vault.ts

1/**2 * vault.ts — sole owner of vault state and chrome.storage vault keys.3 *4 * Every read/write of `peach_vault_a`, `peach_vault_b`, and `peach_settings`5 * goes through this module. No other file accesses those keys directly.6 * External callers reach vault operations via `messages.ts` — never by7 * importing from here cross-boundary (popup/content must not). Invariants8 * for the two-slot schema, unlock timing, and key/disk atomicity are in9 * Projects.md §3.2–§3.6.10 */1112import { deriveKey, generateSalt } from "../crypto/argon2";13import { extractDomain } from "../shared/domain";14import {15  rootKeyToWords,16  wordsToRootKeyMaterial,17  deriveRecoveryKey,18} from "../shared/recovery-words";19import type {20  AccentColorName,21  LegacyVaultEntry,22  ManualSummonRecord,23  SavedIdentity,24  StoredVault,25  VaultEntry,26  VaultHistory,27  VaultSnapshot,28} from "../shared/types";29import { decrypt, encrypt, zeroKey } from "./aes";30import { clearAutoLock, touchAutoLock } from "./alarms";3132type EntryDraft = Omit<33  VaultEntry,34  "id" | "createdAt" | "modifiedAt" | "deletedAt"35>;3637// Slot-neutral storage keys (v1.4.24+). Both slots always exist; slot B38// either holds the decoy vault (when duress is configured) or random noise39// that looks identical at rest. No external indicator is stored — duress40// configuration is recorded only inside the encrypted payload of slot A.41const SLOT_A = "peach_vault_a";42const SLOT_B = "peach_vault_b";4344// Legacy keys, migrated away on first access.45const LEGACY_MAIN = "peach_vault";46const LEGACY_DECOY = "peach_decoy_vault";47const LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG = "peach_duress";4849// Plaintext is padded to the next multiple of this size before encryption.50// This coarsens ciphertext-length leakage into 1 KiB buckets.51const PAD_BLOCK = 1024;5253let derivedKey: Uint8Array | null = null;54// 32-byte random root key, separate from the derivedKey used for vault encryption.55// The root key is wrapped (encrypted) under the recovery key derived from the56// 12-word phrase. When the user changes their password, only the wrapping changes;57// the root key and recovery words remain stable.58let rootKey: Uint8Array | null = null;59let entries: VaultEntry[] = [];60let domainIndex: Map<string, VaultEntry[]> = new Map();61let vaultMode: "real" | "decoy" = "real";62// Cached post-unlock view of whether the real vault records that duress is63// configured. Only meaningful after a real-mode unlock; for decoy-mode unlock64// this stays false because we never see slot A's plaintext.65let duressConfigured = false;6667let migrationRan = false;6869// Set to a corruption reason during the last unlock() attempt when both slots70// decrypted but failed schema validation. Consumed and cleared by71// consumeLastUnlockFailureReason() so messages.ts can surface vault_corrupted72// distinctly from wrong-password (M7/COR-007).73let lastUnlockFailureReason: string | null = null;7475export function consumeLastUnlockFailureReason(): string | null {76  const r = lastUnlockFailureReason;77  lastUnlockFailureReason = null;78  return r;79}8081// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------82// Settings (persisted inside the encrypted vault store as a sidecar key)83// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------8485export type DisplayFont = "cormorant-italic" | "cormorant" | "inter" | "system";86export type TextSize = "small" | "medium" | "large";8788export interface VaultSettings {89  accentColor?: AccentColorName;90  theme?: "dark" | "light";91  autoLockMinutes?: number;92  clipboardClearSeconds?: number;93  lockOnClose?: boolean;94  breachMonitoring?: boolean;95  passkeyProviderEnabled?: boolean;96  trashRetentionDays?: number;97  manualSummonDomains?: Record<string, ManualSummonRecord>;98  declinedCardFingerprints?: string[];99  /**100   * Display font for headlines, brand wordmark, and narrative copy. Default101   * is "cormorant-italic" — the bold italic serif that ships as Peach's102   * voice. Non-italic options exist for users who prefer upright type.103   */104  displayFont?: DisplayFont;105  /**106   * Text size scale for body copy and entry titles. Stops at "large" by107   * design — XL clips dense screens (Vault, Health) inside the fixed108   * 330×480 popup surface.109   */110  textSize?: TextSize;111  /**112   * When true, all entrance/exit transitions and ambient animations are113   * collapsed to instant. Honoured alongside the user's OS-level114   * `prefers-reduced-motion`.115   */116  reduceMotion?: boolean;117  /**118   * Android-only: when true, the master key is escrowed in AndroidKeyStore119   * and the lock screen offers biometric unlock. Toggled from Settings →120   * Security → Biometrics. Has no effect on desktop builds.121   */122  biometricsEnabled?: boolean;123  /**124   * User overrides for keyboard shortcuts. Keys are ShortcutAction names125   * (see src/shared/shortcuts.ts). Missing actions fall through to126   * DEFAULT_BINDINGS — `getActiveBindings(settings.shortcuts)` is the127   * canonical lookup. Storing only the deltas keeps the vault payload128   * small and lets default updates land for users who never rebind.129   */130  shortcuts?: Record<string, { key: string; ctrl?: boolean; meta?: boolean; shift?: boolean; alt?: boolean }>;131}132133let settings: VaultSettings = {};134135export function getSettings(): VaultSettings {136  return settings;137}138139export async function ensureSettingsLoaded(): Promise<VaultSettings> {140  await loadSettings();141  return settings;142}143144export async function updateSettings(patch: Partial<VaultSettings>): Promise<void> {145  await loadSettings();146  settings = { ...settings, ...patch };147  await persistSettings();148}149150async function persistSettings(): Promise<void> {151  try {152    await chrome.storage.local.set({ peach_settings: settings });153  } catch (err) {154    throw mapStorageError(err);155  }156}157158function mapStorageError(err: unknown): Error {159  const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);160  if (/QUOTA_BYTES|quota/i.test(message)) {161    return new Error("STORAGE_QUOTA_EXCEEDED");162  }163  return err instanceof Error ? err : new Error(message);164}165166async function loadSettings(): Promise<void> {167  const result = await chrome.storage.local.get("peach_settings");168  settings = (result as { peach_settings?: VaultSettings }).peach_settings ?? {};169}170171// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------172// HIBP breach check (k-anonymity model)173// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------174175export async function checkBreach(password: string): Promise<number> {176  const encoder = new TextEncoder();177  const hashBuffer = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-1", encoder.encode(password));178  const hashHex = Array.from(new Uint8Array(hashBuffer))179    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))180    .join("")181    .toUpperCase();182183  const prefix = hashHex.slice(0, 5);184  const suffix = hashHex.slice(5);185186  try {187    const res = await fetch(`https://api.pwnedpasswords.com/range/${prefix}`);188    if (!res.ok) return 0;189    const text = await res.text();190    const match = text.split("\r\n").find((l) => l.startsWith(suffix));191    return match ? parseInt(match.split(":")[1], 10) : 0;192  } catch {193    return 0; // Network unavailable — don't block194  }195}196197export async function declineCardSaveOffer(last4: string, expMonth: string, expYear: string): Promise<void> {198  const fingerprint = await cardFingerprint(last4, expMonth, expYear);199  await loadSettings();200  settings = {201    ...settings,202    declinedCardFingerprints: [...(settings.declinedCardFingerprints ?? []), fingerprint],203  };204  await persistSettings();205}206207export async function isCardDeclined(last4: string, expMonth: string, expYear: string): Promise<boolean> {208  await loadSettings();209  const fingerprint = await cardFingerprint(last4, expMonth, expYear);210  return (settings.declinedCardFingerprints ?? []).includes(fingerprint);211}212213async function cardFingerprint(last4: string, expMonth: string, expYear: string): Promise<string> {214  const encoder = new TextEncoder();215  const buf = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-1", encoder.encode(`${last4}${expMonth}${expYear}`));216  return Array.from(new Uint8Array(buf)).map(b => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0")).join("");217}218219function hex(buf: Uint8Array): string {220  return Array.from(buf)221    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))222    .join("");223}224225function unhex(s: string): Uint8Array {226  const out = new Uint8Array(s.length / 2);227  for (let i = 0; i < s.length; i += 2) {228    out[i / 2] = parseInt(s.slice(i, i + 2), 16);229  }230  return out;231}232233// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------234// Root key generation and recovery word wrapping235// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------236237/**238 * Generate a random 32-byte root key and wrap it (AES-256-GCM) under a key239 * derived from the recovery word material via HKDF-SHA256. The wrapped blob240 * fields are stored in slot A alongside the password-wrapped ciphertext. The241 * root key itself is kept in memory for the session so getRecoveryWords() can242 * encode it without re-deriving.243 */244async function generateAndWrapRootKey(): Promise<{245  rawRootKey: string; // hex of the plaintext root key — caller stores in rootKey246  recoverySalt: string;247  wrappedRootKey: string;248  wrappedNonce: string;249  wrappedTag: string;250}> {251  const rootKeyBytes = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32));252253  // Derive the recovery key from the BIP39 words encoding of the root key.254  const words = await rootKeyToWords(rootKeyBytes);255  const wordMaterial = await wordsToRootKeyMaterial(words);256  const recoverySalt = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));257  const recoveryKey = await deriveRecoveryKey(wordMaterial, recoverySalt);258259  // Wrap the root key with the recovery key using AES-256-GCM directly.260  // We hex-encode rootKeyBytes so the plaintext is always valid UTF-8.261  const nonce = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));262  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(hex(rootKeyBytes));263  const raw = await crypto.subtle.encrypt(264    {265      name: "AES-GCM",266      iv: nonce,267      additionalData: new Uint8Array([1]).buffer as ArrayBuffer,268      tagLength: 128,269    },270    recoveryKey,271    encoded272  );273  // WebCrypto returns ciphertext || auth tag concatenated; split them.274  const rawU8 = new Uint8Array(raw);275  const ciphertext = hex(rawU8.slice(0, rawU8.length - 16));276  const tag = hex(rawU8.slice(rawU8.length - 16));277278  return {279    rawRootKey: hex(rootKeyBytes),280    recoverySalt: hex(recoverySalt),281    wrappedRootKey: ciphertext,282    wrappedNonce: hex(nonce),283    wrappedTag: tag,284  };285}286287/**288 * Unwrap the root key using recovery words. Called during recovery flow when289 * the user provides their 12-word phrase and a new password.290 * Exported for use by the RECOVER_WITH_WORDS message handler.291 */292export async function unwrapRootKeyForRecovery(293  wrappedRootKey: string,294  wrappedNonce: string,295  wrappedTag: string,296  recoverySaltHex: string,297  words: string[]298): Promise<void> {299  const wordMaterial = await wordsToRootKeyMaterial(words);300  const recoverySalt = unhex(recoverySaltHex);301  const recoveryKey = await deriveRecoveryKey(wordMaterial, recoverySalt);302303  // Decrypt and cache the root key. The root key bytes were hex-encoded before304  // encryption so the ciphertext is valid UTF-8. We inline the AES-GCM decrypt305  // here to avoid passing a CryptoKey to the string-based encrypt/decrypt helpers.306  // Each component is stored separately in the vault slot; decode them individually307  // so the nonce is always exactly the 12 bytes from wrappedNonce.308  const nonceRaw = unhex(wrappedNonce);309  const ciphertextRaw = unhex(wrappedRootKey);310  const tagRaw = unhex(wrappedTag);311  // Combine ciphertext and tag for AES-GCM (expects ciphertext||tag).312  // Use explicit ArrayBuffer allocations to satisfy TS BufferSource constraints.313  const nonceU8 = nonceRaw as unknown as Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>;314  const combined = new Uint8Array(ciphertextRaw.length + tagRaw.length);315  combined.set(ciphertextRaw, 0);316  combined.set(tagRaw, ciphertextRaw.length);317  const raw = await crypto.subtle.decrypt(318    { name: "AES-GCM", iv: nonceU8, additionalData: new Uint8Array([1]).buffer as ArrayBuffer, tagLength: 128 },319    recoveryKey,320    combined321  );322  const decryptedHex = new TextDecoder().decode(raw);323  rootKey = unhex(decryptedHex);324}325326/**327 * Re-wrap the cached root key under a new derived key (from the user's new328 * password). Called after password change and after recovery re-key so the329 * same recovery words continue to work with the updated password — and so330 * subsequent unlocks can rehydrate rootKey via deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey.331 *332 * recovery_* fields are intentionally not touched: those wrap rootKey under333 * the recovery words, which do not change when the password changes.334 */335export async function rewrapRootKeyForPassword(336  newDerivedKey: Uint8Array,337  _newSalt: Uint8Array338): Promise<void> {339  if (!rootKey) throw new Error("root key not set");340  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);341  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");342  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(newDerivedKey, rootKey);343  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, { ...slotA, ...pwRoot });344}345346/**347 * Change the vault encryption to a new derived key (already derived from348 * the user's new password). Used by RECOVER_WITH_WORDS and changePassword.349 * Caller is responsible for key swap and snapshot.350 */351async function reencryptVaultForNewKey(352  newKey: Uint8Array,353  slotA: StoredVault354): Promise<void> {355  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured);356  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(newKey, plaintext);357  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, {358    ...slotA,359    nonce,360    ciphertext,361    tag,362  });363}364365/**366 * Full password change with an already-derived key (used after recovery).367 * Unlike changePassword(), this skips re-verification of current password368 * since recovery flow has already validated the user's identity via words.369 */370export async function changePasswordWithNewKey(371  newSalt: Uint8Array,372  newKey: Uint8Array373): Promise<void> {374  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);375  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");376  // reencryptVaultForNewKey must receive the updated salt so that subsequent377  // UNLOCK calls with the new password can re-derive the correct key.378  await reencryptVaultForNewKey(newKey, { ...slotA, salt: hex(newSalt) });379  if (derivedKey) zeroKey(derivedKey);380  derivedKey = newKey;381  // Refresh pw_root_* under the new key so deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey works382  // on the next unlock (H2/COR-006). If rootKey is missing — recovery flow383  // should have populated it — fall back silently rather than blowing up the384  // recovery path; migrateToRecovery will rehydrate on the next unlock.385  if (rootKey) {386    const slotAfter = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);387    if (slotAfter) {388      const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(newKey, rootKey);389      await writeSlot(SLOT_A, { ...slotAfter, ...pwRoot });390    }391  }392  if (!duressConfigured) {393    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(slotA.ciphertext.length / 2));394  }395  await stampLocalVaultMutation();396}397398// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------399// Salt generation --- exported so the RECOVER_WITH_WORDS handler can derive400// a new key after password reset without re-importing the crypto module.401// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------402403export { deriveKey, generateSalt };404405export async function loadSlotA(): Promise<StoredVault | null> {406  return loadSlot(SLOT_A);407}408409/**410 * Recover the session root key by AES-GCM-decrypting the pw_root_* fields411 * (a second wrapping of the root key under the password-derived key). This412 * is what makes GET_RECOVERY_WORDS work across lock/unlock cycles without413 * the user re-entering their recovery phrase: the same root key bytes —414 * and therefore the same 12 words — survive every unlock.415 *416 * Returns null when the pw_root fields are absent (pre-v2.12 vault that417 * hasn't been migrated yet) or when decryption fails (wrong derived key,418 * tampered ciphertext). On null the caller should fall through to419 * migrateToRecovery() to populate the fields.420 */421async function deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(422  derivedKeyBytes: Uint8Array,423  slotA: StoredVault,424): Promise<Uint8Array | null> {425  if (!slotA.pw_root_ciphertext || !slotA.pw_root_nonce || !slotA.pw_root_tag) {426    return null;427  }428  try {429    const rootHex = await decrypt(430      derivedKeyBytes,431      slotA.pw_root_nonce,432      slotA.pw_root_ciphertext,433      slotA.pw_root_tag,434    );435    return unhex(rootHex);436  } catch {437    return null;438  }439}440441// AES-GCM-wrap rootKey under derivedKey for the pw_root_* fields. Returns the442// hex-encoded ciphertext/nonce/tag triple ready to embed in StoredVault.443async function wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(444  derivedKeyBytes: Uint8Array,445  rootKeyBytes: Uint8Array,446): Promise<{ pw_root_ciphertext: string; pw_root_nonce: string; pw_root_tag: string }> {447  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKeyBytes, hex(rootKeyBytes));448  return {449    pw_root_ciphertext: ciphertext,450    pw_root_nonce: nonce,451    pw_root_tag: tag,452  };453}454455/**456 * For vaults created before v2.12 (no recovery_salt/recovery_wrapped_root_key),457 * generate the root key, wrap it under the recovery words, and persist the458 * recovery escrow into slot A. The caller must show the recovery words to the459 * user before calling this — once called, those words are the vault's recovery460 * path. This runs once, on the first unlock of an upgraded vault.461 */462export async function migrateToRecovery(): Promise<void> {463  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {464    throw new Error("vault must be unlocked in real mode");465  }466  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);467  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");468  const hasRecoveryEscrow =469    !!slotA.recovery_salt && !!slotA.recovery_wrapped_root_key;470  const hasPwRoot = !!slotA.pw_root_ciphertext && !!slotA.pw_root_nonce;471  if (hasRecoveryEscrow && hasPwRoot) return; // already done472473  // If recovery escrow already exists but pw_root doesn't, we cannot recover474  // the original rootKey without the user's words. The least-surprising path475  // is to rotate to a fresh root key — the user's old recovery words become476  // invalid but we surface peach_recovery_pending so the popup re-presents477  // the words. The unlock-path callers all set that flag.478  const { rawRootKey, recoverySalt, wrappedRootKey, wrappedNonce, wrappedTag } =479    await generateAndWrapRootKey();480  rootKey = unhex(rawRootKey);481482  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(derivedKey, rootKey);483  const nextSlotA: StoredVault = {484    ...slotA,485    recovery_salt: recoverySalt,486    recovery_wrapped_root_key: wrappedRootKey,487    recovery_nonce: wrappedNonce,488    recovery_tag: wrappedTag,489    ...pwRoot,490  };491  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, nextSlotA);492  await stampLocalVaultMutation();493}494495/**496 * Returns the 12 recovery words for the current session's root key.497 * Must be called while the vault is unlocked. Throws if recovery has not498 * been set up (pre-v2.12 vault that hasn't migrated yet).499 */500export async function getRecoveryWords(): Promise<string[]> {501  if (!rootKey) {502    throw new Error("recovery not set up — vault may need migration");503  }504  return rootKeyToWords(rootKey);505}506507async function loadSlot(key: string): Promise<StoredVault | null> {508  const result = await chrome.storage.local.get(key);509  return (result as Record<string, StoredVault | undefined>)[key] ?? null;510}511512async function writeSlot(key: string, vault: StoredVault): Promise<void> {513  try {514    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [key]: vault });515  } catch (err) {516    throw mapStorageError(err);517  }518}519520async function stampLocalVaultMutation(): Promise<void> {521  await chrome.storage.local.set({522    peach_last_modified_at: String(Date.now()),523  });524}525526/**527 * One-shot migration from the pre-A-2 schema (peach_vault + peach_decoy_vault528 * + peach_duress flag) to the slot-neutral schema (peach_vault_a +529 * peach_vault_b). Runs at most once per session; safe to call repeatedly.530 */531async function ensureMigrated(): Promise<void> {532  if (migrationRan) return;533  migrationRan = true;534535  const keys = [LEGACY_MAIN, LEGACY_DECOY, LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG, SLOT_A, SLOT_B];536  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get(keys);537  const slotAExists = raw[SLOT_A] !== undefined;538  const slotBExists = raw[SLOT_B] !== undefined;539  const legacyMain = raw[LEGACY_MAIN] as StoredVault | undefined;540  const legacyDecoy = raw[LEGACY_DECOY] as StoredVault | undefined;541542  // Fresh install with nothing in storage — nothing to do; createVault() sets up both slots.543  if (!slotAExists && !legacyMain) return;544545  // Already migrated.546  if (slotAExists && slotBExists && !legacyMain && !legacyDecoy) return;547548  let didMigrate = false;549  if (legacyMain && !slotAExists) {550    await writeSlot(SLOT_A, legacyMain);551    didMigrate = true;552  }553554  // If slot B isn't set, populate it: use legacy decoy when present, else noise.555  if (!slotBExists) {556    const target = (legacyMain ?? raw[SLOT_A]) as StoredVault | undefined;557    if (legacyDecoy) {558      await writeSlot(SLOT_B, legacyDecoy);559      didMigrate = true;560    } else if (target) {561      await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(target.ciphertext.length / 2));562      didMigrate = true;563    }564  }565566  const toRemove: string[] = [];567  if (legacyMain) toRemove.push(LEGACY_MAIN);568  if (legacyDecoy) toRemove.push(LEGACY_DECOY);569  if (raw[LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG] !== undefined) toRemove.push(LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG);570  if (toRemove.length > 0) {571    await chrome.storage.local.remove(toRemove);572    didMigrate = true;573  }574  if (didMigrate) {575    await stampLocalVaultMutation();576  }577}578579// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------580// Padding + noise helpers581// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------582583/**584 * Pads the plaintext string with trailing spaces so that the encoded byte585 * length is a multiple of PAD_BLOCK. JSON.parse tolerates trailing586 * whitespace after a complete document, so the padding is transparent on587 * decode. Ciphertext length equals plaintext length plus a 16-byte tag.588 */589function padPlaintext(json: string): string {590  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(json);591  const target = Math.max(PAD_BLOCK, Math.ceil(encoded.length / PAD_BLOCK) * PAD_BLOCK);592  const padLen = target - encoded.length;593  return json + " ".repeat(padLen);594}595596/**597 * Produces a StoredVault-shaped record filled with CSPRNG bytes. The598 * ciphertext length matches the given byte count. Because GCM ciphertext is599 * pseudo-random, this blob is indistinguishable at rest from a real600 * encrypted vault without the key.601 *602 * crypto.getRandomValues() caps each call at 65536 bytes (the Web Crypto603 * spec hard limit). Chunk the fill so vaults larger than that — common once604 * the user has dozens of entries or any passkey — don't throw.605 */606const CSPRNG_CHUNK = 65_536;607608function fillRandom(buf: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {609  for (let offset = 0; offset < buf.length; offset += CSPRNG_CHUNK) {610    const end = Math.min(offset + CSPRNG_CHUNK, buf.length);611    const chunk = new Uint8Array(end - offset);612    crypto.getRandomValues(chunk);613    buf.set(chunk, offset);614  }615  return buf;616}617618function generateNoiseBlob(ciphertextBytes: number): StoredVault {619  const salt = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));620  const nonce = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));621  const cipher = fillRandom(new Uint8Array(ciphertextBytes));622  const tag = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));623  return {624    version: 1,625    salt: hex(salt),626    nonce: hex(nonce),627    ciphertext: hex(cipher),628    tag: hex(tag),629  };630}631632// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------633// Encrypted plaintext envelope634// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------635636type VaultPayload = {637  entries: VaultEntry[];638  duressConfigured?: boolean;639};640641type DecryptedPayload = {642  entries: VaultEntry[];643  duressConfigured: boolean;644  /**645   * True when at least one entry in the on-disk payload had a legacy shape646   * (pre-v2.11.0 passkey type/flat fields, or pre-A-2 created/updated keys)647   * and got rewritten by normalizeEntry. The unlock path uses this to648   * persist the new shape immediately — without it, the migration would649   * re-run on every unlock and old shape never disappears from disk.650   */651  migratedFromLegacy: boolean;652};653654function encodePayload(entries: VaultEntry[], duress: boolean): string {655  const envelope: VaultPayload = { entries, duressConfigured: duress };656  return padPlaintext(JSON.stringify(envelope));657}658659function rawNeedsMigration(raw: VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry): boolean {660  if ("created" in raw || "updated" in raw) return true;661  const flat = raw as Partial<VaultEntry>;662  if (flat.type === "passkey") return true;663  // Flat rpId without a passkey sub-object means pre-v2.11.0 schema.664  if (flat.rpId !== undefined && flat.passkey === undefined) return true;665  return false;666}667668function decodePayload(plain: string): DecryptedPayload {669  const parsed = JSON.parse(plain) as670    | Array<VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry>671    | VaultPayload;672673  const rawEntries = Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed : parsed.entries ?? [];674  const flatMigrationNeeded = rawEntries.some(rawNeedsMigration);675676  const normalized = rawEntries.map(normalizeEntry);677  const { merged } = mergePasskeyOnlyIntoLogins(normalized);678679  if (Array.isArray(parsed)) {680    return {681      entries: normalized,682      duressConfigured: false,683      migratedFromLegacy: true, // pre-A-2 array shape always needs save684    };685  }686687  return {688    entries: normalized,689    duressConfigured: parsed.duressConfigured === true,690    migratedFromLegacy: flatMigrationNeeded || merged,691  };692}693694/**695 * One-time consolidation pass run alongside the legacy passkey migration.696 *697 * Pre-v2.11.0 the Chrome passkey path always created a fresh `type:"passkey"`698 * entry per registration — so users who tested registration multiple times699 * accumulated several passkey-bearing entries for the same RP, and the700 * migration to the unified shape carried that duplication forward. This701 * pass collapses the duplicates:702 *703 *   1. Group passkey-bearing (and not deleted) entries by `passkey.rpId`.704 *   2. Within each group, the most recently-active credential wins (prefer705 *      lastUsedAt, fall back to passkey.createdAt, fall back to modifiedAt).706 *   3. If a NON-passkey login entry exists for that RP (matched by url or707 *      additionalUrls hostname), attach the winning passkey to it and708 *      soft-delete every passkey-bearing entry in the group.709 *   4. Otherwise, soft-delete every loser in the group, keeping the winner710 *      as a passkey-only entry.711 *712 * Soft delete (deletedAt) rather than splice — the trash flow keeps the713 * record around for retention and the user can restore if the heuristic714 * picked wrong. The `merged` flag goes back to decodePayload so the715 * unlock path persists the consolidated shape immediately.716 */717function mergePasskeyOnlyIntoLogins(entries: VaultEntry[]): { merged: boolean } {718  let merged = false;719  const now = Date.now();720721  const candidates = entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt && e.passkey);722  const byRpId = new Map<string, VaultEntry[]>();723  for (const e of candidates) {724    const rpId = e.passkey!.rpId;725    const list = byRpId.get(rpId);726    if (list) list.push(e);727    else byRpId.set(rpId, [e]);728  }729730  for (const [rpId, group] of byRpId) {731    if (group.length === 0) continue;732    group.sort((a, b) => {733      const aT =734        a.passkey!.lastUsedAt ?? a.passkey!.createdAt ?? a.modifiedAt ?? a.createdAt;735      const bT =736        b.passkey!.lastUsedAt ?? b.passkey!.createdAt ?? b.modifiedAt ?? b.createdAt;737      return bT - aT;738    });739    const winner = group[0]!;740741    // Look for a NON-passkey login entry matching this RP. Use the URL742    // hostname rather than a substring search so a "login.foo.com" entry743    // doesn't accidentally absorb a passkey for "foo.com".744    const loginTarget = entries.find((e) => {745      if (e.deletedAt || e.passkey || e.type !== "login") return false;746      if (e.url && extractDomain(e.url) === rpId) return true;747      for (const extra of e.additionalUrls ?? []) {748        if (extractDomain(extra) === rpId) return true;749      }750      return false;751    });752753    if (loginTarget) {754      loginTarget.passkey = winner.passkey;755      loginTarget.modifiedAt = now;756      for (const dup of group) {757        if (!dup.deletedAt) {758          dup.deletedAt = now;759          dup.modifiedAt = now;760        }761      }762      merged = true;763    } else if (group.length > 1) {764      for (let i = 1; i < group.length; i += 1) {765        const dup = group[i]!;766        if (!dup.deletedAt) {767          dup.deletedAt = now;768          dup.modifiedAt = now;769        }770      }771      merged = true;772    }773  }774775  return { merged };776}777778// Validates that a `StoredVault` record on disk has the field shape we expect779// before treating an AES-GCM decrypt success as a clean unlock. AES-GCM only780// authenticates the static VERSION_BYTE AAD, not the `version` field on the781// outer record — a corrupted `version: 42` slot still decrypts cleanly. This782// check surfaces that as `corrupted` (M7/COR-007) so the popup can offer a783// history-restore path instead of falsely reporting "wrong password".784function hasValidVaultSchema(v: unknown): v is StoredVault {785  if (typeof v !== "object" || v === null) return false;786  const r = v as Record<string, unknown>;787  return (788    r.version === 1 &&789    typeof r.salt === "string" &&790    typeof r.nonce === "string" &&791    typeof r.ciphertext === "string" &&792    typeof r.tag === "string"793  );794}795796export type TryDecryptResult =797  | { status: "ok"; payload: DecryptedPayload }798  | { status: "wrong_key" }799  | { status: "corrupted"; reason: string };800801// Exported solely for `unlockFromCodex` below, which needs to verify a802// supplied passphrase against a slotA blob *without* committing anything to803// storage. Keep this internal otherwise — callers crossing the messages.ts804// boundary should always go through `unlock` / `verifyMainPassword` so the805// constant-time invariants in Projects.md §3.4 are not bypassed.806export async function tryDecryptSlot(807  vault: StoredVault,808  key: Uint8Array809): Promise<DecryptedPayload | null> {810  const res = await tryDecryptSlotResult(vault, key);811  return res.status === "ok" ? res.payload : null;812}813814export async function tryDecryptSlotResult(815  vault: StoredVault,816  key: Uint8Array817): Promise<TryDecryptResult> {818  if (!hasValidVaultSchema(vault)) {819    return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_slot_schema" };820  }821  let plain: string;822  try {823    plain = await decrypt(key, vault.nonce, vault.ciphertext, vault.tag);824  } catch {825    return { status: "wrong_key" };826  }827  try {828    const parsed = JSON.parse(plain) as unknown;829    if (typeof parsed !== "object" || parsed === null) {830      return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_payload_shape" };831    }832    if (!Array.isArray(parsed) && !Array.isArray((parsed as VaultPayload).entries)) {833      return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_payload_shape" };834    }835    return { status: "ok", payload: decodePayload(plain) };836  } catch {837    return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_payload_json" };838  }839}840841// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------842// Core operations843// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------844845function buildDomainIndexSync(all: VaultEntry[]): void {846  domainIndex = new Map();847848  for (const entry of all) {849    if (entry.deletedAt) continue;850    if (entry.type === "note" || entry.type === "card") continue;851852    // An entry can match multiple sites via `additionalUrls`. Index each853    // hostname so `queryDomain` returns the entry regardless of which alias854    // the user is currently visiting. Dedupe per-entry so a single entry855    // never appears twice in one bucket.856    const domains = new Set<string>();857    const primary = extractDomain(entry.url ?? "");858    if (primary) domains.add(primary);859    for (const extra of entry.additionalUrls ?? []) {860      const d = extractDomain(extra);861      if (d) domains.add(d);862    }863    if (domains.size === 0) continue;864865    for (const domain of domains) {866      const bucket = domainIndex.get(domain) ?? [];867      bucket.push(entry);868      domainIndex.set(domain, bucket);869    }870  }871}872873export async function createVault(password: string): Promise<void> {874  await ensureMigrated();875876  const salt = generateSalt();877  derivedKey = await deriveKey(password, salt);878  entries = [];879  vaultMode = "real";880  duressConfigured = false;881  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);882883  // Generate and wrap the root key for recovery word escrow.884  const { rawRootKey, recoverySalt, wrappedRootKey, wrappedNonce, wrappedTag } =885    await generateAndWrapRootKey();886  rootKey = unhex(rawRootKey);887888  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured);889  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKey, plaintext);890891  // Second wrapping of rootKey under derivedKey so future unlocks can rehydrate892  // it without recovery words (H2/COR-006).893  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(derivedKey, rootKey);894895  const slotA: StoredVault = {896    version: 1,897    salt: hex(salt),898    nonce,899    ciphertext,900    tag,901    recovery_salt: recoverySalt,902    recovery_wrapped_root_key: wrappedRootKey,903    recovery_nonce: wrappedNonce,904    recovery_tag: wrappedTag,905    ...pwRoot,906  };907  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, slotA);908909  // Matching-size noise blob for slot B, so a fresh install shows two910  // similarly-shaped records regardless of whether duress is ever set up.911  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2));912  await stampLocalVaultMutation();913914  touchAutoLock();915}916917export async function hasVault(): Promise<boolean> {918  await ensureMigrated();919  return (await loadSlot(SLOT_A)) !== null;920}921922/**923 * Returns whether the real vault has recorded that a duress passphrase is924 * configured. Reliable only after a real-mode unlock — before unlock or in925 * decoy mode, returns false because we cannot read slot A's plaintext.926 */927export async function isDuressEnabled(): Promise<boolean> {928  return vaultMode === "real" && duressConfigured;929}930931export async function setupDuress(duressPassword: string): Promise<void> {932  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {933    throw new Error("vault must be unlocked in real mode");934  }935  await ensureMigrated();936937  // Encrypt the decoy payload (empty entries) under the duress key. Pad to938  // at least the current slot A ciphertext size so the two slots look the939  // same at rest at setup time.940  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);941  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");942943  const decoySalt = generateSalt();944  const decoyKey = await deriveKey(duressPassword, decoySalt);945  try {946    // Pad the decoy plaintext to match slot A's ciphertext length (minus the947    // 16-byte tag) so encrypted sizes align exactly.948    const targetBytes = slotA.ciphertext.length / 2;949    let plaintext = encodePayload([], false);950    const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(plaintext);951    if (encoded.length < targetBytes) {952      plaintext = plaintext + " ".repeat(targetBytes - encoded.length);953    }954    const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(decoyKey, plaintext);955    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, {956      version: 1,957      salt: hex(decoySalt),958      nonce,959      ciphertext,960      tag,961    });962  } finally {963    zeroKey(decoyKey);964  }965966  // Re-encrypt slot A with the duressConfigured flag set to true. No external967  // flag is written — the bit lives inside the encrypted envelope.968  duressConfigured = true;969  await persistSlotA();970}971972export async function disableDuress(): Promise<void> {973  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {974    throw new Error("vault must be unlocked in real mode");975  }976  await ensureMigrated();977978  // Overwrite slot B with fresh noise that matches slot A's size. The slot979  // remains occupied so its mere existence does not signal that duress was980  // ever configured.981  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);982  if (slotA) {983    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(slotA.ciphertext.length / 2));984  }985986  duressConfigured = false;987  await persistSlotA();988}989990export async function verifyMainPassword(password: string): Promise<boolean> {991  await ensureMigrated();992  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);993  if (!slotA) return false;994  const key = await deriveKey(password, unhex(slotA.salt));995  try {996    return (await tryDecryptSlot(slotA, key)) !== null;997  } finally {998    zeroKey(key);999  }1000}10011002export async function unlock(password: string): Promise<boolean> {1003  await ensureMigrated();10041005  // Load both slots in parallel. Both always exist post-migration; the1006  // parallel load and the parallel derivation below keep wall-clock time1007  // constant regardless of which slot's passphrase (real or decoy) the1008  // caller supplied, so a timing side channel cannot distinguish the1009  // duress path from the real-unlock path (DUR-002).1010  const [slotA, slotB] = await Promise.all([1011    loadSlot(SLOT_A),1012    loadSlot(SLOT_B),1013  ]);10141015  // Derive both keys in parallel, unconditionally.1016  const [keyA, keyB] = await Promise.all([1017    slotA ? deriveKey(password, unhex(slotA.salt)) : Promise.resolve(null),1018    slotB ? deriveKey(password, unhex(slotB.salt)) : Promise.resolve(null),1019  ]);10201021  // Attempt both decrypts in parallel. The Result variant lets us distinguish1022  // 'wrong_key' from 'corrupted' so callers can offer a history-restore path1023  // when a slot's schema is invalid even though AES-GCM authenticated (M7).1024  const [resultA, resultB] = await Promise.all([1025    keyA && slotA1026      ? tryDecryptSlotResult(slotA, keyA)1027      : Promise.resolve({ status: "wrong_key" } as TryDecryptResult),1028    keyB && slotB1029      ? tryDecryptSlotResult(slotB, keyB)1030      : Promise.resolve({ status: "wrong_key" } as TryDecryptResult),1031  ]);1032  const payloadA = resultA.status === "ok" ? resultA.payload : null;1033  const payloadB = resultB.status === "ok" ? resultB.payload : null;10341035  if (payloadA && keyA) {1036    derivedKey = keyA;1037    vaultMode = "real";1038    entries = payloadA.entries;1039    duressConfigured = payloadA.duressConfigured;1040    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1041    await loadSettings();1042    touchAutoLock();1043    if (keyB) zeroKey(keyB);10441045    // slotA is non-null when payloadA is truthy (keyA was derived from slotA).1046    if (slotA) {1047      const needsRecoverySetup =1048        !slotA.recovery_salt || !slotA.recovery_wrapped_root_key;1049      if (!needsRecoverySetup) {1050        rootKey = await deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(keyA, slotA);1051      }1052      // Pre-v2.12 vault, or a vault whose pw_root_* fields haven't been written1053      // yet: generate the recovery escrow and seed pw_root_* so subsequent1054      // unlocks can rehydrate rootKey without the user's recovery words.1055      // Best-effort — a failure here must not block unlock.1056      if (needsRecoverySetup || !rootKey) {1057        try {1058          await migrateToRecovery();1059          if (needsRecoverySetup) {1060            // String "1" matches the popup's existing peach_recovery_pending1061            // check; surfaced so the user re-confirms recovery words after a1062            // legacy-vault unlock (H2/COR-006).1063            await chrome.storage.local.set({ peach_recovery_pending: '1' });1064          }1065        } catch (migrationErr) {1066          console.warn('[Peach] recovery migration failed:', migrationErr);1067        }1068      }1069    }10701071    // If the payload had a pre-v2.11.0 shape (legacy passkey type, flat1072    // passkey fields, or pre-A-2 created/updated keys), rewrite it now so1073    // the next save uses the new format and migration doesn't re-run forever.1074    if (payloadA.migratedFromLegacy) {1075      await persistSlotA();1076    }1077    return true;1078  }10791080  if (payloadB && keyB) {1081    derivedKey = keyB;1082    vaultMode = "decoy";1083    entries = payloadB.entries;1084    duressConfigured = false;1085    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1086    await loadSettings();1087    touchAutoLock();1088    if (keyA) zeroKey(keyA);1089    return true;1090  }10911092  if (keyA) zeroKey(keyA);1093  if (keyB) zeroKey(keyB);1094  // Surface corruption (good AES tag, broken schema) distinctly from1095  // wrong-password so the popup can offer history-restore (M7/COR-007).1096  if (resultA.status === "corrupted") {1097    lastUnlockFailureReason = resultA.reason;1098  } else if (resultB.status === "corrupted") {1099    lastUnlockFailureReason = resultB.reason;1100  }1101  return false;1102}11031104export function lock(): void {1105  if (derivedKey) {1106    zeroKey(derivedKey);1107    derivedKey = null;1108  }1109  if (rootKey) {1110    rootKey.fill(0);1111    rootKey = null;1112  }11131114  entries = [];1115  domainIndex = new Map();1116  vaultMode = "real";1117  duressConfigured = false;1118  clearAutoLock();1119}11201121export function isUnlocked(): boolean {1122  return derivedKey !== null;1123}11241125// Opens the vault using a pre-derived AES-256 key (skipping Argon2id).1126// Used by Android biometric unlock — the key was derived on the native side.1127export async function unlockWithKey(1128  masterKeyHex: string,1129): Promise<{ ok: true; entries: VaultEntry[] } | { ok: false; error: string }> {1130  try {1131    const masterKeyBytes = unhex(masterKeyHex);1132    const stored = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1133    if (!stored) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };1134    const payload = await tryDecryptSlot(stored, masterKeyBytes);1135    if (!payload) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };11361137    derivedKey = masterKeyBytes;1138    vaultMode = "real";1139    entries = payload.entries;1140    duressConfigured = payload.duressConfigured;1141    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1142    await loadSettings();1143    touchAutoLock();1144    return { ok: true, entries };1145  } catch {1146    return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };1147  }1148}11491150/**1151 * Restore the vault from a parsed Peach Codex payload.1152 *1153 * The supplied passphrase is verified against the Codex's slotA *before* any1154 * storage mutation — wrong passphrases return without touching disk. On1155 * success, the current vault state is snapshotted (reason: "restore") so the1156 * user can revert via Settings -> Vault History, then slotA/slotB are written1157 * and `peach_last_modified_at` is set to the Codex's recorded timestamp. A1158 * regular `unlock()` follows so the rest of the SW sees the standard1159 * post-unlock state.1160 *1161 * Intentionally non-Pro-gated — see peach_codex_v2.md "Pro gating". A Codex1162 * printed by a Pro user must always be restorable, even on a free device.1163 *1164 * Timing is not held constant here (in contrast to `unlock`): the Codex flow1165 * is an explicit user action with a known passphrase, not a passive lock1166 * screen, so the duress-vs-real timing side channel does not apply.1167 */1168export async function unlockFromCodex(params: {1169  slotA: string; // JSON string of StoredVault for slot A1170  slotB: string | null; // JSON string of StoredVault for slot B, or null1171  timestamp: number;1172  masterPassphrase: string;1173}): Promise<1174  | { ok: true; entryCount: number }1175  | { ok: false; reason: "wrong_passphrase" | "invalid_slot_format" }1176> {1177  let parsedSlotA: StoredVault;1178  let parsedSlotB: StoredVault | null = null;1179  try {1180    parsedSlotA = JSON.parse(params.slotA) as StoredVault;1181    if (params.slotB !== null) {1182      parsedSlotB = JSON.parse(params.slotB) as StoredVault;1183    }1184    // Minimal structural validation — the decrypt step below catches deeper1185    // corruption, but bail early on obviously-bad shapes so we don't reach1186    // storage with junk.1187    if (1188      typeof parsedSlotA?.salt !== "string" ||1189      typeof parsedSlotA?.nonce !== "string" ||1190      typeof parsedSlotA?.ciphertext !== "string" ||1191      typeof parsedSlotA?.tag !== "string"1192    ) {1193      return { ok: false, reason: "invalid_slot_format" };1194    }1195  } catch {1196    return { ok: false, reason: "invalid_slot_format" };1197  }11981199  // Verify the passphrase against the supplied slotA WITHOUT writing anything.1200  // If this fails the on-disk vault is left completely untouched.1201  const trialKey = await deriveKey(params.masterPassphrase, unhex(parsedSlotA.salt));1202  const trialPayload = await tryDecryptSlot(parsedSlotA, trialKey);1203  if (!trialPayload) {1204    zeroKey(trialKey);1205    return { ok: false, reason: "wrong_passphrase" };1206  }1207  // Drop the trial key; `unlock()` below derives its own copy. Holding two1208  // copies of the master key in memory at once would be a needless surface.1209  zeroKey(trialKey);12101211  // Snapshot the about-to-be-overwritten on-disk state so the user can revert1212  // a mistaken Codex restore via the Vault History UI. Non-fatal if it fails.1213  await takeVaultSnapshot("restore");12141215  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, parsedSlotA);1216  if (parsedSlotB) {1217    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, parsedSlotB);1218  } else {1219    // Slot B must always exist with ciphertext length matching slot A1220    // (Projects.md §3.2). Codex prints may omit slot B (duress wasn't1221    // configured); regenerate noise to satisfy the invariant.1222    await writeSlot(1223      SLOT_B,1224      generateNoiseBlob(parsedSlotA.ciphertext.length / 2),1225    );1226  }1227  await chrome.storage.local.set({1228    peach_last_modified_at: String(params.timestamp),1229  });12301231  // Standard unlock path so domain index, settings, auto-lock, and1232  // recovery-key state all populate exactly as a normal unlock would.1233  const ok = await unlock(params.masterPassphrase);1234  if (!ok) {1235    // Should be unreachable — we just verified the passphrase against the1236    // same slotA we wrote. Treat as wrong_passphrase to keep the contract1237    // simple if some race or storage anomaly intrudes.1238    return { ok: false, reason: "wrong_passphrase" };1239  }1240  return { ok: true, entryCount: getEntries().length };1241}12421243// Returns the current in-memory derived key as a hex string.1244// Used by the biometric enable flow in Settings to store the key in Android Keystore.1245export function getDerivedKeyHex(): string {1246  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_not_unlocked");1247  return hex(derivedKey);1248}12491250export function getEntries(): VaultEntry[] {1251  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");1252  return entries.filter((entry) => !entry.deletedAt);1253}12541255const EMAIL_RE = /^[^\s@]+@[^\s@]+\.[^\s@]+$/;12561257export function getIdentities(): SavedIdentity[] {1258  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");1259  const active = entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt && e.type === "login");12601261  const emailMap = new Map<string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }>();1262  const usernameMap = new Map<string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }>();12631264  for (const entry of active) {1265    const value = entry.username?.trim();1266    if (!value) continue;1267    const map = EMAIL_RE.test(value) ? emailMap : usernameMap;1268    const existing = map.get(value);1269    const domain = extractDomain(entry.url ?? "") ?? "";1270    const modifiedAt = entry.modifiedAt ?? entry.createdAt ?? 0;1271    if (!existing || modifiedAt > existing.lastUsed) {1272      map.set(value, { lastUsed: modifiedAt, count: (existing?.count ?? 0) + 1, domain });1273    } else {1274      map.set(value, { ...existing, count: existing.count + 1 });1275    }1276  }12771278  const toIdentity = (type: "email" | "username") =>1279    ([value, d]: [string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }]): SavedIdentity => ({1280      value, type, lastUsed: d.lastUsed, useCount: d.count, exampleDomain: d.domain || undefined,1281    });12821283  return [1284    ...[...emailMap.entries()].map(toIdentity("email")).sort((a, b) => b.useCount - a.useCount),1285    ...[...usernameMap.entries()].map(toIdentity("username")).sort((a, b) => b.useCount - a.useCount),1286  ];1287}12881289export async function batchAddEntries(drafts: EntryDraft[]): Promise<VaultEntry[]> {1290  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");12911292  const now = Date.now();1293  const added: VaultEntry[] = [];1294  for (const draft of drafts) {1295    try {1296      const sanitized = sanitizeEntryDraft(draft);1297      const nextEntry: VaultEntry = {1298        ...sanitized,1299        id: crypto.randomUUID(),1300        createdAt: now,1301        modifiedAt: now,1302      };1303      entries.push(nextEntry);1304      added.push(nextEntry);1305    } catch {1306      // Skip invalid drafts silently — caller can see diff between input and output length1307    }1308  }13091310  if (added.length > 0) {1311    await persistEntries();1312  }13131314  return added;1315}13161317/**1318 * Restore a set of entries in full fidelity — preserves id, createdAt,1319 * modifiedAt, and every other field unlike `batchAddEntries` which1320 * assigns fresh identity. Used by restore paths where the backup is the1321 * authoritative source of truth. `mode` controls how entries already in1322 * the vault are treated.1323 */1324export async function restoreEntries(1325  incoming: VaultEntry[],1326  mode: "replace" | "merge"1327): Promise<{ added: number; updated: number; skipped: number }> {1328  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");13291330  // A replace with zero incoming entries is almost certainly a caller bug1331  // (e.g. an import that silently dropped everything). Refuse rather than1332  // wipe the vault.1333  if (mode === "replace" && incoming.length === 0) {1334    throw new Error("refuse to replace with empty entry set");1335  }13361337  let added = 0;1338  let updated = 0;1339  let skipped = 0;13401341  if (mode === "replace") {1342    entries = [];1343    for (const entry of incoming) {1344      const normalized = sanitizeRestoredEntry(entry);1345      if (!normalized) {1346        skipped += 1;1347        continue;1348      }1349      entries.push(normalized);1350      added += 1;1351    }1352  } else {1353    const byId = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();1354    for (const e of entries) byId.set(e.id, e);13551356    for (const entry of incoming) {1357      const normalized = sanitizeRestoredEntry(entry);1358      if (!normalized) {1359        skipped += 1;1360        continue;1361      }1362      const existing = byId.get(normalized.id);1363      if (!existing) {1364        entries.push(normalized);1365        added += 1;1366      } else if (normalized.modifiedAt > existing.modifiedAt) {1367        const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === existing.id);1368        if (idx !== -1) {1369          entries[idx] = normalized;1370          updated += 1;1371        }1372      } else {1373        skipped += 1;1374      }1375    }1376  }13771378  await persistEntries("import");1379  return { added, updated, skipped };1380}13811382/**1383 * Validate + normalise a VaultEntry coming from a backup. Accepts1384 * anything structurally sound; keeps all metadata verbatim. Returns1385 * null for values the live vault shouldn't accept (e.g., missing title).1386 */1387function sanitizeRestoredEntry(entry: VaultEntry): VaultEntry | null {1388  if (!entry || typeof entry !== "object") return null;1389  const title = typeof entry.title === "string" ? entry.title.trim() : "";1390  if (!title) return null;1391  const id = typeof entry.id === "string" && entry.id ? entry.id : crypto.randomUUID();1392  const now = Date.now();1393  const createdAt = typeof entry.createdAt === "number" ? entry.createdAt : now;1394  const modifiedAt = typeof entry.modifiedAt === "number" ? entry.modifiedAt : createdAt;13951396  // Migrate legacy passkey shape on import (same logic as on-disk read).1397  // Imports from pre-v2.11.0 vault backups still carry type:"passkey" with1398  // flat fields; bring them into the new shape immediately.1399  const migrated: VaultEntry = migrateLegacyPasskey(1400    {1401      ...entry,1402      id,1403      title,1404      type: entry.type ?? "login",1405      createdAt,1406      modifiedAt,1407    },1408    entry1409  );14101411  // Login entries from backup must carry a password (or be passkey-only,1412  // in which case the passkey sub-object replaces the password requirement).1413  if (1414    migrated.type === "login" &&1415    !migrated.passkey &&1416    typeof migrated.password !== "string"1417  ) {1418    return null;1419  }1420  if (migrated.passkey && !migrated.passkey.credentialId) {1421    return null;1422  }14231424  return migrated;1425}14261427// Soft-deletes every non-deleted entry in one call. The literal string1428// argument is a tripwire against accidental calls — any caller that would1429// wipe the vault has to consciously type "REPLACE_ALL". Do not relax this1430// to a boolean.1431export async function clearVaultEntries(1432  confirmation: "REPLACE_ALL"1433): Promise<void> {1434  if (confirmation !== "REPLACE_ALL") {1435    throw new Error("clearVaultEntries requires explicit confirmation");1436  }1437  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");1438  for (const entry of entries) {1439    if (!entry.deletedAt) {1440      entry.deletedAt = Date.now();1441      entry.modifiedAt = Date.now();1442    }1443  }1444  await persistEntries();1445}14461447export async function addEntry(entry: EntryDraft): Promise<VaultEntry> {1448  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");14491450  const sanitized = sanitizeEntryDraft(entry);1451  const now = Date.now();1452  const nextEntry: VaultEntry = {1453    ...sanitized,1454    id: crypto.randomUUID(),1455    createdAt: now,1456    modifiedAt: now,1457    // Stamp passwordChangedAt at creation so age tracking is accurate from1458    // day one. Non-login entries carry the same stamp harmlessly.1459    passwordChangedAt: sanitized.password ? now : undefined,1460  };14611462  entries.push(nextEntry);1463  await persistEntries();14641465  // Fire-and-forget breach check (only for login entries if breach monitoring is enabled or not set)1466  if (settings.breachMonitoring !== false && nextEntry.type === "login" && nextEntry.password) {1467    checkBreach(nextEntry.password).then(async (count) => {1468      if (count > 0) {1469        const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === nextEntry.id);1470        if (idx !== -1) {1471          entries[idx] = { ...entries[idx], breach: count, modifiedAt: Date.now() };1472          await persistEntries();1473        }1474      }1475    });1476  }14771478  return nextEntry;1479}14801481export async function updateEntry(1482  id: string,1483  patch: Partial<VaultEntry>1484): Promise<void> {1485  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");14861487  const idx = entries.findIndex((entry) => entry.id === id);1488  if (idx === -1 || entries[idx].deletedAt) {1489    throw new Error("entry not found");1490  }14911492  const current = entries[idx];1493  const sanitizedPatch = sanitizeEntryPatch(patch);1494  // Refresh passwordChangedAt only when the password value actually changes —1495  // a metadata-only update (title, tags, etc.) must not reset the age clock1496  // that drives the Pro health rotation recommendation.1497  const passwordChanged =1498    "password" in patch &&1499    typeof sanitizedPatch.password === "string" &&1500    sanitizedPatch.password !== current.password;1501  entries[idx] = {1502    ...current,1503    ...sanitizedPatch,1504    modifiedAt: Date.now(),1505    ...(passwordChanged ? { passwordChangedAt: Date.now() } : {}),1506  };15071508  // A login entry must carry SOMETHING fillable — either a password or a1509  // passkey credential. An empty-password login with no passkey is dead1510  // state. Permit the password-clear when a passkey is attached (that's1511  // the legitimate "drop the password, keep the passkey" path).1512  if (1513    entries[idx].type === "login" &&1514    !entries[idx].password &&1515    !entries[idx].passkey1516  ) {1517    entries[idx] = current;1518    throw new Error("password or passkey required");1519  }15201521  // Card entries must retain their card number1522  if (entries[idx].type === "card" && !entries[idx].cardNumber) {1523    entries[idx] = current;1524    throw new Error("card number is required for card entries");1525  }15261527  await persistEntries();15281529  // Breach check when password changes: clear immediately so old breach doesn't linger,1530  // then async-check the new password and only re-set if it's also found.1531  if ("password" in patch && settings.breachMonitoring !== false && entries[idx].type === "login") {1532    entries[idx] = { ...entries[idx], breach: undefined };1533    await persistEntries();1534    const password = entries[idx].password;1535    if (password) {1536      checkBreach(password).then(async (count) => {1537        const i = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id);1538        if (i !== -1 && count > 0) {1539          entries[i] = { ...entries[i], breach: count, modifiedAt: Date.now() };1540          await persistEntries();1541        }1542      });1543    }1544  }1545}15461547export async function deleteEntry(id: string): Promise<void> {1548  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");15491550  const entry = entries.find((item) => item.id === id);1551  if (!entry || entry.deletedAt) {1552    throw new Error("entry not found");1553  }15541555  entry.deletedAt = Date.now();1556  entry.modifiedAt = Date.now();1557  await persistEntries();1558}15591560export function getDeletedEntries(): VaultEntry[] {1561  if (!derivedKey) return [];1562  return entries.filter((e) => !!e.deletedAt);1563}15641565export async function restoreEntry(id: string): Promise<void> {1566  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");1567  const entry = entries.find((e) => e.id === id && e.deletedAt);1568  if (!entry) throw new Error("deleted entry not found");1569  delete entry.deletedAt;1570  entry.modifiedAt = Date.now();1571  await persistEntries();1572  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1573}15741575export async function purgeEntry(id: string): Promise<void> {1576  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");1577  const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id && e.deletedAt);1578  if (idx === -1) throw new Error("deleted entry not found");1579  entries.splice(idx, 1);1580  await persistEntries();1581}15821583/** Permanently delete entries whose deletedAt is older than retentionMs. 0 = keep forever. */1584export async function purgeExpiredTrash(retentionMs: number): Promise<number> {1585  if (!derivedKey || retentionMs === 0) return 0;1586  const cutoff = Date.now() - retentionMs;1587  const before = entries.length;1588  entries = entries.filter((e) => !(e.deletedAt && e.deletedAt < cutoff));1589  const purged = before - entries.length;1590  if (purged > 0) await persistEntries();1591  return purged;1592}15931594export function queryDomain(domain: string): VaultEntry[] {1595  return domainIndex.get(domain) ?? [];1596}15971598export function getEntryById(id: string): VaultEntry | undefined {1599  return entries.find((entry) => entry.id === id && !entry.deletedAt);1600}16011602async function persistSlotA(1603  reason: VaultSnapshot["reason"] = "local_save",1604): Promise<StoredVault> {1605  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");16061607  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1608  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");16091610  // Snapshot the about-to-be-overwritten state BEFORE we mutate disk. Failures1611  // are swallowed by takeVaultSnapshot — history must never block a save.1612  await takeVaultSnapshot(reason);16131614  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured);1615  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKey, plaintext);16161617  // Preserve existing recovery escrow fields.1618  const nextSlotA: StoredVault = {1619    ...slotA,1620    nonce,1621    ciphertext,1622    tag,1623    // recovery_salt and recovery_wrapped_root_key are already set from loadSlot1624  };1625  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, nextSlotA);16261627  // When duress is not configured, keep slot B size-matched with slot A by1628  // regenerating its noise. When duress IS configured, leave slot B alone —1629  // we don't have the decoy key to re-encrypt it. This is a known trade-off.1630  if (!duressConfigured) {1631    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2));1632  }1633  await stampLocalVaultMutation();16341635  return nextSlotA;1636}16371638async function persistSlotB(): Promise<void> {1639  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");16401641  const slotB = await loadSlot(SLOT_B);1642  if (!slotB) throw new Error("missing slot B");16431644  // Decoy plaintext always reports duressConfigured=false — the decoy user1645  // sees a clean slate.1646  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, false);1647  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKey, plaintext);16481649  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, { ...slotB, nonce, ciphertext, tag });1650  await stampLocalVaultMutation();1651}16521653async function persistEntries(1654  reason: VaultSnapshot["reason"] = "local_save",1655): Promise<void> {1656  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");16571658  if (vaultMode === "decoy") {1659    await persistSlotB();1660  } else {1661    await persistSlotA(reason);1662  }1663  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1664}16651666function cleanAdditionalUrls(values: string[] | undefined): string[] | undefined {1667  if (!Array.isArray(values)) return undefined;1668  const seen = new Set<string>();1669  const cleaned: string[] = [];1670  for (const value of values) {1671    const trimmed = typeof value === "string" ? value.trim() : "";1672    if (!trimmed) continue;1673    const key = trimmed.toLowerCase();1674    if (seen.has(key)) continue;1675    seen.add(key);1676    cleaned.push(trimmed);1677  }1678  return cleaned.length > 0 ? cleaned : undefined;1679}16801681function sanitizeEntryDraft(entry: EntryDraft): EntryDraft {1682  const title = entry.title.trim();1683  // Accept legacy `type:"passkey"` drafts but rewrite to "login" — the new1684  // model is "any entry, optionally with a passkey sub-object." Imports and1685  // any in-flight callers from before v2.11.0 keep working without throwing.1686  let type: VaultEntry["type"] = entry.type ?? "login";1687  if (type === "passkey") type = "login";16881689  if (!title) throw new Error("title is required");1690  // A login entry needs either a password or a passkey credential to be useful.1691  // Passkey-only entries (passkey present, no password) are valid.1692  if (type === "login" && !entry.password?.trim() && !entry.passkey) {1693    throw new Error("password or passkey required");1694  }1695  if (entry.passkey) {1696    const p = entry.passkey;1697    if (1698      !p.rpId ||1699      !p.credentialId ||1700      !p.publicKeyCose ||1701      !p.userHandle ||1702      !p.userName ||1703      (p.algorithm !== -7 && p.algorithm !== -8)1704    ) {1705      throw new Error("invalid passkey credential");1706    }1707  }1708  if (type === "card") {1709    if (!entry.cardholderName?.trim() || !entry.cardNumber?.trim()) {1710      throw new Error("cardholder name and card number are required");1711    }1712  }17131714  return {1715    type,1716    title,1717    username: type === "login" ? entry.username?.trim() ?? "" : undefined,1718    password: type === "login" ? entry.password : undefined,1719    url: type === "login" ? entry.url?.trim() ?? "" : undefined,1720    additionalUrls: type === "login" ? cleanAdditionalUrls(entry.additionalUrls) : undefined,1721    totp: type === "login" ? entry.totp?.trim() || undefined : undefined,1722    notes: entry.notes?.trim() || undefined,1723    breach: type === "login" ? entry.breach : undefined,1724    canary: type === "login" ? entry.canary : undefined,1725    tags: entry.tags,1726    passkey: entry.passkey,1727    cardholderName: type === "card" ? entry.cardholderName?.trim() : undefined,1728    cardNumber: type === "card" ? entry.cardNumber?.trim() : undefined,1729    expMonth: type === "card" ? entry.expMonth?.trim() : undefined,1730    expYear: type === "card" ? entry.expYear?.trim() : undefined,1731    cvc: type === "card" ? entry.cvc?.trim() : undefined,1732    cardNickname: type === "card" ? entry.cardNickname?.trim() || undefined : undefined,1733    network: type === "card" ? entry.network : undefined,1734    last4: type === "card" ? entry.last4?.trim() : undefined,1735  };1736}17371738function sanitizeEntryPatch(patch: Partial<VaultEntry>): Partial<VaultEntry> {1739  const nextPatch: Partial<VaultEntry> = {};17401741  if ("type" in patch) {1742    nextPatch.type = patch.type;1743  }17441745  if ("title" in patch) {1746    const title = patch.title?.trim() ?? "";1747    if (!title) throw new Error("title is required");1748    nextPatch.title = title;1749  }17501751  if ("url" in patch) {1752    nextPatch.url = patch.url?.trim() ?? "";1753  }17541755  if ("additionalUrls" in patch) {1756    const incoming = Array.isArray(patch.additionalUrls) ? patch.additionalUrls : [];1757    const seen = new Set<string>();1758    const cleaned: string[] = [];1759    for (const value of incoming) {1760      const trimmed = typeof value === "string" ? value.trim() : "";1761      if (!trimmed) continue;1762      const key = trimmed.toLowerCase();1763      if (seen.has(key)) continue;1764      seen.add(key);1765      cleaned.push(trimmed);1766    }1767    nextPatch.additionalUrls = cleaned.length > 0 ? cleaned : undefined;1768  }17691770  if ("username" in patch) {1771    nextPatch.username = patch.username?.trim() ?? "";1772  }17731774  if ("email" in patch) {1775    nextPatch.email = patch.email?.trim() || undefined;1776  }17771778  if ("password" in patch) {1779    const password = patch.password ?? "";1780    // Allow clearing a password (e.g. on passkey-only entries)1781    nextPatch.password = password || undefined;1782  }17831784  if ("totp" in patch) {1785    nextPatch.totp = patch.totp?.trim() || undefined;1786  }17871788  if ("notes" in patch) {1789    nextPatch.notes = patch.notes?.trim() || undefined;1790  }17911792  if ("breach" in patch) {1793    nextPatch.breach = patch.breach;1794  }17951796  if ("canary" in patch) {1797    nextPatch.canary = patch.canary;1798  }17991800  if ("passkey" in patch) {1801    // Passkey sub-object replaces all the legacy flat passkey fields. A1802    // patch with `passkey: undefined` removes the credential from the entry1803    // (used by "remove passkey" without deleting the whole entry).1804    nextPatch.passkey = patch.passkey;1805  }18061807  if ("tags" in patch) {1808    nextPatch.tags = patch.tags;1809  }18101811  if ("cardholderName" in patch) {1812    nextPatch.cardholderName = patch.cardholderName?.trim() || undefined;1813  }1814  if ("cardNumber" in patch) {1815    const n = patch.cardNumber ?? "";1816    nextPatch.cardNumber = n || undefined;1817  }1818  if ("expMonth" in patch) {1819    nextPatch.expMonth = patch.expMonth?.trim() || undefined;1820  }1821  if ("expYear" in patch) {1822    nextPatch.expYear = patch.expYear?.trim() || undefined;1823  }1824  if ("cvc" in patch) {1825    nextPatch.cvc = patch.cvc?.trim() || undefined;1826  }1827  if ("cardNickname" in patch) {1828    nextPatch.cardNickname = patch.cardNickname?.trim() || undefined;1829  }1830  if ("network" in patch) {1831    nextPatch.network = patch.network;1832  }1833  if ("last4" in patch) {1834    nextPatch.last4 = patch.last4?.trim() || undefined;1835  }18361837  return nextPatch;1838}18391840function normalizeEntry(entry: VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry): VaultEntry {1841  const createdAt = "createdAt" in entry ? entry.createdAt : entry.created;1842  const modifiedAt =1843    "modifiedAt" in entry ? entry.modifiedAt : entry.updated;18441845  const base: VaultEntry = {1846    id: entry.id,1847    type: "type" in entry ? entry.type : "login",1848    title: entry.title,1849    username: entry.username,1850    password: entry.password,1851    url: entry.url,1852    totp: entry.totp,1853    notes: entry.notes,1854    breach: entry.breach,1855    canary: "canary" in entry ? entry.canary : undefined,1856    passkey: "passkey" in entry ? entry.passkey : undefined,1857    createdAt,1858    modifiedAt,1859    deletedAt: entry.deletedAt,1860    tags: "tags" in entry ? entry.tags : undefined,1861    cardholderName: "cardholderName" in entry ? entry.cardholderName : undefined,1862    cardNumber: "cardNumber" in entry ? entry.cardNumber : undefined,1863    expMonth: "expMonth" in entry ? entry.expMonth : undefined,1864    expYear: "expYear" in entry ? entry.expYear : undefined,1865    cvc: "cvc" in entry ? entry.cvc : undefined,1866    cardNickname: "cardNickname" in entry ? entry.cardNickname : undefined,1867    network: "network" in entry ? entry.network : undefined,1868    last4: "last4" in entry ? entry.last4 : undefined,1869  };18701871  return migrateLegacyPasskey(base, entry);1872}18731874/**1875 * v2.11.0 read migration. Pre-v2.11.0 passkey entries used `type:"passkey"`1876 * with flat top-level fields (rpId, credentialId, etc.). This converts them1877 * to the new shape — `type:"login"` with a `passkey` sub-object — so all1878 * downstream consumers can rely on the new model. The result is rewritten1879 * to disk on next vault save (hasLegacyShape detects the un-migrated case).1880 */1881function migrateLegacyPasskey(1882  base: VaultEntry,1883  raw: VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry1884): VaultEntry {1885  if (base.passkey) return base;1886  const flat = raw as Partial<VaultEntry>;1887  const isPasskeyType = base.type === "passkey";1888  const hasFlatPasskeyFields =1889    typeof flat.rpId === "string" &&1890    typeof flat.credentialId === "string" &&1891    typeof flat.publicKeyCose === "string" &&1892    typeof flat.userHandle === "string" &&1893    typeof flat.userName === "string";1894  if (!isPasskeyType && !hasFlatPasskeyFields) return base;1895  if (!hasFlatPasskeyFields) return base;18961897  const algorithm: -7 | -8 = flat.algorithm === -8 ? -8 : -7;1898  base.passkey = {1899    rpId: flat.rpId!,1900    rpName: flat.rpName ?? flat.rpId!,1901    credentialId: flat.credentialId!,1902    publicKeyCose: flat.publicKeyCose!,1903    privateKeyJwk: flat.privateKeyJwk,1904    userHandle: flat.userHandle!,1905    userName: flat.userName!,1906    userDisplayName: flat.userDisplayName ?? flat.userName!,1907    algorithm,1908    signCount: flat.signCount ?? 0,1909    aaguid: flat.aaguid ?? "",1910    backupEligible: flat.backupEligible === true,1911    backupState: flat.backupState === true,1912    lastUsedAt: flat.lastUsedAt,1913    browser: flat.browser,1914    transports: flat.transports,1915    createdAt: base.createdAt,1916  };1917  // Promote to "login" so the unified Entry view renders. Username gets1918  // populated from the passkey's userName so the entry is searchable in the1919  // existing autofill flow without a separate code path.1920  if (isPasskeyType) base.type = "login";1921  if (!base.username) base.username = flat.userName;1922  if (!base.url) base.url = `https://${flat.rpId}`;1923  return base;1924}192519261927// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------1928// Deduplication1929// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------19301931function entryDupeKey(e: VaultEntry): string {1932  if (e.type === "note") return `note|${e.title.toLowerCase()}`;1933  // Passkey-bearing entries dedupe by the credential's RP + user. Two logins1934  // on different sites that happen to share a username are still distinct;1935  // two passkey credentials for the same RP+user are duplicates regardless1936  // of any login fields they may also carry.1937  if (e.passkey) {1938    return `passkey|${e.passkey.rpId.toLowerCase()}|${e.passkey.userName.toLowerCase()}`;1939  }1940  return `login|${e.title.toLowerCase()}|${(e.url ?? "").toLowerCase()}|${(e.username ?? "").toLowerCase()}`;1941}19421943/** Returns the number of duplicate entries (those that would be removed). */1944export function countDuplicates(): number {1945  const best = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();1946  let dupeCount = 0;1947  for (const e of entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt)) {1948    const key = entryDupeKey(e);1949    const existing = best.get(key);1950    if (!existing) {1951      best.set(key, e);1952    } else {1953      dupeCount++;1954      // Keep the more recently modified one in the map1955      if ((e.modifiedAt ?? e.createdAt ?? 0) > (existing.modifiedAt ?? existing.createdAt ?? 0)) {1956        best.set(key, e);1957      }1958    }1959  }1960  return dupeCount;1961}19621963/**1964 * Soft-deletes duplicate entries, keeping the most recently modified copy of1965 * each group. Returns the number of entries moved to trash.1966 */1967export async function deduplicateEntries(): Promise<number> {1968  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");1969  // Dedup reshapes slot B permanently under the decoy key, which is1970  // forensically distinguishable from a freshly-seeded decoy vault. Refuse.1971  if (vaultMode === "decoy") {1972    throw new Error("deduplicate disabled in decoy mode");1973  }19741975  const best = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();1976  for (const e of entries.filter((en) => !en.deletedAt)) {1977    const key = entryDupeKey(e);1978    const existing = best.get(key);1979    if (!existing) {1980      best.set(key, e);1981    } else if ((e.modifiedAt ?? e.createdAt ?? 0) > (existing.modifiedAt ?? existing.createdAt ?? 0)) {1982      best.set(key, e);1983    }1984  }19851986  const keepIds = new Set(Array.from(best.values()).map((e) => e.id));1987  const now = Date.now();1988  let removed = 0;1989  entries = entries.map((e) => {1990    if (!e.deletedAt && !keepIds.has(e.id)) {1991      removed++;1992      return { ...e, deletedAt: now };1993    }1994    return e;1995  });19961997  if (removed > 0) await persistEntries();1998  return removed;1999}20002001// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------2002// Vault history — snapshot BEFORE every vault write so the saved blob is2003// what is about to be lost, not what was just written. Capped at 10. The2004// stored blobs are AES-256-GCM ciphertext under the master password, so2005// history adds zero security surface.2006// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------20072008const HISTORY_KEY = "peach_vault_history";2009const HISTORY_MAX = 10;20102011/**2012 * Snapshot the CURRENT on-disk vault state into history. Call this BEFORE2013 * overwriting peach_vault_a so the saved blob captures the about-to-be-lost2014 * state. Identical-to-most-recent blobs are skipped to avoid filling history2015 * with no-op writes.2016 */2017export async function takeVaultSnapshot(2018  reason: VaultSnapshot["reason"],2019): Promise<void> {2020  try {2021    const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get([SLOT_A, SLOT_B, HISTORY_KEY]);2022    const slotA = (raw as Record<string, StoredVault | undefined>)[SLOT_A];2023    const slotB = (raw as Record<string, StoredVault | undefined>)[SLOT_B];20242025    // Nothing to snapshot if the real slot doesn't exist yet (fresh install,2026    // pre-createVault). createVault skips snapshots intentionally — there is2027    // no prior state to preserve.2028    if (!slotA) return;20292030    const vault_a = JSON.stringify(slotA);2031    const vault_b = JSON.stringify(slotB ?? slotA);20322033    // Best-effort entry count: only meaningful when the in-memory state is2034    // unlocked AND in real mode. Decoy mode would leak the decoy entry2035    // count; locked mode has no entries to count. Both fall through to null.2036    let entryCount: number | null = null;2037    if (derivedKey && vaultMode === "real") {2038      try {2039        entryCount = entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt).length;2040      } catch {2041        entryCount = null;2042      }2043    }20442045    const existingRaw = (raw as Record<string, VaultHistory | undefined>)[HISTORY_KEY];2046    const history: VaultHistory = existingRaw && Array.isArray(existingRaw.snapshots)2047      ? existingRaw2048      : { snapshots: [] };20492050    // Deduplication: if the most recent snapshot has byte-identical blobs,2051    // skip — saves the same vault N times in a row would otherwise burn the2052    // entire history window with no recovery value.2053    const latest = history.snapshots[0];2054    if (latest && latest.vault_a === vault_a && latest.vault_b === vault_b) {2055      return;2056    }20572058    const snapshot: VaultSnapshot = {2059      id: crypto.randomUUID(),2060      savedAt: Date.now(),2061      reason,2062      vault_a,2063      vault_b,2064      entryCount,2065    };20662067    history.snapshots = [snapshot, ...history.snapshots].slice(0, HISTORY_MAX);2068    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [HISTORY_KEY]: history });2069  } catch {2070    // Non-fatal — history must never block a save. A failed snapshot just2071    // means the user loses one rung of the safety ladder for this write.2072  }2073}20742075/** Wipe all vault history. Called by Panic / DESTROY_VAULT. */2076export async function clearVaultHistory(): Promise<void> {2077  try {2078    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [HISTORY_KEY]: { snapshots: [] } satisfies VaultHistory });2079  } catch {2080    // Non-fatal — DESTROY_VAULT also runs storage.local.clear().2081  }2082}20832084/** Read all snapshots, newest first, for the Settings vault history view. */2085export async function getVaultHistory(): Promise<VaultSnapshot[]> {2086  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get(HISTORY_KEY);2087  const history = (raw as Record<string, VaultHistory | undefined>)[HISTORY_KEY];2088  if (!history || !Array.isArray(history.snapshots)) return [];2089  return history.snapshots;2090}20912092/**2093 * Replace the on-disk vault with the chosen snapshot's blobs and lock the2094 * vault. The current state is itself snapshotted with reason 'restore' first2095 * so the restore is reversible. After this returns, the user must unlock2096 * with the password that matches the restored blob.2097 */2098export async function restoreVaultSnapshot(2099  snapshotId: string,2100): Promise<{ ok: true } | { ok: false; error: string }> {2101  const history = await getVaultHistory();2102  const snapshot = history.find((s) => s.id === snapshotId);2103  if (!snapshot) return { ok: false, error: "snapshot_not_found" };21042105  // Snapshot the about-to-be-replaced current state so the restore is2106  // reversible. takeVaultSnapshot is no-op when the most recent entry is2107  // byte-identical, so a restore-of-a-restore stays clean.2108  await takeVaultSnapshot("restore");21092110  let restoredA: StoredVault;2111  let restoredB: StoredVault;2112  try {2113    restoredA = JSON.parse(snapshot.vault_a) as StoredVault;2114    restoredB = JSON.parse(snapshot.vault_b) as StoredVault;2115  } catch {2116    return { ok: false, error: "snapshot_corrupt" };2117  }21182119  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, restoredA);2120  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, restoredB);2121  await stampLocalVaultMutation();21222123  // Lock so the user must prove they can decrypt the restored blob. If they2124  // restored a pre-password-change snapshot they discover it immediately at2125  // the lock screen rather than silently holding an inaccessible vault.2126  lock();21272128  return { ok: true };2129}21302131/**2132 * Change the master password. Re-encrypts slot A with a fresh salt + new2133 * derived key. Slot B (duress or noise) is left untouched when duress is2134 * configured — it uses an independent key derived from the duress password —2135 * and regenerated as noise when duress is not configured.2136 */2137export async function changePassword(2138  currentPassword: string,2139  newPassword: string2140): Promise<boolean> {2141  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") return false;21422143  // Verify current password before allowing any change2144  const valid = await verifyMainPassword(currentPassword);2145  if (!valid) return false;21462147  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);2148  if (!slotA) return false;2149  if (!rootKey) return false;21502151  // Derive fresh key from new password + new random salt2152  const newSalt = generateSalt();2153  const newKey = await deriveKey(newPassword, newSalt);21542155  // Re-encrypt the in-memory entries with the new key2156  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured);2157  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(newKey, plaintext);21582159  // Pre-wrap root key under the new derived key. Recovery fields wrap rootKey2160  // under recovery words and remain untouched — recovery phrase keeps working2161  // across password changes (H4/COR-002).2162  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(newKey, rootKey);21632164  const finalSlotA: StoredVault = {2165    ...slotA,2166    salt: hex(newSalt),2167    nonce,2168    ciphertext,2169    tag,2170    ...pwRoot,2171  };21722173  // Snapshot the OLD-key blob before overwriting it. If the user later2174  // restores from this snapshot they will need the OLD password — the2175  // post-restore lock surfaces that immediately.2176  await takeVaultSnapshot("local_save");21772178  // Single atomic write: ciphertext, salt, and pw_root_* fields all land in2179  // one storage transaction. An SW kill before this point leaves the old2180  // slot intact; after this point everything tied to the new password is2181  // already on disk together (M6/COR-004).2182  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, finalSlotA);21832184  // Swap the in-memory key synchronously before any further await. If we2185  // threw between the Slot A write and this swap, the next persistEntries()2186  // would overwrite Slot A with old-key ciphertext, locking the user out.2187  zeroKey(derivedKey);2188  derivedKey = newKey;21892190  // Regenerate noise for slot B when duress is not in use. Runs after the2191  // key swap so a failure here is a disposable noise regeneration, not a2192  // lockout.2193  if (!duressConfigured) {2194    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2));2195  }2196  await stampLocalVaultMutation();21972198  return true;2199}22002201// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------2202// Sync helpers2203// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------22042205export async function getVaultBlobForSync(): Promise<{2206  blob: string;2207  timestamp: number;2208  license?: string;2209} | null> {2210  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get([SLOT_A, SLOT_B, 'peach_last_modified_at', 'peach_license']);2211  const slotA = (raw as Record<string, unknown>)[SLOT_A];2212  if (!slotA) return null;2213  const slotB = (raw as Record<string, unknown>)[SLOT_B];2214  const blob = JSON.stringify({ a: slotA, b: slotB });2215  const rawTs = (raw as Record<string, unknown>)['peach_last_modified_at'];2216  const timestamp = typeof rawTs === 'string' ? parseInt(rawTs) : 0;2217  const license = (raw as Record<string, unknown>)['peach_license'];2218  return {2219    blob,2220    timestamp,2221    license: typeof license === 'string' ? license : undefined,2222  };2223}22242225export async function applyIncomingVault(2226  blobJson: string,2227  remoteTimestamp: number,2228  remoteLicense?: string,2229): Promise<boolean> {2230  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get('peach_last_modified_at');2231  const rawTs = (raw as Record<string, unknown>)['peach_last_modified_at'];2232  const localTimestamp = typeof rawTs === 'string' ? parseInt(rawTs) : 0;22332234  if (remoteLicense) {2235    const licenseRaw = await chrome.storage.local.get('peach_license');2236    const existing = (licenseRaw as Record<string, unknown>)['peach_license'];2237    if (!existing) {2238      await chrome.storage.local.set({ peach_license: remoteLicense });2239    }2240  }22412242  if (remoteTimestamp <= localTimestamp) return false;22432244  // Snapshot before overwriting — failure is non-fatal2245  await takeVaultSnapshot('sync_received').catch(() => {});22462247  const { a, b } = JSON.parse(blobJson) as { a: unknown; b?: unknown };2248  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, a as StoredVault);2249  if (b) await writeSlot(SLOT_B, b as StoredVault);2250  await chrome.storage.local.set({2251    peach_last_sync_at: String(Date.now()),2252    peach_last_modified_at: String(remoteTimestamp),2253  });22542255  return true;2256}22572258export async function getSyncIdentity(): Promise<{2259  privateKeyBytes: Uint8Array;2260  publicKeyBytes: Uint8Array;2261  publicKeyHex: string;2262}> {2263  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get('peach_sync_identity');2264  const stored = (raw as Record<string, unknown>)['peach_sync_identity'];2265  if (typeof stored === 'string') {2266    const { priv, pub } = JSON.parse(stored) as { priv: string; pub: string };2267    const privateKeyBytes = base64DecodeBytes(priv);2268    const publicKeyBytes = base64DecodeBytes(pub);2269    return { privateKeyBytes, publicKeyBytes, publicKeyHex: bytesToHex(publicKeyBytes) };2270  }22712272  // Generate a fresh X25519 keypair and persist it.2273  const { generateKeyPair } = await import('@stablelib/x25519');2274  const keypair = generateKeyPair();2275  await chrome.storage.local.set({2276    peach_sync_identity: JSON.stringify({2277      priv: base64EncodeBytes(keypair.secretKey),2278      pub: base64EncodeBytes(keypair.publicKey),2279    }),2280  });2281  return {2282    privateKeyBytes: keypair.secretKey,2283    publicKeyBytes: keypair.publicKey,2284    publicKeyHex: bytesToHex(keypair.publicKey),2285  };2286}22872288// Re-decrypt vault entries from storage using the current in-memory key.2289// Called after applyIncomingVault so the in-memory state stays consistent2290// with what was just written to storage.2291export async function reloadEntriesAfterSync(): Promise<boolean> {2292  if (!derivedKey) return false;2293  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);2294  if (!slotA) return false;2295  try {2296    const payload = await tryDecryptSlot(slotA, derivedKey);2297    if (!payload) return false;2298    entries = payload.entries;2299    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);2300    return true;2301  } catch {2302    return false;2303  }2304}23052306function bytesToHex(bytes: Uint8Array): string {2307  return Array.from(bytes).map(b => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('');2308}23092310function base64EncodeBytes(bytes: Uint8Array): string {2311  let binary = '';2312  for (let i = 0; i < bytes.length; i++) binary += String.fromCharCode(bytes[i]);2313  return btoa(binary);2314}23152316function base64DecodeBytes(b64: string): Uint8Array {2317  const binary = atob(b64);2318  const bytes = new Uint8Array(binary.length);2319  for (let i = 0; i < binary.length; i++) bytes[i] = binary.charCodeAt(i);2320  return bytes;2321}