vault.ts

1/**2 * vault.ts — sole owner of vault state and chrome.storage vault keys.3 *4 * Every read/write of `peach_vault_a`, `peach_vault_b`, and `peach_settings`5 * goes through this module. No other file accesses those keys directly.6 * External callers reach vault operations via `messages.ts` — never by7 * importing from here cross-boundary (popup/content must not). Invariants8 * for the two-slot schema, unlock timing, and key/disk atomicity are in9 * Projects.md §3.2–§3.6.10 */1112import { deriveKey, deriveKeyRaw, generateSalt } from "../crypto/argon2";13import { extractDomain } from "../shared/domain";14import { clampSyncTimestamp } from "../shared/sync-limits";15import { computeVaultId } from "../shared/sync-identity";16import { recordSyncAlerts, type SyncAlert } from "./sync-alerts";17// Static, not `await import()`: runtime import() throws in an MV3 service18// worker. Neither module imports vault.ts back, so there is no cycle to break.19import { triggerSyncIfReachable } from "./sync-trigger";20import { clearPairedDevices } from "./paired-devices";21import {22  rootKeyToWords,23  wordsToRootKeyMaterial,24  deriveRecoveryKey,25} from "../shared/recovery-words";26import type {27  AccentColorName,28  Canary,29  LegacyVaultEntry,30  ManualSummonRecord,31  PasskeyData,32  SavedIdentity,33  StoredVault,34  VaultEntry,35  VaultHistory,36  VaultSnapshot,37} from "../shared/types";38import { decrypt, encrypt, zeroKey } from "./aes";39import { clearAutoLock, touchAutoLock } from "./alarms";40import { setRecoveryConfirmPending } from "./recovery-pending";4142type EntryDraft = Omit<43  VaultEntry,44  "id" | "createdAt" | "modifiedAt" | "deletedAt"45>;4647// Slot-neutral storage keys (v1.4.24+). Both slots always exist; slot B48// either holds the decoy vault (when duress is configured) or random noise49// that looks identical at rest. No external indicator is stored — duress50// configuration is recorded only inside the encrypted payload of slot A.51const SLOT_A = "peach_vault_a";52const SLOT_B = "peach_vault_b";5354// Legacy keys, migrated away on first access.55const LEGACY_MAIN = "peach_vault";56const LEGACY_DECOY = "peach_decoy_vault";57const LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG = "peach_duress";5859// Plaintext is padded to the next multiple of this size before encryption.60// This coarsens ciphertext-length leakage into 1 KiB buckets.61const PAD_BLOCK = 1024;6263// How many past passwords to retain per entry. Generous enough to be useful as64// a recovery aid while bounding the secret material we hold (and the ciphertext65// growth) for an entry whose password is rotated frequently.66const PASSWORD_HISTORY_MAX = 50;6768// When duress is configured, BOTH slots are padded to this fixed ceiling so69// their ciphertext lengths are identical and cannot reveal that a hidden decoy70// vault exists (audit MEDIUM — plausible-deniability leak). 256 KiB comfortably71// holds a very large vault (thousands of entries incl. passkeys). The decoy72// slot can't be re-encrypted on every real-vault save (the real session has no73// decoy key), so a fixed ceiling — rather than size-matching on each write — is74// what keeps the two slots equal. A real vault whose plaintext exceeds this75// would grow past the ceiling and re-expose the bit; that is an extreme,76// documented edge well beyond normal use.77const DURESS_SLOT_SIZE = 262_144;7879let derivedKey: Uint8Array | null = null;80// 32-byte random root key, separate from the derivedKey used for vault encryption.81// The root key is wrapped (encrypted) under the recovery key derived from the82// 12-word phrase. When the user changes their password, only the wrapping changes;83// the root key and recovery words remain stable.84let rootKey: Uint8Array | null = null;85let entries: VaultEntry[] = [];86let domainIndex: Map<string, VaultEntry[]> = new Map();87let vaultMode: "real" | "decoy" = "real";88// Cached post-unlock view of whether the real vault records that duress is89// configured. Only meaningful after a real-mode unlock; for decoy-mode unlock90// this stays false because we never see slot A's plaintext.91let duressConfigured = false;9293let migrationRan = false;9495// Set to a corruption reason during the last unlock() attempt when both slots96// decrypted but failed schema validation. Consumed and cleared by97// consumeLastUnlockFailureReason() so messages.ts can surface vault_corrupted98// distinctly from wrong-password (M7/COR-007).99//100// NOTE: module-level state — if vault.ts is ever moved to a worker context,101// this must be replaced with a structured return value from unlock() or a102// postMessage channel. The signal is invisible across module-instance103// boundaries.104let lastUnlockFailureReason: string | null = null;105106export function consumeLastUnlockFailureReason(): string | null {107  const r = lastUnlockFailureReason;108  lastUnlockFailureReason = null;109  return r;110}111112// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------113// Settings (persisted inside the encrypted vault store as a sidecar key)114// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------115116export type TextSize = "small" | "medium" | "large";117118export interface VaultSettings {119  accentColor?: AccentColorName;120  theme?: "dark" | "light";121  autoLockMinutes?: number;122  clipboardClearSeconds?: number;123  lockOnClose?: boolean;124  breachMonitoring?: boolean;125  passkeyProviderEnabled?: boolean;126  trashRetentionDays?: number;127  manualSummonDomains?: Record<string, ManualSummonRecord>;128  declinedCardFingerprints?: string[];129  /**130   * Text size scale for body copy and entry titles. Stops at "large" by131   * design — XL clips dense screens (Vault, Health) inside the fixed132   * 330×480 popup surface.133   */134  textSize?: TextSize;135  /**136   * When true, all entrance/exit transitions and ambient animations are137   * collapsed to instant. Honoured alongside the user's OS-level138   * `prefers-reduced-motion`.139   */140  reduceMotion?: boolean;141  /**142   * Android-only: when true, the master key is escrowed in AndroidKeyStore143   * and the lock screen offers biometric unlock. Toggled from Settings →144   * Security → Biometrics. Has no effect on desktop builds.145   */146  biometricsEnabled?: boolean;147  /**148   * User overrides for keyboard shortcuts. Keys are ShortcutAction names149   * (see src/shared/shortcuts.ts). Missing actions fall through to150   * DEFAULT_BINDINGS — `getActiveBindings(settings.shortcuts)` is the151   * canonical lookup. Storing only the deltas keeps the vault payload152   * small and lets default updates land for users who never rebind.153   */154  shortcuts?: Record<string, { key: string; ctrl?: boolean; meta?: boolean; shift?: boolean; alt?: boolean }>;155}156157let settings: VaultSettings = {};158159export function getSettings(): VaultSettings {160  return settings;161}162163export async function ensureSettingsLoaded(): Promise<VaultSettings> {164  await loadSettings();165  return settings;166}167168export async function updateSettings(patch: Partial<VaultSettings>): Promise<void> {169  await loadSettings();170  // LV-7: cheap insurance against prototype pollution if a future caller ever171  // feeds parsed external JSON here (native spread keeps __proto__ an own-172  // property today, but Object.assign-style consumers and JSON revivers have173  // been burned before).174  const safe = Object.fromEntries(175    Object.entries(patch).filter(176      ([k]) => !["__proto__", "constructor", "prototype"].includes(k),177    ),178  ) as Partial<VaultSettings>;179  settings = { ...settings, ...safe };180  await persistSettings();181}182183async function persistSettings(): Promise<void> {184  try {185    await chrome.storage.local.set({ peach_settings: settings });186  } catch (err) {187    throw mapStorageError(err);188  }189}190191function mapStorageError(err: unknown): Error {192  const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);193  if (/QUOTA_BYTES|quota/i.test(message)) {194    return new Error("STORAGE_QUOTA_EXCEEDED");195  }196  return err instanceof Error ? err : new Error(message);197}198199async function loadSettings(): Promise<void> {200  const result = await chrome.storage.local.get("peach_settings");201  settings = (result as { peach_settings?: VaultSettings }).peach_settings ?? {};202}203204// Fire-and-forget sync trigger after a committed vault write. A failure here205// must never fail the write that caused it.206function fireSyncTrigger(reason: "vault_change"): void {207  void Promise.resolve()208    .then(() => triggerSyncIfReachable({ reason }))209    .catch(() => {210      /* no sync runner registered, or nothing reachable — non-fatal */211    });212}213214// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------215// HIBP breach check (k-anonymity model)216// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------217218export async function checkBreach(password: string): Promise<number> {219  // HIBP k-anonymity API is keyed on SHA-1 prefixes — this is dictated by220  // the public API, not a security choice. Do not migrate to SHA-256 here.221  const encoder = new TextEncoder();222  const hashBuffer = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-1", encoder.encode(password));223  const hashHex = Array.from(new Uint8Array(hashBuffer))224    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))225    .join("")226    .toUpperCase();227228  const prefix = hashHex.slice(0, 5);229  const suffix = hashHex.slice(5);230231  try {232    // PCH-02-007: request HIBP response padding so response length does not233    // reveal how many suffixes a queried prefix returned.234    const res = await fetch(`https://api.pwnedpasswords.com/range/${prefix}`, {235      headers: { "Add-Padding": "true" },236    });237    if (!res.ok) return 0;238    const text = await res.text();239    const match = text.split("\r\n").find((l) => l.startsWith(suffix));240    return match ? parseInt(match.split(":")[1], 10) : 0;241  } catch {242    return 0; // Network unavailable — don't block243  }244}245246export async function declineCardSaveOffer(last4: string, expMonth: string, expYear: string): Promise<void> {247  const fingerprint = await cardFingerprint(last4, expMonth, expYear);248  await loadSettings();249  settings = {250    ...settings,251    declinedCardFingerprints: [...(settings.declinedCardFingerprints ?? []), fingerprint],252  };253  await persistSettings();254}255256export async function isCardDeclined(last4: string, expMonth: string, expYear: string): Promise<boolean> {257  await loadSettings();258  const fingerprint = await cardFingerprint(last4, expMonth, expYear);259  return (settings.declinedCardFingerprints ?? []).includes(fingerprint);260}261262async function cardFingerprint(last4: string, expMonth: string, expYear: string): Promise<string> {263  const encoder = new TextEncoder();264  const buf = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", encoder.encode(`${last4}|${expMonth}|${expYear}`));265  return Array.from(new Uint8Array(buf).slice(0, 8))266    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))267    .join("");268}269270function hex(buf: Uint8Array): string {271  return Array.from(buf)272    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))273    .join("");274}275276function unhex(s: string): Uint8Array {277  const out = new Uint8Array(s.length / 2);278  for (let i = 0; i < s.length; i += 2) {279    out[i / 2] = parseInt(s.slice(i, i + 2), 16);280  }281  return out;282}283284// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------285// Root key generation and recovery word wrapping286// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------287288/**289 * Generate a random 32-byte root key and wrap it (AES-256-GCM) under a key290 * derived from the recovery word material via HKDF-SHA256. The wrapped blob291 * fields are stored in slot A alongside the password-wrapped ciphertext. The292 * root key itself is kept in memory for the session so getRecoveryWords() can293 * encode it without re-deriving.294 *295 * SECURITY MODEL (PCH-01-005): the recovery KEK is derived from the 12-word296 * material, which encodes only rootKey[0..16] (recovery-words.ts). The KEK is thus297 * derived from a PREFIX of the very plaintext it wraps, and effective recovery298 * security is 128-bit (standard for a 12-word phrase), NOT 256-bit. This is safe —299 * unwrapping requires the words, and the GCM ciphertext leaks nothing without them —300 * but it is intentional, not an oversight. A future escrow version wanting 256-bit301 * recovery must derive the words from INDEPENDENT entropy, not from the root key.302 */303async function generateAndWrapRootKey(): Promise<{304  rawRootKey: string; // hex of the plaintext root key — caller stores in rootKey305  recoverySalt: string;306  wrappedRootKey: string;307  wrappedNonce: string;308  wrappedTag: string;309}> {310  const rootKeyBytes = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32));311312  // Derive the recovery key from the BIP39 words encoding of the root key.313  const words = await rootKeyToWords(rootKeyBytes);314  const wordMaterial = await wordsToRootKeyMaterial(words);315  const recoverySalt = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));316  const recoveryKey = await deriveRecoveryKey(wordMaterial, recoverySalt);317318  // Wrap the root key with the recovery key using AES-256-GCM directly.319  // We hex-encode rootKeyBytes so the plaintext is always valid UTF-8.320  const nonce = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));321  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(hex(rootKeyBytes));322  const raw = await crypto.subtle.encrypt(323    {324      name: "AES-GCM",325      iv: nonce,326      additionalData: new Uint8Array([1]).buffer as ArrayBuffer,327      tagLength: 128,328    },329    recoveryKey,330    encoded331  );332  // WebCrypto returns ciphertext || auth tag concatenated; split them.333  const rawU8 = new Uint8Array(raw);334  const ciphertext = hex(rawU8.slice(0, rawU8.length - 16));335  const tag = hex(rawU8.slice(rawU8.length - 16));336337  return {338    rawRootKey: hex(rootKeyBytes),339    recoverySalt: hex(recoverySalt),340    wrappedRootKey: ciphertext,341    wrappedNonce: hex(nonce),342    wrappedTag: tag,343  };344}345346async function wrapExistingRootKeyForRecovery(rootKeyBytes: Uint8Array): Promise<{347  recoverySalt: string;348  wrappedRootKey: string;349  wrappedNonce: string;350  wrappedTag: string;351}> {352  if (rootKeyBytes.length !== 32) {353    throw new Error("ADOPT_INVALID_ROOT_KEY: expected 32 bytes");354  }355356  const words = await rootKeyToWords(rootKeyBytes);357  const wordMaterial = await wordsToRootKeyMaterial(words);358  const recoverySalt = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));359  const recoveryKey = await deriveRecoveryKey(wordMaterial, recoverySalt);360  const nonce = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));361  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(hex(rootKeyBytes));362  const raw = await crypto.subtle.encrypt(363    {364      name: "AES-GCM",365      iv: nonce,366      additionalData: new Uint8Array([1]).buffer as ArrayBuffer,367      tagLength: 128,368    },369    recoveryKey,370    encoded,371  );372  const rawU8 = new Uint8Array(raw);373  return {374    recoverySalt: hex(recoverySalt),375    wrappedRootKey: hex(rawU8.slice(0, rawU8.length - 16)),376    wrappedNonce: hex(nonce),377    wrappedTag: hex(rawU8.slice(rawU8.length - 16)),378  };379}380381/**382 * Unwrap the root key using recovery words. Called during recovery flow when383 * the user provides their 12-word phrase and a new password.384 * Exported for use by the RECOVER_WITH_WORDS message handler.385 */386export async function unwrapRootKeyForRecovery(387  wrappedRootKey: string,388  wrappedNonce: string,389  wrappedTag: string,390  recoverySaltHex: string,391  words: string[]392): Promise<void> {393  const wordMaterial = await wordsToRootKeyMaterial(words);394  const recoverySalt = unhex(recoverySaltHex);395  const recoveryKey = await deriveRecoveryKey(wordMaterial, recoverySalt);396397  // Decrypt and cache the root key. The root key bytes were hex-encoded before398  // encryption so the ciphertext is valid UTF-8. We inline the AES-GCM decrypt399  // here to avoid passing a CryptoKey to the string-based encrypt/decrypt helpers.400  // Each component is stored separately in the vault slot; decode them individually401  // so the nonce is always exactly the 12 bytes from wrappedNonce.402  const nonceRaw = unhex(wrappedNonce);403  const ciphertextRaw = unhex(wrappedRootKey);404  const tagRaw = unhex(wrappedTag);405  // Combine ciphertext and tag for AES-GCM (expects ciphertext||tag).406  // Use explicit ArrayBuffer allocations to satisfy TS BufferSource constraints.407  const nonceU8 = nonceRaw as unknown as Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>;408  const combined = new Uint8Array(ciphertextRaw.length + tagRaw.length);409  combined.set(ciphertextRaw, 0);410  combined.set(tagRaw, ciphertextRaw.length);411  const raw = await crypto.subtle.decrypt(412    { name: "AES-GCM", iv: nonceU8, additionalData: new Uint8Array([1]).buffer as ArrayBuffer, tagLength: 128 },413    recoveryKey,414    combined415  );416  const decryptedHex = new TextDecoder().decode(raw);417  rootKey = unhex(decryptedHex);418}419420/**421 * Re-wrap the cached root key under a new derived key (from the user's new422 * password). Called after password change and after recovery re-key so the423 * same recovery words continue to work with the updated password — and so424 * subsequent unlocks can rehydrate rootKey via deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey.425 *426 * recovery_* fields are intentionally not touched: those wrap rootKey under427 * the recovery words, which do not change when the password changes.428 */429export async function rewrapRootKeyForPassword(430  newDerivedKey: Uint8Array,431  _newSalt: Uint8Array432): Promise<void> {433  if (!rootKey) throw new Error("root key not set");434  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);435  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");436  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(newDerivedKey, rootKey);437  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, { ...slotA, ...pwRoot });438}439440/**441 * Change the vault encryption to a new derived key (already derived from442 * the user's new password). Used by RECOVER_WITH_WORDS and changePassword.443 * Caller is responsible for key swap and snapshot.444 */445async function reencryptVaultForNewKey(446  newKey: Uint8Array,447  slotA: StoredVault448): Promise<void> {449  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured, duressConfigured ? DURESS_SLOT_SIZE : 0);450  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(newKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");451  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, {452    ...slotA,453    nonce,454    ciphertext,455    tag,456  });457}458459/**460 * Full password change with an already-derived key (used after recovery).461 * Unlike changePassword(), this skips re-verification of current password462 * since recovery flow has already validated the user's identity via words.463 */464export async function changePasswordWithNewKey(465  newSalt: Uint8Array,466  newKey: Uint8Array467): Promise<void> {468  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);469  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");470  // reencryptVaultForNewKey must receive the updated salt so that subsequent471  // UNLOCK calls with the new password can re-derive the correct key.472  await reencryptVaultForNewKey(newKey, { ...slotA, salt: hex(newSalt) });473  if (derivedKey) zeroKey(derivedKey);474  derivedKey = newKey;475  // PCH-01-008: re-escrow the new key (see changePassword). The recovery flow476  // reaches this path, so a post-recovery SW restart would otherwise lock out477  // a user who just reset their password.478  void saveSessionKey(newKey, "real");479  // Refresh pw_root_* under the new key so deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey works480  // on the next unlock (H2/COR-006). If rootKey is missing — recovery flow481  // should have populated it — fall back silently rather than blowing up the482  // recovery path; migrateToRecovery will rehydrate on the next unlock.483  if (rootKey) {484    const slotAfter = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);485    if (slotAfter) {486      const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(newKey, rootKey);487      await writeSlot(SLOT_A, { ...slotAfter, ...pwRoot });488    }489  }490  if (!duressConfigured) {491    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(slotA.ciphertext.length / 2));492  }493  await stampLocalVaultMutation();494}495496// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------497// Salt generation --- exported so the RECOVER_WITH_WORDS handler can derive498// a new key after password reset without re-importing the crypto module.499// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------500501export { deriveKey, generateSalt };502503export async function loadSlotA(): Promise<StoredVault | null> {504  return loadSlot(SLOT_A);505}506507/**508 * Recover the session root key by AES-GCM-decrypting the pw_root_* fields509 * (a second wrapping of the root key under the password-derived key). This510 * is what makes GET_RECOVERY_WORDS work across lock/unlock cycles without511 * the user re-entering their recovery phrase: the same root key bytes —512 * and therefore the same 12 words — survive every unlock.513 *514 * Returns null when the pw_root fields are absent (pre-v2.12 vault that515 * hasn't been migrated yet) or when decryption fails (wrong derived key,516 * tampered ciphertext). On null the caller should fall through to517 * migrateToRecovery() to populate the fields.518 */519async function deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(520  derivedKeyBytes: Uint8Array,521  slotA: StoredVault,522): Promise<Uint8Array | null> {523  if (!slotA.pw_root_ciphertext || !slotA.pw_root_nonce || !slotA.pw_root_tag) {524    return null;525  }526  try {527    const rootHex = await decrypt(528      derivedKeyBytes,529      slotA.pw_root_nonce,530      slotA.pw_root_ciphertext,531      slotA.pw_root_tag,532      "pw_root_v1",533    );534    return unhex(rootHex);535  } catch {536    return null;537  }538}539540// AES-GCM-wrap rootKey under derivedKey for the pw_root_* fields. Returns the541// hex-encoded ciphertext/nonce/tag triple ready to embed in StoredVault.542async function wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(543  derivedKeyBytes: Uint8Array,544  rootKeyBytes: Uint8Array,545): Promise<{ pw_root_ciphertext: string; pw_root_nonce: string; pw_root_tag: string }> {546  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKeyBytes, hex(rootKeyBytes), "pw_root_v1");547  return {548    pw_root_ciphertext: ciphertext,549    pw_root_nonce: nonce,550    pw_root_tag: tag,551  };552}553554/**555 * For vaults created before v2.12 (no recovery_salt/recovery_wrapped_root_key),556 * generate the root key, wrap it under the recovery words, and persist the557 * recovery escrow into slot A. The caller must show the recovery words to the558 * user before calling this — once called, those words are the vault's recovery559 * path. This runs once, on the first unlock of an upgraded vault.560 */561export async function migrateToRecovery(): Promise<void> {562  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {563    throw new Error("vault must be unlocked in real mode");564  }565  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);566  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");567  const hasRecoveryEscrow =568    !!slotA.recovery_salt && !!slotA.recovery_wrapped_root_key;569  const hasPwRoot = !!slotA.pw_root_ciphertext && !!slotA.pw_root_nonce;570  if (hasRecoveryEscrow && hasPwRoot) return; // already done571572  // If recovery escrow already exists but pw_root doesn't, we cannot recover573  // the original rootKey without the user's words. The least-surprising path574  // is to rotate to a fresh root key — the user's old recovery words become575  // invalid but we surface peach_recovery_pending so the popup re-presents576  // the words. The unlock-path callers all set that flag.577  const { rawRootKey, recoverySalt, wrappedRootKey, wrappedNonce, wrappedTag } =578    await generateAndWrapRootKey();579  rootKey = unhex(rawRootKey);580581  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(derivedKey, rootKey);582  const nextSlotA: StoredVault = {583    ...slotA,584    recovery_salt: recoverySalt,585    recovery_wrapped_root_key: wrappedRootKey,586    recovery_nonce: wrappedNonce,587    recovery_tag: wrappedTag,588    ...pwRoot,589  };590  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, nextSlotA);591  await stampLocalVaultMutation();592}593594/**595 * Returns the 12 recovery words for the current session's root key.596 * Must be called while the vault is unlocked. Throws if recovery has not597 * been set up (pre-v2.12 vault that hasn't migrated yet).598 */599export async function getRecoveryWords(): Promise<string[]> {600  if (!rootKey) {601    throw new Error("recovery not set up — vault may need migration");602  }603  return rootKeyToWords(rootKey);604}605606async function loadSlot(key: string): Promise<StoredVault | null> {607  const result = await chrome.storage.local.get(key);608  return (result as Record<string, StoredVault | undefined>)[key] ?? null;609}610611async function writeSlot(key: string, vault: StoredVault): Promise<void> {612  try {613    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [key]: vault });614  } catch (err) {615    throw mapStorageError(err);616  }617}618619async function commitCreatedVaultSlots(slotA: StoredVault, slotB: StoredVault): Promise<void> {620  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get("peach_last_modified_at");621  const previous = Number(622    (raw as Record<string, unknown>).peach_last_modified_at,623  );624  const next = Math.max(625    Date.now(),626    Number.isFinite(previous) ? previous + 1 : 0,627  );628  try {629    await chrome.storage.local.set({630      [SLOT_A]: slotA,631      [SLOT_B]: slotB,632      peach_last_modified_at: String(next),633    });634  } catch (err) {635    throw mapStorageError(err);636  }637}638639// Monotonic clock for per-entry modifiedAt / deletedAt timestamps. Guards the640// sync layer's last-write-wins merge against wall-clock regressions (NTP step,641// manual clock change, DST glitch): a backwards Date.now() must never produce642// an entry timestamp that's <= the entry's existing modifiedAt, or a genuine643// local edit would lose to a stale remote copy. The returned value is always644// strictly greater than both the entry's current modifiedAt and the previous645// call's result (SEV-2-E).646let lastEntryTimestamp = 0;647function monotonicEntryTimestamp(currentModifiedAt?: number): number {648  const base = Math.max(649    Date.now(),650    (currentModifiedAt ?? 0) + 1,651    lastEntryTimestamp + 1,652  );653  lastEntryTimestamp = base;654  return base;655}656657async function stampLocalVaultMutation(): Promise<void> {658  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get("peach_last_modified_at");659  const previous = Number(660    (raw as Record<string, unknown>).peach_last_modified_at,661  );662  const next = Math.max(663    Date.now(),664    Number.isFinite(previous) ? previous + 1 : 0,665  );666  await chrome.storage.local.set({667    peach_last_modified_at: String(next),668  });669}670671/**672 * One-shot migration from the pre-A-2 schema (peach_vault + peach_decoy_vault673 * + peach_duress flag) to the slot-neutral schema (peach_vault_a +674 * peach_vault_b). Runs at most once per session; safe to call repeatedly.675 */676async function ensureMigrated(): Promise<void> {677  if (migrationRan) return;678  migrationRan = true;679680  const keys = [LEGACY_MAIN, LEGACY_DECOY, LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG, SLOT_A, SLOT_B];681  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get(keys);682  const slotAExists = raw[SLOT_A] !== undefined;683  const slotBExists = raw[SLOT_B] !== undefined;684  const legacyMain = raw[LEGACY_MAIN] as StoredVault | undefined;685  const legacyDecoy = raw[LEGACY_DECOY] as StoredVault | undefined;686687  // Fresh install with nothing in storage — nothing to do; createVault() sets up both slots.688  if (!slotAExists && !legacyMain) return;689690  // Already migrated.691  if (slotAExists && slotBExists && !legacyMain && !legacyDecoy) return;692693  let didMigrate = false;694  if (legacyMain && !slotAExists) {695    await writeSlot(SLOT_A, legacyMain);696    didMigrate = true;697  }698699  // If slot B isn't set, populate it: use legacy decoy when present, else noise.700  if (!slotBExists) {701    const target = (legacyMain ?? raw[SLOT_A]) as StoredVault | undefined;702    if (legacyDecoy) {703      await writeSlot(SLOT_B, legacyDecoy);704      didMigrate = true;705    } else if (target) {706      await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(target.ciphertext.length / 2));707      didMigrate = true;708    }709  }710711  const toRemove: string[] = [];712  if (legacyMain) toRemove.push(LEGACY_MAIN);713  if (legacyDecoy) toRemove.push(LEGACY_DECOY);714  if (raw[LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG] !== undefined) toRemove.push(LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG);715  if (toRemove.length > 0) {716    await chrome.storage.local.remove(toRemove);717    didMigrate = true;718  }719  if (didMigrate) {720    await stampLocalVaultMutation();721  }722}723724// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------725// Padding + noise helpers726// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------727728/**729 * Pads the plaintext string with trailing spaces so that the encoded byte730 * length is a multiple of PAD_BLOCK. JSON.parse tolerates trailing731 * whitespace after a complete document, so the padding is transparent on732 * decode. Ciphertext length equals plaintext length plus a 16-byte tag.733 */734function padPlaintext(json: string, minBytes = 0): string {735  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(json);736  const bucket = Math.max(PAD_BLOCK, Math.ceil(encoded.length / PAD_BLOCK) * PAD_BLOCK);737  // minBytes lets the duress path force a fixed ceiling so both slots match.738  const target = Math.max(bucket, minBytes);739  const padLen = target - encoded.length;740  return json + " ".repeat(padLen);741}742743/**744 * Produces a StoredVault-shaped record filled with CSPRNG bytes. The745 * ciphertext length matches the given byte count. Because GCM ciphertext is746 * pseudo-random, this blob is indistinguishable at rest from a real747 * encrypted vault without the key.748 *749 * crypto.getRandomValues() caps each call at 65536 bytes (the Web Crypto750 * spec hard limit). Chunk the fill so vaults larger than that — common once751 * the user has dozens of entries or any passkey — don't throw.752 */753const CSPRNG_CHUNK = 65_536;754755function fillRandom(buf: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {756  for (let offset = 0; offset < buf.length; offset += CSPRNG_CHUNK) {757    const end = Math.min(offset + CSPRNG_CHUNK, buf.length);758    const chunk = new Uint8Array(end - offset);759    crypto.getRandomValues(chunk);760    buf.set(chunk, offset);761  }762  return buf;763}764765function generateNoiseBlob(ciphertextBytes: number): StoredVault {766  const salt = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));767  const nonce = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));768  const cipher = fillRandom(new Uint8Array(ciphertextBytes));769  const tag = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));770  return {771    version: 1,772    salt: hex(salt),773    nonce: hex(nonce),774    ciphertext: hex(cipher),775    tag: hex(tag),776  };777}778779// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------780// Encrypted plaintext envelope781// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------782783type VaultPayload = {784  entries: VaultEntry[];785  duressConfigured?: boolean;786};787788type DecryptedPayload = {789  entries: VaultEntry[];790  duressConfigured: boolean;791  /**792   * True when at least one entry in the on-disk payload had a legacy shape793   * (pre-v2.11.0 passkey type/flat fields, or pre-A-2 created/updated keys)794   * and got rewritten by normalizeEntry. The unlock path uses this to795   * persist the new shape immediately — without it, the migration would796   * re-run on every unlock and old shape never disappears from disk.797   */798  migratedFromLegacy: boolean;799};800801function encodePayload(entries: VaultEntry[], duress: boolean, minBytes = 0): string {802  const envelope: VaultPayload = { entries, duressConfigured: duress };803  return padPlaintext(JSON.stringify(envelope), minBytes);804}805806function rawNeedsMigration(raw: VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry): boolean {807  if ("created" in raw || "updated" in raw) return true;808  const flat = raw as Partial<VaultEntry>;809  if (flat.type === "passkey") return true;810  // Flat rpId without a passkey sub-object means pre-v2.11.0 schema.811  if (flat.rpId !== undefined && flat.passkey === undefined) return true;812  return false;813}814815function decodePayload(plain: string): DecryptedPayload {816  const parsed = JSON.parse(plain) as817    | Array<VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry>818    | VaultPayload;819820  const rawEntries = Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed : parsed.entries ?? [];821  const flatMigrationNeeded = rawEntries.some(rawNeedsMigration);822823  const normalized = rawEntries.map(normalizeEntry);824  const { merged } = mergePasskeyOnlyIntoLogins(normalized);825826  if (Array.isArray(parsed)) {827    return {828      entries: normalized,829      duressConfigured: false,830      migratedFromLegacy: true, // pre-A-2 array shape always needs save831    };832  }833834  return {835    entries: normalized,836    duressConfigured: parsed.duressConfigured === true,837    migratedFromLegacy: flatMigrationNeeded || merged,838  };839}840841/**842 * One-time consolidation pass run alongside the legacy passkey migration.843 *844 * Pre-v2.11.0 the Chrome passkey path always created a fresh `type:"passkey"`845 * entry per registration — so users who tested registration multiple times846 * accumulated several passkey-bearing entries for the same RP, and the847 * migration to the unified shape carried that duplication forward. This848 * pass collapses the duplicates:849 *850 *   1. Group passkey-bearing (and not deleted) entries by `passkey.rpId`.851 *   2. Within each group, the most recently-active credential wins (prefer852 *      lastUsedAt, fall back to passkey.createdAt, fall back to modifiedAt).853 *   3. If a NON-passkey login entry exists for that RP (matched by url or854 *      additionalUrls hostname), attach the winning passkey to it and855 *      soft-delete every passkey-bearing entry in the group.856 *   4. Otherwise, soft-delete every loser in the group, keeping the winner857 *      as a passkey-only entry.858 *859 * Soft delete (deletedAt) rather than splice — the trash flow keeps the860 * record around for retention and the user can restore if the heuristic861 * picked wrong. The `merged` flag goes back to decodePayload so the862 * unlock path persists the consolidated shape immediately.863 */864function mergePasskeyOnlyIntoLogins(entries: VaultEntry[]): { merged: boolean } {865  let merged = false;866  const now = Date.now();867868  const candidates = entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt && e.passkey);869  const byRpId = new Map<string, VaultEntry[]>();870  for (const e of candidates) {871    const rpId = e.passkey!.rpId;872    const list = byRpId.get(rpId);873    if (list) list.push(e);874    else byRpId.set(rpId, [e]);875  }876877  for (const [rpId, group] of byRpId) {878    if (group.length === 0) continue;879    group.sort((a, b) => {880      const aT =881        a.passkey!.lastUsedAt ?? a.passkey!.createdAt ?? a.modifiedAt ?? a.createdAt;882      const bT =883        b.passkey!.lastUsedAt ?? b.passkey!.createdAt ?? b.modifiedAt ?? b.createdAt;884      return bT - aT;885    });886    const winner = group[0]!;887888    // Look for a NON-passkey login entry matching this RP. Use the URL889    // hostname rather than a substring search so a "login.foo.com" entry890    // doesn't accidentally absorb a passkey for "foo.com".891    const loginTarget = entries.find((e) => {892      if (e.deletedAt || e.passkey || e.type !== "login") return false;893      if (e.url && extractDomain(e.url) === rpId) return true;894      for (const extra of e.additionalUrls ?? []) {895        if (extractDomain(extra) === rpId) return true;896      }897      return false;898    });899900    if (loginTarget) {901      loginTarget.passkey = winner.passkey;902      loginTarget.modifiedAt = now;903      for (const dup of group) {904        if (!dup.deletedAt) {905          dup.deletedAt = now;906          dup.modifiedAt = now;907        }908      }909      merged = true;910    } else if (group.length > 1) {911      for (let i = 1; i < group.length; i += 1) {912        const dup = group[i]!;913        if (!dup.deletedAt) {914          dup.deletedAt = now;915          dup.modifiedAt = now;916        }917      }918      merged = true;919    }920  }921922  return { merged };923}924925// Validates that a `StoredVault` record on disk has the field shape we expect926// before treating an AES-GCM decrypt success as a clean unlock. AES-GCM only927// authenticates the static VERSION_BYTE AAD, not the `version` field on the928// outer record — a corrupted `version: 42` slot still decrypts cleanly. This929// check surfaces that as `corrupted` (M7/COR-007) so the popup can offer a930// history-restore path instead of falsely reporting "wrong password".931function hasValidVaultSchema(v: unknown): v is StoredVault {932  if (typeof v !== "object" || v === null) return false;933  const r = v as Record<string, unknown>;934  return (935    r.version === 1 &&936    typeof r.salt === "string" &&937    typeof r.nonce === "string" &&938    typeof r.ciphertext === "string" &&939    typeof r.tag === "string"940  );941}942943export type TryDecryptResult =944  | { status: "ok"; payload: DecryptedPayload }945  | { status: "wrong_key" }946  | { status: "corrupted"; reason: string };947948// Exported solely for `unlockFromCodex` below, which needs to verify a949// supplied passphrase against a slotA blob *without* committing anything to950// storage. Keep this internal otherwise — callers crossing the messages.ts951// boundary should always go through `unlock` / `verifyMainPassword` so the952// constant-time invariants in Projects.md §3.4 are not bypassed.953export async function tryDecryptSlot(954  vault: StoredVault,955  key: Uint8Array,956  aadTag?: string,957): Promise<DecryptedPayload | null> {958  const res = await tryDecryptSlotResult(vault, key, aadTag);959  return res.status === "ok" ? res.payload : null;960}961962export async function tryDecryptSlotResult(963  vault: StoredVault,964  key: Uint8Array,965  aadTag?: string,966): Promise<TryDecryptResult> {967  if (!hasValidVaultSchema(vault)) {968    return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_slot_schema" };969  }970  let plain: string;971  try {972    plain = await decrypt(key, vault.nonce, vault.ciphertext, vault.tag, aadTag);973  } catch {974    return { status: "wrong_key" };975  }976  try {977    const parsed = JSON.parse(plain) as unknown;978    if (typeof parsed !== "object" || parsed === null) {979      return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_payload_shape" };980    }981    if (!Array.isArray(parsed) && !Array.isArray((parsed as VaultPayload).entries)) {982      return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_payload_shape" };983    }984    return { status: "ok", payload: decodePayload(plain) };985  } catch {986    return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_payload_json" };987  }988}989990// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------991// Core operations992// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------993994function buildDomainIndexSync(all: VaultEntry[]): void {995  domainIndex = new Map();996997  for (const entry of all) {998    if (entry.deletedAt) continue;999    if (entry.type === "note" || entry.type === "card") continue;10001001    // An entry can match multiple sites via `additionalUrls`. Index each1002    // hostname so `queryDomain` returns the entry regardless of which alias1003    // the user is currently visiting. Dedupe per-entry so a single entry1004    // never appears twice in one bucket.1005    const domains = new Set<string>();1006    const primary = extractDomain(entry.url ?? "");1007    if (primary) domains.add(primary);1008    for (const extra of entry.additionalUrls ?? []) {1009      const d = extractDomain(extra);1010      if (d) domains.add(d);1011    }1012    if (domains.size === 0) continue;10131014    for (const domain of domains) {1015      const bucket = domainIndex.get(domain) ?? [];1016      bucket.push(entry);1017      domainIndex.set(domain, bucket);1018    }1019  }1020}10211022export async function createVault(password: string): Promise<void> {1023  await ensureMigrated();10241025  const salt = generateSalt();1026  derivedKey = await deriveKey(password, salt);1027  entries = [];1028  vaultMode = "real";1029  duressConfigured = false;1030  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);10311032  // Generate and wrap the root key for recovery word escrow.1033  const { rawRootKey, recoverySalt, wrappedRootKey, wrappedNonce, wrappedTag } =1034    await generateAndWrapRootKey();1035  rootKey = unhex(rawRootKey);10361037  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured, duressConfigured ? DURESS_SLOT_SIZE : 0);1038  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");10391040  // Second wrapping of rootKey under derivedKey so future unlocks can rehydrate1041  // it without recovery words (H2/COR-006).1042  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(derivedKey, rootKey);10431044  const slotA: StoredVault = {1045    version: 1,1046    salt: hex(salt),1047    nonce,1048    ciphertext,1049    tag,1050    recovery_salt: recoverySalt,1051    recovery_wrapped_root_key: wrappedRootKey,1052    recovery_nonce: wrappedNonce,1053    recovery_tag: wrappedTag,1054    ...pwRoot,1055  };1056  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, slotA);10571058  // Matching-size noise blob for slot B, so a fresh install shows two1059  // similarly-shaped records regardless of whether duress is ever set up.1060  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2));1061  await stampLocalVaultMutation();10621063  touchAutoLock();1064}10651066/**1067 * Creates a local vault from an existing vault root key received through the1068 * SAS-gated adoption protocol. The password is local to this device; it wraps1069 * the adopted root key at rest and does not need to match the source device.1070 */1071export async function createVaultFromRootKey(1072  password: string,1073  rootKeyHex: string,1074): Promise<{ vaultId: string }> {1075  if (typeof password !== "string" || password.length === 0) {1076    throw new Error("ADOPT_INVALID_PASSWORD");1077  }1078  if (typeof rootKeyHex !== "string" || !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(rootKeyHex)) {1079    throw new Error("ADOPT_INVALID_ROOT_KEY: expected 64 lowercase hex chars");1080  }10811082  const rootKeyBytes = unhex(rootKeyHex);1083  if (rootKeyBytes.length !== 32) {1084    rootKeyBytes.fill(0);1085    throw new Error("ADOPT_INVALID_ROOT_KEY: expected 32 bytes");1086  }10871088  let nextDerivedKey: Uint8Array | null = null;1089  let sessionRootKey: Uint8Array | null = null;1090  try {1091    await ensureMigrated();1092    if ((await loadSlot(SLOT_A)) !== null) {1093      throw new Error("ADOPT_VAULT_ALREADY_EXISTS");1094    }10951096    const nextEntries: VaultEntry[] = [];1097    const nextDuressConfigured = false;1098    const vaultId = await computeVaultId(rootKeyBytes);1099    const salt = generateSalt();1100    nextDerivedKey = await deriveKey(password, salt);1101    const recovery = await wrapExistingRootKeyForRecovery(rootKeyBytes);11021103    sessionRootKey = new Uint8Array(rootKeyBytes);1104    const plaintext = encodePayload(nextEntries, nextDuressConfigured, 0);1105    const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(nextDerivedKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");1106    const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(nextDerivedKey, sessionRootKey);1107    const slotA: StoredVault = {1108      version: 1,1109      salt: hex(salt),1110      nonce,1111      ciphertext,1112      tag,1113      recovery_salt: recovery.recoverySalt,1114      recovery_wrapped_root_key: recovery.wrappedRootKey,1115      recovery_nonce: recovery.wrappedNonce,1116      recovery_tag: recovery.wrappedTag,1117      ...pwRoot,1118    };1119    const slotB = generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2);1120    await commitCreatedVaultSlots(slotA, slotB);11211122    const previousDerivedKey = derivedKey;1123    const previousRootKey = rootKey;1124    derivedKey = nextDerivedKey;1125    rootKey = sessionRootKey;1126    nextDerivedKey = null;1127    sessionRootKey = null;1128    entries = nextEntries;1129    vaultMode = "real";1130    duressConfigured = nextDuressConfigured;1131    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1132    if (previousDerivedKey && previousDerivedKey !== derivedKey) zeroKey(previousDerivedKey);1133    if (previousRootKey && previousRootKey !== rootKey) previousRootKey.fill(0);1134    touchAutoLock();11351136    return { vaultId };1137  } finally {1138    rootKeyBytes.fill(0);1139    if (nextDerivedKey) zeroKey(nextDerivedKey);1140    if (sessionRootKey) sessionRootKey.fill(0);1141  }1142}11431144export async function hasVault(): Promise<boolean> {1145  await ensureMigrated();1146  return (await loadSlot(SLOT_A)) !== null;1147}11481149/**1150 * Returns whether the real vault has recorded that a duress passphrase is1151 * configured. Reliable only after a real-mode unlock — before unlock or in1152 * decoy mode, returns false because we cannot read slot A's plaintext.1153 */1154export async function isDuressEnabled(): Promise<boolean> {1155  return vaultMode === "real" && duressConfigured;1156}11571158export async function setupDuress(duressPassword: string): Promise<void> {1159  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {1160    throw new Error("vault must be unlocked in real mode");1161  }1162  await ensureMigrated();11631164  // Encrypt the decoy payload (empty entries) under the duress key. Pad to1165  // at least the current slot A ciphertext size so the two slots look the1166  // same at rest at setup time.1167  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1168  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");11691170  const decoySalt = generateSalt();1171  const decoyKey = await deriveKey(duressPassword, decoySalt);1172  try {1173    // Pad the decoy to the fixed duress ceiling. Slot A is re-encrypted to the1174    // same ceiling by the persistSlotA() call below (duressConfigured is now1175    // true), so both slots are exactly DURESS_SLOT_SIZE+tag at rest and their1176    // lengths cannot reveal that duress is configured (audit MEDIUM).1177    const plaintext = encodePayload([], false, DURESS_SLOT_SIZE);1178    const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(decoyKey, plaintext, "slot_b_v1");1179    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, {1180      version: 1,1181      salt: hex(decoySalt),1182      nonce,1183      ciphertext,1184      tag,1185    });1186  } finally {1187    zeroKey(decoyKey);1188  }11891190  // Re-encrypt slot A with the duressConfigured flag set to true. No external1191  // flag is written — the bit lives inside the encrypted envelope.1192  duressConfigured = true;1193  await persistSlotA();1194}11951196export async function disableDuress(): Promise<void> {1197  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {1198    throw new Error("vault must be unlocked in real mode");1199  }1200  await ensureMigrated();12011202  // Overwrite slot B with fresh noise that matches slot A's size. The slot1203  // remains occupied so its mere existence does not signal that duress was1204  // ever configured.1205  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1206  if (slotA) {1207    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(slotA.ciphertext.length / 2));1208  }12091210  duressConfigured = false;1211  await persistSlotA();1212}12131214// L14/COR-015: this function intentionally checks slot A (real vault) only.1215// A duress-mode user attempting changePassword is rejected earlier by the1216// vaultMode === 'decoy' check at changePassword. The real-vs-decoy1217// distinction here is by design — duress users cannot rotate the real1218// password by guessing it, and the asymmetry in error timing is acceptable1219// because duress mode is opt-in and the user knows their own decoy key.1220export async function verifyMainPassword(password: string): Promise<boolean> {1221  await ensureMigrated();1222  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1223  if (!slotA) return false;1224  const key = await deriveKey(password, unhex(slotA.salt));1225  try {1226    return (await tryDecryptSlot(slotA, key, "slot_a_v1")) !== null;1227  } finally {1228    zeroKey(key);1229  }1230}12311232export async function unlock(password: string): Promise<boolean> {1233  // LV-1: the normal path NFC-normalizes inside deriveKey. If that fails and1234  // the supplied password is not already in NFC form, the vault may have been1235  // sealed (pre-LV-1) with the raw, un-normalized bytes — retry with those.1236  if (await attemptUnlockWithDerive(password, deriveKey)) return true;12371238  const nfc = password.normalize("NFC");1239  if (password === nfc) return false; // ASCII/NFC password — no legacy form to try12401241  if (await attemptUnlockWithDerive(password, deriveKeyRaw)) {1242    // Heal: re-seal the real slot under the NFC-normalized key so every1243    // future unlock takes the normal path. Only the real vault is re-sealed;1244    // a non-NFC duress password keeps working through this fallback.1245    if (vaultMode === "real") {1246      try {1247        const newSalt = generateSalt();1248        const newKey = await deriveKey(password, newSalt);1249        await changePasswordWithNewKey(newSalt, newKey);1250      } catch (healErr) {1251        console.warn("[Peach] LV-1 NFC heal failed:", healErr);1252      }1253    }1254    return true;1255  }1256  return false;1257}12581259async function attemptUnlockWithDerive(1260  password: string,1261  derive: typeof deriveKey,1262): Promise<boolean> {1263  await ensureMigrated();12641265  // Load both slots in parallel. Both always exist post-migration; the1266  // parallel load and the parallel derivation below keep wall-clock time1267  // constant regardless of which slot's passphrase (real or decoy) the1268  // caller supplied, so a timing side channel cannot distinguish the1269  // duress path from the real-unlock path (DUR-002).1270  const [slotA, slotB] = await Promise.all([1271    loadSlot(SLOT_A),1272    loadSlot(SLOT_B),1273  ]);12741275  // Derive both keys in parallel, unconditionally.1276  const [keyA, keyB] = await Promise.all([1277    slotA ? derive(password, unhex(slotA.salt)) : Promise.resolve(null),1278    slotB ? derive(password, unhex(slotB.salt)) : Promise.resolve(null),1279  ]);12801281  // Attempt both decrypts in parallel. The Result variant lets us distinguish1282  // 'wrong_key' from 'corrupted' so callers can offer a history-restore path1283  // when a slot's schema is invalid even though AES-GCM authenticated (M7).1284  const [resultA, resultB] = await Promise.all([1285    keyA && slotA1286      ? tryDecryptSlotResult(slotA, keyA, "slot_a_v1")1287      : Promise.resolve({ status: "wrong_key" } as TryDecryptResult),1288    keyB && slotB1289      ? tryDecryptSlotResult(slotB, keyB, "slot_b_v1")1290      : Promise.resolve({ status: "wrong_key" } as TryDecryptResult),1291  ]);1292  const payloadA = resultA.status === "ok" ? resultA.payload : null;1293  const payloadB = resultB.status === "ok" ? resultB.payload : null;12941295  if (payloadA && keyA) {1296    derivedKey = keyA;1297    void saveSessionKey(keyA, "real");1298    vaultMode = "real";1299    entries = payloadA.entries;1300    duressConfigured = payloadA.duressConfigured;1301    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1302    await loadSettings();1303    touchAutoLock();1304    if (keyB) zeroKey(keyB);13051306    // slotA is non-null when payloadA is truthy (keyA was derived from slotA).1307    if (slotA) {1308      const needsRecoverySetup =1309        !slotA.recovery_salt || !slotA.recovery_wrapped_root_key;1310      if (!needsRecoverySetup) {1311        rootKey = await deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(keyA, slotA);1312      }1313      // Pre-v2.12 vault, or a vault whose pw_root_* fields haven't been written1314      // yet: generate the recovery escrow and seed pw_root_* so subsequent1315      // unlocks can rehydrate rootKey without the user's recovery words.1316      // Best-effort — a failure here must not block unlock.1317      if (needsRecoverySetup || !rootKey) {1318        try {1319          await migrateToRecovery();1320          if (needsRecoverySetup) {1321            // String "1" matches the popup's existing peach_recovery_pending1322            // check; surfaced so the user re-confirms recovery words after a1323            // legacy-vault unlock (H2/COR-006).1324            await chrome.storage.local.set({ peach_recovery_pending: '1' });1325          }1326        } catch (migrationErr) {1327          console.warn('[Peach] recovery migration failed:', migrationErr);1328        }1329      }1330    }13311332    // If the payload had a pre-v2.11.0 shape (legacy passkey type, flat1333    // passkey fields, or pre-A-2 created/updated keys), rewrite it now so1334    // the next save uses the new format and migration doesn't re-run forever.1335    if (payloadA.migratedFromLegacy) {1336      await persistSlotA();1337    }1338    return true;1339  }13401341  if (payloadB && keyB) {1342    derivedKey = keyB;1343    void saveSessionKey(keyB, "decoy");1344    vaultMode = "decoy";1345    entries = payloadB.entries;1346    duressConfigured = false;1347    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1348    await loadSettings();1349    touchAutoLock();1350    if (keyA) zeroKey(keyA);1351    return true;1352  }13531354  if (keyA) zeroKey(keyA);1355  if (keyB) zeroKey(keyB);1356  // Surface corruption (good AES tag, broken schema) distinctly from1357  // wrong-password so the popup can offer history-restore (M7/COR-007).1358  if (resultA.status === "corrupted") {1359    lastUnlockFailureReason = resultA.reason;1360  } else if (resultB.status === "corrupted") {1361    lastUnlockFailureReason = resultB.reason;1362  }1363  return false;1364}13651366// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------1367// MV3 service worker session key — survives SW restarts within a browser session1368// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------13691370// chrome.storage.session is cleared on browser close; survives SW restart.1371// Firefox does not implement it (persistent background script, no restart risk).1372const SESSION_KEY_STORAGE = "peach_session_dk";13731374async function saveSessionKey(key: Uint8Array, mode: "real" | "decoy"): Promise<void> {1375  if (!chrome.storage.session) return;1376  await chrome.storage.session.set({ [SESSION_KEY_STORAGE]: { keyHex: hex(key), mode } });1377}13781379async function clearSessionKey(): Promise<void> {1380  if (!chrome.storage.session) return;1381  await chrome.storage.session.remove(SESSION_KEY_STORAGE);1382}13831384/**1385 * On SW restart, re-derive all in-memory vault state from the session key1386 * stored in chrome.storage.session (set at unlock time, cleared on lock).1387 * Returns true if the vault was restored, false if no session key was found.1388 * No-ops if the vault is already unlocked.1389 */1390export async function restoreFromSession(): Promise<boolean> {1391  if (derivedKey !== null) return true;1392  if (!chrome.storage.session) return false;1393  const stored = await chrome.storage.session.get(SESSION_KEY_STORAGE);1394  const entry = stored[SESSION_KEY_STORAGE] as { keyHex: string; mode: "real" | "decoy" } | undefined;1395  if (!entry?.keyHex) return false;13961397  const key = unhex(entry.keyHex);1398  const slotKey = entry.mode === "real" ? SLOT_A : SLOT_B;1399  const aadTag = entry.mode === "real" ? "slot_a_v1" : "slot_b_v1";1400  const slot = await loadSlot(slotKey);1401  if (!slot) { await clearSessionKey(); return false; }14021403  const result = await tryDecryptSlotResult(slot, key, aadTag);1404  if (result.status !== "ok") { await clearSessionKey(); return false; }14051406  derivedKey = key;1407  vaultMode = entry.mode;1408  entries = result.payload.entries;1409  duressConfigured = entry.mode === "real" ? result.payload.duressConfigured : false;1410  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1411  await loadSettings();1412  touchAutoLock();14131414  if (entry.mode === "real" && slot.recovery_salt && slot.recovery_wrapped_root_key) {1415    try { rootKey = await deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(key, slot); } catch { /* non-fatal */ }1416  }14171418  return true;1419}14201421export function lock(): void {1422  void clearSessionKey();1423  if (derivedKey) {1424    zeroKey(derivedKey);1425    derivedKey = null;1426  }1427  if (rootKey) {1428    rootKey.fill(0);1429    rootKey = null;1430  }14311432  entries = [];1433  domainIndex = new Map();1434  vaultMode = "real";1435  duressConfigured = false;1436  clearAutoLock();1437}14381439export function isUnlocked(): boolean {1440  return derivedKey !== null;1441}14421443// Opens the vault using a pre-derived AES-256 key (skipping Argon2id).1444// Used by Android biometric unlock — the key was derived on the native side.1445export async function unlockWithKey(1446  masterKeyHex: string,1447): Promise<{ ok: true; entries: VaultEntry[] } | { ok: false; error: string }> {1448  try {1449    const masterKeyBytes = unhex(masterKeyHex);1450    const stored = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1451    if (!stored) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };1452    const payload = await tryDecryptSlot(stored, masterKeyBytes, "slot_a_v1");1453    if (!payload) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };14541455    derivedKey = masterKeyBytes;1456    vaultMode = "real";1457    entries = payload.entries;1458    duressConfigured = payload.duressConfigured;1459    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1460    await loadSettings();1461    touchAutoLock();14621463    // PCH-01-009: the biometric path skips Argon2id but must still rehydrate the1464    // root key, exactly like attemptUnlockWithDerive and restoreFromSession.1465    // Without it, rootKey stays null after a biometric unlock and sync +1466    // GET_RECOVERY_WORDS report the open vault as locked. Guarded and non-fatal:1467    // a missing/legacy escrow must not fail the unlock itself.1468    if (stored.recovery_salt && stored.recovery_wrapped_root_key) {1469      try {1470        rootKey = await deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(masterKeyBytes, stored);1471      } catch { /* non-fatal — unlock still succeeds without rootKey */ }1472    }1473    return { ok: true, entries };1474  } catch {1475    return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };1476  }1477}14781479/**1480 * Restore the vault from a parsed Peach Codex payload.1481 *1482 * The supplied passphrase is verified against the Codex's slotA *before* any1483 * storage mutation — wrong passphrases return without touching disk. On1484 * success, the current vault state is snapshotted (reason: "restore") so the1485 * user can revert via Settings -> Vault History, then slotA/slotB are written1486 * and `peach_last_modified_at` is set to the Codex's recorded timestamp. A1487 * regular `unlock()` follows so the rest of the SW sees the standard1488 * post-unlock state.1489 *1490 * Intentionally non-Pro-gated — see peach_codex_v2.md "Pro gating". A Codex1491 * printed by a Pro user must always be restorable, even on a free device.1492 *1493 * Timing is not held constant here (in contrast to `unlock`): the Codex flow1494 * is an explicit user action with a known passphrase, not a passive lock1495 * screen, so the duress-vs-real timing side channel does not apply.1496 */1497export async function unlockFromCodex(params: {1498  slotA: string; // JSON string of StoredVault for slot A1499  slotB: string | null; // JSON string of StoredVault for slot B, or null1500  timestamp: number;1501  masterPassphrase: string;1502}): Promise<1503  | { ok: true; entryCount: number }1504  | { ok: false; reason: "wrong_passphrase" | "invalid_slot_format" }1505> {1506  let parsedSlotA: StoredVault;1507  let parsedSlotB: StoredVault | null = null;1508  try {1509    const rawA = JSON.parse(params.slotA) as unknown;1510    if (!hasValidVaultSchema(rawA)) {1511      return { ok: false, reason: "invalid_slot_format" };1512    }1513    parsedSlotA = rawA;1514    if (params.slotB !== null) {1515      const rawB = JSON.parse(params.slotB) as unknown;1516      if (!hasValidVaultSchema(rawB)) {1517        return { ok: false, reason: "invalid_slot_format" };1518      }1519      parsedSlotB = rawB;1520    }1521  } catch {1522    return { ok: false, reason: "invalid_slot_format" };1523  }15241525  // Verify the passphrase against the supplied slotA WITHOUT writing anything.1526  // If this fails the on-disk vault is left completely untouched.1527  const trialKey = await deriveKey(params.masterPassphrase, unhex(parsedSlotA.salt));1528  const trialPayload = await tryDecryptSlot(parsedSlotA, trialKey, "slot_a_v1");1529  if (!trialPayload) {1530    zeroKey(trialKey);1531    return { ok: false, reason: "wrong_passphrase" };1532  }1533  // Drop the trial key; `unlock()` below derives its own copy. Holding two1534  // copies of the master key in memory at once would be a needless surface.1535  zeroKey(trialKey);15361537  // Snapshot the about-to-be-overwritten on-disk state so the user can revert1538  // a mistaken Codex restore via the Vault History UI. Non-fatal if it fails.1539  await takeVaultSnapshot("restore");15401541  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, parsedSlotA);1542  if (parsedSlotB) {1543    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, parsedSlotB);1544  } else {1545    // Slot B must always exist with ciphertext length matching slot A1546    // (Projects.md §3.2). Codex prints may omit slot B (duress wasn't1547    // configured); regenerate noise to satisfy the invariant.1548    await writeSlot(1549      SLOT_B,1550      generateNoiseBlob(parsedSlotA.ciphertext.length / 2),1551    );1552  }1553  await chrome.storage.local.set({1554    peach_last_modified_at: String(params.timestamp),1555  });15561557  // Standard unlock path so domain index, settings, auto-lock, and1558  // recovery-key state all populate exactly as a normal unlock would.1559  const ok = await unlock(params.masterPassphrase);1560  if (!ok) {1561    // Should be unreachable — we just verified the passphrase against the1562    // same slotA we wrote. Treat as wrong_passphrase to keep the contract1563    // simple if some race or storage anomaly intrudes.1564    return { ok: false, reason: "wrong_passphrase" };1565  }1566  return { ok: true, entryCount: getEntries().length };1567}15681569// Returns the current in-memory derived key as a hex string.1570// Used by the biometric enable flow in Settings to store the key in Android Keystore.1571export function getDerivedKeyHex(): string {1572  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_not_unlocked");1573  return hex(derivedKey);1574}15751576/**1577 * Returns the vault's stable root key as hex, or null when locked / not yet1578 * populated. The root key is random per-vault, generated at creation, escrowed1579 * under the recovery words, and re-wrapped (not regenerated) on every password1580 * change — so it is INVARIANT across password rotation, unlike getDerivedKeyHex.1581 *1582 * This is the correct input for sync identity derivation (vault_id, the Noise1583 * NK static key, the Ed25519 manifest signing key, and per-entry envelope1584 * keys): paired devices keep the same identity and can still decrypt each1585 * other's entries after either side rotates its master password (SEV-2-B).1586 *1587 * Returns null rather than throwing so sync callers degrade to VAULT_LOCKED1588 * instead of crashing; rootKey is populated on every real-mode unlock via1589 * deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey / migrateToRecovery.1590 */1591export function getRootKeyHex(): string | null {1592  return rootKey ? hex(rootKey) : null;1593}15941595export function getEntries(): VaultEntry[] {1596  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1597  return entries.filter((entry) => !entry.deletedAt);1598}15991600const EMAIL_RE = /^[^\s@]+@[^\s@]+\.[^\s@]+$/;16011602export function getIdentities(): SavedIdentity[] {1603  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1604  const active = entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt && e.type === "login");16051606  const emailMap = new Map<string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }>();1607  const usernameMap = new Map<string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }>();16081609  for (const entry of active) {1610    const domain = extractDomain(entry.url ?? "") ?? "";1611    const modifiedAt = entry.modifiedAt ?? entry.createdAt ?? 0;16121613    function tally(map: Map<string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }>, v: string) {1614      const existing = map.get(v);1615      if (!existing || modifiedAt > existing.lastUsed) {1616        map.set(v, { lastUsed: modifiedAt, count: (existing?.count ?? 0) + 1, domain });1617      } else {1618        map.set(v, { ...existing, count: existing.count + 1 });1619      }1620    }16211622    const uVal = entry.username?.trim();1623    if (uVal) tally(EMAIL_RE.test(uVal) ? emailMap : usernameMap, uVal);16241625    // Also count the dedicated email field — entries created via the inline1626    // popup new-entry form store email here rather than in username.1627    const eVal = entry.email?.trim();1628    if (eVal) tally(emailMap, eVal);1629  }16301631  const toIdentity = (type: "email" | "username") =>1632    ([value, d]: [string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }]): SavedIdentity => ({1633      value, type, lastUsed: d.lastUsed, useCount: d.count, exampleDomain: d.domain || undefined,1634    });16351636  return [1637    ...[...emailMap.entries()].map(toIdentity("email")).sort((a, b) => b.useCount - a.useCount),1638    ...[...usernameMap.entries()].map(toIdentity("username")).sort((a, b) => b.useCount - a.useCount),1639  ];1640}16411642export async function batchAddEntries(drafts: EntryDraft[]): Promise<VaultEntry[]> {1643  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");16441645  const now = Date.now();1646  const added: VaultEntry[] = [];1647  for (const draft of drafts) {1648    try {1649      const sanitized = sanitizeEntryDraft(draft);1650      const nextEntry: VaultEntry = {1651        ...sanitized,1652        id: crypto.randomUUID(),1653        createdAt: now,1654        modifiedAt: monotonicEntryTimestamp(),1655      };1656      entries.push(nextEntry);1657      added.push(nextEntry);1658    } catch {1659      // Skip invalid drafts silently — caller can see diff between input and output length1660    }1661  }16621663  if (added.length > 0) {1664    await persistEntries();1665  }16661667  return added;1668}16691670/**1671 * Restore a set of entries in full fidelity — preserves id, createdAt,1672 * modifiedAt, and every other field unlike `batchAddEntries` which1673 * assigns fresh identity. Used by restore paths where the backup is the1674 * authoritative source of truth. `mode` controls how entries already in1675 * the vault are treated.1676 */1677export async function restoreEntries(1678  incoming: VaultEntry[],1679  mode: "replace" | "merge"1680): Promise<{ added: number; updated: number; skipped: number }> {1681  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");16821683  // A replace with zero incoming entries is almost certainly a caller bug1684  // (e.g. an import that silently dropped everything). Refuse rather than1685  // wipe the vault.1686  if (mode === "replace" && incoming.length === 0) {1687    throw new Error("refuse to replace with empty entry set");1688  }16891690  let added = 0;1691  let updated = 0;1692  let skipped = 0;16931694  if (mode === "replace") {1695    entries = [];1696    for (const entry of incoming) {1697      const normalized = sanitizeRestoredEntry(entry);1698      if (!normalized) {1699        skipped += 1;1700        continue;1701      }1702      entries.push(normalized);1703      added += 1;1704    }1705  } else {1706    const byId = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();1707    for (const e of entries) byId.set(e.id, e);17081709    for (const entry of incoming) {1710      const normalized = sanitizeRestoredEntry(entry);1711      if (!normalized) {1712        skipped += 1;1713        continue;1714      }1715      const existing = byId.get(normalized.id);1716      if (!existing) {1717        entries.push(normalized);1718        added += 1;1719      } else if (normalized.modifiedAt > existing.modifiedAt) {1720        const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === existing.id);1721        if (idx !== -1) {1722          entries[idx] = normalized;1723          updated += 1;1724        }1725      } else {1726        skipped += 1;1727      }1728    }1729  }17301731  await persistEntries("import");1732  return { added, updated, skipped };1733}17341735/**1736 * Validate + normalise a VaultEntry coming from a backup, import, or sync1737 * peer. MV-6: this is a strict field WHITELIST — `normalizeEntry` copies1738 * only known VaultEntry fields (unknown/attacker keys are dropped), and1739 * nested `passkey`/`canary` shapes are rebuilt field-by-field, never1740 * spread. Returns null for values the live vault shouldn't accept.1741 */1742function sanitizeRestoredEntry(entry: VaultEntry): VaultEntry | null {1743  if (!entry || typeof entry !== "object") return null;1744  const title = typeof entry.title === "string" ? entry.title.trim() : "";1745  if (!title) return null;1746  const id = typeof entry.id === "string" && entry.id ? entry.id : crypto.randomUUID();1747  const now = Date.now();1748  const createdAt = typeof entry.createdAt === "number" ? entry.createdAt : now;1749  const modifiedAt = typeof entry.modifiedAt === "number" ? entry.modifiedAt : createdAt;17501751  // normalizeEntry whitelists every known VaultEntry field and runs the1752  // same legacy-passkey migration as the on-disk read path — pre-v2.11.01753  // backups with flat passkey fields still import correctly because the1754  // legacy flat fields are themselves whitelisted VaultEntry members.1755  const normalized = normalizeEntry({1756    ...entry,1757    id,1758    title,1759    type: entry.type ?? "login",1760    createdAt,1761    modifiedAt,1762  });17631764  if (normalized.passkey) {1765    normalized.passkey = sanitizePasskey(normalized.passkey);1766  }1767  if (normalized.canary) {1768    normalized.canary = sanitizeCanary(normalized.canary);1769  }1770  // PCH-01-016: bound tags on the restore path too, so both import funnels agree.1771  normalized.tags = sanitizeTags(normalized.tags);17721773  // Login entries from backup must carry a password (or be passkey-only,1774  // in which case the passkey sub-object replaces the password requirement).1775  if (1776    normalized.type === "login" &&1777    !normalized.passkey &&1778    typeof normalized.password !== "string"1779  ) {1780    return null;1781  }1782  if (entry.passkey && !normalized.passkey) {1783    // Entry claimed a passkey but the shape didn't validate — refuse the1784    // whole entry rather than silently importing a credential-less husk.1785    return null;1786  }17871788  return normalized;1789}17901791/**1792 * Rebuild a PasskeyData object from untrusted input, field by field.1793 * Returns undefined when required fields are missing/mistyped — a rogue1794 * passkey credential must not activate via import (MV-6 attack scenario).1795 */1796function sanitizePasskey(pk: unknown): PasskeyData | undefined {1797  if (!pk || typeof pk !== "object") return undefined;1798  const r = pk as Record<string, unknown>;1799  if (1800    typeof r.rpId !== "string" || !r.rpId ||1801    typeof r.credentialId !== "string" || !r.credentialId ||1802    typeof r.publicKeyCose !== "string" ||1803    typeof r.userHandle !== "string" ||1804    typeof r.userName !== "string"1805  ) {1806    return undefined;1807  }1808  return {1809    rpId: r.rpId,1810    rpName: typeof r.rpName === "string" ? r.rpName : r.rpId,1811    credentialId: r.credentialId,1812    publicKeyCose: r.publicKeyCose,1813    privateKeyJwk:1814      r.privateKeyJwk && typeof r.privateKeyJwk === "object"1815        ? (r.privateKeyJwk as JsonWebKey)1816        : undefined,1817    userHandle: r.userHandle,1818    userName: r.userName,1819    userDisplayName:1820      typeof r.userDisplayName === "string" ? r.userDisplayName : r.userName,1821    algorithm: r.algorithm === -8 ? -8 : -7,1822    signCount: typeof r.signCount === "number" ? r.signCount : 0,1823    aaguid: typeof r.aaguid === "string" ? r.aaguid : "",1824    backupEligible: r.backupEligible === true,1825    backupState: r.backupState === true,1826    lastUsedAt: typeof r.lastUsedAt === "number" ? r.lastUsedAt : undefined,1827    browser: r.browser === "chrome" || r.browser === "firefox" ? r.browser : undefined,1828    transports: Array.isArray(r.transports)1829      ? r.transports.filter((t): t is string => typeof t === "string")1830      : undefined,1831    createdAt: typeof r.createdAt === "number" ? r.createdAt : Date.now(),1832  };1833}18341835/**1836 * Rebuild a Canary object from untrusted input. The webhook must be a1837 * well-formed HTTPS URL — a poisoned canary.webhookUrl is a standing1838 * exfiltration endpoint that the canary subsystem will POST entry titles1839 * to (MV-6 attack scenario). Invalid → the canary is dropped, not the1840 * entry. FIRE_CANARY_PING re-validates with the full SSRF guard at fire1841 * time (isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl), so this import-time check is the1842 * outer of two gates.1843 */1844function sanitizeCanary(c: unknown): Canary | undefined {1845  if (!c || typeof c !== "object") return undefined;1846  const r = c as Record<string, unknown>;1847  if (typeof r.webhookUrl !== "string") return undefined;1848  let url: URL;1849  try {1850    url = new URL(r.webhookUrl);1851  } catch {1852    return undefined;1853  }1854  if (url.protocol !== "https:") return undefined;1855  return {1856    webhookUrl: url.toString(),1857    label: typeof r.label === "string" ? r.label : undefined,1858    lastPinged: typeof r.lastPinged === "number" ? r.lastPinged : undefined,1859    pingCount: typeof r.pingCount === "number" ? r.pingCount : undefined,1860  };1861}18621863/**1864 * MV-6 / PCH-01-016: tags from imported / batch-added entries are untrusted.1865 * Keep only non-empty strings, cap each at 256 chars, and cap the count at 2551866 * (the same per-entry ceiling the export codec enforces, peachPayload.ts).1867 * Non-array or all-invalid input collapses to undefined.1868 */1869function sanitizeTags(tags: unknown): string[] | undefined {1870  if (!Array.isArray(tags)) return undefined;1871  const out: string[] = [];1872  for (const t of tags) {1873    if (typeof t !== "string") continue;1874    const trimmed = t.trim();1875    if (!trimmed) continue;1876    out.push(trimmed.slice(0, 256));1877    if (out.length >= 255) break;1878  }1879  return out.length > 0 ? out : undefined;1880}18811882// Soft-deletes every non-deleted entry in one call. The literal string1883// argument is a tripwire against accidental calls — any caller that would1884// wipe the vault has to consciously type "REPLACE_ALL". Do not relax this1885// to a boolean.1886export async function clearVaultEntries(1887  confirmation: "REPLACE_ALL"1888): Promise<void> {1889  if (confirmation !== "REPLACE_ALL") {1890    throw new Error("clearVaultEntries requires explicit confirmation");1891  }1892  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1893  for (const entry of entries) {1894    if (!entry.deletedAt) {1895      const stamp = monotonicEntryTimestamp(entry.modifiedAt);1896      entry.deletedAt = stamp;1897      entry.modifiedAt = stamp;1898    }1899  }1900  await persistEntries();1901}19021903export async function addEntry(entry: EntryDraft): Promise<VaultEntry> {1904  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");19051906  const sanitized = sanitizeEntryDraft(entry);1907  const now = Date.now();1908  const stamp = monotonicEntryTimestamp();1909  const nextEntry: VaultEntry = {1910    ...sanitized,1911    id: crypto.randomUUID(),1912    createdAt: now,1913    modifiedAt: stamp,1914    // Stamp passwordChangedAt at creation so age tracking is accurate from1915    // day one. Non-login entries carry the same stamp harmlessly.1916    passwordChangedAt: sanitized.password ? stamp : undefined,1917  };19181919  // Clone-and-replace so a failed persist rolls back the in-memory state1920  // (COR-008). Without this, a quota-full or storage error leaves the1921  // module-level `entries` ahead of what's actually on disk.1922  const rollback = entries;1923  entries = [...entries, nextEntry];1924  try {1925    await persistEntries();1926  } catch (err) {1927    entries = rollback;1928    throw err;1929  }19301931  // Fire-and-forget breach check (only for login entries if breach monitoring is enabled or not set)1932  if (settings.breachMonitoring !== false && nextEntry.type === "login" && nextEntry.password) {1933    checkBreach(nextEntry.password).then(async (count) => {1934      if (count > 0) {1935        const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === nextEntry.id);1936        if (idx !== -1) {1937          entries[idx] = { ...entries[idx], breach: count, modifiedAt: monotonicEntryTimestamp(entries[idx].modifiedAt) };1938          await persistEntries();1939        }1940      }1941    });1942  }19431944  fireSyncTrigger("vault_change");19451946  return nextEntry;1947}19481949/**1950 * Run the passkey-merge pass on the live in-memory entries and persist if1951 * anything changed. Called immediately after any passkey registration so that1952 * a same-domain TOTP-only entry already in the vault gets consolidated right1953 * away instead of waiting until the next lock/unlock cycle.1954 */1955export async function consolidatePasskeyEntries(): Promise<void> {1956  if (!derivedKey) return;1957  const { merged } = mergePasskeyOnlyIntoLogins(entries);1958  if (merged) {1959    await persistEntries();1960  }1961}19621963export async function updateEntry(1964  id: string,1965  patch: Partial<VaultEntry>1966): Promise<void> {1967  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");19681969  const idx = entries.findIndex((entry) => entry.id === id);1970  if (idx === -1 || entries[idx].deletedAt) {1971    throw new Error("entry_not_found");1972  }19731974  const current = entries[idx];1975  const sanitizedPatch = sanitizeEntryPatch(patch);1976  // Refresh passwordChangedAt only when the password value actually changes —1977  // a metadata-only update (title, tags, etc.) must not reset the age clock1978  // that drives the Pro health rotation recommendation.1979  const passwordChanged =1980    "password" in patch &&1981    typeof sanitizedPatch.password === "string" &&1982    sanitizedPatch.password !== current.password;1983  const stamp = monotonicEntryTimestamp(current.modifiedAt);1984  // When the password actually changes, push the outgoing one onto the history1985  // (newest first) so the user can reveal/copy/restore it later. We record the1986  // age it carried (passwordChangedAt, falling back to createdAt) rather than1987  // `now`, so the list reflects when each password was last in effect. Only1988  // capture a non-empty prior value — clearing a password leaves no secret to1989  // keep, and we skip an immediate exact duplicate (e.g. restore-then-restore)1990  // to avoid noise.1991  const priorPassword = current.password;1992  const shouldCapture =1993    passwordChanged &&1994    typeof priorPassword === "string" &&1995    priorPassword.length > 0 &&1996    current.passwordHistory?.[0]?.password !== priorPassword;1997  const nextHistory = shouldCapture1998    ? [1999        { password: priorPassword!, changedAt: current.passwordChangedAt ?? current.createdAt },2000        ...(current.passwordHistory ?? []),2001      ].slice(0, PASSWORD_HISTORY_MAX)2002    : current.passwordHistory;2003  entries[idx] = {2004    ...current,2005    ...sanitizedPatch,2006    modifiedAt: stamp,2007    ...(passwordChanged ? { passwordChangedAt: stamp, passwordHistory: nextHistory } : {}),2008  };2009201020112012  // Card entries must retain their card number2013  if (entries[idx].type === "card" && !entries[idx].cardNumber) {2014    entries[idx] = current;2015    throw new Error("card number is required for card entries");2016  }20172018  // Roll the in-memory entry back to its pre-edit state if the disk write2019  // fails (e.g. storage quota). Without this the module-level `entries` array2020  // would hold an edit that never landed on disk, diverging from the vault2021  // until the next unlock silently reverts it (SEV-3-A). Mirrors addEntry.2022  try {2023    await persistEntries();2024  } catch (err) {2025    entries[idx] = current;2026    throw err;2027  }20282029  // Breach check when password changes: clear immediately so old breach doesn't linger,2030  // then async-check the new password and only re-set if it's also found.2031  if ("password" in patch && settings.breachMonitoring !== false && entries[idx].type === "login") {2032    entries[idx] = { ...entries[idx], breach: undefined };2033    await persistEntries();2034    const password = entries[idx].password;2035    if (password) {2036      checkBreach(password).then(async (count) => {2037        const i = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id);2038        if (i !== -1 && count > 0) {2039          entries[i] = { ...entries[i], breach: count, modifiedAt: monotonicEntryTimestamp(entries[i].modifiedAt) };2040          await persistEntries();2041        }2042      });2043    }2044  }20452046  fireSyncTrigger("vault_change");2047}20482049export async function deleteEntry(id: string): Promise<void> {2050  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");20512052  const entry = entries.find((item) => item.id === id);2053  if (!entry || entry.deletedAt) {2054    throw new Error("entry_not_found");2055  }20562057  // Tombstone timestamp must be strictly greater than the entry's last2058  // modification so the deletion wins LWW against any in-flight edit, even2059  // under clock skew (SEV-2-E).2060  const previousModifiedAt = entry.modifiedAt;2061  const stamp = monotonicEntryTimestamp(entry.modifiedAt);2062  entry.deletedAt = stamp;2063  entry.modifiedAt = stamp;2064  // Roll the tombstone back if the disk write fails, so a quota error doesn't2065  // leave the entry deleted in memory but alive on disk (SEV-3-A).2066  try {2067    await persistEntries();2068  } catch (err) {2069    delete entry.deletedAt;2070    entry.modifiedAt = previousModifiedAt;2071    throw err;2072  }2073  fireSyncTrigger("vault_change");2074}20752076export function getDeletedEntries(): VaultEntry[] {2077  if (!derivedKey) return [];2078  return entries.filter((e) => !!e.deletedAt);2079}20802081/**2082 * Returns the vault's monotonic version — the `peach_last_modified_at` value2083 * stamped on every user-initiated write. Remote (sync) writes do NOT advance2084 * this version so a sync round never cascades into a second outbound sync.2085 */2086export async function getVaultVersion(): Promise<number> {2087  try {2088    const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get("peach_last_modified_at");2089    const v = (raw as Record<string, unknown>).peach_last_modified_at;2090    if (typeof v === "number") return v;2091    if (typeof v === "string" && v !== "") {2092      const n = Number.parseInt(v, 10);2093      return Number.isFinite(n) ? n : 0;2094    }2095    return 0;2096  } catch {2097    return 0;2098  }2099}21002101/**2102 * Internal write variants — bypass `fireSyncTrigger` so the sync layer can2103 * apply entries without cascading into another outbound sync round.2104 *2105 * INVARIANT: callers must not pass entries whose IDs collide with existing2106 * active (non-deleted) entries unless the intent is an explicit overwrite.2107 * These functions do not validate field-level constraints (password required,2108 * card number required, etc.) — they are trust-the-caller paths for sync and2109 * test harness use only.2110 */2111export async function addEntryDirect(entry: VaultEntry): Promise<void> {2112  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");2113  entries = [...entries, entry];2114  await persistEntries("sync_received");2115}21162117export async function updateEntryDirect(patch: VaultEntry): Promise<void> {2118  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");2119  const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === patch.id);2120  if (idx === -1) throw new Error("entry_not_found");2121  entries[idx] = { ...entries[idx], ...patch };2122  await persistEntries("sync_received");2123}21242125export async function deleteEntryDirect(id: string, deletedAt: number): Promise<void> {2126  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");2127  const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id);2128  if (idx === -1) throw new Error("entry_not_found");2129  entries[idx] = { ...entries[idx], deletedAt, modifiedAt: deletedAt };2130  await persistEntries("sync_received");2131}21322133/**2134 * Apply a batch of remote entries + tombstones from a sync peer.2135 * Last-write-wins by `modifiedAt`; a tombstone supersedes a live entry when2136 * `deletedAt > modifiedAt` on the local side. Mutates `entries` directly and2137 * persists with reason `sync_received` — does NOT fire the sync dispatcher, so2138 * applying a sync round cannot cascade into another outbound sync.2139 *2140 * `applied` counts entries that actually changed local state (new add,2141 * overwrite-by-newer, or new tombstone). `received` is the raw payload size2142 * the caller can surface in the sync result UI.2143 */2144export async function applyMergedRemoteEntries(2145  remoteEntries: VaultEntry[],2146  remoteTombstones: Record<string, number>,2147  context: { deviceName?: string } = {},2148): Promise<{ received: number; applied: number; conflicts: number }> {2149  // DESIGN: last-write-wins is applied PER-ENTRY, not per-field. If two devices2150  // concurrently edit different fields of the same entry, the one with the2151  // newer modifiedAt wins the whole entry and the other device's field edits2152  // are dropped silently. This is the deliberate trade-off for a simple,2153  // conflict-free merge — per-field CRDT merge is out of scope. Guidance for2154  // users: edit a given entry on one device at a time.2155  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");21562157  const received = remoteEntries.length + Object.keys(remoteTombstones).length;2158  let applied = 0;2159  let conflicts = 0;21602161  const byId = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();2162  for (const e of entries) byId.set(e.id, e);21632164  const alerts: SyncAlert[] = [];2165  const deviceName = context.deviceName ?? "paired device";2166  const mergeNow = Date.now();21672168  for (const remote of remoteEntries) {2169    const sanitized = sanitizeRestoredEntry(remote);2170    if (!sanitized) continue;2171    // HV-1a: a far-future remote modifiedAt must not permanently pin a2172    // malicious value against honest local edits. Clamp BEFORE any2173    // comparison against local timestamps.2174    sanitized.modifiedAt = clampSyncTimestamp(sanitized.modifiedAt, mergeNow);2175    if (typeof sanitized.deletedAt === "number") {2176      sanitized.deletedAt = clampSyncTimestamp(sanitized.deletedAt, mergeNow);2177    }2178    const tombstoneTs = remoteTombstones[sanitized.id];2179    if (tombstoneTs !== undefined && clampSyncTimestamp(tombstoneTs, mergeNow) >= sanitized.modifiedAt) {2180      continue;2181    }2182    const local = byId.get(sanitized.id);2183    if (!local) {2184      entries.push(sanitized);2185      byId.set(sanitized.id, sanitized);2186      applied += 1;2187    } else if (sanitized.modifiedAt > local.modifiedAt) {2188      const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === local.id);2189      if (idx !== -1) {2190        // HV-1b: surface remote password REPLACEMENTS (existing id, password2191        // differs) so a compromised peer can't silently rewrite credentials.2192        if (2193          !local.deletedAt &&2194          typeof sanitized.password === "string" &&2195          typeof local.password === "string" &&2196          sanitized.password !== local.password2197        ) {2198          alerts.push({2199            type: "REMOTE_PASSWORD_CHANGE",2200            entryId: sanitized.id,2201            entryTitle: sanitized.title,2202            deviceName,2203            timestamp: mergeNow,2204          });2205        }2206        entries[idx] = sanitized;2207        byId.set(sanitized.id, sanitized);2208        applied += 1;2209        if (!local.deletedAt) conflicts += 1;2210      }2211    }2212  }22132214  for (const [id, rawDeletedAt] of Object.entries(remoteTombstones)) {2215    if (typeof rawDeletedAt !== "number" || !Number.isFinite(rawDeletedAt)) continue;2216    // HV-1a/1c: clamp the tombstone timestamp before every comparison.2217    const deletedAt = clampSyncTimestamp(rawDeletedAt, mergeNow);2218    const local = byId.get(id);2219    if (!local) continue;2220    if (local.deletedAt && local.deletedAt >= deletedAt) continue;2221    if (deletedAt < local.modifiedAt) continue;2222    const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id);2223    if (idx !== -1) {2224      // HV-1b: surface remote deletes of live local entries.2225      if (!local.deletedAt) {2226        alerts.push({2227          type: "REMOTE_DELETE",2228          entryId: id,2229          entryTitle: local.title,2230          deviceName,2231          timestamp: mergeNow,2232        });2233      }2234      entries[idx] = { ...local, deletedAt, modifiedAt: deletedAt };2235      applied += 1;2236    }2237  }22382239  if (applied > 0) {2240    await persistEntries("sync_received");2241    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);2242  }2243  // Queued after the merge committed — an alert must describe a mutation2244  // that actually landed. recordSyncAlerts never throws.2245  await recordSyncAlerts(alerts);2246  return { received, applied, conflicts };2247}22482249export async function restoreEntry(id: string): Promise<void> {2250  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");2251  const entry = entries.find((e) => e.id === id && e.deletedAt);2252  if (!entry) throw new Error("deleted entry not found");2253  delete entry.deletedAt;2254  entry.modifiedAt = monotonicEntryTimestamp(entry.modifiedAt);2255  await persistEntries();2256  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);2257}22582259export async function purgeEntry(id: string): Promise<void> {2260  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");2261  const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id && e.deletedAt);2262  if (idx === -1) throw new Error("deleted entry not found");2263  entries.splice(idx, 1);2264  await persistEntries();2265}22662267/** Permanently delete entries whose deletedAt is older than retentionMs. 0 = keep forever. */2268export async function purgeExpiredTrash(retentionMs: number): Promise<number> {2269  if (!derivedKey || retentionMs === 0) return 0;2270  const cutoff = Date.now() - retentionMs;2271  const before = entries.length;2272  entries = entries.filter((e) => !(e.deletedAt && e.deletedAt < cutoff));2273  const purged = before - entries.length;2274  if (purged > 0) await persistEntries();2275  return purged;2276}22772278export function queryDomain(domain: string): VaultEntry[] {2279  return domainIndex.get(domain) ?? [];2280}22812282export function getEntryById(id: string): VaultEntry | undefined {2283  return entries.find((entry) => entry.id === id && !entry.deletedAt);2284}22852286async function persistSlotA(2287  reason: VaultSnapshot["reason"] = "local_save",2288): Promise<StoredVault> {2289  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");22902291  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);2292  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");22932294  // Snapshot the about-to-be-overwritten state BEFORE we mutate disk. Failures2295  // are swallowed by takeVaultSnapshot — history must never block a save.2296  await takeVaultSnapshot(reason);22972298  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured, duressConfigured ? DURESS_SLOT_SIZE : 0);2299  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");23002301  // Preserve existing recovery escrow fields.2302  const nextSlotA: StoredVault = {2303    ...slotA,2304    nonce,2305    ciphertext,2306    tag,2307    // recovery_salt and recovery_wrapped_root_key are already set from loadSlot2308  };2309  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, nextSlotA);23102311  // Slot A (the real vault) is now committed. Wrap every later write so a2312  // mid-persist failure (e.g. a storage error after slot A landed) restores the2313  // prior slot A before rethrowing. Without this, a "failed" save that already2314  // wrote slot A leaves disk ahead of the in-memory rollback in addEntry/2315  // updateEntry/deleteEntry — the entry stays silently on disk and resurfaces2316  // as a duplicate on the next unlock (observed under storage-quota pressure).2317  try {2318    // When duress is not configured, keep slot B size-matched with slot A by2319    // regenerating its noise. When duress IS configured, leave slot B alone —2320    // we don't have the decoy key to re-encrypt it. This is a known trade-off.2321    if (!duressConfigured) {2322      await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2));2323    }2324    // Only advance the vault version for locally-originated writes. Entries2325    // applied from a sync peer ("sync_received") must NOT bump the counter —2326    // otherwise applying a remote round makes us look newer than the peer and2327    // triggers a redundant outbound sync, defeating the no-op optimisation2328    // and risking a ping-pong between two devices (SEV-2-C).2329    if (reason !== "sync_received") {2330      await stampLocalVaultMutation();2331    }2332  } catch (err) {2333    // Best-effort restore — the prior slot A is smaller-or-equal, so this write2334    // fits even when the failure was a quota overflow.2335    await writeSlot(SLOT_A, slotA).catch(() => {});2336    throw err;2337  }23382339  return nextSlotA;2340}23412342async function persistSlotB(): Promise<void> {2343  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");23442345  const slotB = await loadSlot(SLOT_B);2346  if (!slotB) throw new Error("missing slot B");23472348  // Decoy plaintext always reports duressConfigured=false — the decoy user2349  // sees a clean slate. persistSlotB only runs in decoy mode, which only2350  // exists once duress is configured, so pad to the fixed duress ceiling to2351  // keep slot B's length equal to slot A's (audit MEDIUM — deniability).2352  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, false, DURESS_SLOT_SIZE);2353  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKey, plaintext, "slot_b_v1");23542355  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, { ...slotB, nonce, ciphertext, tag });2356  // Symmetric with persistSlotA: if the version stamp fails after the decoy2357  // slot committed, restore the prior slot B so a failed decoy-mode save can't2358  // leave disk ahead of the in-memory rollback.2359  try {2360    await stampLocalVaultMutation();2361  } catch (err) {2362    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, slotB).catch(() => {});2363    throw err;2364  }2365}23662367async function persistEntries(2368  reason: VaultSnapshot["reason"] = "local_save",2369): Promise<void> {2370  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");23712372  if (vaultMode === "decoy") {2373    await persistSlotB();2374  } else {2375    await persistSlotA(reason);2376  }2377  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);2378}23792380function cleanAdditionalUrls(values: string[] | undefined): string[] | undefined {2381  if (!Array.isArray(values)) return undefined;2382  const seen = new Set<string>();2383  const cleaned: string[] = [];2384  for (const value of values) {2385    const trimmed = typeof value === "string" ? value.trim() : "";2386    if (!trimmed) continue;2387    const key = trimmed.toLowerCase();2388    if (seen.has(key)) continue;2389    seen.add(key);2390    cleaned.push(trimmed);2391  }2392  return cleaned.length > 0 ? cleaned : undefined;2393}23942395function sanitizeEntryDraft(entry: EntryDraft): EntryDraft {2396  const title = entry.title.trim();2397  // Accept legacy `type:"passkey"` drafts but rewrite to "login" — the new2398  // model is "any entry, optionally with a passkey sub-object." Imports and2399  // any in-flight callers from before v2.11.0 keep working without throwing.2400  let type: VaultEntry["type"] = entry.type ?? "login";2401  if (type === "passkey") type = "login";24022403  if (!title) throw new Error("title is required");24042405  if (entry.passkey) {2406    const p = entry.passkey;2407    if (2408      !p.rpId ||2409      !p.credentialId ||2410      !p.publicKeyCose ||2411      !p.userHandle ||2412      !p.userName ||2413      (p.algorithm !== -7 && p.algorithm !== -8)2414    ) {2415      throw new Error("invalid passkey credential");2416    }2417  }2418  if (type === "card") {2419    if (!entry.cardholderName?.trim() || !entry.cardNumber?.trim()) {2420      throw new Error("cardholder name and card number are required");2421    }2422  }24232424  return {2425    type,2426    title,2427    username: type === "login" ? entry.username?.trim() ?? "" : undefined,2428    email: type === "login" ? entry.email?.trim() || undefined : undefined,2429    password: type === "login" ? entry.password : undefined,2430    url: type === "login" ? entry.url?.trim() ?? "" : undefined,2431    additionalUrls: type === "login" ? cleanAdditionalUrls(entry.additionalUrls) : undefined,2432    totp: type === "login" ? entry.totp?.trim() || undefined : undefined,2433    // PCH-01-019: preserve non-default TOTP params through batch-add/import so2434    // they are not silently stripped (they fall back to SHA-1/6/30 when absent).2435    totpAlgorithm: type === "login" ? entry.totpAlgorithm : undefined,2436    totpDigits: type === "login" ? entry.totpDigits : undefined,2437    totpPeriod: type === "login" ? entry.totpPeriod : undefined,2438    notes: entry.notes?.trim() || undefined,2439    breach: type === "login" ? entry.breach : undefined,2440    // PCH-01-016: the batch-add path was bypassing the MV-6 canary/tags2441    // whitelist applied on the RESTORE_ENTRIES path. Run both sanitizers here.2442    canary: type === "login" ? sanitizeCanary(entry.canary) : undefined,2443    tags: sanitizeTags(entry.tags),2444    passkey: entry.passkey,2445    cardholderName: type === "card" ? entry.cardholderName?.trim() : undefined,2446    cardNumber: type === "card" ? entry.cardNumber?.trim() : undefined,2447    expMonth: type === "card" ? entry.expMonth?.trim() : undefined,2448    expYear: type === "card" ? entry.expYear?.trim() : undefined,2449    cvc: type === "card" ? entry.cvc?.trim() : undefined,2450    cardNickname: type === "card" ? entry.cardNickname?.trim() || undefined : undefined,2451    network: type === "card" ? entry.network : undefined,2452    last4: type === "card" ? entry.last4?.trim() : undefined,2453  };2454}24552456function sanitizeEntryPatch(patch: Partial<VaultEntry>): Partial<VaultEntry> {2457  const nextPatch: Partial<VaultEntry> = {};24582459  if ("type" in patch) {2460    nextPatch.type = patch.type;2461  }24622463  if ("title" in patch) {2464    const title = patch.title?.trim() ?? "";2465    if (!title) throw new Error("title is required");2466    nextPatch.title = title;2467  }24682469  if ("url" in patch) {2470    nextPatch.url = patch.url?.trim() ?? "";2471  }24722473  if ("additionalUrls" in patch) {2474    const incoming = Array.isArray(patch.additionalUrls) ? patch.additionalUrls : [];2475    const seen = new Set<string>();2476    const cleaned: string[] = [];2477    for (const value of incoming) {2478      const trimmed = typeof value === "string" ? value.trim() : "";2479      if (!trimmed) continue;2480      const key = trimmed.toLowerCase();2481      if (seen.has(key)) continue;2482      seen.add(key);2483      cleaned.push(trimmed);2484    }2485    nextPatch.additionalUrls = cleaned.length > 0 ? cleaned : undefined;2486  }24872488  if ("username" in patch) {2489    nextPatch.username = patch.username?.trim() ?? "";2490  }24912492  if ("email" in patch) {2493    nextPatch.email = patch.email?.trim() || undefined;2494  }24952496  if ("password" in patch) {2497    const password = patch.password ?? "";2498    // Allow clearing a password (e.g. on passkey-only entries)2499    nextPatch.password = password || undefined;2500  }25012502  if ("totp" in patch) {2503    nextPatch.totp = patch.totp?.trim() || undefined;2504  }25052506  if ("notes" in patch) {2507    nextPatch.notes = patch.notes?.trim() || undefined;2508  }25092510  if ("breach" in patch) {2511    nextPatch.breach = patch.breach;2512  }25132514  if ("canary" in patch) {2515    // PCH-02-001: route update patches through the same canary whitelist used2516    // by add/restore/sync. Invalid shapes drop the canary; `undefined` clears it.2517    nextPatch.canary = patch.canary ? sanitizeCanary(patch.canary) : undefined;2518  }25192520  if ("passkey" in patch) {2521    // Passkey sub-object replaces all the legacy flat passkey fields. A2522    // patch with `passkey: undefined` removes the credential from the entry2523    // (used by "remove passkey" without deleting the whole entry).2524    if (patch.passkey === undefined || patch.passkey === null) {2525      nextPatch.passkey = undefined;2526    } else {2527      const sanitized = sanitizePasskey(patch.passkey);2528      if (!sanitized) throw new Error("invalid passkey credential");2529      nextPatch.passkey = sanitized;2530    }2531  }25322533  if ("tags" in patch) {2534    // PCH-02-001: bound tags exactly like both import funnels.2535    nextPatch.tags = sanitizeTags(patch.tags);2536  }25372538  if ("cardholderName" in patch) {2539    nextPatch.cardholderName = patch.cardholderName?.trim() || undefined;2540  }2541  if ("cardNumber" in patch) {2542    const n = patch.cardNumber ?? "";2543    nextPatch.cardNumber = n || undefined;2544  }2545  if ("expMonth" in patch) {2546    nextPatch.expMonth = patch.expMonth?.trim() || undefined;2547  }2548  if ("expYear" in patch) {2549    nextPatch.expYear = patch.expYear?.trim() || undefined;2550  }2551  if ("cvc" in patch) {2552    nextPatch.cvc = patch.cvc?.trim() || undefined;2553  }2554  if ("cardNickname" in patch) {2555    nextPatch.cardNickname = patch.cardNickname?.trim() || undefined;2556  }2557  if ("network" in patch) {2558    nextPatch.network = patch.network;2559  }2560  if ("last4" in patch) {2561    nextPatch.last4 = patch.last4?.trim() || undefined;2562  }25632564  return nextPatch;2565}25662567function normalizeEntry(entry: VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry): VaultEntry {2568  const createdAt = "createdAt" in entry ? entry.createdAt : entry.created;2569  const modifiedAt =2570    "modifiedAt" in entry ? entry.modifiedAt : entry.updated;25712572  const base: VaultEntry = {2573    id: entry.id,2574    type: "type" in entry ? entry.type : "login",2575    title: entry.title,2576    username: entry.username,2577    email: "email" in entry ? entry.email : undefined,2578    password: entry.password,2579    url: entry.url,2580    additionalUrls:2581      "additionalUrls" in entry && Array.isArray(entry.additionalUrls)2582        ? entry.additionalUrls2583        : undefined,2584    totp: entry.totp,2585    // PCH-01-019: carry TOTP params through the normalize/restore path too.2586    totpAlgorithm: entry.totpAlgorithm,2587    totpDigits: entry.totpDigits,2588    totpPeriod: entry.totpPeriod,2589    notes: entry.notes,2590    breach: entry.breach,2591    // Preserve the password-age clock across lock/unlock. Without this the2592    // field is dropped on every decode and the advanced-health "aged password"2593    // signal silently resets to createdAt on each unlock (SEV-2-A).2594    passwordChangedAt:2595      "passwordChangedAt" in entry ? entry.passwordChangedAt : undefined,2596    // Preserve past-password history across lock/unlock. normalizeEntry is a2597    // field whitelist, so an unlisted field is silently dropped on every decode2598    // (same class as the passwordChangedAt SEV-2-A above).2599    passwordHistory:2600      "passwordHistory" in entry && Array.isArray(entry.passwordHistory)2601        ? entry.passwordHistory2602        : undefined,2603    canary: "canary" in entry ? entry.canary : undefined,2604    passkey: "passkey" in entry ? entry.passkey : undefined,2605    createdAt,2606    modifiedAt,2607    deletedAt: entry.deletedAt,2608    tags: "tags" in entry ? entry.tags : undefined,2609    cardholderName: "cardholderName" in entry ? entry.cardholderName : undefined,2610    cardNumber: "cardNumber" in entry ? entry.cardNumber : undefined,2611    expMonth: "expMonth" in entry ? entry.expMonth : undefined,2612    expYear: "expYear" in entry ? entry.expYear : undefined,2613    cvc: "cvc" in entry ? entry.cvc : undefined,2614    cardNickname: "cardNickname" in entry ? entry.cardNickname : undefined,2615    network: "network" in entry ? entry.network : undefined,2616    last4: "last4" in entry ? entry.last4 : undefined,2617  };26182619  return migrateLegacyPasskey(base, entry);2620}26212622/**2623 * v2.11.0 read migration. Pre-v2.11.0 passkey entries used `type:"passkey"`2624 * with flat top-level fields (rpId, credentialId, etc.). This converts them2625 * to the new shape — `type:"login"` with a `passkey` sub-object — so all2626 * downstream consumers can rely on the new model. The result is rewritten2627 * to disk on next vault save (hasLegacyShape detects the un-migrated case).2628 */2629function migrateLegacyPasskey(2630  base: VaultEntry,2631  raw: VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry2632): VaultEntry {2633  if (base.passkey) return base;2634  const flat = raw as Partial<VaultEntry>;2635  const isPasskeyType = base.type === "passkey";2636  const hasFlatPasskeyFields =2637    typeof flat.rpId === "string" &&2638    typeof flat.credentialId === "string" &&2639    typeof flat.publicKeyCose === "string" &&2640    typeof flat.userHandle === "string" &&2641    typeof flat.userName === "string";2642  if (!isPasskeyType && !hasFlatPasskeyFields) return base;2643  if (!hasFlatPasskeyFields) return base;26442645  const algorithm: -7 | -8 = flat.algorithm === -8 ? -8 : -7;2646  base.passkey = {2647    rpId: flat.rpId!,2648    rpName: flat.rpName ?? flat.rpId!,2649    credentialId: flat.credentialId!,2650    publicKeyCose: flat.publicKeyCose!,2651    privateKeyJwk: flat.privateKeyJwk,2652    userHandle: flat.userHandle!,2653    userName: flat.userName!,2654    userDisplayName: flat.userDisplayName ?? flat.userName!,2655    algorithm,2656    signCount: flat.signCount ?? 0,2657    aaguid: flat.aaguid ?? "",2658    backupEligible: flat.backupEligible === true,2659    backupState: flat.backupState === true,2660    lastUsedAt: flat.lastUsedAt,2661    browser: flat.browser,2662    transports: flat.transports,2663    createdAt: base.createdAt,2664  };2665  // Promote to "login" so the unified Entry view renders. Username gets2666  // populated from the passkey's userName so the entry is searchable in the2667  // existing autofill flow without a separate code path.2668  if (isPasskeyType) base.type = "login";2669  if (!base.username) base.username = flat.userName;2670  if (!base.url) base.url = `https://${flat.rpId}`;2671  return base;2672}267326742675// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------2676// Deduplication2677// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------26782679function entryDupeKey(e: VaultEntry): string {2680  if (e.type === "note") return `note|${e.title.toLowerCase()}`;2681  // Passkey-bearing entries dedupe by the credential's RP + user. Two logins2682  // on different sites that happen to share a username are still distinct;2683  // two passkey credentials for the same RP+user are duplicates regardless2684  // of any login fields they may also carry.2685  if (e.passkey) {2686    return `passkey|${e.passkey.rpId.toLowerCase()}|${e.passkey.userName.toLowerCase()}`;2687  }2688  return `login|${e.title.toLowerCase()}|${(e.url ?? "").toLowerCase()}|${(e.username ?? "").toLowerCase()}`;2689}26902691/** Returns the number of duplicate entries (those that would be removed). */2692export function countDuplicates(): number {2693  const best = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();2694  let dupeCount = 0;2695  for (const e of entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt)) {2696    const key = entryDupeKey(e);2697    const existing = best.get(key);2698    if (!existing) {2699      best.set(key, e);2700    } else {2701      dupeCount++;2702      // Keep the more recently modified one in the map2703      if ((e.modifiedAt ?? e.createdAt ?? 0) > (existing.modifiedAt ?? existing.createdAt ?? 0)) {2704        best.set(key, e);2705      }2706    }2707  }2708  return dupeCount;2709}27102711/**2712 * Soft-deletes duplicate entries, keeping the most recently modified copy of2713 * each group. Returns the number of entries moved to trash.2714 */2715export async function deduplicateEntries(): Promise<number> {2716  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");2717  // Dedup reshapes slot B permanently under the decoy key, which is2718  // forensically distinguishable from a freshly-seeded decoy vault. Refuse.2719  if (vaultMode === "decoy") {2720    throw new Error("deduplicate disabled in decoy mode");2721  }27222723  const best = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();2724  for (const e of entries.filter((en) => !en.deletedAt)) {2725    const key = entryDupeKey(e);2726    const existing = best.get(key);2727    if (!existing) {2728      best.set(key, e);2729    } else if ((e.modifiedAt ?? e.createdAt ?? 0) > (existing.modifiedAt ?? existing.createdAt ?? 0)) {2730      best.set(key, e);2731    }2732  }27332734  const keepIds = new Set(Array.from(best.values()).map((e) => e.id));2735  let removed = 0;2736  entries = entries.map((e) => {2737    if (!e.deletedAt && !keepIds.has(e.id)) {2738      removed++;2739      return { ...e, deletedAt: monotonicEntryTimestamp(e.modifiedAt) };2740    }2741    return e;2742  });27432744  if (removed > 0) await persistEntries();2745  return removed;2746}27472748// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------2749// Vault history — snapshot BEFORE every vault write so the saved blob is2750// what is about to be lost, not what was just written. Capped at 5. The2751// stored blobs are AES-256-GCM ciphertext under the master password, so2752// history adds zero security surface.2753// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------27542755const HISTORY_KEY = "peach_vault_history";2756const HISTORY_MAX = 5;27572758// PCH-01-023: coarsen a live-entry count into a low-resolution bucket so the2759// plaintext snapshot field cannot reveal exact vault size or single-entry change2760// deltas. Buckets widen as the vault grows so absolute leakage stays roughly2761// proportional rather than exact.2762function bucketEntryCount(n: number): number {2763  if (n <= 0) return 0;2764  if (n <= 10) return 10;2765  if (n <= 25) return 25;2766  if (n <= 50) return 50;2767  if (n <= 100) return 100;2768  if (n <= 250) return 250;2769  if (n <= 500) return 500;2770  return Math.ceil(n / 500) * 500;2771}27722773/**2774 * Snapshot the CURRENT on-disk vault state into history. Call this BEFORE2775 * overwriting peach_vault_a so the saved blob captures the about-to-be-lost2776 * state. Identical-to-most-recent blobs are skipped to avoid filling history2777 * with no-op writes.2778 */2779export async function takeVaultSnapshot(2780  reason: VaultSnapshot["reason"],2781): Promise<void> {2782  try {2783    const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get([SLOT_A, SLOT_B, HISTORY_KEY]);2784    const slotA = (raw as Record<string, StoredVault | undefined>)[SLOT_A];2785    const slotB = (raw as Record<string, StoredVault | undefined>)[SLOT_B];27862787    // Nothing to snapshot if the real slot doesn't exist yet (fresh install,2788    // pre-createVault). createVault skips snapshots intentionally — there is2789    // no prior state to preserve.2790    if (!slotA) return;27912792    const vault_a = JSON.stringify(slotA);2793    const vault_b = JSON.stringify(slotB ?? slotA);27942795    // Best-effort entry count: only meaningful when the in-memory state is2796    // unlocked AND in real mode. Decoy mode would leak the decoy entry2797    // count; locked mode has no entries to count. Both fall through to null.2798    // PCH-01-023: store a coarse bucket, not the exact count — chrome.storage2799    // .local sits next to the AES-GCM blobs in plaintext, so an exact count would2800    // leak vault size and per-write deltas (the metadata padding hides this).2801    let entryCount: number | null = null;2802    if (derivedKey && vaultMode === "real") {2803      try {2804        entryCount = bucketEntryCount(entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt).length);2805      } catch {2806        entryCount = null;2807      }2808    }28092810    const existingRaw = (raw as Record<string, VaultHistory | undefined>)[HISTORY_KEY];2811    const history: VaultHistory = existingRaw && Array.isArray(existingRaw.snapshots)2812      ? existingRaw2813      : { snapshots: [] };28142815    // Deduplication: if the most recent snapshot has byte-identical blobs,2816    // skip — saves the same vault N times in a row would otherwise burn the2817    // entire history window with no recovery value.2818    const latest = history.snapshots[0];2819    if (latest && latest.vault_a === vault_a && latest.vault_b === vault_b) {2820      return;2821    }28222823    const snapshot: VaultSnapshot = {2824      id: crypto.randomUUID(),2825      savedAt: Date.now(),2826      reason,2827      vault_a,2828      vault_b,2829      entryCount,2830    };28312832    history.snapshots = [snapshot, ...history.snapshots].slice(0, HISTORY_MAX);2833    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [HISTORY_KEY]: history });2834  } catch (err) {2835    // Non-fatal — history must never block a save. A failed snapshot just2836    // means the user loses one rung of the safety ladder for this write.2837    // M4/QUA-006: log so the failure is visible; if it looks like a quota2838    // problem, notify the popup so the user can prune history themselves.2839    console.warn('[Peach] takeVaultSnapshot failed:', err);2840    if (String(err).includes('QUOTA') || String(err).includes('quota')) {2841      try {2842        await chrome.runtime.sendMessage({ type: 'VAULT_STORAGE_QUOTA_WARNING' });2843      } catch {2844        // popup may be closed; surfaced via console.warn above2845      }2846    }2847  }2848}28492850/** Wipe all vault history. Called by Panic / DESTROY_VAULT. */2851export async function clearVaultHistory(): Promise<void> {2852  try {2853    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [HISTORY_KEY]: { snapshots: [] } satisfies VaultHistory });2854  } catch {2855    // Non-fatal — DESTROY_VAULT also runs storage.local.clear().2856  }2857}28582859/** Read all snapshots, newest first, for the Settings vault history view. */2860export async function getVaultHistory(): Promise<VaultSnapshot[]> {2861  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get(HISTORY_KEY);2862  const history = (raw as Record<string, VaultHistory | undefined>)[HISTORY_KEY];2863  if (!history || !Array.isArray(history.snapshots)) return [];2864  return history.snapshots;2865}28662867/**2868 * Replace the on-disk vault with the chosen snapshot's blobs and lock the2869 * vault. The current state is itself snapshotted with reason 'restore' first2870 * so the restore is reversible. After this returns, the user must unlock2871 * with the password that matches the restored blob.2872 */2873export async function restoreVaultSnapshot(2874  snapshotId: string,2875): Promise<{ ok: true } | { ok: false; error: string }> {2876  const history = await getVaultHistory();2877  const snapshot = history.find((s) => s.id === snapshotId);2878  if (!snapshot) return { ok: false, error: "snapshot_not_found" };28792880  // Snapshot the about-to-be-replaced current state so the restore is2881  // reversible. takeVaultSnapshot is no-op when the most recent entry is2882  // byte-identical, so a restore-of-a-restore stays clean.2883  await takeVaultSnapshot("restore");28842885  let restoredA: StoredVault;2886  let restoredB: StoredVault;2887  try {2888    restoredA = JSON.parse(snapshot.vault_a) as StoredVault;2889    restoredB = JSON.parse(snapshot.vault_b) as StoredVault;2890  } catch {2891    return { ok: false, error: "snapshot_corrupt" };2892  }28932894  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, restoredA);2895  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, restoredB);2896  await stampLocalVaultMutation();28972898  // Lock so the user must prove they can decrypt the restored blob. If they2899  // restored a pre-password-change snapshot they discover it immediately at2900  // the lock screen rather than silently holding an inaccessible vault.2901  lock();29022903  return { ok: true };2904}29052906/**2907 * Rotate the vault's sync identity by generating a FRESH ROOT KEY and2908 * re-wrapping everything under it (MV-8). Because every sync credential —2909 * vault_id, the Noise static keypair, the Ed25519 manifest signing key,2910 * and the per-entry envelope keys — derives from the root key, rotation2911 * makes a lost/stolen device's retained key material useless. All paired2912 * devices must re-pair afterwards.2913 *2914 * CONSEQUENCE THE UI MUST SURFACE: the 12 recovery words also derive from2915 * the root key, so rotation INVALIDATES the old recovery phrase. The flow2916 * sets peach_recovery_pending so the popup re-presents the new words for2917 * confirmation, same as the migrateToRecovery rotate path.2918 */2919export async function rotateSyncIdentity(): Promise<{ ok: boolean; error?: string }> {2920  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {2921    return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };2922  }2923  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);2924  if (!slotA) return { ok: false, error: "missing_slot_a" };29252926  // 1. Fresh root key + recovery escrow (new words).2927  const { rawRootKey, recoverySalt, wrappedRootKey, wrappedNonce, wrappedTag } =2928    await generateAndWrapRootKey();29292930  // 2. Re-wrap the new root key under the current password-derived key.2931  const newRootKey = unhex(rawRootKey);2932  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(derivedKey, newRootKey);29332934  // 3. Snapshot, then single atomic slot write — both escrow wrappings of2935  //    the new root key land together (same transactional rule as2936  //    changePassword). Entries are untouched: they are sealed under the2937  //    password-derived key, not the root key.2938  await takeVaultSnapshot("local_save");2939  const nextSlotA: StoredVault = {2940    ...slotA,2941    recovery_salt: recoverySalt,2942    recovery_wrapped_root_key: wrappedRootKey,2943    recovery_nonce: wrappedNonce,2944    recovery_tag: wrappedTag,2945    ...pwRoot,2946  };2947  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, nextSlotA);29482949  // 4. Swap in memory only after disk committed.2950  if (rootKey) zeroKey(rootKey);2951  rootKey = newRootKey;29522953  // 5. Old peers' identities derive from the dead root key — drop them all.2954  await clearPairedDevices();29552956  // 6. Force re-presentation of the NEW recovery words on next popup view.2957  await setRecoveryConfirmPending(); // same flag the create-vault flow uses29582959  await stampLocalVaultMutation();2960  return { ok: true };2961}29622963/**2964 * Change the master password. Re-encrypts slot A with a fresh salt + new2965 * derived key. Slot B (duress or noise) is left untouched when duress is2966 * configured — it uses an independent key derived from the duress password —2967 * and regenerated as noise when duress is not configured.2968 */2969export async function changePassword(2970  currentPassword: string,2971  newPassword: string2972): Promise<boolean> {2973  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") return false;29742975  // Verify current password before allowing any change2976  const valid = await verifyMainPassword(currentPassword);2977  if (!valid) return false;29782979  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);2980  if (!slotA) return false;2981  if (!rootKey) return false;29822983  // Derive fresh key from new password + new random salt2984  const newSalt = generateSalt();2985  const newKey = await deriveKey(newPassword, newSalt);29862987  // Re-encrypt the in-memory entries with the new key2988  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured, duressConfigured ? DURESS_SLOT_SIZE : 0);2989  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(newKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");29902991  // Pre-wrap root key under the new derived key. Recovery fields wrap rootKey2992  // under recovery words and remain untouched — recovery phrase keeps working2993  // across password changes (H4/COR-002).2994  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(newKey, rootKey);29952996  const finalSlotA: StoredVault = {2997    ...slotA,2998    salt: hex(newSalt),2999    nonce,3000    ciphertext,3001    tag,3002    ...pwRoot,3003  };30043005  // Snapshot the OLD-key blob before overwriting it. If the user later3006  // restores from this snapshot they will need the OLD password — the3007  // post-restore lock surfaces that immediately.3008  await takeVaultSnapshot("local_save");30093010  // Single atomic write: ciphertext, salt, and pw_root_* fields all land in3011  // one storage transaction. An SW kill before this point leaves the old3012  // slot intact; after this point everything tied to the new password is3013  // already on disk together (M6/COR-004).3014  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, finalSlotA);30153016  // Swap the in-memory key synchronously before any further await. If we3017  // threw between the Slot A write and this swap, the next persistEntries()3018  // would overwrite Slot A with old-key ciphertext, locking the user out.3019  zeroKey(derivedKey);3020  derivedKey = newKey;30213022  // PCH-01-008: the MV3 session escrow still holds the OLD key. Without this,3023  // the next service-worker restore decrypts the new-key Slot A with the stale3024  // key, fails tryDecryptSlotResult, and silently drops the user to a lock3025  // screen. Re-escrow the new key so restore survives a password change.3026  void saveSessionKey(newKey, "real");30273028  // Regenerate noise for slot B when duress is not in use. Runs after the3029  // key swap so a failure here is a disposable noise regeneration, not a3030  // lockout.3031  if (!duressConfigured) {3032    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2));3033  }3034  await stampLocalVaultMutation();30353036  return true;3037}