vault.ts

1/**2 * vault.ts — sole owner of vault state and chrome.storage vault keys.3 *4 * Every read/write of `peach_vault_a`, `peach_vault_b`, and `peach_settings`5 * goes through this module. No other file accesses those keys directly.6 * External callers reach vault operations via `messages.ts` — never by7 * importing from here cross-boundary (popup/content must not). Invariants8 * for the two-slot schema, unlock timing, and key/disk atomicity are in9 * Projects.md §3.2–§3.6.10 */1112import { deriveKey, generateSalt } from "../crypto/argon2";13import { extractDomain } from "../shared/domain";14import {15  rootKeyToWords,16  wordsToRootKeyMaterial,17  deriveRecoveryKey,18} from "../shared/recovery-words";19import type {20  AccentColorName,21  LegacyVaultEntry,22  ManualSummonRecord,23  SavedIdentity,24  StoredVault,25  VaultEntry,26  VaultHistory,27  VaultSnapshot,28} from "../shared/types";29import { decrypt, encrypt, zeroKey } from "./aes";30import { clearAutoLock, touchAutoLock } from "./alarms";3132type EntryDraft = Omit<33  VaultEntry,34  "id" | "createdAt" | "modifiedAt" | "deletedAt"35>;3637// Slot-neutral storage keys (v1.4.24+). Both slots always exist; slot B38// either holds the decoy vault (when duress is configured) or random noise39// that looks identical at rest. No external indicator is stored — duress40// configuration is recorded only inside the encrypted payload of slot A.41const SLOT_A = "peach_vault_a";42const SLOT_B = "peach_vault_b";4344// Legacy keys, migrated away on first access.45const LEGACY_MAIN = "peach_vault";46const LEGACY_DECOY = "peach_decoy_vault";47const LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG = "peach_duress";4849// Plaintext is padded to the next multiple of this size before encryption.50// This coarsens ciphertext-length leakage into 1 KiB buckets.51const PAD_BLOCK = 1024;5253let derivedKey: Uint8Array | null = null;54// 32-byte random root key, separate from the derivedKey used for vault encryption.55// The root key is wrapped (encrypted) under the recovery key derived from the56// 12-word phrase. When the user changes their password, only the wrapping changes;57// the root key and recovery words remain stable.58let rootKey: Uint8Array | null = null;59let entries: VaultEntry[] = [];60let domainIndex: Map<string, VaultEntry[]> = new Map();61let vaultMode: "real" | "decoy" = "real";62// Cached post-unlock view of whether the real vault records that duress is63// configured. Only meaningful after a real-mode unlock; for decoy-mode unlock64// this stays false because we never see slot A's plaintext.65let duressConfigured = false;6667let migrationRan = false;6869// Set to a corruption reason during the last unlock() attempt when both slots70// decrypted but failed schema validation. Consumed and cleared by71// consumeLastUnlockFailureReason() so messages.ts can surface vault_corrupted72// distinctly from wrong-password (M7/COR-007).73//74// NOTE: module-level state — if vault.ts is ever moved to a worker context,75// this must be replaced with a structured return value from unlock() or a76// postMessage channel. The signal is invisible across module-instance77// boundaries.78let lastUnlockFailureReason: string | null = null;7980export function consumeLastUnlockFailureReason(): string | null {81  const r = lastUnlockFailureReason;82  lastUnlockFailureReason = null;83  return r;84}8586// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------87// Settings (persisted inside the encrypted vault store as a sidecar key)88// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------8990export type TextSize = "small" | "medium" | "large";9192export interface VaultSettings {93  accentColor?: AccentColorName;94  theme?: "dark" | "light";95  autoLockMinutes?: number;96  clipboardClearSeconds?: number;97  lockOnClose?: boolean;98  breachMonitoring?: boolean;99  passkeyProviderEnabled?: boolean;100  trashRetentionDays?: number;101  manualSummonDomains?: Record<string, ManualSummonRecord>;102  declinedCardFingerprints?: string[];103  /**104   * Text size scale for body copy and entry titles. Stops at "large" by105   * design — XL clips dense screens (Vault, Health) inside the fixed106   * 330×480 popup surface.107   */108  textSize?: TextSize;109  /**110   * When true, all entrance/exit transitions and ambient animations are111   * collapsed to instant. Honoured alongside the user's OS-level112   * `prefers-reduced-motion`.113   */114  reduceMotion?: boolean;115  /**116   * Android-only: when true, the master key is escrowed in AndroidKeyStore117   * and the lock screen offers biometric unlock. Toggled from Settings →118   * Security → Biometrics. Has no effect on desktop builds.119   */120  biometricsEnabled?: boolean;121  /**122   * User overrides for keyboard shortcuts. Keys are ShortcutAction names123   * (see src/shared/shortcuts.ts). Missing actions fall through to124   * DEFAULT_BINDINGS — `getActiveBindings(settings.shortcuts)` is the125   * canonical lookup. Storing only the deltas keeps the vault payload126   * small and lets default updates land for users who never rebind.127   */128  shortcuts?: Record<string, { key: string; ctrl?: boolean; meta?: boolean; shift?: boolean; alt?: boolean }>;129}130131let settings: VaultSettings = {};132133export function getSettings(): VaultSettings {134  return settings;135}136137export async function ensureSettingsLoaded(): Promise<VaultSettings> {138  await loadSettings();139  return settings;140}141142export async function updateSettings(patch: Partial<VaultSettings>): Promise<void> {143  await loadSettings();144  settings = { ...settings, ...patch };145  await persistSettings();146}147148async function persistSettings(): Promise<void> {149  try {150    await chrome.storage.local.set({ peach_settings: settings });151  } catch (err) {152    throw mapStorageError(err);153  }154}155156function mapStorageError(err: unknown): Error {157  const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);158  if (/QUOTA_BYTES|quota/i.test(message)) {159    return new Error("STORAGE_QUOTA_EXCEEDED");160  }161  return err instanceof Error ? err : new Error(message);162}163164async function loadSettings(): Promise<void> {165  const result = await chrome.storage.local.get("peach_settings");166  settings = (result as { peach_settings?: VaultSettings }).peach_settings ?? {};167}168169// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------170// HIBP breach check (k-anonymity model)171// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------172173export async function checkBreach(password: string): Promise<number> {174  // HIBP k-anonymity API is keyed on SHA-1 prefixes — this is dictated by175  // the public API, not a security choice. Do not migrate to SHA-256 here.176  const encoder = new TextEncoder();177  const hashBuffer = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-1", encoder.encode(password));178  const hashHex = Array.from(new Uint8Array(hashBuffer))179    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))180    .join("")181    .toUpperCase();182183  const prefix = hashHex.slice(0, 5);184  const suffix = hashHex.slice(5);185186  try {187    const res = await fetch(`https://api.pwnedpasswords.com/range/${prefix}`);188    if (!res.ok) return 0;189    const text = await res.text();190    const match = text.split("\r\n").find((l) => l.startsWith(suffix));191    return match ? parseInt(match.split(":")[1], 10) : 0;192  } catch {193    return 0; // Network unavailable — don't block194  }195}196197export async function declineCardSaveOffer(last4: string, expMonth: string, expYear: string): Promise<void> {198  const fingerprint = await cardFingerprint(last4, expMonth, expYear);199  await loadSettings();200  settings = {201    ...settings,202    declinedCardFingerprints: [...(settings.declinedCardFingerprints ?? []), fingerprint],203  };204  await persistSettings();205}206207export async function isCardDeclined(last4: string, expMonth: string, expYear: string): Promise<boolean> {208  await loadSettings();209  const fingerprint = await cardFingerprint(last4, expMonth, expYear);210  return (settings.declinedCardFingerprints ?? []).includes(fingerprint);211}212213async function cardFingerprint(last4: string, expMonth: string, expYear: string): Promise<string> {214  const encoder = new TextEncoder();215  const buf = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", encoder.encode(`${last4}|${expMonth}|${expYear}`));216  return Array.from(new Uint8Array(buf).slice(0, 8))217    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))218    .join("");219}220221function hex(buf: Uint8Array): string {222  return Array.from(buf)223    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))224    .join("");225}226227function unhex(s: string): Uint8Array {228  const out = new Uint8Array(s.length / 2);229  for (let i = 0; i < s.length; i += 2) {230    out[i / 2] = parseInt(s.slice(i, i + 2), 16);231  }232  return out;233}234235// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------236// Root key generation and recovery word wrapping237// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------238239/**240 * Generate a random 32-byte root key and wrap it (AES-256-GCM) under a key241 * derived from the recovery word material via HKDF-SHA256. The wrapped blob242 * fields are stored in slot A alongside the password-wrapped ciphertext. The243 * root key itself is kept in memory for the session so getRecoveryWords() can244 * encode it without re-deriving.245 */246async function generateAndWrapRootKey(): Promise<{247  rawRootKey: string; // hex of the plaintext root key — caller stores in rootKey248  recoverySalt: string;249  wrappedRootKey: string;250  wrappedNonce: string;251  wrappedTag: string;252}> {253  const rootKeyBytes = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32));254255  // Derive the recovery key from the BIP39 words encoding of the root key.256  const words = await rootKeyToWords(rootKeyBytes);257  const wordMaterial = await wordsToRootKeyMaterial(words);258  const recoverySalt = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));259  const recoveryKey = await deriveRecoveryKey(wordMaterial, recoverySalt);260261  // Wrap the root key with the recovery key using AES-256-GCM directly.262  // We hex-encode rootKeyBytes so the plaintext is always valid UTF-8.263  const nonce = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));264  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(hex(rootKeyBytes));265  const raw = await crypto.subtle.encrypt(266    {267      name: "AES-GCM",268      iv: nonce,269      additionalData: new Uint8Array([1]).buffer as ArrayBuffer,270      tagLength: 128,271    },272    recoveryKey,273    encoded274  );275  // WebCrypto returns ciphertext || auth tag concatenated; split them.276  const rawU8 = new Uint8Array(raw);277  const ciphertext = hex(rawU8.slice(0, rawU8.length - 16));278  const tag = hex(rawU8.slice(rawU8.length - 16));279280  return {281    rawRootKey: hex(rootKeyBytes),282    recoverySalt: hex(recoverySalt),283    wrappedRootKey: ciphertext,284    wrappedNonce: hex(nonce),285    wrappedTag: tag,286  };287}288289/**290 * Unwrap the root key using recovery words. Called during recovery flow when291 * the user provides their 12-word phrase and a new password.292 * Exported for use by the RECOVER_WITH_WORDS message handler.293 */294export async function unwrapRootKeyForRecovery(295  wrappedRootKey: string,296  wrappedNonce: string,297  wrappedTag: string,298  recoverySaltHex: string,299  words: string[]300): Promise<void> {301  const wordMaterial = await wordsToRootKeyMaterial(words);302  const recoverySalt = unhex(recoverySaltHex);303  const recoveryKey = await deriveRecoveryKey(wordMaterial, recoverySalt);304305  // Decrypt and cache the root key. The root key bytes were hex-encoded before306  // encryption so the ciphertext is valid UTF-8. We inline the AES-GCM decrypt307  // here to avoid passing a CryptoKey to the string-based encrypt/decrypt helpers.308  // Each component is stored separately in the vault slot; decode them individually309  // so the nonce is always exactly the 12 bytes from wrappedNonce.310  const nonceRaw = unhex(wrappedNonce);311  const ciphertextRaw = unhex(wrappedRootKey);312  const tagRaw = unhex(wrappedTag);313  // Combine ciphertext and tag for AES-GCM (expects ciphertext||tag).314  // Use explicit ArrayBuffer allocations to satisfy TS BufferSource constraints.315  const nonceU8 = nonceRaw as unknown as Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>;316  const combined = new Uint8Array(ciphertextRaw.length + tagRaw.length);317  combined.set(ciphertextRaw, 0);318  combined.set(tagRaw, ciphertextRaw.length);319  const raw = await crypto.subtle.decrypt(320    { name: "AES-GCM", iv: nonceU8, additionalData: new Uint8Array([1]).buffer as ArrayBuffer, tagLength: 128 },321    recoveryKey,322    combined323  );324  const decryptedHex = new TextDecoder().decode(raw);325  rootKey = unhex(decryptedHex);326}327328/**329 * Re-wrap the cached root key under a new derived key (from the user's new330 * password). Called after password change and after recovery re-key so the331 * same recovery words continue to work with the updated password — and so332 * subsequent unlocks can rehydrate rootKey via deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey.333 *334 * recovery_* fields are intentionally not touched: those wrap rootKey under335 * the recovery words, which do not change when the password changes.336 */337export async function rewrapRootKeyForPassword(338  newDerivedKey: Uint8Array,339  _newSalt: Uint8Array340): Promise<void> {341  if (!rootKey) throw new Error("root key not set");342  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);343  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");344  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(newDerivedKey, rootKey);345  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, { ...slotA, ...pwRoot });346}347348/**349 * Change the vault encryption to a new derived key (already derived from350 * the user's new password). Used by RECOVER_WITH_WORDS and changePassword.351 * Caller is responsible for key swap and snapshot.352 */353async function reencryptVaultForNewKey(354  newKey: Uint8Array,355  slotA: StoredVault356): Promise<void> {357  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured);358  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(newKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");359  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, {360    ...slotA,361    nonce,362    ciphertext,363    tag,364  });365}366367/**368 * Full password change with an already-derived key (used after recovery).369 * Unlike changePassword(), this skips re-verification of current password370 * since recovery flow has already validated the user's identity via words.371 */372export async function changePasswordWithNewKey(373  newSalt: Uint8Array,374  newKey: Uint8Array375): Promise<void> {376  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);377  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");378  // reencryptVaultForNewKey must receive the updated salt so that subsequent379  // UNLOCK calls with the new password can re-derive the correct key.380  await reencryptVaultForNewKey(newKey, { ...slotA, salt: hex(newSalt) });381  if (derivedKey) zeroKey(derivedKey);382  derivedKey = newKey;383  // Refresh pw_root_* under the new key so deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey works384  // on the next unlock (H2/COR-006). If rootKey is missing — recovery flow385  // should have populated it — fall back silently rather than blowing up the386  // recovery path; migrateToRecovery will rehydrate on the next unlock.387  if (rootKey) {388    const slotAfter = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);389    if (slotAfter) {390      const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(newKey, rootKey);391      await writeSlot(SLOT_A, { ...slotAfter, ...pwRoot });392    }393  }394  if (!duressConfigured) {395    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(slotA.ciphertext.length / 2));396  }397  await stampLocalVaultMutation();398}399400// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------401// Salt generation --- exported so the RECOVER_WITH_WORDS handler can derive402// a new key after password reset without re-importing the crypto module.403// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------404405export { deriveKey, generateSalt };406407export async function loadSlotA(): Promise<StoredVault | null> {408  return loadSlot(SLOT_A);409}410411/**412 * Recover the session root key by AES-GCM-decrypting the pw_root_* fields413 * (a second wrapping of the root key under the password-derived key). This414 * is what makes GET_RECOVERY_WORDS work across lock/unlock cycles without415 * the user re-entering their recovery phrase: the same root key bytes —416 * and therefore the same 12 words — survive every unlock.417 *418 * Returns null when the pw_root fields are absent (pre-v2.12 vault that419 * hasn't been migrated yet) or when decryption fails (wrong derived key,420 * tampered ciphertext). On null the caller should fall through to421 * migrateToRecovery() to populate the fields.422 */423async function deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(424  derivedKeyBytes: Uint8Array,425  slotA: StoredVault,426): Promise<Uint8Array | null> {427  if (!slotA.pw_root_ciphertext || !slotA.pw_root_nonce || !slotA.pw_root_tag) {428    return null;429  }430  try {431    const rootHex = await decrypt(432      derivedKeyBytes,433      slotA.pw_root_nonce,434      slotA.pw_root_ciphertext,435      slotA.pw_root_tag,436      "pw_root_v1",437    );438    return unhex(rootHex);439  } catch {440    return null;441  }442}443444// AES-GCM-wrap rootKey under derivedKey for the pw_root_* fields. Returns the445// hex-encoded ciphertext/nonce/tag triple ready to embed in StoredVault.446async function wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(447  derivedKeyBytes: Uint8Array,448  rootKeyBytes: Uint8Array,449): Promise<{ pw_root_ciphertext: string; pw_root_nonce: string; pw_root_tag: string }> {450  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKeyBytes, hex(rootKeyBytes), "pw_root_v1");451  return {452    pw_root_ciphertext: ciphertext,453    pw_root_nonce: nonce,454    pw_root_tag: tag,455  };456}457458/**459 * For vaults created before v2.12 (no recovery_salt/recovery_wrapped_root_key),460 * generate the root key, wrap it under the recovery words, and persist the461 * recovery escrow into slot A. The caller must show the recovery words to the462 * user before calling this — once called, those words are the vault's recovery463 * path. This runs once, on the first unlock of an upgraded vault.464 */465export async function migrateToRecovery(): Promise<void> {466  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {467    throw new Error("vault must be unlocked in real mode");468  }469  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);470  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");471  const hasRecoveryEscrow =472    !!slotA.recovery_salt && !!slotA.recovery_wrapped_root_key;473  const hasPwRoot = !!slotA.pw_root_ciphertext && !!slotA.pw_root_nonce;474  if (hasRecoveryEscrow && hasPwRoot) return; // already done475476  // If recovery escrow already exists but pw_root doesn't, we cannot recover477  // the original rootKey without the user's words. The least-surprising path478  // is to rotate to a fresh root key — the user's old recovery words become479  // invalid but we surface peach_recovery_pending so the popup re-presents480  // the words. The unlock-path callers all set that flag.481  const { rawRootKey, recoverySalt, wrappedRootKey, wrappedNonce, wrappedTag } =482    await generateAndWrapRootKey();483  rootKey = unhex(rawRootKey);484485  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(derivedKey, rootKey);486  const nextSlotA: StoredVault = {487    ...slotA,488    recovery_salt: recoverySalt,489    recovery_wrapped_root_key: wrappedRootKey,490    recovery_nonce: wrappedNonce,491    recovery_tag: wrappedTag,492    ...pwRoot,493  };494  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, nextSlotA);495  await stampLocalVaultMutation();496}497498/**499 * Returns the 12 recovery words for the current session's root key.500 * Must be called while the vault is unlocked. Throws if recovery has not501 * been set up (pre-v2.12 vault that hasn't migrated yet).502 */503export async function getRecoveryWords(): Promise<string[]> {504  if (!rootKey) {505    throw new Error("recovery not set up — vault may need migration");506  }507  return rootKeyToWords(rootKey);508}509510async function loadSlot(key: string): Promise<StoredVault | null> {511  const result = await chrome.storage.local.get(key);512  return (result as Record<string, StoredVault | undefined>)[key] ?? null;513}514515async function writeSlot(key: string, vault: StoredVault): Promise<void> {516  try {517    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [key]: vault });518  } catch (err) {519    throw mapStorageError(err);520  }521}522523async function stampLocalVaultMutation(): Promise<void> {524  await chrome.storage.local.set({525    peach_last_modified_at: String(Date.now()),526  });527}528529/**530 * One-shot migration from the pre-A-2 schema (peach_vault + peach_decoy_vault531 * + peach_duress flag) to the slot-neutral schema (peach_vault_a +532 * peach_vault_b). Runs at most once per session; safe to call repeatedly.533 */534async function ensureMigrated(): Promise<void> {535  if (migrationRan) return;536  migrationRan = true;537538  const keys = [LEGACY_MAIN, LEGACY_DECOY, LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG, SLOT_A, SLOT_B];539  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get(keys);540  const slotAExists = raw[SLOT_A] !== undefined;541  const slotBExists = raw[SLOT_B] !== undefined;542  const legacyMain = raw[LEGACY_MAIN] as StoredVault | undefined;543  const legacyDecoy = raw[LEGACY_DECOY] as StoredVault | undefined;544545  // Fresh install with nothing in storage — nothing to do; createVault() sets up both slots.546  if (!slotAExists && !legacyMain) return;547548  // Already migrated.549  if (slotAExists && slotBExists && !legacyMain && !legacyDecoy) return;550551  let didMigrate = false;552  if (legacyMain && !slotAExists) {553    await writeSlot(SLOT_A, legacyMain);554    didMigrate = true;555  }556557  // If slot B isn't set, populate it: use legacy decoy when present, else noise.558  if (!slotBExists) {559    const target = (legacyMain ?? raw[SLOT_A]) as StoredVault | undefined;560    if (legacyDecoy) {561      await writeSlot(SLOT_B, legacyDecoy);562      didMigrate = true;563    } else if (target) {564      await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(target.ciphertext.length / 2));565      didMigrate = true;566    }567  }568569  const toRemove: string[] = [];570  if (legacyMain) toRemove.push(LEGACY_MAIN);571  if (legacyDecoy) toRemove.push(LEGACY_DECOY);572  if (raw[LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG] !== undefined) toRemove.push(LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG);573  if (toRemove.length > 0) {574    await chrome.storage.local.remove(toRemove);575    didMigrate = true;576  }577  if (didMigrate) {578    await stampLocalVaultMutation();579  }580}581582// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------583// Padding + noise helpers584// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------585586/**587 * Pads the plaintext string with trailing spaces so that the encoded byte588 * length is a multiple of PAD_BLOCK. JSON.parse tolerates trailing589 * whitespace after a complete document, so the padding is transparent on590 * decode. Ciphertext length equals plaintext length plus a 16-byte tag.591 */592function padPlaintext(json: string): string {593  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(json);594  const target = Math.max(PAD_BLOCK, Math.ceil(encoded.length / PAD_BLOCK) * PAD_BLOCK);595  const padLen = target - encoded.length;596  return json + " ".repeat(padLen);597}598599/**600 * Produces a StoredVault-shaped record filled with CSPRNG bytes. The601 * ciphertext length matches the given byte count. Because GCM ciphertext is602 * pseudo-random, this blob is indistinguishable at rest from a real603 * encrypted vault without the key.604 *605 * crypto.getRandomValues() caps each call at 65536 bytes (the Web Crypto606 * spec hard limit). Chunk the fill so vaults larger than that — common once607 * the user has dozens of entries or any passkey — don't throw.608 */609const CSPRNG_CHUNK = 65_536;610611function fillRandom(buf: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {612  for (let offset = 0; offset < buf.length; offset += CSPRNG_CHUNK) {613    const end = Math.min(offset + CSPRNG_CHUNK, buf.length);614    const chunk = new Uint8Array(end - offset);615    crypto.getRandomValues(chunk);616    buf.set(chunk, offset);617  }618  return buf;619}620621function generateNoiseBlob(ciphertextBytes: number): StoredVault {622  const salt = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));623  const nonce = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));624  const cipher = fillRandom(new Uint8Array(ciphertextBytes));625  const tag = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));626  return {627    version: 1,628    salt: hex(salt),629    nonce: hex(nonce),630    ciphertext: hex(cipher),631    tag: hex(tag),632  };633}634635// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------636// Encrypted plaintext envelope637// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------638639type VaultPayload = {640  entries: VaultEntry[];641  duressConfigured?: boolean;642};643644type DecryptedPayload = {645  entries: VaultEntry[];646  duressConfigured: boolean;647  /**648   * True when at least one entry in the on-disk payload had a legacy shape649   * (pre-v2.11.0 passkey type/flat fields, or pre-A-2 created/updated keys)650   * and got rewritten by normalizeEntry. The unlock path uses this to651   * persist the new shape immediately — without it, the migration would652   * re-run on every unlock and old shape never disappears from disk.653   */654  migratedFromLegacy: boolean;655};656657function encodePayload(entries: VaultEntry[], duress: boolean): string {658  const envelope: VaultPayload = { entries, duressConfigured: duress };659  return padPlaintext(JSON.stringify(envelope));660}661662function rawNeedsMigration(raw: VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry): boolean {663  if ("created" in raw || "updated" in raw) return true;664  const flat = raw as Partial<VaultEntry>;665  if (flat.type === "passkey") return true;666  // Flat rpId without a passkey sub-object means pre-v2.11.0 schema.667  if (flat.rpId !== undefined && flat.passkey === undefined) return true;668  return false;669}670671function decodePayload(plain: string): DecryptedPayload {672  const parsed = JSON.parse(plain) as673    | Array<VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry>674    | VaultPayload;675676  const rawEntries = Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed : parsed.entries ?? [];677  const flatMigrationNeeded = rawEntries.some(rawNeedsMigration);678679  const normalized = rawEntries.map(normalizeEntry);680  const { merged } = mergePasskeyOnlyIntoLogins(normalized);681682  if (Array.isArray(parsed)) {683    return {684      entries: normalized,685      duressConfigured: false,686      migratedFromLegacy: true, // pre-A-2 array shape always needs save687    };688  }689690  return {691    entries: normalized,692    duressConfigured: parsed.duressConfigured === true,693    migratedFromLegacy: flatMigrationNeeded || merged,694  };695}696697/**698 * One-time consolidation pass run alongside the legacy passkey migration.699 *700 * Pre-v2.11.0 the Chrome passkey path always created a fresh `type:"passkey"`701 * entry per registration — so users who tested registration multiple times702 * accumulated several passkey-bearing entries for the same RP, and the703 * migration to the unified shape carried that duplication forward. This704 * pass collapses the duplicates:705 *706 *   1. Group passkey-bearing (and not deleted) entries by `passkey.rpId`.707 *   2. Within each group, the most recently-active credential wins (prefer708 *      lastUsedAt, fall back to passkey.createdAt, fall back to modifiedAt).709 *   3. If a NON-passkey login entry exists for that RP (matched by url or710 *      additionalUrls hostname), attach the winning passkey to it and711 *      soft-delete every passkey-bearing entry in the group.712 *   4. Otherwise, soft-delete every loser in the group, keeping the winner713 *      as a passkey-only entry.714 *715 * Soft delete (deletedAt) rather than splice — the trash flow keeps the716 * record around for retention and the user can restore if the heuristic717 * picked wrong. The `merged` flag goes back to decodePayload so the718 * unlock path persists the consolidated shape immediately.719 */720function mergePasskeyOnlyIntoLogins(entries: VaultEntry[]): { merged: boolean } {721  let merged = false;722  const now = Date.now();723724  const candidates = entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt && e.passkey);725  const byRpId = new Map<string, VaultEntry[]>();726  for (const e of candidates) {727    const rpId = e.passkey!.rpId;728    const list = byRpId.get(rpId);729    if (list) list.push(e);730    else byRpId.set(rpId, [e]);731  }732733  for (const [rpId, group] of byRpId) {734    if (group.length === 0) continue;735    group.sort((a, b) => {736      const aT =737        a.passkey!.lastUsedAt ?? a.passkey!.createdAt ?? a.modifiedAt ?? a.createdAt;738      const bT =739        b.passkey!.lastUsedAt ?? b.passkey!.createdAt ?? b.modifiedAt ?? b.createdAt;740      return bT - aT;741    });742    const winner = group[0]!;743744    // Look for a NON-passkey login entry matching this RP. Use the URL745    // hostname rather than a substring search so a "login.foo.com" entry746    // doesn't accidentally absorb a passkey for "foo.com".747    const loginTarget = entries.find((e) => {748      if (e.deletedAt || e.passkey || e.type !== "login") return false;749      if (e.url && extractDomain(e.url) === rpId) return true;750      for (const extra of e.additionalUrls ?? []) {751        if (extractDomain(extra) === rpId) return true;752      }753      return false;754    });755756    if (loginTarget) {757      loginTarget.passkey = winner.passkey;758      loginTarget.modifiedAt = now;759      for (const dup of group) {760        if (!dup.deletedAt) {761          dup.deletedAt = now;762          dup.modifiedAt = now;763        }764      }765      merged = true;766    } else if (group.length > 1) {767      for (let i = 1; i < group.length; i += 1) {768        const dup = group[i]!;769        if (!dup.deletedAt) {770          dup.deletedAt = now;771          dup.modifiedAt = now;772        }773      }774      merged = true;775    }776  }777778  return { merged };779}780781// Validates that a `StoredVault` record on disk has the field shape we expect782// before treating an AES-GCM decrypt success as a clean unlock. AES-GCM only783// authenticates the static VERSION_BYTE AAD, not the `version` field on the784// outer record — a corrupted `version: 42` slot still decrypts cleanly. This785// check surfaces that as `corrupted` (M7/COR-007) so the popup can offer a786// history-restore path instead of falsely reporting "wrong password".787function hasValidVaultSchema(v: unknown): v is StoredVault {788  if (typeof v !== "object" || v === null) return false;789  const r = v as Record<string, unknown>;790  return (791    r.version === 1 &&792    typeof r.salt === "string" &&793    typeof r.nonce === "string" &&794    typeof r.ciphertext === "string" &&795    typeof r.tag === "string"796  );797}798799export type TryDecryptResult =800  | { status: "ok"; payload: DecryptedPayload }801  | { status: "wrong_key" }802  | { status: "corrupted"; reason: string };803804// Exported solely for `unlockFromCodex` below, which needs to verify a805// supplied passphrase against a slotA blob *without* committing anything to806// storage. Keep this internal otherwise — callers crossing the messages.ts807// boundary should always go through `unlock` / `verifyMainPassword` so the808// constant-time invariants in Projects.md §3.4 are not bypassed.809export async function tryDecryptSlot(810  vault: StoredVault,811  key: Uint8Array,812  aadTag?: string,813): Promise<DecryptedPayload | null> {814  const res = await tryDecryptSlotResult(vault, key, aadTag);815  return res.status === "ok" ? res.payload : null;816}817818export async function tryDecryptSlotResult(819  vault: StoredVault,820  key: Uint8Array,821  aadTag?: string,822): Promise<TryDecryptResult> {823  if (!hasValidVaultSchema(vault)) {824    return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_slot_schema" };825  }826  let plain: string;827  try {828    plain = await decrypt(key, vault.nonce, vault.ciphertext, vault.tag, aadTag);829  } catch {830    return { status: "wrong_key" };831  }832  try {833    const parsed = JSON.parse(plain) as unknown;834    if (typeof parsed !== "object" || parsed === null) {835      return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_payload_shape" };836    }837    if (!Array.isArray(parsed) && !Array.isArray((parsed as VaultPayload).entries)) {838      return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_payload_shape" };839    }840    return { status: "ok", payload: decodePayload(plain) };841  } catch {842    return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_payload_json" };843  }844}845846// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------847// Core operations848// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------849850function buildDomainIndexSync(all: VaultEntry[]): void {851  domainIndex = new Map();852853  for (const entry of all) {854    if (entry.deletedAt) continue;855    if (entry.type === "note" || entry.type === "card") continue;856857    // An entry can match multiple sites via `additionalUrls`. Index each858    // hostname so `queryDomain` returns the entry regardless of which alias859    // the user is currently visiting. Dedupe per-entry so a single entry860    // never appears twice in one bucket.861    const domains = new Set<string>();862    const primary = extractDomain(entry.url ?? "");863    if (primary) domains.add(primary);864    for (const extra of entry.additionalUrls ?? []) {865      const d = extractDomain(extra);866      if (d) domains.add(d);867    }868    if (domains.size === 0) continue;869870    for (const domain of domains) {871      const bucket = domainIndex.get(domain) ?? [];872      bucket.push(entry);873      domainIndex.set(domain, bucket);874    }875  }876}877878export async function createVault(password: string): Promise<void> {879  await ensureMigrated();880881  const salt = generateSalt();882  derivedKey = await deriveKey(password, salt);883  entries = [];884  vaultMode = "real";885  duressConfigured = false;886  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);887888  // Generate and wrap the root key for recovery word escrow.889  const { rawRootKey, recoverySalt, wrappedRootKey, wrappedNonce, wrappedTag } =890    await generateAndWrapRootKey();891  rootKey = unhex(rawRootKey);892893  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured);894  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");895896  // Second wrapping of rootKey under derivedKey so future unlocks can rehydrate897  // it without recovery words (H2/COR-006).898  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(derivedKey, rootKey);899900  const slotA: StoredVault = {901    version: 1,902    salt: hex(salt),903    nonce,904    ciphertext,905    tag,906    recovery_salt: recoverySalt,907    recovery_wrapped_root_key: wrappedRootKey,908    recovery_nonce: wrappedNonce,909    recovery_tag: wrappedTag,910    ...pwRoot,911  };912  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, slotA);913914  // Matching-size noise blob for slot B, so a fresh install shows two915  // similarly-shaped records regardless of whether duress is ever set up.916  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2));917  await stampLocalVaultMutation();918919  touchAutoLock();920}921922export async function hasVault(): Promise<boolean> {923  await ensureMigrated();924  return (await loadSlot(SLOT_A)) !== null;925}926927/**928 * Returns whether the real vault has recorded that a duress passphrase is929 * configured. Reliable only after a real-mode unlock — before unlock or in930 * decoy mode, returns false because we cannot read slot A's plaintext.931 */932export async function isDuressEnabled(): Promise<boolean> {933  return vaultMode === "real" && duressConfigured;934}935936export async function setupDuress(duressPassword: string): Promise<void> {937  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {938    throw new Error("vault must be unlocked in real mode");939  }940  await ensureMigrated();941942  // Encrypt the decoy payload (empty entries) under the duress key. Pad to943  // at least the current slot A ciphertext size so the two slots look the944  // same at rest at setup time.945  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);946  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");947948  const decoySalt = generateSalt();949  const decoyKey = await deriveKey(duressPassword, decoySalt);950  try {951    // Pad the decoy plaintext to match slot A's ciphertext length (minus the952    // 16-byte tag) so encrypted sizes align exactly.953    const targetBytes = slotA.ciphertext.length / 2;954    let plaintext = encodePayload([], false);955    const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(plaintext);956    if (encoded.length < targetBytes) {957      plaintext = plaintext + " ".repeat(targetBytes - encoded.length);958    }959    const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(decoyKey, plaintext, "slot_b_v1");960    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, {961      version: 1,962      salt: hex(decoySalt),963      nonce,964      ciphertext,965      tag,966    });967  } finally {968    zeroKey(decoyKey);969  }970971  // Re-encrypt slot A with the duressConfigured flag set to true. No external972  // flag is written — the bit lives inside the encrypted envelope.973  duressConfigured = true;974  await persistSlotA();975}976977export async function disableDuress(): Promise<void> {978  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {979    throw new Error("vault must be unlocked in real mode");980  }981  await ensureMigrated();982983  // Overwrite slot B with fresh noise that matches slot A's size. The slot984  // remains occupied so its mere existence does not signal that duress was985  // ever configured.986  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);987  if (slotA) {988    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(slotA.ciphertext.length / 2));989  }990991  duressConfigured = false;992  await persistSlotA();993}994995// L14/COR-015: this function intentionally checks slot A (real vault) only.996// A duress-mode user attempting changePassword is rejected earlier by the997// vaultMode === 'decoy' check at changePassword. The real-vs-decoy998// distinction here is by design — duress users cannot rotate the real999// password by guessing it, and the asymmetry in error timing is acceptable1000// because duress mode is opt-in and the user knows their own decoy key.1001export async function verifyMainPassword(password: string): Promise<boolean> {1002  await ensureMigrated();1003  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1004  if (!slotA) return false;1005  const key = await deriveKey(password, unhex(slotA.salt));1006  try {1007    return (await tryDecryptSlot(slotA, key, "slot_a_v1")) !== null;1008  } finally {1009    zeroKey(key);1010  }1011}10121013export async function unlock(password: string): Promise<boolean> {1014  await ensureMigrated();10151016  // Load both slots in parallel. Both always exist post-migration; the1017  // parallel load and the parallel derivation below keep wall-clock time1018  // constant regardless of which slot's passphrase (real or decoy) the1019  // caller supplied, so a timing side channel cannot distinguish the1020  // duress path from the real-unlock path (DUR-002).1021  const [slotA, slotB] = await Promise.all([1022    loadSlot(SLOT_A),1023    loadSlot(SLOT_B),1024  ]);10251026  // Derive both keys in parallel, unconditionally.1027  const [keyA, keyB] = await Promise.all([1028    slotA ? deriveKey(password, unhex(slotA.salt)) : Promise.resolve(null),1029    slotB ? deriveKey(password, unhex(slotB.salt)) : Promise.resolve(null),1030  ]);10311032  // Attempt both decrypts in parallel. The Result variant lets us distinguish1033  // 'wrong_key' from 'corrupted' so callers can offer a history-restore path1034  // when a slot's schema is invalid even though AES-GCM authenticated (M7).1035  const [resultA, resultB] = await Promise.all([1036    keyA && slotA1037      ? tryDecryptSlotResult(slotA, keyA, "slot_a_v1")1038      : Promise.resolve({ status: "wrong_key" } as TryDecryptResult),1039    keyB && slotB1040      ? tryDecryptSlotResult(slotB, keyB, "slot_b_v1")1041      : Promise.resolve({ status: "wrong_key" } as TryDecryptResult),1042  ]);1043  const payloadA = resultA.status === "ok" ? resultA.payload : null;1044  const payloadB = resultB.status === "ok" ? resultB.payload : null;10451046  if (payloadA && keyA) {1047    derivedKey = keyA;1048    vaultMode = "real";1049    entries = payloadA.entries;1050    duressConfigured = payloadA.duressConfigured;1051    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1052    await loadSettings();1053    touchAutoLock();1054    if (keyB) zeroKey(keyB);10551056    // slotA is non-null when payloadA is truthy (keyA was derived from slotA).1057    if (slotA) {1058      const needsRecoverySetup =1059        !slotA.recovery_salt || !slotA.recovery_wrapped_root_key;1060      if (!needsRecoverySetup) {1061        rootKey = await deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(keyA, slotA);1062      }1063      // Pre-v2.12 vault, or a vault whose pw_root_* fields haven't been written1064      // yet: generate the recovery escrow and seed pw_root_* so subsequent1065      // unlocks can rehydrate rootKey without the user's recovery words.1066      // Best-effort — a failure here must not block unlock.1067      if (needsRecoverySetup || !rootKey) {1068        try {1069          await migrateToRecovery();1070          if (needsRecoverySetup) {1071            // String "1" matches the popup's existing peach_recovery_pending1072            // check; surfaced so the user re-confirms recovery words after a1073            // legacy-vault unlock (H2/COR-006).1074            await chrome.storage.local.set({ peach_recovery_pending: '1' });1075          }1076        } catch (migrationErr) {1077          console.warn('[Peach] recovery migration failed:', migrationErr);1078        }1079      }1080    }10811082    // If the payload had a pre-v2.11.0 shape (legacy passkey type, flat1083    // passkey fields, or pre-A-2 created/updated keys), rewrite it now so1084    // the next save uses the new format and migration doesn't re-run forever.1085    if (payloadA.migratedFromLegacy) {1086      await persistSlotA();1087    }1088    return true;1089  }10901091  if (payloadB && keyB) {1092    derivedKey = keyB;1093    vaultMode = "decoy";1094    entries = payloadB.entries;1095    duressConfigured = false;1096    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1097    await loadSettings();1098    touchAutoLock();1099    if (keyA) zeroKey(keyA);1100    return true;1101  }11021103  if (keyA) zeroKey(keyA);1104  if (keyB) zeroKey(keyB);1105  // Surface corruption (good AES tag, broken schema) distinctly from1106  // wrong-password so the popup can offer history-restore (M7/COR-007).1107  if (resultA.status === "corrupted") {1108    lastUnlockFailureReason = resultA.reason;1109  } else if (resultB.status === "corrupted") {1110    lastUnlockFailureReason = resultB.reason;1111  }1112  return false;1113}11141115export function lock(): void {1116  if (derivedKey) {1117    zeroKey(derivedKey);1118    derivedKey = null;1119  }1120  if (rootKey) {1121    rootKey.fill(0);1122    rootKey = null;1123  }11241125  entries = [];1126  domainIndex = new Map();1127  vaultMode = "real";1128  duressConfigured = false;1129  clearAutoLock();1130}11311132export function isUnlocked(): boolean {1133  return derivedKey !== null;1134}11351136// Opens the vault using a pre-derived AES-256 key (skipping Argon2id).1137// Used by Android biometric unlock — the key was derived on the native side.1138export async function unlockWithKey(1139  masterKeyHex: string,1140): Promise<{ ok: true; entries: VaultEntry[] } | { ok: false; error: string }> {1141  try {1142    const masterKeyBytes = unhex(masterKeyHex);1143    const stored = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1144    if (!stored) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };1145    const payload = await tryDecryptSlot(stored, masterKeyBytes, "slot_a_v1");1146    if (!payload) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };11471148    derivedKey = masterKeyBytes;1149    vaultMode = "real";1150    entries = payload.entries;1151    duressConfigured = payload.duressConfigured;1152    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1153    await loadSettings();1154    touchAutoLock();1155    return { ok: true, entries };1156  } catch {1157    return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };1158  }1159}11601161/**1162 * Restore the vault from a parsed Peach Codex payload.1163 *1164 * The supplied passphrase is verified against the Codex's slotA *before* any1165 * storage mutation — wrong passphrases return without touching disk. On1166 * success, the current vault state is snapshotted (reason: "restore") so the1167 * user can revert via Settings -> Vault History, then slotA/slotB are written1168 * and `peach_last_modified_at` is set to the Codex's recorded timestamp. A1169 * regular `unlock()` follows so the rest of the SW sees the standard1170 * post-unlock state.1171 *1172 * Intentionally non-Pro-gated — see peach_codex_v2.md "Pro gating". A Codex1173 * printed by a Pro user must always be restorable, even on a free device.1174 *1175 * Timing is not held constant here (in contrast to `unlock`): the Codex flow1176 * is an explicit user action with a known passphrase, not a passive lock1177 * screen, so the duress-vs-real timing side channel does not apply.1178 */1179export async function unlockFromCodex(params: {1180  slotA: string; // JSON string of StoredVault for slot A1181  slotB: string | null; // JSON string of StoredVault for slot B, or null1182  timestamp: number;1183  masterPassphrase: string;1184}): Promise<1185  | { ok: true; entryCount: number }1186  | { ok: false; reason: "wrong_passphrase" | "invalid_slot_format" }1187> {1188  let parsedSlotA: StoredVault;1189  let parsedSlotB: StoredVault | null = null;1190  try {1191    const rawA = JSON.parse(params.slotA) as unknown;1192    if (!hasValidVaultSchema(rawA)) {1193      return { ok: false, reason: "invalid_slot_format" };1194    }1195    parsedSlotA = rawA;1196    if (params.slotB !== null) {1197      const rawB = JSON.parse(params.slotB) as unknown;1198      if (!hasValidVaultSchema(rawB)) {1199        return { ok: false, reason: "invalid_slot_format" };1200      }1201      parsedSlotB = rawB;1202    }1203  } catch {1204    return { ok: false, reason: "invalid_slot_format" };1205  }12061207  // Verify the passphrase against the supplied slotA WITHOUT writing anything.1208  // If this fails the on-disk vault is left completely untouched.1209  const trialKey = await deriveKey(params.masterPassphrase, unhex(parsedSlotA.salt));1210  const trialPayload = await tryDecryptSlot(parsedSlotA, trialKey, "slot_a_v1");1211  if (!trialPayload) {1212    zeroKey(trialKey);1213    return { ok: false, reason: "wrong_passphrase" };1214  }1215  // Drop the trial key; `unlock()` below derives its own copy. Holding two1216  // copies of the master key in memory at once would be a needless surface.1217  zeroKey(trialKey);12181219  // Snapshot the about-to-be-overwritten on-disk state so the user can revert1220  // a mistaken Codex restore via the Vault History UI. Non-fatal if it fails.1221  await takeVaultSnapshot("restore");12221223  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, parsedSlotA);1224  if (parsedSlotB) {1225    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, parsedSlotB);1226  } else {1227    // Slot B must always exist with ciphertext length matching slot A1228    // (Projects.md §3.2). Codex prints may omit slot B (duress wasn't1229    // configured); regenerate noise to satisfy the invariant.1230    await writeSlot(1231      SLOT_B,1232      generateNoiseBlob(parsedSlotA.ciphertext.length / 2),1233    );1234  }1235  await chrome.storage.local.set({1236    peach_last_modified_at: String(params.timestamp),1237  });12381239  // Standard unlock path so domain index, settings, auto-lock, and1240  // recovery-key state all populate exactly as a normal unlock would.1241  const ok = await unlock(params.masterPassphrase);1242  if (!ok) {1243    // Should be unreachable — we just verified the passphrase against the1244    // same slotA we wrote. Treat as wrong_passphrase to keep the contract1245    // simple if some race or storage anomaly intrudes.1246    return { ok: false, reason: "wrong_passphrase" };1247  }1248  return { ok: true, entryCount: getEntries().length };1249}12501251// Returns the current in-memory derived key as a hex string.1252// Used by the biometric enable flow in Settings to store the key in Android Keystore.1253export function getDerivedKeyHex(): string {1254  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_not_unlocked");1255  return hex(derivedKey);1256}12571258export function getEntries(): VaultEntry[] {1259  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1260  return entries.filter((entry) => !entry.deletedAt);1261}12621263const EMAIL_RE = /^[^\s@]+@[^\s@]+\.[^\s@]+$/;12641265export function getIdentities(): SavedIdentity[] {1266  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1267  const active = entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt && e.type === "login");12681269  const emailMap = new Map<string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }>();1270  const usernameMap = new Map<string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }>();12711272  for (const entry of active) {1273    const value = entry.username?.trim();1274    if (!value) continue;1275    const map = EMAIL_RE.test(value) ? emailMap : usernameMap;1276    const existing = map.get(value);1277    const domain = extractDomain(entry.url ?? "") ?? "";1278    const modifiedAt = entry.modifiedAt ?? entry.createdAt ?? 0;1279    if (!existing || modifiedAt > existing.lastUsed) {1280      map.set(value, { lastUsed: modifiedAt, count: (existing?.count ?? 0) + 1, domain });1281    } else {1282      map.set(value, { ...existing, count: existing.count + 1 });1283    }1284  }12851286  const toIdentity = (type: "email" | "username") =>1287    ([value, d]: [string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }]): SavedIdentity => ({1288      value, type, lastUsed: d.lastUsed, useCount: d.count, exampleDomain: d.domain || undefined,1289    });12901291  return [1292    ...[...emailMap.entries()].map(toIdentity("email")).sort((a, b) => b.useCount - a.useCount),1293    ...[...usernameMap.entries()].map(toIdentity("username")).sort((a, b) => b.useCount - a.useCount),1294  ];1295}12961297export async function batchAddEntries(drafts: EntryDraft[]): Promise<VaultEntry[]> {1298  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");12991300  const now = Date.now();1301  const added: VaultEntry[] = [];1302  for (const draft of drafts) {1303    try {1304      const sanitized = sanitizeEntryDraft(draft);1305      const nextEntry: VaultEntry = {1306        ...sanitized,1307        id: crypto.randomUUID(),1308        createdAt: now,1309        modifiedAt: now,1310      };1311      entries.push(nextEntry);1312      added.push(nextEntry);1313    } catch {1314      // Skip invalid drafts silently — caller can see diff between input and output length1315    }1316  }13171318  if (added.length > 0) {1319    await persistEntries();1320  }13211322  return added;1323}13241325/**1326 * Restore a set of entries in full fidelity — preserves id, createdAt,1327 * modifiedAt, and every other field unlike `batchAddEntries` which1328 * assigns fresh identity. Used by restore paths where the backup is the1329 * authoritative source of truth. `mode` controls how entries already in1330 * the vault are treated.1331 */1332export async function restoreEntries(1333  incoming: VaultEntry[],1334  mode: "replace" | "merge"1335): Promise<{ added: number; updated: number; skipped: number }> {1336  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");13371338  // A replace with zero incoming entries is almost certainly a caller bug1339  // (e.g. an import that silently dropped everything). Refuse rather than1340  // wipe the vault.1341  if (mode === "replace" && incoming.length === 0) {1342    throw new Error("refuse to replace with empty entry set");1343  }13441345  let added = 0;1346  let updated = 0;1347  let skipped = 0;13481349  if (mode === "replace") {1350    entries = [];1351    for (const entry of incoming) {1352      const normalized = sanitizeRestoredEntry(entry);1353      if (!normalized) {1354        skipped += 1;1355        continue;1356      }1357      entries.push(normalized);1358      added += 1;1359    }1360  } else {1361    const byId = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();1362    for (const e of entries) byId.set(e.id, e);13631364    for (const entry of incoming) {1365      const normalized = sanitizeRestoredEntry(entry);1366      if (!normalized) {1367        skipped += 1;1368        continue;1369      }1370      const existing = byId.get(normalized.id);1371      if (!existing) {1372        entries.push(normalized);1373        added += 1;1374      } else if (normalized.modifiedAt > existing.modifiedAt) {1375        const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === existing.id);1376        if (idx !== -1) {1377          entries[idx] = normalized;1378          updated += 1;1379        }1380      } else {1381        skipped += 1;1382      }1383    }1384  }13851386  await persistEntries("import");1387  return { added, updated, skipped };1388}13891390/**1391 * Validate + normalise a VaultEntry coming from a backup. Accepts1392 * anything structurally sound; keeps all metadata verbatim. Returns1393 * null for values the live vault shouldn't accept (e.g., missing title).1394 */1395function sanitizeRestoredEntry(entry: VaultEntry): VaultEntry | null {1396  if (!entry || typeof entry !== "object") return null;1397  const title = typeof entry.title === "string" ? entry.title.trim() : "";1398  if (!title) return null;1399  const id = typeof entry.id === "string" && entry.id ? entry.id : crypto.randomUUID();1400  const now = Date.now();1401  const createdAt = typeof entry.createdAt === "number" ? entry.createdAt : now;1402  const modifiedAt = typeof entry.modifiedAt === "number" ? entry.modifiedAt : createdAt;14031404  // Migrate legacy passkey shape on import (same logic as on-disk read).1405  // Imports from pre-v2.11.0 vault backups still carry type:"passkey" with1406  // flat fields; bring them into the new shape immediately.1407  const migrated: VaultEntry = migrateLegacyPasskey(1408    {1409      ...entry,1410      id,1411      title,1412      type: entry.type ?? "login",1413      createdAt,1414      modifiedAt,1415    },1416    entry1417  );14181419  // Login entries from backup must carry a password (or be passkey-only,1420  // in which case the passkey sub-object replaces the password requirement).1421  if (1422    migrated.type === "login" &&1423    !migrated.passkey &&1424    typeof migrated.password !== "string"1425  ) {1426    return null;1427  }1428  if (migrated.passkey && !migrated.passkey.credentialId) {1429    return null;1430  }14311432  return migrated;1433}14341435// Soft-deletes every non-deleted entry in one call. The literal string1436// argument is a tripwire against accidental calls — any caller that would1437// wipe the vault has to consciously type "REPLACE_ALL". Do not relax this1438// to a boolean.1439export async function clearVaultEntries(1440  confirmation: "REPLACE_ALL"1441): Promise<void> {1442  if (confirmation !== "REPLACE_ALL") {1443    throw new Error("clearVaultEntries requires explicit confirmation");1444  }1445  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1446  for (const entry of entries) {1447    if (!entry.deletedAt) {1448      entry.deletedAt = Date.now();1449      entry.modifiedAt = Date.now();1450    }1451  }1452  await persistEntries();1453}14541455export async function addEntry(entry: EntryDraft): Promise<VaultEntry> {1456  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");14571458  const sanitized = sanitizeEntryDraft(entry);1459  const now = Date.now();1460  const nextEntry: VaultEntry = {1461    ...sanitized,1462    id: crypto.randomUUID(),1463    createdAt: now,1464    modifiedAt: now,1465    // Stamp passwordChangedAt at creation so age tracking is accurate from1466    // day one. Non-login entries carry the same stamp harmlessly.1467    passwordChangedAt: sanitized.password ? now : undefined,1468  };14691470  // Clone-and-replace so a failed persist rolls back the in-memory state1471  // (COR-008). Without this, a quota-full or storage error leaves the1472  // module-level `entries` ahead of what's actually on disk.1473  const rollback = entries;1474  entries = [...entries, nextEntry];1475  try {1476    await persistEntries();1477  } catch (err) {1478    entries = rollback;1479    throw err;1480  }14811482  // Fire-and-forget breach check (only for login entries if breach monitoring is enabled or not set)1483  if (settings.breachMonitoring !== false && nextEntry.type === "login" && nextEntry.password) {1484    checkBreach(nextEntry.password).then(async (count) => {1485      if (count > 0) {1486        const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === nextEntry.id);1487        if (idx !== -1) {1488          entries[idx] = { ...entries[idx], breach: count, modifiedAt: Date.now() };1489          await persistEntries();1490        }1491      }1492    });1493  }14941495  return nextEntry;1496}14971498export async function updateEntry(1499  id: string,1500  patch: Partial<VaultEntry>1501): Promise<void> {1502  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");15031504  const idx = entries.findIndex((entry) => entry.id === id);1505  if (idx === -1 || entries[idx].deletedAt) {1506    throw new Error("entry_not_found");1507  }15081509  const current = entries[idx];1510  const sanitizedPatch = sanitizeEntryPatch(patch);1511  // Refresh passwordChangedAt only when the password value actually changes —1512  // a metadata-only update (title, tags, etc.) must not reset the age clock1513  // that drives the Pro health rotation recommendation.1514  const passwordChanged =1515    "password" in patch &&1516    typeof sanitizedPatch.password === "string" &&1517    sanitizedPatch.password !== current.password;1518  entries[idx] = {1519    ...current,1520    ...sanitizedPatch,1521    modifiedAt: Date.now(),1522    ...(passwordChanged ? { passwordChangedAt: Date.now() } : {}),1523  };15241525  // A login entry must carry SOMETHING fillable — either a password or a1526  // passkey credential. An empty-password login with no passkey is dead1527  // state. Permit the password-clear when a passkey is attached (that's1528  // the legitimate "drop the password, keep the passkey" path).1529  if (1530    entries[idx].type === "login" &&1531    !entries[idx].password &&1532    !entries[idx].passkey1533  ) {1534    entries[idx] = current;1535    throw new Error("password or passkey required");1536  }15371538  // Card entries must retain their card number1539  if (entries[idx].type === "card" && !entries[idx].cardNumber) {1540    entries[idx] = current;1541    throw new Error("card number is required for card entries");1542  }15431544  await persistEntries();15451546  // Breach check when password changes: clear immediately so old breach doesn't linger,1547  // then async-check the new password and only re-set if it's also found.1548  if ("password" in patch && settings.breachMonitoring !== false && entries[idx].type === "login") {1549    entries[idx] = { ...entries[idx], breach: undefined };1550    await persistEntries();1551    const password = entries[idx].password;1552    if (password) {1553      checkBreach(password).then(async (count) => {1554        const i = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id);1555        if (i !== -1 && count > 0) {1556          entries[i] = { ...entries[i], breach: count, modifiedAt: Date.now() };1557          await persistEntries();1558        }1559      });1560    }1561  }1562}15631564export async function deleteEntry(id: string): Promise<void> {1565  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");15661567  const entry = entries.find((item) => item.id === id);1568  if (!entry || entry.deletedAt) {1569    throw new Error("entry_not_found");1570  }15711572  entry.deletedAt = Date.now();1573  entry.modifiedAt = Date.now();1574  await persistEntries();1575}15761577export function getDeletedEntries(): VaultEntry[] {1578  if (!derivedKey) return [];1579  return entries.filter((e) => !!e.deletedAt);1580}15811582export async function restoreEntry(id: string): Promise<void> {1583  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1584  const entry = entries.find((e) => e.id === id && e.deletedAt);1585  if (!entry) throw new Error("deleted entry not found");1586  delete entry.deletedAt;1587  entry.modifiedAt = Date.now();1588  await persistEntries();1589  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1590}15911592export async function purgeEntry(id: string): Promise<void> {1593  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1594  const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id && e.deletedAt);1595  if (idx === -1) throw new Error("deleted entry not found");1596  entries.splice(idx, 1);1597  await persistEntries();1598}15991600/** Permanently delete entries whose deletedAt is older than retentionMs. 0 = keep forever. */1601export async function purgeExpiredTrash(retentionMs: number): Promise<number> {1602  if (!derivedKey || retentionMs === 0) return 0;1603  const cutoff = Date.now() - retentionMs;1604  const before = entries.length;1605  entries = entries.filter((e) => !(e.deletedAt && e.deletedAt < cutoff));1606  const purged = before - entries.length;1607  if (purged > 0) await persistEntries();1608  return purged;1609}16101611export function queryDomain(domain: string): VaultEntry[] {1612  return domainIndex.get(domain) ?? [];1613}16141615export function getEntryById(id: string): VaultEntry | undefined {1616  return entries.find((entry) => entry.id === id && !entry.deletedAt);1617}16181619async function persistSlotA(1620  reason: VaultSnapshot["reason"] = "local_save",1621): Promise<StoredVault> {1622  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");16231624  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1625  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");16261627  // Snapshot the about-to-be-overwritten state BEFORE we mutate disk. Failures1628  // are swallowed by takeVaultSnapshot — history must never block a save.1629  await takeVaultSnapshot(reason);16301631  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured);1632  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");16331634  // Preserve existing recovery escrow fields.1635  const nextSlotA: StoredVault = {1636    ...slotA,1637    nonce,1638    ciphertext,1639    tag,1640    // recovery_salt and recovery_wrapped_root_key are already set from loadSlot1641  };1642  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, nextSlotA);16431644  // When duress is not configured, keep slot B size-matched with slot A by1645  // regenerating its noise. When duress IS configured, leave slot B alone —1646  // we don't have the decoy key to re-encrypt it. This is a known trade-off.1647  if (!duressConfigured) {1648    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2));1649  }1650  await stampLocalVaultMutation();16511652  return nextSlotA;1653}16541655async function persistSlotB(): Promise<void> {1656  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");16571658  const slotB = await loadSlot(SLOT_B);1659  if (!slotB) throw new Error("missing slot B");16601661  // Decoy plaintext always reports duressConfigured=false — the decoy user1662  // sees a clean slate.1663  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, false);1664  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKey, plaintext, "slot_b_v1");16651666  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, { ...slotB, nonce, ciphertext, tag });1667  await stampLocalVaultMutation();1668}16691670async function persistEntries(1671  reason: VaultSnapshot["reason"] = "local_save",1672): Promise<void> {1673  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");16741675  if (vaultMode === "decoy") {1676    await persistSlotB();1677  } else {1678    await persistSlotA(reason);1679  }1680  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1681}16821683function cleanAdditionalUrls(values: string[] | undefined): string[] | undefined {1684  if (!Array.isArray(values)) return undefined;1685  const seen = new Set<string>();1686  const cleaned: string[] = [];1687  for (const value of values) {1688    const trimmed = typeof value === "string" ? value.trim() : "";1689    if (!trimmed) continue;1690    const key = trimmed.toLowerCase();1691    if (seen.has(key)) continue;1692    seen.add(key);1693    cleaned.push(trimmed);1694  }1695  return cleaned.length > 0 ? cleaned : undefined;1696}16971698function sanitizeEntryDraft(entry: EntryDraft): EntryDraft {1699  const title = entry.title.trim();1700  // Accept legacy `type:"passkey"` drafts but rewrite to "login" — the new1701  // model is "any entry, optionally with a passkey sub-object." Imports and1702  // any in-flight callers from before v2.11.0 keep working without throwing.1703  let type: VaultEntry["type"] = entry.type ?? "login";1704  if (type === "passkey") type = "login";17051706  if (!title) throw new Error("title is required");1707  // A login entry needs either a password or a passkey credential to be useful.1708  // Passkey-only entries (passkey present, no password) are valid.1709  if (type === "login" && !entry.password?.trim() && !entry.passkey) {1710    throw new Error("password or passkey required");1711  }1712  if (entry.passkey) {1713    const p = entry.passkey;1714    if (1715      !p.rpId ||1716      !p.credentialId ||1717      !p.publicKeyCose ||1718      !p.userHandle ||1719      !p.userName ||1720      (p.algorithm !== -7 && p.algorithm !== -8)1721    ) {1722      throw new Error("invalid passkey credential");1723    }1724  }1725  if (type === "card") {1726    if (!entry.cardholderName?.trim() || !entry.cardNumber?.trim()) {1727      throw new Error("cardholder name and card number are required");1728    }1729  }17301731  return {1732    type,1733    title,1734    username: type === "login" ? entry.username?.trim() ?? "" : undefined,1735    password: type === "login" ? entry.password : undefined,1736    url: type === "login" ? entry.url?.trim() ?? "" : undefined,1737    additionalUrls: type === "login" ? cleanAdditionalUrls(entry.additionalUrls) : undefined,1738    totp: type === "login" ? entry.totp?.trim() || undefined : undefined,1739    notes: entry.notes?.trim() || undefined,1740    breach: type === "login" ? entry.breach : undefined,1741    canary: type === "login" ? entry.canary : undefined,1742    tags: entry.tags,1743    passkey: entry.passkey,1744    cardholderName: type === "card" ? entry.cardholderName?.trim() : undefined,1745    cardNumber: type === "card" ? entry.cardNumber?.trim() : undefined,1746    expMonth: type === "card" ? entry.expMonth?.trim() : undefined,1747    expYear: type === "card" ? entry.expYear?.trim() : undefined,1748    cvc: type === "card" ? entry.cvc?.trim() : undefined,1749    cardNickname: type === "card" ? entry.cardNickname?.trim() || undefined : undefined,1750    network: type === "card" ? entry.network : undefined,1751    last4: type === "card" ? entry.last4?.trim() : undefined,1752  };1753}17541755function sanitizeEntryPatch(patch: Partial<VaultEntry>): Partial<VaultEntry> {1756  const nextPatch: Partial<VaultEntry> = {};17571758  if ("type" in patch) {1759    nextPatch.type = patch.type;1760  }17611762  if ("title" in patch) {1763    const title = patch.title?.trim() ?? "";1764    if (!title) throw new Error("title is required");1765    nextPatch.title = title;1766  }17671768  if ("url" in patch) {1769    nextPatch.url = patch.url?.trim() ?? "";1770  }17711772  if ("additionalUrls" in patch) {1773    const incoming = Array.isArray(patch.additionalUrls) ? patch.additionalUrls : [];1774    const seen = new Set<string>();1775    const cleaned: string[] = [];1776    for (const value of incoming) {1777      const trimmed = typeof value === "string" ? value.trim() : "";1778      if (!trimmed) continue;1779      const key = trimmed.toLowerCase();1780      if (seen.has(key)) continue;1781      seen.add(key);1782      cleaned.push(trimmed);1783    }1784    nextPatch.additionalUrls = cleaned.length > 0 ? cleaned : undefined;1785  }17861787  if ("username" in patch) {1788    nextPatch.username = patch.username?.trim() ?? "";1789  }17901791  if ("email" in patch) {1792    nextPatch.email = patch.email?.trim() || undefined;1793  }17941795  if ("password" in patch) {1796    const password = patch.password ?? "";1797    // Allow clearing a password (e.g. on passkey-only entries)1798    nextPatch.password = password || undefined;1799  }18001801  if ("totp" in patch) {1802    nextPatch.totp = patch.totp?.trim() || undefined;1803  }18041805  if ("notes" in patch) {1806    nextPatch.notes = patch.notes?.trim() || undefined;1807  }18081809  if ("breach" in patch) {1810    nextPatch.breach = patch.breach;1811  }18121813  if ("canary" in patch) {1814    nextPatch.canary = patch.canary;1815  }18161817  if ("passkey" in patch) {1818    // Passkey sub-object replaces all the legacy flat passkey fields. A1819    // patch with `passkey: undefined` removes the credential from the entry1820    // (used by "remove passkey" without deleting the whole entry).1821    nextPatch.passkey = patch.passkey;1822  }18231824  if ("tags" in patch) {1825    nextPatch.tags = patch.tags;1826  }18271828  if ("cardholderName" in patch) {1829    nextPatch.cardholderName = patch.cardholderName?.trim() || undefined;1830  }1831  if ("cardNumber" in patch) {1832    const n = patch.cardNumber ?? "";1833    nextPatch.cardNumber = n || undefined;1834  }1835  if ("expMonth" in patch) {1836    nextPatch.expMonth = patch.expMonth?.trim() || undefined;1837  }1838  if ("expYear" in patch) {1839    nextPatch.expYear = patch.expYear?.trim() || undefined;1840  }1841  if ("cvc" in patch) {1842    nextPatch.cvc = patch.cvc?.trim() || undefined;1843  }1844  if ("cardNickname" in patch) {1845    nextPatch.cardNickname = patch.cardNickname?.trim() || undefined;1846  }1847  if ("network" in patch) {1848    nextPatch.network = patch.network;1849  }1850  if ("last4" in patch) {1851    nextPatch.last4 = patch.last4?.trim() || undefined;1852  }18531854  return nextPatch;1855}18561857function normalizeEntry(entry: VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry): VaultEntry {1858  const createdAt = "createdAt" in entry ? entry.createdAt : entry.created;1859  const modifiedAt =1860    "modifiedAt" in entry ? entry.modifiedAt : entry.updated;18611862  const base: VaultEntry = {1863    id: entry.id,1864    type: "type" in entry ? entry.type : "login",1865    title: entry.title,1866    username: entry.username,1867    password: entry.password,1868    url: entry.url,1869    totp: entry.totp,1870    notes: entry.notes,1871    breach: entry.breach,1872    canary: "canary" in entry ? entry.canary : undefined,1873    passkey: "passkey" in entry ? entry.passkey : undefined,1874    createdAt,1875    modifiedAt,1876    deletedAt: entry.deletedAt,1877    tags: "tags" in entry ? entry.tags : undefined,1878    cardholderName: "cardholderName" in entry ? entry.cardholderName : undefined,1879    cardNumber: "cardNumber" in entry ? entry.cardNumber : undefined,1880    expMonth: "expMonth" in entry ? entry.expMonth : undefined,1881    expYear: "expYear" in entry ? entry.expYear : undefined,1882    cvc: "cvc" in entry ? entry.cvc : undefined,1883    cardNickname: "cardNickname" in entry ? entry.cardNickname : undefined,1884    network: "network" in entry ? entry.network : undefined,1885    last4: "last4" in entry ? entry.last4 : undefined,1886  };18871888  return migrateLegacyPasskey(base, entry);1889}18901891/**1892 * v2.11.0 read migration. Pre-v2.11.0 passkey entries used `type:"passkey"`1893 * with flat top-level fields (rpId, credentialId, etc.). This converts them1894 * to the new shape — `type:"login"` with a `passkey` sub-object — so all1895 * downstream consumers can rely on the new model. The result is rewritten1896 * to disk on next vault save (hasLegacyShape detects the un-migrated case).1897 */1898function migrateLegacyPasskey(1899  base: VaultEntry,1900  raw: VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry1901): VaultEntry {1902  if (base.passkey) return base;1903  const flat = raw as Partial<VaultEntry>;1904  const isPasskeyType = base.type === "passkey";1905  const hasFlatPasskeyFields =1906    typeof flat.rpId === "string" &&1907    typeof flat.credentialId === "string" &&1908    typeof flat.publicKeyCose === "string" &&1909    typeof flat.userHandle === "string" &&1910    typeof flat.userName === "string";1911  if (!isPasskeyType && !hasFlatPasskeyFields) return base;1912  if (!hasFlatPasskeyFields) return base;19131914  const algorithm: -7 | -8 = flat.algorithm === -8 ? -8 : -7;1915  base.passkey = {1916    rpId: flat.rpId!,1917    rpName: flat.rpName ?? flat.rpId!,1918    credentialId: flat.credentialId!,1919    publicKeyCose: flat.publicKeyCose!,1920    privateKeyJwk: flat.privateKeyJwk,1921    userHandle: flat.userHandle!,1922    userName: flat.userName!,1923    userDisplayName: flat.userDisplayName ?? flat.userName!,1924    algorithm,1925    signCount: flat.signCount ?? 0,1926    aaguid: flat.aaguid ?? "",1927    backupEligible: flat.backupEligible === true,1928    backupState: flat.backupState === true,1929    lastUsedAt: flat.lastUsedAt,1930    browser: flat.browser,1931    transports: flat.transports,1932    createdAt: base.createdAt,1933  };1934  // Promote to "login" so the unified Entry view renders. Username gets1935  // populated from the passkey's userName so the entry is searchable in the1936  // existing autofill flow without a separate code path.1937  if (isPasskeyType) base.type = "login";1938  if (!base.username) base.username = flat.userName;1939  if (!base.url) base.url = `https://${flat.rpId}`;1940  return base;1941}194219431944// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------1945// Deduplication1946// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------19471948function entryDupeKey(e: VaultEntry): string {1949  if (e.type === "note") return `note|${e.title.toLowerCase()}`;1950  // Passkey-bearing entries dedupe by the credential's RP + user. Two logins1951  // on different sites that happen to share a username are still distinct;1952  // two passkey credentials for the same RP+user are duplicates regardless1953  // of any login fields they may also carry.1954  if (e.passkey) {1955    return `passkey|${e.passkey.rpId.toLowerCase()}|${e.passkey.userName.toLowerCase()}`;1956  }1957  return `login|${e.title.toLowerCase()}|${(e.url ?? "").toLowerCase()}|${(e.username ?? "").toLowerCase()}`;1958}19591960/** Returns the number of duplicate entries (those that would be removed). */1961export function countDuplicates(): number {1962  const best = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();1963  let dupeCount = 0;1964  for (const e of entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt)) {1965    const key = entryDupeKey(e);1966    const existing = best.get(key);1967    if (!existing) {1968      best.set(key, e);1969    } else {1970      dupeCount++;1971      // Keep the more recently modified one in the map1972      if ((e.modifiedAt ?? e.createdAt ?? 0) > (existing.modifiedAt ?? existing.createdAt ?? 0)) {1973        best.set(key, e);1974      }1975    }1976  }1977  return dupeCount;1978}19791980/**1981 * Soft-deletes duplicate entries, keeping the most recently modified copy of1982 * each group. Returns the number of entries moved to trash.1983 */1984export async function deduplicateEntries(): Promise<number> {1985  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1986  // Dedup reshapes slot B permanently under the decoy key, which is1987  // forensically distinguishable from a freshly-seeded decoy vault. Refuse.1988  if (vaultMode === "decoy") {1989    throw new Error("deduplicate disabled in decoy mode");1990  }19911992  const best = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();1993  for (const e of entries.filter((en) => !en.deletedAt)) {1994    const key = entryDupeKey(e);1995    const existing = best.get(key);1996    if (!existing) {1997      best.set(key, e);1998    } else if ((e.modifiedAt ?? e.createdAt ?? 0) > (existing.modifiedAt ?? existing.createdAt ?? 0)) {1999      best.set(key, e);2000    }2001  }20022003  const keepIds = new Set(Array.from(best.values()).map((e) => e.id));2004  const now = Date.now();2005  let removed = 0;2006  entries = entries.map((e) => {2007    if (!e.deletedAt && !keepIds.has(e.id)) {2008      removed++;2009      return { ...e, deletedAt: now };2010    }2011    return e;2012  });20132014  if (removed > 0) await persistEntries();2015  return removed;2016}20172018// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------2019// Vault history — snapshot BEFORE every vault write so the saved blob is2020// what is about to be lost, not what was just written. Capped at 10. The2021// stored blobs are AES-256-GCM ciphertext under the master password, so2022// history adds zero security surface.2023// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------20242025const HISTORY_KEY = "peach_vault_history";2026const HISTORY_MAX = 10;20272028/**2029 * Snapshot the CURRENT on-disk vault state into history. Call this BEFORE2030 * overwriting peach_vault_a so the saved blob captures the about-to-be-lost2031 * state. Identical-to-most-recent blobs are skipped to avoid filling history2032 * with no-op writes.2033 */2034export async function takeVaultSnapshot(2035  reason: VaultSnapshot["reason"],2036): Promise<void> {2037  try {2038    const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get([SLOT_A, SLOT_B, HISTORY_KEY]);2039    const slotA = (raw as Record<string, StoredVault | undefined>)[SLOT_A];2040    const slotB = (raw as Record<string, StoredVault | undefined>)[SLOT_B];20412042    // Nothing to snapshot if the real slot doesn't exist yet (fresh install,2043    // pre-createVault). createVault skips snapshots intentionally — there is2044    // no prior state to preserve.2045    if (!slotA) return;20462047    const vault_a = JSON.stringify(slotA);2048    const vault_b = JSON.stringify(slotB ?? slotA);20492050    // Best-effort entry count: only meaningful when the in-memory state is2051    // unlocked AND in real mode. Decoy mode would leak the decoy entry2052    // count; locked mode has no entries to count. Both fall through to null.2053    let entryCount: number | null = null;2054    if (derivedKey && vaultMode === "real") {2055      try {2056        entryCount = entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt).length;2057      } catch {2058        entryCount = null;2059      }2060    }20612062    const existingRaw = (raw as Record<string, VaultHistory | undefined>)[HISTORY_KEY];2063    const history: VaultHistory = existingRaw && Array.isArray(existingRaw.snapshots)2064      ? existingRaw2065      : { snapshots: [] };20662067    // Deduplication: if the most recent snapshot has byte-identical blobs,2068    // skip — saves the same vault N times in a row would otherwise burn the2069    // entire history window with no recovery value.2070    const latest = history.snapshots[0];2071    if (latest && latest.vault_a === vault_a && latest.vault_b === vault_b) {2072      return;2073    }20742075    const snapshot: VaultSnapshot = {2076      id: crypto.randomUUID(),2077      savedAt: Date.now(),2078      reason,2079      vault_a,2080      vault_b,2081      entryCount,2082    };20832084    history.snapshots = [snapshot, ...history.snapshots].slice(0, HISTORY_MAX);2085    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [HISTORY_KEY]: history });2086  } catch (err) {2087    // Non-fatal — history must never block a save. A failed snapshot just2088    // means the user loses one rung of the safety ladder for this write.2089    // M4/QUA-006: log so the failure is visible; if it looks like a quota2090    // problem, notify the popup so the user can prune history themselves.2091    console.warn('[Peach] takeVaultSnapshot failed:', err);2092    if (String(err).includes('QUOTA') || String(err).includes('quota')) {2093      try {2094        await chrome.runtime.sendMessage({ type: 'VAULT_STORAGE_QUOTA_WARNING' });2095      } catch {2096        // popup may be closed; surfaced via console.warn above2097      }2098    }2099  }2100}21012102/** Wipe all vault history. Called by Panic / DESTROY_VAULT. */2103export async function clearVaultHistory(): Promise<void> {2104  try {2105    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [HISTORY_KEY]: { snapshots: [] } satisfies VaultHistory });2106  } catch {2107    // Non-fatal — DESTROY_VAULT also runs storage.local.clear().2108  }2109}21102111/** Read all snapshots, newest first, for the Settings vault history view. */2112export async function getVaultHistory(): Promise<VaultSnapshot[]> {2113  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get(HISTORY_KEY);2114  const history = (raw as Record<string, VaultHistory | undefined>)[HISTORY_KEY];2115  if (!history || !Array.isArray(history.snapshots)) return [];2116  return history.snapshots;2117}21182119/**2120 * Replace the on-disk vault with the chosen snapshot's blobs and lock the2121 * vault. The current state is itself snapshotted with reason 'restore' first2122 * so the restore is reversible. After this returns, the user must unlock2123 * with the password that matches the restored blob.2124 */2125export async function restoreVaultSnapshot(2126  snapshotId: string,2127): Promise<{ ok: true } | { ok: false; error: string }> {2128  const history = await getVaultHistory();2129  const snapshot = history.find((s) => s.id === snapshotId);2130  if (!snapshot) return { ok: false, error: "snapshot_not_found" };21312132  // Snapshot the about-to-be-replaced current state so the restore is2133  // reversible. takeVaultSnapshot is no-op when the most recent entry is2134  // byte-identical, so a restore-of-a-restore stays clean.2135  await takeVaultSnapshot("restore");21362137  let restoredA: StoredVault;2138  let restoredB: StoredVault;2139  try {2140    restoredA = JSON.parse(snapshot.vault_a) as StoredVault;2141    restoredB = JSON.parse(snapshot.vault_b) as StoredVault;2142  } catch {2143    return { ok: false, error: "snapshot_corrupt" };2144  }21452146  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, restoredA);2147  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, restoredB);2148  await stampLocalVaultMutation();21492150  // Lock so the user must prove they can decrypt the restored blob. If they2151  // restored a pre-password-change snapshot they discover it immediately at2152  // the lock screen rather than silently holding an inaccessible vault.2153  lock();21542155  return { ok: true };2156}21572158/**2159 * Change the master password. Re-encrypts slot A with a fresh salt + new2160 * derived key. Slot B (duress or noise) is left untouched when duress is2161 * configured — it uses an independent key derived from the duress password —2162 * and regenerated as noise when duress is not configured.2163 */2164export async function changePassword(2165  currentPassword: string,2166  newPassword: string2167): Promise<boolean> {2168  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") return false;21692170  // Verify current password before allowing any change2171  const valid = await verifyMainPassword(currentPassword);2172  if (!valid) return false;21732174  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);2175  if (!slotA) return false;2176  if (!rootKey) return false;21772178  // Derive fresh key from new password + new random salt2179  const newSalt = generateSalt();2180  const newKey = await deriveKey(newPassword, newSalt);21812182  // Re-encrypt the in-memory entries with the new key2183  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured);2184  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(newKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");21852186  // Pre-wrap root key under the new derived key. Recovery fields wrap rootKey2187  // under recovery words and remain untouched — recovery phrase keeps working2188  // across password changes (H4/COR-002).2189  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(newKey, rootKey);21902191  const finalSlotA: StoredVault = {2192    ...slotA,2193    salt: hex(newSalt),2194    nonce,2195    ciphertext,2196    tag,2197    ...pwRoot,2198  };21992200  // Snapshot the OLD-key blob before overwriting it. If the user later2201  // restores from this snapshot they will need the OLD password — the2202  // post-restore lock surfaces that immediately.2203  await takeVaultSnapshot("local_save");22042205  // Single atomic write: ciphertext, salt, and pw_root_* fields all land in2206  // one storage transaction. An SW kill before this point leaves the old2207  // slot intact; after this point everything tied to the new password is2208  // already on disk together (M6/COR-004).2209  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, finalSlotA);22102211  // Swap the in-memory key synchronously before any further await. If we2212  // threw between the Slot A write and this swap, the next persistEntries()2213  // would overwrite Slot A with old-key ciphertext, locking the user out.2214  zeroKey(derivedKey);2215  derivedKey = newKey;22162217  // Regenerate noise for slot B when duress is not in use. Runs after the2218  // key swap so a failure here is a disposable noise regeneration, not a2219  // lockout.2220  if (!duressConfigured) {2221    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2));2222  }2223  await stampLocalVaultMutation();22242225  return true;2226}2227