vault.ts

1/**2 * vault.ts — sole owner of vault state and chrome.storage vault keys.3 *4 * Every read/write of `peach_vault_a`, `peach_vault_b`, and `peach_settings`5 * goes through this module. No other file accesses those keys directly.6 * External callers reach vault operations via `messages.ts` — never by7 * importing from here cross-boundary (popup/content must not). Invariants8 * for the two-slot schema, unlock timing, and key/disk atomicity are in9 * Projects.md §3.2–§3.6.10 */1112import { deriveKey, generateSalt } from "../crypto/argon2";13import { extractDomain } from "../shared/domain";14import { clampSyncTimestamp } from "../shared/sync-limits";15import { computeVaultId } from "../shared/sync-identity";16// Static, not `await import()`: runtime import() throws in an MV3 service17// worker. Neither module imports vault.ts back, so there is no cycle to break.18import { triggerSyncIfReachable } from "./sync-trigger";19import { clearPairedDevices } from "./paired-devices";20import {21  rootKeyToWords,22  wordsToRootKeyMaterial,23  deriveRecoveryKey,24} from "../shared/recovery-words";25import type {26  AccentColorName,27  Canary,28  ManualSummonRecord,29  PasskeyData,30  SavedIdentity,31  StoredVault,32  VaultEntry,33  VaultHistory,34  VaultSnapshot,35} from "../shared/types";36import { decrypt, encrypt, zeroKey } from "./aes";37import { clearAutoLock, touchAutoLock } from "./alarms";38import {39  clearRecoveryConfirmPending,40  setRecoveryConfirmPending,41} from "./recovery-pending";42import {43  clearPairSecrets,44  dropSessionCache,45  reconcilePairSecrets,46  setSessionAllowed,47} from "./pair-secrets";4849type EntryDraft = Omit<50  VaultEntry,51  "id" | "createdAt" | "modifiedAt" | "deletedAt"52>;5354// Slot-neutral storage keys (v1.4.24+). Both slots always exist; slot B55// either holds the decoy vault (when duress is configured) or random noise56// that looks identical at rest. No external indicator is stored — duress57// configuration is recorded only inside the encrypted payload of slot A.58const SLOT_A = "peach_vault_a";59const SLOT_B = "peach_vault_b";6061// Plaintext is padded to the next multiple of this size before encryption.62// This coarsens ciphertext-length leakage into 1 KiB buckets.63const PAD_BLOCK = 1024;6465// How many past passwords to retain per entry. Generous enough to be useful as66// a recovery aid while bounding the secret material we hold (and the ciphertext67// growth) for an entry whose password is rotated frequently.68const PASSWORD_HISTORY_MAX = 50;6970// When duress is configured, BOTH slots are padded to this fixed ceiling so71// their ciphertext lengths are identical and cannot reveal that a hidden decoy72// vault exists (audit MEDIUM — plausible-deniability leak). 256 KiB comfortably73// holds a very large vault (thousands of entries incl. passkeys). The decoy74// slot can't be re-encrypted on every real-vault save (the real session has no75// decoy key), so a fixed ceiling — rather than size-matching on each write — is76// what keeps the two slots equal. A real vault whose plaintext exceeds this77// would grow past the ceiling and re-expose the bit; that is an extreme,78// documented edge well beyond normal use.79const DURESS_SLOT_SIZE = 262_144;8081let derivedKey: Uint8Array | null = null;82// 32-byte random root key, separate from the derivedKey used for vault encryption.83// The root key is wrapped (encrypted) under the recovery key derived from the84// 12-word phrase. When the user changes their password, only the wrapping changes;85// the root key and recovery words remain stable.86let rootKey: Uint8Array | null = null;87let entries: VaultEntry[] = [];88// Tombstones outlive their full entry records so a peer that was offline89// during a purge cannot reintroduce an old ciphertext envelope. This map is90// serialized only inside the encrypted vault payload.91let tombstones = new Map<string, number>();92let domainIndex: Map<string, VaultEntry[]> = new Map();93let vaultMode: "real" | "decoy" = "real";94// Cached post-unlock view of whether the real vault records that duress is95// configured. Only meaningful after a real-mode unlock; for decoy-mode unlock96// this stays false because we never see slot A's plaintext.97let duressConfigured = false;9899// Set to a corruption reason during the last unlock() attempt when both slots100// decrypted but failed schema validation. Consumed and cleared by101// consumeLastUnlockFailureReason() so messages.ts can surface vault_corrupted102// distinctly from wrong-password (M7/COR-007).103//104// NOTE: module-level state — if vault.ts is ever moved to a worker context,105// this must be replaced with a structured return value from unlock() or a106// postMessage channel. The signal is invisible across module-instance107// boundaries.108let lastUnlockFailureReason: string | null = null;109110export function consumeLastUnlockFailureReason(): string | null {111  const r = lastUnlockFailureReason;112  lastUnlockFailureReason = null;113  return r;114}115116// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------117// Settings (persisted inside the encrypted vault store as a sidecar key)118// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------119120export type TextSize = "small" | "medium" | "large";121122export interface VaultSettings {123  accentColor?: AccentColorName;124  theme?: "dark" | "light";125  autoLockMinutes?: number;126  clipboardClearSeconds?: number;127  lockOnClose?: boolean;128  breachMonitoring?: boolean;129  passkeyProviderEnabled?: boolean;130  trashRetentionDays?: number;131  manualSummonDomains?: Record<string, ManualSummonRecord>;132  manualSummonSalt?: string;133  declinedCardFingerprints?: string[];134135  /** Metadata is bounded because it remains outside the encrypted vault blob. */136  metadataVersion?: 1;137  /**138   * Text size scale for body copy and entry titles. Stops at "large" by139   * design — XL clips dense screens (Vault, Health) inside the fixed140   * 330×480 popup surface.141   */142  textSize?: TextSize;143  /**144   * When true, all entrance/exit transitions and ambient animations are145   * collapsed to instant. Honoured alongside the user's OS-level146   * `prefers-reduced-motion`.147   */148  reduceMotion?: boolean;149  /** Whether this vault has a local PIN unlock wrapper configured. */150  pinEnabled?: boolean;151  /** Whether the lock screen should open on PIN instead of the password. */152  pinPreferred?: boolean;153  /**154   * User overrides for keyboard shortcuts. Keys are ShortcutAction names155   * (see src/shared/shortcuts.ts). Missing actions fall through to156   * DEFAULT_BINDINGS — `getActiveBindings(settings.shortcuts)` is the157   * canonical lookup. Storing only the deltas keeps the vault payload158   * small and lets default updates land for users who never rebind.159   */160  shortcuts?: Record<string, { key: string; ctrl?: boolean; meta?: boolean; shift?: boolean; alt?: boolean }>;161}162163interface StoredPinWrap {164  version: 1;165  salt: string;166  nonce: string;167  ciphertext: string;168  tag: string;169}170171const PIN_WRAP_STORAGE = "peach_pin_wrap";172const PIN_ATTEMPTS_STORAGE = "peach_pin_attempts";173const PIN_MIN_LENGTH = 4;174const PIN_MAX_LENGTH = 12;175const PIN_MAX_ATTEMPTS = 3;176177let settings: VaultSettings = {};178const CARD_DECLINE_MAX = 256;179/** Hex length of a keyed card-decline digest. Legacy records are 16 hex. */180const CARD_DECLINE_DIGEST_HEX = 32;181182async function metadataDigest(value: string, key: string): Promise<string> {183  const bytes = new TextEncoder().encode(`${key}:${value}`);184  const digest = new Uint8Array(await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", bytes));185  return Array.from(digest.slice(0, 16)).map((byte) => byte.toString(16).padStart(2, "0")).join("");186}187188let inMemoryPinWrap: StoredPinWrap | null = null;189let inMemoryPinFailedAttempts = 0;190let sessionPinStorageFailed = false;191192export function getSettings(): VaultSettings {193  return settings;194}195196export async function ensureSettingsLoaded(): Promise<VaultSettings> {197  await loadSettings();198  return settings;199}200201export async function updateSettings(patch: Partial<VaultSettings>): Promise<void> {202  await loadSettings();203  // LV-7: cheap insurance against prototype pollution if a future caller ever204  // feeds parsed external JSON here (native spread keeps __proto__ an own-205  // property today, but Object.assign-style consumers and JSON revivers have206  // been burned before).207  const safe = Object.fromEntries(208    Object.entries(patch).filter(209      ([k]) => !["__proto__", "constructor", "prototype"].includes(k),210    ),211  ) as Partial<VaultSettings>;212  settings = { ...settings, ...safe };213  await persistSettings();214}215216function isValidPin(pin: string): boolean {217  return new RegExp(`^\\d{${PIN_MIN_LENGTH},${PIN_MAX_LENGTH}}$`).test(pin);218}219220/** Set up a local PIN wrapper after proving the current master password. */221export async function setupPinUnlock(currentPassword: string, pin: string): Promise<boolean> {222  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real" || !isValidPin(pin)) return false;223  if (!(await verifyMainPassword(currentPassword))) return false;224225  const salt = generateSalt();226  const pinKey = await deriveKey(pin, salt);227  try {228    const wrapped = await encrypt(pinKey, hex(derivedKey), "pin_wrap_v1");229    await savePinWrap({ version: 1, salt: hex(salt), ...wrapped });230    await updateSettings({ pinEnabled: true });231    return true;232  } finally {233    zeroKey(pinKey);234  }235}236237async function clearPinUnlockStorage(): Promise<void> {238  inMemoryPinWrap = null;239  inMemoryPinFailedAttempts = 0;240  sessionPinStorageFailed = false;241  if (chrome.storage.session) {242    await chrome.storage.session.remove([PIN_WRAP_STORAGE, PIN_ATTEMPTS_STORAGE]);243  }244  await updateSettings({ pinEnabled: false });245}246247/** Remove the PIN wrapper after proving the current master password. */248export async function disablePinUnlock(currentPassword: string): Promise<boolean> {249  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") return false;250  if (!(await verifyMainPassword(currentPassword))) return false;251  await clearPinUnlockStorage();252  return true;253}254255/** Unlock the real vault from its locally stored PIN-wrapped derived key. */256export async function unlockWithPin(pin: string): Promise<boolean> {257  if (!isValidPin(pin)) return false;258  await loadSettings();259  if (!settings.pinEnabled) return false;260261  const { stored, failedAttempts } = await loadPinState();262  if (failedAttempts >= PIN_MAX_ATTEMPTS) return false;263  if (264    !stored ||265    stored.version !== 1 ||266    !stored.salt ||267    !stored.nonce ||268    !stored.ciphertext ||269    !stored.tag270  ) return false;271272  const pinKey = await deriveKey(pin, unhex(stored.salt));273  let unwrappedKey: Uint8Array | null = null;274  try {275    const masterKeyHex = await decrypt(276      pinKey,277      stored.nonce,278      stored.ciphertext,279      stored.tag,280      "pin_wrap_v1",281    );282    if (!/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(masterKeyHex)) return false;283    unwrappedKey = unhex(masterKeyHex);284    const result = await unlockWithKey(masterKeyHex);285    if (!result.ok) return false;286    await saveSessionKey(unwrappedKey, "real");287    await resetPinFailedAttempts();288    return true;289  } catch {290    await recordPinFailure(failedAttempts + 1);291    return false;292  } finally {293    zeroKey(pinKey);294    if (unwrappedKey) zeroKey(unwrappedKey);295  }296}297298async function savePinWrap(stored: StoredPinWrap): Promise<void> {299  inMemoryPinWrap = stored;300  inMemoryPinFailedAttempts = 0;301  sessionPinStorageFailed = !chrome.storage.session;302  if (!chrome.storage.session) return;303  try {304    await chrome.storage.session.set({ [PIN_WRAP_STORAGE]: stored, [PIN_ATTEMPTS_STORAGE]: 0 });305    sessionPinStorageFailed = false;306  } catch {307    // Firefox fallback: keep the wrapper only in this background context.308    sessionPinStorageFailed = true;309  }310}311312async function loadPinState(): Promise<{313  stored: StoredPinWrap | undefined;314  failedAttempts: number;315}> {316  if (!chrome.storage.session) {317    return { stored: inMemoryPinWrap ?? undefined, failedAttempts: inMemoryPinFailedAttempts };318  }319  try {320    const result = await chrome.storage.session.get([PIN_WRAP_STORAGE, PIN_ATTEMPTS_STORAGE]);321    return {322      stored: (result[PIN_WRAP_STORAGE] as StoredPinWrap | undefined) ??323        (sessionPinStorageFailed ? inMemoryPinWrap ?? undefined : undefined),324      failedAttempts: typeof result[PIN_ATTEMPTS_STORAGE] === "number"325        ? result[PIN_ATTEMPTS_STORAGE]326        : 0,327    };328  } catch {329    return { stored: inMemoryPinWrap ?? undefined, failedAttempts: inMemoryPinFailedAttempts };330  }331}332333async function recordPinFailure(failedAttempts: number): Promise<void> {334  inMemoryPinFailedAttempts = Math.min(failedAttempts, PIN_MAX_ATTEMPTS);335  if (!chrome.storage.session) return;336  try {337    await chrome.storage.session.set({ [PIN_ATTEMPTS_STORAGE]: inMemoryPinFailedAttempts });338  } catch { /* in-memory counter remains the fallback */ }339}340341async function resetPinFailedAttempts(): Promise<void> {342  inMemoryPinFailedAttempts = 0;343  if (!chrome.storage.session) return;344  try {345    await chrome.storage.session.set({ [PIN_ATTEMPTS_STORAGE]: 0 });346  } catch { /* in-memory counter remains the fallback */ }347}348349export async function getPinUnlockStatus(): Promise<{350  configured: boolean;351  available: boolean;352  attemptsRemaining: number;353}> {354  await loadSettings();355  if (!settings.pinEnabled) {356    return { configured: false, available: false, attemptsRemaining: 0 };357  }358  const { stored, failedAttempts } = await loadPinState();359  const available = Boolean(stored) && failedAttempts < PIN_MAX_ATTEMPTS;360  return {361    configured: true,362    available,363    attemptsRemaining: stored ? Math.max(0, PIN_MAX_ATTEMPTS - failedAttempts) : 0,364  };365}366367async function persistSettings(): Promise<void> {368  try {369    await chrome.storage.local.set({370      peach_settings: {371        ...settings,372        manualSummonDomains: undefined,373        manualSummonSalt: undefined,374        cardFingerprintSalt: undefined,375        declinedCardFingerprints: settings.declinedCardFingerprints ?? [],376        metadataVersion: 1,377      },378    });379  } catch (err) {380    throw mapStorageError(err);381  }382}383384function mapStorageError(err: unknown): Error {385  const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);386  if (/QUOTA_BYTES|quota/i.test(message)) {387    return new Error("STORAGE_QUOTA_EXCEEDED");388  }389  return err instanceof Error ? err : new Error(message);390}391392async function loadSettings(): Promise<void> {393  const result = await chrome.storage.local.get("peach_settings");394  settings = (result as { peach_settings?: VaultSettings }).peach_settings ?? {};395}396397// Fire-and-forget sync trigger after a committed vault write. A failure here398// must never fail the write that caused it.399function fireSyncTrigger(reason: "vault_change"): void {400  void Promise.resolve()401    .then(() => triggerSyncIfReachable({ reason }))402    .catch(() => {403      /* no sync runner registered, or nothing reachable — non-fatal */404    });405}406407let lockedSyncRefreshHook: (() => Promise<void>) | null = null;408let lockedSyncUnlockHook: (() => Promise<void>) | null = null;409410export function setLockedSyncHooks(hooks: {411  refresh: () => Promise<void>;412  afterUnlock: () => Promise<void>;413}): void {414  lockedSyncRefreshHook = hooks.refresh;415  lockedSyncUnlockHook = hooks.afterUnlock;416}417418async function refreshLockedSyncState(): Promise<void> {419  if (vaultMode !== "real" || !rootKey || !lockedSyncRefreshHook) return;420  await lockedSyncRefreshHook().catch((error) => {421    console.warn("[Peach sync] locked spool refresh failed:", error);422  });423}424425// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------426// HIBP breach check (k-anonymity model)427// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------428429export async function checkBreach(password: string): Promise<number> {430  // HIBP k-anonymity API is keyed on SHA-1 prefixes — this is dictated by431  // the public API, not a security choice. Do not migrate to SHA-256 here.432  const encoder = new TextEncoder();433  const hashBuffer = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-1", encoder.encode(password));434  const hashHex = Array.from(new Uint8Array(hashBuffer))435    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))436    .join("")437    .toUpperCase();438439  const prefix = hashHex.slice(0, 5);440  const suffix = hashHex.slice(5);441442  try {443    // PCH-02-007: request HIBP response padding so response length does not444    // reveal how many suffixes a queried prefix returned.445    const res = await fetch(`https://api.pwnedpasswords.com/range/${prefix}`, {446      headers: { "Add-Padding": "true" },447    });448    if (!res.ok) return 0;449    const text = await res.text();450    const match = text.split("\r\n").find((l) => l.startsWith(suffix));451    return match ? parseInt(match.split(":")[1], 10) : 0;452  } catch {453    return 0; // Network unavailable — don't block454  }455}456457export async function declineCardSaveOffer(last4: string, expMonth: string, expYear: string): Promise<void> {458  // Unreachable from the message layer, which gates on isUnlocked first.459  const key = await cardDeclineKey();460  if (!key) return;461  const fingerprint = await cardFingerprint(last4, expMonth, expYear);462  await loadSettings();463  settings = {464    ...settings,465    declinedCardFingerprints: [466      // Legacy records predate the keyed digest and are silently dropped here:467      // they are 16 hex characters rather than 32, and are no longer accepted.468      ...(settings.declinedCardFingerprints ?? []).filter(469        (stored) => stored.length === CARD_DECLINE_DIGEST_HEX,470      ),471      await metadataDigest(fingerprint, key),472    ].slice(-CARD_DECLINE_MAX),473  };474  await persistSettings();475}476477export async function isCardDeclined(last4: string, expMonth: string, expYear: string): Promise<boolean> {478  await loadSettings();479  const key = await cardDeclineKey();480  if (!key) return false;481  const fingerprint = await cardFingerprint(last4, expMonth, expYear);482  const candidate = await metadataDigest(fingerprint, key);483  return (settings.declinedCardFingerprints ?? []).some(484    (stored) => stored.length === CARD_DECLINE_DIGEST_HEX && stored === candidate,485  );486}487488/**489 * Keying material for the declined-card digest, derived from the vault root490 * key so it is available only while unlocked and never written to storage.491 *492 * PB-26-108: the previous scheme stored a random salt beside the records. A493 * salt defeats precomputed tables, not an attacker holding the file — the494 * candidate space here is ~10^4 last-four values x 12 months x a few years, so495 * a stored salt left the card's last four and expiry recoverable offline in496 * seconds. `peach_settings` is unencrypted and directly readable by a content497 * script on Firefox, so the key has to live outside storage entirely.498 */499async function cardDeclineKey(): Promise<string | null> {500  const root = getRootKeyHex();501  if (!root) return null;502  const digest = new Uint8Array(503    await crypto.subtle.digest(504      "SHA-256",505      new TextEncoder().encode(`peach-card-decline-v1:${root}`),506    ),507  );508  return hex(digest);509}510511async function cardFingerprint(last4: string, expMonth: string, expYear: string): Promise<string> {512  const encoder = new TextEncoder();513  const buf = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", encoder.encode(`${last4}|${expMonth}|${expYear}`));514  return Array.from(new Uint8Array(buf).slice(0, 8))515    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))516    .join("");517}518519function hex(buf: Uint8Array): string {520  return Array.from(buf)521    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))522    .join("");523}524525function unhex(s: string): Uint8Array {526  const out = new Uint8Array(s.length / 2);527  for (let i = 0; i < s.length; i += 2) {528    out[i / 2] = parseInt(s.slice(i, i + 2), 16);529  }530  return out;531}532533// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------534// Root key generation and recovery word wrapping535// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------536537/**538 * Generate a random 32-byte root key and wrap it (AES-256-GCM) under a key539 * derived from the recovery word material via HKDF-SHA256. The wrapped blob540 * fields are stored in slot A alongside the password-wrapped ciphertext. The541 * root key itself is kept in memory for the session so getRecoveryWords() can542 * encode it without re-deriving.543 *544 * SECURITY MODEL (PCH-01-005): the recovery KEK is derived from the 12-word545 * material, which encodes only rootKey[0..16] (recovery-words.ts). The KEK is thus546 * derived from a PREFIX of the very plaintext it wraps, and effective recovery547 * security is 128-bit (standard for a 12-word phrase), NOT 256-bit. This is safe —548 * unwrapping requires the words, and the GCM ciphertext leaks nothing without them —549 * but it is intentional, not an oversight. A future escrow version wanting 256-bit550 * recovery must derive the words from INDEPENDENT entropy, not from the root key.551 */552async function generateAndWrapRootKey(): Promise<{553  rawRootKey: string; // hex of the plaintext root key — caller stores in rootKey554  recoverySalt: string;555  wrappedRootKey: string;556  wrappedNonce: string;557  wrappedTag: string;558}> {559  const rootKeyBytes = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32));560561  // Derive the recovery key from the BIP39 words encoding of the root key.562  const words = await rootKeyToWords(rootKeyBytes);563  const wordMaterial = await wordsToRootKeyMaterial(words);564  const recoverySalt = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));565  const recoveryKey = await deriveRecoveryKey(wordMaterial, recoverySalt);566567  // Wrap the root key with the recovery key using AES-256-GCM directly.568  // We hex-encode rootKeyBytes so the plaintext is always valid UTF-8.569  const nonce = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));570  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(hex(rootKeyBytes));571  const raw = await crypto.subtle.encrypt(572    {573      name: "AES-GCM",574      iv: nonce,575      additionalData: new Uint8Array([1]).buffer as ArrayBuffer,576      tagLength: 128,577    },578    recoveryKey,579    encoded580  );581  // WebCrypto returns ciphertext || auth tag concatenated; split them.582  const rawU8 = new Uint8Array(raw);583  const ciphertext = hex(rawU8.slice(0, rawU8.length - 16));584  const tag = hex(rawU8.slice(rawU8.length - 16));585586  return {587    rawRootKey: hex(rootKeyBytes),588    recoverySalt: hex(recoverySalt),589    wrappedRootKey: ciphertext,590    wrappedNonce: hex(nonce),591    wrappedTag: tag,592  };593}594595async function wrapExistingRootKeyForRecovery(rootKeyBytes: Uint8Array): Promise<{596  recoverySalt: string;597  wrappedRootKey: string;598  wrappedNonce: string;599  wrappedTag: string;600}> {601  if (rootKeyBytes.length !== 32) {602    throw new Error("ADOPT_INVALID_ROOT_KEY: expected 32 bytes");603  }604605  const words = await rootKeyToWords(rootKeyBytes);606  const wordMaterial = await wordsToRootKeyMaterial(words);607  const recoverySalt = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));608  const recoveryKey = await deriveRecoveryKey(wordMaterial, recoverySalt);609  const nonce = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));610  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(hex(rootKeyBytes));611  const raw = await crypto.subtle.encrypt(612    {613      name: "AES-GCM",614      iv: nonce,615      additionalData: new Uint8Array([1]).buffer as ArrayBuffer,616      tagLength: 128,617    },618    recoveryKey,619    encoded,620  );621  const rawU8 = new Uint8Array(raw);622  return {623    recoverySalt: hex(recoverySalt),624    wrappedRootKey: hex(rawU8.slice(0, rawU8.length - 16)),625    wrappedNonce: hex(nonce),626    wrappedTag: hex(rawU8.slice(rawU8.length - 16)),627  };628}629630/**631 * Unwrap the root key using recovery words. Called during recovery flow when632 * the user provides their 12-word phrase and a new password.633 * Exported for use by the RECOVER_WITH_WORDS message handler.634 */635export async function unwrapRootKeyForRecovery(636  wrappedRootKey: string,637  wrappedNonce: string,638  wrappedTag: string,639  recoverySaltHex: string,640  words: string[]641): Promise<void> {642  const wordMaterial = await wordsToRootKeyMaterial(words);643  const recoverySalt = unhex(recoverySaltHex);644  const recoveryKey = await deriveRecoveryKey(wordMaterial, recoverySalt);645646  // Decrypt and cache the root key. The root key bytes were hex-encoded before647  // encryption so the ciphertext is valid UTF-8. We inline the AES-GCM decrypt648  // here to avoid passing a CryptoKey to the string-based encrypt/decrypt helpers.649  // Each component is stored separately in the vault slot; decode them individually650  // so the nonce is always exactly the 12 bytes from wrappedNonce.651  const nonceRaw = unhex(wrappedNonce);652  const ciphertextRaw = unhex(wrappedRootKey);653  const tagRaw = unhex(wrappedTag);654  // Combine ciphertext and tag for AES-GCM (expects ciphertext||tag).655  // Use explicit ArrayBuffer allocations to satisfy TS BufferSource constraints.656  const nonceU8 = nonceRaw as unknown as Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>;657  const combined = new Uint8Array(ciphertextRaw.length + tagRaw.length);658  combined.set(ciphertextRaw, 0);659  combined.set(tagRaw, ciphertextRaw.length);660  const raw = await crypto.subtle.decrypt(661    { name: "AES-GCM", iv: nonceU8, additionalData: new Uint8Array([1]).buffer as ArrayBuffer, tagLength: 128 },662    recoveryKey,663    combined664  );665  const decryptedHex = new TextDecoder().decode(raw);666  rootKey = unhex(decryptedHex);667}668669/**670 * Re-wrap the cached root key under a new derived key (from the user's new671 * password). Called after password change and after recovery re-key so the672 * same recovery words continue to work with the updated password — and so673 * subsequent unlocks can rehydrate rootKey via deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey.674 *675 * recovery_* fields are intentionally not touched: those wrap rootKey under676 * the recovery words, which do not change when the password changes.677 */678export async function rewrapRootKeyForPassword(679  newDerivedKey: Uint8Array,680  _newSalt: Uint8Array681): Promise<void> {682  if (!rootKey) throw new Error("root key not set");683  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);684  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");685  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(newDerivedKey, rootKey);686  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, { ...slotA, ...pwRoot });687}688689/**690 * Change the vault encryption to a new derived key (already derived from691 * the user's new password). Used by RECOVER_WITH_WORDS and changePassword.692 * Caller is responsible for key swap and snapshot.693 */694async function reencryptVaultForNewKey(695  newKey: Uint8Array,696  slotA: StoredVault697): Promise<void> {698  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured, duressConfigured ? DURESS_SLOT_SIZE : 0);699  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(newKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");700  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, {701    ...slotA,702    nonce,703    ciphertext,704    tag,705  });706}707708/**709 * Full password change with an already-derived key (used after recovery).710 * Unlike changePassword(), this skips re-verification of current password711 * since recovery flow has already validated the user's identity via words.712 */713export async function changePasswordWithNewKey(714  newSalt: Uint8Array,715  newKey: Uint8Array716): Promise<void> {717  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);718  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");719  // reencryptVaultForNewKey must receive the updated salt so that subsequent720  // UNLOCK calls with the new password can re-derive the correct key.721  await reencryptVaultForNewKey(newKey, { ...slotA, salt: hex(newSalt) });722  if (derivedKey) zeroKey(derivedKey);723  derivedKey = newKey;724  // PCH-01-008: re-escrow the new key (see changePassword). The recovery flow725  // reaches this path, so a post-recovery SW restart would otherwise lock out726  // a user who just reset their password.727  void saveSessionKey(newKey, "real");728  // Refresh pw_root_* under the new key so deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey works729  // on the next unlock (H2/COR-006). If rootKey is missing — recovery flow730  // should have populated it — fall back silently rather than blowing up the731  // recovery path; the escrow is already present on every supported vault.732  if (rootKey) {733    const slotAfter = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);734    if (slotAfter) {735      const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(newKey, rootKey);736      await writeSlot(SLOT_A, { ...slotAfter, ...pwRoot });737    }738  }739  if (!duressConfigured) {740    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(slotA.ciphertext.length / 2));741  }742  await clearPinUnlockStorage();743  await stampLocalVaultMutation();744}745746// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------747// Salt generation --- exported so the RECOVER_WITH_WORDS handler can derive748// a new key after password reset without re-importing the crypto module.749// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------750751export { deriveKey, generateSalt };752753export async function loadSlotA(): Promise<StoredVault | null> {754  return loadSlot(SLOT_A);755}756757/**758 * Recover the session root key by AES-GCM-decrypting the pw_root_* fields759 * (a second wrapping of the root key under the password-derived key). This760 * is what makes GET_RECOVERY_WORDS work across lock/unlock cycles without761 * the user re-entering their recovery phrase: the same root key bytes —762 * and therefore the same 12 words — survive every unlock.763 *764 * Returns null when the escrow is absent or decryption fails.765 */766async function deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(767  derivedKeyBytes: Uint8Array,768  slotA: StoredVault,769): Promise<Uint8Array | null> {770  if (!slotA.pw_root_ciphertext || !slotA.pw_root_nonce || !slotA.pw_root_tag) {771    return null;772  }773  try {774    const rootHex = await decrypt(775      derivedKeyBytes,776      slotA.pw_root_nonce,777      slotA.pw_root_ciphertext,778      slotA.pw_root_tag,779      "pw_root_v1",780    );781    return unhex(rootHex);782  } catch {783    return null;784  }785}786787// AES-GCM-wrap rootKey under derivedKey for the pw_root_* fields. Returns the788// hex-encoded ciphertext/nonce/tag triple ready to embed in StoredVault.789async function wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(790  derivedKeyBytes: Uint8Array,791  rootKeyBytes: Uint8Array,792): Promise<{ pw_root_ciphertext: string; pw_root_nonce: string; pw_root_tag: string }> {793  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKeyBytes, hex(rootKeyBytes), "pw_root_v1");794  return {795    pw_root_ciphertext: ciphertext,796    pw_root_nonce: nonce,797    pw_root_tag: tag,798  };799}800801/** Returns the 12 recovery words for the current session's root key. */802export async function getRecoveryWords(): Promise<string[]> {803  if (!rootKey) {804    throw new Error("recovery not set up");805  }806  return rootKeyToWords(rootKey);807}808809async function loadSlot(key: string): Promise<StoredVault | null> {810  const result = await chrome.storage.local.get(key);811  return (result as Record<string, StoredVault | undefined>)[key] ?? null;812}813814async function writeSlot(key: string, vault: StoredVault): Promise<void> {815  try {816    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [key]: vault });817  } catch (err) {818    throw mapStorageError(err);819  }820}821822/**823 * Roll back a vault that was created by [createVaultFromRootKey] but824 * couldn't be paired (e.g. the subsequent license activation, identity825 * derivation, or paired-device upsert failed). Without this, a failed826 * receiver session leaves behind an empty vault — the user has to827 * re-pair to get a working setup, but the empty vault sits in the way.828 *829 * The call is idempotent: removing keys that aren't there is a no-op.830 */831export async function rollbackAdoptedVault(): Promise<void> {832  await lock();833  try {834    await chrome.storage.local.remove([835      SLOT_A,836      SLOT_B,837      "peach_last_modified_at",838    ]);839  } catch (err) {840    throw mapStorageError(err);841  }842}843844async function commitCreatedVaultSlots(slotA: StoredVault, slotB: StoredVault): Promise<void> {845  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get("peach_last_modified_at");846  const previous = Number(847    (raw as Record<string, unknown>).peach_last_modified_at,848  );849  const next = Math.max(850    Date.now(),851    Number.isFinite(previous) ? previous + 1 : 0,852  );853  try {854    await chrome.storage.local.set({855      [SLOT_A]: slotA,856      [SLOT_B]: slotB,857      peach_last_modified_at: String(next),858    });859  } catch (err) {860    throw mapStorageError(err);861  }862}863864// Monotonic clock for per-entry modifiedAt / deletedAt timestamps. Guards the865// sync layer's last-write-wins merge against wall-clock regressions (NTP step,866// manual clock change, DST glitch): a backwards Date.now() must never produce867// an entry timestamp that's <= the entry's existing modifiedAt, or a genuine868// local edit would lose to a stale remote copy. The returned value is always869// strictly greater than both the entry's current modifiedAt and the previous870// call's result (SEV-2-E).871let lastEntryTimestamp = 0;872function monotonicEntryTimestamp(currentModifiedAt?: number): number {873  const base = Math.max(874    Date.now(),875    (currentModifiedAt ?? 0) + 1,876    lastEntryTimestamp + 1,877  );878  lastEntryTimestamp = base;879  return base;880}881882async function stampLocalVaultMutation(): Promise<void> {883  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get("peach_last_modified_at");884  const previous = Number(885    (raw as Record<string, unknown>).peach_last_modified_at,886  );887  const next = Math.max(888    Date.now(),889    Number.isFinite(previous) ? previous + 1 : 0,890  );891  await chrome.storage.local.set({892    peach_last_modified_at: String(next),893  });894}895896// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------897// Padding + noise helpers898// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------899900/**901 * Pads the plaintext string with trailing spaces so that the encoded byte902 * length is a multiple of PAD_BLOCK. JSON.parse tolerates trailing903 * whitespace after a complete document, so the padding is transparent on904 * decode. Ciphertext length equals plaintext length plus a 16-byte tag.905 */906function padPlaintext(json: string, minBytes = 0): string {907  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(json);908  const bucket = Math.max(PAD_BLOCK, Math.ceil(encoded.length / PAD_BLOCK) * PAD_BLOCK);909  // minBytes lets the duress path force a fixed ceiling so both slots match.910  const target = Math.max(bucket, minBytes);911  const padLen = target - encoded.length;912  return json + " ".repeat(padLen);913}914915/**916 * Produces a StoredVault-shaped record filled with CSPRNG bytes. The917 * ciphertext length matches the given byte count. Because GCM ciphertext is918 * pseudo-random, this blob is indistinguishable at rest from a real919 * encrypted vault without the key.920 *921 * crypto.getRandomValues() caps each call at 65536 bytes (the Web Crypto922 * spec hard limit). Chunk the fill so vaults larger than that — common once923 * the user has dozens of entries or any passkey — don't throw.924 */925const CSPRNG_CHUNK = 65_536;926927function fillRandom(buf: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {928  for (let offset = 0; offset < buf.length; offset += CSPRNG_CHUNK) {929    const end = Math.min(offset + CSPRNG_CHUNK, buf.length);930    const chunk = new Uint8Array(end - offset);931    crypto.getRandomValues(chunk);932    buf.set(chunk, offset);933  }934  return buf;935}936937function generateNoiseBlob(ciphertextBytes: number): StoredVault {938  const salt = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));939  const nonce = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));940  const cipher = fillRandom(new Uint8Array(ciphertextBytes));941  const tag = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));942  return {943    version: 1,944    salt: hex(salt),945    nonce: hex(nonce),946    ciphertext: hex(cipher),947    tag: hex(tag),948  };949}950951// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------952// Encrypted plaintext envelope953// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------954955type VaultPayload = {956  entries: VaultEntry[];957  tombstones?: Record<string, number>;958  duressConfigured?: boolean;959};960961type DecryptedPayload = {962  entries: VaultEntry[];963  tombstones: Map<string, number>;964  duressConfigured: boolean;965};966967function encodePayload(entries: VaultEntry[], duress: boolean, minBytes = 0): string {968  const envelope: VaultPayload = {969    entries,970    tombstones: Object.fromEntries(tombstones),971    duressConfigured: duress,972  };973  return padPlaintext(JSON.stringify(envelope), minBytes);974}975976function decodeTombstones(raw: unknown, allEntries: VaultEntry[]): Map<string, number> {977  const result = new Map<string, number>();978  if (raw && typeof raw === "object" && !Array.isArray(raw)) {979    for (const [id, timestamp] of Object.entries(raw as Record<string, unknown>)) {980      if (typeof timestamp === "number" && Number.isFinite(timestamp) && timestamp > 0) {981        result.set(id, timestamp);982      }983    }984  }985  // Older payloads had no ledger. Rebuild the durable portion from any986  // soft-deleted entries before they are eligible for a later purge.987  for (const entry of allEntries) {988    if (typeof entry.deletedAt !== "number" || !Number.isFinite(entry.deletedAt) || entry.deletedAt <= 0) {989      continue;990    }991    if ((result.get(entry.id) ?? 0) < entry.deletedAt) {992      result.set(entry.id, entry.deletedAt);993    }994  }995  return result;996}997998function reconcileTombstones(): void {999  const byId = new Map(entries.map((entry) => [entry.id, entry]));1000  for (const [id] of tombstones) {1001    if (byId.has(id) && !byId.get(id)?.deletedAt) tombstones.delete(id);1002  }1003  for (const entry of entries) {1004    if (typeof entry.deletedAt === "number" && Number.isFinite(entry.deletedAt) && entry.deletedAt > 0) {1005      if ((tombstones.get(entry.id) ?? 0) < entry.deletedAt) {1006        tombstones.set(entry.id, entry.deletedAt);1007      }1008    }1009  }1010}10111012function decodePayload(plain: string): DecryptedPayload {1013  const parsed = JSON.parse(plain) as VaultPayload;1014  if (!parsed || typeof parsed !== "object" || !Array.isArray(parsed.entries)) {1015    throw new Error("invalid vault payload");1016  }1017  const normalized = parsed.entries.map(normalizeEntry);1018  return {1019    entries: normalized,1020    tombstones: decodeTombstones(parsed.tombstones, normalized),1021    duressConfigured: parsed.duressConfigured === true,1022  };1023}10241025/**1026 * Consolidate duplicate passkey records after registration.1027 *1028 * Multiple registrations for one RP can leave duplicate passkey records. This1029 * pass collapses the duplicates:1030 *1031 *   1. Group passkey-bearing (and not deleted) entries by `passkey.rpId`.1032 *   2. Within each group, the most recently-active credential wins (prefer1033 *      lastUsedAt, fall back to passkey.createdAt, fall back to modifiedAt).1034 *   3. If a NON-passkey login entry exists for that RP (matched by url or1035 *      additionalUrls hostname), attach the winning passkey to it and1036 *      soft-delete every passkey-bearing entry in the group.1037 *   4. Otherwise, soft-delete every loser in the group, keeping the winner1038 *      as a passkey-only entry.1039 *1040 * Soft delete (deletedAt) rather than splice — the trash flow keeps the1041 * record around for retention and the user can restore if the heuristic1042 * picked wrong. The `merged` flag goes back to decodePayload so the1043 * unlock path persists the consolidated shape immediately.1044 */1045function mergePasskeyOnlyIntoLogins(entries: VaultEntry[]): { merged: boolean } {1046  let merged = false;1047  const now = Date.now();10481049  const candidates = entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt && e.passkey);1050  const byRpId = new Map<string, VaultEntry[]>();1051  for (const e of candidates) {1052    const rpId = e.passkey!.rpId;1053    const list = byRpId.get(rpId);1054    if (list) list.push(e);1055    else byRpId.set(rpId, [e]);1056  }10571058  for (const [rpId, group] of byRpId) {1059    if (group.length === 0) continue;1060    group.sort((a, b) => {1061      const aT =1062        a.passkey!.lastUsedAt ?? a.passkey!.createdAt ?? a.modifiedAt ?? a.createdAt;1063      const bT =1064        b.passkey!.lastUsedAt ?? b.passkey!.createdAt ?? b.modifiedAt ?? b.createdAt;1065      return bT - aT;1066    });1067    const winner = group[0]!;10681069    // Look for a NON-passkey login entry matching this RP. Use the URL1070    // hostname rather than a substring search so a "login.foo.com" entry1071    // doesn't accidentally absorb a passkey for "foo.com".1072    const loginTarget = entries.find((e) => {1073      if (e.deletedAt || e.passkey || e.type !== "login") return false;1074      if (e.url && extractDomain(e.url) === rpId) return true;1075      for (const extra of e.additionalUrls ?? []) {1076        if (extractDomain(extra) === rpId) return true;1077      }1078      return false;1079    });10801081    if (loginTarget) {1082      loginTarget.passkey = winner.passkey;1083      // A passkey entry may also carry the site's TOTP seed. Preserve it when1084      // the passkey is consolidated onto an existing login instead of1085      // soft-deleting the only record that held the 2FA configuration.1086      if (!loginTarget.totp && winner.totp) {1087        loginTarget.totp = winner.totp;1088        loginTarget.totpAlgorithm = winner.totpAlgorithm;1089        loginTarget.totpDigits = winner.totpDigits;1090        loginTarget.totpPeriod = winner.totpPeriod;1091      }1092      loginTarget.modifiedAt = now;1093      for (const dup of group) {1094        if (!dup.deletedAt) {1095          dup.deletedAt = now;1096          dup.modifiedAt = now;1097        }1098      }1099      merged = true;1100    } else if (group.length > 1) {1101      for (let i = 1; i < group.length; i += 1) {1102        const dup = group[i]!;1103        if (!dup.deletedAt) {1104          dup.deletedAt = now;1105          dup.modifiedAt = now;1106        }1107      }1108      merged = true;1109    }1110  }11111112  return { merged };1113}11141115// Validates that a `StoredVault` record on disk has the field shape we expect1116// before treating an AES-GCM decrypt success as a clean unlock. AES-GCM only1117// authenticates the static VERSION_BYTE AAD, not the `version` field on the1118// outer record — a corrupted `version: 42` slot still decrypts cleanly. This1119// check surfaces that as `corrupted` (M7/COR-007) so the popup can offer a1120// history-restore path instead of falsely reporting "wrong password".1121function hasValidVaultSchema(v: unknown): v is StoredVault {1122  if (typeof v !== "object" || v === null) return false;1123  const r = v as Record<string, unknown>;1124  return (1125    r.version === 1 &&1126    typeof r.salt === "string" &&1127    typeof r.nonce === "string" &&1128    typeof r.ciphertext === "string" &&1129    typeof r.tag === "string"1130  );1131}11321133export type TryDecryptResult =1134  | { status: "ok"; payload: DecryptedPayload }1135  | { status: "wrong_key" }1136  | { status: "corrupted"; reason: string };11371138// Exported solely for `unlockFromCodex` below, which needs to verify a1139// supplied passphrase against a slotA blob *without* committing anything to1140// storage. Keep this internal otherwise — callers crossing the messages.ts1141// boundary should always go through `unlock` / `verifyMainPassword` so the1142// constant-time invariants in Projects.md §3.4 are not bypassed.1143export async function tryDecryptSlot(1144  vault: StoredVault,1145  key: Uint8Array,1146  aadTag?: string,1147): Promise<DecryptedPayload | null> {1148  const res = await tryDecryptSlotResult(vault, key, aadTag);1149  return res.status === "ok" ? res.payload : null;1150}11511152export async function tryDecryptSlotResult(1153  vault: StoredVault,1154  key: Uint8Array,1155  aadTag?: string,1156): Promise<TryDecryptResult> {1157  if (!hasValidVaultSchema(vault)) {1158    return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_slot_schema" };1159  }1160  let plain: string;1161  try {1162    plain = await decrypt(key, vault.nonce, vault.ciphertext, vault.tag, aadTag);1163  } catch {1164    return { status: "wrong_key" };1165  }1166  try {1167    const parsed = JSON.parse(plain) as unknown;1168    if (typeof parsed !== "object" || parsed === null) {1169      return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_payload_shape" };1170    }1171    if (!Array.isArray(parsed) && !Array.isArray((parsed as VaultPayload).entries)) {1172      return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_payload_shape" };1173    }1174    return { status: "ok", payload: decodePayload(plain) };1175  } catch {1176    return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_payload_json" };1177  }1178}11791180// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------1181// Core operations1182// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------11831184function buildDomainIndexSync(all: VaultEntry[]): void {1185  domainIndex = new Map();11861187  for (const entry of all) {1188    if (entry.deletedAt) continue;1189    if (entry.type === "note" || entry.type === "card") continue;11901191    // An entry can match multiple sites via `additionalUrls`. Index each1192    // hostname so `queryDomain` returns the entry regardless of which alias1193    // the user is currently visiting. Dedupe per-entry so a single entry1194    // never appears twice in one bucket.1195    const domains = new Set<string>();1196    const primary = extractDomain(entry.url ?? "");1197    if (primary) domains.add(primary);1198    for (const extra of entry.additionalUrls ?? []) {1199      const d = extractDomain(extra);1200      if (d) domains.add(d);1201    }1202    if (domains.size === 0) continue;12031204    for (const domain of domains) {1205      const bucket = domainIndex.get(domain) ?? [];1206      bucket.push(entry);1207      domainIndex.set(domain, bucket);1208    }1209  }1210}12111212export async function createVault(password: string): Promise<void> {1213  const salt = generateSalt();1214  derivedKey = await deriveKey(password, salt);1215  entries = [];1216  tombstones = new Map();1217  vaultMode = "real";1218  duressConfigured = false;1219  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);12201221  // Generate and wrap the root key for recovery word escrow.1222  const { rawRootKey, recoverySalt, wrappedRootKey, wrappedNonce, wrappedTag } =1223    await generateAndWrapRootKey();1224  rootKey = unhex(rawRootKey);12251226  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured, duressConfigured ? DURESS_SLOT_SIZE : 0);1227  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");12281229  // Second wrapping of rootKey under derivedKey so future unlocks can rehydrate1230  // it without recovery words (H2/COR-006).1231  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(derivedKey, rootKey);12321233  const slotA: StoredVault = {1234    version: 1,1235    salt: hex(salt),1236    nonce,1237    ciphertext,1238    tag,1239    recovery_salt: recoverySalt,1240    recovery_wrapped_root_key: wrappedRootKey,1241    recovery_nonce: wrappedNonce,1242    recovery_tag: wrappedTag,1243    ...pwRoot,1244  };1245  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, slotA);12461247  // Matching-size noise blob for slot B, so a fresh install shows two1248  // similarly-shaped records regardless of whether duress is ever set up.1249  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2));1250  await stampLocalVaultMutation();12511252  touchAutoLock();1253}12541255/**1256 * Creates a local vault from an existing vault root key received through the1257 * SAS-gated adoption protocol. The password is local to this device; it wraps1258 * the adopted root key at rest and does not need to match the source device.1259 */1260export async function createVaultFromRootKey(1261  password: string,1262  rootKeyHex: string,1263): Promise<{ vaultId: string }> {1264  if (typeof password !== "string" || password.length === 0) {1265    throw new Error("ADOPT_INVALID_PASSWORD");1266  }1267  if (typeof rootKeyHex !== "string" || !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(rootKeyHex)) {1268    throw new Error("ADOPT_INVALID_ROOT_KEY: expected 64 lowercase hex chars");1269  }12701271  const rootKeyBytes = unhex(rootKeyHex);1272  if (rootKeyBytes.length !== 32) {1273    rootKeyBytes.fill(0);1274    throw new Error("ADOPT_INVALID_ROOT_KEY: expected 32 bytes");1275  }12761277  let nextDerivedKey: Uint8Array | null = null;1278  let sessionRootKey: Uint8Array | null = null;1279  try {1280    if ((await loadSlot(SLOT_A)) !== null) {1281      throw new Error("ADOPT_VAULT_ALREADY_EXISTS");1282    }12831284    const nextEntries: VaultEntry[] = [];1285    const nextDuressConfigured = false;1286    const vaultId = await computeVaultId(rootKeyBytes);1287    const salt = generateSalt();1288    nextDerivedKey = await deriveKey(password, salt);1289    const recovery = await wrapExistingRootKeyForRecovery(rootKeyBytes);12901291    sessionRootKey = new Uint8Array(rootKeyBytes);1292    const plaintext = encodePayload(nextEntries, nextDuressConfigured, 0);1293    const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(nextDerivedKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");1294    const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(nextDerivedKey, sessionRootKey);1295    const slotA: StoredVault = {1296      version: 1,1297      salt: hex(salt),1298      nonce,1299      ciphertext,1300      tag,1301      recovery_salt: recovery.recoverySalt,1302      recovery_wrapped_root_key: recovery.wrappedRootKey,1303      recovery_nonce: recovery.wrappedNonce,1304      recovery_tag: recovery.wrappedTag,1305      ...pwRoot,1306    };1307    const slotB = generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2);1308    await commitCreatedVaultSlots(slotA, slotB);13091310    const previousDerivedKey = derivedKey;1311    const previousRootKey = rootKey;1312    derivedKey = nextDerivedKey;1313    rootKey = sessionRootKey;1314    nextDerivedKey = null;1315    sessionRootKey = null;1316    entries = nextEntries;1317    tombstones = new Map();1318    vaultMode = "real";1319    duressConfigured = nextDuressConfigured;1320    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1321    if (previousDerivedKey && previousDerivedKey !== derivedKey) zeroKey(previousDerivedKey);1322    if (previousRootKey && previousRootKey !== rootKey) previousRootKey.fill(0);1323    touchAutoLock();13241325    return { vaultId };1326  } finally {1327    rootKeyBytes.fill(0);1328    if (nextDerivedKey) zeroKey(nextDerivedKey);1329    if (sessionRootKey) sessionRootKey.fill(0);1330  }1331}13321333export async function hasVault(): Promise<boolean> {1334  return (await loadSlot(SLOT_A)) !== null;1335}13361337/**1338 * Returns whether the real vault has recorded that a duress passphrase is1339 * configured. Reliable only after a real-mode unlock — before unlock or in1340 * decoy mode, returns false because we cannot read slot A's plaintext.1341 */1342export async function isDuressEnabled(): Promise<boolean> {1343  return vaultMode === "real" && duressConfigured;1344}13451346export async function setupDuress(duressPassword: string): Promise<void> {1347  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {1348    throw new Error("vault must be unlocked in real mode");1349  }1350  // Encrypt the decoy payload (empty entries) under the duress key. Pad to1351  // at least the current slot A ciphertext size so the two slots look the1352  // same at rest at setup time.1353  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1354  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");13551356  const decoySalt = generateSalt();1357  const decoyKey = await deriveKey(duressPassword, decoySalt);1358  try {1359    // Pad the decoy to the fixed duress ceiling. Slot A is re-encrypted to the1360    // same ceiling by the persistSlotA() call below (duressConfigured is now1361    // true), so both slots are exactly DURESS_SLOT_SIZE+tag at rest and their1362    // lengths cannot reveal that duress is configured (audit MEDIUM).1363    const plaintext = encodePayload([], false, DURESS_SLOT_SIZE);1364    const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(decoyKey, plaintext, "slot_b_v1");1365    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, {1366      version: 1,1367      salt: hex(decoySalt),1368      nonce,1369      ciphertext,1370      tag,1371    });1372  } finally {1373    zeroKey(decoyKey);1374  }13751376  // Re-encrypt slot A with the duressConfigured flag set to true. No external1377  // flag is written — the bit lives inside the encrypted envelope.1378  duressConfigured = true;1379  await persistSlotA();1380}13811382export async function disableDuress(): Promise<void> {1383  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {1384    throw new Error("vault must be unlocked in real mode");1385  }1386  // Overwrite slot B with fresh noise that matches slot A's size. The slot1387  // remains occupied so its mere existence does not signal that duress was1388  // ever configured.1389  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1390  if (slotA) {1391    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(slotA.ciphertext.length / 2));1392  }13931394  duressConfigured = false;1395  await persistSlotA();1396}13971398// L14/COR-015: this function intentionally checks slot A (real vault) only.1399// A duress-mode user attempting changePassword is rejected earlier by the1400// vaultMode === 'decoy' check at changePassword. The real-vs-decoy1401// distinction here is by design — duress users cannot rotate the real1402// password by guessing it, and the asymmetry in error timing is acceptable1403// because duress mode is opt-in and the user knows their own decoy key.1404export async function verifyMainPassword(password: string): Promise<boolean> {1405  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1406  if (!slotA) return false;1407  const key = await deriveKey(password, unhex(slotA.salt));1408  try {1409    return (await tryDecryptSlot(slotA, key, "slot_a_v1")) !== null;1410  } finally {1411    zeroKey(key);1412  }1413}14141415export async function unlock(password: string): Promise<boolean> {1416  return attemptUnlockWithDerive(password, deriveKey);1417}14181419async function attemptUnlockWithDerive(1420  password: string,1421  derive: typeof deriveKey,1422): Promise<boolean> {1423  // Load both current-format slots in parallel. Both exist on a supported1424  // install; the1425  // parallel load and the parallel derivation below keep wall-clock time1426  // constant regardless of which slot's passphrase (real or decoy) the1427  // caller supplied, so a timing side channel cannot distinguish the1428  // duress path from the real-unlock path (DUR-002).1429  const [slotA, slotB] = await Promise.all([1430    loadSlot(SLOT_A),1431    loadSlot(SLOT_B),1432  ]);14331434  // Derive both keys in parallel, unconditionally.1435  const [keyA, keyB] = await Promise.all([1436    slotA ? derive(password, unhex(slotA.salt)) : Promise.resolve(null),1437    slotB ? derive(password, unhex(slotB.salt)) : Promise.resolve(null),1438  ]);14391440  // Attempt both decrypts in parallel. The Result variant lets us distinguish1441  // 'wrong_key' from 'corrupted' so callers can offer a history-restore path1442  // when a slot's schema is invalid even though AES-GCM authenticated (M7).1443  const [resultA, resultB] = await Promise.all([1444    keyA && slotA1445      ? tryDecryptSlotResult(slotA, keyA, "slot_a_v1")1446      : Promise.resolve({ status: "wrong_key" } as TryDecryptResult),1447    keyB && slotB1448      ? tryDecryptSlotResult(slotB, keyB, "slot_b_v1")1449      : Promise.resolve({ status: "wrong_key" } as TryDecryptResult),1450  ]);1451  const payloadA = resultA.status === "ok" ? resultA.payload : null;1452  const payloadB = resultB.status === "ok" ? resultB.payload : null;14531454  if (payloadA && keyA) {1455    derivedKey = keyA;1456    void saveSessionKey(keyA, "real");1457    vaultMode = "real";1458    entries = payloadA.entries;1459    tombstones = payloadA.tombstones;1460    duressConfigured = payloadA.duressConfigured;1461    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1462    await loadSettings();1463    touchAutoLock();1464    if (keyB) zeroKey(keyB);14651466    // Current vaults always carry a password-wrapped root key. Older vaults1467    // without this escrow are outside the supported storage format.1468    rootKey = slotA ? await deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(keyA, slotA) : null;1469    if (!rootKey) {1470      await lock();1471      return false;1472    }14731474    // PB-26-213: adopt legacy plaintext pair secrets into the encrypted1475    // record and refresh the trusted-session operational copy.1476    await reconcilePairSecrets(rootKey);14771478    await lockedSyncUnlockHook?.().catch((error) => {1479      console.warn("[Peach sync] locked inbox drain failed:", error);1480    });1481    await resetPinFailedAttempts();1482    return true;1483  }14841485  if (payloadB && keyB) {1486    derivedKey = keyB;1487    void saveSessionKey(keyB, "decoy");1488    vaultMode = "decoy";1489    entries = payloadB.entries;1490    tombstones = payloadB.tombstones;1491    duressConfigured = false;1492    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1493    await loadSettings();1494    touchAutoLock();1495    if (keyA) zeroKey(keyA);1496    // PB-26-213: a duress session must never serve the real pair-secret map.1497    await dropSessionCache();1498    return true;1499  }15001501  if (keyA) zeroKey(keyA);1502  if (keyB) zeroKey(keyB);1503  // Surface corruption (good AES tag, broken schema) distinctly from1504  // wrong-password so the popup can offer history-restore (M7/COR-007).1505  if (resultA.status === "corrupted") {1506    lastUnlockFailureReason = resultA.reason;1507  } else if (resultB.status === "corrupted") {1508    lastUnlockFailureReason = resultB.reason;1509  }1510  return false;1511}15121513// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------1514// MV3 service worker session key — survives SW restarts within a browser session1515// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------15161517// chrome.storage.session is cleared on browser close; survives SW restart.1518// Firefox does not implement it (persistent background script, no restart risk).1519const SESSION_KEY_STORAGE = "peach_session_dk";15201521// PB-26-203: the session-key escrow may only operate where startup positively1522// established trusted-only session storage. Defaults to available so direct1523// vault imports (tests, non-entry bootstraps) keep working; entry.ts applies1524// the real hardening result before the first restore.1525let sessionEscrowAvailable = true;15261527/**1528 * Apply the storage-hardening result at startup. When the trusted-only1529 * session state cannot be established, any stored session key is removed and1530 * the escrow stays off: the user unlocks again after a worker restart1531 * instead of trusting an unproven boundary.1532 */1533export async function applyStorageHardening(sessionEscrow: boolean): Promise<void> {1534  setSessionAllowed(sessionEscrow);1535  if (sessionEscrow) return;1536  sessionEscrowAvailable = false;1537  await clearSessionKey();1538}15391540async function saveSessionKey(key: Uint8Array, mode: "real" | "decoy"): Promise<void> {1541  if (!chrome.storage.session || !sessionEscrowAvailable) return;1542  await chrome.storage.session.set({ [SESSION_KEY_STORAGE]: { keyHex: hex(key), mode } });1543}15441545async function clearSessionKey(): Promise<void> {1546  if (!chrome.storage.session) return;1547  await chrome.storage.session.remove(SESSION_KEY_STORAGE);1548}15491550// A lock that only holds while the service worker stays alive is no lock at1551// all: a cold worker's restoreFromSession() would find the surviving session1552// key and silently re-unlock ~a minute after the user locked. So lock()1553// bumps this epoch synchronously at entry and zeroes keys/indexes before any1554// await; a restore that started earlier sees the mismatch after its next1555// await and aborts instead of publishing.1556let vaultEpoch = 0;15571558// One in-flight restore shared by concurrent callers: storage is read once1559// and the locked-sync unlock hook runs once.1560let restoreInFlight: Promise<boolean> | null = null;15611562/**1563 * On SW restart, re-derive all in-memory vault state from the session key1564 * stored in chrome.storage.session (set at unlock time, cleared by lock();1565 * also cleared on browser close or when restoration fails).1566 * Returns true if the vault was restored, false if no session key was found.1567 * No-ops if the vault is already unlocked.1568 */1569export async function restoreFromSession(): Promise<boolean> {1570  if (derivedKey !== null) return true;1571  if (restoreInFlight) return restoreInFlight;1572  const task = restoreFromSessionInner();1573  restoreInFlight = task;1574  try {1575    return await task;1576  } finally {1577    restoreInFlight = null;1578  }1579}15801581async function restoreFromSessionInner(): Promise<boolean> {1582  const epoch = vaultEpoch;1583  const stale = () => epoch !== vaultEpoch;1584  if (derivedKey !== null) return true;1585  if (!sessionEscrowAvailable) return false;1586  if (!chrome.storage.session) return false;1587  const stored = await chrome.storage.session.get(SESSION_KEY_STORAGE);1588  if (stale()) return false;1589  const entry = stored[SESSION_KEY_STORAGE] as { keyHex: string; mode: "real" | "decoy" } | undefined;1590  if (!entry?.keyHex) return false;15911592  const key = unhex(entry.keyHex);1593  const slotKey = entry.mode === "real" ? SLOT_A : SLOT_B;1594  const aadTag = entry.mode === "real" ? "slot_a_v1" : "slot_b_v1";1595  const slot = await loadSlot(slotKey);1596  if (stale()) { zeroKey(key); return false; }1597  if (!slot) { await clearSessionKey(); return false; }15981599  const result = await tryDecryptSlotResult(slot, key, aadTag);1600  if (stale()) { zeroKey(key); return false; }1601  if (result.status !== "ok") { await clearSessionKey(); return false; }16021603  // Decrypted payload stays in locals until the final epoch-checked commit1604  // below; nothing observable is published before then.1605  const payload = result.payload;1606  await loadSettings();1607  if (stale()) { zeroKey(key); return false; }16081609  // Rehydrate the root key used by sync identity derivation from the password1610  // escrow stored on the current vault format.1611  let freshRoot: Uint8Array | null = null;1612  if (entry.mode === "real") {1613    freshRoot = await deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(key, slot);1614    if (stale()) { zeroKey(key); if (freshRoot) zeroKey(freshRoot); return false; }1615    if (!freshRoot) {1616      await lock();1617      return false;1618    }1619  }16201621  if (stale()) { zeroKey(key); if (freshRoot) zeroKey(freshRoot); return false; }1622  if (freshRoot) {1623    // PB-26-213: encrypted pair-secret record + session copy, before publish.1624    await reconcilePairSecrets(freshRoot);1625    if (stale()) { zeroKey(key); zeroKey(freshRoot); return false; }1626  } else {1627    // PB-26-213: a duress restore must never serve the real pair-secret map.1628    await dropSessionCache();1629    if (stale()) { zeroKey(key); return false; }1630  }1631  derivedKey = key;1632  vaultMode = entry.mode;1633  entries = payload.entries;1634  tombstones = payload.tombstones;1635  duressConfigured = entry.mode === "real" ? payload.duressConfigured : false;1636  if (freshRoot) rootKey = freshRoot;1637  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1638  touchAutoLock();16391640  await lockedSyncUnlockHook?.().catch((error) => {1641    console.warn("[Peach sync] locked inbox drain failed:", error);1642  });1643  if (stale()) return false;16441645  return true;1646}16471648export async function lock(): Promise<void> {1649  // A user-initiated lock must be durable across MV3 service-worker restarts.1650  // The SW is idle-killed after ~30s of inactivity, and the popup's next open1651  // wakes a cold SW whose restoreFromSession() reads chrome.storage.session.1652  // If the session key survived lock(), that restore would silently re-unlock1653  // the vault ~a minute after the user locked it — a lock that only held1654  // while the SW happened to stay alive. The background-sync convenience the1655  // session key once bought (sync runner re-waking to a restored vault) is1656  // not worth an unlocked vault the user never asked to unlock; when locked,1657  // sync-runner correctly reports VAULT_LOCKED instead.1658  vaultEpoch++;1659  if (derivedKey) {1660    zeroKey(derivedKey);1661    derivedKey = null;1662  }1663  if (rootKey) {1664    rootKey.fill(0);1665    rootKey = null;1666  }16671668  entries = [];1669  tombstones = new Map();1670  domainIndex = new Map();1671  vaultMode = "real";1672  duressConfigured = false;1673  clearAutoLock();1674  await clearSessionKey();1675  await clearRecoveryConfirmPending();1676}16771678export function isUnlocked(): boolean {1679  return derivedKey !== null;1680}16811682// Opens the vault using a pre-derived AES-256 key (skipping Argon2id). The1683// PIN-unlock path unwraps this key from its PIN wrap; the passphrase path1684// always derives from scratch via Argon2id.1685export async function unlockWithKey(1686  masterKeyHex: string,1687): Promise<{ ok: true; entries: VaultEntry[] } | { ok: false; error: string }> {1688  try {1689    const masterKeyBytes = unhex(masterKeyHex);1690    const stored = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1691    if (!stored) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };1692    const payload = await tryDecryptSlot(stored, masterKeyBytes, "slot_a_v1");1693    if (!payload) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };16941695    derivedKey = masterKeyBytes;1696    vaultMode = "real";1697    entries = payload.entries;1698    tombstones = payload.tombstones;1699    duressConfigured = payload.duressConfigured;1700    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1701    await loadSettings();1702    touchAutoLock();17031704    rootKey = await deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(masterKeyBytes, stored);1705    if (!rootKey) {1706      await lock();1707      return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };1708    }1709    await reconcilePairSecrets(rootKey);1710    return { ok: true, entries };1711  } catch {1712    return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };1713  }1714}17151716// --- Adoption duress-slot helpers (passthrough, no decrypt) ---17171718/**1719 * Adoption SOURCE helper: returns the sealed slot B as a JSON string when1720 * duress is configured and slot B exists, so the inline snapshot can ship it1721 * to the receiver. Returns null otherwise. Never decrypts.1722 */1723export async function exportDuressSlotForAdoption(): Promise<string | null> {1724  if (!(await isDuressEnabled())) return null;1725  const slotB = await loadSlot(SLOT_B);1726  if (!slotB) return null;1727  return JSON.stringify(slotB);1728}17291730/**1731 * Adoption RECEIVER helper: installs a duress slot received from a source1732 * device. Validates the StoredVault shape (same guard as unlockFromCodex)1733 * and writes it to slot B. Throws on invalid shape so the caller can treat1734 * it as a non-fatal snapshot failure. Never decrypts.1735 */1736export async function installAdoptedDuressSlot(json: string): Promise<void> {1737  let parsed: StoredVault;1738  try {1739    const raw = JSON.parse(json) as unknown;1740    if (!hasValidVaultSchema(raw)) {1741      throw new Error("invalid_duress_slot_shape");1742    }1743    parsed = raw;1744  } catch (err) {1745    if (err instanceof SyntaxError) {1746      throw new Error("invalid_duress_slot_shape");1747    }1748    throw err;1749  }1750  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, parsed);1751}17521753/**1754 * Restore the vault from a parsed Peach Codex payload.1755 *1756 * The supplied passphrase is verified against the Codex's slotA *before* any1757 * storage mutation — wrong passphrases return without touching disk. On1758 * success, the current vault state is snapshotted (reason: "restore") so the1759 * user can revert via Settings -> Vault History, then slotA/slotB are written1760 * and `peach_last_modified_at` is set to the Codex's recorded timestamp. A1761 * regular `unlock()` follows so the rest of the SW sees the standard1762 * post-unlock state.1763 *1764 * Intentionally non-Pro-gated — see peach_codex_v2.md "Pro gating". A Codex1765 * printed by a Pro user must always be restorable, even on a free device.1766 *1767 * Timing is not held constant here (in contrast to `unlock`): the Codex flow1768 * is an explicit user action with a known passphrase, not a passive lock1769 * screen, so the duress-vs-real timing side channel does not apply.1770 */1771export async function unlockFromCodex(params: {1772  slotA: string; // JSON string of StoredVault for slot A1773  slotB: string | null; // JSON string of StoredVault for slot B, or null1774  timestamp: number;1775  masterPassphrase: string;1776}): Promise<1777  | { ok: true; entryCount: number }1778  | { ok: false; reason: "wrong_passphrase" | "invalid_slot_format" }1779> {1780  let parsedSlotA: StoredVault;1781  let parsedSlotB: StoredVault | null = null;1782  try {1783    const rawA = JSON.parse(params.slotA) as unknown;1784    if (!hasValidVaultSchema(rawA)) {1785      return { ok: false, reason: "invalid_slot_format" };1786    }1787    parsedSlotA = rawA;1788    if (params.slotB !== null) {1789      const rawB = JSON.parse(params.slotB) as unknown;1790      if (!hasValidVaultSchema(rawB)) {1791        return { ok: false, reason: "invalid_slot_format" };1792      }1793      parsedSlotB = rawB;1794    }1795  } catch {1796    return { ok: false, reason: "invalid_slot_format" };1797  }17981799  // Verify the passphrase against the supplied slotA WITHOUT writing anything.1800  // If this fails the on-disk vault is left completely untouched.1801  const trialKey = await deriveKey(params.masterPassphrase, unhex(parsedSlotA.salt));1802  const trialPayload = await tryDecryptSlot(parsedSlotA, trialKey, "slot_a_v1");1803  if (!trialPayload) {1804    zeroKey(trialKey);1805    return { ok: false, reason: "wrong_passphrase" };1806  }1807  // Drop the trial key; `unlock()` below derives its own copy. Holding two1808  // copies of the master key in memory at once would be a needless surface.1809  zeroKey(trialKey);18101811  // Snapshot the about-to-be-overwritten on-disk state so the user can revert1812  // a mistaken Codex restore via the Vault History UI. Non-fatal if it fails.1813  await takeVaultSnapshot("restore");18141815  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, parsedSlotA);1816  if (parsedSlotB) {1817    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, parsedSlotB);1818  } else {1819    // Slot B must always exist with ciphertext length matching slot A1820    // (Projects.md §3.2). Codex prints may omit slot B (duress wasn't1821    // configured); regenerate noise to satisfy the invariant.1822    await writeSlot(1823      SLOT_B,1824      generateNoiseBlob(parsedSlotA.ciphertext.length / 2),1825    );1826  }1827  await chrome.storage.local.set({1828    peach_last_modified_at: String(params.timestamp),1829  });18301831  // Standard unlock path so domain index, settings, auto-lock, and1832  // recovery-key state all populate exactly as a normal unlock would.1833  const ok = await unlock(params.masterPassphrase);1834  if (!ok) {1835    // Should be unreachable — we just verified the passphrase against the1836    // same slotA we wrote. Treat as wrong_passphrase to keep the contract1837    // simple if some race or storage anomaly intrudes.1838    return { ok: false, reason: "wrong_passphrase" };1839  }1840  return { ok: true, entryCount: getEntries().length };1841}18421843// Returns the current in-memory derived key as a hex string. Only the PIN1844// unlock path needs this value, and it reads module state directly; this1845// accessor exists so unlockWithKey's root-key rehydration is testable.1846export /* @testable */ function getDerivedKeyHex(): string {1847  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_not_unlocked");1848  return hex(derivedKey);1849}18501851/**1852 * Returns the vault's stable root key as hex, or null when locked / not yet1853 * populated. The root key is random per-vault, generated at creation, escrowed1854 * under the recovery words, and re-wrapped (not regenerated) on every password1855 * change — so it is INVARIANT across password rotation, unlike getDerivedKeyHex.1856 *1857 * This is the correct input for sync identity derivation (vault_id, the Noise1858 * NK static key, the Ed25519 manifest signing key, and per-entry envelope1859 * keys): paired devices keep the same identity and can still decrypt each1860 * other's entries after either side rotates its master password (SEV-2-B).1861 *1862 * Returns null rather than throwing so sync callers degrade to VAULT_LOCKED1863 * instead of crashing; rootKey is populated on every supported real-mode1864 * unlock via deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey.1865 */1866export function getRootKeyHex(): string | null {1867  return rootKey ? hex(rootKey) : null;1868}18691870export function getEntries(): VaultEntry[] {1871  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1872  return entries.filter((entry) => !entry.deletedAt);1873}18741875const EMAIL_RE = /^[^\s@]+@[^\s@]+\.[^\s@]+$/;18761877export function getIdentities(): SavedIdentity[] {1878  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1879  const active = entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt && e.type === "login");18801881  const emailMap = new Map<string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }>();1882  const usernameMap = new Map<string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }>();18831884  for (const entry of active) {1885    const domain = extractDomain(entry.url ?? "") ?? "";1886    const modifiedAt = entry.modifiedAt ?? entry.createdAt ?? 0;18871888    function tally(map: Map<string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }>, v: string) {1889      const existing = map.get(v);1890      if (!existing || modifiedAt > existing.lastUsed) {1891        map.set(v, { lastUsed: modifiedAt, count: (existing?.count ?? 0) + 1, domain });1892      } else {1893        map.set(v, { ...existing, count: existing.count + 1 });1894      }1895    }18961897    const uVal = entry.username?.trim();1898    if (uVal) tally(EMAIL_RE.test(uVal) ? emailMap : usernameMap, uVal);18991900    // Also count the dedicated email field — entries created via the inline1901    // popup new-entry form store email here rather than in username.1902    const eVal = entry.email?.trim();1903    if (eVal) tally(emailMap, eVal);1904  }19051906  const toIdentity = (type: "email" | "username") =>1907    ([value, d]: [string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }]): SavedIdentity => ({1908      value, type, lastUsed: d.lastUsed, useCount: d.count, exampleDomain: d.domain || undefined,1909    });19101911  return [1912    ...[...emailMap.entries()].map(toIdentity("email")).sort((a, b) => b.useCount - a.useCount),1913    ...[...usernameMap.entries()].map(toIdentity("username")).sort((a, b) => b.useCount - a.useCount),1914  ];1915}19161917export async function batchAddEntries(drafts: EntryDraft[]): Promise<VaultEntry[]> {1918  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");19191920  const now = Date.now();1921  const added: VaultEntry[] = [];1922  for (const draft of drafts) {1923    try {1924      const sanitized = sanitizeEntryDraft(draft);1925      const nextEntry: VaultEntry = {1926        ...sanitized,1927        id: crypto.randomUUID(),1928        createdAt: now,1929        modifiedAt: monotonicEntryTimestamp(),1930      };1931      entries.push(nextEntry);1932      added.push(nextEntry);1933    } catch {1934      // Skip invalid drafts silently — caller can see diff between input and output length1935    }1936  }19371938  if (added.length > 0) {1939    await persistEntries();1940  }19411942  return added;1943}19441945/**1946 * Restore a set of entries in full fidelity — preserves id, createdAt,1947 * modifiedAt, and every other field unlike `batchAddEntries` which1948 * assigns fresh identity. Used by restore paths where the backup is the1949 * authoritative source of truth. `mode` controls how entries already in1950 * the vault are treated.1951 */1952export async function restoreEntries(1953  incoming: VaultEntry[],1954  mode: "replace" | "merge"1955): Promise<{ added: number; updated: number; skipped: number }> {1956  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");19571958  // A replace with zero incoming entries is almost certainly a caller bug1959  // (e.g. an import that silently dropped everything). Refuse rather than1960  // wipe the vault.1961  if (mode === "replace" && incoming.length === 0) {1962    throw new Error("refuse to replace with empty entry set");1963  }19641965  let added = 0;1966  let updated = 0;1967  let skipped = 0;19681969  if (mode === "replace") {1970    entries = [];1971    for (const entry of incoming) {1972      const normalized = naturalizeRestoredId(sanitizeRestoredEntry(entry));1973      if (!normalized) {1974        skipped += 1;1975        continue;1976      }1977      entries.push(normalized);1978      if (normalized.deletedAt) {1979        tombstones.set(1980          normalized.id,1981          Math.max(tombstones.get(normalized.id) ?? 0, normalized.deletedAt),1982        );1983      } else {1984        tombstones.delete(normalized.id);1985      }1986      added += 1;1987    }1988  } else {1989    const byId = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();1990    for (const e of entries) byId.set(e.id, e);19911992    for (const entry of incoming) {1993      const normalized = naturalizeRestoredId(sanitizeRestoredEntry(entry));1994      if (!normalized) {1995        skipped += 1;1996        continue;1997      }1998      const existing = byId.get(normalized.id);1999      if (!existing) {2000        entries.push(normalized);2001        if (normalized.deletedAt) tombstones.set(normalized.id, normalized.deletedAt);2002        else tombstones.delete(normalized.id);2003        added += 1;2004      } else if (normalized.modifiedAt > existing.modifiedAt) {2005        const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === existing.id);2006        if (idx !== -1) {2007          entries[idx] = normalized;2008          if (normalized.deletedAt) tombstones.set(normalized.id, normalized.deletedAt);2009          else tombstones.delete(normalized.id);2010          updated += 1;2011        }2012      } else {2013        skipped += 1;2014      }2015    }2016  }20172018  await persistEntries("import");2019  return { added, updated, skipped };2020}20212022/**2023 * A Peach entry id is a UUID. A restored or imported file carries whatever id2024 * its author used, and no reader bounds it, so one oversized id would ride2025 * into every future sync frame and be rejected there — a permanent, opaque2026 * failure on both platforms, caused by data that was already local.2027 *2028 * The action is mint, not reject: this is the last point where an id is still2029 * ours to choose, so the worst outcome is one duplicate if the same vault is2030 * later restored beside a device still holding the old id. Rejecting would2031 * lose the user's import.2032 *2033 * Deliberately NOT inside sanitizeRestoredEntry, which applyMergedRemoteEntries2034 * also calls. Sync has to adopt a peer's id verbatim — that is the only thing2035 * keeping two devices agreed on which entry they are discussing — so reminting2036 * there would fork identity on every device, on every round.2037 */2038const ENTRY_ID_SHAPE = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,64}$/;20392040function naturalizeRestoredId(entry: VaultEntry | null): VaultEntry | null {2041  if (!entry || ENTRY_ID_SHAPE.test(entry.id)) return entry;2042  return { ...entry, id: crypto.randomUUID() };2043}20442045/**2046 * Validate + normalise a VaultEntry coming from a backup, import, or sync2047 * peer. MV-6: this is a strict field WHITELIST — `normalizeEntry` copies2048 * only known VaultEntry fields (unknown/attacker keys are dropped), and2049 * nested `passkey`/`canary` shapes are rebuilt field-by-field, never2050 * spread. Returns null for values the live vault shouldn't accept.2051 */2052function sanitizeRestoredEntry(entry: VaultEntry): VaultEntry | null {2053  if (!entry || typeof entry !== "object") return null;2054  const title = typeof entry.title === "string" ? entry.title.trim() : "";2055  if (!title) return null;2056  const id = typeof entry.id === "string" && entry.id ? entry.id : crypto.randomUUID();2057  const now = Date.now();2058  const createdAt = typeof entry.createdAt === "number" ? entry.createdAt : now;2059  const modifiedAt = typeof entry.modifiedAt === "number" ? entry.modifiedAt : createdAt;20602061  // normalizeEntry whitelists every known VaultEntry field before the entry2062  // reaches the live vault.2063  const normalized = normalizeEntry({2064    ...entry,2065    id,2066    title,2067    type: entry.type ?? "login",2068    createdAt,2069    modifiedAt,2070  });20712072  if (normalized.passkey) {2073    normalized.passkey = sanitizePasskey(normalized.passkey);2074  }2075  if (normalized.canary) {2076    normalized.canary = sanitizeCanary(normalized.canary);2077  }2078  // PCH-01-016: bound tags on the restore path too, so both import funnels agree.2079  normalized.tags = sanitizeTags(normalized.tags);20802081  // Login entries from backup must carry a password (or be passkey-only,2082  // in which case the passkey sub-object replaces the password requirement).2083  if (2084    normalized.type === "login" &&2085    !normalized.passkey &&2086    typeof normalized.password !== "string"2087  ) {2088    return null;2089  }2090  if (entry.passkey && !normalized.passkey) {2091    // Entry claimed a passkey but the shape didn't validate — refuse the2092    // whole entry rather than silently importing a credential-less husk.2093    return null;2094  }20952096  return normalized;2097}20982099/**2100 * Rebuild a PasskeyData object from untrusted input, field by field.2101 * Returns undefined when required fields are missing/mistyped — a rogue2102 * passkey credential must not activate via import (MV-6 attack scenario).2103 */2104function sanitizePasskey(pk: unknown): PasskeyData | undefined {2105  if (!pk || typeof pk !== "object") return undefined;2106  const r = pk as Record<string, unknown>;2107  if (2108    typeof r.rpId !== "string" || !r.rpId ||2109    typeof r.credentialId !== "string" || !r.credentialId ||2110    typeof r.publicKeyCose !== "string" ||2111    typeof r.userHandle !== "string" ||2112    typeof r.userName !== "string"2113  ) {2114    return undefined;2115  }2116  return {2117    rpId: r.rpId,2118    rpName: typeof r.rpName === "string" ? r.rpName : r.rpId,2119    credentialId: r.credentialId,2120    publicKeyCose: r.publicKeyCose,2121    privateKeyJwk:2122      r.privateKeyJwk && typeof r.privateKeyJwk === "object"2123        ? (r.privateKeyJwk as JsonWebKey)2124        : undefined,2125    userHandle: r.userHandle,2126    userName: r.userName,2127    userDisplayName:2128      typeof r.userDisplayName === "string" ? r.userDisplayName : r.userName,2129    algorithm: r.algorithm === -8 ? -8 : -7,2130    signCount: typeof r.signCount === "number" ? r.signCount : 0,2131    aaguid: typeof r.aaguid === "string" ? r.aaguid : "",2132    backupEligible: r.backupEligible === true,2133    backupState: r.backupState === true,2134    lastUsedAt: typeof r.lastUsedAt === "number" ? r.lastUsedAt : undefined,2135    browser: r.browser === "chrome" || r.browser === "firefox" ? r.browser : undefined,2136    transports: Array.isArray(r.transports)2137      ? r.transports.filter((t): t is string => typeof t === "string")2138      : undefined,2139    createdAt: typeof r.createdAt === "number" ? r.createdAt : Date.now(),2140  };2141}21422143/**2144 * Rebuild a Canary object from untrusted input. The webhook must be a2145 * well-formed HTTPS URL — a poisoned canary.webhookUrl is a standing2146 * exfiltration endpoint that the canary subsystem will POST entry titles2147 * to (MV-6 attack scenario). Invalid → the canary is dropped, not the2148 * entry. FIRE_CANARY_PING re-validates with the full SSRF guard at fire2149 * time (isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl), so this import-time check is the2150 * outer of two gates.2151 */2152function sanitizeCanary(c: unknown): Canary | undefined {2153  if (!c || typeof c !== "object") return undefined;2154  const r = c as Record<string, unknown>;2155  if (typeof r.webhookUrl !== "string") return undefined;2156  let url: URL;2157  try {2158    url = new URL(r.webhookUrl);2159  } catch {2160    return undefined;2161  }2162  if (url.protocol !== "https:") return undefined;2163  return {2164    webhookUrl: url.toString(),2165    label: typeof r.label === "string" ? r.label : undefined,2166    lastPinged: typeof r.lastPinged === "number" ? r.lastPinged : undefined,2167    pingCount: typeof r.pingCount === "number" ? r.pingCount : undefined,2168  };2169}21702171/**2172 * MV-6 / PCH-01-016: tags from imported / batch-added entries are untrusted.2173 * Keep only non-empty strings, cap each at 256 chars, and cap the count at 2552174 * (the same per-entry ceiling the export codec enforces, peachPayload.ts).2175 * Non-array or all-invalid input collapses to undefined.2176 */2177function sanitizeTags(tags: unknown): string[] | undefined {2178  if (!Array.isArray(tags)) return undefined;2179  const out: string[] = [];2180  for (const t of tags) {2181    if (typeof t !== "string") continue;2182    const trimmed = t.trim();2183    if (!trimmed) continue;2184    out.push(trimmed.slice(0, 256));2185    if (out.length >= 255) break;2186  }2187  return out.length > 0 ? out : undefined;2188}21892190// Soft-deletes every non-deleted entry in one call. The literal string2191// argument is a tripwire against accidental calls — any caller that would2192// wipe the vault has to consciously type "REPLACE_ALL". Do not relax this2193// to a boolean.2194export async function clearVaultEntries(2195  confirmation: "REPLACE_ALL"2196): Promise<void> {2197  if (confirmation !== "REPLACE_ALL") {2198    throw new Error("clearVaultEntries requires explicit confirmation");2199  }2200  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");2201  for (const entry of entries) {2202    if (!entry.deletedAt) {2203      const stamp = monotonicEntryTimestamp(Math.max(2204        entry.modifiedAt,2205        tombstones.get(entry.id) ?? 0,2206      ));2207      entry.deletedAt = stamp;2208      entry.modifiedAt = stamp;2209      tombstones.set(entry.id, stamp);2210    }2211  }2212  await persistEntries();2213}22142215export async function addEntry(entry: EntryDraft): Promise<VaultEntry> {2216  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");22172218  const sanitized = sanitizeEntryDraft(entry);2219  const now = Date.now();2220  const stamp = monotonicEntryTimestamp();2221  const nextEntry: VaultEntry = {2222    ...sanitized,2223    id: crypto.randomUUID(),2224    createdAt: now,2225    modifiedAt: stamp,2226    // Stamp passwordChangedAt at creation so age tracking is accurate from2227    // day one. Non-login entries carry the same stamp harmlessly.2228    passwordChangedAt: sanitized.password ? stamp : undefined,2229  };22302231  // Clone-and-replace so a failed persist rolls back the in-memory state2232  // (COR-008). Without this, a quota-full or storage error leaves the2233  // module-level `entries` ahead of what's actually on disk.2234  const rollback = entries;2235  entries = [...entries, nextEntry];2236  try {2237    await persistEntries();2238  } catch (err) {2239    entries = rollback;2240    throw err;2241  }22422243  // Fire-and-forget breach check (only for login entries if breach monitoring is enabled or not set)2244  if (settings.breachMonitoring !== false && nextEntry.type === "login" && nextEntry.password) {2245    checkBreach(nextEntry.password).then(async (count) => {2246      if (count > 0) {2247        const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === nextEntry.id);2248        if (idx !== -1) {2249          entries[idx] = { ...entries[idx], breach: count, modifiedAt: monotonicEntryTimestamp(entries[idx].modifiedAt) };2250          await persistEntries();2251        }2252      }2253    });2254  }22552256  fireSyncTrigger("vault_change");22572258  return nextEntry;2259}22602261/**2262 * Run the passkey-merge pass on the live in-memory entries and persist if2263 * anything changed. Called immediately after any passkey registration so that2264 * a same-domain TOTP-only entry already in the vault gets consolidated right2265 * away instead of waiting until the next lock/unlock cycle.2266 */2267export async function consolidatePasskeyEntries(): Promise<void> {2268  if (!derivedKey) return;2269  const { merged } = mergePasskeyOnlyIntoLogins(entries);2270  if (merged) {2271    await persistEntries();2272  }2273}22742275export async function updateEntry(2276  id: string,2277  patch: Partial<VaultEntry>2278): Promise<void> {2279  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");22802281  const idx = entries.findIndex((entry) => entry.id === id);2282  if (idx === -1 || entries[idx].deletedAt) {2283    throw new Error("entry_not_found");2284  }22852286  const current = entries[idx];2287  const sanitizedPatch = sanitizeEntryPatch(patch);2288  // Refresh passwordChangedAt only when the password value actually changes —2289  // a metadata-only update (title, tags, etc.) must not reset the age clock2290  // that drives the Pro health rotation recommendation.2291  const passwordChanged =2292    "password" in patch &&2293    typeof sanitizedPatch.password === "string" &&2294    sanitizedPatch.password !== current.password;2295  const stamp = monotonicEntryTimestamp(current.modifiedAt);2296  // When the password actually changes, push the outgoing one onto the history2297  // (newest first) so the user can reveal/copy/restore it later. We record the2298  // age it carried (passwordChangedAt, falling back to createdAt) rather than2299  // `now`, so the list reflects when each password was last in effect. Only2300  // capture a non-empty prior value — clearing a password leaves no secret to2301  // keep, and we skip an immediate exact duplicate (e.g. restore-then-restore)2302  // to avoid noise.2303  const priorPassword = current.password;2304  const shouldCapture =2305    passwordChanged &&2306    typeof priorPassword === "string" &&2307    priorPassword.length > 0 &&2308    current.passwordHistory?.[0]?.password !== priorPassword;2309  const nextHistory = shouldCapture2310    ? [2311        { password: priorPassword!, changedAt: current.passwordChangedAt ?? current.createdAt },2312        ...(current.passwordHistory ?? []),2313      ].slice(0, PASSWORD_HISTORY_MAX)2314    : current.passwordHistory;2315  entries[idx] = {2316    ...current,2317    ...sanitizedPatch,2318    modifiedAt: stamp,2319    ...(passwordChanged ? { passwordChangedAt: stamp, passwordHistory: nextHistory } : {}),2320  };2321232223232324  // Card entries must retain their card number2325  if (entries[idx].type === "card" && !entries[idx].cardNumber) {2326    entries[idx] = current;2327    throw new Error("card number is required for card entries");2328  }23292330  // Roll the in-memory entry back to its pre-edit state if the disk write2331  // fails (e.g. storage quota). Without this the module-level `entries` array2332  // would hold an edit that never landed on disk, diverging from the vault2333  // until the next unlock silently reverts it (SEV-3-A). Mirrors addEntry.2334  try {2335    await persistEntries();2336  } catch (err) {2337    entries[idx] = current;2338    throw err;2339  }23402341  // Breach check when password changes: clear immediately so old breach doesn't linger,2342  // then async-check the new password and only re-set if it's also found.2343  if ("password" in patch && settings.breachMonitoring !== false && entries[idx].type === "login") {2344    entries[idx] = { ...entries[idx], breach: undefined };2345    await persistEntries();2346    const password = entries[idx].password;2347    if (password) {2348      checkBreach(password).then(async (count) => {2349        const i = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id);2350        if (i !== -1 && count > 0) {2351          entries[i] = { ...entries[i], breach: count, modifiedAt: monotonicEntryTimestamp(entries[i].modifiedAt) };2352          await persistEntries();2353        }2354      });2355    }2356  }23572358  fireSyncTrigger("vault_change");2359}23602361export async function deleteEntry(id: string): Promise<void> {2362  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");23632364  const entry = entries.find((item) => item.id === id);2365  if (!entry || entry.deletedAt) {2366    throw new Error("entry_not_found");2367  }23682369  // Tombstone timestamp must be strictly greater than the entry's last2370  // modification so the deletion wins LWW against any in-flight edit, even2371  // under clock skew (SEV-2-E).2372  const previousModifiedAt = entry.modifiedAt;2373  const previousTombstone = tombstones.get(id);2374  const stamp = monotonicEntryTimestamp(Math.max(entry.modifiedAt, previousTombstone ?? 0));2375  entry.deletedAt = stamp;2376  entry.modifiedAt = stamp;2377  tombstones.set(id, stamp);2378  // Roll the tombstone back if the disk write fails, so a quota error doesn't2379  // leave the entry deleted in memory but alive on disk (SEV-3-A).2380  try {2381    await persistEntries();2382  } catch (err) {2383    delete entry.deletedAt;2384    entry.modifiedAt = previousModifiedAt;2385    if (previousTombstone === undefined) tombstones.delete(id);2386    else tombstones.set(id, previousTombstone);2387    throw err;2388  }2389  fireSyncTrigger("vault_change");2390}23912392export function getDeletedEntries(): VaultEntry[] {2393  if (!derivedKey) return [];2394  return entries.filter((e) => !!e.deletedAt);2395}23962397/** Return all durable deletion timestamps, including purged full entries. */2398export function getTombstoneManifest(): Record<string, number> {2399  if (!derivedKey) return {};2400  return Object.fromEntries(tombstones);2401}24022403/**2404 * Returns the vault's monotonic version — the `peach_last_modified_at` value2405 * stamped on every user-initiated write. Remote (sync) writes do NOT advance2406 * this version so a sync round never cascades into a second outbound sync.2407 */2408export async function getVaultVersion(): Promise<number> {2409  try {2410    const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get("peach_last_modified_at");2411    const v = (raw as Record<string, unknown>).peach_last_modified_at;2412    if (typeof v === "number") return v;2413    if (typeof v === "string" && v !== "") {2414      const n = Number.parseInt(v, 10);2415      return Number.isFinite(n) ? n : 0;2416    }2417    return 0;2418  } catch {2419    return 0;2420  }2421}24222423/**2424 * Apply a batch of remote entries + tombstones from a sync peer.2425 * Last-write-wins by `modifiedAt`; a tombstone supersedes a live entry when2426 * `deletedAt > modifiedAt` on the local side. Mutates `entries` directly and2427 * persists with reason `sync_received` — does NOT fire the sync dispatcher, so2428 * applying a sync round cannot cascade into another outbound sync.2429 *2430 * `applied` counts entries that actually changed local state (new add,2431 * overwrite-by-newer, or new tombstone). `received` is the raw payload size2432 * the caller can surface in the sync result UI.2433 */2434export async function applyMergedRemoteEntries(2435  remoteEntries: VaultEntry[],2436  remoteTombstones: Record<string, number>,2437  _context: { deviceName?: string } = {},2438): Promise<{ received: number; applied: number; conflicts: number }> {2439  // DESIGN: last-write-wins is applied PER-ENTRY, not per-field. If two devices2440  // concurrently edit different fields of the same entry, the one with the2441  // newer modifiedAt wins the whole entry and the other device's field edits2442  // are dropped silently. This is the deliberate trade-off for a simple,2443  // conflict-free merge — per-field CRDT merge is out of scope. Guidance for2444  // users: edit a given entry on one device at a time.2445  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");24462447  const received = remoteEntries.length + Object.keys(remoteTombstones).length;2448  let applied = 0;2449  let conflicts = 0;24502451  const byId = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();2452  for (const e of entries) byId.set(e.id, e);24532454  const mergeNow = Date.now();2455  const remoteTombstoneTimes = new Map<string, number>();2456  for (const [id, rawDeletedAt] of Object.entries(remoteTombstones)) {2457    if (typeof rawDeletedAt === "number" && Number.isFinite(rawDeletedAt) && rawDeletedAt > 0) {2458      remoteTombstoneTimes.set(id, clampSyncTimestamp(rawDeletedAt, mergeNow));2459    }2460  }24612462  for (const remote of remoteEntries) {2463    const sanitized = sanitizeRestoredEntry(remote);2464    if (!sanitized) continue;2465    // HV-1a: a far-future remote modifiedAt must not permanently pin a2466    // malicious value against honest local edits. Clamp BEFORE any2467    // comparison against local timestamps.2468    sanitized.modifiedAt = clampSyncTimestamp(sanitized.modifiedAt, mergeNow);2469    if (typeof sanitized.deletedAt === "number") {2470      sanitized.deletedAt = clampSyncTimestamp(sanitized.deletedAt, mergeNow);2471    }2472    const remoteTombstoneTs = remoteTombstoneTimes.get(sanitized.id);2473    const localTombstoneTs = tombstones.get(sanitized.id);2474    const tombstoneTs = Math.max(remoteTombstoneTs ?? 0, localTombstoneTs ?? 0);2475    if (tombstoneTs > 0 && tombstoneTs >= sanitized.modifiedAt) {2476      continue;2477    }2478    const local = byId.get(sanitized.id);2479    if (!local) {2480      entries.push(sanitized);2481      byId.set(sanitized.id, sanitized);2482      tombstones.delete(sanitized.id);2483      applied += 1;2484    } else if (sanitized.modifiedAt > local.modifiedAt) {2485      const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === local.id);2486      if (idx !== -1) {2487        entries[idx] = sanitized;2488        byId.set(sanitized.id, sanitized);2489        tombstones.delete(sanitized.id);2490        applied += 1;2491        if (!local.deletedAt) conflicts += 1;2492      }2493    }2494  }24952496  for (const [id, rawDeletedAt] of Object.entries(remoteTombstones)) {2497    if (typeof rawDeletedAt !== "number" || !Number.isFinite(rawDeletedAt) || rawDeletedAt <= 0) continue;2498    // HV-1a/1c: clamp the tombstone timestamp before every comparison.2499    const deletedAt = remoteTombstoneTimes.get(id)!;2500    const knownTombstone = tombstones.get(id);2501    if (knownTombstone !== undefined && knownTombstone >= deletedAt) continue;2502    const local = byId.get(id);2503    if (!local) {2504      tombstones.set(id, deletedAt);2505      applied += 1;2506      continue;2507    }2508    if (local.deletedAt && local.deletedAt >= deletedAt) continue;2509    if (deletedAt < local.modifiedAt) continue;2510    const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id);2511    if (idx !== -1) {2512      entries[idx] = { ...local, deletedAt, modifiedAt: deletedAt };2513      tombstones.set(id, deletedAt);2514      applied += 1;2515    }2516  }25172518  if (applied > 0) {2519    await persistEntries("sync_received");2520    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);2521  }2522  return { received, applied, conflicts };2523}25242525export async function restoreEntry(id: string): Promise<void> {2526  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");2527  const entry = entries.find((e) => e.id === id && e.deletedAt);2528  if (!entry) throw new Error("deleted entry not found");2529  const previousDeletedAt = entry.deletedAt;2530  const previousModifiedAt = entry.modifiedAt;2531  const previousTombstone = tombstones.get(id);2532  delete entry.deletedAt;2533  entry.modifiedAt = monotonicEntryTimestamp(Math.max(2534    entry.modifiedAt,2535    previousTombstone ?? 0,2536  ));2537  tombstones.delete(id);2538  try {2539    await persistEntries();2540  } catch (err) {2541    entry.deletedAt = previousDeletedAt;2542    entry.modifiedAt = previousModifiedAt;2543    if (previousTombstone !== undefined) tombstones.set(id, previousTombstone);2544    throw err;2545  }2546  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);2547}25482549export async function purgeEntry(id: string): Promise<void> {2550  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");2551  const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id && e.deletedAt);2552  if (idx === -1) throw new Error("deleted entry not found");2553  const entry = entries[idx]!;2554  tombstones.set(id, Math.max(tombstones.get(id) ?? 0, entry.deletedAt!));2555  entries.splice(idx, 1);2556  await persistEntries();2557}25582559/** Permanently delete entries whose deletedAt is older than retentionMs. 0 = keep forever. */2560export async function purgeExpiredTrash(retentionMs: number): Promise<number> {2561  if (!derivedKey || retentionMs === 0) return 0;2562  const cutoff = Date.now() - retentionMs;2563  const before = entries.length;2564  for (const entry of entries) {2565    if (entry.deletedAt && entry.deletedAt < cutoff) {2566      tombstones.set(entry.id, Math.max(tombstones.get(entry.id) ?? 0, entry.deletedAt));2567    }2568  }2569  entries = entries.filter((e) => !(e.deletedAt && e.deletedAt < cutoff));2570  const purged = before - entries.length;2571  if (purged > 0) await persistEntries();2572  return purged;2573}25742575export function queryDomain(domain: string): VaultEntry[] {2576  return domainIndex.get(domain) ?? [];2577}25782579export function getEntryById(id: string): VaultEntry | undefined {2580  return entries.find((entry) => entry.id === id && !entry.deletedAt);2581}25822583async function persistSlotA(2584  reason: VaultSnapshot["reason"] = "local_save",2585): Promise<StoredVault> {2586  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");25872588  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);2589  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");25902591  // Snapshot the about-to-be-overwritten state BEFORE we mutate disk. Failures2592  // are swallowed by takeVaultSnapshot — history must never block a save.2593  await takeVaultSnapshot(reason);25942595  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured, duressConfigured ? DURESS_SLOT_SIZE : 0);2596  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");25972598  // Preserve existing recovery escrow fields.2599  const nextSlotA: StoredVault = {2600    ...slotA,2601    nonce,2602    ciphertext,2603    tag,2604    // recovery_salt and recovery_wrapped_root_key are already set from loadSlot2605  };2606  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, nextSlotA);26072608  // Slot A (the real vault) is now committed. Wrap every later write so a2609  // mid-persist failure (e.g. a storage error after slot A landed) restores the2610  // prior slot A before rethrowing. Without this, a "failed" save that already2611  // wrote slot A leaves disk ahead of the in-memory rollback in addEntry/2612  // updateEntry/deleteEntry — the entry stays silently on disk and resurfaces2613  // as a duplicate on the next unlock (observed under storage-quota pressure).2614  try {2615    // When duress is not configured, keep slot B size-matched with slot A by2616    // regenerating its noise. When duress IS configured, leave slot B alone —2617    // we don't have the decoy key to re-encrypt it. This is a known trade-off.2618    if (!duressConfigured) {2619      await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2));2620    }2621    // Only advance the vault version for locally-originated writes. Entries2622    // applied from a sync peer ("sync_received") must NOT bump the counter —2623    // otherwise applying a remote round makes us look newer than the peer and2624    // triggers a redundant outbound sync, defeating the no-op optimisation2625    // and risking a ping-pong between two devices (SEV-2-C).2626    if (reason !== "sync_received") {2627      await stampLocalVaultMutation();2628    }2629  } catch (err) {2630    // Best-effort restore — the prior slot A is smaller-or-equal, so this write2631    // fits even when the failure was a quota overflow.2632    await writeSlot(SLOT_A, slotA).catch(() => {});2633    throw err;2634  }26352636  return nextSlotA;2637}26382639async function persistSlotB(): Promise<void> {2640  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");26412642  const slotB = await loadSlot(SLOT_B);2643  if (!slotB) throw new Error("missing slot B");26442645  // Decoy plaintext always reports duressConfigured=false — the decoy user2646  // sees a clean slate. persistSlotB only runs in decoy mode, which only2647  // exists once duress is configured, so pad to the fixed duress ceiling to2648  // keep slot B's length equal to slot A's (audit MEDIUM — deniability).2649  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, false, DURESS_SLOT_SIZE);2650  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKey, plaintext, "slot_b_v1");26512652  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, { ...slotB, nonce, ciphertext, tag });2653  // Symmetric with persistSlotA: if the version stamp fails after the decoy2654  // slot committed, restore the prior slot B so a failed decoy-mode save can't2655  // leave disk ahead of the in-memory rollback.2656  try {2657    await stampLocalVaultMutation();2658  } catch (err) {2659    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, slotB).catch(() => {});2660    throw err;2661  }2662}26632664async function persistEntries(2665  reason: VaultSnapshot["reason"] = "local_save",2666): Promise<void> {2667  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");26682669  // Reconcile direct soft-delete callers while restoring the previous map if2670  // storage rejects the save.2671  const previousTombstones = tombstones;2672  tombstones = new Map(tombstones);2673  reconcileTombstones();2674  try {2675    if (vaultMode === "decoy") {2676      await persistSlotB();2677    } else {2678      await persistSlotA(reason);2679    }2680  } catch (err) {2681    tombstones = previousTombstones;2682    throw err;2683  }2684  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);2685  await refreshLockedSyncState();2686}26872688// PB-26-011: drop URLs whose parsed scheme is not http(s) at the storage2689// boundary. Schemeless values (e.g. "github.com") are inert and kept — they2690// pre-date this guard in existing data. Unparseable values are kept: the2691// reviewed render paths never execute them (favicons via _favicon/, domains2692// via tldts); this is defense-in-depth against future sinks.2693function allowHttpUrl(url: string | undefined): string {2694  const trimmed = url?.trim() ?? "";2695  if (!trimmed) return "";2696  try {2697    const parsed = new URL(trimmed);2698    if (parsed.protocol !== "https:" && parsed.protocol !== "http:") return "";2699  } catch {2700    // No scheme to reject.2701  }2702  return trimmed;2703}27042705function cleanAdditionalUrls(values: string[] | undefined): string[] | undefined {2706  if (!Array.isArray(values)) return undefined;2707  const seen = new Set<string>();2708  const cleaned: string[] = [];2709  for (const value of values) {2710    const trimmed = typeof value === "string" ? value.trim() : "";2711    if (!trimmed) continue;2712    if (!allowHttpUrl(trimmed)) continue;2713    const key = trimmed.toLowerCase();2714    if (seen.has(key)) continue;2715    seen.add(key);2716    cleaned.push(trimmed);2717  }2718  return cleaned.length > 0 ? cleaned : undefined;2719}27202721function sanitizeEntryDraft(entry: EntryDraft): EntryDraft {2722  const title = entry.title.trim();2723  const type: VaultEntry["type"] = entry.type ?? "login";27242725  if (!title) throw new Error("title is required");27262727  if (entry.passkey) {2728    const p = entry.passkey;2729    if (2730      !p.rpId ||2731      !p.credentialId ||2732      !p.publicKeyCose ||2733      !p.userHandle ||2734      !p.userName ||2735      (p.algorithm !== -7 && p.algorithm !== -8)2736    ) {2737      throw new Error("invalid passkey credential");2738    }2739  }2740  if (type === "card") {2741    if (!entry.cardholderName?.trim() || !entry.cardNumber?.trim()) {2742      throw new Error("cardholder name and card number are required");2743    }2744  }27452746  return {2747    type,2748    title,2749    username: type === "login" ? entry.username?.trim() ?? "" : undefined,2750    email: type === "login" ? entry.email?.trim() || undefined : undefined,2751    password: type === "login" ? entry.password : undefined,2752    url: type === "login" ? allowHttpUrl(entry.url) : undefined,2753    additionalUrls: type === "login" ? cleanAdditionalUrls(entry.additionalUrls) : undefined,2754    totp: type === "login" ? entry.totp?.trim() || undefined : undefined,2755    // PCH-01-019: preserve non-default TOTP params through batch-add/import so2756    // they are not silently stripped (they fall back to SHA-1/6/30 when absent).2757    totpAlgorithm: type === "login" ? entry.totpAlgorithm : undefined,2758    totpDigits: type === "login" ? entry.totpDigits : undefined,2759    totpPeriod: type === "login" ? entry.totpPeriod : undefined,2760    notes: entry.notes?.trim() || undefined,2761    breach: type === "login" ? entry.breach : undefined,2762    // PCH-01-016: the batch-add path was bypassing the MV-6 canary/tags2763    // whitelist applied on the RESTORE_ENTRIES path. Run both sanitizers here.2764    canary: type === "login" ? sanitizeCanary(entry.canary) : undefined,2765    tags: sanitizeTags(entry.tags),2766    passkey: entry.passkey,2767    cardholderName: type === "card" ? entry.cardholderName?.trim() : undefined,2768    cardNumber: type === "card" ? entry.cardNumber?.trim() : undefined,2769    expMonth: type === "card" ? entry.expMonth?.trim() : undefined,2770    expYear: type === "card" ? entry.expYear?.trim() : undefined,2771    cvc: type === "card" ? entry.cvc?.trim() : undefined,2772    cardNickname: type === "card" ? entry.cardNickname?.trim() || undefined : undefined,2773    network: type === "card" ? entry.network : undefined,2774    last4: type === "card" ? entry.last4?.trim() : undefined,2775  };2776}27772778function sanitizeEntryPatch(patch: Partial<VaultEntry>): Partial<VaultEntry> {2779  const nextPatch: Partial<VaultEntry> = {};27802781  if ("type" in patch) {2782    nextPatch.type = patch.type;2783  }27842785  if ("title" in patch) {2786    const title = patch.title?.trim() ?? "";2787    if (!title) throw new Error("title is required");2788    nextPatch.title = title;2789  }27902791  if ("url" in patch) {2792    nextPatch.url = allowHttpUrl(patch.url);2793  }27942795  if ("additionalUrls" in patch) {2796    const incoming = Array.isArray(patch.additionalUrls) ? patch.additionalUrls : [];2797    const seen = new Set<string>();2798    const cleaned: string[] = [];2799    for (const value of incoming) {2800      const trimmed = typeof value === "string" ? value.trim() : "";2801      if (!trimmed || !allowHttpUrl(trimmed)) continue;2802      const key = trimmed.toLowerCase();2803      if (seen.has(key)) continue;2804      seen.add(key);2805      cleaned.push(trimmed);2806    }2807    nextPatch.additionalUrls = cleaned.length > 0 ? cleaned : undefined;2808  }28092810  if ("username" in patch) {2811    nextPatch.username = patch.username?.trim() ?? "";2812  }28132814  if ("email" in patch) {2815    nextPatch.email = patch.email?.trim() || undefined;2816  }28172818  if ("password" in patch) {2819    const password = patch.password ?? "";2820    // Allow clearing a password (e.g. on passkey-only entries)2821    nextPatch.password = password || undefined;2822  }28232824  if ("totp" in patch) {2825    nextPatch.totp = patch.totp?.trim() || undefined;2826  }28272828  if ("notes" in patch) {2829    nextPatch.notes = patch.notes?.trim() || undefined;2830  }28312832  if ("breach" in patch) {2833    nextPatch.breach = patch.breach;2834  }28352836  if ("canary" in patch) {2837    // PCH-02-001: route update patches through the same canary whitelist used2838    // by add/restore/sync. Invalid shapes drop the canary; `undefined` clears it.2839    nextPatch.canary = patch.canary ? sanitizeCanary(patch.canary) : undefined;2840  }28412842  if ("passkey" in patch) {2843    // A patch with `passkey: undefined` removes the credential from the entry2844    // (used by "remove passkey" without deleting the whole entry).2845    if (patch.passkey === undefined || patch.passkey === null) {2846      nextPatch.passkey = undefined;2847    } else {2848      const sanitized = sanitizePasskey(patch.passkey);2849      if (!sanitized) throw new Error("invalid passkey credential");2850      nextPatch.passkey = sanitized;2851    }2852  }28532854  if ("tags" in patch) {2855    // PCH-02-001: bound tags exactly like both import funnels.2856    nextPatch.tags = sanitizeTags(patch.tags);2857  }28582859  if ("cardholderName" in patch) {2860    nextPatch.cardholderName = patch.cardholderName?.trim() || undefined;2861  }2862  if ("cardNumber" in patch) {2863    const n = patch.cardNumber ?? "";2864    nextPatch.cardNumber = n || undefined;2865  }2866  if ("expMonth" in patch) {2867    nextPatch.expMonth = patch.expMonth?.trim() || undefined;2868  }2869  if ("expYear" in patch) {2870    nextPatch.expYear = patch.expYear?.trim() || undefined;2871  }2872  if ("cvc" in patch) {2873    nextPatch.cvc = patch.cvc?.trim() || undefined;2874  }2875  if ("cardNickname" in patch) {2876    nextPatch.cardNickname = patch.cardNickname?.trim() || undefined;2877  }2878  if ("network" in patch) {2879    nextPatch.network = patch.network;2880  }2881  if ("last4" in patch) {2882    nextPatch.last4 = patch.last4?.trim() || undefined;2883  }28842885  return nextPatch;2886}28872888function normalizeEntry(entry: VaultEntry): VaultEntry {2889  const base: VaultEntry = {2890    id: entry.id,2891    type: entry.type,2892    title: entry.title,2893    username: entry.username,2894    email: entry.email,2895    password: entry.password,2896    url: entry.url,2897    additionalUrls:2898      "additionalUrls" in entry && Array.isArray(entry.additionalUrls)2899        ? entry.additionalUrls2900        : undefined,2901    totp: entry.totp,2902    // PCH-01-019: carry TOTP params through the normalize/restore path too.2903    totpAlgorithm: entry.totpAlgorithm,2904    totpDigits: entry.totpDigits,2905    totpPeriod: entry.totpPeriod,2906    notes: entry.notes,2907    breach: entry.breach,2908    // Preserve the password-age clock across lock/unlock. Without this the2909    // field is dropped on every decode and the advanced-health "aged password"2910    // signal silently resets to createdAt on each unlock (SEV-2-A).2911    passwordChangedAt:2912      "passwordChangedAt" in entry ? entry.passwordChangedAt : undefined,2913    // Preserve past-password history across lock/unlock. normalizeEntry is a2914    // field whitelist, so an unlisted field is silently dropped on every decode2915    // (same class as the passwordChangedAt SEV-2-A above).2916    passwordHistory:2917      "passwordHistory" in entry && Array.isArray(entry.passwordHistory)2918        ? entry.passwordHistory2919        : undefined,2920    canary: entry.canary,2921    passkey: entry.passkey,2922    createdAt: entry.createdAt,2923    modifiedAt: entry.modifiedAt,2924    deletedAt: entry.deletedAt,2925    tags: entry.tags,2926    cardholderName: "cardholderName" in entry ? entry.cardholderName : undefined,2927    cardNumber: "cardNumber" in entry ? entry.cardNumber : undefined,2928    expMonth: "expMonth" in entry ? entry.expMonth : undefined,2929    expYear: "expYear" in entry ? entry.expYear : undefined,2930    cvc: "cvc" in entry ? entry.cvc : undefined,2931    cardNickname: "cardNickname" in entry ? entry.cardNickname : undefined,2932    network: "network" in entry ? entry.network : undefined,2933    last4: "last4" in entry ? entry.last4 : undefined,2934  };29352936  return base;2937}293829392940// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------2941// Deduplication2942// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------29432944function entryDupeKey(e: VaultEntry): string {2945  if (e.type === "note") return `note|${e.title.toLowerCase()}`;2946  // Passkey-bearing entries dedupe by the credential's RP + user. Two logins2947  // on different sites that happen to share a username are still distinct;2948  // two passkey credentials for the same RP+user are duplicates regardless2949  // of any login fields they may also carry.2950  if (e.passkey) {2951    return `passkey|${e.passkey.rpId.toLowerCase()}|${e.passkey.userName.toLowerCase()}`;2952  }2953  return `login|${e.title.toLowerCase()}|${(e.url ?? "").toLowerCase()}|${(e.username ?? "").toLowerCase()}`;2954}29552956/** Returns the number of duplicate entries (those that would be removed). */2957export function countDuplicates(): number {2958  const best = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();2959  let dupeCount = 0;2960  for (const e of entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt)) {2961    const key = entryDupeKey(e);2962    const existing = best.get(key);2963    if (!existing) {2964      best.set(key, e);2965    } else {2966      dupeCount++;2967      // Keep the more recently modified one in the map2968      if ((e.modifiedAt ?? e.createdAt ?? 0) > (existing.modifiedAt ?? existing.createdAt ?? 0)) {2969        best.set(key, e);2970      }2971    }2972  }2973  return dupeCount;2974}29752976/**2977 * Soft-deletes duplicate entries, keeping the most recently modified copy of2978 * each group. Returns the number of entries moved to trash.2979 */2980export async function deduplicateEntries(): Promise<number> {2981  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");2982  // Dedup reshapes slot B permanently under the decoy key, which is2983  // forensically distinguishable from a freshly-seeded decoy vault. Refuse.2984  if (vaultMode === "decoy") {2985    throw new Error("deduplicate disabled in decoy mode");2986  }29872988  const best = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();2989  for (const e of entries.filter((en) => !en.deletedAt)) {2990    const key = entryDupeKey(e);2991    const existing = best.get(key);2992    if (!existing) {2993      best.set(key, e);2994    } else if ((e.modifiedAt ?? e.createdAt ?? 0) > (existing.modifiedAt ?? existing.createdAt ?? 0)) {2995      best.set(key, e);2996    }2997  }29982999  const keepIds = new Set(Array.from(best.values()).map((e) => e.id));3000  let removed = 0;3001  entries = entries.map((e) => {3002    if (!e.deletedAt && !keepIds.has(e.id)) {3003      removed++;3004      const deletedAt = monotonicEntryTimestamp(Math.max(3005        e.modifiedAt,3006        tombstones.get(e.id) ?? 0,3007      ));3008      tombstones.set(e.id, deletedAt);3009      return { ...e, deletedAt };3010    }3011    return e;3012  });30133014  if (removed > 0) await persistEntries();3015  return removed;3016}30173018// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------3019// Vault history — snapshot BEFORE every vault write so the saved blob is3020// what is about to be lost, not what was just written. Capped at 5. The3021// stored blobs are AES-256-GCM ciphertext under the master password, so3022// history adds zero security surface.3023// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------30243025const HISTORY_KEY = "peach_vault_history";3026const HISTORY_MAX = 5;30273028// PCH-01-023: coarsen a live-entry count into a low-resolution bucket so the3029// plaintext snapshot field cannot reveal exact vault size or single-entry change3030// deltas. Buckets widen as the vault grows so absolute leakage stays roughly3031// proportional rather than exact.3032function bucketEntryCount(n: number): number {3033  if (n <= 0) return 0;3034  if (n <= 10) return 10;3035  if (n <= 25) return 25;3036  if (n <= 50) return 50;3037  if (n <= 100) return 100;3038  if (n <= 250) return 250;3039  if (n <= 500) return 500;3040  return Math.ceil(n / 500) * 500;3041}30423043/**3044 * Snapshot the CURRENT on-disk vault state into history. Call this BEFORE3045 * overwriting peach_vault_a so the saved blob captures the about-to-be-lost3046 * state. Identical-to-most-recent blobs are skipped to avoid filling history3047 * with no-op writes.3048 */3049export async function takeVaultSnapshot(3050  reason: VaultSnapshot["reason"],3051): Promise<void> {3052  try {3053    const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get([SLOT_A, SLOT_B, HISTORY_KEY]);3054    const slotA = (raw as Record<string, StoredVault | undefined>)[SLOT_A];3055    const slotB = (raw as Record<string, StoredVault | undefined>)[SLOT_B];30563057    // Nothing to snapshot if the real slot doesn't exist yet (fresh install,3058    // pre-createVault). createVault skips snapshots intentionally — there is3059    // no prior state to preserve.3060    if (!slotA) return;30613062    const vault_a = JSON.stringify(slotA);3063    const vault_b = JSON.stringify(slotB ?? slotA);30643065    // Best-effort entry count: only meaningful when the in-memory state is3066    // unlocked AND in real mode. Decoy mode would leak the decoy entry3067    // count; locked mode has no entries to count. Both fall through to null.3068    // PCH-01-023: store a coarse bucket, not the exact count — chrome.storage3069    // .local sits next to the AES-GCM blobs in plaintext, so an exact count would3070    // leak vault size and per-write deltas (the metadata padding hides this).3071    let entryCount: number | null = null;3072    if (derivedKey && vaultMode === "real") {3073      try {3074        entryCount = bucketEntryCount(entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt).length);3075      } catch {3076        entryCount = null;3077      }3078    }30793080    const existingRaw = (raw as Record<string, VaultHistory | undefined>)[HISTORY_KEY];3081    const history: VaultHistory = existingRaw && Array.isArray(existingRaw.snapshots)3082      ? existingRaw3083      : { snapshots: [] };30843085    // Deduplication: if the most recent snapshot has byte-identical blobs,3086    // skip — saves the same vault N times in a row would otherwise burn the3087    // entire history window with no recovery value.3088    const latest = history.snapshots[0];3089    if (latest && latest.vault_a === vault_a && latest.vault_b === vault_b) {3090      return;3091    }30923093    const snapshot: VaultSnapshot = {3094      id: crypto.randomUUID(),3095      savedAt: Date.now(),3096      reason,3097      vault_a,3098      vault_b,3099      entryCount,3100    };31013102    history.snapshots = [snapshot, ...history.snapshots].slice(0, HISTORY_MAX);3103    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [HISTORY_KEY]: history });3104  } catch (err) {3105    // Non-fatal — history must never block a save. A failed snapshot just3106    // means the user loses one rung of the safety ladder for this write.3107    // M4/QUA-006: log so the failure is visible; if it looks like a quota3108    // problem, notify the popup so the user can prune history themselves.3109    console.warn('[Peach] takeVaultSnapshot failed:', err);3110    if (String(err).includes('QUOTA') || String(err).includes('quota')) {3111      try {3112        await chrome.runtime.sendMessage({ type: 'VAULT_STORAGE_QUOTA_WARNING' });3113      } catch {3114        // popup may be closed; surfaced via console.warn above3115      }3116    }3117  }3118}31193120/** Wipe all vault history. Called by Panic / DESTROY_VAULT. */3121export async function clearVaultHistory(): Promise<void> {3122  try {3123    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [HISTORY_KEY]: { snapshots: [] } satisfies VaultHistory });3124  } catch {3125    // Non-fatal — DESTROY_VAULT also runs storage.local.clear().3126  }3127}31283129/** Read all snapshots, newest first, for the Settings vault history view. */3130export async function getVaultHistory(): Promise<VaultSnapshot[]> {3131  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get(HISTORY_KEY);3132  const history = (raw as Record<string, VaultHistory | undefined>)[HISTORY_KEY];3133  if (!history || !Array.isArray(history.snapshots)) return [];3134  return history.snapshots;3135}31363137/**3138 * Replace the on-disk vault with the chosen snapshot's blobs and lock the3139 * vault. The current state is itself snapshotted with reason 'restore' first3140 * so the restore is reversible. After this returns, the user must unlock3141 * with the password that matches the restored blob.3142 */3143export async function restoreVaultSnapshot(3144  snapshotId: string,3145): Promise<{ ok: true } | { ok: false; error: string }> {3146  const history = await getVaultHistory();3147  const snapshot = history.find((s) => s.id === snapshotId);3148  if (!snapshot) return { ok: false, error: "snapshot_not_found" };31493150  // Snapshot the about-to-be-replaced current state so the restore is3151  // reversible. takeVaultSnapshot is no-op when the most recent entry is3152  // byte-identical, so a restore-of-a-restore stays clean.3153  await takeVaultSnapshot("restore");31543155  let restoredA: StoredVault;3156  let restoredB: StoredVault;3157  try {3158    restoredA = JSON.parse(snapshot.vault_a) as StoredVault;3159    restoredB = JSON.parse(snapshot.vault_b) as StoredVault;3160  } catch {3161    return { ok: false, error: "snapshot_corrupt" };3162  }31633164  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, restoredA);3165  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, restoredB);3166  await stampLocalVaultMutation();31673168  // Lock so the user must prove they can decrypt the restored blob. If they3169  // restored a pre-password-change snapshot they discover it immediately at3170  // the lock screen rather than silently holding an inaccessible vault.3171  await lock();31723173  return { ok: true };3174}31753176/**3177 * Rotate the vault's sync identity by generating a FRESH ROOT KEY and3178 * re-wrapping everything under it (MV-8). Because every sync credential —3179 * vault_id, the Noise static keypair, the Ed25519 manifest signing key,3180 * and the per-entry envelope keys — derives from the root key, rotation3181 * makes a lost/stolen device's retained key material useless. All paired3182 * devices must re-pair afterwards.3183 *3184 * CONSEQUENCE THE UI MUST SURFACE: the 12 recovery words also derive from3185 * the root key, so rotation INVALIDATES the old recovery phrase. The flow3186 * sets peach_recovery_pending so the popup re-presents the new words for3187 * confirmation, same as the initial recovery-word confirmation path.3188 */3189export async function rotateSyncIdentity(): Promise<{ ok: boolean; error?: string }> {3190  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {3191    return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };3192  }3193  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);3194  if (!slotA) return { ok: false, error: "missing_slot_a" };31953196  // 1. Fresh root key + recovery escrow (new words).3197  const { rawRootKey, recoverySalt, wrappedRootKey, wrappedNonce, wrappedTag } =3198    await generateAndWrapRootKey();31993200  // 2. Re-wrap the new root key under the current password-derived key.3201  const newRootKey = unhex(rawRootKey);3202  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(derivedKey, newRootKey);32033204  // 3. Snapshot, then single atomic slot write — both escrow wrappings of3205  //    the new root key land together (same transactional rule as3206  //    changePassword). Entries are untouched: they are sealed under the3207  //    password-derived key, not the root key.3208  await takeVaultSnapshot("local_save");3209  const nextSlotA: StoredVault = {3210    ...slotA,3211    recovery_salt: recoverySalt,3212    recovery_wrapped_root_key: wrappedRootKey,3213    recovery_nonce: wrappedNonce,3214    recovery_tag: wrappedTag,3215    ...pwRoot,3216  };3217  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, nextSlotA);32183219  // 4. Swap in memory only after disk committed.3220  if (rootKey) zeroKey(rootKey);3221  rootKey = newRootKey;32223223  // 5. Old peers' identities derive from the dead root key — drop them all,3224  // with their rendezvous secrets (PB-26-213: rotation clears the map, so3225  // there is nothing to rewrap under the new key).3226  await clearPairedDevices();3227  await clearPairSecrets();32283229  // 6. Force re-presentation of the NEW recovery words on next popup view.3230  await setRecoveryConfirmPending(); // same flag the create-vault flow uses32313232  await stampLocalVaultMutation();3233  return { ok: true };3234}32353236/**3237 * Change the master password. Re-encrypts slot A with a fresh salt + new3238 * derived key. Slot B (duress or noise) is left untouched when duress is3239 * configured — it uses an independent key derived from the duress password —3240 * and regenerated as noise when duress is not configured.3241 */3242export async function changePassword(3243  currentPassword: string,3244  newPassword: string3245): Promise<boolean> {3246  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") return false;32473248  // Verify current password before allowing any change3249  const valid = await verifyMainPassword(currentPassword);3250  if (!valid) return false;32513252  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);3253  if (!slotA) return false;3254  if (!rootKey) return false;32553256  // Derive fresh key from new password + new random salt3257  const newSalt = generateSalt();3258  const newKey = await deriveKey(newPassword, newSalt);32593260  // Re-encrypt the in-memory entries with the new key3261  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured, duressConfigured ? DURESS_SLOT_SIZE : 0);3262  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(newKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");32633264  // Pre-wrap root key under the new derived key. Recovery fields wrap rootKey3265  // under recovery words and remain untouched — recovery phrase keeps working3266  // across password changes (H4/COR-002).3267  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(newKey, rootKey);32683269  const finalSlotA: StoredVault = {3270    ...slotA,3271    salt: hex(newSalt),3272    nonce,3273    ciphertext,3274    tag,3275    ...pwRoot,3276  };32773278  // Snapshot the OLD-key blob before overwriting it. If the user later3279  // restores from this snapshot they will need the OLD password — the3280  // post-restore lock surfaces that immediately.3281  await takeVaultSnapshot("local_save");32823283  // Single atomic write: ciphertext, salt, and pw_root_* fields all land in3284  // one storage transaction. An SW kill before this point leaves the old3285  // slot intact; after this point everything tied to the new password is3286  // already on disk together (M6/COR-004).3287  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, finalSlotA);32883289  // Swap the in-memory key synchronously before any further await. If we3290  // threw between the Slot A write and this swap, the next persistEntries()3291  // would overwrite Slot A with old-key ciphertext, locking the user out.3292  zeroKey(derivedKey);3293  derivedKey = newKey;32943295  // PCH-01-008: the MV3 session escrow still holds the OLD key. Without this,3296  // the next service-worker restore decrypts the new-key Slot A with the stale3297  // key, fails tryDecryptSlotResult, and silently drops the user to a lock3298  // screen. Re-escrow the new key so restore survives a password change.3299  void saveSessionKey(newKey, "real");33003301  // Regenerate noise for slot B when duress is not in use. Runs after the3302  // key swap so a failure here is a disposable noise regeneration, not a3303  // lockout.3304  if (!duressConfigured) {3305    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2));3306  }3307  await clearPinUnlockStorage();3308  await stampLocalVaultMutation();33093310  return true;3311}