vault.ts

1/**2 * vault.ts — sole owner of vault state and chrome.storage vault keys.3 *4 * Every read/write of `peach_vault_a`, `peach_vault_b`, and `peach_settings`5 * goes through this module. No other file accesses those keys directly.6 * External callers reach vault operations via `messages.ts` — never by7 * importing from here cross-boundary (popup/content must not). Invariants8 * for the two-slot schema, unlock timing, and key/disk atomicity are in9 * Projects.md §3.2–§3.6.10 */1112import { deriveKey, generateSalt } from "../crypto/argon2";13import { extractDomain } from "../shared/domain";14import {15  rootKeyToWords,16  wordsToRootKeyMaterial,17  deriveRecoveryKey,18} from "../shared/recovery-words";19import type {20  AccentColorName,21  LegacyVaultEntry,22  ManualSummonRecord,23  SavedIdentity,24  StoredVault,25  VaultEntry,26  VaultHistory,27  VaultSnapshot,28} from "../shared/types";29import { decrypt, encrypt, zeroKey } from "./aes";30import { clearAutoLock, touchAutoLock } from "./alarms";3132type EntryDraft = Omit<33  VaultEntry,34  "id" | "createdAt" | "modifiedAt" | "deletedAt"35>;3637// Slot-neutral storage keys (v1.4.24+). Both slots always exist; slot B38// either holds the decoy vault (when duress is configured) or random noise39// that looks identical at rest. No external indicator is stored — duress40// configuration is recorded only inside the encrypted payload of slot A.41const SLOT_A = "peach_vault_a";42const SLOT_B = "peach_vault_b";4344// Legacy keys, migrated away on first access.45const LEGACY_MAIN = "peach_vault";46const LEGACY_DECOY = "peach_decoy_vault";47const LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG = "peach_duress";4849// Plaintext is padded to the next multiple of this size before encryption.50// This coarsens ciphertext-length leakage into 1 KiB buckets.51const PAD_BLOCK = 1024;5253let derivedKey: Uint8Array | null = null;54// 32-byte random root key, separate from the derivedKey used for vault encryption.55// The root key is wrapped (encrypted) under the recovery key derived from the56// 12-word phrase. When the user changes their password, only the wrapping changes;57// the root key and recovery words remain stable.58let rootKey: Uint8Array | null = null;59let entries: VaultEntry[] = [];60let domainIndex: Map<string, VaultEntry[]> = new Map();61let vaultMode: "real" | "decoy" = "real";62// Cached post-unlock view of whether the real vault records that duress is63// configured. Only meaningful after a real-mode unlock; for decoy-mode unlock64// this stays false because we never see slot A's plaintext.65let duressConfigured = false;6667let migrationRan = false;6869// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------70// Settings (persisted inside the encrypted vault store as a sidecar key)71// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------7273export type DisplayFont = "cormorant-italic" | "cormorant" | "inter" | "system";74export type TextSize = "small" | "medium" | "large";7576export interface VaultSettings {77  accentColor?: AccentColorName;78  theme?: "dark" | "light";79  autoLockMinutes?: number;80  clipboardClearSeconds?: number;81  lockOnClose?: boolean;82  breachMonitoring?: boolean;83  passkeyProviderEnabled?: boolean;84  trashRetentionDays?: number;85  manualSummonDomains?: Record<string, ManualSummonRecord>;86  declinedCardFingerprints?: string[];87  /**88   * Display font for headlines, brand wordmark, and narrative copy. Default89   * is "cormorant-italic" — the bold italic serif that ships as Peach's90   * voice. Non-italic options exist for users who prefer upright type.91   */92  displayFont?: DisplayFont;93  /**94   * Text size scale for body copy and entry titles. Stops at "large" by95   * design — XL clips dense screens (Vault, Health) inside the fixed96   * 330×480 popup surface.97   */98  textSize?: TextSize;99  /**100   * When true, all entrance/exit transitions and ambient animations are101   * collapsed to instant. Honoured alongside the user's OS-level102   * `prefers-reduced-motion`.103   */104  reduceMotion?: boolean;105  /**106   * Android-only: when true, the master key is escrowed in AndroidKeyStore107   * and the lock screen offers biometric unlock. Toggled from Settings →108   * Security → Biometrics. Has no effect on desktop builds.109   */110  biometricsEnabled?: boolean;111  /**112   * User overrides for keyboard shortcuts. Keys are ShortcutAction names113   * (see src/shared/shortcuts.ts). Missing actions fall through to114   * DEFAULT_BINDINGS — `getActiveBindings(settings.shortcuts)` is the115   * canonical lookup. Storing only the deltas keeps the vault payload116   * small and lets default updates land for users who never rebind.117   */118  shortcuts?: Record<string, { key: string; ctrl?: boolean; meta?: boolean; shift?: boolean; alt?: boolean }>;119}120121let settings: VaultSettings = {};122123export function getSettings(): VaultSettings {124  return settings;125}126127export async function ensureSettingsLoaded(): Promise<VaultSettings> {128  await loadSettings();129  return settings;130}131132export async function updateSettings(patch: Partial<VaultSettings>): Promise<void> {133  await loadSettings();134  settings = { ...settings, ...patch };135  await persistSettings();136}137138async function persistSettings(): Promise<void> {139  try {140    await chrome.storage.local.set({ peach_settings: settings });141  } catch (err) {142    throw mapStorageError(err);143  }144}145146function mapStorageError(err: unknown): Error {147  const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);148  if (/QUOTA_BYTES|quota/i.test(message)) {149    return new Error("STORAGE_QUOTA_EXCEEDED");150  }151  return err instanceof Error ? err : new Error(message);152}153154async function loadSettings(): Promise<void> {155  const result = await chrome.storage.local.get("peach_settings");156  settings = (result as { peach_settings?: VaultSettings }).peach_settings ?? {};157}158159// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------160// HIBP breach check (k-anonymity model)161// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------162163export async function checkBreach(password: string): Promise<number> {164  const encoder = new TextEncoder();165  const hashBuffer = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-1", encoder.encode(password));166  const hashHex = Array.from(new Uint8Array(hashBuffer))167    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))168    .join("")169    .toUpperCase();170171  const prefix = hashHex.slice(0, 5);172  const suffix = hashHex.slice(5);173174  try {175    const res = await fetch(`https://api.pwnedpasswords.com/range/${prefix}`);176    if (!res.ok) return 0;177    const text = await res.text();178    const match = text.split("\r\n").find((l) => l.startsWith(suffix));179    return match ? parseInt(match.split(":")[1], 10) : 0;180  } catch {181    return 0; // Network unavailable — don't block182  }183}184185export async function declineCardSaveOffer(last4: string, expMonth: string, expYear: string): Promise<void> {186  const fingerprint = await cardFingerprint(last4, expMonth, expYear);187  await loadSettings();188  settings = {189    ...settings,190    declinedCardFingerprints: [...(settings.declinedCardFingerprints ?? []), fingerprint],191  };192  await persistSettings();193}194195export async function isCardDeclined(last4: string, expMonth: string, expYear: string): Promise<boolean> {196  await loadSettings();197  const fingerprint = await cardFingerprint(last4, expMonth, expYear);198  return (settings.declinedCardFingerprints ?? []).includes(fingerprint);199}200201async function cardFingerprint(last4: string, expMonth: string, expYear: string): Promise<string> {202  const encoder = new TextEncoder();203  const buf = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-1", encoder.encode(`${last4}${expMonth}${expYear}`));204  return Array.from(new Uint8Array(buf)).map(b => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0")).join("");205}206207function hex(buf: Uint8Array): string {208  return Array.from(buf)209    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))210    .join("");211}212213function unhex(s: string): Uint8Array {214  const out = new Uint8Array(s.length / 2);215  for (let i = 0; i < s.length; i += 2) {216    out[i / 2] = parseInt(s.slice(i, i + 2), 16);217  }218  return out;219}220221// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------222// Root key generation and recovery word wrapping223// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------224225/**226 * Generate a random 32-byte root key and wrap it (AES-256-GCM) under a key227 * derived from the recovery word material via HKDF-SHA256. The wrapped blob228 * fields are stored in slot A alongside the password-wrapped ciphertext. The229 * root key itself is kept in memory for the session so getRecoveryWords() can230 * encode it without re-deriving.231 */232async function generateAndWrapRootKey(): Promise<{233  rawRootKey: string; // hex of the plaintext root key — caller stores in rootKey234  recoverySalt: string;235  wrappedRootKey: string;236  wrappedNonce: string;237  wrappedTag: string;238}> {239  const rootKeyBytes = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32));240241  // Derive the recovery key from the BIP39 words encoding of the root key.242  const words = await rootKeyToWords(rootKeyBytes);243  const wordMaterial = await wordsToRootKeyMaterial(words);244  const recoverySalt = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));245  const recoveryKey = await deriveRecoveryKey(wordMaterial, recoverySalt);246247  // Wrap the root key with the recovery key using AES-256-GCM directly.248  // We hex-encode rootKeyBytes so the plaintext is always valid UTF-8.249  const nonce = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));250  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(hex(rootKeyBytes));251  const raw = await crypto.subtle.encrypt(252    {253      name: "AES-GCM",254      iv: nonce,255      additionalData: new Uint8Array([1]).buffer as ArrayBuffer,256      tagLength: 128,257    },258    recoveryKey,259    encoded260  );261  // WebCrypto returns ciphertext || auth tag concatenated; split them.262  const rawU8 = new Uint8Array(raw);263  const ciphertext = hex(rawU8.slice(0, rawU8.length - 16));264  const tag = hex(rawU8.slice(rawU8.length - 16));265266  return {267    rawRootKey: hex(rootKeyBytes),268    recoverySalt: hex(recoverySalt),269    wrappedRootKey: ciphertext,270    wrappedNonce: hex(nonce),271    wrappedTag: tag,272  };273}274275/**276 * Unwrap the root key using recovery words. Called during recovery flow when277 * the user provides their 12-word phrase and a new password.278 * Exported for use by the RECOVER_WITH_WORDS message handler.279 */280export async function unwrapRootKeyForRecovery(281  wrappedRootKey: string,282  wrappedNonce: string,283  wrappedTag: string,284  recoverySaltHex: string,285  words: string[]286): Promise<void> {287  const wordMaterial = await wordsToRootKeyMaterial(words);288  const recoverySalt = unhex(recoverySaltHex);289  const recoveryKey = await deriveRecoveryKey(wordMaterial, recoverySalt);290291  // Decrypt and cache the root key. The root key bytes were hex-encoded before292  // encryption so the ciphertext is valid UTF-8. We inline the AES-GCM decrypt293  // here to avoid passing a CryptoKey to the string-based encrypt/decrypt helpers.294  // Each component is stored separately in the vault slot; decode them individually295  // so the nonce is always exactly the 12 bytes from wrappedNonce.296  const nonceRaw = unhex(wrappedNonce);297  const ciphertextRaw = unhex(wrappedRootKey);298  const tagRaw = unhex(wrappedTag);299  // Combine ciphertext and tag for AES-GCM (expects ciphertext||tag).300  // Use explicit ArrayBuffer allocations to satisfy TS BufferSource constraints.301  const nonceU8 = nonceRaw as unknown as Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>;302  const combined = new Uint8Array(ciphertextRaw.length + tagRaw.length);303  combined.set(ciphertextRaw, 0);304  combined.set(tagRaw, ciphertextRaw.length);305  const raw = await crypto.subtle.decrypt(306    { name: "AES-GCM", iv: nonceU8, additionalData: new Uint8Array([1]).buffer as ArrayBuffer, tagLength: 128 },307    recoveryKey,308    combined309  );310  const decryptedHex = new TextDecoder().decode(raw);311  rootKey = unhex(decryptedHex);312}313314/**315 * Re-wrap the cached root key under a new derived key (from the user's new316 * password). Called after password change and after recovery re-key so the317 * same recovery words continue to work with the updated password — and so318 * subsequent unlocks can rehydrate rootKey via deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey.319 *320 * recovery_* fields are intentionally not touched: those wrap rootKey under321 * the recovery words, which do not change when the password changes.322 */323export async function rewrapRootKeyForPassword(324  newDerivedKey: Uint8Array,325  _newSalt: Uint8Array326): Promise<void> {327  if (!rootKey) throw new Error("root key not set");328  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);329  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");330  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(newDerivedKey, rootKey);331  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, { ...slotA, ...pwRoot });332}333334/**335 * Change the vault encryption to a new derived key (already derived from336 * the user's new password). Used by RECOVER_WITH_WORDS and changePassword.337 * Caller is responsible for key swap and snapshot.338 */339async function reencryptVaultForNewKey(340  newKey: Uint8Array,341  slotA: StoredVault342): Promise<void> {343  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured);344  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(newKey, plaintext);345  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, {346    ...slotA,347    nonce,348    ciphertext,349    tag,350  });351}352353/**354 * Full password change with an already-derived key (used after recovery).355 * Unlike changePassword(), this skips re-verification of current password356 * since recovery flow has already validated the user's identity via words.357 */358export async function changePasswordWithNewKey(359  newSalt: Uint8Array,360  newKey: Uint8Array361): Promise<void> {362  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);363  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");364  // reencryptVaultForNewKey must receive the updated salt so that subsequent365  // UNLOCK calls with the new password can re-derive the correct key.366  await reencryptVaultForNewKey(newKey, { ...slotA, salt: hex(newSalt) });367  if (derivedKey) zeroKey(derivedKey);368  derivedKey = newKey;369  // Refresh pw_root_* under the new key so deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey works370  // on the next unlock (H2/COR-006). If rootKey is missing — recovery flow371  // should have populated it — fall back silently rather than blowing up the372  // recovery path; migrateToRecovery will rehydrate on the next unlock.373  if (rootKey) {374    const slotAfter = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);375    if (slotAfter) {376      const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(newKey, rootKey);377      await writeSlot(SLOT_A, { ...slotAfter, ...pwRoot });378    }379  }380  if (!duressConfigured) {381    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(slotA.ciphertext.length / 2));382  }383  await stampLocalVaultMutation();384}385386// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------387// Salt generation --- exported so the RECOVER_WITH_WORDS handler can derive388// a new key after password reset without re-importing the crypto module.389// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------390391export { deriveKey, generateSalt };392393export async function loadSlotA(): Promise<StoredVault | null> {394  return loadSlot(SLOT_A);395}396397/**398 * Recover the session root key by AES-GCM-decrypting the pw_root_* fields399 * (a second wrapping of the root key under the password-derived key). This400 * is what makes GET_RECOVERY_WORDS work across lock/unlock cycles without401 * the user re-entering their recovery phrase: the same root key bytes —402 * and therefore the same 12 words — survive every unlock.403 *404 * Returns null when the pw_root fields are absent (pre-v2.12 vault that405 * hasn't been migrated yet) or when decryption fails (wrong derived key,406 * tampered ciphertext). On null the caller should fall through to407 * migrateToRecovery() to populate the fields.408 */409async function deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(410  derivedKeyBytes: Uint8Array,411  slotA: StoredVault,412): Promise<Uint8Array | null> {413  if (!slotA.pw_root_ciphertext || !slotA.pw_root_nonce || !slotA.pw_root_tag) {414    return null;415  }416  try {417    const rootHex = await decrypt(418      derivedKeyBytes,419      slotA.pw_root_nonce,420      slotA.pw_root_ciphertext,421      slotA.pw_root_tag,422    );423    return unhex(rootHex);424  } catch {425    return null;426  }427}428429// AES-GCM-wrap rootKey under derivedKey for the pw_root_* fields. Returns the430// hex-encoded ciphertext/nonce/tag triple ready to embed in StoredVault.431async function wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(432  derivedKeyBytes: Uint8Array,433  rootKeyBytes: Uint8Array,434): Promise<{ pw_root_ciphertext: string; pw_root_nonce: string; pw_root_tag: string }> {435  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKeyBytes, hex(rootKeyBytes));436  return {437    pw_root_ciphertext: ciphertext,438    pw_root_nonce: nonce,439    pw_root_tag: tag,440  };441}442443/**444 * For vaults created before v2.12 (no recovery_salt/recovery_wrapped_root_key),445 * generate the root key, wrap it under the recovery words, and persist the446 * recovery escrow into slot A. The caller must show the recovery words to the447 * user before calling this — once called, those words are the vault's recovery448 * path. This runs once, on the first unlock of an upgraded vault.449 */450export async function migrateToRecovery(): Promise<void> {451  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {452    throw new Error("vault must be unlocked in real mode");453  }454  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);455  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");456  const hasRecoveryEscrow =457    !!slotA.recovery_salt && !!slotA.recovery_wrapped_root_key;458  const hasPwRoot = !!slotA.pw_root_ciphertext && !!slotA.pw_root_nonce;459  if (hasRecoveryEscrow && hasPwRoot) return; // already done460461  // If recovery escrow already exists but pw_root doesn't, we cannot recover462  // the original rootKey without the user's words. The least-surprising path463  // is to rotate to a fresh root key — the user's old recovery words become464  // invalid but we surface peach_recovery_pending so the popup re-presents465  // the words. The unlock-path callers all set that flag.466  const { rawRootKey, recoverySalt, wrappedRootKey, wrappedNonce, wrappedTag } =467    await generateAndWrapRootKey();468  rootKey = unhex(rawRootKey);469470  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(derivedKey, rootKey);471  const nextSlotA: StoredVault = {472    ...slotA,473    recovery_salt: recoverySalt,474    recovery_wrapped_root_key: wrappedRootKey,475    recovery_nonce: wrappedNonce,476    recovery_tag: wrappedTag,477    ...pwRoot,478  };479  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, nextSlotA);480  await stampLocalVaultMutation();481}482483/**484 * Returns the 12 recovery words for the current session's root key.485 * Must be called while the vault is unlocked. Throws if recovery has not486 * been set up (pre-v2.12 vault that hasn't migrated yet).487 */488export async function getRecoveryWords(): Promise<string[]> {489  if (!rootKey) {490    throw new Error("recovery not set up — vault may need migration");491  }492  return rootKeyToWords(rootKey);493}494495async function loadSlot(key: string): Promise<StoredVault | null> {496  const result = await chrome.storage.local.get(key);497  return (result as Record<string, StoredVault | undefined>)[key] ?? null;498}499500async function writeSlot(key: string, vault: StoredVault): Promise<void> {501  try {502    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [key]: vault });503  } catch (err) {504    throw mapStorageError(err);505  }506}507508async function stampLocalVaultMutation(): Promise<void> {509  await chrome.storage.local.set({510    peach_last_modified_at: String(Date.now()),511  });512}513514/**515 * One-shot migration from the pre-A-2 schema (peach_vault + peach_decoy_vault516 * + peach_duress flag) to the slot-neutral schema (peach_vault_a +517 * peach_vault_b). Runs at most once per session; safe to call repeatedly.518 */519async function ensureMigrated(): Promise<void> {520  if (migrationRan) return;521  migrationRan = true;522523  const keys = [LEGACY_MAIN, LEGACY_DECOY, LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG, SLOT_A, SLOT_B];524  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get(keys);525  const slotAExists = raw[SLOT_A] !== undefined;526  const slotBExists = raw[SLOT_B] !== undefined;527  const legacyMain = raw[LEGACY_MAIN] as StoredVault | undefined;528  const legacyDecoy = raw[LEGACY_DECOY] as StoredVault | undefined;529530  // Fresh install with nothing in storage — nothing to do; createVault() sets up both slots.531  if (!slotAExists && !legacyMain) return;532533  // Already migrated.534  if (slotAExists && slotBExists && !legacyMain && !legacyDecoy) return;535536  let didMigrate = false;537  if (legacyMain && !slotAExists) {538    await writeSlot(SLOT_A, legacyMain);539    didMigrate = true;540  }541542  // If slot B isn't set, populate it: use legacy decoy when present, else noise.543  if (!slotBExists) {544    const target = (legacyMain ?? raw[SLOT_A]) as StoredVault | undefined;545    if (legacyDecoy) {546      await writeSlot(SLOT_B, legacyDecoy);547      didMigrate = true;548    } else if (target) {549      await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(target.ciphertext.length / 2));550      didMigrate = true;551    }552  }553554  const toRemove: string[] = [];555  if (legacyMain) toRemove.push(LEGACY_MAIN);556  if (legacyDecoy) toRemove.push(LEGACY_DECOY);557  if (raw[LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG] !== undefined) toRemove.push(LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG);558  if (toRemove.length > 0) {559    await chrome.storage.local.remove(toRemove);560    didMigrate = true;561  }562  if (didMigrate) {563    await stampLocalVaultMutation();564  }565}566567// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------568// Padding + noise helpers569// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------570571/**572 * Pads the plaintext string with trailing spaces so that the encoded byte573 * length is a multiple of PAD_BLOCK. JSON.parse tolerates trailing574 * whitespace after a complete document, so the padding is transparent on575 * decode. Ciphertext length equals plaintext length plus a 16-byte tag.576 */577function padPlaintext(json: string): string {578  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(json);579  const target = Math.max(PAD_BLOCK, Math.ceil(encoded.length / PAD_BLOCK) * PAD_BLOCK);580  const padLen = target - encoded.length;581  return json + " ".repeat(padLen);582}583584/**585 * Produces a StoredVault-shaped record filled with CSPRNG bytes. The586 * ciphertext length matches the given byte count. Because GCM ciphertext is587 * pseudo-random, this blob is indistinguishable at rest from a real588 * encrypted vault without the key.589 *590 * crypto.getRandomValues() caps each call at 65536 bytes (the Web Crypto591 * spec hard limit). Chunk the fill so vaults larger than that — common once592 * the user has dozens of entries or any passkey — don't throw.593 */594const CSPRNG_CHUNK = 65_536;595596function fillRandom(buf: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {597  for (let offset = 0; offset < buf.length; offset += CSPRNG_CHUNK) {598    const end = Math.min(offset + CSPRNG_CHUNK, buf.length);599    const chunk = new Uint8Array(end - offset);600    crypto.getRandomValues(chunk);601    buf.set(chunk, offset);602  }603  return buf;604}605606function generateNoiseBlob(ciphertextBytes: number): StoredVault {607  const salt = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));608  const nonce = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));609  const cipher = fillRandom(new Uint8Array(ciphertextBytes));610  const tag = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));611  return {612    version: 1,613    salt: hex(salt),614    nonce: hex(nonce),615    ciphertext: hex(cipher),616    tag: hex(tag),617  };618}619620// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------621// Encrypted plaintext envelope622// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------623624type VaultPayload = {625  entries: VaultEntry[];626  duressConfigured?: boolean;627};628629type DecryptedPayload = {630  entries: VaultEntry[];631  duressConfigured: boolean;632  /**633   * True when at least one entry in the on-disk payload had a legacy shape634   * (pre-v2.11.0 passkey type/flat fields, or pre-A-2 created/updated keys)635   * and got rewritten by normalizeEntry. The unlock path uses this to636   * persist the new shape immediately — without it, the migration would637   * re-run on every unlock and old shape never disappears from disk.638   */639  migratedFromLegacy: boolean;640};641642function encodePayload(entries: VaultEntry[], duress: boolean): string {643  const envelope: VaultPayload = { entries, duressConfigured: duress };644  return padPlaintext(JSON.stringify(envelope));645}646647function rawNeedsMigration(raw: VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry): boolean {648  if ("created" in raw || "updated" in raw) return true;649  const flat = raw as Partial<VaultEntry>;650  if (flat.type === "passkey") return true;651  // Flat rpId without a passkey sub-object means pre-v2.11.0 schema.652  if (flat.rpId !== undefined && flat.passkey === undefined) return true;653  return false;654}655656function decodePayload(plain: string): DecryptedPayload {657  const parsed = JSON.parse(plain) as658    | Array<VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry>659    | VaultPayload;660661  const rawEntries = Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed : parsed.entries ?? [];662  const flatMigrationNeeded = rawEntries.some(rawNeedsMigration);663664  const normalized = rawEntries.map(normalizeEntry);665  const { merged } = mergePasskeyOnlyIntoLogins(normalized);666667  if (Array.isArray(parsed)) {668    return {669      entries: normalized,670      duressConfigured: false,671      migratedFromLegacy: true, // pre-A-2 array shape always needs save672    };673  }674675  return {676    entries: normalized,677    duressConfigured: parsed.duressConfigured === true,678    migratedFromLegacy: flatMigrationNeeded || merged,679  };680}681682/**683 * One-time consolidation pass run alongside the legacy passkey migration.684 *685 * Pre-v2.11.0 the Chrome passkey path always created a fresh `type:"passkey"`686 * entry per registration — so users who tested registration multiple times687 * accumulated several passkey-bearing entries for the same RP, and the688 * migration to the unified shape carried that duplication forward. This689 * pass collapses the duplicates:690 *691 *   1. Group passkey-bearing (and not deleted) entries by `passkey.rpId`.692 *   2. Within each group, the most recently-active credential wins (prefer693 *      lastUsedAt, fall back to passkey.createdAt, fall back to modifiedAt).694 *   3. If a NON-passkey login entry exists for that RP (matched by url or695 *      additionalUrls hostname), attach the winning passkey to it and696 *      soft-delete every passkey-bearing entry in the group.697 *   4. Otherwise, soft-delete every loser in the group, keeping the winner698 *      as a passkey-only entry.699 *700 * Soft delete (deletedAt) rather than splice — the trash flow keeps the701 * record around for retention and the user can restore if the heuristic702 * picked wrong. The `merged` flag goes back to decodePayload so the703 * unlock path persists the consolidated shape immediately.704 */705function mergePasskeyOnlyIntoLogins(entries: VaultEntry[]): { merged: boolean } {706  let merged = false;707  const now = Date.now();708709  const candidates = entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt && e.passkey);710  const byRpId = new Map<string, VaultEntry[]>();711  for (const e of candidates) {712    const rpId = e.passkey!.rpId;713    const list = byRpId.get(rpId);714    if (list) list.push(e);715    else byRpId.set(rpId, [e]);716  }717718  for (const [rpId, group] of byRpId) {719    if (group.length === 0) continue;720    group.sort((a, b) => {721      const aT =722        a.passkey!.lastUsedAt ?? a.passkey!.createdAt ?? a.modifiedAt ?? a.createdAt;723      const bT =724        b.passkey!.lastUsedAt ?? b.passkey!.createdAt ?? b.modifiedAt ?? b.createdAt;725      return bT - aT;726    });727    const winner = group[0]!;728729    // Look for a NON-passkey login entry matching this RP. Use the URL730    // hostname rather than a substring search so a "login.foo.com" entry731    // doesn't accidentally absorb a passkey for "foo.com".732    const loginTarget = entries.find((e) => {733      if (e.deletedAt || e.passkey || e.type !== "login") return false;734      if (e.url && extractDomain(e.url) === rpId) return true;735      for (const extra of e.additionalUrls ?? []) {736        if (extractDomain(extra) === rpId) return true;737      }738      return false;739    });740741    if (loginTarget) {742      loginTarget.passkey = winner.passkey;743      loginTarget.modifiedAt = now;744      for (const dup of group) {745        if (!dup.deletedAt) {746          dup.deletedAt = now;747          dup.modifiedAt = now;748        }749      }750      merged = true;751    } else if (group.length > 1) {752      for (let i = 1; i < group.length; i += 1) {753        const dup = group[i]!;754        if (!dup.deletedAt) {755          dup.deletedAt = now;756          dup.modifiedAt = now;757        }758      }759      merged = true;760    }761  }762763  return { merged };764}765766// Exported solely for `unlockFromCodex` below, which needs to verify a767// supplied passphrase against a slotA blob *without* committing anything to768// storage. Keep this internal otherwise — callers crossing the messages.ts769// boundary should always go through `unlock` / `verifyMainPassword` so the770// constant-time invariants in Projects.md §3.4 are not bypassed.771export async function tryDecryptSlot(772  vault: StoredVault,773  key: Uint8Array774): Promise<DecryptedPayload | null> {775  try {776    const plain = await decrypt(key, vault.nonce, vault.ciphertext, vault.tag);777    return decodePayload(plain);778  } catch {779    return null;780  }781}782783// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------784// Core operations785// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------786787function buildDomainIndexSync(all: VaultEntry[]): void {788  domainIndex = new Map();789790  for (const entry of all) {791    if (entry.deletedAt) continue;792    if (entry.type === "note" || entry.type === "card") continue;793794    // An entry can match multiple sites via `additionalUrls`. Index each795    // hostname so `queryDomain` returns the entry regardless of which alias796    // the user is currently visiting. Dedupe per-entry so a single entry797    // never appears twice in one bucket.798    const domains = new Set<string>();799    const primary = extractDomain(entry.url ?? "");800    if (primary) domains.add(primary);801    for (const extra of entry.additionalUrls ?? []) {802      const d = extractDomain(extra);803      if (d) domains.add(d);804    }805    if (domains.size === 0) continue;806807    for (const domain of domains) {808      const bucket = domainIndex.get(domain) ?? [];809      bucket.push(entry);810      domainIndex.set(domain, bucket);811    }812  }813}814815export async function createVault(password: string): Promise<void> {816  await ensureMigrated();817818  const salt = generateSalt();819  derivedKey = await deriveKey(password, salt);820  entries = [];821  vaultMode = "real";822  duressConfigured = false;823  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);824825  // Generate and wrap the root key for recovery word escrow.826  const { rawRootKey, recoverySalt, wrappedRootKey, wrappedNonce, wrappedTag } =827    await generateAndWrapRootKey();828  rootKey = unhex(rawRootKey);829830  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured);831  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKey, plaintext);832833  // Second wrapping of rootKey under derivedKey so future unlocks can rehydrate834  // it without recovery words (H2/COR-006).835  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(derivedKey, rootKey);836837  const slotA: StoredVault = {838    version: 1,839    salt: hex(salt),840    nonce,841    ciphertext,842    tag,843    recovery_salt: recoverySalt,844    recovery_wrapped_root_key: wrappedRootKey,845    recovery_nonce: wrappedNonce,846    recovery_tag: wrappedTag,847    ...pwRoot,848  };849  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, slotA);850851  // Matching-size noise blob for slot B, so a fresh install shows two852  // similarly-shaped records regardless of whether duress is ever set up.853  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2));854  await stampLocalVaultMutation();855856  touchAutoLock();857}858859export async function hasVault(): Promise<boolean> {860  await ensureMigrated();861  return (await loadSlot(SLOT_A)) !== null;862}863864/**865 * Returns whether the real vault has recorded that a duress passphrase is866 * configured. Reliable only after a real-mode unlock — before unlock or in867 * decoy mode, returns false because we cannot read slot A's plaintext.868 */869export async function isDuressEnabled(): Promise<boolean> {870  return vaultMode === "real" && duressConfigured;871}872873export async function setupDuress(duressPassword: string): Promise<void> {874  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {875    throw new Error("vault must be unlocked in real mode");876  }877  await ensureMigrated();878879  // Encrypt the decoy payload (empty entries) under the duress key. Pad to880  // at least the current slot A ciphertext size so the two slots look the881  // same at rest at setup time.882  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);883  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");884885  const decoySalt = generateSalt();886  const decoyKey = await deriveKey(duressPassword, decoySalt);887  try {888    // Pad the decoy plaintext to match slot A's ciphertext length (minus the889    // 16-byte tag) so encrypted sizes align exactly.890    const targetBytes = slotA.ciphertext.length / 2;891    let plaintext = encodePayload([], false);892    const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(plaintext);893    if (encoded.length < targetBytes) {894      plaintext = plaintext + " ".repeat(targetBytes - encoded.length);895    }896    const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(decoyKey, plaintext);897    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, {898      version: 1,899      salt: hex(decoySalt),900      nonce,901      ciphertext,902      tag,903    });904  } finally {905    zeroKey(decoyKey);906  }907908  // Re-encrypt slot A with the duressConfigured flag set to true. No external909  // flag is written — the bit lives inside the encrypted envelope.910  duressConfigured = true;911  await persistSlotA();912}913914export async function disableDuress(): Promise<void> {915  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {916    throw new Error("vault must be unlocked in real mode");917  }918  await ensureMigrated();919920  // Overwrite slot B with fresh noise that matches slot A's size. The slot921  // remains occupied so its mere existence does not signal that duress was922  // ever configured.923  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);924  if (slotA) {925    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(slotA.ciphertext.length / 2));926  }927928  duressConfigured = false;929  await persistSlotA();930}931932export async function verifyMainPassword(password: string): Promise<boolean> {933  await ensureMigrated();934  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);935  if (!slotA) return false;936  const key = await deriveKey(password, unhex(slotA.salt));937  try {938    return (await tryDecryptSlot(slotA, key)) !== null;939  } finally {940    zeroKey(key);941  }942}943944export async function unlock(password: string): Promise<boolean> {945  await ensureMigrated();946947  // Load both slots in parallel. Both always exist post-migration; the948  // parallel load and the parallel derivation below keep wall-clock time949  // constant regardless of which slot's passphrase (real or decoy) the950  // caller supplied, so a timing side channel cannot distinguish the951  // duress path from the real-unlock path (DUR-002).952  const [slotA, slotB] = await Promise.all([953    loadSlot(SLOT_A),954    loadSlot(SLOT_B),955  ]);956957  // Derive both keys in parallel, unconditionally.958  const [keyA, keyB] = await Promise.all([959    slotA ? deriveKey(password, unhex(slotA.salt)) : Promise.resolve(null),960    slotB ? deriveKey(password, unhex(slotB.salt)) : Promise.resolve(null),961  ]);962963  // Attempt both decrypts in parallel.964  const [payloadA, payloadB] = await Promise.all([965    keyA && slotA ? tryDecryptSlot(slotA, keyA) : Promise.resolve(null),966    keyB && slotB ? tryDecryptSlot(slotB, keyB) : Promise.resolve(null),967  ]);968969  if (payloadA && keyA) {970    derivedKey = keyA;971    vaultMode = "real";972    entries = payloadA.entries;973    duressConfigured = payloadA.duressConfigured;974    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);975    await loadSettings();976    touchAutoLock();977    if (keyB) zeroKey(keyB);978979    // slotA is non-null when payloadA is truthy (keyA was derived from slotA).980    if (slotA) {981      const needsRecoverySetup =982        !slotA.recovery_salt || !slotA.recovery_wrapped_root_key;983      if (!needsRecoverySetup) {984        rootKey = await deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(keyA, slotA);985      }986      // Pre-v2.12 vault, or a vault whose pw_root_* fields haven't been written987      // yet: generate the recovery escrow and seed pw_root_* so subsequent988      // unlocks can rehydrate rootKey without the user's recovery words.989      // Best-effort — a failure here must not block unlock.990      if (needsRecoverySetup || !rootKey) {991        try {992          await migrateToRecovery();993          if (needsRecoverySetup) {994            // String "1" matches the popup's existing peach_recovery_pending995            // check; surfaced so the user re-confirms recovery words after a996            // legacy-vault unlock (H2/COR-006).997            await chrome.storage.local.set({ peach_recovery_pending: '1' });998          }999        } catch (migrationErr) {1000          console.warn('[Peach] recovery migration failed:', migrationErr);1001        }1002      }1003    }10041005    // If the payload had a pre-v2.11.0 shape (legacy passkey type, flat1006    // passkey fields, or pre-A-2 created/updated keys), rewrite it now so1007    // the next save uses the new format and migration doesn't re-run forever.1008    if (payloadA.migratedFromLegacy) {1009      await persistSlotA();1010    }1011    return true;1012  }10131014  if (payloadB && keyB) {1015    derivedKey = keyB;1016    vaultMode = "decoy";1017    entries = payloadB.entries;1018    duressConfigured = false;1019    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1020    await loadSettings();1021    touchAutoLock();1022    if (keyA) zeroKey(keyA);1023    return true;1024  }10251026  if (keyA) zeroKey(keyA);1027  if (keyB) zeroKey(keyB);1028  return false;1029}10301031export function lock(): void {1032  if (derivedKey) {1033    zeroKey(derivedKey);1034    derivedKey = null;1035  }1036  if (rootKey) {1037    rootKey.fill(0);1038    rootKey = null;1039  }10401041  entries = [];1042  domainIndex = new Map();1043  vaultMode = "real";1044  duressConfigured = false;1045  clearAutoLock();1046}10471048export function isUnlocked(): boolean {1049  return derivedKey !== null;1050}10511052// Opens the vault using a pre-derived AES-256 key (skipping Argon2id).1053// Used by Android biometric unlock — the key was derived on the native side.1054export async function unlockWithKey(1055  masterKeyHex: string,1056): Promise<{ ok: true; entries: VaultEntry[] } | { ok: false; error: string }> {1057  try {1058    const masterKeyBytes = unhex(masterKeyHex);1059    const stored = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1060    if (!stored) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };1061    const payload = await tryDecryptSlot(stored, masterKeyBytes);1062    if (!payload) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };10631064    derivedKey = masterKeyBytes;1065    vaultMode = "real";1066    entries = payload.entries;1067    duressConfigured = payload.duressConfigured;1068    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1069    await loadSettings();1070    touchAutoLock();1071    return { ok: true, entries };1072  } catch {1073    return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };1074  }1075}10761077/**1078 * Restore the vault from a parsed Peach Codex payload.1079 *1080 * The supplied passphrase is verified against the Codex's slotA *before* any1081 * storage mutation — wrong passphrases return without touching disk. On1082 * success, the current vault state is snapshotted (reason: "restore") so the1083 * user can revert via Settings -> Vault History, then slotA/slotB are written1084 * and `peach_last_modified_at` is set to the Codex's recorded timestamp. A1085 * regular `unlock()` follows so the rest of the SW sees the standard1086 * post-unlock state.1087 *1088 * Intentionally non-Pro-gated — see peach_codex_v2.md "Pro gating". A Codex1089 * printed by a Pro user must always be restorable, even on a free device.1090 *1091 * Timing is not held constant here (in contrast to `unlock`): the Codex flow1092 * is an explicit user action with a known passphrase, not a passive lock1093 * screen, so the duress-vs-real timing side channel does not apply.1094 */1095export async function unlockFromCodex(params: {1096  slotA: string; // JSON string of StoredVault for slot A1097  slotB: string | null; // JSON string of StoredVault for slot B, or null1098  timestamp: number;1099  masterPassphrase: string;1100}): Promise<1101  | { ok: true; entryCount: number }1102  | { ok: false; reason: "wrong_passphrase" | "invalid_slot_format" }1103> {1104  let parsedSlotA: StoredVault;1105  let parsedSlotB: StoredVault | null = null;1106  try {1107    parsedSlotA = JSON.parse(params.slotA) as StoredVault;1108    if (params.slotB !== null) {1109      parsedSlotB = JSON.parse(params.slotB) as StoredVault;1110    }1111    // Minimal structural validation — the decrypt step below catches deeper1112    // corruption, but bail early on obviously-bad shapes so we don't reach1113    // storage with junk.1114    if (1115      typeof parsedSlotA?.salt !== "string" ||1116      typeof parsedSlotA?.nonce !== "string" ||1117      typeof parsedSlotA?.ciphertext !== "string" ||1118      typeof parsedSlotA?.tag !== "string"1119    ) {1120      return { ok: false, reason: "invalid_slot_format" };1121    }1122  } catch {1123    return { ok: false, reason: "invalid_slot_format" };1124  }11251126  // Verify the passphrase against the supplied slotA WITHOUT writing anything.1127  // If this fails the on-disk vault is left completely untouched.1128  const trialKey = await deriveKey(params.masterPassphrase, unhex(parsedSlotA.salt));1129  const trialPayload = await tryDecryptSlot(parsedSlotA, trialKey);1130  if (!trialPayload) {1131    zeroKey(trialKey);1132    return { ok: false, reason: "wrong_passphrase" };1133  }1134  // Drop the trial key; `unlock()` below derives its own copy. Holding two1135  // copies of the master key in memory at once would be a needless surface.1136  zeroKey(trialKey);11371138  // Snapshot the about-to-be-overwritten on-disk state so the user can revert1139  // a mistaken Codex restore via the Vault History UI. Non-fatal if it fails.1140  await takeVaultSnapshot("restore");11411142  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, parsedSlotA);1143  if (parsedSlotB) {1144    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, parsedSlotB);1145  } else {1146    // Slot B must always exist with ciphertext length matching slot A1147    // (Projects.md §3.2). Codex prints may omit slot B (duress wasn't1148    // configured); regenerate noise to satisfy the invariant.1149    await writeSlot(1150      SLOT_B,1151      generateNoiseBlob(parsedSlotA.ciphertext.length / 2),1152    );1153  }1154  await chrome.storage.local.set({1155    peach_last_modified_at: String(params.timestamp),1156  });11571158  // Standard unlock path so domain index, settings, auto-lock, and1159  // recovery-key state all populate exactly as a normal unlock would.1160  const ok = await unlock(params.masterPassphrase);1161  if (!ok) {1162    // Should be unreachable — we just verified the passphrase against the1163    // same slotA we wrote. Treat as wrong_passphrase to keep the contract1164    // simple if some race or storage anomaly intrudes.1165    return { ok: false, reason: "wrong_passphrase" };1166  }1167  return { ok: true, entryCount: getEntries().length };1168}11691170// Returns the current in-memory derived key as a hex string.1171// Used by the biometric enable flow in Settings to store the key in Android Keystore.1172export function getDerivedKeyHex(): string {1173  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_not_unlocked");1174  return hex(derivedKey);1175}11761177export function getEntries(): VaultEntry[] {1178  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");1179  return entries.filter((entry) => !entry.deletedAt);1180}11811182const EMAIL_RE = /^[^\s@]+@[^\s@]+\.[^\s@]+$/;11831184export function getIdentities(): SavedIdentity[] {1185  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");1186  const active = entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt && e.type === "login");11871188  const emailMap = new Map<string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }>();1189  const usernameMap = new Map<string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }>();11901191  for (const entry of active) {1192    const value = entry.username?.trim();1193    if (!value) continue;1194    const map = EMAIL_RE.test(value) ? emailMap : usernameMap;1195    const existing = map.get(value);1196    const domain = extractDomain(entry.url ?? "") ?? "";1197    const modifiedAt = entry.modifiedAt ?? entry.createdAt ?? 0;1198    if (!existing || modifiedAt > existing.lastUsed) {1199      map.set(value, { lastUsed: modifiedAt, count: (existing?.count ?? 0) + 1, domain });1200    } else {1201      map.set(value, { ...existing, count: existing.count + 1 });1202    }1203  }12041205  const toIdentity = (type: "email" | "username") =>1206    ([value, d]: [string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }]): SavedIdentity => ({1207      value, type, lastUsed: d.lastUsed, useCount: d.count, exampleDomain: d.domain || undefined,1208    });12091210  return [1211    ...[...emailMap.entries()].map(toIdentity("email")).sort((a, b) => b.useCount - a.useCount),1212    ...[...usernameMap.entries()].map(toIdentity("username")).sort((a, b) => b.useCount - a.useCount),1213  ];1214}12151216export async function batchAddEntries(drafts: EntryDraft[]): Promise<VaultEntry[]> {1217  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");12181219  const now = Date.now();1220  const added: VaultEntry[] = [];1221  for (const draft of drafts) {1222    try {1223      const sanitized = sanitizeEntryDraft(draft);1224      const nextEntry: VaultEntry = {1225        ...sanitized,1226        id: crypto.randomUUID(),1227        createdAt: now,1228        modifiedAt: now,1229      };1230      entries.push(nextEntry);1231      added.push(nextEntry);1232    } catch {1233      // Skip invalid drafts silently — caller can see diff between input and output length1234    }1235  }12361237  if (added.length > 0) {1238    await persistEntries();1239  }12401241  return added;1242}12431244/**1245 * Restore a set of entries in full fidelity — preserves id, createdAt,1246 * modifiedAt, and every other field unlike `batchAddEntries` which1247 * assigns fresh identity. Used by restore paths where the backup is the1248 * authoritative source of truth. `mode` controls how entries already in1249 * the vault are treated.1250 */1251export async function restoreEntries(1252  incoming: VaultEntry[],1253  mode: "replace" | "merge"1254): Promise<{ added: number; updated: number; skipped: number }> {1255  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");12561257  // A replace with zero incoming entries is almost certainly a caller bug1258  // (e.g. an import that silently dropped everything). Refuse rather than1259  // wipe the vault.1260  if (mode === "replace" && incoming.length === 0) {1261    throw new Error("refuse to replace with empty entry set");1262  }12631264  let added = 0;1265  let updated = 0;1266  let skipped = 0;12671268  if (mode === "replace") {1269    entries = [];1270    for (const entry of incoming) {1271      const normalized = sanitizeRestoredEntry(entry);1272      if (!normalized) {1273        skipped += 1;1274        continue;1275      }1276      entries.push(normalized);1277      added += 1;1278    }1279  } else {1280    const byId = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();1281    for (const e of entries) byId.set(e.id, e);12821283    for (const entry of incoming) {1284      const normalized = sanitizeRestoredEntry(entry);1285      if (!normalized) {1286        skipped += 1;1287        continue;1288      }1289      const existing = byId.get(normalized.id);1290      if (!existing) {1291        entries.push(normalized);1292        added += 1;1293      } else if (normalized.modifiedAt > existing.modifiedAt) {1294        const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === existing.id);1295        if (idx !== -1) {1296          entries[idx] = normalized;1297          updated += 1;1298        }1299      } else {1300        skipped += 1;1301      }1302    }1303  }13041305  await persistEntries("import");1306  return { added, updated, skipped };1307}13081309/**1310 * Validate + normalise a VaultEntry coming from a backup. Accepts1311 * anything structurally sound; keeps all metadata verbatim. Returns1312 * null for values the live vault shouldn't accept (e.g., missing title).1313 */1314function sanitizeRestoredEntry(entry: VaultEntry): VaultEntry | null {1315  if (!entry || typeof entry !== "object") return null;1316  const title = typeof entry.title === "string" ? entry.title.trim() : "";1317  if (!title) return null;1318  const id = typeof entry.id === "string" && entry.id ? entry.id : crypto.randomUUID();1319  const now = Date.now();1320  const createdAt = typeof entry.createdAt === "number" ? entry.createdAt : now;1321  const modifiedAt = typeof entry.modifiedAt === "number" ? entry.modifiedAt : createdAt;13221323  // Migrate legacy passkey shape on import (same logic as on-disk read).1324  // Imports from pre-v2.11.0 vault backups still carry type:"passkey" with1325  // flat fields; bring them into the new shape immediately.1326  const migrated: VaultEntry = migrateLegacyPasskey(1327    {1328      ...entry,1329      id,1330      title,1331      type: entry.type ?? "login",1332      createdAt,1333      modifiedAt,1334    },1335    entry1336  );13371338  // Login entries from backup must carry a password (or be passkey-only,1339  // in which case the passkey sub-object replaces the password requirement).1340  if (1341    migrated.type === "login" &&1342    !migrated.passkey &&1343    typeof migrated.password !== "string"1344  ) {1345    return null;1346  }1347  if (migrated.passkey && !migrated.passkey.credentialId) {1348    return null;1349  }13501351  return migrated;1352}13531354// Soft-deletes every non-deleted entry in one call. The literal string1355// argument is a tripwire against accidental calls — any caller that would1356// wipe the vault has to consciously type "REPLACE_ALL". Do not relax this1357// to a boolean.1358export async function clearVaultEntries(1359  confirmation: "REPLACE_ALL"1360): Promise<void> {1361  if (confirmation !== "REPLACE_ALL") {1362    throw new Error("clearVaultEntries requires explicit confirmation");1363  }1364  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");1365  for (const entry of entries) {1366    if (!entry.deletedAt) {1367      entry.deletedAt = Date.now();1368      entry.modifiedAt = Date.now();1369    }1370  }1371  await persistEntries();1372}13731374export async function addEntry(entry: EntryDraft): Promise<VaultEntry> {1375  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");13761377  const sanitized = sanitizeEntryDraft(entry);1378  const now = Date.now();1379  const nextEntry: VaultEntry = {1380    ...sanitized,1381    id: crypto.randomUUID(),1382    createdAt: now,1383    modifiedAt: now,1384    // Stamp passwordChangedAt at creation so age tracking is accurate from1385    // day one. Non-login entries carry the same stamp harmlessly.1386    passwordChangedAt: sanitized.password ? now : undefined,1387  };13881389  entries.push(nextEntry);1390  await persistEntries();13911392  // Fire-and-forget breach check (only for login entries if breach monitoring is enabled or not set)1393  if (settings.breachMonitoring !== false && nextEntry.type === "login" && nextEntry.password) {1394    checkBreach(nextEntry.password).then(async (count) => {1395      if (count > 0) {1396        const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === nextEntry.id);1397        if (idx !== -1) {1398          entries[idx] = { ...entries[idx], breach: count, modifiedAt: Date.now() };1399          await persistEntries();1400        }1401      }1402    });1403  }14041405  return nextEntry;1406}14071408export async function updateEntry(1409  id: string,1410  patch: Partial<VaultEntry>1411): Promise<void> {1412  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");14131414  const idx = entries.findIndex((entry) => entry.id === id);1415  if (idx === -1 || entries[idx].deletedAt) {1416    throw new Error("entry not found");1417  }14181419  const current = entries[idx];1420  const sanitizedPatch = sanitizeEntryPatch(patch);1421  // Refresh passwordChangedAt only when the password value actually changes —1422  // a metadata-only update (title, tags, etc.) must not reset the age clock1423  // that drives the Pro health rotation recommendation.1424  const passwordChanged =1425    "password" in patch &&1426    typeof sanitizedPatch.password === "string" &&1427    sanitizedPatch.password !== current.password;1428  entries[idx] = {1429    ...current,1430    ...sanitizedPatch,1431    modifiedAt: Date.now(),1432    ...(passwordChanged ? { passwordChangedAt: Date.now() } : {}),1433  };14341435  // A login entry must carry SOMETHING fillable — either a password or a1436  // passkey credential. An empty-password login with no passkey is dead1437  // state. Permit the password-clear when a passkey is attached (that's1438  // the legitimate "drop the password, keep the passkey" path).1439  if (1440    entries[idx].type === "login" &&1441    !entries[idx].password &&1442    !entries[idx].passkey1443  ) {1444    entries[idx] = current;1445    throw new Error("password or passkey required");1446  }14471448  // Card entries must retain their card number1449  if (entries[idx].type === "card" && !entries[idx].cardNumber) {1450    entries[idx] = current;1451    throw new Error("card number is required for card entries");1452  }14531454  await persistEntries();14551456  // Breach check when password changes: clear immediately so old breach doesn't linger,1457  // then async-check the new password and only re-set if it's also found.1458  if ("password" in patch && settings.breachMonitoring !== false && entries[idx].type === "login") {1459    entries[idx] = { ...entries[idx], breach: undefined };1460    await persistEntries();1461    const password = entries[idx].password;1462    if (password) {1463      checkBreach(password).then(async (count) => {1464        const i = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id);1465        if (i !== -1 && count > 0) {1466          entries[i] = { ...entries[i], breach: count, modifiedAt: Date.now() };1467          await persistEntries();1468        }1469      });1470    }1471  }1472}14731474export async function deleteEntry(id: string): Promise<void> {1475  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");14761477  const entry = entries.find((item) => item.id === id);1478  if (!entry || entry.deletedAt) {1479    throw new Error("entry not found");1480  }14811482  entry.deletedAt = Date.now();1483  entry.modifiedAt = Date.now();1484  await persistEntries();1485}14861487export function getDeletedEntries(): VaultEntry[] {1488  if (!derivedKey) return [];1489  return entries.filter((e) => !!e.deletedAt);1490}14911492export async function restoreEntry(id: string): Promise<void> {1493  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");1494  const entry = entries.find((e) => e.id === id && e.deletedAt);1495  if (!entry) throw new Error("deleted entry not found");1496  delete entry.deletedAt;1497  entry.modifiedAt = Date.now();1498  await persistEntries();1499  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1500}15011502export async function purgeEntry(id: string): Promise<void> {1503  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");1504  const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id && e.deletedAt);1505  if (idx === -1) throw new Error("deleted entry not found");1506  entries.splice(idx, 1);1507  await persistEntries();1508}15091510/** Permanently delete entries whose deletedAt is older than retentionMs. 0 = keep forever. */1511export async function purgeExpiredTrash(retentionMs: number): Promise<number> {1512  if (!derivedKey || retentionMs === 0) return 0;1513  const cutoff = Date.now() - retentionMs;1514  const before = entries.length;1515  entries = entries.filter((e) => !(e.deletedAt && e.deletedAt < cutoff));1516  const purged = before - entries.length;1517  if (purged > 0) await persistEntries();1518  return purged;1519}15201521export function queryDomain(domain: string): VaultEntry[] {1522  return domainIndex.get(domain) ?? [];1523}15241525export function getEntryById(id: string): VaultEntry | undefined {1526  return entries.find((entry) => entry.id === id && !entry.deletedAt);1527}15281529async function persistSlotA(1530  reason: VaultSnapshot["reason"] = "local_save",1531): Promise<StoredVault> {1532  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");15331534  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1535  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");15361537  // Snapshot the about-to-be-overwritten state BEFORE we mutate disk. Failures1538  // are swallowed by takeVaultSnapshot — history must never block a save.1539  await takeVaultSnapshot(reason);15401541  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured);1542  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKey, plaintext);15431544  // Preserve existing recovery escrow fields.1545  const nextSlotA: StoredVault = {1546    ...slotA,1547    nonce,1548    ciphertext,1549    tag,1550    // recovery_salt and recovery_wrapped_root_key are already set from loadSlot1551  };1552  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, nextSlotA);15531554  // When duress is not configured, keep slot B size-matched with slot A by1555  // regenerating its noise. When duress IS configured, leave slot B alone —1556  // we don't have the decoy key to re-encrypt it. This is a known trade-off.1557  if (!duressConfigured) {1558    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2));1559  }1560  await stampLocalVaultMutation();15611562  return nextSlotA;1563}15641565async function persistSlotB(): Promise<void> {1566  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");15671568  const slotB = await loadSlot(SLOT_B);1569  if (!slotB) throw new Error("missing slot B");15701571  // Decoy plaintext always reports duressConfigured=false — the decoy user1572  // sees a clean slate.1573  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, false);1574  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKey, plaintext);15751576  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, { ...slotB, nonce, ciphertext, tag });1577  await stampLocalVaultMutation();1578}15791580async function persistEntries(1581  reason: VaultSnapshot["reason"] = "local_save",1582): Promise<void> {1583  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");15841585  if (vaultMode === "decoy") {1586    await persistSlotB();1587  } else {1588    await persistSlotA(reason);1589  }1590  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1591}15921593function cleanAdditionalUrls(values: string[] | undefined): string[] | undefined {1594  if (!Array.isArray(values)) return undefined;1595  const seen = new Set<string>();1596  const cleaned: string[] = [];1597  for (const value of values) {1598    const trimmed = typeof value === "string" ? value.trim() : "";1599    if (!trimmed) continue;1600    const key = trimmed.toLowerCase();1601    if (seen.has(key)) continue;1602    seen.add(key);1603    cleaned.push(trimmed);1604  }1605  return cleaned.length > 0 ? cleaned : undefined;1606}16071608function sanitizeEntryDraft(entry: EntryDraft): EntryDraft {1609  const title = entry.title.trim();1610  // Accept legacy `type:"passkey"` drafts but rewrite to "login" — the new1611  // model is "any entry, optionally with a passkey sub-object." Imports and1612  // any in-flight callers from before v2.11.0 keep working without throwing.1613  let type: VaultEntry["type"] = entry.type ?? "login";1614  if (type === "passkey") type = "login";16151616  if (!title) throw new Error("title is required");1617  // A login entry needs either a password or a passkey credential to be useful.1618  // Passkey-only entries (passkey present, no password) are valid.1619  if (type === "login" && !entry.password?.trim() && !entry.passkey) {1620    throw new Error("password or passkey required");1621  }1622  if (entry.passkey) {1623    const p = entry.passkey;1624    if (1625      !p.rpId ||1626      !p.credentialId ||1627      !p.publicKeyCose ||1628      !p.userHandle ||1629      !p.userName ||1630      (p.algorithm !== -7 && p.algorithm !== -8)1631    ) {1632      throw new Error("invalid passkey credential");1633    }1634  }1635  if (type === "card") {1636    if (!entry.cardholderName?.trim() || !entry.cardNumber?.trim()) {1637      throw new Error("cardholder name and card number are required");1638    }1639  }16401641  return {1642    type,1643    title,1644    username: type === "login" ? entry.username?.trim() ?? "" : undefined,1645    password: type === "login" ? entry.password : undefined,1646    url: type === "login" ? entry.url?.trim() ?? "" : undefined,1647    additionalUrls: type === "login" ? cleanAdditionalUrls(entry.additionalUrls) : undefined,1648    totp: type === "login" ? entry.totp?.trim() || undefined : undefined,1649    notes: entry.notes?.trim() || undefined,1650    breach: type === "login" ? entry.breach : undefined,1651    canary: type === "login" ? entry.canary : undefined,1652    tags: entry.tags,1653    passkey: entry.passkey,1654    cardholderName: type === "card" ? entry.cardholderName?.trim() : undefined,1655    cardNumber: type === "card" ? entry.cardNumber?.trim() : undefined,1656    expMonth: type === "card" ? entry.expMonth?.trim() : undefined,1657    expYear: type === "card" ? entry.expYear?.trim() : undefined,1658    cvc: type === "card" ? entry.cvc?.trim() : undefined,1659    cardNickname: type === "card" ? entry.cardNickname?.trim() || undefined : undefined,1660    network: type === "card" ? entry.network : undefined,1661    last4: type === "card" ? entry.last4?.trim() : undefined,1662  };1663}16641665function sanitizeEntryPatch(patch: Partial<VaultEntry>): Partial<VaultEntry> {1666  const nextPatch: Partial<VaultEntry> = {};16671668  if ("type" in patch) {1669    nextPatch.type = patch.type;1670  }16711672  if ("title" in patch) {1673    const title = patch.title?.trim() ?? "";1674    if (!title) throw new Error("title is required");1675    nextPatch.title = title;1676  }16771678  if ("url" in patch) {1679    nextPatch.url = patch.url?.trim() ?? "";1680  }16811682  if ("additionalUrls" in patch) {1683    const incoming = Array.isArray(patch.additionalUrls) ? patch.additionalUrls : [];1684    const seen = new Set<string>();1685    const cleaned: string[] = [];1686    for (const value of incoming) {1687      const trimmed = typeof value === "string" ? value.trim() : "";1688      if (!trimmed) continue;1689      const key = trimmed.toLowerCase();1690      if (seen.has(key)) continue;1691      seen.add(key);1692      cleaned.push(trimmed);1693    }1694    nextPatch.additionalUrls = cleaned.length > 0 ? cleaned : undefined;1695  }16961697  if ("username" in patch) {1698    nextPatch.username = patch.username?.trim() ?? "";1699  }17001701  if ("email" in patch) {1702    nextPatch.email = patch.email?.trim() || undefined;1703  }17041705  if ("password" in patch) {1706    const password = patch.password ?? "";1707    // Allow clearing a password (e.g. on passkey-only entries)1708    nextPatch.password = password || undefined;1709  }17101711  if ("totp" in patch) {1712    nextPatch.totp = patch.totp?.trim() || undefined;1713  }17141715  if ("notes" in patch) {1716    nextPatch.notes = patch.notes?.trim() || undefined;1717  }17181719  if ("breach" in patch) {1720    nextPatch.breach = patch.breach;1721  }17221723  if ("canary" in patch) {1724    nextPatch.canary = patch.canary;1725  }17261727  if ("passkey" in patch) {1728    // Passkey sub-object replaces all the legacy flat passkey fields. A1729    // patch with `passkey: undefined` removes the credential from the entry1730    // (used by "remove passkey" without deleting the whole entry).1731    nextPatch.passkey = patch.passkey;1732  }17331734  if ("tags" in patch) {1735    nextPatch.tags = patch.tags;1736  }17371738  if ("cardholderName" in patch) {1739    nextPatch.cardholderName = patch.cardholderName?.trim() || undefined;1740  }1741  if ("cardNumber" in patch) {1742    const n = patch.cardNumber ?? "";1743    nextPatch.cardNumber = n || undefined;1744  }1745  if ("expMonth" in patch) {1746    nextPatch.expMonth = patch.expMonth?.trim() || undefined;1747  }1748  if ("expYear" in patch) {1749    nextPatch.expYear = patch.expYear?.trim() || undefined;1750  }1751  if ("cvc" in patch) {1752    nextPatch.cvc = patch.cvc?.trim() || undefined;1753  }1754  if ("cardNickname" in patch) {1755    nextPatch.cardNickname = patch.cardNickname?.trim() || undefined;1756  }1757  if ("network" in patch) {1758    nextPatch.network = patch.network;1759  }1760  if ("last4" in patch) {1761    nextPatch.last4 = patch.last4?.trim() || undefined;1762  }17631764  return nextPatch;1765}17661767function normalizeEntry(entry: VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry): VaultEntry {1768  const createdAt = "createdAt" in entry ? entry.createdAt : entry.created;1769  const modifiedAt =1770    "modifiedAt" in entry ? entry.modifiedAt : entry.updated;17711772  const base: VaultEntry = {1773    id: entry.id,1774    type: "type" in entry ? entry.type : "login",1775    title: entry.title,1776    username: entry.username,1777    password: entry.password,1778    url: entry.url,1779    totp: entry.totp,1780    notes: entry.notes,1781    breach: entry.breach,1782    canary: "canary" in entry ? entry.canary : undefined,1783    passkey: "passkey" in entry ? entry.passkey : undefined,1784    createdAt,1785    modifiedAt,1786    deletedAt: entry.deletedAt,1787    tags: "tags" in entry ? entry.tags : undefined,1788    cardholderName: "cardholderName" in entry ? entry.cardholderName : undefined,1789    cardNumber: "cardNumber" in entry ? entry.cardNumber : undefined,1790    expMonth: "expMonth" in entry ? entry.expMonth : undefined,1791    expYear: "expYear" in entry ? entry.expYear : undefined,1792    cvc: "cvc" in entry ? entry.cvc : undefined,1793    cardNickname: "cardNickname" in entry ? entry.cardNickname : undefined,1794    network: "network" in entry ? entry.network : undefined,1795    last4: "last4" in entry ? entry.last4 : undefined,1796  };17971798  return migrateLegacyPasskey(base, entry);1799}18001801/**1802 * v2.11.0 read migration. Pre-v2.11.0 passkey entries used `type:"passkey"`1803 * with flat top-level fields (rpId, credentialId, etc.). This converts them1804 * to the new shape — `type:"login"` with a `passkey` sub-object — so all1805 * downstream consumers can rely on the new model. The result is rewritten1806 * to disk on next vault save (hasLegacyShape detects the un-migrated case).1807 */1808function migrateLegacyPasskey(1809  base: VaultEntry,1810  raw: VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry1811): VaultEntry {1812  if (base.passkey) return base;1813  const flat = raw as Partial<VaultEntry>;1814  const isPasskeyType = base.type === "passkey";1815  const hasFlatPasskeyFields =1816    typeof flat.rpId === "string" &&1817    typeof flat.credentialId === "string" &&1818    typeof flat.publicKeyCose === "string" &&1819    typeof flat.userHandle === "string" &&1820    typeof flat.userName === "string";1821  if (!isPasskeyType && !hasFlatPasskeyFields) return base;1822  if (!hasFlatPasskeyFields) return base;18231824  const algorithm: -7 | -8 = flat.algorithm === -8 ? -8 : -7;1825  base.passkey = {1826    rpId: flat.rpId!,1827    rpName: flat.rpName ?? flat.rpId!,1828    credentialId: flat.credentialId!,1829    publicKeyCose: flat.publicKeyCose!,1830    privateKeyJwk: flat.privateKeyJwk,1831    userHandle: flat.userHandle!,1832    userName: flat.userName!,1833    userDisplayName: flat.userDisplayName ?? flat.userName!,1834    algorithm,1835    signCount: flat.signCount ?? 0,1836    aaguid: flat.aaguid ?? "",1837    backupEligible: flat.backupEligible === true,1838    backupState: flat.backupState === true,1839    lastUsedAt: flat.lastUsedAt,1840    browser: flat.browser,1841    transports: flat.transports,1842    createdAt: base.createdAt,1843  };1844  // Promote to "login" so the unified Entry view renders. Username gets1845  // populated from the passkey's userName so the entry is searchable in the1846  // existing autofill flow without a separate code path.1847  if (isPasskeyType) base.type = "login";1848  if (!base.username) base.username = flat.userName;1849  if (!base.url) base.url = `https://${flat.rpId}`;1850  return base;1851}185218531854// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------1855// Deduplication1856// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------18571858function entryDupeKey(e: VaultEntry): string {1859  if (e.type === "note") return `note|${e.title.toLowerCase()}`;1860  // Passkey-bearing entries dedupe by the credential's RP + user. Two logins1861  // on different sites that happen to share a username are still distinct;1862  // two passkey credentials for the same RP+user are duplicates regardless1863  // of any login fields they may also carry.1864  if (e.passkey) {1865    return `passkey|${e.passkey.rpId.toLowerCase()}|${e.passkey.userName.toLowerCase()}`;1866  }1867  return `login|${e.title.toLowerCase()}|${(e.url ?? "").toLowerCase()}|${(e.username ?? "").toLowerCase()}`;1868}18691870/** Returns the number of duplicate entries (those that would be removed). */1871export function countDuplicates(): number {1872  const best = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();1873  let dupeCount = 0;1874  for (const e of entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt)) {1875    const key = entryDupeKey(e);1876    const existing = best.get(key);1877    if (!existing) {1878      best.set(key, e);1879    } else {1880      dupeCount++;1881      // Keep the more recently modified one in the map1882      if ((e.modifiedAt ?? e.createdAt ?? 0) > (existing.modifiedAt ?? existing.createdAt ?? 0)) {1883        best.set(key, e);1884      }1885    }1886  }1887  return dupeCount;1888}18891890/**1891 * Soft-deletes duplicate entries, keeping the most recently modified copy of1892 * each group. Returns the number of entries moved to trash.1893 */1894export async function deduplicateEntries(): Promise<number> {1895  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");1896  // Dedup reshapes slot B permanently under the decoy key, which is1897  // forensically distinguishable from a freshly-seeded decoy vault. Refuse.1898  if (vaultMode === "decoy") {1899    throw new Error("deduplicate disabled in decoy mode");1900  }19011902  const best = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();1903  for (const e of entries.filter((en) => !en.deletedAt)) {1904    const key = entryDupeKey(e);1905    const existing = best.get(key);1906    if (!existing) {1907      best.set(key, e);1908    } else if ((e.modifiedAt ?? e.createdAt ?? 0) > (existing.modifiedAt ?? existing.createdAt ?? 0)) {1909      best.set(key, e);1910    }1911  }19121913  const keepIds = new Set(Array.from(best.values()).map((e) => e.id));1914  const now = Date.now();1915  let removed = 0;1916  entries = entries.map((e) => {1917    if (!e.deletedAt && !keepIds.has(e.id)) {1918      removed++;1919      return { ...e, deletedAt: now };1920    }1921    return e;1922  });19231924  if (removed > 0) await persistEntries();1925  return removed;1926}19271928// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------1929// Vault history — snapshot BEFORE every vault write so the saved blob is1930// what is about to be lost, not what was just written. Capped at 10. The1931// stored blobs are AES-256-GCM ciphertext under the master password, so1932// history adds zero security surface.1933// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------19341935const HISTORY_KEY = "peach_vault_history";1936const HISTORY_MAX = 10;19371938/**1939 * Snapshot the CURRENT on-disk vault state into history. Call this BEFORE1940 * overwriting peach_vault_a so the saved blob captures the about-to-be-lost1941 * state. Identical-to-most-recent blobs are skipped to avoid filling history1942 * with no-op writes.1943 */1944export async function takeVaultSnapshot(1945  reason: VaultSnapshot["reason"],1946): Promise<void> {1947  try {1948    const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get([SLOT_A, SLOT_B, HISTORY_KEY]);1949    const slotA = (raw as Record<string, StoredVault | undefined>)[SLOT_A];1950    const slotB = (raw as Record<string, StoredVault | undefined>)[SLOT_B];19511952    // Nothing to snapshot if the real slot doesn't exist yet (fresh install,1953    // pre-createVault). createVault skips snapshots intentionally — there is1954    // no prior state to preserve.1955    if (!slotA) return;19561957    const vault_a = JSON.stringify(slotA);1958    const vault_b = JSON.stringify(slotB ?? slotA);19591960    // Best-effort entry count: only meaningful when the in-memory state is1961    // unlocked AND in real mode. Decoy mode would leak the decoy entry1962    // count; locked mode has no entries to count. Both fall through to null.1963    let entryCount: number | null = null;1964    if (derivedKey && vaultMode === "real") {1965      try {1966        entryCount = entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt).length;1967      } catch {1968        entryCount = null;1969      }1970    }19711972    const existingRaw = (raw as Record<string, VaultHistory | undefined>)[HISTORY_KEY];1973    const history: VaultHistory = existingRaw && Array.isArray(existingRaw.snapshots)1974      ? existingRaw1975      : { snapshots: [] };19761977    // Deduplication: if the most recent snapshot has byte-identical blobs,1978    // skip — saves the same vault N times in a row would otherwise burn the1979    // entire history window with no recovery value.1980    const latest = history.snapshots[0];1981    if (latest && latest.vault_a === vault_a && latest.vault_b === vault_b) {1982      return;1983    }19841985    const snapshot: VaultSnapshot = {1986      id: crypto.randomUUID(),1987      savedAt: Date.now(),1988      reason,1989      vault_a,1990      vault_b,1991      entryCount,1992    };19931994    history.snapshots = [snapshot, ...history.snapshots].slice(0, HISTORY_MAX);1995    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [HISTORY_KEY]: history });1996  } catch {1997    // Non-fatal — history must never block a save. A failed snapshot just1998    // means the user loses one rung of the safety ladder for this write.1999  }2000}20012002/** Wipe all vault history. Called by Panic / DESTROY_VAULT. */2003export async function clearVaultHistory(): Promise<void> {2004  try {2005    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [HISTORY_KEY]: { snapshots: [] } satisfies VaultHistory });2006  } catch {2007    // Non-fatal — DESTROY_VAULT also runs storage.local.clear().2008  }2009}20102011/** Read all snapshots, newest first, for the Settings vault history view. */2012export async function getVaultHistory(): Promise<VaultSnapshot[]> {2013  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get(HISTORY_KEY);2014  const history = (raw as Record<string, VaultHistory | undefined>)[HISTORY_KEY];2015  if (!history || !Array.isArray(history.snapshots)) return [];2016  return history.snapshots;2017}20182019/**2020 * Replace the on-disk vault with the chosen snapshot's blobs and lock the2021 * vault. The current state is itself snapshotted with reason 'restore' first2022 * so the restore is reversible. After this returns, the user must unlock2023 * with the password that matches the restored blob.2024 */2025export async function restoreVaultSnapshot(2026  snapshotId: string,2027): Promise<{ ok: true } | { ok: false; error: string }> {2028  const history = await getVaultHistory();2029  const snapshot = history.find((s) => s.id === snapshotId);2030  if (!snapshot) return { ok: false, error: "snapshot_not_found" };20312032  // Snapshot the about-to-be-replaced current state so the restore is2033  // reversible. takeVaultSnapshot is no-op when the most recent entry is2034  // byte-identical, so a restore-of-a-restore stays clean.2035  await takeVaultSnapshot("restore");20362037  let restoredA: StoredVault;2038  let restoredB: StoredVault;2039  try {2040    restoredA = JSON.parse(snapshot.vault_a) as StoredVault;2041    restoredB = JSON.parse(snapshot.vault_b) as StoredVault;2042  } catch {2043    return { ok: false, error: "snapshot_corrupt" };2044  }20452046  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, restoredA);2047  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, restoredB);2048  await stampLocalVaultMutation();20492050  // Lock so the user must prove they can decrypt the restored blob. If they2051  // restored a pre-password-change snapshot they discover it immediately at2052  // the lock screen rather than silently holding an inaccessible vault.2053  lock();20542055  return { ok: true };2056}20572058/**2059 * Change the master password. Re-encrypts slot A with a fresh salt + new2060 * derived key. Slot B (duress or noise) is left untouched when duress is2061 * configured — it uses an independent key derived from the duress password —2062 * and regenerated as noise when duress is not configured.2063 */2064export async function changePassword(2065  currentPassword: string,2066  newPassword: string2067): Promise<boolean> {2068  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") return false;20692070  // Verify current password before allowing any change2071  const valid = await verifyMainPassword(currentPassword);2072  if (!valid) return false;20732074  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);2075  if (!slotA) return false;20762077  // Derive fresh key from new password + new random salt2078  const newSalt = generateSalt();2079  const newKey = await deriveKey(newPassword, newSalt);20802081  // Re-encrypt the in-memory entries with the new key2082  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured);2083  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(newKey, plaintext);20842085  const freshSlotA: StoredVault = {2086    ...slotA,2087    salt: hex(newSalt),2088    nonce,2089    ciphertext,2090    tag,2091  };2092  // Snapshot the OLD-key blob before overwriting it. If the user later2093  // restores from this snapshot they will need the OLD password — the2094  // post-restore lock surfaces that immediately.2095  await takeVaultSnapshot("local_save");2096  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, freshSlotA);20972098  // Swap the in-memory key synchronously before any further await. If we2099  // threw between the Slot A write and this swap, the next persistEntries()2100  // would overwrite Slot A with old-key ciphertext, locking the user out.2101  zeroKey(derivedKey);2102  derivedKey = newKey;21032104  // Rotate the root key so the old recovery words are immediately invalidated.2105  // After this point getRecoveryWords() returns a fresh 12-word set.2106  const {2107    rawRootKey: freshRawKey,2108    recoverySalt: freshSalt,2109    wrappedRootKey: freshWrapped,2110    wrappedNonce: freshNonce,2111    wrappedTag: freshTag,2112  } = await generateAndWrapRootKey();2113  rootKey = unhex(freshRawKey);2114  const slotAfterRekey = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);2115  if (slotAfterRekey) {2116    await writeSlot(SLOT_A, {2117      ...slotAfterRekey,2118      recovery_salt: freshSalt,2119      recovery_wrapped_root_key: freshWrapped,2120      recovery_nonce: freshNonce,2121      recovery_tag: freshTag,2122    });2123  }21242125  // Regenerate noise for slot B when duress is not in use. Runs after the2126  // key swap so a failure here is a disposable noise regeneration, not a2127  // lockout.2128  if (!duressConfigured) {2129    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2));2130  }2131  await stampLocalVaultMutation();21322133  return true;2134}21352136// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------2137// Sync helpers2138// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------21392140export async function getVaultBlobForSync(): Promise<{2141  blob: string;2142  timestamp: number;2143  license?: string;2144} | null> {2145  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get([SLOT_A, SLOT_B, 'peach_last_modified_at', 'peach_license']);2146  const slotA = (raw as Record<string, unknown>)[SLOT_A];2147  if (!slotA) return null;2148  const slotB = (raw as Record<string, unknown>)[SLOT_B];2149  const blob = JSON.stringify({ a: slotA, b: slotB });2150  const rawTs = (raw as Record<string, unknown>)['peach_last_modified_at'];2151  const timestamp = typeof rawTs === 'string' ? parseInt(rawTs) : 0;2152  const license = (raw as Record<string, unknown>)['peach_license'];2153  return {2154    blob,2155    timestamp,2156    license: typeof license === 'string' ? license : undefined,2157  };2158}21592160export async function applyIncomingVault(2161  blobJson: string,2162  remoteTimestamp: number,2163  remoteLicense?: string,2164): Promise<boolean> {2165  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get('peach_last_modified_at');2166  const rawTs = (raw as Record<string, unknown>)['peach_last_modified_at'];2167  const localTimestamp = typeof rawTs === 'string' ? parseInt(rawTs) : 0;21682169  if (remoteLicense) {2170    const licenseRaw = await chrome.storage.local.get('peach_license');2171    const existing = (licenseRaw as Record<string, unknown>)['peach_license'];2172    if (!existing) {2173      await chrome.storage.local.set({ peach_license: remoteLicense });2174    }2175  }21762177  if (remoteTimestamp <= localTimestamp) return false;21782179  // Snapshot before overwriting — failure is non-fatal2180  await takeVaultSnapshot('sync_received').catch(() => {});21812182  const { a, b } = JSON.parse(blobJson) as { a: unknown; b?: unknown };2183  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, a as StoredVault);2184  if (b) await writeSlot(SLOT_B, b as StoredVault);2185  await chrome.storage.local.set({2186    peach_last_sync_at: String(Date.now()),2187    peach_last_modified_at: String(remoteTimestamp),2188  });21892190  return true;2191}21922193export async function getSyncIdentity(): Promise<{2194  privateKeyBytes: Uint8Array;2195  publicKeyBytes: Uint8Array;2196  publicKeyHex: string;2197}> {2198  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get('peach_sync_identity');2199  const stored = (raw as Record<string, unknown>)['peach_sync_identity'];2200  if (typeof stored === 'string') {2201    const { priv, pub } = JSON.parse(stored) as { priv: string; pub: string };2202    const privateKeyBytes = base64DecodeBytes(priv);2203    const publicKeyBytes = base64DecodeBytes(pub);2204    return { privateKeyBytes, publicKeyBytes, publicKeyHex: bytesToHex(publicKeyBytes) };2205  }22062207  // Generate a fresh X25519 keypair and persist it.2208  const { generateKeyPair } = await import('@stablelib/x25519');2209  const keypair = generateKeyPair();2210  await chrome.storage.local.set({2211    peach_sync_identity: JSON.stringify({2212      priv: base64EncodeBytes(keypair.secretKey),2213      pub: base64EncodeBytes(keypair.publicKey),2214    }),2215  });2216  return {2217    privateKeyBytes: keypair.secretKey,2218    publicKeyBytes: keypair.publicKey,2219    publicKeyHex: bytesToHex(keypair.publicKey),2220  };2221}22222223// Re-decrypt vault entries from storage using the current in-memory key.2224// Called after applyIncomingVault so the in-memory state stays consistent2225// with what was just written to storage.2226export async function reloadEntriesAfterSync(): Promise<boolean> {2227  if (!derivedKey) return false;2228  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);2229  if (!slotA) return false;2230  try {2231    const payload = await tryDecryptSlot(slotA, derivedKey);2232    if (!payload) return false;2233    entries = payload.entries;2234    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);2235    return true;2236  } catch {2237    return false;2238  }2239}22402241function bytesToHex(bytes: Uint8Array): string {2242  return Array.from(bytes).map(b => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('');2243}22442245function base64EncodeBytes(bytes: Uint8Array): string {2246  let binary = '';2247  for (let i = 0; i < bytes.length; i++) binary += String.fromCharCode(bytes[i]);2248  return btoa(binary);2249}22502251function base64DecodeBytes(b64: string): Uint8Array {2252  const binary = atob(b64);2253  const bytes = new Uint8Array(binary.length);2254  for (let i = 0; i < binary.length; i++) bytes[i] = binary.charCodeAt(i);2255  return bytes;2256}