vault.ts

1/**2 * vault.ts — sole owner of vault state and chrome.storage vault keys.3 *4 * Every read/write of `peach_vault_a`, `peach_vault_b`, and `peach_settings`5 * goes through this module. No other file accesses those keys directly.6 * External callers reach vault operations via `messages.ts` — never by7 * importing from here cross-boundary (popup/content must not). Invariants8 * for the two-slot schema, unlock timing, and key/disk atomicity are in9 * Projects.md §3.2–§3.6.10 */1112import { deriveKey, deriveKeyRaw, generateSalt } from "../crypto/argon2";13import { extractDomain } from "../shared/domain";14import { clampSyncTimestamp } from "../shared/sync-limits";15import { computeVaultId } from "../shared/sync-identity";16// Static, not `await import()`: runtime import() throws in an MV3 service17// worker. Neither module imports vault.ts back, so there is no cycle to break.18import { triggerSyncIfReachable } from "./sync-trigger";19import { clearPairedDevices } from "./paired-devices";20import {21  rootKeyToWords,22  wordsToRootKeyMaterial,23  deriveRecoveryKey,24} from "../shared/recovery-words";25import type {26  AccentColorName,27  Canary,28  LegacyVaultEntry,29  ManualSummonRecord,30  PasskeyData,31  SavedIdentity,32  StoredVault,33  VaultEntry,34  VaultHistory,35  VaultSnapshot,36} from "../shared/types";37import { decrypt, encrypt, zeroKey } from "./aes";38import { clearAutoLock, touchAutoLock } from "./alarms";39import { setRecoveryConfirmPending } from "./recovery-pending";4041type EntryDraft = Omit<42  VaultEntry,43  "id" | "createdAt" | "modifiedAt" | "deletedAt"44>;4546// Slot-neutral storage keys (v1.4.24+). Both slots always exist; slot B47// either holds the decoy vault (when duress is configured) or random noise48// that looks identical at rest. No external indicator is stored — duress49// configuration is recorded only inside the encrypted payload of slot A.50const SLOT_A = "peach_vault_a";51const SLOT_B = "peach_vault_b";5253// Legacy keys, migrated away on first access.54const LEGACY_MAIN = "peach_vault";55const LEGACY_DECOY = "peach_decoy_vault";56const LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG = "peach_duress";5758// Plaintext is padded to the next multiple of this size before encryption.59// This coarsens ciphertext-length leakage into 1 KiB buckets.60const PAD_BLOCK = 1024;6162// How many past passwords to retain per entry. Generous enough to be useful as63// a recovery aid while bounding the secret material we hold (and the ciphertext64// growth) for an entry whose password is rotated frequently.65const PASSWORD_HISTORY_MAX = 50;6667// When duress is configured, BOTH slots are padded to this fixed ceiling so68// their ciphertext lengths are identical and cannot reveal that a hidden decoy69// vault exists (audit MEDIUM — plausible-deniability leak). 256 KiB comfortably70// holds a very large vault (thousands of entries incl. passkeys). The decoy71// slot can't be re-encrypted on every real-vault save (the real session has no72// decoy key), so a fixed ceiling — rather than size-matching on each write — is73// what keeps the two slots equal. A real vault whose plaintext exceeds this74// would grow past the ceiling and re-expose the bit; that is an extreme,75// documented edge well beyond normal use.76const DURESS_SLOT_SIZE = 262_144;7778let derivedKey: Uint8Array | null = null;79// 32-byte random root key, separate from the derivedKey used for vault encryption.80// The root key is wrapped (encrypted) under the recovery key derived from the81// 12-word phrase. When the user changes their password, only the wrapping changes;82// the root key and recovery words remain stable.83let rootKey: Uint8Array | null = null;84let entries: VaultEntry[] = [];85let domainIndex: Map<string, VaultEntry[]> = new Map();86let vaultMode: "real" | "decoy" = "real";87// Cached post-unlock view of whether the real vault records that duress is88// configured. Only meaningful after a real-mode unlock; for decoy-mode unlock89// this stays false because we never see slot A's plaintext.90let duressConfigured = false;9192let migrationRan = false;9394// Set to a corruption reason during the last unlock() attempt when both slots95// decrypted but failed schema validation. Consumed and cleared by96// consumeLastUnlockFailureReason() so messages.ts can surface vault_corrupted97// distinctly from wrong-password (M7/COR-007).98//99// NOTE: module-level state — if vault.ts is ever moved to a worker context,100// this must be replaced with a structured return value from unlock() or a101// postMessage channel. The signal is invisible across module-instance102// boundaries.103let lastUnlockFailureReason: string | null = null;104105export function consumeLastUnlockFailureReason(): string | null {106  const r = lastUnlockFailureReason;107  lastUnlockFailureReason = null;108  return r;109}110111// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------112// Settings (persisted inside the encrypted vault store as a sidecar key)113// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------114115export type TextSize = "small" | "medium" | "large";116117export interface VaultSettings {118  accentColor?: AccentColorName;119  theme?: "dark" | "light";120  autoLockMinutes?: number;121  clipboardClearSeconds?: number;122  lockOnClose?: boolean;123  breachMonitoring?: boolean;124  passkeyProviderEnabled?: boolean;125  trashRetentionDays?: number;126  manualSummonDomains?: Record<string, ManualSummonRecord>;127  declinedCardFingerprints?: string[];128  /**129   * Text size scale for body copy and entry titles. Stops at "large" by130   * design — XL clips dense screens (Vault, Health) inside the fixed131   * 330×480 popup surface.132   */133  textSize?: TextSize;134  /**135   * When true, all entrance/exit transitions and ambient animations are136   * collapsed to instant. Honoured alongside the user's OS-level137   * `prefers-reduced-motion`.138   */139  reduceMotion?: boolean;140  /**141   * Android-only: when true, the master key is escrowed in AndroidKeyStore142   * and the lock screen offers biometric unlock. Toggled from Settings →143   * Security → Biometrics. Has no effect on desktop builds.144   */145  biometricsEnabled?: boolean;146  /**147   * User overrides for keyboard shortcuts. Keys are ShortcutAction names148   * (see src/shared/shortcuts.ts). Missing actions fall through to149   * DEFAULT_BINDINGS — `getActiveBindings(settings.shortcuts)` is the150   * canonical lookup. Storing only the deltas keeps the vault payload151   * small and lets default updates land for users who never rebind.152   */153  shortcuts?: Record<string, { key: string; ctrl?: boolean; meta?: boolean; shift?: boolean; alt?: boolean }>;154}155156let settings: VaultSettings = {};157158export function getSettings(): VaultSettings {159  return settings;160}161162export async function ensureSettingsLoaded(): Promise<VaultSettings> {163  await loadSettings();164  return settings;165}166167export async function updateSettings(patch: Partial<VaultSettings>): Promise<void> {168  await loadSettings();169  // LV-7: cheap insurance against prototype pollution if a future caller ever170  // feeds parsed external JSON here (native spread keeps __proto__ an own-171  // property today, but Object.assign-style consumers and JSON revivers have172  // been burned before).173  const safe = Object.fromEntries(174    Object.entries(patch).filter(175      ([k]) => !["__proto__", "constructor", "prototype"].includes(k),176    ),177  ) as Partial<VaultSettings>;178  settings = { ...settings, ...safe };179  await persistSettings();180}181182async function persistSettings(): Promise<void> {183  try {184    await chrome.storage.local.set({ peach_settings: settings });185  } catch (err) {186    throw mapStorageError(err);187  }188}189190function mapStorageError(err: unknown): Error {191  const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);192  if (/QUOTA_BYTES|quota/i.test(message)) {193    return new Error("STORAGE_QUOTA_EXCEEDED");194  }195  return err instanceof Error ? err : new Error(message);196}197198async function loadSettings(): Promise<void> {199  const result = await chrome.storage.local.get("peach_settings");200  settings = (result as { peach_settings?: VaultSettings }).peach_settings ?? {};201}202203// Fire-and-forget sync trigger after a committed vault write. A failure here204// must never fail the write that caused it.205function fireSyncTrigger(reason: "vault_change"): void {206  void Promise.resolve()207    .then(() => triggerSyncIfReachable({ reason }))208    .catch(() => {209      /* no sync runner registered, or nothing reachable — non-fatal */210    });211}212213let lockedSyncRefreshHook: (() => Promise<void>) | null = null;214let lockedSyncUnlockHook: (() => Promise<void>) | null = null;215216export function setLockedSyncHooks(hooks: {217  refresh: () => Promise<void>;218  afterUnlock: () => Promise<void>;219}): void {220  lockedSyncRefreshHook = hooks.refresh;221  lockedSyncUnlockHook = hooks.afterUnlock;222}223224async function refreshLockedSyncState(): Promise<void> {225  if (vaultMode !== "real" || !rootKey || !lockedSyncRefreshHook) return;226  await lockedSyncRefreshHook().catch((error) => {227    console.warn("[Peach sync] locked spool refresh failed:", error);228  });229}230231// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------232// HIBP breach check (k-anonymity model)233// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------234235export async function checkBreach(password: string): Promise<number> {236  // HIBP k-anonymity API is keyed on SHA-1 prefixes — this is dictated by237  // the public API, not a security choice. Do not migrate to SHA-256 here.238  const encoder = new TextEncoder();239  const hashBuffer = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-1", encoder.encode(password));240  const hashHex = Array.from(new Uint8Array(hashBuffer))241    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))242    .join("")243    .toUpperCase();244245  const prefix = hashHex.slice(0, 5);246  const suffix = hashHex.slice(5);247248  try {249    // PCH-02-007: request HIBP response padding so response length does not250    // reveal how many suffixes a queried prefix returned.251    const res = await fetch(`https://api.pwnedpasswords.com/range/${prefix}`, {252      headers: { "Add-Padding": "true" },253    });254    if (!res.ok) return 0;255    const text = await res.text();256    const match = text.split("\r\n").find((l) => l.startsWith(suffix));257    return match ? parseInt(match.split(":")[1], 10) : 0;258  } catch {259    return 0; // Network unavailable — don't block260  }261}262263export async function declineCardSaveOffer(last4: string, expMonth: string, expYear: string): Promise<void> {264  const fingerprint = await cardFingerprint(last4, expMonth, expYear);265  await loadSettings();266  settings = {267    ...settings,268    declinedCardFingerprints: [...(settings.declinedCardFingerprints ?? []), fingerprint],269  };270  await persistSettings();271}272273export async function isCardDeclined(last4: string, expMonth: string, expYear: string): Promise<boolean> {274  await loadSettings();275  const fingerprint = await cardFingerprint(last4, expMonth, expYear);276  return (settings.declinedCardFingerprints ?? []).includes(fingerprint);277}278279async function cardFingerprint(last4: string, expMonth: string, expYear: string): Promise<string> {280  const encoder = new TextEncoder();281  const buf = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", encoder.encode(`${last4}|${expMonth}|${expYear}`));282  return Array.from(new Uint8Array(buf).slice(0, 8))283    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))284    .join("");285}286287function hex(buf: Uint8Array): string {288  return Array.from(buf)289    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))290    .join("");291}292293function unhex(s: string): Uint8Array {294  const out = new Uint8Array(s.length / 2);295  for (let i = 0; i < s.length; i += 2) {296    out[i / 2] = parseInt(s.slice(i, i + 2), 16);297  }298  return out;299}300301// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------302// Root key generation and recovery word wrapping303// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------304305/**306 * Generate a random 32-byte root key and wrap it (AES-256-GCM) under a key307 * derived from the recovery word material via HKDF-SHA256. The wrapped blob308 * fields are stored in slot A alongside the password-wrapped ciphertext. The309 * root key itself is kept in memory for the session so getRecoveryWords() can310 * encode it without re-deriving.311 *312 * SECURITY MODEL (PCH-01-005): the recovery KEK is derived from the 12-word313 * material, which encodes only rootKey[0..16] (recovery-words.ts). The KEK is thus314 * derived from a PREFIX of the very plaintext it wraps, and effective recovery315 * security is 128-bit (standard for a 12-word phrase), NOT 256-bit. This is safe —316 * unwrapping requires the words, and the GCM ciphertext leaks nothing without them —317 * but it is intentional, not an oversight. A future escrow version wanting 256-bit318 * recovery must derive the words from INDEPENDENT entropy, not from the root key.319 */320async function generateAndWrapRootKey(): Promise<{321  rawRootKey: string; // hex of the plaintext root key — caller stores in rootKey322  recoverySalt: string;323  wrappedRootKey: string;324  wrappedNonce: string;325  wrappedTag: string;326}> {327  const rootKeyBytes = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32));328329  // Derive the recovery key from the BIP39 words encoding of the root key.330  const words = await rootKeyToWords(rootKeyBytes);331  const wordMaterial = await wordsToRootKeyMaterial(words);332  const recoverySalt = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));333  const recoveryKey = await deriveRecoveryKey(wordMaterial, recoverySalt);334335  // Wrap the root key with the recovery key using AES-256-GCM directly.336  // We hex-encode rootKeyBytes so the plaintext is always valid UTF-8.337  const nonce = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));338  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(hex(rootKeyBytes));339  const raw = await crypto.subtle.encrypt(340    {341      name: "AES-GCM",342      iv: nonce,343      additionalData: new Uint8Array([1]).buffer as ArrayBuffer,344      tagLength: 128,345    },346    recoveryKey,347    encoded348  );349  // WebCrypto returns ciphertext || auth tag concatenated; split them.350  const rawU8 = new Uint8Array(raw);351  const ciphertext = hex(rawU8.slice(0, rawU8.length - 16));352  const tag = hex(rawU8.slice(rawU8.length - 16));353354  return {355    rawRootKey: hex(rootKeyBytes),356    recoverySalt: hex(recoverySalt),357    wrappedRootKey: ciphertext,358    wrappedNonce: hex(nonce),359    wrappedTag: tag,360  };361}362363async function wrapExistingRootKeyForRecovery(rootKeyBytes: Uint8Array): Promise<{364  recoverySalt: string;365  wrappedRootKey: string;366  wrappedNonce: string;367  wrappedTag: string;368}> {369  if (rootKeyBytes.length !== 32) {370    throw new Error("ADOPT_INVALID_ROOT_KEY: expected 32 bytes");371  }372373  const words = await rootKeyToWords(rootKeyBytes);374  const wordMaterial = await wordsToRootKeyMaterial(words);375  const recoverySalt = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));376  const recoveryKey = await deriveRecoveryKey(wordMaterial, recoverySalt);377  const nonce = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));378  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(hex(rootKeyBytes));379  const raw = await crypto.subtle.encrypt(380    {381      name: "AES-GCM",382      iv: nonce,383      additionalData: new Uint8Array([1]).buffer as ArrayBuffer,384      tagLength: 128,385    },386    recoveryKey,387    encoded,388  );389  const rawU8 = new Uint8Array(raw);390  return {391    recoverySalt: hex(recoverySalt),392    wrappedRootKey: hex(rawU8.slice(0, rawU8.length - 16)),393    wrappedNonce: hex(nonce),394    wrappedTag: hex(rawU8.slice(rawU8.length - 16)),395  };396}397398/**399 * Unwrap the root key using recovery words. Called during recovery flow when400 * the user provides their 12-word phrase and a new password.401 * Exported for use by the RECOVER_WITH_WORDS message handler.402 */403export async function unwrapRootKeyForRecovery(404  wrappedRootKey: string,405  wrappedNonce: string,406  wrappedTag: string,407  recoverySaltHex: string,408  words: string[]409): Promise<void> {410  const wordMaterial = await wordsToRootKeyMaterial(words);411  const recoverySalt = unhex(recoverySaltHex);412  const recoveryKey = await deriveRecoveryKey(wordMaterial, recoverySalt);413414  // Decrypt and cache the root key. The root key bytes were hex-encoded before415  // encryption so the ciphertext is valid UTF-8. We inline the AES-GCM decrypt416  // here to avoid passing a CryptoKey to the string-based encrypt/decrypt helpers.417  // Each component is stored separately in the vault slot; decode them individually418  // so the nonce is always exactly the 12 bytes from wrappedNonce.419  const nonceRaw = unhex(wrappedNonce);420  const ciphertextRaw = unhex(wrappedRootKey);421  const tagRaw = unhex(wrappedTag);422  // Combine ciphertext and tag for AES-GCM (expects ciphertext||tag).423  // Use explicit ArrayBuffer allocations to satisfy TS BufferSource constraints.424  const nonceU8 = nonceRaw as unknown as Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>;425  const combined = new Uint8Array(ciphertextRaw.length + tagRaw.length);426  combined.set(ciphertextRaw, 0);427  combined.set(tagRaw, ciphertextRaw.length);428  const raw = await crypto.subtle.decrypt(429    { name: "AES-GCM", iv: nonceU8, additionalData: new Uint8Array([1]).buffer as ArrayBuffer, tagLength: 128 },430    recoveryKey,431    combined432  );433  const decryptedHex = new TextDecoder().decode(raw);434  rootKey = unhex(decryptedHex);435}436437/**438 * Re-wrap the cached root key under a new derived key (from the user's new439 * password). Called after password change and after recovery re-key so the440 * same recovery words continue to work with the updated password — and so441 * subsequent unlocks can rehydrate rootKey via deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey.442 *443 * recovery_* fields are intentionally not touched: those wrap rootKey under444 * the recovery words, which do not change when the password changes.445 */446export async function rewrapRootKeyForPassword(447  newDerivedKey: Uint8Array,448  _newSalt: Uint8Array449): Promise<void> {450  if (!rootKey) throw new Error("root key not set");451  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);452  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");453  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(newDerivedKey, rootKey);454  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, { ...slotA, ...pwRoot });455}456457/**458 * Change the vault encryption to a new derived key (already derived from459 * the user's new password). Used by RECOVER_WITH_WORDS and changePassword.460 * Caller is responsible for key swap and snapshot.461 */462async function reencryptVaultForNewKey(463  newKey: Uint8Array,464  slotA: StoredVault465): Promise<void> {466  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured, duressConfigured ? DURESS_SLOT_SIZE : 0);467  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(newKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");468  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, {469    ...slotA,470    nonce,471    ciphertext,472    tag,473  });474}475476/**477 * Full password change with an already-derived key (used after recovery).478 * Unlike changePassword(), this skips re-verification of current password479 * since recovery flow has already validated the user's identity via words.480 */481export async function changePasswordWithNewKey(482  newSalt: Uint8Array,483  newKey: Uint8Array484): Promise<void> {485  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);486  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");487  // reencryptVaultForNewKey must receive the updated salt so that subsequent488  // UNLOCK calls with the new password can re-derive the correct key.489  await reencryptVaultForNewKey(newKey, { ...slotA, salt: hex(newSalt) });490  if (derivedKey) zeroKey(derivedKey);491  derivedKey = newKey;492  // PCH-01-008: re-escrow the new key (see changePassword). The recovery flow493  // reaches this path, so a post-recovery SW restart would otherwise lock out494  // a user who just reset their password.495  void saveSessionKey(newKey, "real");496  // Refresh pw_root_* under the new key so deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey works497  // on the next unlock (H2/COR-006). If rootKey is missing — recovery flow498  // should have populated it — fall back silently rather than blowing up the499  // recovery path; migrateToRecovery will rehydrate on the next unlock.500  if (rootKey) {501    const slotAfter = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);502    if (slotAfter) {503      const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(newKey, rootKey);504      await writeSlot(SLOT_A, { ...slotAfter, ...pwRoot });505    }506  }507  if (!duressConfigured) {508    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(slotA.ciphertext.length / 2));509  }510  await stampLocalVaultMutation();511}512513// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------514// Salt generation --- exported so the RECOVER_WITH_WORDS handler can derive515// a new key after password reset without re-importing the crypto module.516// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------517518export { deriveKey, generateSalt };519520export async function loadSlotA(): Promise<StoredVault | null> {521  return loadSlot(SLOT_A);522}523524/**525 * Recover the session root key by AES-GCM-decrypting the pw_root_* fields526 * (a second wrapping of the root key under the password-derived key). This527 * is what makes GET_RECOVERY_WORDS work across lock/unlock cycles without528 * the user re-entering their recovery phrase: the same root key bytes —529 * and therefore the same 12 words — survive every unlock.530 *531 * Returns null when the pw_root fields are absent (pre-v2.12 vault that532 * hasn't been migrated yet) or when decryption fails (wrong derived key,533 * tampered ciphertext). On null the caller should fall through to534 * migrateToRecovery() to populate the fields.535 */536async function deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(537  derivedKeyBytes: Uint8Array,538  slotA: StoredVault,539): Promise<Uint8Array | null> {540  if (!slotA.pw_root_ciphertext || !slotA.pw_root_nonce || !slotA.pw_root_tag) {541    return null;542  }543  try {544    const rootHex = await decrypt(545      derivedKeyBytes,546      slotA.pw_root_nonce,547      slotA.pw_root_ciphertext,548      slotA.pw_root_tag,549      "pw_root_v1",550    );551    return unhex(rootHex);552  } catch {553    return null;554  }555}556557// AES-GCM-wrap rootKey under derivedKey for the pw_root_* fields. Returns the558// hex-encoded ciphertext/nonce/tag triple ready to embed in StoredVault.559async function wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(560  derivedKeyBytes: Uint8Array,561  rootKeyBytes: Uint8Array,562): Promise<{ pw_root_ciphertext: string; pw_root_nonce: string; pw_root_tag: string }> {563  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKeyBytes, hex(rootKeyBytes), "pw_root_v1");564  return {565    pw_root_ciphertext: ciphertext,566    pw_root_nonce: nonce,567    pw_root_tag: tag,568  };569}570571/**572 * For vaults created before v2.12 (no recovery_salt/recovery_wrapped_root_key),573 * generate the root key, wrap it under the recovery words, and persist the574 * recovery escrow into slot A. The caller must show the recovery words to the575 * user before calling this — once called, those words are the vault's recovery576 * path. This runs once, on the first unlock of an upgraded vault.577 */578export async function migrateToRecovery(): Promise<void> {579  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {580    throw new Error("vault must be unlocked in real mode");581  }582  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);583  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");584  const hasRecoveryEscrow =585    !!slotA.recovery_salt && !!slotA.recovery_wrapped_root_key;586  const hasPwRoot = !!slotA.pw_root_ciphertext && !!slotA.pw_root_nonce;587  if (hasRecoveryEscrow && hasPwRoot) return; // already done588589  // If recovery escrow already exists but pw_root doesn't, we cannot recover590  // the original rootKey without the user's words. The least-surprising path591  // is to rotate to a fresh root key — the user's old recovery words become592  // invalid but we surface peach_recovery_pending so the popup re-presents593  // the words. The unlock-path callers all set that flag.594  const { rawRootKey, recoverySalt, wrappedRootKey, wrappedNonce, wrappedTag } =595    await generateAndWrapRootKey();596  rootKey = unhex(rawRootKey);597598  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(derivedKey, rootKey);599  const nextSlotA: StoredVault = {600    ...slotA,601    recovery_salt: recoverySalt,602    recovery_wrapped_root_key: wrappedRootKey,603    recovery_nonce: wrappedNonce,604    recovery_tag: wrappedTag,605    ...pwRoot,606  };607  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, nextSlotA);608  await stampLocalVaultMutation();609}610611/**612 * Returns the 12 recovery words for the current session's root key.613 * Must be called while the vault is unlocked. Throws if recovery has not614 * been set up (pre-v2.12 vault that hasn't migrated yet).615 */616export async function getRecoveryWords(): Promise<string[]> {617  if (!rootKey) {618    throw new Error("recovery not set up — vault may need migration");619  }620  return rootKeyToWords(rootKey);621}622623async function loadSlot(key: string): Promise<StoredVault | null> {624  const result = await chrome.storage.local.get(key);625  return (result as Record<string, StoredVault | undefined>)[key] ?? null;626}627628async function writeSlot(key: string, vault: StoredVault): Promise<void> {629  try {630    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [key]: vault });631  } catch (err) {632    throw mapStorageError(err);633  }634}635636/**637 * Roll back a vault that was created by [createVaultFromRootKey] but638 * couldn't be paired (e.g. the subsequent license activation, identity639 * derivation, or paired-device upsert failed). Without this, a failed640 * receiver session leaves behind an empty vault — the user has to641 * re-pair to get a working setup, but the empty vault sits in the way.642 *643 * The call is idempotent: removing keys that aren't there is a no-op.644 */645export async function rollbackAdoptedVault(): Promise<void> {646  lock();647  try {648    await chrome.storage.local.remove([649      SLOT_A,650      SLOT_B,651      "peach_last_modified_at",652    ]);653  } catch (err) {654    throw mapStorageError(err);655  }656}657658async function commitCreatedVaultSlots(slotA: StoredVault, slotB: StoredVault): Promise<void> {659  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get("peach_last_modified_at");660  const previous = Number(661    (raw as Record<string, unknown>).peach_last_modified_at,662  );663  const next = Math.max(664    Date.now(),665    Number.isFinite(previous) ? previous + 1 : 0,666  );667  try {668    await chrome.storage.local.set({669      [SLOT_A]: slotA,670      [SLOT_B]: slotB,671      peach_last_modified_at: String(next),672    });673  } catch (err) {674    throw mapStorageError(err);675  }676}677678// Monotonic clock for per-entry modifiedAt / deletedAt timestamps. Guards the679// sync layer's last-write-wins merge against wall-clock regressions (NTP step,680// manual clock change, DST glitch): a backwards Date.now() must never produce681// an entry timestamp that's <= the entry's existing modifiedAt, or a genuine682// local edit would lose to a stale remote copy. The returned value is always683// strictly greater than both the entry's current modifiedAt and the previous684// call's result (SEV-2-E).685let lastEntryTimestamp = 0;686function monotonicEntryTimestamp(currentModifiedAt?: number): number {687  const base = Math.max(688    Date.now(),689    (currentModifiedAt ?? 0) + 1,690    lastEntryTimestamp + 1,691  );692  lastEntryTimestamp = base;693  return base;694}695696async function stampLocalVaultMutation(): Promise<void> {697  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get("peach_last_modified_at");698  const previous = Number(699    (raw as Record<string, unknown>).peach_last_modified_at,700  );701  const next = Math.max(702    Date.now(),703    Number.isFinite(previous) ? previous + 1 : 0,704  );705  await chrome.storage.local.set({706    peach_last_modified_at: String(next),707  });708}709710/**711 * One-shot migration from the pre-A-2 schema (peach_vault + peach_decoy_vault712 * + peach_duress flag) to the slot-neutral schema (peach_vault_a +713 * peach_vault_b). Runs at most once per session; safe to call repeatedly.714 */715async function ensureMigrated(): Promise<void> {716  if (migrationRan) return;717  migrationRan = true;718719  const keys = [LEGACY_MAIN, LEGACY_DECOY, LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG, SLOT_A, SLOT_B];720  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get(keys);721  const slotAExists = raw[SLOT_A] !== undefined;722  const slotBExists = raw[SLOT_B] !== undefined;723  const legacyMain = raw[LEGACY_MAIN] as StoredVault | undefined;724  const legacyDecoy = raw[LEGACY_DECOY] as StoredVault | undefined;725726  // Fresh install with nothing in storage — nothing to do; createVault() sets up both slots.727  if (!slotAExists && !legacyMain) return;728729  // Already migrated.730  if (slotAExists && slotBExists && !legacyMain && !legacyDecoy) return;731732  let didMigrate = false;733  if (legacyMain && !slotAExists) {734    await writeSlot(SLOT_A, legacyMain);735    didMigrate = true;736  }737738  // If slot B isn't set, populate it: use legacy decoy when present, else noise.739  if (!slotBExists) {740    const target = (legacyMain ?? raw[SLOT_A]) as StoredVault | undefined;741    if (legacyDecoy) {742      await writeSlot(SLOT_B, legacyDecoy);743      didMigrate = true;744    } else if (target) {745      await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(target.ciphertext.length / 2));746      didMigrate = true;747    }748  }749750  const toRemove: string[] = [];751  if (legacyMain) toRemove.push(LEGACY_MAIN);752  if (legacyDecoy) toRemove.push(LEGACY_DECOY);753  if (raw[LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG] !== undefined) toRemove.push(LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG);754  if (toRemove.length > 0) {755    await chrome.storage.local.remove(toRemove);756    didMigrate = true;757  }758  if (didMigrate) {759    await stampLocalVaultMutation();760  }761}762763// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------764// Padding + noise helpers765// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------766767/**768 * Pads the plaintext string with trailing spaces so that the encoded byte769 * length is a multiple of PAD_BLOCK. JSON.parse tolerates trailing770 * whitespace after a complete document, so the padding is transparent on771 * decode. Ciphertext length equals plaintext length plus a 16-byte tag.772 */773function padPlaintext(json: string, minBytes = 0): string {774  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(json);775  const bucket = Math.max(PAD_BLOCK, Math.ceil(encoded.length / PAD_BLOCK) * PAD_BLOCK);776  // minBytes lets the duress path force a fixed ceiling so both slots match.777  const target = Math.max(bucket, minBytes);778  const padLen = target - encoded.length;779  return json + " ".repeat(padLen);780}781782/**783 * Produces a StoredVault-shaped record filled with CSPRNG bytes. The784 * ciphertext length matches the given byte count. Because GCM ciphertext is785 * pseudo-random, this blob is indistinguishable at rest from a real786 * encrypted vault without the key.787 *788 * crypto.getRandomValues() caps each call at 65536 bytes (the Web Crypto789 * spec hard limit). Chunk the fill so vaults larger than that — common once790 * the user has dozens of entries or any passkey — don't throw.791 */792const CSPRNG_CHUNK = 65_536;793794function fillRandom(buf: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {795  for (let offset = 0; offset < buf.length; offset += CSPRNG_CHUNK) {796    const end = Math.min(offset + CSPRNG_CHUNK, buf.length);797    const chunk = new Uint8Array(end - offset);798    crypto.getRandomValues(chunk);799    buf.set(chunk, offset);800  }801  return buf;802}803804function generateNoiseBlob(ciphertextBytes: number): StoredVault {805  const salt = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));806  const nonce = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));807  const cipher = fillRandom(new Uint8Array(ciphertextBytes));808  const tag = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));809  return {810    version: 1,811    salt: hex(salt),812    nonce: hex(nonce),813    ciphertext: hex(cipher),814    tag: hex(tag),815  };816}817818// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------819// Encrypted plaintext envelope820// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------821822type VaultPayload = {823  entries: VaultEntry[];824  duressConfigured?: boolean;825};826827type DecryptedPayload = {828  entries: VaultEntry[];829  duressConfigured: boolean;830  /**831   * True when at least one entry in the on-disk payload had a legacy shape832   * (pre-v2.11.0 passkey type/flat fields, or pre-A-2 created/updated keys)833   * and got rewritten by normalizeEntry. The unlock path uses this to834   * persist the new shape immediately — without it, the migration would835   * re-run on every unlock and old shape never disappears from disk.836   */837  migratedFromLegacy: boolean;838};839840function encodePayload(entries: VaultEntry[], duress: boolean, minBytes = 0): string {841  const envelope: VaultPayload = { entries, duressConfigured: duress };842  return padPlaintext(JSON.stringify(envelope), minBytes);843}844845function rawNeedsMigration(raw: VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry): boolean {846  if ("created" in raw || "updated" in raw) return true;847  const flat = raw as Partial<VaultEntry>;848  if (flat.type === "passkey") return true;849  // Flat rpId without a passkey sub-object means pre-v2.11.0 schema.850  if (flat.rpId !== undefined && flat.passkey === undefined) return true;851  return false;852}853854function decodePayload(plain: string): DecryptedPayload {855  const parsed = JSON.parse(plain) as856    | Array<VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry>857    | VaultPayload;858859  const rawEntries = Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed : parsed.entries ?? [];860  const flatMigrationNeeded = rawEntries.some(rawNeedsMigration);861862  const normalized = rawEntries.map(normalizeEntry);863  const { merged } = mergePasskeyOnlyIntoLogins(normalized);864865  if (Array.isArray(parsed)) {866    return {867      entries: normalized,868      duressConfigured: false,869      migratedFromLegacy: true, // pre-A-2 array shape always needs save870    };871  }872873  return {874    entries: normalized,875    duressConfigured: parsed.duressConfigured === true,876    migratedFromLegacy: flatMigrationNeeded || merged,877  };878}879880/**881 * One-time consolidation pass run alongside the legacy passkey migration.882 *883 * Pre-v2.11.0 the Chrome passkey path always created a fresh `type:"passkey"`884 * entry per registration — so users who tested registration multiple times885 * accumulated several passkey-bearing entries for the same RP, and the886 * migration to the unified shape carried that duplication forward. This887 * pass collapses the duplicates:888 *889 *   1. Group passkey-bearing (and not deleted) entries by `passkey.rpId`.890 *   2. Within each group, the most recently-active credential wins (prefer891 *      lastUsedAt, fall back to passkey.createdAt, fall back to modifiedAt).892 *   3. If a NON-passkey login entry exists for that RP (matched by url or893 *      additionalUrls hostname), attach the winning passkey to it and894 *      soft-delete every passkey-bearing entry in the group.895 *   4. Otherwise, soft-delete every loser in the group, keeping the winner896 *      as a passkey-only entry.897 *898 * Soft delete (deletedAt) rather than splice — the trash flow keeps the899 * record around for retention and the user can restore if the heuristic900 * picked wrong. The `merged` flag goes back to decodePayload so the901 * unlock path persists the consolidated shape immediately.902 */903function mergePasskeyOnlyIntoLogins(entries: VaultEntry[]): { merged: boolean } {904  let merged = false;905  const now = Date.now();906907  const candidates = entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt && e.passkey);908  const byRpId = new Map<string, VaultEntry[]>();909  for (const e of candidates) {910    const rpId = e.passkey!.rpId;911    const list = byRpId.get(rpId);912    if (list) list.push(e);913    else byRpId.set(rpId, [e]);914  }915916  for (const [rpId, group] of byRpId) {917    if (group.length === 0) continue;918    group.sort((a, b) => {919      const aT =920        a.passkey!.lastUsedAt ?? a.passkey!.createdAt ?? a.modifiedAt ?? a.createdAt;921      const bT =922        b.passkey!.lastUsedAt ?? b.passkey!.createdAt ?? b.modifiedAt ?? b.createdAt;923      return bT - aT;924    });925    const winner = group[0]!;926927    // Look for a NON-passkey login entry matching this RP. Use the URL928    // hostname rather than a substring search so a "login.foo.com" entry929    // doesn't accidentally absorb a passkey for "foo.com".930    const loginTarget = entries.find((e) => {931      if (e.deletedAt || e.passkey || e.type !== "login") return false;932      if (e.url && extractDomain(e.url) === rpId) return true;933      for (const extra of e.additionalUrls ?? []) {934        if (extractDomain(extra) === rpId) return true;935      }936      return false;937    });938939    if (loginTarget) {940      loginTarget.passkey = winner.passkey;941      // A passkey entry may also carry the site's TOTP seed. Preserve it when942      // the passkey is consolidated onto an existing login instead of943      // soft-deleting the only record that held the 2FA configuration.944      if (!loginTarget.totp && winner.totp) {945        loginTarget.totp = winner.totp;946        loginTarget.totpAlgorithm = winner.totpAlgorithm;947        loginTarget.totpDigits = winner.totpDigits;948        loginTarget.totpPeriod = winner.totpPeriod;949      }950      loginTarget.modifiedAt = now;951      for (const dup of group) {952        if (!dup.deletedAt) {953          dup.deletedAt = now;954          dup.modifiedAt = now;955        }956      }957      merged = true;958    } else if (group.length > 1) {959      for (let i = 1; i < group.length; i += 1) {960        const dup = group[i]!;961        if (!dup.deletedAt) {962          dup.deletedAt = now;963          dup.modifiedAt = now;964        }965      }966      merged = true;967    }968  }969970  return { merged };971}972973// Validates that a `StoredVault` record on disk has the field shape we expect974// before treating an AES-GCM decrypt success as a clean unlock. AES-GCM only975// authenticates the static VERSION_BYTE AAD, not the `version` field on the976// outer record — a corrupted `version: 42` slot still decrypts cleanly. This977// check surfaces that as `corrupted` (M7/COR-007) so the popup can offer a978// history-restore path instead of falsely reporting "wrong password".979function hasValidVaultSchema(v: unknown): v is StoredVault {980  if (typeof v !== "object" || v === null) return false;981  const r = v as Record<string, unknown>;982  return (983    r.version === 1 &&984    typeof r.salt === "string" &&985    typeof r.nonce === "string" &&986    typeof r.ciphertext === "string" &&987    typeof r.tag === "string"988  );989}990991export type TryDecryptResult =992  | { status: "ok"; payload: DecryptedPayload }993  | { status: "wrong_key" }994  | { status: "corrupted"; reason: string };995996// Exported solely for `unlockFromCodex` below, which needs to verify a997// supplied passphrase against a slotA blob *without* committing anything to998// storage. Keep this internal otherwise — callers crossing the messages.ts999// boundary should always go through `unlock` / `verifyMainPassword` so the1000// constant-time invariants in Projects.md §3.4 are not bypassed.1001export async function tryDecryptSlot(1002  vault: StoredVault,1003  key: Uint8Array,1004  aadTag?: string,1005): Promise<DecryptedPayload | null> {1006  const res = await tryDecryptSlotResult(vault, key, aadTag);1007  return res.status === "ok" ? res.payload : null;1008}10091010export async function tryDecryptSlotResult(1011  vault: StoredVault,1012  key: Uint8Array,1013  aadTag?: string,1014): Promise<TryDecryptResult> {1015  if (!hasValidVaultSchema(vault)) {1016    return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_slot_schema" };1017  }1018  let plain: string;1019  try {1020    plain = await decrypt(key, vault.nonce, vault.ciphertext, vault.tag, aadTag);1021  } catch {1022    return { status: "wrong_key" };1023  }1024  try {1025    const parsed = JSON.parse(plain) as unknown;1026    if (typeof parsed !== "object" || parsed === null) {1027      return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_payload_shape" };1028    }1029    if (!Array.isArray(parsed) && !Array.isArray((parsed as VaultPayload).entries)) {1030      return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_payload_shape" };1031    }1032    return { status: "ok", payload: decodePayload(plain) };1033  } catch {1034    return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_payload_json" };1035  }1036}10371038// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------1039// Core operations1040// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------10411042function buildDomainIndexSync(all: VaultEntry[]): void {1043  domainIndex = new Map();10441045  for (const entry of all) {1046    if (entry.deletedAt) continue;1047    if (entry.type === "note" || entry.type === "card") continue;10481049    // An entry can match multiple sites via `additionalUrls`. Index each1050    // hostname so `queryDomain` returns the entry regardless of which alias1051    // the user is currently visiting. Dedupe per-entry so a single entry1052    // never appears twice in one bucket.1053    const domains = new Set<string>();1054    const primary = extractDomain(entry.url ?? "");1055    if (primary) domains.add(primary);1056    for (const extra of entry.additionalUrls ?? []) {1057      const d = extractDomain(extra);1058      if (d) domains.add(d);1059    }1060    if (domains.size === 0) continue;10611062    for (const domain of domains) {1063      const bucket = domainIndex.get(domain) ?? [];1064      bucket.push(entry);1065      domainIndex.set(domain, bucket);1066    }1067  }1068}10691070export async function createVault(password: string): Promise<void> {1071  await ensureMigrated();10721073  const salt = generateSalt();1074  derivedKey = await deriveKey(password, salt);1075  entries = [];1076  vaultMode = "real";1077  duressConfigured = false;1078  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);10791080  // Generate and wrap the root key for recovery word escrow.1081  const { rawRootKey, recoverySalt, wrappedRootKey, wrappedNonce, wrappedTag } =1082    await generateAndWrapRootKey();1083  rootKey = unhex(rawRootKey);10841085  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured, duressConfigured ? DURESS_SLOT_SIZE : 0);1086  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");10871088  // Second wrapping of rootKey under derivedKey so future unlocks can rehydrate1089  // it without recovery words (H2/COR-006).1090  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(derivedKey, rootKey);10911092  const slotA: StoredVault = {1093    version: 1,1094    salt: hex(salt),1095    nonce,1096    ciphertext,1097    tag,1098    recovery_salt: recoverySalt,1099    recovery_wrapped_root_key: wrappedRootKey,1100    recovery_nonce: wrappedNonce,1101    recovery_tag: wrappedTag,1102    ...pwRoot,1103  };1104  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, slotA);11051106  // Matching-size noise blob for slot B, so a fresh install shows two1107  // similarly-shaped records regardless of whether duress is ever set up.1108  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2));1109  await stampLocalVaultMutation();11101111  touchAutoLock();1112}11131114/**1115 * Creates a local vault from an existing vault root key received through the1116 * SAS-gated adoption protocol. The password is local to this device; it wraps1117 * the adopted root key at rest and does not need to match the source device.1118 */1119export async function createVaultFromRootKey(1120  password: string,1121  rootKeyHex: string,1122): Promise<{ vaultId: string }> {1123  if (typeof password !== "string" || password.length === 0) {1124    throw new Error("ADOPT_INVALID_PASSWORD");1125  }1126  if (typeof rootKeyHex !== "string" || !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(rootKeyHex)) {1127    throw new Error("ADOPT_INVALID_ROOT_KEY: expected 64 lowercase hex chars");1128  }11291130  const rootKeyBytes = unhex(rootKeyHex);1131  if (rootKeyBytes.length !== 32) {1132    rootKeyBytes.fill(0);1133    throw new Error("ADOPT_INVALID_ROOT_KEY: expected 32 bytes");1134  }11351136  let nextDerivedKey: Uint8Array | null = null;1137  let sessionRootKey: Uint8Array | null = null;1138  try {1139    await ensureMigrated();1140    if ((await loadSlot(SLOT_A)) !== null) {1141      throw new Error("ADOPT_VAULT_ALREADY_EXISTS");1142    }11431144    const nextEntries: VaultEntry[] = [];1145    const nextDuressConfigured = false;1146    const vaultId = await computeVaultId(rootKeyBytes);1147    const salt = generateSalt();1148    nextDerivedKey = await deriveKey(password, salt);1149    const recovery = await wrapExistingRootKeyForRecovery(rootKeyBytes);11501151    sessionRootKey = new Uint8Array(rootKeyBytes);1152    const plaintext = encodePayload(nextEntries, nextDuressConfigured, 0);1153    const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(nextDerivedKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");1154    const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(nextDerivedKey, sessionRootKey);1155    const slotA: StoredVault = {1156      version: 1,1157      salt: hex(salt),1158      nonce,1159      ciphertext,1160      tag,1161      recovery_salt: recovery.recoverySalt,1162      recovery_wrapped_root_key: recovery.wrappedRootKey,1163      recovery_nonce: recovery.wrappedNonce,1164      recovery_tag: recovery.wrappedTag,1165      ...pwRoot,1166    };1167    const slotB = generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2);1168    await commitCreatedVaultSlots(slotA, slotB);11691170    const previousDerivedKey = derivedKey;1171    const previousRootKey = rootKey;1172    derivedKey = nextDerivedKey;1173    rootKey = sessionRootKey;1174    nextDerivedKey = null;1175    sessionRootKey = null;1176    entries = nextEntries;1177    vaultMode = "real";1178    duressConfigured = nextDuressConfigured;1179    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1180    if (previousDerivedKey && previousDerivedKey !== derivedKey) zeroKey(previousDerivedKey);1181    if (previousRootKey && previousRootKey !== rootKey) previousRootKey.fill(0);1182    touchAutoLock();11831184    return { vaultId };1185  } finally {1186    rootKeyBytes.fill(0);1187    if (nextDerivedKey) zeroKey(nextDerivedKey);1188    if (sessionRootKey) sessionRootKey.fill(0);1189  }1190}11911192export async function hasVault(): Promise<boolean> {1193  await ensureMigrated();1194  return (await loadSlot(SLOT_A)) !== null;1195}11961197/**1198 * Returns whether the real vault has recorded that a duress passphrase is1199 * configured. Reliable only after a real-mode unlock — before unlock or in1200 * decoy mode, returns false because we cannot read slot A's plaintext.1201 */1202export async function isDuressEnabled(): Promise<boolean> {1203  return vaultMode === "real" && duressConfigured;1204}12051206export async function setupDuress(duressPassword: string): Promise<void> {1207  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {1208    throw new Error("vault must be unlocked in real mode");1209  }1210  await ensureMigrated();12111212  // Encrypt the decoy payload (empty entries) under the duress key. Pad to1213  // at least the current slot A ciphertext size so the two slots look the1214  // same at rest at setup time.1215  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1216  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");12171218  const decoySalt = generateSalt();1219  const decoyKey = await deriveKey(duressPassword, decoySalt);1220  try {1221    // Pad the decoy to the fixed duress ceiling. Slot A is re-encrypted to the1222    // same ceiling by the persistSlotA() call below (duressConfigured is now1223    // true), so both slots are exactly DURESS_SLOT_SIZE+tag at rest and their1224    // lengths cannot reveal that duress is configured (audit MEDIUM).1225    const plaintext = encodePayload([], false, DURESS_SLOT_SIZE);1226    const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(decoyKey, plaintext, "slot_b_v1");1227    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, {1228      version: 1,1229      salt: hex(decoySalt),1230      nonce,1231      ciphertext,1232      tag,1233    });1234  } finally {1235    zeroKey(decoyKey);1236  }12371238  // Re-encrypt slot A with the duressConfigured flag set to true. No external1239  // flag is written — the bit lives inside the encrypted envelope.1240  duressConfigured = true;1241  await persistSlotA();1242}12431244export async function disableDuress(): Promise<void> {1245  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {1246    throw new Error("vault must be unlocked in real mode");1247  }1248  await ensureMigrated();12491250  // Overwrite slot B with fresh noise that matches slot A's size. The slot1251  // remains occupied so its mere existence does not signal that duress was1252  // ever configured.1253  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1254  if (slotA) {1255    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(slotA.ciphertext.length / 2));1256  }12571258  duressConfigured = false;1259  await persistSlotA();1260}12611262// L14/COR-015: this function intentionally checks slot A (real vault) only.1263// A duress-mode user attempting changePassword is rejected earlier by the1264// vaultMode === 'decoy' check at changePassword. The real-vs-decoy1265// distinction here is by design — duress users cannot rotate the real1266// password by guessing it, and the asymmetry in error timing is acceptable1267// because duress mode is opt-in and the user knows their own decoy key.1268export async function verifyMainPassword(password: string): Promise<boolean> {1269  await ensureMigrated();1270  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1271  if (!slotA) return false;1272  const key = await deriveKey(password, unhex(slotA.salt));1273  try {1274    return (await tryDecryptSlot(slotA, key, "slot_a_v1")) !== null;1275  } finally {1276    zeroKey(key);1277  }1278}12791280export async function unlock(password: string): Promise<boolean> {1281  // LV-1: the normal path NFC-normalizes inside deriveKey. If that fails and1282  // the supplied password is not already in NFC form, the vault may have been1283  // sealed (pre-LV-1) with the raw, un-normalized bytes — retry with those.1284  if (await attemptUnlockWithDerive(password, deriveKey)) return true;12851286  const nfc = password.normalize("NFC");1287  if (password === nfc) return false; // ASCII/NFC password — no legacy form to try12881289  if (await attemptUnlockWithDerive(password, deriveKeyRaw)) {1290    // Heal: re-seal the real slot under the NFC-normalized key so every1291    // future unlock takes the normal path. Only the real vault is re-sealed;1292    // a non-NFC duress password keeps working through this fallback.1293    if (vaultMode === "real") {1294      try {1295        const newSalt = generateSalt();1296        const newKey = await deriveKey(password, newSalt);1297        await changePasswordWithNewKey(newSalt, newKey);1298      } catch (healErr) {1299        console.warn("[Peach] LV-1 NFC heal failed:", healErr);1300      }1301    }1302    return true;1303  }1304  return false;1305}13061307async function attemptUnlockWithDerive(1308  password: string,1309  derive: typeof deriveKey,1310): Promise<boolean> {1311  await ensureMigrated();13121313  // Load both slots in parallel. Both always exist post-migration; the1314  // parallel load and the parallel derivation below keep wall-clock time1315  // constant regardless of which slot's passphrase (real or decoy) the1316  // caller supplied, so a timing side channel cannot distinguish the1317  // duress path from the real-unlock path (DUR-002).1318  const [slotA, slotB] = await Promise.all([1319    loadSlot(SLOT_A),1320    loadSlot(SLOT_B),1321  ]);13221323  // Derive both keys in parallel, unconditionally.1324  const [keyA, keyB] = await Promise.all([1325    slotA ? derive(password, unhex(slotA.salt)) : Promise.resolve(null),1326    slotB ? derive(password, unhex(slotB.salt)) : Promise.resolve(null),1327  ]);13281329  // Attempt both decrypts in parallel. The Result variant lets us distinguish1330  // 'wrong_key' from 'corrupted' so callers can offer a history-restore path1331  // when a slot's schema is invalid even though AES-GCM authenticated (M7).1332  const [resultA, resultB] = await Promise.all([1333    keyA && slotA1334      ? tryDecryptSlotResult(slotA, keyA, "slot_a_v1")1335      : Promise.resolve({ status: "wrong_key" } as TryDecryptResult),1336    keyB && slotB1337      ? tryDecryptSlotResult(slotB, keyB, "slot_b_v1")1338      : Promise.resolve({ status: "wrong_key" } as TryDecryptResult),1339  ]);1340  const payloadA = resultA.status === "ok" ? resultA.payload : null;1341  const payloadB = resultB.status === "ok" ? resultB.payload : null;13421343  if (payloadA && keyA) {1344    derivedKey = keyA;1345    void saveSessionKey(keyA, "real");1346    vaultMode = "real";1347    entries = payloadA.entries;1348    duressConfigured = payloadA.duressConfigured;1349    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1350    await loadSettings();1351    touchAutoLock();1352    if (keyB) zeroKey(keyB);13531354    // slotA is non-null when payloadA is truthy (keyA was derived from slotA).1355    if (slotA) {1356      const needsRecoverySetup =1357        !slotA.recovery_salt || !slotA.recovery_wrapped_root_key;1358      if (!needsRecoverySetup) {1359        rootKey = await deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(keyA, slotA);1360      }1361      // Pre-v2.12 vault, or a vault whose pw_root_* fields haven't been written1362      // yet: generate the recovery escrow and seed pw_root_* so subsequent1363      // unlocks can rehydrate rootKey without the user's recovery words.1364      // Best-effort — a failure here must not block unlock.1365      if (needsRecoverySetup || !rootKey) {1366        try {1367          await migrateToRecovery();1368          if (needsRecoverySetup) {1369            // String "1" matches the popup's existing peach_recovery_pending1370            // check; surfaced so the user re-confirms recovery words after a1371            // legacy-vault unlock (H2/COR-006).1372            await chrome.storage.local.set({ peach_recovery_pending: '1' });1373          }1374        } catch (migrationErr) {1375          console.warn('[Peach] recovery migration failed:', migrationErr);1376        }1377      }1378    }13791380    // If the payload had a pre-v2.11.0 shape (legacy passkey type, flat1381    // passkey fields, or pre-A-2 created/updated keys), rewrite it now so1382    // the next save uses the new format and migration doesn't re-run forever.1383    if (payloadA.migratedFromLegacy) {1384      await persistSlotA();1385    }1386    await lockedSyncUnlockHook?.().catch((error) => {1387      console.warn("[Peach sync] locked inbox drain failed:", error);1388    });1389    return true;1390  }13911392  if (payloadB && keyB) {1393    derivedKey = keyB;1394    void saveSessionKey(keyB, "decoy");1395    vaultMode = "decoy";1396    entries = payloadB.entries;1397    duressConfigured = false;1398    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1399    await loadSettings();1400    touchAutoLock();1401    if (keyA) zeroKey(keyA);1402    return true;1403  }14041405  if (keyA) zeroKey(keyA);1406  if (keyB) zeroKey(keyB);1407  // Surface corruption (good AES tag, broken schema) distinctly from1408  // wrong-password so the popup can offer history-restore (M7/COR-007).1409  if (resultA.status === "corrupted") {1410    lastUnlockFailureReason = resultA.reason;1411  } else if (resultB.status === "corrupted") {1412    lastUnlockFailureReason = resultB.reason;1413  }1414  return false;1415}14161417// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------1418// MV3 service worker session key — survives SW restarts within a browser session1419// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------14201421// chrome.storage.session is cleared on browser close; survives SW restart.1422// Firefox does not implement it (persistent background script, no restart risk).1423const SESSION_KEY_STORAGE = "peach_session_dk";14241425async function saveSessionKey(key: Uint8Array, mode: "real" | "decoy"): Promise<void> {1426  if (!chrome.storage.session) return;1427  await chrome.storage.session.set({ [SESSION_KEY_STORAGE]: { keyHex: hex(key), mode } });1428}14291430async function clearSessionKey(): Promise<void> {1431  if (!chrome.storage.session) return;1432  await chrome.storage.session.remove(SESSION_KEY_STORAGE);1433}14341435/**1436 * On SW restart, re-derive all in-memory vault state from the session key1437 * stored in chrome.storage.session (set at unlock time, cleared by lock();1438 * also cleared on browser close or when restoration fails).1439 * Returns true if the vault was restored, false if no session key was found.1440 * No-ops if the vault is already unlocked.1441 */1442export async function restoreFromSession(): Promise<boolean> {1443  if (derivedKey !== null) return true;1444  if (!chrome.storage.session) return false;1445  const stored = await chrome.storage.session.get(SESSION_KEY_STORAGE);1446  const entry = stored[SESSION_KEY_STORAGE] as { keyHex: string; mode: "real" | "decoy" } | undefined;1447  if (!entry?.keyHex) return false;14481449  const key = unhex(entry.keyHex);1450  const slotKey = entry.mode === "real" ? SLOT_A : SLOT_B;1451  const aadTag = entry.mode === "real" ? "slot_a_v1" : "slot_b_v1";1452  const slot = await loadSlot(slotKey);1453  if (!slot) { await clearSessionKey(); return false; }14541455  const result = await tryDecryptSlotResult(slot, key, aadTag);1456  if (result.status !== "ok") { await clearSessionKey(); return false; }14571458  derivedKey = key;1459  vaultMode = entry.mode;1460  entries = result.payload.entries;1461  duressConfigured = entry.mode === "real" ? result.payload.duressConfigured : false;1462  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1463  await loadSettings();1464  touchAutoLock();14651466  // The rootKey is what identity/sync derivations use. deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey1467  // pulls it from the pw_root_* fields on the slot — set on every createVault +1468  // re-set on every password change (H2/COR-006). The previous gate on1469  // recovery_salt + recovery_wrapped_root_key silently left rootKey unset for1470  // any vault that hadn't been through migrateToRecovery, which broke background1471  // sync: the SW re-woke from the alarm, isUnlocked() was true (the session key1472  // restored derivedKey + entries), but getRootKeyHex() returned null and the1473  // runner returned VAULT_LOCKED. The fix is to always try the pw_root path1474  // when the slot has those fields — the recovery fields are independent.1475  if (entry.mode === "real") {1476    try {1477      rootKey = await deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(key, slot);1478    } catch {1479      /* non-fatal — sync identity will still skip on the runner's null-rootKey check */1480    }1481  }14821483  await lockedSyncUnlockHook?.().catch((error) => {1484    console.warn("[Peach sync] locked inbox drain failed:", error);1485  });14861487  return true;1488}14891490export function lock(): void {1491  // A user-initiated lock must be durable across MV3 service-worker restarts.1492  // The SW is idle-killed after ~30s of inactivity, and the popup's next open1493  // wakes a cold SW whose restoreFromSession() reads chrome.storage.session.1494  // If the session key survived lock(), that restore would silently re-unlock1495  // the vault ~a minute after the user locked it — a lock that only held1496  // while the SW happened to stay alive. The background-sync convenience the1497  // session key once bought (sync runner re-waking to a restored vault) is1498  // not worth an unlocked vault the user never asked to unlock; when locked,1499  // sync-runner correctly reports VAULT_LOCKED instead.1500  void clearSessionKey();1501  if (derivedKey) {1502    zeroKey(derivedKey);1503    derivedKey = null;1504  }1505  if (rootKey) {1506    rootKey.fill(0);1507    rootKey = null;1508  }15091510  entries = [];1511  domainIndex = new Map();1512  vaultMode = "real";1513  duressConfigured = false;1514  clearAutoLock();1515}15161517export function isUnlocked(): boolean {1518  return derivedKey !== null;1519}15201521// Opens the vault using a pre-derived AES-256 key (skipping Argon2id).1522// Used by Android biometric unlock — the key was derived on the native side.1523// SECURITY: only reachable via Capacitor native bridge; browser messages.ts never routes here.1524export async function unlockWithKey(1525  masterKeyHex: string,1526): Promise<{ ok: true; entries: VaultEntry[] } | { ok: false; error: string }> {1527  try {1528    const masterKeyBytes = unhex(masterKeyHex);1529    const stored = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1530    if (!stored) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };1531    const payload = await tryDecryptSlot(stored, masterKeyBytes, "slot_a_v1");1532    if (!payload) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };15331534    derivedKey = masterKeyBytes;1535    vaultMode = "real";1536    entries = payload.entries;1537    duressConfigured = payload.duressConfigured;1538    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1539    await loadSettings();1540    touchAutoLock();15411542    // PCH-01-009: the biometric path skips Argon2id but must still rehydrate the1543    // root key, exactly like attemptUnlockWithDerive and restoreFromSession.1544    // Without it, rootKey stays null after a biometric unlock and sync +1545    // GET_RECOVERY_WORDS report the open vault as locked. Guarded and non-fatal:1546    // a missing/legacy escrow must not fail the unlock itself.1547    if (stored.recovery_salt && stored.recovery_wrapped_root_key) {1548      try {1549        rootKey = await deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(masterKeyBytes, stored);1550      } catch { /* non-fatal — unlock still succeeds without rootKey */ }1551    }1552    return { ok: true, entries };1553  } catch {1554    return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };1555  }1556}15571558// --- Adoption duress-slot helpers (passthrough, no decrypt) ---15591560/**1561 * Adoption SOURCE helper: returns the sealed slot B as a JSON string when1562 * duress is configured and slot B exists, so the inline snapshot can ship it1563 * to the receiver. Returns null otherwise. Never decrypts.1564 */1565export async function exportDuressSlotForAdoption(): Promise<string | null> {1566  if (!(await isDuressEnabled())) return null;1567  await ensureMigrated();1568  const slotB = await loadSlot(SLOT_B);1569  if (!slotB) return null;1570  return JSON.stringify(slotB);1571}15721573/**1574 * Adoption RECEIVER helper: installs a duress slot received from a source1575 * device. Validates the StoredVault shape (same guard as unlockFromCodex)1576 * and writes it to slot B. Throws on invalid shape so the caller can treat1577 * it as a non-fatal snapshot failure. Never decrypts.1578 */1579export async function installAdoptedDuressSlot(json: string): Promise<void> {1580  let parsed: StoredVault;1581  try {1582    const raw = JSON.parse(json) as unknown;1583    if (!hasValidVaultSchema(raw)) {1584      throw new Error("invalid_duress_slot_shape");1585    }1586    parsed = raw;1587  } catch (err) {1588    if (err instanceof SyntaxError) {1589      throw new Error("invalid_duress_slot_shape");1590    }1591    throw err;1592  }1593  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, parsed);1594}15951596/**1597 * Restore the vault from a parsed Peach Codex payload.1598 *1599 * The supplied passphrase is verified against the Codex's slotA *before* any1600 * storage mutation — wrong passphrases return without touching disk. On1601 * success, the current vault state is snapshotted (reason: "restore") so the1602 * user can revert via Settings -> Vault History, then slotA/slotB are written1603 * and `peach_last_modified_at` is set to the Codex's recorded timestamp. A1604 * regular `unlock()` follows so the rest of the SW sees the standard1605 * post-unlock state.1606 *1607 * Intentionally non-Pro-gated — see peach_codex_v2.md "Pro gating". A Codex1608 * printed by a Pro user must always be restorable, even on a free device.1609 *1610 * Timing is not held constant here (in contrast to `unlock`): the Codex flow1611 * is an explicit user action with a known passphrase, not a passive lock1612 * screen, so the duress-vs-real timing side channel does not apply.1613 */1614export async function unlockFromCodex(params: {1615  slotA: string; // JSON string of StoredVault for slot A1616  slotB: string | null; // JSON string of StoredVault for slot B, or null1617  timestamp: number;1618  masterPassphrase: string;1619}): Promise<1620  | { ok: true; entryCount: number }1621  | { ok: false; reason: "wrong_passphrase" | "invalid_slot_format" }1622> {1623  let parsedSlotA: StoredVault;1624  let parsedSlotB: StoredVault | null = null;1625  try {1626    const rawA = JSON.parse(params.slotA) as unknown;1627    if (!hasValidVaultSchema(rawA)) {1628      return { ok: false, reason: "invalid_slot_format" };1629    }1630    parsedSlotA = rawA;1631    if (params.slotB !== null) {1632      const rawB = JSON.parse(params.slotB) as unknown;1633      if (!hasValidVaultSchema(rawB)) {1634        return { ok: false, reason: "invalid_slot_format" };1635      }1636      parsedSlotB = rawB;1637    }1638  } catch {1639    return { ok: false, reason: "invalid_slot_format" };1640  }16411642  // Verify the passphrase against the supplied slotA WITHOUT writing anything.1643  // If this fails the on-disk vault is left completely untouched.1644  const trialKey = await deriveKey(params.masterPassphrase, unhex(parsedSlotA.salt));1645  const trialPayload = await tryDecryptSlot(parsedSlotA, trialKey, "slot_a_v1");1646  if (!trialPayload) {1647    zeroKey(trialKey);1648    return { ok: false, reason: "wrong_passphrase" };1649  }1650  // Drop the trial key; `unlock()` below derives its own copy. Holding two1651  // copies of the master key in memory at once would be a needless surface.1652  zeroKey(trialKey);16531654  // Snapshot the about-to-be-overwritten on-disk state so the user can revert1655  // a mistaken Codex restore via the Vault History UI. Non-fatal if it fails.1656  await takeVaultSnapshot("restore");16571658  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, parsedSlotA);1659  if (parsedSlotB) {1660    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, parsedSlotB);1661  } else {1662    // Slot B must always exist with ciphertext length matching slot A1663    // (Projects.md §3.2). Codex prints may omit slot B (duress wasn't1664    // configured); regenerate noise to satisfy the invariant.1665    await writeSlot(1666      SLOT_B,1667      generateNoiseBlob(parsedSlotA.ciphertext.length / 2),1668    );1669  }1670  await chrome.storage.local.set({1671    peach_last_modified_at: String(params.timestamp),1672  });16731674  // Standard unlock path so domain index, settings, auto-lock, and1675  // recovery-key state all populate exactly as a normal unlock would.1676  const ok = await unlock(params.masterPassphrase);1677  if (!ok) {1678    // Should be unreachable — we just verified the passphrase against the1679    // same slotA we wrote. Treat as wrong_passphrase to keep the contract1680    // simple if some race or storage anomaly intrudes.1681    return { ok: false, reason: "wrong_passphrase" };1682  }1683  return { ok: true, entryCount: getEntries().length };1684}16851686// Returns the current in-memory derived key as a hex string.1687// Used by the biometric enable flow in Settings to store the key in Android Keystore.1688export function getDerivedKeyHex(): string {1689  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_not_unlocked");1690  return hex(derivedKey);1691}16921693/**1694 * Returns the vault's stable root key as hex, or null when locked / not yet1695 * populated. The root key is random per-vault, generated at creation, escrowed1696 * under the recovery words, and re-wrapped (not regenerated) on every password1697 * change — so it is INVARIANT across password rotation, unlike getDerivedKeyHex.1698 *1699 * This is the correct input for sync identity derivation (vault_id, the Noise1700 * NK static key, the Ed25519 manifest signing key, and per-entry envelope1701 * keys): paired devices keep the same identity and can still decrypt each1702 * other's entries after either side rotates its master password (SEV-2-B).1703 *1704 * Returns null rather than throwing so sync callers degrade to VAULT_LOCKED1705 * instead of crashing; rootKey is populated on every real-mode unlock via1706 * deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey / migrateToRecovery.1707 */1708export function getRootKeyHex(): string | null {1709  return rootKey ? hex(rootKey) : null;1710}17111712export function getEntries(): VaultEntry[] {1713  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1714  return entries.filter((entry) => !entry.deletedAt);1715}17161717const EMAIL_RE = /^[^\s@]+@[^\s@]+\.[^\s@]+$/;17181719export function getIdentities(): SavedIdentity[] {1720  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1721  const active = entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt && e.type === "login");17221723  const emailMap = new Map<string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }>();1724  const usernameMap = new Map<string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }>();17251726  for (const entry of active) {1727    const domain = extractDomain(entry.url ?? "") ?? "";1728    const modifiedAt = entry.modifiedAt ?? entry.createdAt ?? 0;17291730    function tally(map: Map<string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }>, v: string) {1731      const existing = map.get(v);1732      if (!existing || modifiedAt > existing.lastUsed) {1733        map.set(v, { lastUsed: modifiedAt, count: (existing?.count ?? 0) + 1, domain });1734      } else {1735        map.set(v, { ...existing, count: existing.count + 1 });1736      }1737    }17381739    const uVal = entry.username?.trim();1740    if (uVal) tally(EMAIL_RE.test(uVal) ? emailMap : usernameMap, uVal);17411742    // Also count the dedicated email field — entries created via the inline1743    // popup new-entry form store email here rather than in username.1744    const eVal = entry.email?.trim();1745    if (eVal) tally(emailMap, eVal);1746  }17471748  const toIdentity = (type: "email" | "username") =>1749    ([value, d]: [string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }]): SavedIdentity => ({1750      value, type, lastUsed: d.lastUsed, useCount: d.count, exampleDomain: d.domain || undefined,1751    });17521753  return [1754    ...[...emailMap.entries()].map(toIdentity("email")).sort((a, b) => b.useCount - a.useCount),1755    ...[...usernameMap.entries()].map(toIdentity("username")).sort((a, b) => b.useCount - a.useCount),1756  ];1757}17581759export async function batchAddEntries(drafts: EntryDraft[]): Promise<VaultEntry[]> {1760  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");17611762  const now = Date.now();1763  const added: VaultEntry[] = [];1764  for (const draft of drafts) {1765    try {1766      const sanitized = sanitizeEntryDraft(draft);1767      const nextEntry: VaultEntry = {1768        ...sanitized,1769        id: crypto.randomUUID(),1770        createdAt: now,1771        modifiedAt: monotonicEntryTimestamp(),1772      };1773      entries.push(nextEntry);1774      added.push(nextEntry);1775    } catch {1776      // Skip invalid drafts silently — caller can see diff between input and output length1777    }1778  }17791780  if (added.length > 0) {1781    await persistEntries();1782  }17831784  return added;1785}17861787/**1788 * Restore a set of entries in full fidelity — preserves id, createdAt,1789 * modifiedAt, and every other field unlike `batchAddEntries` which1790 * assigns fresh identity. Used by restore paths where the backup is the1791 * authoritative source of truth. `mode` controls how entries already in1792 * the vault are treated.1793 */1794export async function restoreEntries(1795  incoming: VaultEntry[],1796  mode: "replace" | "merge"1797): Promise<{ added: number; updated: number; skipped: number }> {1798  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");17991800  // A replace with zero incoming entries is almost certainly a caller bug1801  // (e.g. an import that silently dropped everything). Refuse rather than1802  // wipe the vault.1803  if (mode === "replace" && incoming.length === 0) {1804    throw new Error("refuse to replace with empty entry set");1805  }18061807  let added = 0;1808  let updated = 0;1809  let skipped = 0;18101811  if (mode === "replace") {1812    entries = [];1813    for (const entry of incoming) {1814      const normalized = sanitizeRestoredEntry(entry);1815      if (!normalized) {1816        skipped += 1;1817        continue;1818      }1819      entries.push(normalized);1820      added += 1;1821    }1822  } else {1823    const byId = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();1824    for (const e of entries) byId.set(e.id, e);18251826    for (const entry of incoming) {1827      const normalized = sanitizeRestoredEntry(entry);1828      if (!normalized) {1829        skipped += 1;1830        continue;1831      }1832      const existing = byId.get(normalized.id);1833      if (!existing) {1834        entries.push(normalized);1835        added += 1;1836      } else if (normalized.modifiedAt > existing.modifiedAt) {1837        const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === existing.id);1838        if (idx !== -1) {1839          entries[idx] = normalized;1840          updated += 1;1841        }1842      } else {1843        skipped += 1;1844      }1845    }1846  }18471848  await persistEntries("import");1849  return { added, updated, skipped };1850}18511852/**1853 * Validate + normalise a VaultEntry coming from a backup, import, or sync1854 * peer. MV-6: this is a strict field WHITELIST — `normalizeEntry` copies1855 * only known VaultEntry fields (unknown/attacker keys are dropped), and1856 * nested `passkey`/`canary` shapes are rebuilt field-by-field, never1857 * spread. Returns null for values the live vault shouldn't accept.1858 */1859function sanitizeRestoredEntry(entry: VaultEntry): VaultEntry | null {1860  if (!entry || typeof entry !== "object") return null;1861  const title = typeof entry.title === "string" ? entry.title.trim() : "";1862  if (!title) return null;1863  const id = typeof entry.id === "string" && entry.id ? entry.id : crypto.randomUUID();1864  const now = Date.now();1865  const createdAt = typeof entry.createdAt === "number" ? entry.createdAt : now;1866  const modifiedAt = typeof entry.modifiedAt === "number" ? entry.modifiedAt : createdAt;18671868  // normalizeEntry whitelists every known VaultEntry field and runs the1869  // same legacy-passkey migration as the on-disk read path — pre-v2.11.01870  // backups with flat passkey fields still import correctly because the1871  // legacy flat fields are themselves whitelisted VaultEntry members.1872  const normalized = normalizeEntry({1873    ...entry,1874    id,1875    title,1876    type: entry.type ?? "login",1877    createdAt,1878    modifiedAt,1879  });18801881  if (normalized.passkey) {1882    normalized.passkey = sanitizePasskey(normalized.passkey);1883  }1884  if (normalized.canary) {1885    normalized.canary = sanitizeCanary(normalized.canary);1886  }1887  // PCH-01-016: bound tags on the restore path too, so both import funnels agree.1888  normalized.tags = sanitizeTags(normalized.tags);18891890  // Login entries from backup must carry a password (or be passkey-only,1891  // in which case the passkey sub-object replaces the password requirement).1892  if (1893    normalized.type === "login" &&1894    !normalized.passkey &&1895    typeof normalized.password !== "string"1896  ) {1897    return null;1898  }1899  if (entry.passkey && !normalized.passkey) {1900    // Entry claimed a passkey but the shape didn't validate — refuse the1901    // whole entry rather than silently importing a credential-less husk.1902    return null;1903  }19041905  return normalized;1906}19071908/**1909 * Rebuild a PasskeyData object from untrusted input, field by field.1910 * Returns undefined when required fields are missing/mistyped — a rogue1911 * passkey credential must not activate via import (MV-6 attack scenario).1912 */1913function sanitizePasskey(pk: unknown): PasskeyData | undefined {1914  if (!pk || typeof pk !== "object") return undefined;1915  const r = pk as Record<string, unknown>;1916  if (1917    typeof r.rpId !== "string" || !r.rpId ||1918    typeof r.credentialId !== "string" || !r.credentialId ||1919    typeof r.publicKeyCose !== "string" ||1920    typeof r.userHandle !== "string" ||1921    typeof r.userName !== "string"1922  ) {1923    return undefined;1924  }1925  return {1926    rpId: r.rpId,1927    rpName: typeof r.rpName === "string" ? r.rpName : r.rpId,1928    credentialId: r.credentialId,1929    publicKeyCose: r.publicKeyCose,1930    privateKeyJwk:1931      r.privateKeyJwk && typeof r.privateKeyJwk === "object"1932        ? (r.privateKeyJwk as JsonWebKey)1933        : undefined,1934    userHandle: r.userHandle,1935    userName: r.userName,1936    userDisplayName:1937      typeof r.userDisplayName === "string" ? r.userDisplayName : r.userName,1938    algorithm: r.algorithm === -8 ? -8 : -7,1939    signCount: typeof r.signCount === "number" ? r.signCount : 0,1940    aaguid: typeof r.aaguid === "string" ? r.aaguid : "",1941    backupEligible: r.backupEligible === true,1942    backupState: r.backupState === true,1943    lastUsedAt: typeof r.lastUsedAt === "number" ? r.lastUsedAt : undefined,1944    browser: r.browser === "chrome" || r.browser === "firefox" ? r.browser : undefined,1945    transports: Array.isArray(r.transports)1946      ? r.transports.filter((t): t is string => typeof t === "string")1947      : undefined,1948    createdAt: typeof r.createdAt === "number" ? r.createdAt : Date.now(),1949  };1950}19511952/**1953 * Rebuild a Canary object from untrusted input. The webhook must be a1954 * well-formed HTTPS URL — a poisoned canary.webhookUrl is a standing1955 * exfiltration endpoint that the canary subsystem will POST entry titles1956 * to (MV-6 attack scenario). Invalid → the canary is dropped, not the1957 * entry. FIRE_CANARY_PING re-validates with the full SSRF guard at fire1958 * time (isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl), so this import-time check is the1959 * outer of two gates.1960 */1961function sanitizeCanary(c: unknown): Canary | undefined {1962  if (!c || typeof c !== "object") return undefined;1963  const r = c as Record<string, unknown>;1964  if (typeof r.webhookUrl !== "string") return undefined;1965  let url: URL;1966  try {1967    url = new URL(r.webhookUrl);1968  } catch {1969    return undefined;1970  }1971  if (url.protocol !== "https:") return undefined;1972  return {1973    webhookUrl: url.toString(),1974    label: typeof r.label === "string" ? r.label : undefined,1975    lastPinged: typeof r.lastPinged === "number" ? r.lastPinged : undefined,1976    pingCount: typeof r.pingCount === "number" ? r.pingCount : undefined,1977  };1978}19791980/**1981 * MV-6 / PCH-01-016: tags from imported / batch-added entries are untrusted.1982 * Keep only non-empty strings, cap each at 256 chars, and cap the count at 2551983 * (the same per-entry ceiling the export codec enforces, peachPayload.ts).1984 * Non-array or all-invalid input collapses to undefined.1985 */1986function sanitizeTags(tags: unknown): string[] | undefined {1987  if (!Array.isArray(tags)) return undefined;1988  const out: string[] = [];1989  for (const t of tags) {1990    if (typeof t !== "string") continue;1991    const trimmed = t.trim();1992    if (!trimmed) continue;1993    out.push(trimmed.slice(0, 256));1994    if (out.length >= 255) break;1995  }1996  return out.length > 0 ? out : undefined;1997}19981999// Soft-deletes every non-deleted entry in one call. The literal string2000// argument is a tripwire against accidental calls — any caller that would2001// wipe the vault has to consciously type "REPLACE_ALL". Do not relax this2002// to a boolean.2003export async function clearVaultEntries(2004  confirmation: "REPLACE_ALL"2005): Promise<void> {2006  if (confirmation !== "REPLACE_ALL") {2007    throw new Error("clearVaultEntries requires explicit confirmation");2008  }2009  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");2010  for (const entry of entries) {2011    if (!entry.deletedAt) {2012      const stamp = monotonicEntryTimestamp(entry.modifiedAt);2013      entry.deletedAt = stamp;2014      entry.modifiedAt = stamp;2015    }2016  }2017  await persistEntries();2018}20192020export async function addEntry(entry: EntryDraft): Promise<VaultEntry> {2021  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");20222023  const sanitized = sanitizeEntryDraft(entry);2024  const now = Date.now();2025  const stamp = monotonicEntryTimestamp();2026  const nextEntry: VaultEntry = {2027    ...sanitized,2028    id: crypto.randomUUID(),2029    createdAt: now,2030    modifiedAt: stamp,2031    // Stamp passwordChangedAt at creation so age tracking is accurate from2032    // day one. Non-login entries carry the same stamp harmlessly.2033    passwordChangedAt: sanitized.password ? stamp : undefined,2034  };20352036  // Clone-and-replace so a failed persist rolls back the in-memory state2037  // (COR-008). Without this, a quota-full or storage error leaves the2038  // module-level `entries` ahead of what's actually on disk.2039  const rollback = entries;2040  entries = [...entries, nextEntry];2041  try {2042    await persistEntries();2043  } catch (err) {2044    entries = rollback;2045    throw err;2046  }20472048  // Fire-and-forget breach check (only for login entries if breach monitoring is enabled or not set)2049  if (settings.breachMonitoring !== false && nextEntry.type === "login" && nextEntry.password) {2050    checkBreach(nextEntry.password).then(async (count) => {2051      if (count > 0) {2052        const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === nextEntry.id);2053        if (idx !== -1) {2054          entries[idx] = { ...entries[idx], breach: count, modifiedAt: monotonicEntryTimestamp(entries[idx].modifiedAt) };2055          await persistEntries();2056        }2057      }2058    });2059  }20602061  fireSyncTrigger("vault_change");20622063  return nextEntry;2064}20652066/**2067 * Run the passkey-merge pass on the live in-memory entries and persist if2068 * anything changed. Called immediately after any passkey registration so that2069 * a same-domain TOTP-only entry already in the vault gets consolidated right2070 * away instead of waiting until the next lock/unlock cycle.2071 */2072export async function consolidatePasskeyEntries(): Promise<void> {2073  if (!derivedKey) return;2074  const { merged } = mergePasskeyOnlyIntoLogins(entries);2075  if (merged) {2076    await persistEntries();2077  }2078}20792080export async function updateEntry(2081  id: string,2082  patch: Partial<VaultEntry>2083): Promise<void> {2084  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");20852086  const idx = entries.findIndex((entry) => entry.id === id);2087  if (idx === -1 || entries[idx].deletedAt) {2088    throw new Error("entry_not_found");2089  }20902091  const current = entries[idx];2092  const sanitizedPatch = sanitizeEntryPatch(patch);2093  // Refresh passwordChangedAt only when the password value actually changes —2094  // a metadata-only update (title, tags, etc.) must not reset the age clock2095  // that drives the Pro health rotation recommendation.2096  const passwordChanged =2097    "password" in patch &&2098    typeof sanitizedPatch.password === "string" &&2099    sanitizedPatch.password !== current.password;2100  const stamp = monotonicEntryTimestamp(current.modifiedAt);2101  // When the password actually changes, push the outgoing one onto the history2102  // (newest first) so the user can reveal/copy/restore it later. We record the2103  // age it carried (passwordChangedAt, falling back to createdAt) rather than2104  // `now`, so the list reflects when each password was last in effect. Only2105  // capture a non-empty prior value — clearing a password leaves no secret to2106  // keep, and we skip an immediate exact duplicate (e.g. restore-then-restore)2107  // to avoid noise.2108  const priorPassword = current.password;2109  const shouldCapture =2110    passwordChanged &&2111    typeof priorPassword === "string" &&2112    priorPassword.length > 0 &&2113    current.passwordHistory?.[0]?.password !== priorPassword;2114  const nextHistory = shouldCapture2115    ? [2116        { password: priorPassword!, changedAt: current.passwordChangedAt ?? current.createdAt },2117        ...(current.passwordHistory ?? []),2118      ].slice(0, PASSWORD_HISTORY_MAX)2119    : current.passwordHistory;2120  entries[idx] = {2121    ...current,2122    ...sanitizedPatch,2123    modifiedAt: stamp,2124    ...(passwordChanged ? { passwordChangedAt: stamp, passwordHistory: nextHistory } : {}),2125  };2126212721282129  // Card entries must retain their card number2130  if (entries[idx].type === "card" && !entries[idx].cardNumber) {2131    entries[idx] = current;2132    throw new Error("card number is required for card entries");2133  }21342135  // Roll the in-memory entry back to its pre-edit state if the disk write2136  // fails (e.g. storage quota). Without this the module-level `entries` array2137  // would hold an edit that never landed on disk, diverging from the vault2138  // until the next unlock silently reverts it (SEV-3-A). Mirrors addEntry.2139  try {2140    await persistEntries();2141  } catch (err) {2142    entries[idx] = current;2143    throw err;2144  }21452146  // Breach check when password changes: clear immediately so old breach doesn't linger,2147  // then async-check the new password and only re-set if it's also found.2148  if ("password" in patch && settings.breachMonitoring !== false && entries[idx].type === "login") {2149    entries[idx] = { ...entries[idx], breach: undefined };2150    await persistEntries();2151    const password = entries[idx].password;2152    if (password) {2153      checkBreach(password).then(async (count) => {2154        const i = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id);2155        if (i !== -1 && count > 0) {2156          entries[i] = { ...entries[i], breach: count, modifiedAt: monotonicEntryTimestamp(entries[i].modifiedAt) };2157          await persistEntries();2158        }2159      });2160    }2161  }21622163  fireSyncTrigger("vault_change");2164}21652166export async function deleteEntry(id: string): Promise<void> {2167  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");21682169  const entry = entries.find((item) => item.id === id);2170  if (!entry || entry.deletedAt) {2171    throw new Error("entry_not_found");2172  }21732174  // Tombstone timestamp must be strictly greater than the entry's last2175  // modification so the deletion wins LWW against any in-flight edit, even2176  // under clock skew (SEV-2-E).2177  const previousModifiedAt = entry.modifiedAt;2178  const stamp = monotonicEntryTimestamp(entry.modifiedAt);2179  entry.deletedAt = stamp;2180  entry.modifiedAt = stamp;2181  // Roll the tombstone back if the disk write fails, so a quota error doesn't2182  // leave the entry deleted in memory but alive on disk (SEV-3-A).2183  try {2184    await persistEntries();2185  } catch (err) {2186    delete entry.deletedAt;2187    entry.modifiedAt = previousModifiedAt;2188    throw err;2189  }2190  fireSyncTrigger("vault_change");2191}21922193export function getDeletedEntries(): VaultEntry[] {2194  if (!derivedKey) return [];2195  return entries.filter((e) => !!e.deletedAt);2196}21972198/**2199 * Returns the vault's monotonic version — the `peach_last_modified_at` value2200 * stamped on every user-initiated write. Remote (sync) writes do NOT advance2201 * this version so a sync round never cascades into a second outbound sync.2202 */2203export async function getVaultVersion(): Promise<number> {2204  try {2205    const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get("peach_last_modified_at");2206    const v = (raw as Record<string, unknown>).peach_last_modified_at;2207    if (typeof v === "number") return v;2208    if (typeof v === "string" && v !== "") {2209      const n = Number.parseInt(v, 10);2210      return Number.isFinite(n) ? n : 0;2211    }2212    return 0;2213  } catch {2214    return 0;2215  }2216}22172218/**2219 * Internal write variants — bypass `fireSyncTrigger` so the sync layer can2220 * apply entries without cascading into another outbound sync round.2221 *2222 * INVARIANT: callers must not pass entries whose IDs collide with existing2223 * active (non-deleted) entries unless the intent is an explicit overwrite.2224 * These functions do not validate field-level constraints (password required,2225 * card number required, etc.) — they are trust-the-caller paths for sync and2226 * test harness use only.2227 */2228export async function addEntryDirect(entry: VaultEntry): Promise<void> {2229  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");2230  entries = [...entries, entry];2231  await persistEntries("sync_received");2232}22332234export async function updateEntryDirect(patch: VaultEntry): Promise<void> {2235  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");2236  const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === patch.id);2237  if (idx === -1) throw new Error("entry_not_found");2238  entries[idx] = { ...entries[idx], ...patch };2239  await persistEntries("sync_received");2240}22412242export async function deleteEntryDirect(id: string, deletedAt: number): Promise<void> {2243  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");2244  const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id);2245  if (idx === -1) throw new Error("entry_not_found");2246  entries[idx] = { ...entries[idx], deletedAt, modifiedAt: deletedAt };2247  await persistEntries("sync_received");2248}22492250/**2251 * Apply a batch of remote entries + tombstones from a sync peer.2252 * Last-write-wins by `modifiedAt`; a tombstone supersedes a live entry when2253 * `deletedAt > modifiedAt` on the local side. Mutates `entries` directly and2254 * persists with reason `sync_received` — does NOT fire the sync dispatcher, so2255 * applying a sync round cannot cascade into another outbound sync.2256 *2257 * `applied` counts entries that actually changed local state (new add,2258 * overwrite-by-newer, or new tombstone). `received` is the raw payload size2259 * the caller can surface in the sync result UI.2260 */2261export async function applyMergedRemoteEntries(2262  remoteEntries: VaultEntry[],2263  remoteTombstones: Record<string, number>,2264  _context: { deviceName?: string } = {},2265): Promise<{ received: number; applied: number; conflicts: number }> {2266  // DESIGN: last-write-wins is applied PER-ENTRY, not per-field. If two devices2267  // concurrently edit different fields of the same entry, the one with the2268  // newer modifiedAt wins the whole entry and the other device's field edits2269  // are dropped silently. This is the deliberate trade-off for a simple,2270  // conflict-free merge — per-field CRDT merge is out of scope. Guidance for2271  // users: edit a given entry on one device at a time.2272  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");22732274  const received = remoteEntries.length + Object.keys(remoteTombstones).length;2275  let applied = 0;2276  let conflicts = 0;22772278  const byId = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();2279  for (const e of entries) byId.set(e.id, e);22802281  const mergeNow = Date.now();22822283  for (const remote of remoteEntries) {2284    const sanitized = sanitizeRestoredEntry(remote);2285    if (!sanitized) continue;2286    // HV-1a: a far-future remote modifiedAt must not permanently pin a2287    // malicious value against honest local edits. Clamp BEFORE any2288    // comparison against local timestamps.2289    sanitized.modifiedAt = clampSyncTimestamp(sanitized.modifiedAt, mergeNow);2290    if (typeof sanitized.deletedAt === "number") {2291      sanitized.deletedAt = clampSyncTimestamp(sanitized.deletedAt, mergeNow);2292    }2293    const tombstoneTs = remoteTombstones[sanitized.id];2294    if (tombstoneTs !== undefined && clampSyncTimestamp(tombstoneTs, mergeNow) >= sanitized.modifiedAt) {2295      continue;2296    }2297    const local = byId.get(sanitized.id);2298    if (!local) {2299      entries.push(sanitized);2300      byId.set(sanitized.id, sanitized);2301      applied += 1;2302    } else if (sanitized.modifiedAt > local.modifiedAt) {2303      const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === local.id);2304      if (idx !== -1) {2305        entries[idx] = sanitized;2306        byId.set(sanitized.id, sanitized);2307        applied += 1;2308        if (!local.deletedAt) conflicts += 1;2309      }2310    }2311  }23122313  for (const [id, rawDeletedAt] of Object.entries(remoteTombstones)) {2314    if (typeof rawDeletedAt !== "number" || !Number.isFinite(rawDeletedAt)) continue;2315    // HV-1a/1c: clamp the tombstone timestamp before every comparison.2316    const deletedAt = clampSyncTimestamp(rawDeletedAt, mergeNow);2317    const local = byId.get(id);2318    if (!local) continue;2319    if (local.deletedAt && local.deletedAt >= deletedAt) continue;2320    if (deletedAt < local.modifiedAt) continue;2321    const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id);2322    if (idx !== -1) {2323      entries[idx] = { ...local, deletedAt, modifiedAt: deletedAt };2324      applied += 1;2325    }2326  }23272328  if (applied > 0) {2329    await persistEntries("sync_received");2330    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);2331  }2332  return { received, applied, conflicts };2333}23342335export async function restoreEntry(id: string): Promise<void> {2336  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");2337  const entry = entries.find((e) => e.id === id && e.deletedAt);2338  if (!entry) throw new Error("deleted entry not found");2339  delete entry.deletedAt;2340  entry.modifiedAt = monotonicEntryTimestamp(entry.modifiedAt);2341  await persistEntries();2342  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);2343}23442345export async function purgeEntry(id: string): Promise<void> {2346  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");2347  const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id && e.deletedAt);2348  if (idx === -1) throw new Error("deleted entry not found");2349  entries.splice(idx, 1);2350  await persistEntries();2351}23522353/** Permanently delete entries whose deletedAt is older than retentionMs. 0 = keep forever. */2354export async function purgeExpiredTrash(retentionMs: number): Promise<number> {2355  if (!derivedKey || retentionMs === 0) return 0;2356  const cutoff = Date.now() - retentionMs;2357  const before = entries.length;2358  entries = entries.filter((e) => !(e.deletedAt && e.deletedAt < cutoff));2359  const purged = before - entries.length;2360  if (purged > 0) await persistEntries();2361  return purged;2362}23632364export function queryDomain(domain: string): VaultEntry[] {2365  return domainIndex.get(domain) ?? [];2366}23672368export function getEntryById(id: string): VaultEntry | undefined {2369  return entries.find((entry) => entry.id === id && !entry.deletedAt);2370}23712372async function persistSlotA(2373  reason: VaultSnapshot["reason"] = "local_save",2374): Promise<StoredVault> {2375  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");23762377  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);2378  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");23792380  // Snapshot the about-to-be-overwritten state BEFORE we mutate disk. Failures2381  // are swallowed by takeVaultSnapshot — history must never block a save.2382  await takeVaultSnapshot(reason);23832384  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured, duressConfigured ? DURESS_SLOT_SIZE : 0);2385  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");23862387  // Preserve existing recovery escrow fields.2388  const nextSlotA: StoredVault = {2389    ...slotA,2390    nonce,2391    ciphertext,2392    tag,2393    // recovery_salt and recovery_wrapped_root_key are already set from loadSlot2394  };2395  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, nextSlotA);23962397  // Slot A (the real vault) is now committed. Wrap every later write so a2398  // mid-persist failure (e.g. a storage error after slot A landed) restores the2399  // prior slot A before rethrowing. Without this, a "failed" save that already2400  // wrote slot A leaves disk ahead of the in-memory rollback in addEntry/2401  // updateEntry/deleteEntry — the entry stays silently on disk and resurfaces2402  // as a duplicate on the next unlock (observed under storage-quota pressure).2403  try {2404    // When duress is not configured, keep slot B size-matched with slot A by2405    // regenerating its noise. When duress IS configured, leave slot B alone —2406    // we don't have the decoy key to re-encrypt it. This is a known trade-off.2407    if (!duressConfigured) {2408      await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2));2409    }2410    // Only advance the vault version for locally-originated writes. Entries2411    // applied from a sync peer ("sync_received") must NOT bump the counter —2412    // otherwise applying a remote round makes us look newer than the peer and2413    // triggers a redundant outbound sync, defeating the no-op optimisation2414    // and risking a ping-pong between two devices (SEV-2-C).2415    if (reason !== "sync_received") {2416      await stampLocalVaultMutation();2417    }2418  } catch (err) {2419    // Best-effort restore — the prior slot A is smaller-or-equal, so this write2420    // fits even when the failure was a quota overflow.2421    await writeSlot(SLOT_A, slotA).catch(() => {});2422    throw err;2423  }24242425  return nextSlotA;2426}24272428async function persistSlotB(): Promise<void> {2429  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");24302431  const slotB = await loadSlot(SLOT_B);2432  if (!slotB) throw new Error("missing slot B");24332434  // Decoy plaintext always reports duressConfigured=false — the decoy user2435  // sees a clean slate. persistSlotB only runs in decoy mode, which only2436  // exists once duress is configured, so pad to the fixed duress ceiling to2437  // keep slot B's length equal to slot A's (audit MEDIUM — deniability).2438  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, false, DURESS_SLOT_SIZE);2439  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKey, plaintext, "slot_b_v1");24402441  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, { ...slotB, nonce, ciphertext, tag });2442  // Symmetric with persistSlotA: if the version stamp fails after the decoy2443  // slot committed, restore the prior slot B so a failed decoy-mode save can't2444  // leave disk ahead of the in-memory rollback.2445  try {2446    await stampLocalVaultMutation();2447  } catch (err) {2448    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, slotB).catch(() => {});2449    throw err;2450  }2451}24522453async function persistEntries(2454  reason: VaultSnapshot["reason"] = "local_save",2455): Promise<void> {2456  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");24572458  if (vaultMode === "decoy") {2459    await persistSlotB();2460  } else {2461    await persistSlotA(reason);2462  }2463  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);2464  await refreshLockedSyncState();2465}24662467function cleanAdditionalUrls(values: string[] | undefined): string[] | undefined {2468  if (!Array.isArray(values)) return undefined;2469  const seen = new Set<string>();2470  const cleaned: string[] = [];2471  for (const value of values) {2472    const trimmed = typeof value === "string" ? value.trim() : "";2473    if (!trimmed) continue;2474    const key = trimmed.toLowerCase();2475    if (seen.has(key)) continue;2476    seen.add(key);2477    cleaned.push(trimmed);2478  }2479  return cleaned.length > 0 ? cleaned : undefined;2480}24812482function sanitizeEntryDraft(entry: EntryDraft): EntryDraft {2483  const title = entry.title.trim();2484  // Accept legacy `type:"passkey"` drafts but rewrite to "login" — the new2485  // model is "any entry, optionally with a passkey sub-object." Imports and2486  // any in-flight callers from before v2.11.0 keep working without throwing.2487  let type: VaultEntry["type"] = entry.type ?? "login";2488  if (type === "passkey") type = "login";24892490  if (!title) throw new Error("title is required");24912492  if (entry.passkey) {2493    const p = entry.passkey;2494    if (2495      !p.rpId ||2496      !p.credentialId ||2497      !p.publicKeyCose ||2498      !p.userHandle ||2499      !p.userName ||2500      (p.algorithm !== -7 && p.algorithm !== -8)2501    ) {2502      throw new Error("invalid passkey credential");2503    }2504  }2505  if (type === "card") {2506    if (!entry.cardholderName?.trim() || !entry.cardNumber?.trim()) {2507      throw new Error("cardholder name and card number are required");2508    }2509  }25102511  return {2512    type,2513    title,2514    username: type === "login" ? entry.username?.trim() ?? "" : undefined,2515    email: type === "login" ? entry.email?.trim() || undefined : undefined,2516    password: type === "login" ? entry.password : undefined,2517    url: type === "login" ? entry.url?.trim() ?? "" : undefined,2518    additionalUrls: type === "login" ? cleanAdditionalUrls(entry.additionalUrls) : undefined,2519    totp: type === "login" ? entry.totp?.trim() || undefined : undefined,2520    // PCH-01-019: preserve non-default TOTP params through batch-add/import so2521    // they are not silently stripped (they fall back to SHA-1/6/30 when absent).2522    totpAlgorithm: type === "login" ? entry.totpAlgorithm : undefined,2523    totpDigits: type === "login" ? entry.totpDigits : undefined,2524    totpPeriod: type === "login" ? entry.totpPeriod : undefined,2525    notes: entry.notes?.trim() || undefined,2526    breach: type === "login" ? entry.breach : undefined,2527    // PCH-01-016: the batch-add path was bypassing the MV-6 canary/tags2528    // whitelist applied on the RESTORE_ENTRIES path. Run both sanitizers here.2529    canary: type === "login" ? sanitizeCanary(entry.canary) : undefined,2530    tags: sanitizeTags(entry.tags),2531    passkey: entry.passkey,2532    cardholderName: type === "card" ? entry.cardholderName?.trim() : undefined,2533    cardNumber: type === "card" ? entry.cardNumber?.trim() : undefined,2534    expMonth: type === "card" ? entry.expMonth?.trim() : undefined,2535    expYear: type === "card" ? entry.expYear?.trim() : undefined,2536    cvc: type === "card" ? entry.cvc?.trim() : undefined,2537    cardNickname: type === "card" ? entry.cardNickname?.trim() || undefined : undefined,2538    network: type === "card" ? entry.network : undefined,2539    last4: type === "card" ? entry.last4?.trim() : undefined,2540  };2541}25422543function sanitizeEntryPatch(patch: Partial<VaultEntry>): Partial<VaultEntry> {2544  const nextPatch: Partial<VaultEntry> = {};25452546  if ("type" in patch) {2547    nextPatch.type = patch.type;2548  }25492550  if ("title" in patch) {2551    const title = patch.title?.trim() ?? "";2552    if (!title) throw new Error("title is required");2553    nextPatch.title = title;2554  }25552556  if ("url" in patch) {2557    nextPatch.url = patch.url?.trim() ?? "";2558  }25592560  if ("additionalUrls" in patch) {2561    const incoming = Array.isArray(patch.additionalUrls) ? patch.additionalUrls : [];2562    const seen = new Set<string>();2563    const cleaned: string[] = [];2564    for (const value of incoming) {2565      const trimmed = typeof value === "string" ? value.trim() : "";2566      if (!trimmed) continue;2567      const key = trimmed.toLowerCase();2568      if (seen.has(key)) continue;2569      seen.add(key);2570      cleaned.push(trimmed);2571    }2572    nextPatch.additionalUrls = cleaned.length > 0 ? cleaned : undefined;2573  }25742575  if ("username" in patch) {2576    nextPatch.username = patch.username?.trim() ?? "";2577  }25782579  if ("email" in patch) {2580    nextPatch.email = patch.email?.trim() || undefined;2581  }25822583  if ("password" in patch) {2584    const password = patch.password ?? "";2585    // Allow clearing a password (e.g. on passkey-only entries)2586    nextPatch.password = password || undefined;2587  }25882589  if ("totp" in patch) {2590    nextPatch.totp = patch.totp?.trim() || undefined;2591  }25922593  if ("notes" in patch) {2594    nextPatch.notes = patch.notes?.trim() || undefined;2595  }25962597  if ("breach" in patch) {2598    nextPatch.breach = patch.breach;2599  }26002601  if ("canary" in patch) {2602    // PCH-02-001: route update patches through the same canary whitelist used2603    // by add/restore/sync. Invalid shapes drop the canary; `undefined` clears it.2604    nextPatch.canary = patch.canary ? sanitizeCanary(patch.canary) : undefined;2605  }26062607  if ("passkey" in patch) {2608    // Passkey sub-object replaces all the legacy flat passkey fields. A2609    // patch with `passkey: undefined` removes the credential from the entry2610    // (used by "remove passkey" without deleting the whole entry).2611    if (patch.passkey === undefined || patch.passkey === null) {2612      nextPatch.passkey = undefined;2613    } else {2614      const sanitized = sanitizePasskey(patch.passkey);2615      if (!sanitized) throw new Error("invalid passkey credential");2616      nextPatch.passkey = sanitized;2617    }2618  }26192620  if ("tags" in patch) {2621    // PCH-02-001: bound tags exactly like both import funnels.2622    nextPatch.tags = sanitizeTags(patch.tags);2623  }26242625  if ("cardholderName" in patch) {2626    nextPatch.cardholderName = patch.cardholderName?.trim() || undefined;2627  }2628  if ("cardNumber" in patch) {2629    const n = patch.cardNumber ?? "";2630    nextPatch.cardNumber = n || undefined;2631  }2632  if ("expMonth" in patch) {2633    nextPatch.expMonth = patch.expMonth?.trim() || undefined;2634  }2635  if ("expYear" in patch) {2636    nextPatch.expYear = patch.expYear?.trim() || undefined;2637  }2638  if ("cvc" in patch) {2639    nextPatch.cvc = patch.cvc?.trim() || undefined;2640  }2641  if ("cardNickname" in patch) {2642    nextPatch.cardNickname = patch.cardNickname?.trim() || undefined;2643  }2644  if ("network" in patch) {2645    nextPatch.network = patch.network;2646  }2647  if ("last4" in patch) {2648    nextPatch.last4 = patch.last4?.trim() || undefined;2649  }26502651  return nextPatch;2652}26532654function normalizeEntry(entry: VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry): VaultEntry {2655  const createdAt = "createdAt" in entry ? entry.createdAt : entry.created;2656  const modifiedAt =2657    "modifiedAt" in entry ? entry.modifiedAt : entry.updated;26582659  const base: VaultEntry = {2660    id: entry.id,2661    type: "type" in entry ? entry.type : "login",2662    title: entry.title,2663    username: entry.username,2664    email: "email" in entry ? entry.email : undefined,2665    password: entry.password,2666    url: entry.url,2667    additionalUrls:2668      "additionalUrls" in entry && Array.isArray(entry.additionalUrls)2669        ? entry.additionalUrls2670        : undefined,2671    totp: entry.totp,2672    // PCH-01-019: carry TOTP params through the normalize/restore path too.2673    totpAlgorithm: entry.totpAlgorithm,2674    totpDigits: entry.totpDigits,2675    totpPeriod: entry.totpPeriod,2676    notes: entry.notes,2677    breach: entry.breach,2678    // Preserve the password-age clock across lock/unlock. Without this the2679    // field is dropped on every decode and the advanced-health "aged password"2680    // signal silently resets to createdAt on each unlock (SEV-2-A).2681    passwordChangedAt:2682      "passwordChangedAt" in entry ? entry.passwordChangedAt : undefined,2683    // Preserve past-password history across lock/unlock. normalizeEntry is a2684    // field whitelist, so an unlisted field is silently dropped on every decode2685    // (same class as the passwordChangedAt SEV-2-A above).2686    passwordHistory:2687      "passwordHistory" in entry && Array.isArray(entry.passwordHistory)2688        ? entry.passwordHistory2689        : undefined,2690    canary: "canary" in entry ? entry.canary : undefined,2691    passkey: "passkey" in entry ? entry.passkey : undefined,2692    createdAt,2693    modifiedAt,2694    deletedAt: entry.deletedAt,2695    tags: "tags" in entry ? entry.tags : undefined,2696    cardholderName: "cardholderName" in entry ? entry.cardholderName : undefined,2697    cardNumber: "cardNumber" in entry ? entry.cardNumber : undefined,2698    expMonth: "expMonth" in entry ? entry.expMonth : undefined,2699    expYear: "expYear" in entry ? entry.expYear : undefined,2700    cvc: "cvc" in entry ? entry.cvc : undefined,2701    cardNickname: "cardNickname" in entry ? entry.cardNickname : undefined,2702    network: "network" in entry ? entry.network : undefined,2703    last4: "last4" in entry ? entry.last4 : undefined,2704  };27052706  return migrateLegacyPasskey(base, entry);2707}27082709/**2710 * v2.11.0 read migration. Pre-v2.11.0 passkey entries used `type:"passkey"`2711 * with flat top-level fields (rpId, credentialId, etc.). This converts them2712 * to the new shape — `type:"login"` with a `passkey` sub-object — so all2713 * downstream consumers can rely on the new model. The result is rewritten2714 * to disk on next vault save (hasLegacyShape detects the un-migrated case).2715 */2716function migrateLegacyPasskey(2717  base: VaultEntry,2718  raw: VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry2719): VaultEntry {2720  if (base.passkey) return base;2721  const flat = raw as Partial<VaultEntry>;2722  const isPasskeyType = base.type === "passkey";2723  const hasFlatPasskeyFields =2724    typeof flat.rpId === "string" &&2725    typeof flat.credentialId === "string" &&2726    typeof flat.publicKeyCose === "string" &&2727    typeof flat.userHandle === "string" &&2728    typeof flat.userName === "string";2729  if (!isPasskeyType && !hasFlatPasskeyFields) return base;2730  if (!hasFlatPasskeyFields) return base;27312732  const algorithm: -7 | -8 = flat.algorithm === -8 ? -8 : -7;2733  base.passkey = {2734    rpId: flat.rpId!,2735    rpName: flat.rpName ?? flat.rpId!,2736    credentialId: flat.credentialId!,2737    publicKeyCose: flat.publicKeyCose!,2738    privateKeyJwk: flat.privateKeyJwk,2739    userHandle: flat.userHandle!,2740    userName: flat.userName!,2741    userDisplayName: flat.userDisplayName ?? flat.userName!,2742    algorithm,2743    signCount: flat.signCount ?? 0,2744    aaguid: flat.aaguid ?? "",2745    backupEligible: flat.backupEligible === true,2746    backupState: flat.backupState === true,2747    lastUsedAt: flat.lastUsedAt,2748    browser: flat.browser,2749    transports: flat.transports,2750    createdAt: base.createdAt,2751  };2752  // Promote to "login" so the unified Entry view renders. Username gets2753  // populated from the passkey's userName so the entry is searchable in the2754  // existing autofill flow without a separate code path.2755  if (isPasskeyType) base.type = "login";2756  if (!base.username) base.username = flat.userName;2757  if (!base.url) base.url = `https://${flat.rpId}`;2758  return base;2759}276027612762// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------2763// Deduplication2764// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------27652766function entryDupeKey(e: VaultEntry): string {2767  if (e.type === "note") return `note|${e.title.toLowerCase()}`;2768  // Passkey-bearing entries dedupe by the credential's RP + user. Two logins2769  // on different sites that happen to share a username are still distinct;2770  // two passkey credentials for the same RP+user are duplicates regardless2771  // of any login fields they may also carry.2772  if (e.passkey) {2773    return `passkey|${e.passkey.rpId.toLowerCase()}|${e.passkey.userName.toLowerCase()}`;2774  }2775  return `login|${e.title.toLowerCase()}|${(e.url ?? "").toLowerCase()}|${(e.username ?? "").toLowerCase()}`;2776}27772778/** Returns the number of duplicate entries (those that would be removed). */2779export function countDuplicates(): number {2780  const best = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();2781  let dupeCount = 0;2782  for (const e of entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt)) {2783    const key = entryDupeKey(e);2784    const existing = best.get(key);2785    if (!existing) {2786      best.set(key, e);2787    } else {2788      dupeCount++;2789      // Keep the more recently modified one in the map2790      if ((e.modifiedAt ?? e.createdAt ?? 0) > (existing.modifiedAt ?? existing.createdAt ?? 0)) {2791        best.set(key, e);2792      }2793    }2794  }2795  return dupeCount;2796}27972798/**2799 * Soft-deletes duplicate entries, keeping the most recently modified copy of2800 * each group. Returns the number of entries moved to trash.2801 */2802export async function deduplicateEntries(): Promise<number> {2803  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");2804  // Dedup reshapes slot B permanently under the decoy key, which is2805  // forensically distinguishable from a freshly-seeded decoy vault. Refuse.2806  if (vaultMode === "decoy") {2807    throw new Error("deduplicate disabled in decoy mode");2808  }28092810  const best = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();2811  for (const e of entries.filter((en) => !en.deletedAt)) {2812    const key = entryDupeKey(e);2813    const existing = best.get(key);2814    if (!existing) {2815      best.set(key, e);2816    } else if ((e.modifiedAt ?? e.createdAt ?? 0) > (existing.modifiedAt ?? existing.createdAt ?? 0)) {2817      best.set(key, e);2818    }2819  }28202821  const keepIds = new Set(Array.from(best.values()).map((e) => e.id));2822  let removed = 0;2823  entries = entries.map((e) => {2824    if (!e.deletedAt && !keepIds.has(e.id)) {2825      removed++;2826      return { ...e, deletedAt: monotonicEntryTimestamp(e.modifiedAt) };2827    }2828    return e;2829  });28302831  if (removed > 0) await persistEntries();2832  return removed;2833}28342835// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------2836// Vault history — snapshot BEFORE every vault write so the saved blob is2837// what is about to be lost, not what was just written. Capped at 5. The2838// stored blobs are AES-256-GCM ciphertext under the master password, so2839// history adds zero security surface.2840// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------28412842const HISTORY_KEY = "peach_vault_history";2843const HISTORY_MAX = 5;28442845// PCH-01-023: coarsen a live-entry count into a low-resolution bucket so the2846// plaintext snapshot field cannot reveal exact vault size or single-entry change2847// deltas. Buckets widen as the vault grows so absolute leakage stays roughly2848// proportional rather than exact.2849function bucketEntryCount(n: number): number {2850  if (n <= 0) return 0;2851  if (n <= 10) return 10;2852  if (n <= 25) return 25;2853  if (n <= 50) return 50;2854  if (n <= 100) return 100;2855  if (n <= 250) return 250;2856  if (n <= 500) return 500;2857  return Math.ceil(n / 500) * 500;2858}28592860/**2861 * Snapshot the CURRENT on-disk vault state into history. Call this BEFORE2862 * overwriting peach_vault_a so the saved blob captures the about-to-be-lost2863 * state. Identical-to-most-recent blobs are skipped to avoid filling history2864 * with no-op writes.2865 */2866export async function takeVaultSnapshot(2867  reason: VaultSnapshot["reason"],2868): Promise<void> {2869  try {2870    const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get([SLOT_A, SLOT_B, HISTORY_KEY]);2871    const slotA = (raw as Record<string, StoredVault | undefined>)[SLOT_A];2872    const slotB = (raw as Record<string, StoredVault | undefined>)[SLOT_B];28732874    // Nothing to snapshot if the real slot doesn't exist yet (fresh install,2875    // pre-createVault). createVault skips snapshots intentionally — there is2876    // no prior state to preserve.2877    if (!slotA) return;28782879    const vault_a = JSON.stringify(slotA);2880    const vault_b = JSON.stringify(slotB ?? slotA);28812882    // Best-effort entry count: only meaningful when the in-memory state is2883    // unlocked AND in real mode. Decoy mode would leak the decoy entry2884    // count; locked mode has no entries to count. Both fall through to null.2885    // PCH-01-023: store a coarse bucket, not the exact count — chrome.storage2886    // .local sits next to the AES-GCM blobs in plaintext, so an exact count would2887    // leak vault size and per-write deltas (the metadata padding hides this).2888    let entryCount: number | null = null;2889    if (derivedKey && vaultMode === "real") {2890      try {2891        entryCount = bucketEntryCount(entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt).length);2892      } catch {2893        entryCount = null;2894      }2895    }28962897    const existingRaw = (raw as Record<string, VaultHistory | undefined>)[HISTORY_KEY];2898    const history: VaultHistory = existingRaw && Array.isArray(existingRaw.snapshots)2899      ? existingRaw2900      : { snapshots: [] };29012902    // Deduplication: if the most recent snapshot has byte-identical blobs,2903    // skip — saves the same vault N times in a row would otherwise burn the2904    // entire history window with no recovery value.2905    const latest = history.snapshots[0];2906    if (latest && latest.vault_a === vault_a && latest.vault_b === vault_b) {2907      return;2908    }29092910    const snapshot: VaultSnapshot = {2911      id: crypto.randomUUID(),2912      savedAt: Date.now(),2913      reason,2914      vault_a,2915      vault_b,2916      entryCount,2917    };29182919    history.snapshots = [snapshot, ...history.snapshots].slice(0, HISTORY_MAX);2920    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [HISTORY_KEY]: history });2921  } catch (err) {2922    // Non-fatal — history must never block a save. A failed snapshot just2923    // means the user loses one rung of the safety ladder for this write.2924    // M4/QUA-006: log so the failure is visible; if it looks like a quota2925    // problem, notify the popup so the user can prune history themselves.2926    console.warn('[Peach] takeVaultSnapshot failed:', err);2927    if (String(err).includes('QUOTA') || String(err).includes('quota')) {2928      try {2929        await chrome.runtime.sendMessage({ type: 'VAULT_STORAGE_QUOTA_WARNING' });2930      } catch {2931        // popup may be closed; surfaced via console.warn above2932      }2933    }2934  }2935}29362937/** Wipe all vault history. Called by Panic / DESTROY_VAULT. */2938export async function clearVaultHistory(): Promise<void> {2939  try {2940    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [HISTORY_KEY]: { snapshots: [] } satisfies VaultHistory });2941  } catch {2942    // Non-fatal — DESTROY_VAULT also runs storage.local.clear().2943  }2944}29452946/** Read all snapshots, newest first, for the Settings vault history view. */2947export async function getVaultHistory(): Promise<VaultSnapshot[]> {2948  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get(HISTORY_KEY);2949  const history = (raw as Record<string, VaultHistory | undefined>)[HISTORY_KEY];2950  if (!history || !Array.isArray(history.snapshots)) return [];2951  return history.snapshots;2952}29532954/**2955 * Replace the on-disk vault with the chosen snapshot's blobs and lock the2956 * vault. The current state is itself snapshotted with reason 'restore' first2957 * so the restore is reversible. After this returns, the user must unlock2958 * with the password that matches the restored blob.2959 */2960export async function restoreVaultSnapshot(2961  snapshotId: string,2962): Promise<{ ok: true } | { ok: false; error: string }> {2963  const history = await getVaultHistory();2964  const snapshot = history.find((s) => s.id === snapshotId);2965  if (!snapshot) return { ok: false, error: "snapshot_not_found" };29662967  // Snapshot the about-to-be-replaced current state so the restore is2968  // reversible. takeVaultSnapshot is no-op when the most recent entry is2969  // byte-identical, so a restore-of-a-restore stays clean.2970  await takeVaultSnapshot("restore");29712972  let restoredA: StoredVault;2973  let restoredB: StoredVault;2974  try {2975    restoredA = JSON.parse(snapshot.vault_a) as StoredVault;2976    restoredB = JSON.parse(snapshot.vault_b) as StoredVault;2977  } catch {2978    return { ok: false, error: "snapshot_corrupt" };2979  }29802981  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, restoredA);2982  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, restoredB);2983  await stampLocalVaultMutation();29842985  // Lock so the user must prove they can decrypt the restored blob. If they2986  // restored a pre-password-change snapshot they discover it immediately at2987  // the lock screen rather than silently holding an inaccessible vault.2988  lock();29892990  return { ok: true };2991}29922993/**2994 * Rotate the vault's sync identity by generating a FRESH ROOT KEY and2995 * re-wrapping everything under it (MV-8). Because every sync credential —2996 * vault_id, the Noise static keypair, the Ed25519 manifest signing key,2997 * and the per-entry envelope keys — derives from the root key, rotation2998 * makes a lost/stolen device's retained key material useless. All paired2999 * devices must re-pair afterwards.3000 *3001 * CONSEQUENCE THE UI MUST SURFACE: the 12 recovery words also derive from3002 * the root key, so rotation INVALIDATES the old recovery phrase. The flow3003 * sets peach_recovery_pending so the popup re-presents the new words for3004 * confirmation, same as the migrateToRecovery rotate path.3005 */3006export async function rotateSyncIdentity(): Promise<{ ok: boolean; error?: string }> {3007  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {3008    return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };3009  }3010  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);3011  if (!slotA) return { ok: false, error: "missing_slot_a" };30123013  // 1. Fresh root key + recovery escrow (new words).3014  const { rawRootKey, recoverySalt, wrappedRootKey, wrappedNonce, wrappedTag } =3015    await generateAndWrapRootKey();30163017  // 2. Re-wrap the new root key under the current password-derived key.3018  const newRootKey = unhex(rawRootKey);3019  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(derivedKey, newRootKey);30203021  // 3. Snapshot, then single atomic slot write — both escrow wrappings of3022  //    the new root key land together (same transactional rule as3023  //    changePassword). Entries are untouched: they are sealed under the3024  //    password-derived key, not the root key.3025  await takeVaultSnapshot("local_save");3026  const nextSlotA: StoredVault = {3027    ...slotA,3028    recovery_salt: recoverySalt,3029    recovery_wrapped_root_key: wrappedRootKey,3030    recovery_nonce: wrappedNonce,3031    recovery_tag: wrappedTag,3032    ...pwRoot,3033  };3034  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, nextSlotA);30353036  // 4. Swap in memory only after disk committed.3037  if (rootKey) zeroKey(rootKey);3038  rootKey = newRootKey;30393040  // 5. Old peers' identities derive from the dead root key — drop them all.3041  await clearPairedDevices();30423043  // 6. Force re-presentation of the NEW recovery words on next popup view.3044  await setRecoveryConfirmPending(); // same flag the create-vault flow uses30453046  await stampLocalVaultMutation();3047  return { ok: true };3048}30493050/**3051 * Change the master password. Re-encrypts slot A with a fresh salt + new3052 * derived key. Slot B (duress or noise) is left untouched when duress is3053 * configured — it uses an independent key derived from the duress password —3054 * and regenerated as noise when duress is not configured.3055 */3056export async function changePassword(3057  currentPassword: string,3058  newPassword: string3059): Promise<boolean> {3060  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") return false;30613062  // Verify current password before allowing any change3063  const valid = await verifyMainPassword(currentPassword);3064  if (!valid) return false;30653066  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);3067  if (!slotA) return false;3068  if (!rootKey) return false;30693070  // Derive fresh key from new password + new random salt3071  const newSalt = generateSalt();3072  const newKey = await deriveKey(newPassword, newSalt);30733074  // Re-encrypt the in-memory entries with the new key3075  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured, duressConfigured ? DURESS_SLOT_SIZE : 0);3076  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(newKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");30773078  // Pre-wrap root key under the new derived key. Recovery fields wrap rootKey3079  // under recovery words and remain untouched — recovery phrase keeps working3080  // across password changes (H4/COR-002).3081  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(newKey, rootKey);30823083  const finalSlotA: StoredVault = {3084    ...slotA,3085    salt: hex(newSalt),3086    nonce,3087    ciphertext,3088    tag,3089    ...pwRoot,3090  };30913092  // Snapshot the OLD-key blob before overwriting it. If the user later3093  // restores from this snapshot they will need the OLD password — the3094  // post-restore lock surfaces that immediately.3095  await takeVaultSnapshot("local_save");30963097  // Single atomic write: ciphertext, salt, and pw_root_* fields all land in3098  // one storage transaction. An SW kill before this point leaves the old3099  // slot intact; after this point everything tied to the new password is3100  // already on disk together (M6/COR-004).3101  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, finalSlotA);31023103  // Swap the in-memory key synchronously before any further await. If we3104  // threw between the Slot A write and this swap, the next persistEntries()3105  // would overwrite Slot A with old-key ciphertext, locking the user out.3106  zeroKey(derivedKey);3107  derivedKey = newKey;31083109  // PCH-01-008: the MV3 session escrow still holds the OLD key. Without this,3110  // the next service-worker restore decrypts the new-key Slot A with the stale3111  // key, fails tryDecryptSlotResult, and silently drops the user to a lock3112  // screen. Re-escrow the new key so restore survives a password change.3113  void saveSessionKey(newKey, "real");31143115  // Regenerate noise for slot B when duress is not in use. Runs after the3116  // key swap so a failure here is a disposable noise regeneration, not a3117  // lockout.3118  if (!duressConfigured) {3119    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2));3120  }3121  await stampLocalVaultMutation();31223123  return true;3124}