PENDING_KEY]: pending });859  await openApprovalPopup();860  return { ok: true };861}862863export async function completeFirefoxPasskeyCreate(payload: {864  requestId: number;865  rpId: string;866  rpName: string;867  userName: string;868  userDisplayName?: string;869  userHandle: string;870  credentialId: string;871  publicKeyCose: string;872  algorithm: -7 | -8;873  aaguid?: string;874  transports?: string[];875  backupEligible?: boolean;876  backupState?: boolean;877}): Promise<{ ok: boolean; error?: string }> {878  if (!vault.isUnlocked()) return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };879880  // Bind completion to the pending ceremony: requestId, rpId, challenge, and881  // userHandle are minted by the background at INITIATE time and only ever882  // leave extension context through the approval popup, so a page (or anything883  // replaying relayed messages) cannot synthesize a matching completion for an884  // rpId it does not own. (Codex Security 2026-08-04 MEDIUM,885  // broken-access-control.passkey-ceremony-approval.)886  const pending = chrome.storage.session887    ? ((await chrome.storage.session.get(FIREFOX_PENDING_KEY))[FIREFOX_PENDING_KEY] as888        | PendingPasskeyRequest889        | undefined)890    : undefined;891  if (892    !pending ||893    pending.requestId !== payload.requestId ||894    pending.rpId !== payload.rpId ||895    pending.userHandle !== payload.userHandle896  ) {897    return { ok: false, error: "no_pending_request" };898  }899900  const passkey: PasskeyData = {901    rpId: payload.rpId,902    rpName: payload.rpName,903    credentialId: payload.credentialId,904    publicKeyCose: payload.publicKeyCose,905    userHandle: payload.userHandle,906    userName: payload.userName,907    userDisplayName: payload.userDisplayName ?? payload.userName,908    algorithm: payload.algorithm,909    signCount: 0,910    aaguid: payload.aaguid ?? base64urlEncode(new Uint8Array(16)),911    backupEligible: payload.backupEligible ?? false,912    backupState: payload.backupState ?? false,913    browser: "firefox",914    transports: payload.transports ?? ["internal"],915    createdAt: Date.now(),916  };917918  // Same attach-or-create flow as the Chrome path: prefer attaching to an919  // existing login entry for the same domain so the user ends up with one920  // entry per site, not two (a login + a passkey-only).921  const target = findAttachTarget(payload.rpId);922  if (target) {923    await vault.updateEntry(target.id, { passkey });924  } else {925    await vault.addEntry({926      type: "login",927      title: payload.rpName || payload.rpId,928      url: `https://${payload.rpId}`,929      username: payload.userName,930      passkey,931    });932  }933  await vault.consolidatePasskeyEntries();934935  if (chrome.storage.session) {936    await chrome.storage.session.remove(FIREFOX_PENDING_KEY);937  }938  return { ok: true };939}940941const MAX_DECLINE_DOMAIN_LENGTH = 253;942943function normaliseDeclineDomain(domain: string): string | null {944  if (!domain || domain.length > MAX_DECLINE_DOMAIN_LENGTH) return null;945  try {946    const url = new URL(`https://${domain}`);947    return isValidRpId(url.hostname, url.origin) ? url.hostname : null;948  } catch {949    return null;950  }951}952953function declineKey(domain: string): string {954  return `${FIREFOX_DECLINE_PREFIX}${domain}`;955}956957export async function recordPasskeyOfferDecline(domain: string): Promise<void> {958  const validDomain = normaliseDeclineDomain(domain);959  if (!validDomain) return;960  await chrome.storage.local.set({ [declineKey(validDomain)]: Date.now() });961}962963export async function isPasskeyOfferDeclined(domain: string): Promise<boolean> {964  const validDomain = normaliseDeclineDomain(domain);965  if (!validDomain) return false;966  const key = declineKey(validDomain);967968  const stored = (await chrome.storage.local.get(key)) as Record<string, number | undefined>;969  const at = stored[key];970  if (typeof at !== "number") return false;971  if (Date.now() - at > FIREFOX_DECLINE_TTL_MS) {972    await chrome.storage.local.remove(key);973    return false;974  }975  return true;976}977978// ── Firefox content-script proxy path (v2.12.0) ────────────────────────979//980// The MAIN-world monkey-patch in src/content/passkeys-firefox.ts replaces981// navigator.credentials.create / .get on every Firefox page. It builds a982// clientDataJSON whose `origin` is the PAGE's origin (not moz-extension://),983// then hands every ceremony to the background via PASSKEY_HAS_CREDENTIALS,984// PASSKEY_CREATE, and PASSKEY_GET. The handlers below own those messages.985//986// Removal: when Firefox ships chrome.webAuthenticationProxy, the runtime flag987// FIREFOX_USE_CONTENT_SCRIPT_PROXY in src/shared/passkey-flags.ts evaluates988// to false and these handlers short-circuit. The full removal checklist is989// in that file — the deletion is purely subtractive.990991interface FirefoxAllowCredential {992  id: string;993  type?: string;994}995996interface FirefoxPubKeyCredParam {997  type?: string;998  alg: number;999}10001001export interface FirefoxPasskeyHasCredentialsPayload {1002  rpId: string;1003  allowCredentials: FirefoxAllowCredential[];1004}10051006export interface FirefoxPasskeyCreatePayload {1007  rpId: string;1008  rpName?: string;1009  userId: string;1010  userName: string;1011  userDisplayName?: string;1012  challenge: string;1013  clientDataJSON: number[];1014  origin: string;1015  pubKeyCredParams?: FirefoxPubKeyCredParam[];1016  authenticatorSelection?: Record<string, unknown>;1017  timeout?: number;1018  attestation?: string;1019}10201021export interface FirefoxPasskeyGetPayload {1022  rpId: string;1023  challenge: string;1024  clientDataJSON: number[];1025  origin: string;1026  allowCredentials: FirefoxAllowCredential[];1027  userVerification?: string;1028}10291030interface FirefoxCreateCredentialResponse {1031  type: "create";1032  id: string;1033  clientDataJSON: number[];1034  attestationObject: string;1035  authenticatorData: string;1036  publicKey: string;1037  algorithm: -7 | -8;1038}10391040interface FirefoxGetCredentialResponse {1041  type: "get";1042  id: string;1043  clientDataJSON: number[];1044  authenticatorData: string;1045  signature: string;1046  userHandle: string;1047}10481049type FirefoxPasskeyResult<T> =1050  | { ok: true; credential: T }1051  | { ok: false; error: "pro_required" | "user_cancelled" | "no_credentials" | "vault_locked" | "not_applicable" | "internal_error"; message?: string };10521053function listPasskeyEntries(): Array<VaultEntry & { passkey: PasskeyData }> {1054  return vault.getEntries().filter(1055    (entry): entry is VaultEntry & { passkey: PasskeyData } =>1056      entry.passkey !== undefined && !entry.deletedAt1057  );1058}10591060/** Decode the `origin` field out of a WebAuthn clientDataJSON byte array. */1061function clientDataJsonOrigin(bytes: number[] | undefined): string | null {1062  if (!Array.isArray(bytes)) return null;1063  try {1064    const obj = JSON.parse(new TextDecoder().decode(new Uint8Array(bytes))) as { origin?: unknown };1065    return typeof obj.origin === "string" ? obj.origin : null;1066  } catch {1067    return null;1068  }1069}10701071/**1072 * Enforce the WebAuthn rpId<->origin relationship on the Firefox proxy path,1073 * where Peach is the authenticator. The ONLY trustworthy origin is the one the1074 * browser attested for the calling page (`callerOrigin`, derived from the1075 * message sender in messages.ts) — NEVER `payload.origin`, which the page1076 * controls and can set to match any rpId (SEV-1-A / audit CRITICAL). Also1077 * refuse to sign a clientDataJSON whose embedded origin disagrees with the1078 * attested origin, so a forged ceremony can't smuggle a foreign origin into1079 * the signed bytes the RP verifies.1080 */1081function assertOriginOwnsRpId(1082  rpId: string,1083  callerOrigin: string | undefined,1084  clientDataJSON?: number[],1085): void {1086  if (!callerOrigin || !isValidRpId(rpId, callerOrigin)) {1087    throw new DOMException(1088      `SecurityError: relying party ID "${rpId}" is not a registrable domain ` +1089        `suffix of the calling origin "${callerOrigin ?? "(unknown)"}".`,1090      "SecurityError",1091    );1092  }1093  const cdjOrigin = clientDataJsonOrigin(clientDataJSON);1094  if (cdjOrigin !== null && cdjOrigin !== callerOrigin) {1095    throw new DOMException(1096      `SecurityError: clientDataJSON origin "${cdjOrigin}" does not match the ` +1097        `attested calling origin "${callerOrigin}".`,1098      "SecurityError",1099    );1100  }1101}11021103export async function handlePasskeyHasCredentials(1104  payload: FirefoxPasskeyHasCredentialsPayload,1105  callerOrigin?: string,1106): Promise<{ ok: true; hasCredentials: boolean } | { ok: false; error: string }> {1107  if (!FIREFOX_USE_CONTENT_SCRIPT_PROXY) {1108    return { ok: false, error: "not_applicable" };1109  }1110  // Scope the existence check to the caller's own origin so an arbitrary page1111  // cannot enumerate which sites the user holds passkeys for (audit MEDIUM).1112  // A false answer is indistinguishable from "no credential" to the page.1113  if (!callerOrigin || !isValidRpId(payload.rpId, callerOrigin)) {1114    return { ok: true, hasCredentials: false };1115  }1116  if (!vault.isUnlocked()) {1117    // Cannot enumerate without the vault key. The MAIN-world proxy treats a1118    // false answer as "fall through to the platform" — exactly the right1119    // outcome when Peach is locked: the user gets the native UI instead.1120    return { ok: true, hasCredentials: false };1121  }1122  const passkeys = listPasskeyEntries().filter(1123    (entry) => entry.passkey.rpId === payload.rpId1124  );1125  if (passkeys.length === 0) return { ok: true, hasCredentials: false };11261127  const allow = payload.allowCredentials ?? [];1128  if (allow.length === 0) return { ok: true, hasCredentials: true };11291130  const hasMatch = passkeys.some((entry) =>1131    allow.some((ac) => ac.id === entry.passkey.credentialId)1132  );1133  return { ok: true, hasCredentials: hasMatch };1134}11351136/**1137 * Approval prompt for the Firefox proxy ceremonies. Reuses the existing1138 * pending-passkey channel (badge + popup + 60s timeout) — the same approval1139 * UI Chrome ceremonies use, so the popup's State 11/12 view doesn't need1140 * any new code path. The page-side proxy never sees the request id; the1141 * background mints one and discards it after resolution.1142 */1143async function requestFirefoxApproval(args: {1144  type: "create" | "get";1145  rpId: string;1146  rpName?: string;1147  userName: string;1148  userDisplayName?: string;1149}): Promise<boolean> {1150  // Synthetic request id — the Firefox proxy path doesn't have a1151  // chrome.webAuthenticationProxy request to tie back to.1152  const requestId = randomRequestId();1153  return promptUserApproval({1154    requestId,1155    type: args.type,1156    rpId: args.rpId,1157    rpName: args.rpName ?? args.rpId,1158    userName: args.userName,1159    userDisplayName: args.userDisplayName,1160  });1161}11621163export async function handleFirefoxPasskeyCreate(1164  payload: FirefoxPasskeyCreatePayload,1165  callerOrigin?: string,1166): Promise<FirefoxPasskeyResult<FirefoxCreateCredentialResponse>> {1167  if (!FIREFOX_USE_CONTENT_SCRIPT_PROXY) {1168    return { ok: false, error: "not_applicable" };1169  }1170  // WebAuthn §7.1 step 6 — the requested rpId must be owned by the page's1171  // browser-ATTESTED origin (threaded in as callerOrigin from the message1172  // sender), NOT the page-supplied payload.origin which an attacker controls.1173  // On the Firefox proxy path Peach is the authenticator and must enforce this1174  // before minting anything (audit CRITICAL — origin spoofing).1175  assertOriginOwnsRpId(payload.rpId, callerOrigin, payload.clientDataJSON);1176  if (!(await isProUser())) {1177    broadcastPasskeyProGate();1178    return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1179  }1180  if (!vault.isUnlocked()) {1181    await openApprovalPopup();1182    return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1183  }11841185  const algorithm = pickPasskeyAlgorithm(payload.pubKeyCredParams ?? []);1186  if (!algorithm) {1187    return { ok: false, error: "internal_error", message: "No supported algorithm offered" };1188  }11891190  const approved = await requestFirefoxApproval({1191    type: "create",1192    rpId: payload.rpId,1193    rpName: payload.rpName,1194    userName: payload.userName,1195    userDisplayName: payload.userDisplayName,1196  });1197  if (!approved) return { ok: false, error: "user_cancelled" };11981199  const { bytes: credentialIdBytes, base64url: credentialId } = generateCredentialId();1200  const { publicKeyCose, publicKeySpki, privateKeyJwk } = await generatePasskeyKeypair(algorithm);12011202  // 0x45 = UP|UV|AT  (user-present + user-verified + attested-credential-data).1203  // Matches Chrome's create flag set in handleCreateRequest above.1204  const authenticatorData = await buildAuthenticatorData({1205    rpId: payload.rpId,1206    flags: 0x45,1207    signCount: 0,1208    credentialId: credentialIdBytes,1209    publicKeyCose,1210  });1211  const attestationObject = createAttestationObject(authenticatorData);12121213  const passkey: PasskeyData = {1214    rpId: payload.rpId,1215    rpName: payload.rpName ?? payload.rpId,1216    credentialId,1217    publicKeyCose: base64urlEncode(publicKeyCose),1218    privateKeyJwk,1219    userHandle: payload.userId,1220    userName: payload.userName,1221    userDisplayName: payload.userDisplayName ?? payload.userName,1222    algorithm,1223    signCount: 0,1224    aaguid: base64urlEncode(new Uint8Array(16)),1225    backupEligible: false,1226    backupState: false,1227    browser: "firefox",1228    transports: ["internal"],1229    createdAt: Date.now(),1230  };12311232  const target = findAttachTarget(payload.rpId);1233  if (target) {1234    await vault.updateEntry(target.id, { passkey });1235  } else {1236    await vault.addEntry({1237      type: "login",1238      title: payload.rpName || payload.rpId,1239      url: `https://${payload.rpId}`,1240      username: payload.userName,1241      passkey,1242    });1243  }1244  await vault.consolidatePasskeyEntries();12451246  return {1247    ok: true,1248    credential: {1249      type: "create",1250      id: credentialId,1251      // The content script already encoded clientDataJSON with the page1252      // origin; round-trip the exact bytes back so the RP sees the same1253      // hash it computes locally.1254      clientDataJSON: payload.clientDataJSON,1255      attestationObject: base64urlEncode(attestationObject),1256      authenticatorData: base64urlEncode(authenticatorData),1257      publicKey: base64urlEncode(publicKeySpki),1258      algorithm,1259    },1260  };1261}12621263export async function handleFirefoxPasskeyGet(1264  payload: FirefoxPasskeyGetPayload,1265  callerOrigin?: string,1266): Promise<FirefoxPasskeyResult<FirefoxGetCredentialResponse>> {1267  if (!FIREFOX_USE_CONTENT_SCRIPT_PROXY) {1268    return { ok: false, error: "not_applicable" };1269  }1270  // WebAuthn §7.2 step 8 — the rpId must be owned by the page's browser-attested1271  // origin (callerOrigin from the message sender), NOT the page-supplied1272  // payload.origin. Both rpId and payload.origin are attacker-controlled, so1273  // validating one against the other is no protection; a cross-origin page must1274  // not be able to coax Peach into signing an assertion scoped to another site1275  // (audit CRITICAL — assertion forgery).1276  assertOriginOwnsRpId(payload.rpId, callerOrigin, payload.clientDataJSON);1277  if (!(await isProUser())) {1278    broadcastPasskeyProGate();1279    return { ok: false, error: "pro_required" };1280  }1281  if (!vault.isUnlocked()) {1282    await openApprovalPopup();1283    return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };1284  }12851286  const allow = payload.allowCredentials ?? [];1287  const candidates = listPasskeyEntries().filter((entry) => {1288    if (entry.passkey.rpId !== payload.rpId) return false;1289    if (allow.length === 0) return true;1290    return allow.some((ac) => ac.id === entry.passkey.credentialId);1291  });12921293  if (candidates.length === 0) return { ok: false, error: "no_credentials" };12941295  // Most-recently-used wins when several credentials match. A future1296  // multi-account selector goes here; for now this matches the Chrome path's1297  // behavior for the common one-passkey-per-rp case.1298  candidates.sort((a, b) => (b.passkey.lastUsedAt ?? 0) - (a.passkey.lastUsedAt ?? 0));1299  const match = candidates[0]!;1300  const credential = match.passkey;13011302  if (!credential.privateKeyJwk) {1303    // Pre-v2.12.0 Firefox passkeys delegated to the platform authenticator1304    // — no Peach-held private key to sign with. The MAIN-world proxy treats1305    // no_credentials as a fall-through, which routes to the platform UI.1306    return { ok: false, error: "no_credentials" };1307  }13081309  const approved = await requestFirefoxApproval({1310    type: "get",1311    rpId: credential.rpId,1312    rpName: credential.rpName,1313    userName: credential.userName,1314    userDisplayName: credential.userDisplayName,1315  });1316  if (!approved) return { ok: false, error: "user_cancelled" };13171318  const nextSignCount = credential.signCount + 1;1319  // 0x05 = UP|UV. backup bits track whatever was set at registration time1320  // (consistent with the Chrome path).1321  const flags =1322    0x05 |1323    (credential.backupEligible ? 0x08 : 0) |1324    (credential.backupState ? 0x10 : 0);1325  const authenticatorData = await buildAuthenticatorData({1326    rpId: credential.rpId,1327    flags,1328    signCount: nextSignCount,1329  });13301331  // The content script supplied clientDataJSON bytes built with the page1332  // origin. SHA-256 those bytes verbatim — never re-serialize, or the hash1333  // diverges from what the RP computes.1334  const clientDataBytes = new Uint8Array(payload.clientDataJSON);1335  const clientDataHash = new Uint8Array(1336    await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", clientDataBytes)1337  );1338  const signature = await signPasskeyAssertion(1339    credential.privateKeyJwk,1340    credential.algorithm,1341    authenticatorData,1342    clientDataHash1343  );13441345  await vault.updateEntry(match.id, {1346    passkey: {1347      ...credential,1348      signCount: nextSignCount,1349      lastUsedAt: Date.now(),1350    },1351  });13521353  return {1354    ok: true,1355    credential: {1356      type: "get",1357      id: credential.credentialId,1358      clientDataJSON: payload.clientDataJSON,1359      authenticatorData: base64urlEncode(authenticatorData),1360      signature: base64urlEncode(signature),1361      userHandle: credential.userHandle,1362    },1363  };1364}13651366export async function setupPasskeyProxy(): Promise<void> {1367  if (!isPasskeySupported()) {1368    return;1369  }13701371  // Firefox doesn't expose chrome.webAuthenticationProxy listeners. The1372  // popup-context credential creator is the entry point; nothing to wire here.1373  if (detectSharedBrowser() === "firefox") {1374    await refreshPasskeyProxy();1375    return;1376  }13771378  if (!listenersRegistered) {1379    chrome.webAuthenticationProxy.onIsUvpaaRequest.addListener((requestInfo) => {1380      // Peach is a user-verifying platform authenticator whenever the proxy1381      // is attached. The lock state is irrelevant here — the create/get1382      // handlers prompt for unlock when needed. Returning false while locked1383      // makes Google (and any RP that checks isUvpaa as a precondition) show1384      // "A passkey can't be created on this device" before the user even1385      // gets a chance to start the ceremony.1386      void chrome.webAuthenticationProxy.completeIsUvpaaRequest({1387        requestId: requestInfo.requestId,1388        isUvpaa: true,1389      });1390    });1391    chrome.webAuthenticationProxy.onCreateRequest.addListener((requestInfo) => {1392      void handleCreateRequest(requestInfo).catch(async (error) => {1393        // "Invalid requestId" means Chrome already cancelled — handlers will1394        // short-circuit, but if it propagates out from a still-in-flight branch,1395        // don't double-complete.1396        if (isInvalidRequestIdError(error)) {1397          return;1398        }1399        console.error("Peach passkey create failed", error);1400        await rejectCreate(1401          requestInfo.requestId,1402          "UnknownError",1403          error instanceof Error ? error.message : "Passkey creation failed."1404        );1405      });1406    });1407    chrome.webAuthenticationProxy.onGetRequest.addListener((requestInfo) => {1408      void handleGetRequest(requestInfo).catch(async (error) => {1409        if (isInvalidRequestIdError(error)) {1410          return;1411        }1412        console.error("Peach passkey get failed", error);1413        await rejectGet(1414          requestInfo.requestId,1415          "UnknownError",1416          error instanceof Error ? error.message : "Passkey authentication failed."1417        );1418      });1419    });1420    chrome.webAuthenticationProxy.onRequestCanceled.addListener((requestId) => {1421      markCancelled(requestId);1422      // Release any unlock waiter parked for this request.1423      const waiter = unlockWaiters.get(requestId);1424      if (waiter) {1425        clearTimeout(waiter.timeoutId);1426        waiter.resolve(false);1427        unlockWaiters.delete(requestId);1428      }1429      void resolvePendingPasskeyRequest(requestId, false);1430    });1431    listenersRegistered = true;1432  }14331434  await refreshPasskeyProxy();1435}