vault.ts

1/**2 * vault.ts — sole owner of vault state and chrome.storage vault keys.3 *4 * Every read/write of `peach_vault_a`, `peach_vault_b`, and `peach_settings`5 * goes through this module. No other file accesses those keys directly.6 * External callers reach vault operations via `messages.ts` — never by7 * importing from here cross-boundary (popup/content must not). Invariants8 * for the two-slot schema, unlock timing, and key/disk atomicity are in9 * Projects.md §3.2–§3.6.10 */1112import { deriveKey, deriveKeyRaw, generateSalt } from "../crypto/argon2";13import { extractDomain } from "../shared/domain";14import { clampSyncTimestamp } from "../shared/sync-limits";15import { recordSyncAlerts, type SyncAlert } from "./sync-alerts";16import {17  rootKeyToWords,18  wordsToRootKeyMaterial,19  deriveRecoveryKey,20} from "../shared/recovery-words";21import type {22  AccentColorName,23  Canary,24  LegacyVaultEntry,25  ManualSummonRecord,26  PasskeyData,27  SavedIdentity,28  StoredVault,29  VaultEntry,30  VaultHistory,31  VaultSnapshot,32} from "../shared/types";33import { decrypt, encrypt, zeroKey } from "./aes";34import { clearAutoLock, touchAutoLock } from "./alarms";35import { setRecoveryConfirmPending } from "./recovery-pending";3637type EntryDraft = Omit<38  VaultEntry,39  "id" | "createdAt" | "modifiedAt" | "deletedAt"40>;4142// Slot-neutral storage keys (v1.4.24+). Both slots always exist; slot B43// either holds the decoy vault (when duress is configured) or random noise44// that looks identical at rest. No external indicator is stored — duress45// configuration is recorded only inside the encrypted payload of slot A.46const SLOT_A = "peach_vault_a";47const SLOT_B = "peach_vault_b";4849// Legacy keys, migrated away on first access.50const LEGACY_MAIN = "peach_vault";51const LEGACY_DECOY = "peach_decoy_vault";52const LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG = "peach_duress";5354// Plaintext is padded to the next multiple of this size before encryption.55// This coarsens ciphertext-length leakage into 1 KiB buckets.56const PAD_BLOCK = 1024;5758// How many past passwords to retain per entry. Generous enough to be useful as59// a recovery aid while bounding the secret material we hold (and the ciphertext60// growth) for an entry whose password is rotated frequently.61const PASSWORD_HISTORY_MAX = 50;6263// When duress is configured, BOTH slots are padded to this fixed ceiling so64// their ciphertext lengths are identical and cannot reveal that a hidden decoy65// vault exists (audit MEDIUM — plausible-deniability leak). 256 KiB comfortably66// holds a very large vault (thousands of entries incl. passkeys). The decoy67// slot can't be re-encrypted on every real-vault save (the real session has no68// decoy key), so a fixed ceiling — rather than size-matching on each write — is69// what keeps the two slots equal. A real vault whose plaintext exceeds this70// would grow past the ceiling and re-expose the bit; that is an extreme,71// documented edge well beyond normal use.72const DURESS_SLOT_SIZE = 262_144;7374let derivedKey: Uint8Array | null = null;75// 32-byte random root key, separate from the derivedKey used for vault encryption.76// The root key is wrapped (encrypted) under the recovery key derived from the77// 12-word phrase. When the user changes their password, only the wrapping changes;78// the root key and recovery words remain stable.79let rootKey: Uint8Array | null = null;80let entries: VaultEntry[] = [];81let domainIndex: Map<string, VaultEntry[]> = new Map();82let vaultMode: "real" | "decoy" = "real";83// Cached post-unlock view of whether the real vault records that duress is84// configured. Only meaningful after a real-mode unlock; for decoy-mode unlock85// this stays false because we never see slot A's plaintext.86let duressConfigured = false;8788let migrationRan = false;8990// Set to a corruption reason during the last unlock() attempt when both slots91// decrypted but failed schema validation. Consumed and cleared by92// consumeLastUnlockFailureReason() so messages.ts can surface vault_corrupted93// distinctly from wrong-password (M7/COR-007).94//95// NOTE: module-level state — if vault.ts is ever moved to a worker context,96// this must be replaced with a structured return value from unlock() or a97// postMessage channel. The signal is invisible across module-instance98// boundaries.99let lastUnlockFailureReason: string | null = null;100101export function consumeLastUnlockFailureReason(): string | null {102  const r = lastUnlockFailureReason;103  lastUnlockFailureReason = null;104  return r;105}106107// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------108// Settings (persisted inside the encrypted vault store as a sidecar key)109// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------110111export type TextSize = "small" | "medium" | "large";112113export interface VaultSettings {114  accentColor?: AccentColorName;115  theme?: "dark" | "light";116  autoLockMinutes?: number;117  clipboardClearSeconds?: number;118  lockOnClose?: boolean;119  breachMonitoring?: boolean;120  passkeyProviderEnabled?: boolean;121  trashRetentionDays?: number;122  manualSummonDomains?: Record<string, ManualSummonRecord>;123  declinedCardFingerprints?: string[];124  /**125   * Text size scale for body copy and entry titles. Stops at "large" by126   * design — XL clips dense screens (Vault, Health) inside the fixed127   * 330×480 popup surface.128   */129  textSize?: TextSize;130  /**131   * When true, all entrance/exit transitions and ambient animations are132   * collapsed to instant. Honoured alongside the user's OS-level133   * `prefers-reduced-motion`.134   */135  reduceMotion?: boolean;136  /**137   * Android-only: when true, the master key is escrowed in AndroidKeyStore138   * and the lock screen offers biometric unlock. Toggled from Settings →139   * Security → Biometrics. Has no effect on desktop builds.140   */141  biometricsEnabled?: boolean;142  /**143   * User overrides for keyboard shortcuts. Keys are ShortcutAction names144   * (see src/shared/shortcuts.ts). Missing actions fall through to145   * DEFAULT_BINDINGS — `getActiveBindings(settings.shortcuts)` is the146   * canonical lookup. Storing only the deltas keeps the vault payload147   * small and lets default updates land for users who never rebind.148   */149  shortcuts?: Record<string, { key: string; ctrl?: boolean; meta?: boolean; shift?: boolean; alt?: boolean }>;150}151152let settings: VaultSettings = {};153154export function getSettings(): VaultSettings {155  return settings;156}157158export async function ensureSettingsLoaded(): Promise<VaultSettings> {159  await loadSettings();160  return settings;161}162163export async function updateSettings(patch: Partial<VaultSettings>): Promise<void> {164  await loadSettings();165  // LV-7: cheap insurance against prototype pollution if a future caller ever166  // feeds parsed external JSON here (native spread keeps __proto__ an own-167  // property today, but Object.assign-style consumers and JSON revivers have168  // been burned before).169  const safe = Object.fromEntries(170    Object.entries(patch).filter(171      ([k]) => !["__proto__", "constructor", "prototype"].includes(k),172    ),173  ) as Partial<VaultSettings>;174  settings = { ...settings, ...safe };175  await persistSettings();176}177178async function persistSettings(): Promise<void> {179  try {180    await chrome.storage.local.set({ peach_settings: settings });181  } catch (err) {182    throw mapStorageError(err);183  }184}185186function mapStorageError(err: unknown): Error {187  const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);188  if (/QUOTA_BYTES|quota/i.test(message)) {189    return new Error("STORAGE_QUOTA_EXCEEDED");190  }191  return err instanceof Error ? err : new Error(message);192}193194async function loadSettings(): Promise<void> {195  const result = await chrome.storage.local.get("peach_settings");196  settings = (result as { peach_settings?: VaultSettings }).peach_settings ?? {};197}198199// Fire-and-forget sync trigger after a committed vault write. Lazy200// dynamic import avoids a circular dependency between vault.ts and201// sync-trigger.ts (the trigger imports paired-devices, which only reads202// storage, but the lazy load also gives us a clean opt-out path in203// tests where sync-trigger has not been initialised).204function fireSyncTrigger(reason: "vault_change"): void {205  void import("./sync-trigger")206    .then((mod) => mod.triggerSyncIfReachable({ reason }))207    .catch(() => {208      /* sync trigger module not available — non-fatal */209    });210}211212// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------213// HIBP breach check (k-anonymity model)214// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------215216export async function checkBreach(password: string): Promise<number> {217  // HIBP k-anonymity API is keyed on SHA-1 prefixes — this is dictated by218  // the public API, not a security choice. Do not migrate to SHA-256 here.219  const encoder = new TextEncoder();220  const hashBuffer = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-1", encoder.encode(password));221  const hashHex = Array.from(new Uint8Array(hashBuffer))222    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))223    .join("")224    .toUpperCase();225226  const prefix = hashHex.slice(0, 5);227  const suffix = hashHex.slice(5);228229  try {230    const res = await fetch(`https://api.pwnedpasswords.com/range/${prefix}`);231    if (!res.ok) return 0;232    const text = await res.text();233    const match = text.split("\r\n").find((l) => l.startsWith(suffix));234    return match ? parseInt(match.split(":")[1], 10) : 0;235  } catch {236    return 0; // Network unavailable — don't block237  }238}239240export async function declineCardSaveOffer(last4: string, expMonth: string, expYear: string): Promise<void> {241  const fingerprint = await cardFingerprint(last4, expMonth, expYear);242  await loadSettings();243  settings = {244    ...settings,245    declinedCardFingerprints: [...(settings.declinedCardFingerprints ?? []), fingerprint],246  };247  await persistSettings();248}249250export async function isCardDeclined(last4: string, expMonth: string, expYear: string): Promise<boolean> {251  await loadSettings();252  const fingerprint = await cardFingerprint(last4, expMonth, expYear);253  return (settings.declinedCardFingerprints ?? []).includes(fingerprint);254}255256async function cardFingerprint(last4: string, expMonth: string, expYear: string): Promise<string> {257  const encoder = new TextEncoder();258  const buf = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", encoder.encode(`${last4}|${expMonth}|${expYear}`));259  return Array.from(new Uint8Array(buf).slice(0, 8))260    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))261    .join("");262}263264function hex(buf: Uint8Array): string {265  return Array.from(buf)266    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))267    .join("");268}269270function unhex(s: string): Uint8Array {271  const out = new Uint8Array(s.length / 2);272  for (let i = 0; i < s.length; i += 2) {273    out[i / 2] = parseInt(s.slice(i, i + 2), 16);274  }275  return out;276}277278// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------279// Root key generation and recovery word wrapping280// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------281282/**283 * Generate a random 32-byte root key and wrap it (AES-256-GCM) under a key284 * derived from the recovery word material via HKDF-SHA256. The wrapped blob285 * fields are stored in slot A alongside the password-wrapped ciphertext. The286 * root key itself is kept in memory for the session so getRecoveryWords() can287 * encode it without re-deriving.288 */289async function generateAndWrapRootKey(): Promise<{290  rawRootKey: string; // hex of the plaintext root key — caller stores in rootKey291  recoverySalt: string;292  wrappedRootKey: string;293  wrappedNonce: string;294  wrappedTag: string;295}> {296  const rootKeyBytes = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32));297298  // Derive the recovery key from the BIP39 words encoding of the root key.299  const words = await rootKeyToWords(rootKeyBytes);300  const wordMaterial = await wordsToRootKeyMaterial(words);301  const recoverySalt = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));302  const recoveryKey = await deriveRecoveryKey(wordMaterial, recoverySalt);303304  // Wrap the root key with the recovery key using AES-256-GCM directly.305  // We hex-encode rootKeyBytes so the plaintext is always valid UTF-8.306  const nonce = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));307  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(hex(rootKeyBytes));308  const raw = await crypto.subtle.encrypt(309    {310      name: "AES-GCM",311      iv: nonce,312      additionalData: new Uint8Array([1]).buffer as ArrayBuffer,313      tagLength: 128,314    },315    recoveryKey,316    encoded317  );318  // WebCrypto returns ciphertext || auth tag concatenated; split them.319  const rawU8 = new Uint8Array(raw);320  const ciphertext = hex(rawU8.slice(0, rawU8.length - 16));321  const tag = hex(rawU8.slice(rawU8.length - 16));322323  return {324    rawRootKey: hex(rootKeyBytes),325    recoverySalt: hex(recoverySalt),326    wrappedRootKey: ciphertext,327    wrappedNonce: hex(nonce),328    wrappedTag: tag,329  };330}331332/**333 * Unwrap the root key using recovery words. Called during recovery flow when334 * the user provides their 12-word phrase and a new password.335 * Exported for use by the RECOVER_WITH_WORDS message handler.336 */337export async function unwrapRootKeyForRecovery(338  wrappedRootKey: string,339  wrappedNonce: string,340  wrappedTag: string,341  recoverySaltHex: string,342  words: string[]343): Promise<void> {344  const wordMaterial = await wordsToRootKeyMaterial(words);345  const recoverySalt = unhex(recoverySaltHex);346  const recoveryKey = await deriveRecoveryKey(wordMaterial, recoverySalt);347348  // Decrypt and cache the root key. The root key bytes were hex-encoded before349  // encryption so the ciphertext is valid UTF-8. We inline the AES-GCM decrypt350  // here to avoid passing a CryptoKey to the string-based encrypt/decrypt helpers.351  // Each component is stored separately in the vault slot; decode them individually352  // so the nonce is always exactly the 12 bytes from wrappedNonce.353  const nonceRaw = unhex(wrappedNonce);354  const ciphertextRaw = unhex(wrappedRootKey);355  const tagRaw = unhex(wrappedTag);356  // Combine ciphertext and tag for AES-GCM (expects ciphertext||tag).357  // Use explicit ArrayBuffer allocations to satisfy TS BufferSource constraints.358  const nonceU8 = nonceRaw as unknown as Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>;359  const combined = new Uint8Array(ciphertextRaw.length + tagRaw.length);360  combined.set(ciphertextRaw, 0);361  combined.set(tagRaw, ciphertextRaw.length);362  const raw = await crypto.subtle.decrypt(363    { name: "AES-GCM", iv: nonceU8, additionalData: new Uint8Array([1]).buffer as ArrayBuffer, tagLength: 128 },364    recoveryKey,365    combined366  );367  const decryptedHex = new TextDecoder().decode(raw);368  rootKey = unhex(decryptedHex);369}370371/**372 * Re-wrap the cached root key under a new derived key (from the user's new373 * password). Called after password change and after recovery re-key so the374 * same recovery words continue to work with the updated password — and so375 * subsequent unlocks can rehydrate rootKey via deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey.376 *377 * recovery_* fields are intentionally not touched: those wrap rootKey under378 * the recovery words, which do not change when the password changes.379 */380export async function rewrapRootKeyForPassword(381  newDerivedKey: Uint8Array,382  _newSalt: Uint8Array383): Promise<void> {384  if (!rootKey) throw new Error("root key not set");385  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);386  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");387  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(newDerivedKey, rootKey);388  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, { ...slotA, ...pwRoot });389}390391/**392 * Change the vault encryption to a new derived key (already derived from393 * the user's new password). Used by RECOVER_WITH_WORDS and changePassword.394 * Caller is responsible for key swap and snapshot.395 */396async function reencryptVaultForNewKey(397  newKey: Uint8Array,398  slotA: StoredVault399): Promise<void> {400  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured, duressConfigured ? DURESS_SLOT_SIZE : 0);401  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(newKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");402  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, {403    ...slotA,404    nonce,405    ciphertext,406    tag,407  });408}409410/**411 * Full password change with an already-derived key (used after recovery).412 * Unlike changePassword(), this skips re-verification of current password413 * since recovery flow has already validated the user's identity via words.414 */415export async function changePasswordWithNewKey(416  newSalt: Uint8Array,417  newKey: Uint8Array418): Promise<void> {419  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);420  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");421  // reencryptVaultForNewKey must receive the updated salt so that subsequent422  // UNLOCK calls with the new password can re-derive the correct key.423  await reencryptVaultForNewKey(newKey, { ...slotA, salt: hex(newSalt) });424  if (derivedKey) zeroKey(derivedKey);425  derivedKey = newKey;426  // PCH-01-008: re-escrow the new key (see changePassword). The recovery flow427  // reaches this path, so a post-recovery SW restart would otherwise lock out428  // a user who just reset their password.429  void saveSessionKey(newKey, "real");430  // Refresh pw_root_* under the new key so deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey works431  // on the next unlock (H2/COR-006). If rootKey is missing — recovery flow432  // should have populated it — fall back silently rather than blowing up the433  // recovery path; migrateToRecovery will rehydrate on the next unlock.434  if (rootKey) {435    const slotAfter = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);436    if (slotAfter) {437      const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(newKey, rootKey);438      await writeSlot(SLOT_A, { ...slotAfter, ...pwRoot });439    }440  }441  if (!duressConfigured) {442    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(slotA.ciphertext.length / 2));443  }444  await stampLocalVaultMutation();445}446447// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------448// Salt generation --- exported so the RECOVER_WITH_WORDS handler can derive449// a new key after password reset without re-importing the crypto module.450// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------451452export { deriveKey, generateSalt };453454export async function loadSlotA(): Promise<StoredVault | null> {455  return loadSlot(SLOT_A);456}457458/**459 * Recover the session root key by AES-GCM-decrypting the pw_root_* fields460 * (a second wrapping of the root key under the password-derived key). This461 * is what makes GET_RECOVERY_WORDS work across lock/unlock cycles without462 * the user re-entering their recovery phrase: the same root key bytes —463 * and therefore the same 12 words — survive every unlock.464 *465 * Returns null when the pw_root fields are absent (pre-v2.12 vault that466 * hasn't been migrated yet) or when decryption fails (wrong derived key,467 * tampered ciphertext). On null the caller should fall through to468 * migrateToRecovery() to populate the fields.469 */470async function deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(471  derivedKeyBytes: Uint8Array,472  slotA: StoredVault,473): Promise<Uint8Array | null> {474  if (!slotA.pw_root_ciphertext || !slotA.pw_root_nonce || !slotA.pw_root_tag) {475    return null;476  }477  try {478    const rootHex = await decrypt(479      derivedKeyBytes,480      slotA.pw_root_nonce,481      slotA.pw_root_ciphertext,482      slotA.pw_root_tag,483      "pw_root_v1",484    );485    return unhex(rootHex);486  } catch {487    return null;488  }489}490491// AES-GCM-wrap rootKey under derivedKey for the pw_root_* fields. Returns the492// hex-encoded ciphertext/nonce/tag triple ready to embed in StoredVault.493async function wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(494  derivedKeyBytes: Uint8Array,495  rootKeyBytes: Uint8Array,496): Promise<{ pw_root_ciphertext: string; pw_root_nonce: string; pw_root_tag: string }> {497  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKeyBytes, hex(rootKeyBytes), "pw_root_v1");498  return {499    pw_root_ciphertext: ciphertext,500    pw_root_nonce: nonce,501    pw_root_tag: tag,502  };503}504505/**506 * For vaults created before v2.12 (no recovery_salt/recovery_wrapped_root_key),507 * generate the root key, wrap it under the recovery words, and persist the508 * recovery escrow into slot A. The caller must show the recovery words to the509 * user before calling this — once called, those words are the vault's recovery510 * path. This runs once, on the first unlock of an upgraded vault.511 */512export async function migrateToRecovery(): Promise<void> {513  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {514    throw new Error("vault must be unlocked in real mode");515  }516  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);517  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");518  const hasRecoveryEscrow =519    !!slotA.recovery_salt && !!slotA.recovery_wrapped_root_key;520  const hasPwRoot = !!slotA.pw_root_ciphertext && !!slotA.pw_root_nonce;521  if (hasRecoveryEscrow && hasPwRoot) return; // already done522523  // If recovery escrow already exists but pw_root doesn't, we cannot recover524  // the original rootKey without the user's words. The least-surprising path525  // is to rotate to a fresh root key — the user's old recovery words become526  // invalid but we surface peach_recovery_pending so the popup re-presents527  // the words. The unlock-path callers all set that flag.528  const { rawRootKey, recoverySalt, wrappedRootKey, wrappedNonce, wrappedTag } =529    await generateAndWrapRootKey();530  rootKey = unhex(rawRootKey);531532  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(derivedKey, rootKey);533  const nextSlotA: StoredVault = {534    ...slotA,535    recovery_salt: recoverySalt,536    recovery_wrapped_root_key: wrappedRootKey,537    recovery_nonce: wrappedNonce,538    recovery_tag: wrappedTag,539    ...pwRoot,540  };541  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, nextSlotA);542  await stampLocalVaultMutation();543}544545/**546 * Returns the 12 recovery words for the current session's root key.547 * Must be called while the vault is unlocked. Throws if recovery has not548 * been set up (pre-v2.12 vault that hasn't migrated yet).549 */550export async function getRecoveryWords(): Promise<string[]> {551  if (!rootKey) {552    throw new Error("recovery not set up — vault may need migration");553  }554  return rootKeyToWords(rootKey);555}556557async function loadSlot(key: string): Promise<StoredVault | null> {558  const result = await chrome.storage.local.get(key);559  return (result as Record<string, StoredVault | undefined>)[key] ?? null;560}561562async function writeSlot(key: string, vault: StoredVault): Promise<void> {563  try {564    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [key]: vault });565  } catch (err) {566    throw mapStorageError(err);567  }568}569570// Monotonic clock for per-entry modifiedAt / deletedAt timestamps. Guards the571// sync layer's last-write-wins merge against wall-clock regressions (NTP step,572// manual clock change, DST glitch): a backwards Date.now() must never produce573// an entry timestamp that's <= the entry's existing modifiedAt, or a genuine574// local edit would lose to a stale remote copy. The returned value is always575// strictly greater than both the entry's current modifiedAt and the previous576// call's result (SEV-2-E).577let lastEntryTimestamp = 0;578function monotonicEntryTimestamp(currentModifiedAt?: number): number {579  const base = Math.max(580    Date.now(),581    (currentModifiedAt ?? 0) + 1,582    lastEntryTimestamp + 1,583  );584  lastEntryTimestamp = base;585  return base;586}587588async function stampLocalVaultMutation(): Promise<void> {589  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get("peach_last_modified_at");590  const previous = Number(591    (raw as Record<string, unknown>).peach_last_modified_at,592  );593  const next = Math.max(594    Date.now(),595    Number.isFinite(previous) ? previous + 1 : 0,596  );597  await chrome.storage.local.set({598    peach_last_modified_at: String(next),599  });600}601602/**603 * One-shot migration from the pre-A-2 schema (peach_vault + peach_decoy_vault604 * + peach_duress flag) to the slot-neutral schema (peach_vault_a +605 * peach_vault_b). Runs at most once per session; safe to call repeatedly.606 */607async function ensureMigrated(): Promise<void> {608  if (migrationRan) return;609  migrationRan = true;610611  const keys = [LEGACY_MAIN, LEGACY_DECOY, LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG, SLOT_A, SLOT_B];612  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get(keys);613  const slotAExists = raw[SLOT_A] !== undefined;614  const slotBExists = raw[SLOT_B] !== undefined;615  const legacyMain = raw[LEGACY_MAIN] as StoredVault | undefined;616  const legacyDecoy = raw[LEGACY_DECOY] as StoredVault | undefined;617618  // Fresh install with nothing in storage — nothing to do; createVault() sets up both slots.619  if (!slotAExists && !legacyMain) return;620621  // Already migrated.622  if (slotAExists && slotBExists && !legacyMain && !legacyDecoy) return;623624  let didMigrate = false;625  if (legacyMain && !slotAExists) {626    await writeSlot(SLOT_A, legacyMain);627    didMigrate = true;628  }629630  // If slot B isn't set, populate it: use legacy decoy when present, else noise.631  if (!slotBExists) {632    const target = (legacyMain ?? raw[SLOT_A]) as StoredVault | undefined;633    if (legacyDecoy) {634      await writeSlot(SLOT_B, legacyDecoy);635      didMigrate = true;636    } else if (target) {637      await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(target.ciphertext.length / 2));638      didMigrate = true;639    }640  }641642  const toRemove: string[] = [];643  if (legacyMain) toRemove.push(LEGACY_MAIN);644  if (legacyDecoy) toRemove.push(LEGACY_DECOY);645  if (raw[LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG] !== undefined) toRemove.push(LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG);646  if (toRemove.length > 0) {647    await chrome.storage.local.remove(toRemove);648    didMigrate = true;649  }650  if (didMigrate) {651    await stampLocalVaultMutation();652  }653}654655// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------656// Padding + noise helpers657// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------658659/**660 * Pads the plaintext string with trailing spaces so that the encoded byte661 * length is a multiple of PAD_BLOCK. JSON.parse tolerates trailing662 * whitespace after a complete document, so the padding is transparent on663 * decode. Ciphertext length equals plaintext length plus a 16-byte tag.664 */665function padPlaintext(json: string, minBytes = 0): string {666  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(json);667  const bucket = Math.max(PAD_BLOCK, Math.ceil(encoded.length / PAD_BLOCK) * PAD_BLOCK);668  // minBytes lets the duress path force a fixed ceiling so both slots match.669  const target = Math.max(bucket, minBytes);670  const padLen = target - encoded.length;671  return json + " ".repeat(padLen);672}673674/**675 * Produces a StoredVault-shaped record filled with CSPRNG bytes. The676 * ciphertext length matches the given byte count. Because GCM ciphertext is677 * pseudo-random, this blob is indistinguishable at rest from a real678 * encrypted vault without the key.679 *680 * crypto.getRandomValues() caps each call at 65536 bytes (the Web Crypto681 * spec hard limit). Chunk the fill so vaults larger than that — common once682 * the user has dozens of entries or any passkey — don't throw.683 */684const CSPRNG_CHUNK = 65_536;685686function fillRandom(buf: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {687  for (let offset = 0; offset < buf.length; offset += CSPRNG_CHUNK) {688    const end = Math.min(offset + CSPRNG_CHUNK, buf.length);689    const chunk = new Uint8Array(end - offset);690    crypto.getRandomValues(chunk);691    buf.set(chunk, offset);692  }693  return buf;694}695696function generateNoiseBlob(ciphertextBytes: number): StoredVault {697  const salt = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));698  const nonce = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));699  const cipher = fillRandom(new Uint8Array(ciphertextBytes));700  const tag = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));701  return {702    version: 1,703    salt: hex(salt),704    nonce: hex(nonce),705    ciphertext: hex(cipher),706    tag: hex(tag),707  };708}709710// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------711// Encrypted plaintext envelope712// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------713714type VaultPayload = {715  entries: VaultEntry[];716  duressConfigured?: boolean;717};718719type DecryptedPayload = {720  entries: VaultEntry[];721  duressConfigured: boolean;722  /**723   * True when at least one entry in the on-disk payload had a legacy shape724   * (pre-v2.11.0 passkey type/flat fields, or pre-A-2 created/updated keys)725   * and got rewritten by normalizeEntry. The unlock path uses this to726   * persist the new shape immediately — without it, the migration would727   * re-run on every unlock and old shape never disappears from disk.728   */729  migratedFromLegacy: boolean;730};731732function encodePayload(entries: VaultEntry[], duress: boolean, minBytes = 0): string {733  const envelope: VaultPayload = { entries, duressConfigured: duress };734  return padPlaintext(JSON.stringify(envelope), minBytes);735}736737function rawNeedsMigration(raw: VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry): boolean {738  if ("created" in raw || "updated" in raw) return true;739  const flat = raw as Partial<VaultEntry>;740  if (flat.type === "passkey") return true;741  // Flat rpId without a passkey sub-object means pre-v2.11.0 schema.742  if (flat.rpId !== undefined && flat.passkey === undefined) return true;743  return false;744}745746function decodePayload(plain: string): DecryptedPayload {747  const parsed = JSON.parse(plain) as748    | Array<VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry>749    | VaultPayload;750751  const rawEntries = Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed : parsed.entries ?? [];752  const flatMigrationNeeded = rawEntries.some(rawNeedsMigration);753754  const normalized = rawEntries.map(normalizeEntry);755  const { merged } = mergePasskeyOnlyIntoLogins(normalized);756757  if (Array.isArray(parsed)) {758    return {759      entries: normalized,760      duressConfigured: false,761      migratedFromLegacy: true, // pre-A-2 array shape always needs save762    };763  }764765  return {766    entries: normalized,767    duressConfigured: parsed.duressConfigured === true,768    migratedFromLegacy: flatMigrationNeeded || merged,769  };770}771772/**773 * One-time consolidation pass run alongside the legacy passkey migration.774 *775 * Pre-v2.11.0 the Chrome passkey path always created a fresh `type:"passkey"`776 * entry per registration — so users who tested registration multiple times777 * accumulated several passkey-bearing entries for the same RP, and the778 * migration to the unified shape carried that duplication forward. This779 * pass collapses the duplicates:780 *781 *   1. Group passkey-bearing (and not deleted) entries by `passkey.rpId`.782 *   2. Within each group, the most recently-active credential wins (prefer783 *      lastUsedAt, fall back to passkey.createdAt, fall back to modifiedAt).784 *   3. If a NON-passkey login entry exists for that RP (matched by url or785 *      additionalUrls hostname), attach the winning passkey to it and786 *      soft-delete every passkey-bearing entry in the group.787 *   4. Otherwise, soft-delete every loser in the group, keeping the winner788 *      as a passkey-only entry.789 *790 * Soft delete (deletedAt) rather than splice — the trash flow keeps the791 * record around for retention and the user can restore if the heuristic792 * picked wrong. The `merged` flag goes back to decodePayload so the793 * unlock path persists the consolidated shape immediately.794 */795function mergePasskeyOnlyIntoLogins(entries: VaultEntry[]): { merged: boolean } {796  let merged = false;797  const now = Date.now();798799  const candidates = entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt && e.passkey);800  const byRpId = new Map<string, VaultEntry[]>();801  for (const e of candidates) {802    const rpId = e.passkey!.rpId;803    const list = byRpId.get(rpId);804    if (list) list.push(e);805    else byRpId.set(rpId, [e]);806  }807808  for (const [rpId, group] of byRpId) {809    if (group.length === 0) continue;810    group.sort((a, b) => {811      const aT =812        a.passkey!.lastUsedAt ?? a.passkey!.createdAt ?? a.modifiedAt ?? a.createdAt;813      const bT =814        b.passkey!.lastUsedAt ?? b.passkey!.createdAt ?? b.modifiedAt ?? b.createdAt;815      return bT - aT;816    });817    const winner = group[0]!;818819    // Look for a NON-passkey login entry matching this RP. Use the URL820    // hostname rather than a substring search so a "login.foo.com" entry821    // doesn't accidentally absorb a passkey for "foo.com".822    const loginTarget = entries.find((e) => {823      if (e.deletedAt || e.passkey || e.type !== "login") return false;824      if (e.url && extractDomain(e.url) === rpId) return true;825      for (const extra of e.additionalUrls ?? []) {826        if (extractDomain(extra) === rpId) return true;827      }828      return false;829    });830831    if (loginTarget) {832      loginTarget.passkey = winner.passkey;833      loginTarget.modifiedAt = now;834      for (const dup of group) {835        if (!dup.deletedAt) {836          dup.deletedAt = now;837          dup.modifiedAt = now;838        }839      }840      merged = true;841    } else if (group.length > 1) {842      for (let i = 1; i < group.length; i += 1) {843        const dup = group[i]!;844        if (!dup.deletedAt) {845          dup.deletedAt = now;846          dup.modifiedAt = now;847        }848      }849      merged = true;850    }851  }852853  return { merged };854}855856// Validates that a `StoredVault` record on disk has the field shape we expect857// before treating an AES-GCM decrypt success as a clean unlock. AES-GCM only858// authenticates the static VERSION_BYTE AAD, not the `version` field on the859// outer record — a corrupted `version: 42` slot still decrypts cleanly. This860// check surfaces that as `corrupted` (M7/COR-007) so the popup can offer a861// history-restore path instead of falsely reporting "wrong password".862function hasValidVaultSchema(v: unknown): v is StoredVault {863  if (typeof v !== "object" || v === null) return false;864  const r = v as Record<string, unknown>;865  return (866    r.version === 1 &&867    typeof r.salt === "string" &&868    typeof r.nonce === "string" &&869    typeof r.ciphertext === "string" &&870    typeof r.tag === "string"871  );872}873874export type TryDecryptResult =875  | { status: "ok"; payload: DecryptedPayload }876  | { status: "wrong_key" }877  | { status: "corrupted"; reason: string };878879// Exported solely for `unlockFromCodex` below, which needs to verify a880// supplied passphrase against a slotA blob *without* committing anything to881// storage. Keep this internal otherwise — callers crossing the messages.ts882// boundary should always go through `unlock` / `verifyMainPassword` so the883// constant-time invariants in Projects.md §3.4 are not bypassed.884export async function tryDecryptSlot(885  vault: StoredVault,886  key: Uint8Array,887  aadTag?: string,888): Promise<DecryptedPayload | null> {889  const res = await tryDecryptSlotResult(vault, key, aadTag);890  return res.status === "ok" ? res.payload : null;891}892893export async function tryDecryptSlotResult(894  vault: StoredVault,895  key: Uint8Array,896  aadTag?: string,897): Promise<TryDecryptResult> {898  if (!hasValidVaultSchema(vault)) {899    return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_slot_schema" };900  }901  let plain: string;902  try {903    plain = await decrypt(key, vault.nonce, vault.ciphertext, vault.tag, aadTag);904  } catch {905    return { status: "wrong_key" };906  }907  try {908    const parsed = JSON.parse(plain) as unknown;909    if (typeof parsed !== "object" || parsed === null) {910      return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_payload_shape" };911    }912    if (!Array.isArray(parsed) && !Array.isArray((parsed as VaultPayload).entries)) {913      return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_payload_shape" };914    }915    return { status: "ok", payload: decodePayload(plain) };916  } catch {917    return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_payload_json" };918  }919}920921// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------922// Core operations923// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------924925function buildDomainIndexSync(all: VaultEntry[]): void {926  domainIndex = new Map();927928  for (const entry of all) {929    if (entry.deletedAt) continue;930    if (entry.type === "note" || entry.type === "card") continue;931932    // An entry can match multiple sites via `additionalUrls`. Index each933    // hostname so `queryDomain` returns the entry regardless of which alias934    // the user is currently visiting. Dedupe per-entry so a single entry935    // never appears twice in one bucket.936    const domains = new Set<string>();937    const primary = extractDomain(entry.url ?? "");938    if (primary) domains.add(primary);939    for (const extra of entry.additionalUrls ?? []) {940      const d = extractDomain(extra);941      if (d) domains.add(d);942    }943    if (domains.size === 0) continue;944945    for (const domain of domains) {946      const bucket = domainIndex.get(domain) ?? [];947      bucket.push(entry);948      domainIndex.set(domain, bucket);949    }950  }951}952953export async function createVault(password: string): Promise<void> {954  await ensureMigrated();955956  const salt = generateSalt();957  derivedKey = await deriveKey(password, salt);958  entries = [];959  vaultMode = "real";960  duressConfigured = false;961  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);962963  // Generate and wrap the root key for recovery word escrow.964  const { rawRootKey, recoverySalt, wrappedRootKey, wrappedNonce, wrappedTag } =965    await generateAndWrapRootKey();966  rootKey = unhex(rawRootKey);967968  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured, duressConfigured ? DURESS_SLOT_SIZE : 0);969  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");970971  // Second wrapping of rootKey under derivedKey so future unlocks can rehydrate972  // it without recovery words (H2/COR-006).973  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(derivedKey, rootKey);974975  const slotA: StoredVault = {976    version: 1,977    salt: hex(salt),978    nonce,979    ciphertext,980    tag,981    recovery_salt: recoverySalt,982    recovery_wrapped_root_key: wrappedRootKey,983    recovery_nonce: wrappedNonce,984    recovery_tag: wrappedTag,985    ...pwRoot,986  };987  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, slotA);988989  // Matching-size noise blob for slot B, so a fresh install shows two990  // similarly-shaped records regardless of whether duress is ever set up.991  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2));992  await stampLocalVaultMutation();993994  touchAutoLock();995}996997export async function hasVault(): Promise<boolean> {998  await ensureMigrated();999  return (await loadSlot(SLOT_A)) !== null;1000}10011002/**1003 * Returns whether the real vault has recorded that a duress passphrase is1004 * configured. Reliable only after a real-mode unlock — before unlock or in1005 * decoy mode, returns false because we cannot read slot A's plaintext.1006 */1007export async function isDuressEnabled(): Promise<boolean> {1008  return vaultMode === "real" && duressConfigured;1009}10101011export async function setupDuress(duressPassword: string): Promise<void> {1012  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {1013    throw new Error("vault must be unlocked in real mode");1014  }1015  await ensureMigrated();10161017  // Encrypt the decoy payload (empty entries) under the duress key. Pad to1018  // at least the current slot A ciphertext size so the two slots look the1019  // same at rest at setup time.1020  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1021  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");10221023  const decoySalt = generateSalt();1024  const decoyKey = await deriveKey(duressPassword, decoySalt);1025  try {1026    // Pad the decoy to the fixed duress ceiling. Slot A is re-encrypted to the1027    // same ceiling by the persistSlotA() call below (duressConfigured is now1028    // true), so both slots are exactly DURESS_SLOT_SIZE+tag at rest and their1029    // lengths cannot reveal that duress is configured (audit MEDIUM).1030    const plaintext = encodePayload([], false, DURESS_SLOT_SIZE);1031    const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(decoyKey, plaintext, "slot_b_v1");1032    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, {1033      version: 1,1034      salt: hex(decoySalt),1035      nonce,1036      ciphertext,1037      tag,1038    });1039  } finally {1040    zeroKey(decoyKey);1041  }10421043  // Re-encrypt slot A with the duressConfigured flag set to true. No external1044  // flag is written — the bit lives inside the encrypted envelope.1045  duressConfigured = true;1046  await persistSlotA();1047}10481049export async function disableDuress(): Promise<void> {1050  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {1051    throw new Error("vault must be unlocked in real mode");1052  }1053  await ensureMigrated();10541055  // Overwrite slot B with fresh noise that matches slot A's size. The slot1056  // remains occupied so its mere existence does not signal that duress was1057  // ever configured.1058  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1059  if (slotA) {1060    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(slotA.ciphertext.length / 2));1061  }10621063  duressConfigured = false;1064  await persistSlotA();1065}10661067// L14/COR-015: this function intentionally checks slot A (real vault) only.1068// A duress-mode user attempting changePassword is rejected earlier by the1069// vaultMode === 'decoy' check at changePassword. The real-vs-decoy1070// distinction here is by design — duress users cannot rotate the real1071// password by guessing it, and the asymmetry in error timing is acceptable1072// because duress mode is opt-in and the user knows their own decoy key.1073export async function verifyMainPassword(password: string): Promise<boolean> {1074  await ensureMigrated();1075  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1076  if (!slotA) return false;1077  const key = await deriveKey(password, unhex(slotA.salt));1078  try {1079    return (await tryDecryptSlot(slotA, key, "slot_a_v1")) !== null;1080  } finally {1081    zeroKey(key);1082  }1083}10841085export async function unlock(password: string): Promise<boolean> {1086  // LV-1: the normal path NFC-normalizes inside deriveKey. If that fails and1087  // the supplied password is not already in NFC form, the vault may have been1088  // sealed (pre-LV-1) with the raw, un-normalized bytes — retry with those.1089  if (await attemptUnlockWithDerive(password, deriveKey)) return true;10901091  const nfc = password.normalize("NFC");1092  if (password === nfc) return false; // ASCII/NFC password — no legacy form to try10931094  if (await attemptUnlockWithDerive(password, deriveKeyRaw)) {1095    // Heal: re-seal the real slot under the NFC-normalized key so every1096    // future unlock takes the normal path. Only the real vault is re-sealed;1097    // a non-NFC duress password keeps working through this fallback.1098    if (vaultMode === "real") {1099      try {1100        const newSalt = generateSalt();1101        const newKey = await deriveKey(password, newSalt);1102        await changePasswordWithNewKey(newSalt, newKey);1103      } catch (healErr) {1104        console.warn("[Peach] LV-1 NFC heal failed:", healErr);1105      }1106    }1107    return true;1108  }1109  return false;1110}11111112async function attemptUnlockWithDerive(1113  password: string,1114  derive: typeof deriveKey,1115): Promise<boolean> {1116  await ensureMigrated();11171118  // Load both slots in parallel. Both always exist post-migration; the1119  // parallel load and the parallel derivation below keep wall-clock time1120  // constant regardless of which slot's passphrase (real or decoy) the1121  // caller supplied, so a timing side channel cannot distinguish the1122  // duress path from the real-unlock path (DUR-002).1123  const [slotA, slotB] = await Promise.all([1124    loadSlot(SLOT_A),1125    loadSlot(SLOT_B),1126  ]);11271128  // Derive both keys in parallel, unconditionally.1129  const [keyA, keyB] = await Promise.all([1130    slotA ? derive(password, unhex(slotA.salt)) : Promise.resolve(null),1131    slotB ? derive(password, unhex(slotB.salt)) : Promise.resolve(null),1132  ]);11331134  // Attempt both decrypts in parallel. The Result variant lets us distinguish1135  // 'wrong_key' from 'corrupted' so callers can offer a history-restore path1136  // when a slot's schema is invalid even though AES-GCM authenticated (M7).1137  const [resultA, resultB] = await Promise.all([1138    keyA && slotA1139      ? tryDecryptSlotResult(slotA, keyA, "slot_a_v1")1140      : Promise.resolve({ status: "wrong_key" } as TryDecryptResult),1141    keyB && slotB1142      ? tryDecryptSlotResult(slotB, keyB, "slot_b_v1")1143      : Promise.resolve({ status: "wrong_key" } as TryDecryptResult),1144  ]);1145  const payloadA = resultA.status === "ok" ? resultA.payload : null;1146  const payloadB = resultB.status === "ok" ? resultB.payload : null;11471148  if (payloadA && keyA) {1149    derivedKey = keyA;1150    void saveSessionKey(keyA, "real");1151    vaultMode = "real";1152    entries = payloadA.entries;1153    duressConfigured = payloadA.duressConfigured;1154    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1155    await loadSettings();1156    touchAutoLock();1157    if (keyB) zeroKey(keyB);11581159    // slotA is non-null when payloadA is truthy (keyA was derived from slotA).1160    if (slotA) {1161      const needsRecoverySetup =1162        !slotA.recovery_salt || !slotA.recovery_wrapped_root_key;1163      if (!needsRecoverySetup) {1164        rootKey = await deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(keyA, slotA);1165      }1166      // Pre-v2.12 vault, or a vault whose pw_root_* fields haven't been written1167      // yet: generate the recovery escrow and seed pw_root_* so subsequent1168      // unlocks can rehydrate rootKey without the user's recovery words.1169      // Best-effort — a failure here must not block unlock.1170      if (needsRecoverySetup || !rootKey) {1171        try {1172          await migrateToRecovery();1173          if (needsRecoverySetup) {1174            // String "1" matches the popup's existing peach_recovery_pending1175            // check; surfaced so the user re-confirms recovery words after a1176            // legacy-vault unlock (H2/COR-006).1177            await chrome.storage.local.set({ peach_recovery_pending: '1' });1178          }1179        } catch (migrationErr) {1180          console.warn('[Peach] recovery migration failed:', migrationErr);1181        }1182      }1183    }11841185    // If the payload had a pre-v2.11.0 shape (legacy passkey type, flat1186    // passkey fields, or pre-A-2 created/updated keys), rewrite it now so1187    // the next save uses the new format and migration doesn't re-run forever.1188    if (payloadA.migratedFromLegacy) {1189      await persistSlotA();1190    }1191    return true;1192  }11931194  if (payloadB && keyB) {1195    derivedKey = keyB;1196    void saveSessionKey(keyB, "decoy");1197    vaultMode = "decoy";1198    entries = payloadB.entries;1199    duressConfigured = false;1200    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1201    await loadSettings();1202    touchAutoLock();1203    if (keyA) zeroKey(keyA);1204    return true;1205  }12061207  if (keyA) zeroKey(keyA);1208  if (keyB) zeroKey(keyB);1209  // Surface corruption (good AES tag, broken schema) distinctly from1210  // wrong-password so the popup can offer history-restore (M7/COR-007).1211  if (resultA.status === "corrupted") {1212    lastUnlockFailureReason = resultA.reason;1213  } else if (resultB.status === "corrupted") {1214    lastUnlockFailureReason = resultB.reason;1215  }1216  return false;1217}12181219// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------1220// MV3 service worker session key — survives SW restarts within a browser session1221// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------12221223// chrome.storage.session is cleared on browser close; survives SW restart.1224// Firefox does not implement it (persistent background script, no restart risk).1225const SESSION_KEY_STORAGE = "peach_session_dk";12261227async function saveSessionKey(key: Uint8Array, mode: "real" | "decoy"): Promise<void> {1228  if (!chrome.storage.session) return;1229  await chrome.storage.session.set({ [SESSION_KEY_STORAGE]: { keyHex: hex(key), mode } });1230}12311232async function clearSessionKey(): Promise<void> {1233  if (!chrome.storage.session) return;1234  await chrome.storage.session.remove(SESSION_KEY_STORAGE);1235}12361237/**1238 * On SW restart, re-derive all in-memory vault state from the session key1239 * stored in chrome.storage.session (set at unlock time, cleared on lock).1240 * Returns true if the vault was restored, false if no session key was found.1241 * No-ops if the vault is already unlocked.1242 */1243export async function restoreFromSession(): Promise<boolean> {1244  if (derivedKey !== null) return true;1245  if (!chrome.storage.session) return false;1246  const stored = await chrome.storage.session.get(SESSION_KEY_STORAGE);1247  const entry = stored[SESSION_KEY_STORAGE] as { keyHex: string; mode: "real" | "decoy" } | undefined;1248  if (!entry?.keyHex) return false;12491250  const key = unhex(entry.keyHex);1251  const slotKey = entry.mode === "real" ? SLOT_A : SLOT_B;1252  const aadTag = entry.mode === "real" ? "slot_a_v1" : "slot_b_v1";1253  const slot = await loadSlot(slotKey);1254  if (!slot) { await clearSessionKey(); return false; }12551256  const result = await tryDecryptSlotResult(slot, key, aadTag);1257  if (result.status !== "ok") { await clearSessionKey(); return false; }12581259  derivedKey = key;1260  vaultMode = entry.mode;1261  entries = result.payload.entries;1262  duressConfigured = entry.mode === "real" ? result.payload.duressConfigured : false;1263  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1264  await loadSettings();1265  touchAutoLock();12661267  if (entry.mode === "real" && slot.recovery_salt && slot.recovery_wrapped_root_key) {1268    try { rootKey = await deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(key, slot); } catch { /* non-fatal */ }1269  }12701271  return true;1272}12731274export function lock(): void {1275  void clearSessionKey();1276  if (derivedKey) {1277    zeroKey(derivedKey);1278    derivedKey = null;1279  }1280  if (rootKey) {1281    rootKey.fill(0);1282    rootKey = null;1283  }12841285  entries = [];1286  domainIndex = new Map();1287  vaultMode = "real";1288  duressConfigured = false;1289  clearAutoLock();1290}12911292export function isUnlocked(): boolean {1293  return derivedKey !== null;1294}12951296// Opens the vault using a pre-derived AES-256 key (skipping Argon2id).1297// Used by Android biometric unlock — the key was derived on the native side.1298export async function unlockWithKey(1299  masterKeyHex: string,1300): Promise<{ ok: true; entries: VaultEntry[] } | { ok: false; error: string }> {1301  try {1302    const masterKeyBytes = unhex(masterKeyHex);1303    const stored = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1304    if (!stored) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };1305    const payload = await tryDecryptSlot(stored, masterKeyBytes, "slot_a_v1");1306    if (!payload) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };13071308    derivedKey = masterKeyBytes;1309    vaultMode = "real";1310    entries = payload.entries;1311    duressConfigured = payload.duressConfigured;1312    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1313    await loadSettings();1314    touchAutoLock();1315    return { ok: true, entries };1316  } catch {1317    return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };1318  }1319}13201321/**1322 * Restore the vault from a parsed Peach Codex payload.1323 *1324 * The supplied passphrase is verified against the Codex's slotA *before* any1325 * storage mutation — wrong passphrases return without touching disk. On1326 * success, the current vault state is snapshotted (reason: "restore") so the1327 * user can revert via Settings -> Vault History, then slotA/slotB are written1328 * and `peach_last_modified_at` is set to the Codex's recorded timestamp. A1329 * regular `unlock()` follows so the rest of the SW sees the standard1330 * post-unlock state.1331 *1332 * Intentionally non-Pro-gated — see peach_codex_v2.md "Pro gating". A Codex1333 * printed by a Pro user must always be restorable, even on a free device.1334 *1335 * Timing is not held constant here (in contrast to `unlock`): the Codex flow1336 * is an explicit user action with a known passphrase, not a passive lock1337 * screen, so the duress-vs-real timing side channel does not apply.1338 */1339export async function unlockFromCodex(params: {1340  slotA: string; // JSON string of StoredVault for slot A1341  slotB: string | null; // JSON string of StoredVault for slot B, or null1342  timestamp: number;1343  masterPassphrase: string;1344}): Promise<1345  | { ok: true; entryCount: number }1346  | { ok: false; reason: "wrong_passphrase" | "invalid_slot_format" }1347> {1348  let parsedSlotA: StoredVault;1349  let parsedSlotB: StoredVault | null = null;1350  try {1351    const rawA = JSON.parse(params.slotA) as unknown;1352    if (!hasValidVaultSchema(rawA)) {1353      return { ok: false, reason: "invalid_slot_format" };1354    }1355    parsedSlotA = rawA;1356    if (params.slotB !== null) {1357      const rawB = JSON.parse(params.slotB) as unknown;1358      if (!hasValidVaultSchema(rawB)) {1359        return { ok: false, reason: "invalid_slot_format" };1360      }1361      parsedSlotB = rawB;1362    }1363  } catch {1364    return { ok: false, reason: "invalid_slot_format" };1365  }13661367  // Verify the passphrase against the supplied slotA WITHOUT writing anything.1368  // If this fails the on-disk vault is left completely untouched.1369  const trialKey = await deriveKey(params.masterPassphrase, unhex(parsedSlotA.salt));1370  const trialPayload = await tryDecryptSlot(parsedSlotA, trialKey, "slot_a_v1");1371  if (!trialPayload) {1372    zeroKey(trialKey);1373    return { ok: false, reason: "wrong_passphrase" };1374  }1375  // Drop the trial key; `unlock()` below derives its own copy. Holding two1376  // copies of the master key in memory at once would be a needless surface.1377  zeroKey(trialKey);13781379  // Snapshot the about-to-be-overwritten on-disk state so the user can revert1380  // a mistaken Codex restore via the Vault History UI. Non-fatal if it fails.1381  await takeVaultSnapshot("restore");13821383  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, parsedSlotA);1384  if (parsedSlotB) {1385    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, parsedSlotB);1386  } else {1387    // Slot B must always exist with ciphertext length matching slot A1388    // (Projects.md §3.2). Codex prints may omit slot B (duress wasn't1389    // configured); regenerate noise to satisfy the invariant.1390    await writeSlot(1391      SLOT_B,1392      generateNoiseBlob(parsedSlotA.ciphertext.length / 2),1393    );1394  }1395  await chrome.storage.local.set({1396    peach_last_modified_at: String(params.timestamp),1397  });13981399  // Standard unlock path so domain index, settings, auto-lock, and1400  // recovery-key state all populate exactly as a normal unlock would.1401  const ok = await unlock(params.masterPassphrase);1402  if (!ok) {1403    // Should be unreachable — we just verified the passphrase against the1404    // same slotA we wrote. Treat as wrong_passphrase to keep the contract1405    // simple if some race or storage anomaly intrudes.1406    return { ok: false, reason: "wrong_passphrase" };1407  }1408  return { ok: true, entryCount: getEntries().length };1409}14101411// Returns the current in-memory derived key as a hex string.1412// Used by the biometric enable flow in Settings to store the key in Android Keystore.1413export function getDerivedKeyHex(): string {1414  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_not_unlocked");1415  return hex(derivedKey);1416}14171418/**1419 * Returns the vault's stable root key as hex, or null when locked / not yet1420 * populated. The root key is random per-vault, generated at creation, escrowed1421 * under the recovery words, and re-wrapped (not regenerated) on every password1422 * change — so it is INVARIANT across password rotation, unlike getDerivedKeyHex.1423 *1424 * This is the correct input for sync identity derivation (vault_id, the Noise1425 * XX static key, the Ed25519 manifest signing key, and per-entry envelope1426 * keys): paired devices keep the same identity and can still decrypt each1427 * other's entries after either side rotates its master password (SEV-2-B).1428 *1429 * Returns null rather than throwing so sync callers degrade to VAULT_LOCKED1430 * instead of crashing; rootKey is populated on every real-mode unlock via1431 * deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey / migrateToRecovery.1432 */1433export function getRootKeyHex(): string | null {1434  return rootKey ? hex(rootKey) : null;1435}14361437export function getEntries(): VaultEntry[] {1438  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1439  return entries.filter((entry) => !entry.deletedAt);1440}14411442const EMAIL_RE = /^[^\s@]+@[^\s@]+\.[^\s@]+$/;14431444export function getIdentities(): SavedIdentity[] {1445  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1446  const active = entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt && e.type === "login");14471448  const emailMap = new Map<string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }>();1449  const usernameMap = new Map<string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }>();14501451  for (const entry of active) {1452    const domain = extractDomain(entry.url ?? "") ?? "";1453    const modifiedAt = entry.modifiedAt ?? entry.createdAt ?? 0;14541455    function tally(map: Map<string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }>, v: string) {1456      const existing = map.get(v);1457      if (!existing || modifiedAt > existing.lastUsed) {1458        map.set(v, { lastUsed: modifiedAt, count: (existing?.count ?? 0) + 1, domain });1459      } else {1460        map.set(v, { ...existing, count: existing.count + 1 });1461      }1462    }14631464    const uVal = entry.username?.trim();1465    if (uVal) tally(EMAIL_RE.test(uVal) ? emailMap : usernameMap, uVal);14661467    // Also count the dedicated email field — entries created via the inline1468    // popup new-entry form store email here rather than in username.1469    const eVal = entry.email?.trim();1470    if (eVal) tally(emailMap, eVal);1471  }14721473  const toIdentity = (type: "email" | "username") =>1474    ([value, d]: [string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }]): SavedIdentity => ({1475      value, type, lastUsed: d.lastUsed, useCount: d.count, exampleDomain: d.domain || undefined,1476    });14771478  return [1479    ...[...emailMap.entries()].map(toIdentity("email")).sort((a, b) => b.useCount - a.useCount),1480    ...[...usernameMap.entries()].map(toIdentity("username")).sort((a, b) => b.useCount - a.useCount),1481  ];1482}14831484export async function batchAddEntries(drafts: EntryDraft[]): Promise<VaultEntry[]> {1485  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");14861487  const now = Date.now();1488  const added: VaultEntry[] = [];1489  for (const draft of drafts) {1490    try {1491      const sanitized = sanitizeEntryDraft(draft);1492      const nextEntry: VaultEntry = {1493        ...sanitized,1494        id: crypto.randomUUID(),1495        createdAt: now,1496        modifiedAt: monotonicEntryTimestamp(),1497      };1498      entries.push(nextEntry);1499      added.push(nextEntry);1500    } catch {1501      // Skip invalid drafts silently — caller can see diff between input and output length1502    }1503  }15041505  if (added.length > 0) {1506    await persistEntries();1507  }15081509  return added;1510}15111512/**1513 * Restore a set of entries in full fidelity — preserves id, createdAt,1514 * modifiedAt, and every other field unlike `batchAddEntries` which1515 * assigns fresh identity. Used by restore paths where the backup is the1516 * authoritative source of truth. `mode` controls how entries already in1517 * the vault are treated.1518 */1519export async function restoreEntries(1520  incoming: VaultEntry[],1521  mode: "replace" | "merge"1522): Promise<{ added: number; updated: number; skipped: number }> {1523  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");15241525  // A replace with zero incoming entries is almost certainly a caller bug1526  // (e.g. an import that silently dropped everything). Refuse rather than1527  // wipe the vault.1528  if (mode === "replace" && incoming.length === 0) {1529    throw new Error("refuse to replace with empty entry set");1530  }15311532  let added = 0;1533  let updated = 0;1534  let skipped = 0;15351536  if (mode === "replace") {1537    entries = [];1538    for (const entry of incoming) {1539      const normalized = sanitizeRestoredEntry(entry);1540      if (!normalized) {1541        skipped += 1;1542        continue;1543      }1544      entries.push(normalized);1545      added += 1;1546    }1547  } else {1548    const byId = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();1549    for (const e of entries) byId.set(e.id, e);15501551    for (const entry of incoming) {1552      const normalized = sanitizeRestoredEntry(entry);1553      if (!normalized) {1554        skipped += 1;1555        continue;1556      }1557      const existing = byId.get(normalized.id);1558      if (!existing) {1559        entries.push(normalized);1560        added += 1;1561      } else if (normalized.modifiedAt > existing.modifiedAt) {1562        const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === existing.id);1563        if (idx !== -1) {1564          entries[idx] = normalized;1565          updated += 1;1566        }1567      } else {1568        skipped += 1;1569      }1570    }1571  }15721573  await persistEntries("import");1574  return { added, updated, skipped };1575}15761577/**1578 * Validate + normalise a VaultEntry coming from a backup, import, or sync1579 * peer. MV-6: this is a strict field WHITELIST — `normalizeEntry` copies1580 * only known VaultEntry fields (unknown/attacker keys are dropped), and1581 * nested `passkey`/`canary` shapes are rebuilt field-by-field, never1582 * spread. Returns null for values the live vault shouldn't accept.1583 */1584function sanitizeRestoredEntry(entry: VaultEntry): VaultEntry | null {1585  if (!entry || typeof entry !== "object") return null;1586  const title = typeof entry.title === "string" ? entry.title.trim() : "";1587  if (!title) return null;1588  const id = typeof entry.id === "string" && entry.id ? entry.id : crypto.randomUUID();1589  const now = Date.now();1590  const createdAt = typeof entry.createdAt === "number" ? entry.createdAt : now;1591  const modifiedAt = typeof entry.modifiedAt === "number" ? entry.modifiedAt : createdAt;15921593  // normalizeEntry whitelists every known VaultEntry field and runs the1594  // same legacy-passkey migration as the on-disk read path — pre-v2.11.01595  // backups with flat passkey fields still import correctly because the1596  // legacy flat fields are themselves whitelisted VaultEntry members.1597  const normalized = normalizeEntry({1598    ...entry,1599    id,1600    title,1601    type: entry.type ?? "login",1602    createdAt,1603    modifiedAt,1604  });16051606  if (normalized.passkey) {1607    normalized.passkey = sanitizePasskey(normalized.passkey);1608  }1609  if (normalized.canary) {1610    normalized.canary = sanitizeCanary(normalized.canary);1611  }16121613  // Login entries from backup must carry a password (or be passkey-only,1614  // in which case the passkey sub-object replaces the password requirement).1615  if (1616    normalized.type === "login" &&1617    !normalized.passkey &&1618    typeof normalized.password !== "string"1619  ) {1620    return null;1621  }1622  if (entry.passkey && !normalized.passkey) {1623    // Entry claimed a passkey but the shape didn't validate — refuse the1624    // whole entry rather than silently importing a credential-less husk.1625    return null;1626  }16271628  return normalized;1629}16301631/**1632 * Rebuild a PasskeyData object from untrusted input, field by field.1633 * Returns undefined when required fields are missing/mistyped — a rogue1634 * passkey credential must not activate via import (MV-6 attack scenario).1635 */1636function sanitizePasskey(pk: unknown): PasskeyData | undefined {1637  if (!pk || typeof pk !== "object") return undefined;1638  const r = pk as Record<string, unknown>;1639  if (1640    typeof r.rpId !== "string" || !r.rpId ||1641    typeof r.credentialId !== "string" || !r.credentialId ||1642    typeof r.publicKeyCose !== "string" ||1643    typeof r.userHandle !== "string" ||1644    typeof r.userName !== "string"1645  ) {1646    return undefined;1647  }1648  return {1649    rpId: r.rpId,1650    rpName: typeof r.rpName === "string" ? r.rpName : r.rpId,1651    credentialId: r.credentialId,1652    publicKeyCose: r.publicKeyCose,1653    privateKeyJwk:1654      r.privateKeyJwk && typeof r.privateKeyJwk === "object"1655        ? (r.privateKeyJwk as JsonWebKey)1656        : undefined,1657    userHandle: r.userHandle,1658    userName: r.userName,1659    userDisplayName:1660      typeof r.userDisplayName === "string" ? r.userDisplayName : r.userName,1661    algorithm: r.algorithm === -8 ? -8 : -7,1662    signCount: typeof r.signCount === "number" ? r.signCount : 0,1663    aaguid: typeof r.aaguid === "string" ? r.aaguid : "",1664    backupEligible: r.backupEligible === true,1665    backupState: r.backupState === true,1666    lastUsedAt: typeof r.lastUsedAt === "number" ? r.lastUsedAt : undefined,1667    browser: r.browser === "chrome" || r.browser === "firefox" ? r.browser : undefined,1668    transports: Array.isArray(r.transports)1669      ? r.transports.filter((t): t is string => typeof t === "string")1670      : undefined,1671    createdAt: typeof r.createdAt === "number" ? r.createdAt : Date.now(),1672  };1673}16741675/**1676 * Rebuild a Canary object from untrusted input. The webhook must be a1677 * well-formed HTTPS URL — a poisoned canary.webhookUrl is a standing1678 * exfiltration endpoint that the canary subsystem will POST entry titles1679 * to (MV-6 attack scenario). Invalid → the canary is dropped, not the1680 * entry. FIRE_CANARY_PING re-validates with the full SSRF guard at fire1681 * time (isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl), so this import-time check is the1682 * outer of two gates.1683 */1684function sanitizeCanary(c: unknown): Canary | undefined {1685  if (!c || typeof c !== "object") return undefined;1686  const r = c as Record<string, unknown>;1687  if (typeof r.webhookUrl !== "string") return undefined;1688  let url: URL;1689  try {1690    url = new URL(r.webhookUrl);1691  } catch {1692    return undefined;1693  }1694  if (url.protocol !== "https:") return undefined;1695  return {1696    webhookUrl: url.toString(),1697    label: typeof r.label === "string" ? r.label : undefined,1698    lastPinged: typeof r.lastPinged === "number" ? r.lastPinged : undefined,1699    pingCount: typeof r.pingCount === "number" ? r.pingCount : undefined,1700  };1701}17021703// Soft-deletes every non-deleted entry in one call. The literal string1704// argument is a tripwire against accidental calls — any caller that would1705// wipe the vault has to consciously type "REPLACE_ALL". Do not relax this1706// to a boolean.1707export async function clearVaultEntries(1708  confirmation: "REPLACE_ALL"1709): Promise<void> {1710  if (confirmation !== "REPLACE_ALL") {1711    throw new Error("clearVaultEntries requires explicit confirmation");1712  }1713  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1714  for (const entry of entries) {1715    if (!entry.deletedAt) {1716      const stamp = monotonicEntryTimestamp(entry.modifiedAt);1717      entry.deletedAt = stamp;1718      entry.modifiedAt = stamp;1719    }1720  }1721  await persistEntries();1722}17231724export async function addEntry(entry: EntryDraft): Promise<VaultEntry> {1725  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");17261727  const sanitized = sanitizeEntryDraft(entry);1728  const now = Date.now();1729  const stamp = monotonicEntryTimestamp();1730  const nextEntry: VaultEntry = {1731    ...sanitized,1732    id: crypto.randomUUID(),1733    createdAt: now,1734    modifiedAt: stamp,1735    // Stamp passwordChangedAt at creation so age tracking is accurate from1736    // day one. Non-login entries carry the same stamp harmlessly.1737    passwordChangedAt: sanitized.password ? stamp : undefined,1738  };17391740  // Clone-and-replace so a failed persist rolls back the in-memory state1741  // (COR-008). Without this, a quota-full or storage error leaves the1742  // module-level `entries` ahead of what's actually on disk.1743  const rollback = entries;1744  entries = [...entries, nextEntry];1745  try {1746    await persistEntries();1747  } catch (err) {1748    entries = rollback;1749    throw err;1750  }17511752  // Fire-and-forget breach check (only for login entries if breach monitoring is enabled or not set)1753  if (settings.breachMonitoring !== false && nextEntry.type === "login" && nextEntry.password) {1754    checkBreach(nextEntry.password).then(async (count) => {1755      if (count > 0) {1756        const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === nextEntry.id);1757        if (idx !== -1) {1758          entries[idx] = { ...entries[idx], breach: count, modifiedAt: monotonicEntryTimestamp(entries[idx].modifiedAt) };1759          await persistEntries();1760        }1761      }1762    });1763  }17641765  fireSyncTrigger("vault_change");17661767  return nextEntry;1768}17691770/**1771 * Run the passkey-merge pass on the live in-memory entries and persist if1772 * anything changed. Called immediately after any passkey registration so that1773 * a same-domain TOTP-only entry already in the vault gets consolidated right1774 * away instead of waiting until the next lock/unlock cycle.1775 */1776export async function consolidatePasskeyEntries(): Promise<void> {1777  if (!derivedKey) return;1778  const { merged } = mergePasskeyOnlyIntoLogins(entries);1779  if (merged) {1780    await persistEntries();1781  }1782}17831784export async function updateEntry(1785  id: string,1786  patch: Partial<VaultEntry>1787): Promise<void> {1788  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");17891790  const idx = entries.findIndex((entry) => entry.id === id);1791  if (idx === -1 || entries[idx].deletedAt) {1792    throw new Error("entry_not_found");1793  }17941795  const current = entries[idx];1796  const sanitizedPatch = sanitizeEntryPatch(patch);1797  // Refresh passwordChangedAt only when the password value actually changes —1798  // a metadata-only update (title, tags, etc.) must not reset the age clock1799  // that drives the Pro health rotation recommendation.1800  const passwordChanged =1801    "password" in patch &&1802    typeof sanitizedPatch.password === "string" &&1803    sanitizedPatch.password !== current.password;1804  const stamp = monotonicEntryTimestamp(current.modifiedAt);1805  // When the password actually changes, push the outgoing one onto the history1806  // (newest first) so the user can reveal/copy/restore it later. We record the1807  // age it carried (passwordChangedAt, falling back to createdAt) rather than1808  // `now`, so the list reflects when each password was last in effect. Only1809  // capture a non-empty prior value — clearing a password leaves no secret to1810  // keep, and we skip an immediate exact duplicate (e.g. restore-then-restore)1811  // to avoid noise.1812  const priorPassword = current.password;1813  const shouldCapture =1814    passwordChanged &&1815    typeof priorPassword === "string" &&1816    priorPassword.length > 0 &&1817    current.passwordHistory?.[0]?.password !== priorPassword;1818  const nextHistory = shouldCapture1819    ? [1820        { password: priorPassword!, changedAt: current.passwordChangedAt ?? current.createdAt },1821        ...(current.passwordHistory ?? []),1822      ].slice(0, PASSWORD_HISTORY_MAX)1823    : current.passwordHistory;1824  entries[idx] = {1825    ...current,1826    ...sanitizedPatch,1827    modifiedAt: stamp,1828    ...(passwordChanged ? { passwordChangedAt: stamp, passwordHistory: nextHistory } : {}),1829  };1830183118321833  // Card entries must retain their card number1834  if (entries[idx].type === "card" && !entries[idx].cardNumber) {1835    entries[idx] = current;1836    throw new Error("card number is required for card entries");1837  }18381839  // Roll the in-memory entry back to its pre-edit state if the disk write1840  // fails (e.g. storage quota). Without this the module-level `entries` array1841  // would hold an edit that never landed on disk, diverging from the vault1842  // until the next unlock silently reverts it (SEV-3-A). Mirrors addEntry.1843  try {1844    await persistEntries();1845  } catch (err) {1846    entries[idx] = current;1847    throw err;1848  }18491850  // Breach check when password changes: clear immediately so old breach doesn't linger,1851  // then async-check the new password and only re-set if it's also found.1852  if ("password" in patch && settings.breachMonitoring !== false && entries[idx].type === "login") {1853    entries[idx] = { ...entries[idx], breach: undefined };1854    await persistEntries();1855    const password = entries[idx].password;1856    if (password) {1857      checkBreach(password).then(async (count) => {1858        const i = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id);1859        if (i !== -1 && count > 0) {1860          entries[i] = { ...entries[i], breach: count, modifiedAt: monotonicEntryTimestamp(entries[i].modifiedAt) };1861          await persistEntries();1862        }1863      });1864    }1865  }18661867  fireSyncTrigger("vault_change");1868}18691870export async function deleteEntry(id: string): Promise<void> {1871  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");18721873  const entry = entries.find((item) => item.id === id);1874  if (!entry || entry.deletedAt) {1875    throw new Error("entry_not_found");1876  }18771878  // Tombstone timestamp must be strictly greater than the entry's last1879  // modification so the deletion wins LWW against any in-flight edit, even1880  // under clock skew (SEV-2-E).1881  const previousModifiedAt = entry.modifiedAt;1882  const stamp = monotonicEntryTimestamp(entry.modifiedAt);1883  entry.deletedAt = stamp;1884  entry.modifiedAt = stamp;1885  // Roll the tombstone back if the disk write fails, so a quota error doesn't1886  // leave the entry deleted in memory but alive on disk (SEV-3-A).1887  try {1888    await persistEntries();1889  } catch (err) {1890    delete entry.deletedAt;1891    entry.modifiedAt = previousModifiedAt;1892    throw err;1893  }1894  fireSyncTrigger("vault_change");1895}18961897export function getDeletedEntries(): VaultEntry[] {1898  if (!derivedKey) return [];1899  return entries.filter((e) => !!e.deletedAt);1900}19011902/**1903 * Returns the vault's monotonic version — the `peach_last_modified_at` value1904 * stamped on every user-initiated write. Remote (sync) writes do NOT advance1905 * this version so a sync round never cascades into a second outbound sync.1906 */1907export async function getVaultVersion(): Promise<number> {1908  try {1909    const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get("peach_last_modified_at");1910    const v = (raw as Record<string, unknown>).peach_last_modified_at;1911    if (typeof v === "number") return v;1912    if (typeof v === "string" && v !== "") {1913      const n = Number.parseInt(v, 10);1914      return Number.isFinite(n) ? n : 0;1915    }1916    return 0;1917  } catch {1918    return 0;1919  }1920}19211922/**1923 * Internal write variants — bypass `fireSyncTrigger` so the sync layer can1924 * apply entries without cascading into another outbound sync round.1925 *1926 * INVARIANT: callers must not pass entries whose IDs collide with existing1927 * active (non-deleted) entries unless the intent is an explicit overwrite.1928 * These functions do not validate field-level constraints (password required,1929 * card number required, etc.) — they are trust-the-caller paths for sync and1930 * test harness use only.1931 */1932export async function addEntryDirect(entry: VaultEntry): Promise<void> {1933  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1934  entries = [...entries, entry];1935  await persistEntries("sync_received");1936}19371938export async function updateEntryDirect(patch: VaultEntry): Promise<void> {1939  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1940  const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === patch.id);1941  if (idx === -1) throw new Error("entry_not_found");1942  entries[idx] = { ...entries[idx], ...patch };1943  await persistEntries("sync_received");1944}19451946export async function deleteEntryDirect(id: string, deletedAt: number): Promise<void> {1947  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1948  const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id);1949  if (idx === -1) throw new Error("entry_not_found");1950  entries[idx] = { ...entries[idx], deletedAt, modifiedAt: deletedAt };1951  await persistEntries("sync_received");1952}19531954/**1955 * Apply a batch of remote entries + tombstones from a chirp-sync peer.1956 * Last-write-wins by `modifiedAt`; a tombstone supersedes a live entry when1957 * `deletedAt > modifiedAt` on the local side. Mutates `entries` directly and1958 * persists with reason `sync_received` — does NOT fire the sync dispatcher, so1959 * applying a sync round cannot cascade into another outbound sync.1960 *1961 * `applied` counts entries that actually changed local state (new add,1962 * overwrite-by-newer, or new tombstone). `received` is the raw payload size1963 * the caller can surface in the sync result UI.1964 */1965export async function applyMergedRemoteEntries(1966  remoteEntries: VaultEntry[],1967  remoteTombstones: Record<string, number>,1968  context: { deviceName?: string } = {},1969): Promise<{ received: number; applied: number; conflicts: number }> {1970  // DESIGN: last-write-wins is applied PER-ENTRY, not per-field. If two devices1971  // concurrently edit different fields of the same entry, the one with the1972  // newer modifiedAt wins the whole entry and the other device's field edits1973  // are dropped silently. This is the deliberate trade-off for a simple,1974  // conflict-free merge — per-field CRDT merge is out of scope. Guidance for1975  // users: edit a given entry on one device at a time.1976  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");19771978  const received = remoteEntries.length + Object.keys(remoteTombstones).length;1979  let applied = 0;1980  let conflicts = 0;19811982  const byId = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();1983  for (const e of entries) byId.set(e.id, e);19841985  const alerts: SyncAlert[] = [];1986  const deviceName = context.deviceName ?? "paired device";1987  const mergeNow = Date.now();19881989  for (const remote of remoteEntries) {1990    const sanitized = sanitizeRestoredEntry(remote);1991    if (!sanitized) continue;1992    // HV-1a: a far-future remote modifiedAt must not permanently pin a1993    // malicious value against honest local edits. Clamp BEFORE any1994    // comparison against local timestamps.1995    sanitized.modifiedAt = clampSyncTimestamp(sanitized.modifiedAt, mergeNow);1996    if (typeof sanitized.deletedAt === "number") {1997      sanitized.deletedAt = clampSyncTimestamp(sanitized.deletedAt, mergeNow);1998    }1999    const tombstoneTs = remoteTombstones[sanitized.id];2000    if (tombstoneTs !== undefined && clampSyncTimestamp(tombstoneTs, mergeNow) >= sanitized.modifiedAt) {2001      continue;2002    }2003    const local = byId.get(sanitized.id);2004    if (!local) {2005      entries.push(sanitized);2006      byId.set(sanitized.id, sanitized);2007      applied += 1;2008    } else if (sanitized.modifiedAt > local.modifiedAt) {2009      const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === local.id);2010      if (idx !== -1) {2011        // HV-1b: surface remote password REPLACEMENTS (existing id, password2012        // differs) so a compromised peer can't silently rewrite credentials.2013        if (2014          !local.deletedAt &&2015          typeof sanitized.password === "string" &&2016          typeof local.password === "string" &&2017          sanitized.password !== local.password2018        ) {2019          alerts.push({2020            type: "REMOTE_PASSWORD_CHANGE",2021            entryId: sanitized.id,2022            entryTitle: sanitized.title,2023            deviceName,2024            timestamp: mergeNow,2025          });2026        }2027        entries[idx] = sanitized;2028        byId.set(sanitized.id, sanitized);2029        applied += 1;2030        if (!local.deletedAt) conflicts += 1;2031      }2032    }2033  }20342035  for (const [id, rawDeletedAt] of Object.entries(remoteTombstones)) {2036    if (typeof rawDeletedAt !== "number" || !Number.isFinite(rawDeletedAt)) continue;2037    // HV-1a/1c: clamp the tombstone timestamp before every comparison.2038    const deletedAt = clampSyncTimestamp(rawDeletedAt, mergeNow);2039    const local = byId.get(id);2040    if (!local) continue;2041    if (local.deletedAt && local.deletedAt >= deletedAt) continue;2042    if (deletedAt < local.modifiedAt) continue;2043    const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id);2044    if (idx !== -1) {2045      // HV-1b: surface remote deletes of live local entries.2046      if (!local.deletedAt) {2047        alerts.push({2048          type: "REMOTE_DELETE",2049          entryId: id,2050          entryTitle: local.title,2051          deviceName,2052          timestamp: mergeNow,2053        });2054      }2055      entries[idx] = { ...local, deletedAt, modifiedAt: deletedAt };2056      applied += 1;2057    }2058  }20592060  if (applied > 0) {2061    await persistEntries("sync_received");2062    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);2063  }2064  // Queued after the merge committed — an alert must describe a mutation2065  // that actually landed. recordSyncAlerts never throws.2066  await recordSyncAlerts(alerts);2067  return { received, applied, conflicts };2068}20692070export async function restoreEntry(id: string): Promise<void> {2071  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");2072  const entry = entries.find((e) => e.id === id && e.deletedAt);2073  if (!entry) throw new Error("deleted entry not found");2074  delete entry.deletedAt;2075  entry.modifiedAt = monotonicEntryTimestamp(entry.modifiedAt);2076  await persistEntries();2077  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);2078}20792080export async function purgeEntry(id: string): Promise<void> {2081  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");2082  const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id && e.deletedAt);2083  if (idx === -1) throw new Error("deleted entry not found");2084  entries.splice(idx, 1);2085  await persistEntries();2086}20872088/** Permanently delete entries whose deletedAt is older than retentionMs. 0 = keep forever. */2089export async function purgeExpiredTrash(retentionMs: number): Promise<number> {2090  if (!derivedKey || retentionMs === 0) return 0;2091  const cutoff = Date.now() - retentionMs;2092  const before = entries.length;2093  entries = entries.filter((e) => !(e.deletedAt && e.deletedAt < cutoff));2094  const purged = before - entries.length;2095  if (purged > 0) await persistEntries();2096  return purged;2097}20982099export function queryDomain(domain: string): VaultEntry[] {2100  return domainIndex.get(domain) ?? [];2101}21022103export function getEntryById(id: string): VaultEntry | undefined {2104  return entries.find((entry) => entry.id === id && !entry.deletedAt);2105}21062107async function persistSlotA(2108  reason: VaultSnapshot["reason"] = "local_save",2109): Promise<StoredVault> {2110  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");21112112  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);2113  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");21142115  // Snapshot the about-to-be-overwritten state BEFORE we mutate disk. Failures2116  // are swallowed by takeVaultSnapshot — history must never block a save.2117  await takeVaultSnapshot(reason);21182119  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured, duressConfigured ? DURESS_SLOT_SIZE : 0);2120  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");21212122  // Preserve existing recovery escrow fields.2123  const nextSlotA: StoredVault = {2124    ...slotA,2125    nonce,2126    ciphertext,2127    tag,2128    // recovery_salt and recovery_wrapped_root_key are already set from loadSlot2129  };2130  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, nextSlotA);21312132  // Slot A (the real vault) is now committed. Wrap every later write so a2133  // mid-persist failure (e.g. a storage error after slot A landed) restores the2134  // prior slot A before rethrowing. Without this, a "failed" save that already2135  // wrote slot A leaves disk ahead of the in-memory rollback in addEntry/2136  // updateEntry/deleteEntry — the entry stays silently on disk and resurfaces2137  // as a duplicate on the next unlock (observed under storage-quota pressure).2138  try {2139    // When duress is not configured, keep slot B size-matched with slot A by2140    // regenerating its noise. When duress IS configured, leave slot B alone —2141    // we don't have the decoy key to re-encrypt it. This is a known trade-off.2142    if (!duressConfigured) {2143      await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2));2144    }2145    // Only advance the vault version for locally-originated writes. Entries2146    // applied from a sync peer ("sync_received") must NOT bump the counter —2147    // otherwise applying a remote round makes us look newer than the peer and2148    // triggers a redundant outbound sync, defeating the no-op optimisation2149    // and risking a ping-pong between two devices (SEV-2-C).2150    if (reason !== "sync_received") {2151      await stampLocalVaultMutation();2152    }2153  } catch (err) {2154    // Best-effort restore — the prior slot A is smaller-or-equal, so this write2155    // fits even when the failure was a quota overflow.2156    await writeSlot(SLOT_A, slotA).catch(() => {});2157    throw err;2158  }21592160  return nextSlotA;2161}21622163async function persistSlotB(): Promise<void> {2164  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");21652166  const slotB = await loadSlot(SLOT_B);2167  if (!slotB) throw new Error("missing slot B");21682169  // Decoy plaintext always reports duressConfigured=false — the decoy user2170  // sees a clean slate. persistSlotB only runs in decoy mode, which only2171  // exists once duress is configured, so pad to the fixed duress ceiling to2172  // keep slot B's length equal to slot A's (audit MEDIUM — deniability).2173  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, false, DURESS_SLOT_SIZE);2174  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKey, plaintext, "slot_b_v1");21752176  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, { ...slotB, nonce, ciphertext, tag });2177  // Symmetric with persistSlotA: if the version stamp fails after the decoy2178  // slot committed, restore the prior slot B so a failed decoy-mode save can't2179  // leave disk ahead of the in-memory rollback.2180  try {2181    await stampLocalVaultMutation();2182  } catch (err) {2183    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, slotB).catch(() => {});2184    throw err;2185  }2186}21872188async function persistEntries(2189  reason: VaultSnapshot["reason"] = "local_save",2190): Promise<void> {2191  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");21922193  if (vaultMode === "decoy") {2194    await persistSlotB();2195  } else {2196    await persistSlotA(reason);2197  }2198  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);2199}22002201function cleanAdditionalUrls(values: string[] | undefined): string[] | undefined {2202  if (!Array.isArray(values)) return undefined;2203  const seen = new Set<string>();2204  const cleaned: string[] = [];2205  for (const value of values) {2206    const trimmed = typeof value === "string" ? value.trim() : "";2207    if (!trimmed) continue;2208    const key = trimmed.toLowerCase();2209    if (seen.has(key)) continue;2210    seen.add(key);2211    cleaned.push(trimmed);2212  }2213  return cleaned.length > 0 ? cleaned : undefined;2214}22152216function sanitizeEntryDraft(entry: EntryDraft): EntryDraft {2217  const title = entry.title.trim();2218  // Accept legacy `type:"passkey"` drafts but rewrite to "login" — the new2219  // model is "any entry, optionally with a passkey sub-object." Imports and2220  // any in-flight callers from before v2.11.0 keep working without throwing.2221  let type: VaultEntry["type"] = entry.type ?? "login";2222  if (type === "passkey") type = "login";22232224  if (!title) throw new Error("title is required");22252226  if (entry.passkey) {2227    const p = entry.passkey;2228    if (2229      !p.rpId ||2230      !p.credentialId ||2231      !p.publicKeyCose ||2232      !p.userHandle ||2233      !p.userName ||2234      (p.algorithm !== -7 && p.algorithm !== -8)2235    ) {2236      throw new Error("invalid passkey credential");2237    }2238  }2239  if (type === "card") {2240    if (!entry.cardholderName?.trim() || !entry.cardNumber?.trim()) {2241      throw new Error("cardholder name and card number are required");2242    }2243  }22442245  return {2246    type,2247    title,2248    username: type === "login" ? entry.username?.trim() ?? "" : undefined,2249    email: type === "login" ? entry.email?.trim() || undefined : undefined,2250    password: type === "login" ? entry.password : undefined,2251    url: type === "login" ? entry.url?.trim() ?? "" : undefined,2252    additionalUrls: type === "login" ? cleanAdditionalUrls(entry.additionalUrls) : undefined,2253    totp: type === "login" ? entry.totp?.trim() || undefined : undefined,2254    notes: entry.notes?.trim() || undefined,2255    breach: type === "login" ? entry.breach : undefined,2256    canary: type === "login" ? entry.canary : undefined,2257    tags: entry.tags,2258    passkey: entry.passkey,2259    cardholderName: type === "card" ? entry.cardholderName?.trim() : undefined,2260    cardNumber: type === "card" ? entry.cardNumber?.trim() : undefined,2261    expMonth: type === "card" ? entry.expMonth?.trim() : undefined,2262    expYear: type === "card" ? entry.expYear?.trim() : undefined,2263    cvc: type === "card" ? entry.cvc?.trim() : undefined,2264    cardNickname: type === "card" ? entry.cardNickname?.trim() || undefined : undefined,2265    network: type === "card" ? entry.network : undefined,2266    last4: type === "card" ? entry.last4?.trim() : undefined,2267  };2268}22692270function sanitizeEntryPatch(patch: Partial<VaultEntry>): Partial<VaultEntry> {2271  const nextPatch: Partial<VaultEntry> = {};22722273  if ("type" in patch) {2274    nextPatch.type = patch.type;2275  }22762277  if ("title" in patch) {2278    const title = patch.title?.trim() ?? "";2279    if (!title) throw new Error("title is required");2280    nextPatch.title = title;2281  }22822283  if ("url" in patch) {2284    nextPatch.url = patch.url?.trim() ?? "";2285  }22862287  if ("additionalUrls" in patch) {2288    const incoming = Array.isArray(patch.additionalUrls) ? patch.additionalUrls : [];2289    const seen = new Set<string>();2290    const cleaned: string[] = [];2291    for (const value of incoming) {2292      const trimmed = typeof value === "string" ? value.trim() : "";2293      if (!trimmed) continue;2294      const key = trimmed.toLowerCase();2295      if (seen.has(key)) continue;2296      seen.add(key);2297      cleaned.push(trimmed);2298    }2299    nextPatch.additionalUrls = cleaned.length > 0 ? cleaned : undefined;2300  }23012302  if ("username" in patch) {2303    nextPatch.username = patch.username?.trim() ?? "";2304  }23052306  if ("email" in patch) {2307    nextPatch.email = patch.email?.trim() || undefined;2308  }23092310  if ("password" in patch) {2311    const password = patch.password ?? "";2312    // Allow clearing a password (e.g. on passkey-only entries)2313    nextPatch.password = password || undefined;2314  }23152316  if ("totp" in patch) {2317    nextPatch.totp = patch.totp?.trim() || undefined;2318  }23192320  if ("notes" in patch) {2321    nextPatch.notes = patch.notes?.trim() || undefined;2322  }23232324  if ("breach" in patch) {2325    nextPatch.breach = patch.breach;2326  }23272328  if ("canary" in patch) {2329    nextPatch.canary = patch.canary;2330  }23312332  if ("passkey" in patch) {2333    // Passkey sub-object replaces all the legacy flat passkey fields. A2334    // patch with `passkey: undefined` removes the credential from the entry2335    // (used by "remove passkey" without deleting the whole entry).2336    nextPatch.passkey = patch.passkey;2337  }23382339  if ("tags" in patch) {2340    nextPatch.tags = patch.tags;2341  }23422343  if ("cardholderName" in patch) {2344    nextPatch.cardholderName = patch.cardholderName?.trim() || undefined;2345  }2346  if ("cardNumber" in patch) {2347    const n = patch.cardNumber ?? "";2348    nextPatch.cardNumber = n || undefined;2349  }2350  if ("expMonth" in patch) {2351    nextPatch.expMonth = patch.expMonth?.trim() || undefined;2352  }2353  if ("expYear" in patch) {2354    nextPatch.expYear = patch.expYear?.trim() || undefined;2355  }2356  if ("cvc" in patch) {2357    nextPatch.cvc = patch.cvc?.trim() || undefined;2358  }2359  if ("cardNickname" in patch) {2360    nextPatch.cardNickname = patch.cardNickname?.trim() || undefined;2361  }2362  if ("network" in patch) {2363    nextPatch.network = patch.network;2364  }2365  if ("last4" in patch) {2366    nextPatch.last4 = patch.last4?.trim() || undefined;2367  }23682369  return nextPatch;2370}23712372function normalizeEntry(entry: VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry): VaultEntry {2373  const createdAt = "createdAt" in entry ? entry.createdAt : entry.created;2374  const modifiedAt =2375    "modifiedAt" in entry ? entry.modifiedAt : entry.updated;23762377  const base: VaultEntry = {2378    id: entry.id,2379    type: "type" in entry ? entry.type : "login",2380    title: entry.title,2381    username: entry.username,2382    email: "email" in entry ? entry.email : undefined,2383    password: entry.password,2384    url: entry.url,2385    additionalUrls:2386      "additionalUrls" in entry && Array.isArray(entry.additionalUrls)2387        ? entry.additionalUrls2388        : undefined,2389    totp: entry.totp,2390    notes: entry.notes,2391    breach: entry.breach,2392    // Preserve the password-age clock across lock/unlock. Without this the2393    // field is dropped on every decode and the advanced-health "aged password"2394    // signal silently resets to createdAt on each unlock (SEV-2-A).2395    passwordChangedAt:2396      "passwordChangedAt" in entry ? entry.passwordChangedAt : undefined,2397    // Preserve past-password history across lock/unlock. normalizeEntry is a2398    // field whitelist, so an unlisted field is silently dropped on every decode2399    // (same class as the passwordChangedAt SEV-2-A above).2400    passwordHistory:2401      "passwordHistory" in entry && Array.isArray(entry.passwordHistory)2402        ? entry.passwordHistory2403        : undefined,2404    canary: "canary" in entry ? entry.canary : undefined,2405    passkey: "passkey" in entry ? entry.passkey : undefined,2406    createdAt,2407    modifiedAt,2408    deletedAt: entry.deletedAt,2409    tags: "tags" in entry ? entry.tags : undefined,2410    cardholderName: "cardholderName" in entry ? entry.cardholderName : undefined,2411    cardNumber: "cardNumber" in entry ? entry.cardNumber : undefined,2412    expMonth: "expMonth" in entry ? entry.expMonth : undefined,2413    expYear: "expYear" in entry ? entry.expYear : undefined,2414    cvc: "cvc" in entry ? entry.cvc : undefined,2415    cardNickname: "cardNickname" in entry ? entry.cardNickname : undefined,2416    network: "network" in entry ? entry.network : undefined,2417    last4: "last4" in entry ? entry.last4 : undefined,2418  };24192420  return migrateLegacyPasskey(base, entry);2421}24222423/**2424 * v2.11.0 read migration. Pre-v2.11.0 passkey entries used `type:"passkey"`2425 * with flat top-level fields (rpId, credentialId, etc.). This converts them2426 * to the new shape — `type:"login"` with a `passkey` sub-object — so all2427 * downstream consumers can rely on the new model. The result is rewritten2428 * to disk on next vault save (hasLegacyShape detects the un-migrated case).2429 */2430function migrateLegacyPasskey(2431  base: VaultEntry,2432  raw: VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry2433): VaultEntry {2434  if (base.passkey) return base;2435  const flat = raw as Partial<VaultEntry>;2436  const isPasskeyType = base.type === "passkey";2437  const hasFlatPasskeyFields =2438    typeof flat.rpId === "string" &&2439    typeof flat.credentialId === "string" &&2440    typeof flat.publicKeyCose === "string" &&2441    typeof flat.userHandle === "string" &&2442    typeof flat.userName === "string";2443  if (!isPasskeyType && !hasFlatPasskeyFields) return base;2444  if (!hasFlatPasskeyFields) return base;24452446  const algorithm: -7 | -8 = flat.algorithm === -8 ? -8 : -7;2447  base.passkey = {2448    rpId: flat.rpId!,2449    rpName: flat.rpName ?? flat.rpId!,2450    credentialId: flat.credentialId!,2451    publicKeyCose: flat.publicKeyCose!,2452    privateKeyJwk: flat.privateKeyJwk,2453    userHandle: flat.userHandle!,2454    userName: flat.userName!,2455    userDisplayName: flat.userDisplayName ?? flat.userName!,2456    algorithm,2457    signCount: flat.signCount ?? 0,2458    aaguid: flat.aaguid ?? "",2459    backupEligible: flat.backupEligible === true,2460    backupState: flat.backupState === true,2461    lastUsedAt: flat.lastUsedAt,2462    browser: flat.browser,2463    transports: flat.transports,2464    createdAt: base.createdAt,2465  };2466  // Promote to "login" so the unified Entry view renders. Username gets2467  // populated from the passkey's userName so the entry is searchable in the2468  // existing autofill flow without a separate code path.2469  if (isPasskeyType) base.type = "login";2470  if (!base.username) base.username = flat.userName;2471  if (!base.url) base.url = `https://${flat.rpId}`;2472  return base;2473}247424752476// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------2477// Deduplication2478// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------24792480function entryDupeKey(e: VaultEntry): string {2481  if (e.type === "note") return `note|${e.title.toLowerCase()}`;2482  // Passkey-bearing entries dedupe by the credential's RP + user. Two logins2483  // on different sites that happen to share a username are still distinct;2484  // two passkey credentials for the same RP+user are duplicates regardless2485  // of any login fields they may also carry.2486  if (e.passkey) {2487    return `passkey|${e.passkey.rpId.toLowerCase()}|${e.passkey.userName.toLowerCase()}`;2488  }2489  return `login|${e.title.toLowerCase()}|${(e.url ?? "").toLowerCase()}|${(e.username ?? "").toLowerCase()}`;2490}24912492/** Returns the number of duplicate entries (those that would be removed). */2493export function countDuplicates(): number {2494  const best = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();2495  let dupeCount = 0;2496  for (const e of entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt)) {2497    const key = entryDupeKey(e);2498    const existing = best.get(key);2499    if (!existing) {2500      best.set(key, e);2501    } else {2502      dupeCount++;2503      // Keep the more recently modified one in the map2504      if ((e.modifiedAt ?? e.createdAt ?? 0) > (existing.modifiedAt ?? existing.createdAt ?? 0)) {2505        best.set(key, e);2506      }2507    }2508  }2509  return dupeCount;2510}25112512/**2513 * Soft-deletes duplicate entries, keeping the most recently modified copy of2514 * each group. Returns the number of entries moved to trash.2515 */2516export async function deduplicateEntries(): Promise<number> {2517  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");2518  // Dedup reshapes slot B permanently under the decoy key, which is2519  // forensically distinguishable from a freshly-seeded decoy vault. Refuse.2520  if (vaultMode === "decoy") {2521    throw new Error("deduplicate disabled in decoy mode");2522  }25232524  const best = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();2525  for (const e of entries.filter((en) => !en.deletedAt)) {2526    const key = entryDupeKey(e);2527    const existing = best.get(key);2528    if (!existing) {2529      best.set(key, e);2530    } else if ((e.modifiedAt ?? e.createdAt ?? 0) > (existing.modifiedAt ?? existing.createdAt ?? 0)) {2531      best.set(key, e);2532    }2533  }25342535  const keepIds = new Set(Array.from(best.values()).map((e) => e.id));2536  let removed = 0;2537  entries = entries.map((e) => {2538    if (!e.deletedAt && !keepIds.has(e.id)) {2539      removed++;2540      return { ...e, deletedAt: monotonicEntryTimestamp(e.modifiedAt) };2541    }2542    return e;2543  });25442545  if (removed > 0) await persistEntries();2546  return removed;2547}25482549// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------2550// Vault history — snapshot BEFORE every vault write so the saved blob is2551// what is about to be lost, not what was just written. Capped at 5. The2552// stored blobs are AES-256-GCM ciphertext under the master password, so2553// history adds zero security surface.2554// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------25552556const HISTORY_KEY = "peach_vault_history";2557const HISTORY_MAX = 5;25582559/**2560 * Snapshot the CURRENT on-disk vault state into history. Call this BEFORE2561 * overwriting peach_vault_a so the saved blob captures the about-to-be-lost2562 * state. Identical-to-most-recent blobs are skipped to avoid filling history2563 * with no-op writes.2564 */2565export async function takeVaultSnapshot(2566  reason: VaultSnapshot["reason"],2567): Promise<void> {2568  try {2569    const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get([SLOT_A, SLOT_B, HISTORY_KEY]);2570    const slotA = (raw as Record<string, StoredVault | undefined>)[SLOT_A];2571    const slotB = (raw as Record<string, StoredVault | undefined>)[SLOT_B];25722573    // Nothing to snapshot if the real slot doesn't exist yet (fresh install,2574    // pre-createVault). createVault skips snapshots intentionally — there is2575    // no prior state to preserve.2576    if (!slotA) return;25772578    const vault_a = JSON.stringify(slotA);2579    const vault_b = JSON.stringify(slotB ?? slotA);25802581    // Best-effort entry count: only meaningful when the in-memory state is2582    // unlocked AND in real mode. Decoy mode would leak the decoy entry2583    // count; locked mode has no entries to count. Both fall through to null.2584    let entryCount: number | null = null;2585    if (derivedKey && vaultMode === "real") {2586      try {2587        entryCount = entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt).length;2588      } catch {2589        entryCount = null;2590      }2591    }25922593    const existingRaw = (raw as Record<string, VaultHistory | undefined>)[HISTORY_KEY];2594    const history: VaultHistory = existingRaw && Array.isArray(existingRaw.snapshots)2595      ? existingRaw2596      : { snapshots: [] };25972598    // Deduplication: if the most recent snapshot has byte-identical blobs,2599    // skip — saves the same vault N times in a row would otherwise burn the2600    // entire history window with no recovery value.2601    const latest = history.snapshots[0];2602    if (latest && latest.vault_a === vault_a && latest.vault_b === vault_b) {2603      return;2604    }26052606    const snapshot: VaultSnapshot = {2607      id: crypto.randomUUID(),2608      savedAt: Date.now(),2609      reason,2610      vault_a,2611      vault_b,2612      entryCount,2613    };26142615    history.snapshots = [snapshot, ...history.snapshots].slice(0, HISTORY_MAX);2616    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [HISTORY_KEY]: history });2617  } catch (err) {2618    // Non-fatal — history must never block a save. A failed snapshot just2619    // means the user loses one rung of the safety ladder for this write.2620    // M4/QUA-006: log so the failure is visible; if it looks like a quota2621    // problem, notify the popup so the user can prune history themselves.2622    console.warn('[Peach] takeVaultSnapshot failed:', err);2623    if (String(err).includes('QUOTA') || String(err).includes('quota')) {2624      try {2625        await chrome.runtime.sendMessage({ type: 'VAULT_STORAGE_QUOTA_WARNING' });2626      } catch {2627        // popup may be closed; surfaced via console.warn above2628      }2629    }2630  }2631}26322633/** Wipe all vault history. Called by Panic / DESTROY_VAULT. */2634export async function clearVaultHistory(): Promise<void> {2635  try {2636    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [HISTORY_KEY]: { snapshots: [] } satisfies VaultHistory });2637  } catch {2638    // Non-fatal — DESTROY_VAULT also runs storage.local.clear().2639  }2640}26412642/** Read all snapshots, newest first, for the Settings vault history view. */2643export async function getVaultHistory(): Promise<VaultSnapshot[]> {2644  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get(HISTORY_KEY);2645  const history = (raw as Record<string, VaultHistory | undefined>)[HISTORY_KEY];2646  if (!history || !Array.isArray(history.snapshots)) return [];2647  return history.snapshots;2648}26492650/**2651 * Replace the on-disk vault with the chosen snapshot's blobs and lock the2652 * vault. The current state is itself snapshotted with reason 'restore' first2653 * so the restore is reversible. After this returns, the user must unlock2654 * with the password that matches the restored blob.2655 */2656export async function restoreVaultSnapshot(2657  snapshotId: string,2658): Promise<{ ok: true } | { ok: false; error: string }> {2659  const history = await getVaultHistory();2660  const snapshot = history.find((s) => s.id === snapshotId);2661  if (!snapshot) return { ok: false, error: "snapshot_not_found" };26622663  // Snapshot the about-to-be-replaced current state so the restore is2664  // reversible. takeVaultSnapshot is no-op when the most recent entry is2665  // byte-identical, so a restore-of-a-restore stays clean.2666  await takeVaultSnapshot("restore");26672668  let restoredA: StoredVault;2669  let restoredB: StoredVault;2670  try {2671    restoredA = JSON.parse(snapshot.vault_a) as StoredVault;2672    restoredB = JSON.parse(snapshot.vault_b) as StoredVault;2673  } catch {2674    return { ok: false, error: "snapshot_corrupt" };2675  }26762677  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, restoredA);2678  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, restoredB);2679  await stampLocalVaultMutation();26802681  // Lock so the user must prove they can decrypt the restored blob. If they2682  // restored a pre-password-change snapshot they discover it immediately at2683  // the lock screen rather than silently holding an inaccessible vault.2684  lock();26852686  return { ok: true };2687}26882689/**2690 * Rotate the vault's sync identity by generating a FRESH ROOT KEY and2691 * re-wrapping everything under it (MV-8). Because every sync credential —2692 * vault_id, the Noise XX static keypair, the Ed25519 manifest signing key,2693 * and the per-entry envelope keys — derives from the root key, rotation2694 * makes a lost/stolen device's retained key material useless. All paired2695 * devices must re-pair afterwards.2696 *2697 * CONSEQUENCE THE UI MUST SURFACE: the 12 recovery words also derive from2698 * the root key, so rotation INVALIDATES the old recovery phrase. The flow2699 * sets peach_recovery_pending so the popup re-presents the new words for2700 * confirmation, same as the migrateToRecovery rotate path.2701 */2702export async function rotateSyncIdentity(): Promise<{ ok: boolean; error?: string }> {2703  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {2704    return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };2705  }2706  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);2707  if (!slotA) return { ok: false, error: "missing_slot_a" };27082709  // 1. Fresh root key + recovery escrow (new words).2710  const { rawRootKey, recoverySalt, wrappedRootKey, wrappedNonce, wrappedTag } =2711    await generateAndWrapRootKey();27122713  // 2. Re-wrap the new root key under the current password-derived key.2714  const newRootKey = unhex(rawRootKey);2715  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(derivedKey, newRootKey);27162717  // 3. Snapshot, then single atomic slot write — both escrow wrappings of2718  //    the new root key land together (same transactional rule as2719  //    changePassword). Entries are untouched: they are sealed under the2720  //    password-derived key, not the root key.2721  await takeVaultSnapshot("local_save");2722  const nextSlotA: StoredVault = {2723    ...slotA,2724    recovery_salt: recoverySalt,2725    recovery_wrapped_root_key: wrappedRootKey,2726    recovery_nonce: wrappedNonce,2727    recovery_tag: wrappedTag,2728    ...pwRoot,2729  };2730  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, nextSlotA);27312732  // 4. Swap in memory only after disk committed.2733  if (rootKey) zeroKey(rootKey);2734  rootKey = newRootKey;27352736  // 5. Old peers' identities derive from the dead root key — drop them all.2737  const { clearPairedDevices } = await import("./paired-devices");2738  await clearPairedDevices();27392740  // 6. Force re-presentation of the NEW recovery words on next popup view.2741  await setRecoveryConfirmPending(); // same flag the create-vault flow uses27422743  await stampLocalVaultMutation();2744  return { ok: true };2745}27462747/**2748 * Change the master password. Re-encrypts slot A with a fresh salt + new2749 * derived key. Slot B (duress or noise) is left untouched when duress is2750 * configured — it uses an independent key derived from the duress password —2751 * and regenerated as noise when duress is not configured.2752 */2753export async function changePassword(2754  currentPassword: string,2755  newPassword: string2756): Promise<boolean> {2757  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") return false;27582759  // Verify current password before allowing any change2760  const valid = await verifyMainPassword(currentPassword);2761  if (!valid) return false;27622763  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);2764  if (!slotA) return false;2765  if (!rootKey) return false;27662767  // Derive fresh key from new password + new random salt2768  const newSalt = generateSalt();2769  const newKey = await deriveKey(newPassword, newSalt);27702771  // Re-encrypt the in-memory entries with the new key2772  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured, duressConfigured ? DURESS_SLOT_SIZE : 0);2773  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(newKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");27742775  // Pre-wrap root key under the new derived key. Recovery fields wrap rootKey2776  // under recovery words and remain untouched — recovery phrase keeps working2777  // across password changes (H4/COR-002).2778  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(newKey, rootKey);27792780  const finalSlotA: StoredVault = {2781    ...slotA,2782    salt: hex(newSalt),2783    nonce,2784    ciphertext,2785    tag,2786    ...pwRoot,2787  };27882789  // Snapshot the OLD-key blob before overwriting it. If the user later2790  // restores from this snapshot they will need the OLD password — the2791  // post-restore lock surfaces that immediately.2792  await takeVaultSnapshot("local_save");27932794  // Single atomic write: ciphertext, salt, and pw_root_* fields all land in2795  // one storage transaction. An SW kill before this point leaves the old2796  // slot intact; after this point everything tied to the new password is2797  // already on disk together (M6/COR-004).2798  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, finalSlotA);27992800  // Swap the in-memory key synchronously before any further await. If we2801  // threw between the Slot A write and this swap, the next persistEntries()2802  // would overwrite Slot A with old-key ciphertext, locking the user out.2803  zeroKey(derivedKey);2804  derivedKey = newKey;28052806  // PCH-01-008: the MV3 session escrow still holds the OLD key. Without this,2807  // the next service-worker restore decrypts the new-key Slot A with the stale2808  // key, fails tryDecryptSlotResult, and silently drops the user to a lock2809  // screen. Re-escrow the new key so restore survives a password change.2810  void saveSessionKey(newKey, "real");28112812  // Regenerate noise for slot B when duress is not in use. Runs after the2813  // key swap so a failure here is a disposable noise regeneration, not a2814  // lockout.2815  if (!duressConfigured) {2816    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2));2817  }2818  await stampLocalVaultMutation();28192820  return true;2821}