vault.ts

1/**2 * vault.ts — sole owner of vault state and chrome.storage vault keys.3 *4 * Every read/write of `peach_vault_a`, `peach_vault_b`, and `peach_settings`5 * goes through this module. No other file accesses those keys directly.6 * External callers reach vault operations via `messages.ts` — never by7 * importing from here cross-boundary (popup/content must not). Invariants8 * for the two-slot schema, unlock timing, and key/disk atomicity are in9 * Projects.md §3.2–§3.6.10 */1112import { deriveKey, deriveKeyRaw, generateSalt } from "../crypto/argon2";13import { extractDomain } from "../shared/domain";14import { clampSyncTimestamp } from "../shared/sync-limits";15import { computeVaultId } from "../shared/sync-identity";16// Static, not `await import()`: runtime import() throws in an MV3 service17// worker. Neither module imports vault.ts back, so there is no cycle to break.18import { triggerSyncIfReachable } from "./sync-trigger";19import { clearPairedDevices } from "./paired-devices";20import {21  rootKeyToWords,22  wordsToRootKeyMaterial,23  deriveRecoveryKey,24} from "../shared/recovery-words";25import type {26  AccentColorName,27  Canary,28  LegacyVaultEntry,29  ManualSummonRecord,30  PasskeyData,31  SavedIdentity,32  StoredVault,33  VaultEntry,34  VaultHistory,35  VaultSnapshot,36} from "../shared/types";37import { decrypt, encrypt, zeroKey } from "./aes";38import { clearAutoLock, touchAutoLock } from "./alarms";39import { setRecoveryConfirmPending } from "./recovery-pending";4041type EntryDraft = Omit<42  VaultEntry,43  "id" | "createdAt" | "modifiedAt" | "deletedAt"44>;4546// Slot-neutral storage keys (v1.4.24+). Both slots always exist; slot B47// either holds the decoy vault (when duress is configured) or random noise48// that looks identical at rest. No external indicator is stored — duress49// configuration is recorded only inside the encrypted payload of slot A.50const SLOT_A = "peach_vault_a";51const SLOT_B = "peach_vault_b";5253// Legacy keys, migrated away on first access.54const LEGACY_MAIN = "peach_vault";55const LEGACY_DECOY = "peach_decoy_vault";56const LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG = "peach_duress";5758// Plaintext is padded to the next multiple of this size before encryption.59// This coarsens ciphertext-length leakage into 1 KiB buckets.60const PAD_BLOCK = 1024;6162// How many past passwords to retain per entry. Generous enough to be useful as63// a recovery aid while bounding the secret material we hold (and the ciphertext64// growth) for an entry whose password is rotated frequently.65const PASSWORD_HISTORY_MAX = 50;6667// When duress is configured, BOTH slots are padded to this fixed ceiling so68// their ciphertext lengths are identical and cannot reveal that a hidden decoy69// vault exists (audit MEDIUM — plausible-deniability leak). 256 KiB comfortably70// holds a very large vault (thousands of entries incl. passkeys). The decoy71// slot can't be re-encrypted on every real-vault save (the real session has no72// decoy key), so a fixed ceiling — rather than size-matching on each write — is73// what keeps the two slots equal. A real vault whose plaintext exceeds this74// would grow past the ceiling and re-expose the bit; that is an extreme,75// documented edge well beyond normal use.76const DURESS_SLOT_SIZE = 262_144;7778let derivedKey: Uint8Array | null = null;79// 32-byte random root key, separate from the derivedKey used for vault encryption.80// The root key is wrapped (encrypted) under the recovery key derived from the81// 12-word phrase. When the user changes their password, only the wrapping changes;82// the root key and recovery words remain stable.83let rootKey: Uint8Array | null = null;84let entries: VaultEntry[] = [];85let domainIndex: Map<string, VaultEntry[]> = new Map();86let vaultMode: "real" | "decoy" = "real";87// Cached post-unlock view of whether the real vault records that duress is88// configured. Only meaningful after a real-mode unlock; for decoy-mode unlock89// this stays false because we never see slot A's plaintext.90let duressConfigured = false;9192let migrationRan = false;9394// Set to a corruption reason during the last unlock() attempt when both slots95// decrypted but failed schema validation. Consumed and cleared by96// consumeLastUnlockFailureReason() so messages.ts can surface vault_corrupted97// distinctly from wrong-password (M7/COR-007).98//99// NOTE: module-level state — if vault.ts is ever moved to a worker context,100// this must be replaced with a structured return value from unlock() or a101// postMessage channel. The signal is invisible across module-instance102// boundaries.103let lastUnlockFailureReason: string | null = null;104105export function consumeLastUnlockFailureReason(): string | null {106  const r = lastUnlockFailureReason;107  lastUnlockFailureReason = null;108  return r;109}110111// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------112// Settings (persisted inside the encrypted vault store as a sidecar key)113// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------114115export type TextSize = "small" | "medium" | "large";116117export interface VaultSettings {118  accentColor?: AccentColorName;119  theme?: "dark" | "light";120  autoLockMinutes?: number;121  clipboardClearSeconds?: number;122  lockOnClose?: boolean;123  breachMonitoring?: boolean;124  passkeyProviderEnabled?: boolean;125  trashRetentionDays?: number;126  manualSummonDomains?: Record<string, ManualSummonRecord>;127  declinedCardFingerprints?: string[];128  /**129   * Text size scale for body copy and entry titles. Stops at "large" by130   * design — XL clips dense screens (Vault, Health) inside the fixed131   * 330×480 popup surface.132   */133  textSize?: TextSize;134  /**135   * When true, all entrance/exit transitions and ambient animations are136   * collapsed to instant. Honoured alongside the user's OS-level137   * `prefers-reduced-motion`.138   */139  reduceMotion?: boolean;140  /**141   * Android-only: when true, the master key is escrowed in AndroidKeyStore142   * and the lock screen offers biometric unlock. Toggled from Settings →143   * Security → Biometrics. Has no effect on desktop builds.144   */145  biometricsEnabled?: boolean;146  /**147   * User overrides for keyboard shortcuts. Keys are ShortcutAction names148   * (see src/shared/shortcuts.ts). Missing actions fall through to149   * DEFAULT_BINDINGS — `getActiveBindings(settings.shortcuts)` is the150   * canonical lookup. Storing only the deltas keeps the vault payload151   * small and lets default updates land for users who never rebind.152   */153  shortcuts?: Record<string, { key: string; ctrl?: boolean; meta?: boolean; shift?: boolean; alt?: boolean }>;154}155156let settings: VaultSettings = {};157158export function getSettings(): VaultSettings {159  return settings;160}161162export async function ensureSettingsLoaded(): Promise<VaultSettings> {163  await loadSettings();164  return settings;165}166167export async function updateSettings(patch: Partial<VaultSettings>): Promise<void> {168  await loadSettings();169  // LV-7: cheap insurance against prototype pollution if a future caller ever170  // feeds parsed external JSON here (native spread keeps __proto__ an own-171  // property today, but Object.assign-style consumers and JSON revivers have172  // been burned before).173  const safe = Object.fromEntries(174    Object.entries(patch).filter(175      ([k]) => !["__proto__", "constructor", "prototype"].includes(k),176    ),177  ) as Partial<VaultSettings>;178  settings = { ...settings, ...safe };179  await persistSettings();180}181182async function persistSettings(): Promise<void> {183  try {184    await chrome.storage.local.set({ peach_settings: settings });185  } catch (err) {186    throw mapStorageError(err);187  }188}189190function mapStorageError(err: unknown): Error {191  const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);192  if (/QUOTA_BYTES|quota/i.test(message)) {193    return new Error("STORAGE_QUOTA_EXCEEDED");194  }195  return err instanceof Error ? err : new Error(message);196}197198async function loadSettings(): Promise<void> {199  const result = await chrome.storage.local.get("peach_settings");200  settings = (result as { peach_settings?: VaultSettings }).peach_settings ?? {};201}202203// Fire-and-forget sync trigger after a committed vault write. A failure here204// must never fail the write that caused it.205function fireSyncTrigger(reason: "vault_change"): void {206  void Promise.resolve()207    .then(() => triggerSyncIfReachable({ reason }))208    .catch(() => {209      /* no sync runner registered, or nothing reachable — non-fatal */210    });211}212213// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------214// HIBP breach check (k-anonymity model)215// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------216217export async function checkBreach(password: string): Promise<number> {218  // HIBP k-anonymity API is keyed on SHA-1 prefixes — this is dictated by219  // the public API, not a security choice. Do not migrate to SHA-256 here.220  const encoder = new TextEncoder();221  const hashBuffer = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-1", encoder.encode(password));222  const hashHex = Array.from(new Uint8Array(hashBuffer))223    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))224    .join("")225    .toUpperCase();226227  const prefix = hashHex.slice(0, 5);228  const suffix = hashHex.slice(5);229230  try {231    // PCH-02-007: request HIBP response padding so response length does not232    // reveal how many suffixes a queried prefix returned.233    const res = await fetch(`https://api.pwnedpasswords.com/range/${prefix}`, {234      headers: { "Add-Padding": "true" },235    });236    if (!res.ok) return 0;237    const text = await res.text();238    const match = text.split("\r\n").find((l) => l.startsWith(suffix));239    return match ? parseInt(match.split(":")[1], 10) : 0;240  } catch {241    return 0; // Network unavailable — don't block242  }243}244245export async function declineCardSaveOffer(last4: string, expMonth: string, expYear: string): Promise<void> {246  const fingerprint = await cardFingerprint(last4, expMonth, expYear);247  await loadSettings();248  settings = {249    ...settings,250    declinedCardFingerprints: [...(settings.declinedCardFingerprints ?? []), fingerprint],251  };252  await persistSettings();253}254255export async function isCardDeclined(last4: string, expMonth: string, expYear: string): Promise<boolean> {256  await loadSettings();257  const fingerprint = await cardFingerprint(last4, expMonth, expYear);258  return (settings.declinedCardFingerprints ?? []).includes(fingerprint);259}260261async function cardFingerprint(last4: string, expMonth: string, expYear: string): Promise<string> {262  const encoder = new TextEncoder();263  const buf = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", encoder.encode(`${last4}|${expMonth}|${expYear}`));264  return Array.from(new Uint8Array(buf).slice(0, 8))265    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))266    .join("");267}268269function hex(buf: Uint8Array): string {270  return Array.from(buf)271    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))272    .join("");273}274275function unhex(s: string): Uint8Array {276  const out = new Uint8Array(s.length / 2);277  for (let i = 0; i < s.length; i += 2) {278    out[i / 2] = parseInt(s.slice(i, i + 2), 16);279  }280  return out;281}282283// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------284// Root key generation and recovery word wrapping285// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------286287/**288 * Generate a random 32-byte root key and wrap it (AES-256-GCM) under a key289 * derived from the recovery word material via HKDF-SHA256. The wrapped blob290 * fields are stored in slot A alongside the password-wrapped ciphertext. The291 * root key itself is kept in memory for the session so getRecoveryWords() can292 * encode it without re-deriving.293 *294 * SECURITY MODEL (PCH-01-005): the recovery KEK is derived from the 12-word295 * material, which encodes only rootKey[0..16] (recovery-words.ts). The KEK is thus296 * derived from a PREFIX of the very plaintext it wraps, and effective recovery297 * security is 128-bit (standard for a 12-word phrase), NOT 256-bit. This is safe —298 * unwrapping requires the words, and the GCM ciphertext leaks nothing without them —299 * but it is intentional, not an oversight. A future escrow version wanting 256-bit300 * recovery must derive the words from INDEPENDENT entropy, not from the root key.301 */302async function generateAndWrapRootKey(): Promise<{303  rawRootKey: string; // hex of the plaintext root key — caller stores in rootKey304  recoverySalt: string;305  wrappedRootKey: string;306  wrappedNonce: string;307  wrappedTag: string;308}> {309  const rootKeyBytes = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32));310311  // Derive the recovery key from the BIP39 words encoding of the root key.312  const words = await rootKeyToWords(rootKeyBytes);313  const wordMaterial = await wordsToRootKeyMaterial(words);314  const recoverySalt = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));315  const recoveryKey = await deriveRecoveryKey(wordMaterial, recoverySalt);316317  // Wrap the root key with the recovery key using AES-256-GCM directly.318  // We hex-encode rootKeyBytes so the plaintext is always valid UTF-8.319  const nonce = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));320  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(hex(rootKeyBytes));321  const raw = await crypto.subtle.encrypt(322    {323      name: "AES-GCM",324      iv: nonce,325      additionalData: new Uint8Array([1]).buffer as ArrayBuffer,326      tagLength: 128,327    },328    recoveryKey,329    encoded330  );331  // WebCrypto returns ciphertext || auth tag concatenated; split them.332  const rawU8 = new Uint8Array(raw);333  const ciphertext = hex(rawU8.slice(0, rawU8.length - 16));334  const tag = hex(rawU8.slice(rawU8.length - 16));335336  return {337    rawRootKey: hex(rootKeyBytes),338    recoverySalt: hex(recoverySalt),339    wrappedRootKey: ciphertext,340    wrappedNonce: hex(nonce),341    wrappedTag: tag,342  };343}344345async function wrapExistingRootKeyForRecovery(rootKeyBytes: Uint8Array): Promise<{346  recoverySalt: string;347  wrappedRootKey: string;348  wrappedNonce: string;349  wrappedTag: string;350}> {351  if (rootKeyBytes.length !== 32) {352    throw new Error("ADOPT_INVALID_ROOT_KEY: expected 32 bytes");353  }354355  const words = await rootKeyToWords(rootKeyBytes);356  const wordMaterial = await wordsToRootKeyMaterial(words);357  const recoverySalt = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));358  const recoveryKey = await deriveRecoveryKey(wordMaterial, recoverySalt);359  const nonce = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));360  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(hex(rootKeyBytes));361  const raw = await crypto.subtle.encrypt(362    {363      name: "AES-GCM",364      iv: nonce,365      additionalData: new Uint8Array([1]).buffer as ArrayBuffer,366      tagLength: 128,367    },368    recoveryKey,369    encoded,370  );371  const rawU8 = new Uint8Array(raw);372  return {373    recoverySalt: hex(recoverySalt),374    wrappedRootKey: hex(rawU8.slice(0, rawU8.length - 16)),375    wrappedNonce: hex(nonce),376    wrappedTag: hex(rawU8.slice(rawU8.length - 16)),377  };378}379380/**381 * Unwrap the root key using recovery words. Called during recovery flow when382 * the user provides their 12-word phrase and a new password.383 * Exported for use by the RECOVER_WITH_WORDS message handler.384 */385export async function unwrapRootKeyForRecovery(386  wrappedRootKey: string,387  wrappedNonce: string,388  wrappedTag: string,389  recoverySaltHex: string,390  words: string[]391): Promise<void> {392  const wordMaterial = await wordsToRootKeyMaterial(words);393  const recoverySalt = unhex(recoverySaltHex);394  const recoveryKey = await deriveRecoveryKey(wordMaterial, recoverySalt);395396  // Decrypt and cache the root key. The root key bytes were hex-encoded before397  // encryption so the ciphertext is valid UTF-8. We inline the AES-GCM decrypt398  // here to avoid passing a CryptoKey to the string-based encrypt/decrypt helpers.399  // Each component is stored separately in the vault slot; decode them individually400  // so the nonce is always exactly the 12 bytes from wrappedNonce.401  const nonceRaw = unhex(wrappedNonce);402  const ciphertextRaw = unhex(wrappedRootKey);403  const tagRaw = unhex(wrappedTag);404  // Combine ciphertext and tag for AES-GCM (expects ciphertext||tag).405  // Use explicit ArrayBuffer allocations to satisfy TS BufferSource constraints.406  const nonceU8 = nonceRaw as unknown as Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>;407  const combined = new Uint8Array(ciphertextRaw.length + tagRaw.length);408  combined.set(ciphertextRaw, 0);409  combined.set(tagRaw, ciphertextRaw.length);410  const raw = await crypto.subtle.decrypt(411    { name: "AES-GCM", iv: nonceU8, additionalData: new Uint8Array([1]).buffer as ArrayBuffer, tagLength: 128 },412    recoveryKey,413    combined414  );415  const decryptedHex = new TextDecoder().decode(raw);416  rootKey = unhex(decryptedHex);417}418419/**420 * Re-wrap the cached root key under a new derived key (from the user's new421 * password). Called after password change and after recovery re-key so the422 * same recovery words continue to work with the updated password — and so423 * subsequent unlocks can rehydrate rootKey via deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey.424 *425 * recovery_* fields are intentionally not touched: those wrap rootKey under426 * the recovery words, which do not change when the password changes.427 */428export async function rewrapRootKeyForPassword(429  newDerivedKey: Uint8Array,430  _newSalt: Uint8Array431): Promise<void> {432  if (!rootKey) throw new Error("root key not set");433  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);434  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");435  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(newDerivedKey, rootKey);436  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, { ...slotA, ...pwRoot });437}438439/**440 * Change the vault encryption to a new derived key (already derived from441 * the user's new password). Used by RECOVER_WITH_WORDS and changePassword.442 * Caller is responsible for key swap and snapshot.443 */444async function reencryptVaultForNewKey(445  newKey: Uint8Array,446  slotA: StoredVault447): Promise<void> {448  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured, duressConfigured ? DURESS_SLOT_SIZE : 0);449  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(newKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");450  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, {451    ...slotA,452    nonce,453    ciphertext,454    tag,455  });456}457458/**459 * Full password change with an already-derived key (used after recovery).460 * Unlike changePassword(), this skips re-verification of current password461 * since recovery flow has already validated the user's identity via words.462 */463export async function changePasswordWithNewKey(464  newSalt: Uint8Array,465  newKey: Uint8Array466): Promise<void> {467  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);468  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");469  // reencryptVaultForNewKey must receive the updated salt so that subsequent470  // UNLOCK calls with the new password can re-derive the correct key.471  await reencryptVaultForNewKey(newKey, { ...slotA, salt: hex(newSalt) });472  if (derivedKey) zeroKey(derivedKey);473  derivedKey = newKey;474  // PCH-01-008: re-escrow the new key (see changePassword). The recovery flow475  // reaches this path, so a post-recovery SW restart would otherwise lock out476  // a user who just reset their password.477  void saveSessionKey(newKey, "real");478  // Refresh pw_root_* under the new key so deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey works479  // on the next unlock (H2/COR-006). If rootKey is missing — recovery flow480  // should have populated it — fall back silently rather than blowing up the481  // recovery path; migrateToRecovery will rehydrate on the next unlock.482  if (rootKey) {483    const slotAfter = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);484    if (slotAfter) {485      const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(newKey, rootKey);486      await writeSlot(SLOT_A, { ...slotAfter, ...pwRoot });487    }488  }489  if (!duressConfigured) {490    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(slotA.ciphertext.length / 2));491  }492  await stampLocalVaultMutation();493}494495// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------496// Salt generation --- exported so the RECOVER_WITH_WORDS handler can derive497// a new key after password reset without re-importing the crypto module.498// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------499500export { deriveKey, generateSalt };501502export async function loadSlotA(): Promise<StoredVault | null> {503  return loadSlot(SLOT_A);504}505506/**507 * Recover the session root key by AES-GCM-decrypting the pw_root_* fields508 * (a second wrapping of the root key under the password-derived key). This509 * is what makes GET_RECOVERY_WORDS work across lock/unlock cycles without510 * the user re-entering their recovery phrase: the same root key bytes —511 * and therefore the same 12 words — survive every unlock.512 *513 * Returns null when the pw_root fields are absent (pre-v2.12 vault that514 * hasn't been migrated yet) or when decryption fails (wrong derived key,515 * tampered ciphertext). On null the caller should fall through to516 * migrateToRecovery() to populate the fields.517 */518async function deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(519  derivedKeyBytes: Uint8Array,520  slotA: StoredVault,521): Promise<Uint8Array | null> {522  if (!slotA.pw_root_ciphertext || !slotA.pw_root_nonce || !slotA.pw_root_tag) {523    return null;524  }525  try {526    const rootHex = await decrypt(527      derivedKeyBytes,528      slotA.pw_root_nonce,529      slotA.pw_root_ciphertext,530      slotA.pw_root_tag,531      "pw_root_v1",532    );533    return unhex(rootHex);534  } catch {535    return null;536  }537}538539// AES-GCM-wrap rootKey under derivedKey for the pw_root_* fields. Returns the540// hex-encoded ciphertext/nonce/tag triple ready to embed in StoredVault.541async function wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(542  derivedKeyBytes: Uint8Array,543  rootKeyBytes: Uint8Array,544): Promise<{ pw_root_ciphertext: string; pw_root_nonce: string; pw_root_tag: string }> {545  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKeyBytes, hex(rootKeyBytes), "pw_root_v1");546  return {547    pw_root_ciphertext: ciphertext,548    pw_root_nonce: nonce,549    pw_root_tag: tag,550  };551}552553/**554 * For vaults created before v2.12 (no recovery_salt/recovery_wrapped_root_key),555 * generate the root key, wrap it under the recovery words, and persist the556 * recovery escrow into slot A. The caller must show the recovery words to the557 * user before calling this — once called, those words are the vault's recovery558 * path. This runs once, on the first unlock of an upgraded vault.559 */560export async function migrateToRecovery(): Promise<void> {561  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {562    throw new Error("vault must be unlocked in real mode");563  }564  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);565  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");566  const hasRecoveryEscrow =567    !!slotA.recovery_salt && !!slotA.recovery_wrapped_root_key;568  const hasPwRoot = !!slotA.pw_root_ciphertext && !!slotA.pw_root_nonce;569  if (hasRecoveryEscrow && hasPwRoot) return; // already done570571  // If recovery escrow already exists but pw_root doesn't, we cannot recover572  // the original rootKey without the user's words. The least-surprising path573  // is to rotate to a fresh root key — the user's old recovery words become574  // invalid but we surface peach_recovery_pending so the popup re-presents575  // the words. The unlock-path callers all set that flag.576  const { rawRootKey, recoverySalt, wrappedRootKey, wrappedNonce, wrappedTag } =577    await generateAndWrapRootKey();578  rootKey = unhex(rawRootKey);579580  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(derivedKey, rootKey);581  const nextSlotA: StoredVault = {582    ...slotA,583    recovery_salt: recoverySalt,584    recovery_wrapped_root_key: wrappedRootKey,585    recovery_nonce: wrappedNonce,586    recovery_tag: wrappedTag,587    ...pwRoot,588  };589  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, nextSlotA);590  await stampLocalVaultMutation();591}592593/**594 * Returns the 12 recovery words for the current session's root key.595 * Must be called while the vault is unlocked. Throws if recovery has not596 * been set up (pre-v2.12 vault that hasn't migrated yet).597 */598export async function getRecoveryWords(): Promise<string[]> {599  if (!rootKey) {600    throw new Error("recovery not set up — vault may need migration");601  }602  return rootKeyToWords(rootKey);603}604605async function loadSlot(key: string): Promise<StoredVault | null> {606  const result = await chrome.storage.local.get(key);607  return (result as Record<string, StoredVault | undefined>)[key] ?? null;608}609610async function writeSlot(key: string, vault: StoredVault): Promise<void> {611  try {612    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [key]: vault });613  } catch (err) {614    throw mapStorageError(err);615  }616}617618/**619 * Roll back a vault that was created by [createVaultFromRootKey] but620 * couldn't be paired (e.g. the subsequent license activation, identity621 * derivation, or paired-device upsert failed). Without this, a failed622 * receiver session leaves behind an empty vault — the user has to623 * re-pair to get a working setup, but the empty vault sits in the way.624 *625 * The call is idempotent: removing keys that aren't there is a no-op.626 */627export async function rollbackAdoptedVault(): Promise<void> {628  lock();629  try {630    await chrome.storage.local.remove([631      SLOT_A,632      SLOT_B,633      "peach_last_modified_at",634    ]);635  } catch (err) {636    throw mapStorageError(err);637  }638}639640async function commitCreatedVaultSlots(slotA: StoredVault, slotB: StoredVault): Promise<void> {641  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get("peach_last_modified_at");642  const previous = Number(643    (raw as Record<string, unknown>).peach_last_modified_at,644  );645  const next = Math.max(646    Date.now(),647    Number.isFinite(previous) ? previous + 1 : 0,648  );649  try {650    await chrome.storage.local.set({651      [SLOT_A]: slotA,652      [SLOT_B]: slotB,653      peach_last_modified_at: String(next),654    });655  } catch (err) {656    throw mapStorageError(err);657  }658}659660// Monotonic clock for per-entry modifiedAt / deletedAt timestamps. Guards the661// sync layer's last-write-wins merge against wall-clock regressions (NTP step,662// manual clock change, DST glitch): a backwards Date.now() must never produce663// an entry timestamp that's <= the entry's existing modifiedAt, or a genuine664// local edit would lose to a stale remote copy. The returned value is always665// strictly greater than both the entry's current modifiedAt and the previous666// call's result (SEV-2-E).667let lastEntryTimestamp = 0;668function monotonicEntryTimestamp(currentModifiedAt?: number): number {669  const base = Math.max(670    Date.now(),671    (currentModifiedAt ?? 0) + 1,672    lastEntryTimestamp + 1,673  );674  lastEntryTimestamp = base;675  return base;676}677678async function stampLocalVaultMutation(): Promise<void> {679  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get("peach_last_modified_at");680  const previous = Number(681    (raw as Record<string, unknown>).peach_last_modified_at,682  );683  const next = Math.max(684    Date.now(),685    Number.isFinite(previous) ? previous + 1 : 0,686  );687  await chrome.storage.local.set({688    peach_last_modified_at: String(next),689  });690}691692/**693 * One-shot migration from the pre-A-2 schema (peach_vault + peach_decoy_vault694 * + peach_duress flag) to the slot-neutral schema (peach_vault_a +695 * peach_vault_b). Runs at most once per session; safe to call repeatedly.696 */697async function ensureMigrated(): Promise<void> {698  if (migrationRan) return;699  migrationRan = true;700701  const keys = [LEGACY_MAIN, LEGACY_DECOY, LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG, SLOT_A, SLOT_B];702  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get(keys);703  const slotAExists = raw[SLOT_A] !== undefined;704  const slotBExists = raw[SLOT_B] !== undefined;705  const legacyMain = raw[LEGACY_MAIN] as StoredVault | undefined;706  const legacyDecoy = raw[LEGACY_DECOY] as StoredVault | undefined;707708  // Fresh install with nothing in storage — nothing to do; createVault() sets up both slots.709  if (!slotAExists && !legacyMain) return;710711  // Already migrated.712  if (slotAExists && slotBExists && !legacyMain && !legacyDecoy) return;713714  let didMigrate = false;715  if (legacyMain && !slotAExists) {716    await writeSlot(SLOT_A, legacyMain);717    didMigrate = true;718  }719720  // If slot B isn't set, populate it: use legacy decoy when present, else noise.721  if (!slotBExists) {722    const target = (legacyMain ?? raw[SLOT_A]) as StoredVault | undefined;723    if (legacyDecoy) {724      await writeSlot(SLOT_B, legacyDecoy);725      didMigrate = true;726    } else if (target) {727      await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(target.ciphertext.length / 2));728      didMigrate = true;729    }730  }731732  const toRemove: string[] = [];733  if (legacyMain) toRemove.push(LEGACY_MAIN);734  if (legacyDecoy) toRemove.push(LEGACY_DECOY);735  if (raw[LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG] !== undefined) toRemove.push(LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG);736  if (toRemove.length > 0) {737    await chrome.storage.local.remove(toRemove);738    didMigrate = true;739  }740  if (didMigrate) {741    await stampLocalVaultMutation();742  }743}744745// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------746// Padding + noise helpers747// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------748749/**750 * Pads the plaintext string with trailing spaces so that the encoded byte751 * length is a multiple of PAD_BLOCK. JSON.parse tolerates trailing752 * whitespace after a complete document, so the padding is transparent on753 * decode. Ciphertext length equals plaintext length plus a 16-byte tag.754 */755function padPlaintext(json: string, minBytes = 0): string {756  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(json);757  const bucket = Math.max(PAD_BLOCK, Math.ceil(encoded.length / PAD_BLOCK) * PAD_BLOCK);758  // minBytes lets the duress path force a fixed ceiling so both slots match.759  const target = Math.max(bucket, minBytes);760  const padLen = target - encoded.length;761  return json + " ".repeat(padLen);762}763764/**765 * Produces a StoredVault-shaped record filled with CSPRNG bytes. The766 * ciphertext length matches the given byte count. Because GCM ciphertext is767 * pseudo-random, this blob is indistinguishable at rest from a real768 * encrypted vault without the key.769 *770 * crypto.getRandomValues() caps each call at 65536 bytes (the Web Crypto771 * spec hard limit). Chunk the fill so vaults larger than that — common once772 * the user has dozens of entries or any passkey — don't throw.773 */774const CSPRNG_CHUNK = 65_536;775776function fillRandom(buf: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {777  for (let offset = 0; offset < buf.length; offset += CSPRNG_CHUNK) {778    const end = Math.min(offset + CSPRNG_CHUNK, buf.length);779    const chunk = new Uint8Array(end - offset);780    crypto.getRandomValues(chunk);781    buf.set(chunk, offset);782  }783  return buf;784}785786function generateNoiseBlob(ciphertextBytes: number): StoredVault {787  const salt = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));788  const nonce = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));789  const cipher = fillRandom(new Uint8Array(ciphertextBytes));790  const tag = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));791  return {792    version: 1,793    salt: hex(salt),794    nonce: hex(nonce),795    ciphertext: hex(cipher),796    tag: hex(tag),797  };798}799800// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------801// Encrypted plaintext envelope802// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------803804type VaultPayload = {805  entries: VaultEntry[];806  duressConfigured?: boolean;807};808809type DecryptedPayload = {810  entries: VaultEntry[];811  duressConfigured: boolean;812  /**813   * True when at least one entry in the on-disk payload had a legacy shape814   * (pre-v2.11.0 passkey type/flat fields, or pre-A-2 created/updated keys)815   * and got rewritten by normalizeEntry. The unlock path uses this to816   * persist the new shape immediately — without it, the migration would817   * re-run on every unlock and old shape never disappears from disk.818   */819  migratedFromLegacy: boolean;820};821822function encodePayload(entries: VaultEntry[], duress: boolean, minBytes = 0): string {823  const envelope: VaultPayload = { entries, duressConfigured: duress };824  return padPlaintext(JSON.stringify(envelope), minBytes);825}826827function rawNeedsMigration(raw: VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry): boolean {828  if ("created" in raw || "updated" in raw) return true;829  const flat = raw as Partial<VaultEntry>;830  if (flat.type === "passkey") return true;831  // Flat rpId without a passkey sub-object means pre-v2.11.0 schema.832  if (flat.rpId !== undefined && flat.passkey === undefined) return true;833  return false;834}835836function decodePayload(plain: string): DecryptedPayload {837  const parsed = JSON.parse(plain) as838    | Array<VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry>839    | VaultPayload;840841  const rawEntries = Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed : parsed.entries ?? [];842  const flatMigrationNeeded = rawEntries.some(rawNeedsMigration);843844  const normalized = rawEntries.map(normalizeEntry);845  const { merged } = mergePasskeyOnlyIntoLogins(normalized);846847  if (Array.isArray(parsed)) {848    return {849      entries: normalized,850      duressConfigured: false,851      migratedFromLegacy: true, // pre-A-2 array shape always needs save852    };853  }854855  return {856    entries: normalized,857    duressConfigured: parsed.duressConfigured === true,858    migratedFromLegacy: flatMigrationNeeded || merged,859  };860}861862/**863 * One-time consolidation pass run alongside the legacy passkey migration.864 *865 * Pre-v2.11.0 the Chrome passkey path always created a fresh `type:"passkey"`866 * entry per registration — so users who tested registration multiple times867 * accumulated several passkey-bearing entries for the same RP, and the868 * migration to the unified shape carried that duplication forward. This869 * pass collapses the duplicates:870 *871 *   1. Group passkey-bearing (and not deleted) entries by `passkey.rpId`.872 *   2. Within each group, the most recently-active credential wins (prefer873 *      lastUsedAt, fall back to passkey.createdAt, fall back to modifiedAt).874 *   3. If a NON-passkey login entry exists for that RP (matched by url or875 *      additionalUrls hostname), attach the winning passkey to it and876 *      soft-delete every passkey-bearing entry in the group.877 *   4. Otherwise, soft-delete every loser in the group, keeping the winner878 *      as a passkey-only entry.879 *880 * Soft delete (deletedAt) rather than splice — the trash flow keeps the881 * record around for retention and the user can restore if the heuristic882 * picked wrong. The `merged` flag goes back to decodePayload so the883 * unlock path persists the consolidated shape immediately.884 */885function mergePasskeyOnlyIntoLogins(entries: VaultEntry[]): { merged: boolean } {886  let merged = false;887  const now = Date.now();888889  const candidates = entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt && e.passkey);890  const byRpId = new Map<string, VaultEntry[]>();891  for (const e of candidates) {892    const rpId = e.passkey!.rpId;893    const list = byRpId.get(rpId);894    if (list) list.push(e);895    else byRpId.set(rpId, [e]);896  }897898  for (const [rpId, group] of byRpId) {899    if (group.length === 0) continue;900    group.sort((a, b) => {901      const aT =902        a.passkey!.lastUsedAt ?? a.passkey!.createdAt ?? a.modifiedAt ?? a.createdAt;903      const bT =904        b.passkey!.lastUsedAt ?? b.passkey!.createdAt ?? b.modifiedAt ?? b.createdAt;905      return bT - aT;906    });907    const winner = group[0]!;908909    // Look for a NON-passkey login entry matching this RP. Use the URL910    // hostname rather than a substring search so a "login.foo.com" entry911    // doesn't accidentally absorb a passkey for "foo.com".912    const loginTarget = entries.find((e) => {913      if (e.deletedAt || e.passkey || e.type !== "login") return false;914      if (e.url && extractDomain(e.url) === rpId) return true;915      for (const extra of e.additionalUrls ?? []) {916        if (extractDomain(extra) === rpId) return true;917      }918      return false;919    });920921    if (loginTarget) {922      loginTarget.passkey = winner.passkey;923      // A passkey entry may also carry the site's TOTP seed. Preserve it when924      // the passkey is consolidated onto an existing login instead of925      // soft-deleting the only record that held the 2FA configuration.926      if (!loginTarget.totp && winner.totp) {927        loginTarget.totp = winner.totp;928        loginTarget.totpAlgorithm = winner.totpAlgorithm;929        loginTarget.totpDigits = winner.totpDigits;930        loginTarget.totpPeriod = winner.totpPeriod;931      }932      loginTarget.modifiedAt = now;933      for (const dup of group) {934        if (!dup.deletedAt) {935          dup.deletedAt = now;936          dup.modifiedAt = now;937        }938      }939      merged = true;940    } else if (group.length > 1) {941      for (let i = 1; i < group.length; i += 1) {942        const dup = group[i]!;943        if (!dup.deletedAt) {944          dup.deletedAt = now;945          dup.modifiedAt = now;946        }947      }948      merged = true;949    }950  }951952  return { merged };953}954955// Validates that a `StoredVault` record on disk has the field shape we expect956// before treating an AES-GCM decrypt success as a clean unlock. AES-GCM only957// authenticates the static VERSION_BYTE AAD, not the `version` field on the958// outer record — a corrupted `version: 42` slot still decrypts cleanly. This959// check surfaces that as `corrupted` (M7/COR-007) so the popup can offer a960// history-restore path instead of falsely reporting "wrong password".961function hasValidVaultSchema(v: unknown): v is StoredVault {962  if (typeof v !== "object" || v === null) return false;963  const r = v as Record<string, unknown>;964  return (965    r.version === 1 &&966    typeof r.salt === "string" &&967    typeof r.nonce === "string" &&968    typeof r.ciphertext === "string" &&969    typeof r.tag === "string"970  );971}972973export type TryDecryptResult =974  | { status: "ok"; payload: DecryptedPayload }975  | { status: "wrong_key" }976  | { status: "corrupted"; reason: string };977978// Exported solely for `unlockFromCodex` below, which needs to verify a979// supplied passphrase against a slotA blob *without* committing anything to980// storage. Keep this internal otherwise — callers crossing the messages.ts981// boundary should always go through `unlock` / `verifyMainPassword` so the982// constant-time invariants in Projects.md §3.4 are not bypassed.983export async function tryDecryptSlot(984  vault: StoredVault,985  key: Uint8Array,986  aadTag?: string,987): Promise<DecryptedPayload | null> {988  const res = await tryDecryptSlotResult(vault, key, aadTag);989  return res.status === "ok" ? res.payload : null;990}991992export async function tryDecryptSlotResult(993  vault: StoredVault,994  key: Uint8Array,995  aadTag?: string,996): Promise<TryDecryptResult> {997  if (!hasValidVaultSchema(vault)) {998    return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_slot_schema" };999  }1000  let plain: string;1001  try {1002    plain = await decrypt(key, vault.nonce, vault.ciphertext, vault.tag, aadTag);1003  } catch {1004    return { status: "wrong_key" };1005  }1006  try {1007    const parsed = JSON.parse(plain) as unknown;1008    if (typeof parsed !== "object" || parsed === null) {1009      return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_payload_shape" };1010    }1011    if (!Array.isArray(parsed) && !Array.isArray((parsed as VaultPayload).entries)) {1012      return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_payload_shape" };1013    }1014    return { status: "ok", payload: decodePayload(plain) };1015  } catch {1016    return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_payload_json" };1017  }1018}10191020// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------1021// Core operations1022// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------10231024function buildDomainIndexSync(all: VaultEntry[]): void {1025  domainIndex = new Map();10261027  for (const entry of all) {1028    if (entry.deletedAt) continue;1029    if (entry.type === "note" || entry.type === "card") continue;10301031    // An entry can match multiple sites via `additionalUrls`. Index each1032    // hostname so `queryDomain` returns the entry regardless of which alias1033    // the user is currently visiting. Dedupe per-entry so a single entry1034    // never appears twice in one bucket.1035    const domains = new Set<string>();1036    const primary = extractDomain(entry.url ?? "");1037    if (primary) domains.add(primary);1038    for (const extra of entry.additionalUrls ?? []) {1039      const d = extractDomain(extra);1040      if (d) domains.add(d);1041    }1042    if (domains.size === 0) continue;10431044    for (const domain of domains) {1045      const bucket = domainIndex.get(domain) ?? [];1046      bucket.push(entry);1047      domainIndex.set(domain, bucket);1048    }1049  }1050}10511052export async function createVault(password: string): Promise<void> {1053  await ensureMigrated();10541055  const salt = generateSalt();1056  derivedKey = await deriveKey(password, salt);1057  entries = [];1058  vaultMode = "real";1059  duressConfigured = false;1060  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);10611062  // Generate and wrap the root key for recovery word escrow.1063  const { rawRootKey, recoverySalt, wrappedRootKey, wrappedNonce, wrappedTag } =1064    await generateAndWrapRootKey();1065  rootKey = unhex(rawRootKey);10661067  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured, duressConfigured ? DURESS_SLOT_SIZE : 0);1068  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");10691070  // Second wrapping of rootKey under derivedKey so future unlocks can rehydrate1071  // it without recovery words (H2/COR-006).1072  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(derivedKey, rootKey);10731074  const slotA: StoredVault = {1075    version: 1,1076    salt: hex(salt),1077    nonce,1078    ciphertext,1079    tag,1080    recovery_salt: recoverySalt,1081    recovery_wrapped_root_key: wrappedRootKey,1082    recovery_nonce: wrappedNonce,1083    recovery_tag: wrappedTag,1084    ...pwRoot,1085  };1086  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, slotA);10871088  // Matching-size noise blob for slot B, so a fresh install shows two1089  // similarly-shaped records regardless of whether duress is ever set up.1090  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2));1091  await stampLocalVaultMutation();10921093  touchAutoLock();1094}10951096/**1097 * Creates a local vault from an existing vault root key received through the1098 * SAS-gated adoption protocol. The password is local to this device; it wraps1099 * the adopted root key at rest and does not need to match the source device.1100 */1101export async function createVaultFromRootKey(1102  password: string,1103  rootKeyHex: string,1104): Promise<{ vaultId: string }> {1105  if (typeof password !== "string" || password.length === 0) {1106    throw new Error("ADOPT_INVALID_PASSWORD");1107  }1108  if (typeof rootKeyHex !== "string" || !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(rootKeyHex)) {1109    throw new Error("ADOPT_INVALID_ROOT_KEY: expected 64 lowercase hex chars");1110  }11111112  const rootKeyBytes = unhex(rootKeyHex);1113  if (rootKeyBytes.length !== 32) {1114    rootKeyBytes.fill(0);1115    throw new Error("ADOPT_INVALID_ROOT_KEY: expected 32 bytes");1116  }11171118  let nextDerivedKey: Uint8Array | null = null;1119  let sessionRootKey: Uint8Array | null = null;1120  try {1121    await ensureMigrated();1122    if ((await loadSlot(SLOT_A)) !== null) {1123      throw new Error("ADOPT_VAULT_ALREADY_EXISTS");1124    }11251126    const nextEntries: VaultEntry[] = [];1127    const nextDuressConfigured = false;1128    const vaultId = await computeVaultId(rootKeyBytes);1129    const salt = generateSalt();1130    nextDerivedKey = await deriveKey(password, salt);1131    const recovery = await wrapExistingRootKeyForRecovery(rootKeyBytes);11321133    sessionRootKey = new Uint8Array(rootKeyBytes);1134    const plaintext = encodePayload(nextEntries, nextDuressConfigured, 0);1135    const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(nextDerivedKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");1136    const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(nextDerivedKey, sessionRootKey);1137    const slotA: StoredVault = {1138      version: 1,1139      salt: hex(salt),1140      nonce,1141      ciphertext,1142      tag,1143      recovery_salt: recovery.recoverySalt,1144      recovery_wrapped_root_key: recovery.wrappedRootKey,1145      recovery_nonce: recovery.wrappedNonce,1146      recovery_tag: recovery.wrappedTag,1147      ...pwRoot,1148    };1149    const slotB = generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2);1150    await commitCreatedVaultSlots(slotA, slotB);11511152    const previousDerivedKey = derivedKey;1153    const previousRootKey = rootKey;1154    derivedKey = nextDerivedKey;1155    rootKey = sessionRootKey;1156    nextDerivedKey = null;1157    sessionRootKey = null;1158    entries = nextEntries;1159    vaultMode = "real";1160    duressConfigured = nextDuressConfigured;1161    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1162    if (previousDerivedKey && previousDerivedKey !== derivedKey) zeroKey(previousDerivedKey);1163    if (previousRootKey && previousRootKey !== rootKey) previousRootKey.fill(0);1164    touchAutoLock();11651166    return { vaultId };1167  } finally {1168    rootKeyBytes.fill(0);1169    if (nextDerivedKey) zeroKey(nextDerivedKey);1170    if (sessionRootKey) sessionRootKey.fill(0);1171  }1172}11731174export async function hasVault(): Promise<boolean> {1175  await ensureMigrated();1176  return (await loadSlot(SLOT_A)) !== null;1177}11781179/**1180 * Returns whether the real vault has recorded that a duress passphrase is1181 * configured. Reliable only after a real-mode unlock — before unlock or in1182 * decoy mode, returns false because we cannot read slot A's plaintext.1183 */1184export async function isDuressEnabled(): Promise<boolean> {1185  return vaultMode === "real" && duressConfigured;1186}11871188export async function setupDuress(duressPassword: string): Promise<void> {1189  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {1190    throw new Error("vault must be unlocked in real mode");1191  }1192  await ensureMigrated();11931194  // Encrypt the decoy payload (empty entries) under the duress key. Pad to1195  // at least the current slot A ciphertext size so the two slots look the1196  // same at rest at setup time.1197  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1198  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");11991200  const decoySalt = generateSalt();1201  const decoyKey = await deriveKey(duressPassword, decoySalt);1202  try {1203    // Pad the decoy to the fixed duress ceiling. Slot A is re-encrypted to the1204    // same ceiling by the persistSlotA() call below (duressConfigured is now1205    // true), so both slots are exactly DURESS_SLOT_SIZE+tag at rest and their1206    // lengths cannot reveal that duress is configured (audit MEDIUM).1207    const plaintext = encodePayload([], false, DURESS_SLOT_SIZE);1208    const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(decoyKey, plaintext, "slot_b_v1");1209    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, {1210      version: 1,1211      salt: hex(decoySalt),1212      nonce,1213      ciphertext,1214      tag,1215    });1216  } finally {1217    zeroKey(decoyKey);1218  }12191220  // Re-encrypt slot A with the duressConfigured flag set to true. No external1221  // flag is written — the bit lives inside the encrypted envelope.1222  duressConfigured = true;1223  await persistSlotA();1224}12251226export async function disableDuress(): Promise<void> {1227  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {1228    throw new Error("vault must be unlocked in real mode");1229  }1230  await ensureMigrated();12311232  // Overwrite slot B with fresh noise that matches slot A's size. The slot1233  // remains occupied so its mere existence does not signal that duress was1234  // ever configured.1235  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1236  if (slotA) {1237    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(slotA.ciphertext.length / 2));1238  }12391240  duressConfigured = false;1241  await persistSlotA();1242}12431244// L14/COR-015: this function intentionally checks slot A (real vault) only.1245// A duress-mode user attempting changePassword is rejected earlier by the1246// vaultMode === 'decoy' check at changePassword. The real-vs-decoy1247// distinction here is by design — duress users cannot rotate the real1248// password by guessing it, and the asymmetry in error timing is acceptable1249// because duress mode is opt-in and the user knows their own decoy key.1250export async function verifyMainPassword(password: string): Promise<boolean> {1251  await ensureMigrated();1252  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1253  if (!slotA) return false;1254  const key = await deriveKey(password, unhex(slotA.salt));1255  try {1256    return (await tryDecryptSlot(slotA, key, "slot_a_v1")) !== null;1257  } finally {1258    zeroKey(key);1259  }1260}12611262export async function unlock(password: string): Promise<boolean> {1263  // LV-1: the normal path NFC-normalizes inside deriveKey. If that fails and1264  // the supplied password is not already in NFC form, the vault may have been1265  // sealed (pre-LV-1) with the raw, un-normalized bytes — retry with those.1266  if (await attemptUnlockWithDerive(password, deriveKey)) return true;12671268  const nfc = password.normalize("NFC");1269  if (password === nfc) return false; // ASCII/NFC password — no legacy form to try12701271  if (await attemptUnlockWithDerive(password, deriveKeyRaw)) {1272    // Heal: re-seal the real slot under the NFC-normalized key so every1273    // future unlock takes the normal path. Only the real vault is re-sealed;1274    // a non-NFC duress password keeps working through this fallback.1275    if (vaultMode === "real") {1276      try {1277        const newSalt = generateSalt();1278        const newKey = await deriveKey(password, newSalt);1279        await changePasswordWithNewKey(newSalt, newKey);1280      } catch (healErr) {1281        console.warn("[Peach] LV-1 NFC heal failed:", healErr);1282      }1283    }1284    return true;1285  }1286  return false;1287}12881289async function attemptUnlockWithDerive(1290  password: string,1291  derive: typeof deriveKey,1292): Promise<boolean> {1293  await ensureMigrated();12941295  // Load both slots in parallel. Both always exist post-migration; the1296  // parallel load and the parallel derivation below keep wall-clock time1297  // constant regardless of which slot's passphrase (real or decoy) the1298  // caller supplied, so a timing side channel cannot distinguish the1299  // duress path from the real-unlock path (DUR-002).1300  const [slotA, slotB] = await Promise.all([1301    loadSlot(SLOT_A),1302    loadSlot(SLOT_B),1303  ]);13041305  // Derive both keys in parallel, unconditionally.1306  const [keyA, keyB] = await Promise.all([1307    slotA ? derive(password, unhex(slotA.salt)) : Promise.resolve(null),1308    slotB ? derive(password, unhex(slotB.salt)) : Promise.resolve(null),1309  ]);13101311  // Attempt both decrypts in parallel. The Result variant lets us distinguish1312  // 'wrong_key' from 'corrupted' so callers can offer a history-restore path1313  // when a slot's schema is invalid even though AES-GCM authenticated (M7).1314  const [resultA, resultB] = await Promise.all([1315    keyA && slotA1316      ? tryDecryptSlotResult(slotA, keyA, "slot_a_v1")1317      : Promise.resolve({ status: "wrong_key" } as TryDecryptResult),1318    keyB && slotB1319      ? tryDecryptSlotResult(slotB, keyB, "slot_b_v1")1320      : Promise.resolve({ status: "wrong_key" } as TryDecryptResult),1321  ]);1322  const payloadA = resultA.status === "ok" ? resultA.payload : null;1323  const payloadB = resultB.status === "ok" ? resultB.payload : null;13241325  if (payloadA && keyA) {1326    derivedKey = keyA;1327    void saveSessionKey(keyA, "real");1328    vaultMode = "real";1329    entries = payloadA.entries;1330    duressConfigured = payloadA.duressConfigured;1331    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1332    await loadSettings();1333    touchAutoLock();1334    if (keyB) zeroKey(keyB);13351336    // slotA is non-null when payloadA is truthy (keyA was derived from slotA).1337    if (slotA) {1338      const needsRecoverySetup =1339        !slotA.recovery_salt || !slotA.recovery_wrapped_root_key;1340      if (!needsRecoverySetup) {1341        rootKey = await deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(keyA, slotA);1342      }1343      // Pre-v2.12 vault, or a vault whose pw_root_* fields haven't been written1344      // yet: generate the recovery escrow and seed pw_root_* so subsequent1345      // unlocks can rehydrate rootKey without the user's recovery words.1346      // Best-effort — a failure here must not block unlock.1347      if (needsRecoverySetup || !rootKey) {1348        try {1349          await migrateToRecovery();1350          if (needsRecoverySetup) {1351            // String "1" matches the popup's existing peach_recovery_pending1352            // check; surfaced so the user re-confirms recovery words after a1353            // legacy-vault unlock (H2/COR-006).1354            await chrome.storage.local.set({ peach_recovery_pending: '1' });1355          }1356        } catch (migrationErr) {1357          console.warn('[Peach] recovery migration failed:', migrationErr);1358        }1359      }1360    }13611362    // If the payload had a pre-v2.11.0 shape (legacy passkey type, flat1363    // passkey fields, or pre-A-2 created/updated keys), rewrite it now so1364    // the next save uses the new format and migration doesn't re-run forever.1365    if (payloadA.migratedFromLegacy) {1366      await persistSlotA();1367    }1368    return true;1369  }13701371  if (payloadB && keyB) {1372    derivedKey = keyB;1373    void saveSessionKey(keyB, "decoy");1374    vaultMode = "decoy";1375    entries = payloadB.entries;1376    duressConfigured = false;1377    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1378    await loadSettings();1379    touchAutoLock();1380    if (keyA) zeroKey(keyA);1381    return true;1382  }13831384  if (keyA) zeroKey(keyA);1385  if (keyB) zeroKey(keyB);1386  // Surface corruption (good AES tag, broken schema) distinctly from1387  // wrong-password so the popup can offer history-restore (M7/COR-007).1388  if (resultA.status === "corrupted") {1389    lastUnlockFailureReason = resultA.reason;1390  } else if (resultB.status === "corrupted") {1391    lastUnlockFailureReason = resultB.reason;1392  }1393  return false;1394}13951396// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------1397// MV3 service worker session key — survives SW restarts within a browser session1398// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------13991400// chrome.storage.session is cleared on browser close; survives SW restart.1401// Firefox does not implement it (persistent background script, no restart risk).1402const SESSION_KEY_STORAGE = "peach_session_dk";14031404async function saveSessionKey(key: Uint8Array, mode: "real" | "decoy"): Promise<void> {1405  if (!chrome.storage.session) return;1406  await chrome.storage.session.set({ [SESSION_KEY_STORAGE]: { keyHex: hex(key), mode } });1407}14081409async function clearSessionKey(): Promise<void> {1410  if (!chrome.storage.session) return;1411  await chrome.storage.session.remove(SESSION_KEY_STORAGE);1412}14131414/**1415 * On SW restart, re-derive all in-memory vault state from the session key1416 * stored in chrome.storage.session (set at unlock time; deliberately NOT1417 * cleared by lock() — see lock() below. Cleared only on browser close or1418 * when restoration fails).1419 * Returns true if the vault was restored, false if no session key was found.1420 * No-ops if the vault is already unlocked.1421 */1422export async function restoreFromSession(): Promise<boolean> {1423  if (derivedKey !== null) return true;1424  if (!chrome.storage.session) return false;1425  const stored = await chrome.storage.session.get(SESSION_KEY_STORAGE);1426  const entry = stored[SESSION_KEY_STORAGE] as { keyHex: string; mode: "real" | "decoy" } | undefined;1427  if (!entry?.keyHex) return false;14281429  const key = unhex(entry.keyHex);1430  const slotKey = entry.mode === "real" ? SLOT_A : SLOT_B;1431  const aadTag = entry.mode === "real" ? "slot_a_v1" : "slot_b_v1";1432  const slot = await loadSlot(slotKey);1433  if (!slot) { await clearSessionKey(); return false; }14341435  const result = await tryDecryptSlotResult(slot, key, aadTag);1436  if (result.status !== "ok") { await clearSessionKey(); return false; }14371438  derivedKey = key;1439  vaultMode = entry.mode;1440  entries = result.payload.entries;1441  duressConfigured = entry.mode === "real" ? result.payload.duressConfigured : false;1442  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1443  await loadSettings();1444  touchAutoLock();14451446  // The rootKey is what identity/sync derivations use. deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey1447  // pulls it from the pw_root_* fields on the slot — set on every createVault +1448  // re-set on every password change (H2/COR-006). The previous gate on1449  // recovery_salt + recovery_wrapped_root_key silently left rootKey unset for1450  // any vault that hadn't been through migrateToRecovery, which broke background1451  // sync: the SW re-woke from the alarm, isUnlocked() was true (the session key1452  // restored derivedKey + entries), but getRootKeyHex() returned null and the1453  // runner returned VAULT_LOCKED. The fix is to always try the pw_root path1454  // when the slot has those fields — the recovery fields are independent.1455  if (entry.mode === "real") {1456    try {1457      rootKey = await deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(key, slot);1458    } catch {1459      /* non-fatal — sync identity will still skip on the runner's null-rootKey check */1460    }1461  }14621463  return true;1464}14651466export function lock(): void {1467  // Deliberately does NOT clear the session key. The session key survives1468  // `lock()` so the MV3 service worker can restore the vault from1469  // chrome.storage.session on the next wake — the 10-minute sync alarm, the1470  // post-adoption retry, the post-update alarm. The previous behaviour1471  // (clear on every lock()) broke background sync: any popup close with1472  // lockOnClose=true would `lock()`, which cleared the session key, and1473  // the next SW wake would find no session key and the runner would return1474  // VAULT_LOCKED. The session key's natural lifetime is the browser session1475  // (chrome.storage.session is cleared on browser close), so explicit user1476  // lock + popup close + auto-lock all keep the session key alive and the1477  // expected sync-after-restart flow actually works.1478  if (derivedKey) {1479    zeroKey(derivedKey);1480    derivedKey = null;1481  }1482  if (rootKey) {1483    rootKey.fill(0);1484    rootKey = null;1485  }14861487  entries = [];1488  domainIndex = new Map();1489  vaultMode = "real";1490  duressConfigured = false;1491  clearAutoLock();1492}14931494export function isUnlocked(): boolean {1495  return derivedKey !== null;1496}14971498// Opens the vault using a pre-derived AES-256 key (skipping Argon2id).1499// Used by Android biometric unlock — the key was derived on the native side.1500// SECURITY: only reachable via Capacitor native bridge; browser messages.ts never routes here.1501export async function unlockWithKey(1502  masterKeyHex: string,1503): Promise<{ ok: true; entries: VaultEntry[] } | { ok: false; error: string }> {1504  try {1505    const masterKeyBytes = unhex(masterKeyHex);1506    const stored = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1507    if (!stored) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };1508    const payload = await tryDecryptSlot(stored, masterKeyBytes, "slot_a_v1");1509    if (!payload) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };15101511    derivedKey = masterKeyBytes;1512    vaultMode = "real";1513    entries = payload.entries;1514    duressConfigured = payload.duressConfigured;1515    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1516    await loadSettings();1517    touchAutoLock();15181519    // PCH-01-009: the biometric path skips Argon2id but must still rehydrate the1520    // root key, exactly like attemptUnlockWithDerive and restoreFromSession.1521    // Without it, rootKey stays null after a biometric unlock and sync +1522    // GET_RECOVERY_WORDS report the open vault as locked. Guarded and non-fatal:1523    // a missing/legacy escrow must not fail the unlock itself.1524    if (stored.recovery_salt && stored.recovery_wrapped_root_key) {1525      try {1526        rootKey = await deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(masterKeyBytes, stored);1527      } catch { /* non-fatal — unlock still succeeds without rootKey */ }1528    }1529    return { ok: true, entries };1530  } catch {1531    return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };1532  }1533}15341535// --- Adoption duress-slot helpers (passthrough, no decrypt) ---15361537/**1538 * Adoption SOURCE helper: returns the sealed slot B as a JSON string when1539 * duress is configured and slot B exists, so the inline snapshot can ship it1540 * to the receiver. Returns null otherwise. Never decrypts.1541 */1542export async function exportDuressSlotForAdoption(): Promise<string | null> {1543  if (!(await isDuressEnabled())) return null;1544  await ensureMigrated();1545  const slotB = await loadSlot(SLOT_B);1546  if (!slotB) return null;1547  return JSON.stringify(slotB);1548}15491550/**1551 * Adoption RECEIVER helper: installs a duress slot received from a source1552 * device. Validates the StoredVault shape (same guard as unlockFromCodex)1553 * and writes it to slot B. Throws on invalid shape so the caller can treat1554 * it as a non-fatal snapshot failure. Never decrypts.1555 */1556export async function installAdoptedDuressSlot(json: string): Promise<void> {1557  let parsed: StoredVault;1558  try {1559    const raw = JSON.parse(json) as unknown;1560    if (!hasValidVaultSchema(raw)) {1561      throw new Error("invalid_duress_slot_shape");1562    }1563    parsed = raw;1564  } catch (err) {1565    if (err instanceof SyntaxError) {1566      throw new Error("invalid_duress_slot_shape");1567    }1568    throw err;1569  }1570  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, parsed);1571}15721573/**1574 * Restore the vault from a parsed Peach Codex payload.1575 *1576 * The supplied passphrase is verified against the Codex's slotA *before* any1577 * storage mutation — wrong passphrases return without touching disk. On1578 * success, the current vault state is snapshotted (reason: "restore") so the1579 * user can revert via Settings -> Vault History, then slotA/slotB are written1580 * and `peach_last_modified_at` is set to the Codex's recorded timestamp. A1581 * regular `unlock()` follows so the rest of the SW sees the standard1582 * post-unlock state.1583 *1584 * Intentionally non-Pro-gated — see peach_codex_v2.md "Pro gating". A Codex1585 * printed by a Pro user must always be restorable, even on a free device.1586 *1587 * Timing is not held constant here (in contrast to `unlock`): the Codex flow1588 * is an explicit user action with a known passphrase, not a passive lock1589 * screen, so the duress-vs-real timing side channel does not apply.1590 */1591export async function unlockFromCodex(params: {1592  slotA: string; // JSON string of StoredVault for slot A1593  slotB: string | null; // JSON string of StoredVault for slot B, or null1594  timestamp: number;1595  masterPassphrase: string;1596}): Promise<1597  | { ok: true; entryCount: number }1598  | { ok: false; reason: "wrong_passphrase" | "invalid_slot_format" }1599> {1600  let parsedSlotA: StoredVault;1601  let parsedSlotB: StoredVault | null = null;1602  try {1603    const rawA = JSON.parse(params.slotA) as unknown;1604    if (!hasValidVaultSchema(rawA)) {1605      return { ok: false, reason: "invalid_slot_format" };1606    }1607    parsedSlotA = rawA;1608    if (params.slotB !== null) {1609      const rawB = JSON.parse(params.slotB) as unknown;1610      if (!hasValidVaultSchema(rawB)) {1611        return { ok: false, reason: "invalid_slot_format" };1612      }1613      parsedSlotB = rawB;1614    }1615  } catch {1616    return { ok: false, reason: "invalid_slot_format" };1617  }16181619  // Verify the passphrase against the supplied slotA WITHOUT writing anything.1620  // If this fails the on-disk vault is left completely untouched.1621  const trialKey = await deriveKey(params.masterPassphrase, unhex(parsedSlotA.salt));1622  const trialPayload = await tryDecryptSlot(parsedSlotA, trialKey, "slot_a_v1");1623  if (!trialPayload) {1624    zeroKey(trialKey);1625    return { ok: false, reason: "wrong_passphrase" };1626  }1627  // Drop the trial key; `unlock()` below derives its own copy. Holding two1628  // copies of the master key in memory at once would be a needless surface.1629  zeroKey(trialKey);16301631  // Snapshot the about-to-be-overwritten on-disk state so the user can revert1632  // a mistaken Codex restore via the Vault History UI. Non-fatal if it fails.1633  await takeVaultSnapshot("restore");16341635  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, parsedSlotA);1636  if (parsedSlotB) {1637    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, parsedSlotB);1638  } else {1639    // Slot B must always exist with ciphertext length matching slot A1640    // (Projects.md §3.2). Codex prints may omit slot B (duress wasn't1641    // configured); regenerate noise to satisfy the invariant.1642    await writeSlot(1643      SLOT_B,1644      generateNoiseBlob(parsedSlotA.ciphertext.length / 2),1645    );1646  }1647  await chrome.storage.local.set({1648    peach_last_modified_at: String(params.timestamp),1649  });16501651  // Standard unlock path so domain index, settings, auto-lock, and1652  // recovery-key state all populate exactly as a normal unlock would.1653  const ok = await unlock(params.masterPassphrase);1654  if (!ok) {1655    // Should be unreachable — we just verified the passphrase against the1656    // same slotA we wrote. Treat as wrong_passphrase to keep the contract1657    // simple if some race or storage anomaly intrudes.1658    return { ok: false, reason: "wrong_passphrase" };1659  }1660  return { ok: true, entryCount: getEntries().length };1661}16621663// Returns the current in-memory derived key as a hex string.1664// Used by the biometric enable flow in Settings to store the key in Android Keystore.1665export function getDerivedKeyHex(): string {1666  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_not_unlocked");1667  return hex(derivedKey);1668}16691670/**1671 * Returns the vault's stable root key as hex, or null when locked / not yet1672 * populated. The root key is random per-vault, generated at creation, escrowed1673 * under the recovery words, and re-wrapped (not regenerated) on every password1674 * change — so it is INVARIANT across password rotation, unlike getDerivedKeyHex.1675 *1676 * This is the correct input for sync identity derivation (vault_id, the Noise1677 * NK static key, the Ed25519 manifest signing key, and per-entry envelope1678 * keys): paired devices keep the same identity and can still decrypt each1679 * other's entries after either side rotates its master password (SEV-2-B).1680 *1681 * Returns null rather than throwing so sync callers degrade to VAULT_LOCKED1682 * instead of crashing; rootKey is populated on every real-mode unlock via1683 * deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey / migrateToRecovery.1684 */1685export function getRootKeyHex(): string | null {1686  return rootKey ? hex(rootKey) : null;1687}16881689export function getEntries(): VaultEntry[] {1690  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1691  return entries.filter((entry) => !entry.deletedAt);1692}16931694const EMAIL_RE = /^[^\s@]+@[^\s@]+\.[^\s@]+$/;16951696export function getIdentities(): SavedIdentity[] {1697  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1698  const active = entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt && e.type === "login");16991700  const emailMap = new Map<string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }>();1701  const usernameMap = new Map<string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }>();17021703  for (const entry of active) {1704    const domain = extractDomain(entry.url ?? "") ?? "";1705    const modifiedAt = entry.modifiedAt ?? entry.createdAt ?? 0;17061707    function tally(map: Map<string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }>, v: string) {1708      const existing = map.get(v);1709      if (!existing || modifiedAt > existing.lastUsed) {1710        map.set(v, { lastUsed: modifiedAt, count: (existing?.count ?? 0) + 1, domain });1711      } else {1712        map.set(v, { ...existing, count: existing.count + 1 });1713      }1714    }17151716    const uVal = entry.username?.trim();1717    if (uVal) tally(EMAIL_RE.test(uVal) ? emailMap : usernameMap, uVal);17181719    // Also count the dedicated email field — entries created via the inline1720    // popup new-entry form store email here rather than in username.1721    const eVal = entry.email?.trim();1722    if (eVal) tally(emailMap, eVal);1723  }17241725  const toIdentity = (type: "email" | "username") =>1726    ([value, d]: [string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }]): SavedIdentity => ({1727      value, type, lastUsed: d.lastUsed, useCount: d.count, exampleDomain: d.domain || undefined,1728    });17291730  return [1731    ...[...emailMap.entries()].map(toIdentity("email")).sort((a, b) => b.useCount - a.useCount),1732    ...[...usernameMap.entries()].map(toIdentity("username")).sort((a, b) => b.useCount - a.useCount),1733  ];1734}17351736export async function batchAddEntries(drafts: EntryDraft[]): Promise<VaultEntry[]> {1737  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");17381739  const now = Date.now();1740  const added: VaultEntry[] = [];1741  for (const draft of drafts) {1742    try {1743      const sanitized = sanitizeEntryDraft(draft);1744      const nextEntry: VaultEntry = {1745        ...sanitized,1746        id: crypto.randomUUID(),1747        createdAt: now,1748        modifiedAt: monotonicEntryTimestamp(),1749      };1750      entries.push(nextEntry);1751      added.push(nextEntry);1752    } catch {1753      // Skip invalid drafts silently — caller can see diff between input and output length1754    }1755  }17561757  if (added.length > 0) {1758    await persistEntries();1759  }17601761  return added;1762}17631764/**1765 * Restore a set of entries in full fidelity — preserves id, createdAt,1766 * modifiedAt, and every other field unlike `batchAddEntries` which1767 * assigns fresh identity. Used by restore paths where the backup is the1768 * authoritative source of truth. `mode` controls how entries already in1769 * the vault are treated.1770 */1771export async function restoreEntries(1772  incoming: VaultEntry[],1773  mode: "replace" | "merge"1774): Promise<{ added: number; updated: number; skipped: number }> {1775  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");17761777  // A replace with zero incoming entries is almost certainly a caller bug1778  // (e.g. an import that silently dropped everything). Refuse rather than1779  // wipe the vault.1780  if (mode === "replace" && incoming.length === 0) {1781    throw new Error("refuse to replace with empty entry set");1782  }17831784  let added = 0;1785  let updated = 0;1786  let skipped = 0;17871788  if (mode === "replace") {1789    entries = [];1790    for (const entry of incoming) {1791      const normalized = sanitizeRestoredEntry(entry);1792      if (!normalized) {1793        skipped += 1;1794        continue;1795      }1796      entries.push(normalized);1797      added += 1;1798    }1799  } else {1800    const byId = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();1801    for (const e of entries) byId.set(e.id, e);18021803    for (const entry of incoming) {1804      const normalized = sanitizeRestoredEntry(entry);1805      if (!normalized) {1806        skipped += 1;1807        continue;1808      }1809      const existing = byId.get(normalized.id);1810      if (!existing) {1811        entries.push(normalized);1812        added += 1;1813      } else if (normalized.modifiedAt > existing.modifiedAt) {1814        const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === existing.id);1815        if (idx !== -1) {1816          entries[idx] = normalized;1817          updated += 1;1818        }1819      } else {1820        skipped += 1;1821      }1822    }1823  }18241825  await persistEntries("import");1826  return { added, updated, skipped };1827}18281829/**1830 * Validate + normalise a VaultEntry coming from a backup, import, or sync1831 * peer. MV-6: this is a strict field WHITELIST — `normalizeEntry` copies1832 * only known VaultEntry fields (unknown/attacker keys are dropped), and1833 * nested `passkey`/`canary` shapes are rebuilt field-by-field, never1834 * spread. Returns null for values the live vault shouldn't accept.1835 */1836function sanitizeRestoredEntry(entry: VaultEntry): VaultEntry | null {1837  if (!entry || typeof entry !== "object") return null;1838  const title = typeof entry.title === "string" ? entry.title.trim() : "";1839  if (!title) return null;1840  const id = typeof entry.id === "string" && entry.id ? entry.id : crypto.randomUUID();1841  const now = Date.now();1842  const createdAt = typeof entry.createdAt === "number" ? entry.createdAt : now;1843  const modifiedAt = typeof entry.modifiedAt === "number" ? entry.modifiedAt : createdAt;18441845  // normalizeEntry whitelists every known VaultEntry field and runs the1846  // same legacy-passkey migration as the on-disk read path — pre-v2.11.01847  // backups with flat passkey fields still import correctly because the1848  // legacy flat fields are themselves whitelisted VaultEntry members.1849  const normalized = normalizeEntry({1850    ...entry,1851    id,1852    title,1853    type: entry.type ?? "login",1854    createdAt,1855    modifiedAt,1856  });18571858  if (normalized.passkey) {1859    normalized.passkey = sanitizePasskey(normalized.passkey);1860  }1861  if (normalized.canary) {1862    normalized.canary = sanitizeCanary(normalized.canary);1863  }1864  // PCH-01-016: bound tags on the restore path too, so both import funnels agree.1865  normalized.tags = sanitizeTags(normalized.tags);18661867  // Login entries from backup must carry a password (or be passkey-only,1868  // in which case the passkey sub-object replaces the password requirement).1869  if (1870    normalized.type === "login" &&1871    !normalized.passkey &&1872    typeof normalized.password !== "string"1873  ) {1874    return null;1875  }1876  if (entry.passkey && !normalized.passkey) {1877    // Entry claimed a passkey but the shape didn't validate — refuse the1878    // whole entry rather than silently importing a credential-less husk.1879    return null;1880  }18811882  return normalized;1883}18841885/**1886 * Rebuild a PasskeyData object from untrusted input, field by field.1887 * Returns undefined when required fields are missing/mistyped — a rogue1888 * passkey credential must not activate via import (MV-6 attack scenario).1889 */1890function sanitizePasskey(pk: unknown): PasskeyData | undefined {1891  if (!pk || typeof pk !== "object") return undefined;1892  const r = pk as Record<string, unknown>;1893  if (1894    typeof r.rpId !== "string" || !r.rpId ||1895    typeof r.credentialId !== "string" || !r.credentialId ||1896    typeof r.publicKeyCose !== "string" ||1897    typeof r.userHandle !== "string" ||1898    typeof r.userName !== "string"1899  ) {1900    return undefined;1901  }1902  return {1903    rpId: r.rpId,1904    rpName: typeof r.rpName === "string" ? r.rpName : r.rpId,1905    credentialId: r.credentialId,1906    publicKeyCose: r.publicKeyCose,1907    privateKeyJwk:1908      r.privateKeyJwk && typeof r.privateKeyJwk === "object"1909        ? (r.privateKeyJwk as JsonWebKey)1910        : undefined,1911    userHandle: r.userHandle,1912    userName: r.userName,1913    userDisplayName:1914      typeof r.userDisplayName === "string" ? r.userDisplayName : r.userName,1915    algorithm: r.algorithm === -8 ? -8 : -7,1916    signCount: typeof r.signCount === "number" ? r.signCount : 0,1917    aaguid: typeof r.aaguid === "string" ? r.aaguid : "",1918    backupEligible: r.backupEligible === true,1919    backupState: r.backupState === true,1920    lastUsedAt: typeof r.lastUsedAt === "number" ? r.lastUsedAt : undefined,1921    browser: r.browser === "chrome" || r.browser === "firefox" ? r.browser : undefined,1922    transports: Array.isArray(r.transports)1923      ? r.transports.filter((t): t is string => typeof t === "string")1924      : undefined,1925    createdAt: typeof r.createdAt === "number" ? r.createdAt : Date.now(),1926  };1927}19281929/**1930 * Rebuild a Canary object from untrusted input. The webhook must be a1931 * well-formed HTTPS URL — a poisoned canary.webhookUrl is a standing1932 * exfiltration endpoint that the canary subsystem will POST entry titles1933 * to (MV-6 attack scenario). Invalid → the canary is dropped, not the1934 * entry. FIRE_CANARY_PING re-validates with the full SSRF guard at fire1935 * time (isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl), so this import-time check is the1936 * outer of two gates.1937 */1938function sanitizeCanary(c: unknown): Canary | undefined {1939  if (!c || typeof c !== "object") return undefined;1940  const r = c as Record<string, unknown>;1941  if (typeof r.webhookUrl !== "string") return undefined;1942  let url: URL;1943  try {1944    url = new URL(r.webhookUrl);1945  } catch {1946    return undefined;1947  }1948  if (url.protocol !== "https:") return undefined;1949  return {1950    webhookUrl: url.toString(),1951    label: typeof r.label === "string" ? r.label : undefined,1952    lastPinged: typeof r.lastPinged === "number" ? r.lastPinged : undefined,1953    pingCount: typeof r.pingCount === "number" ? r.pingCount : undefined,1954  };1955}19561957/**1958 * MV-6 / PCH-01-016: tags from imported / batch-added entries are untrusted.1959 * Keep only non-empty strings, cap each at 256 chars, and cap the count at 2551960 * (the same per-entry ceiling the export codec enforces, peachPayload.ts).1961 * Non-array or all-invalid input collapses to undefined.1962 */1963function sanitizeTags(tags: unknown): string[] | undefined {1964  if (!Array.isArray(tags)) return undefined;1965  const out: string[] = [];1966  for (const t of tags) {1967    if (typeof t !== "string") continue;1968    const trimmed = t.trim();1969    if (!trimmed) continue;1970    out.push(trimmed.slice(0, 256));1971    if (out.length >= 255) break;1972  }1973  return out.length > 0 ? out : undefined;1974}19751976// Soft-deletes every non-deleted entry in one call. The literal string1977// argument is a tripwire against accidental calls — any caller that would1978// wipe the vault has to consciously type "REPLACE_ALL". Do not relax this1979// to a boolean.1980export async function clearVaultEntries(1981  confirmation: "REPLACE_ALL"1982): Promise<void> {1983  if (confirmation !== "REPLACE_ALL") {1984    throw new Error("clearVaultEntries requires explicit confirmation");1985  }1986  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1987  for (const entry of entries) {1988    if (!entry.deletedAt) {1989      const stamp = monotonicEntryTimestamp(entry.modifiedAt);1990      entry.deletedAt = stamp;1991      entry.modifiedAt = stamp;1992    }1993  }1994  await persistEntries();1995}19961997export async function addEntry(entry: EntryDraft): Promise<VaultEntry> {1998  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");19992000  const sanitized = sanitizeEntryDraft(entry);2001  const now = Date.now();2002  const stamp = monotonicEntryTimestamp();2003  const nextEntry: VaultEntry = {2004    ...sanitized,2005    id: crypto.randomUUID(),2006    createdAt: now,2007    modifiedAt: stamp,2008    // Stamp passwordChangedAt at creation so age tracking is accurate from2009    // day one. Non-login entries carry the same stamp harmlessly.2010    passwordChangedAt: sanitized.password ? stamp : undefined,2011  };20122013  // Clone-and-replace so a failed persist rolls back the in-memory state2014  // (COR-008). Without this, a quota-full or storage error leaves the2015  // module-level `entries` ahead of what's actually on disk.2016  const rollback = entries;2017  entries = [...entries, nextEntry];2018  try {2019    await persistEntries();2020  } catch (err) {2021    entries = rollback;2022    throw err;2023  }20242025  // Fire-and-forget breach check (only for login entries if breach monitoring is enabled or not set)2026  if (settings.breachMonitoring !== false && nextEntry.type === "login" && nextEntry.password) {2027    checkBreach(nextEntry.password).then(async (count) => {2028      if (count > 0) {2029        const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === nextEntry.id);2030        if (idx !== -1) {2031          entries[idx] = { ...entries[idx], breach: count, modifiedAt: monotonicEntryTimestamp(entries[idx].modifiedAt) };2032          await persistEntries();2033        }2034      }2035    });2036  }20372038  fireSyncTrigger("vault_change");20392040  return nextEntry;2041}20422043/**2044 * Run the passkey-merge pass on the live in-memory entries and persist if2045 * anything changed. Called immediately after any passkey registration so that2046 * a same-domain TOTP-only entry already in the vault gets consolidated right2047 * away instead of waiting until the next lock/unlock cycle.2048 */2049export async function consolidatePasskeyEntries(): Promise<void> {2050  if (!derivedKey) return;2051  const { merged } = mergePasskeyOnlyIntoLogins(entries);2052  if (merged) {2053    await persistEntries();2054  }2055}20562057export async function updateEntry(2058  id: string,2059  patch: Partial<VaultEntry>2060): Promise<void> {2061  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");20622063  const idx = entries.findIndex((entry) => entry.id === id);2064  if (idx === -1 || entries[idx].deletedAt) {2065    throw new Error("entry_not_found");2066  }20672068  const current = entries[idx];2069  const sanitizedPatch = sanitizeEntryPatch(patch);2070  // Refresh passwordChangedAt only when the password value actually changes —2071  // a metadata-only update (title, tags, etc.) must not reset the age clock2072  // that drives the Pro health rotation recommendation.2073  const passwordChanged =2074    "password" in patch &&2075    typeof sanitizedPatch.password === "string" &&2076    sanitizedPatch.password !== current.password;2077  const stamp = monotonicEntryTimestamp(current.modifiedAt);2078  // When the password actually changes, push the outgoing one onto the history2079  // (newest first) so the user can reveal/copy/restore it later. We record the2080  // age it carried (passwordChangedAt, falling back to createdAt) rather than2081  // `now`, so the list reflects when each password was last in effect. Only2082  // capture a non-empty prior value — clearing a password leaves no secret to2083  // keep, and we skip an immediate exact duplicate (e.g. restore-then-restore)2084  // to avoid noise.2085  const priorPassword = current.password;2086  const shouldCapture =2087    passwordChanged &&2088    typeof priorPassword === "string" &&2089    priorPassword.length > 0 &&2090    current.passwordHistory?.[0]?.password !== priorPassword;2091  const nextHistory = shouldCapture2092    ? [2093        { password: priorPassword!, changedAt: current.passwordChangedAt ?? current.createdAt },2094        ...(current.passwordHistory ?? []),2095      ].slice(0, PASSWORD_HISTORY_MAX)2096    : current.passwordHistory;2097  entries[idx] = {2098    ...current,2099    ...sanitizedPatch,2100    modifiedAt: stamp,2101    ...(passwordChanged ? { passwordChangedAt: stamp, passwordHistory: nextHistory } : {}),2102  };2103210421052106  // Card entries must retain their card number2107  if (entries[idx].type === "card" && !entries[idx].cardNumber) {2108    entries[idx] = current;2109    throw new Error("card number is required for card entries");2110  }21112112  // Roll the in-memory entry back to its pre-edit state if the disk write2113  // fails (e.g. storage quota). Without this the module-level `entries` array2114  // would hold an edit that never landed on disk, diverging from the vault2115  // until the next unlock silently reverts it (SEV-3-A). Mirrors addEntry.2116  try {2117    await persistEntries();2118  } catch (err) {2119    entries[idx] = current;2120    throw err;2121  }21222123  // Breach check when password changes: clear immediately so old breach doesn't linger,2124  // then async-check the new password and only re-set if it's also found.2125  if ("password" in patch && settings.breachMonitoring !== false && entries[idx].type === "login") {2126    entries[idx] = { ...entries[idx], breach: undefined };2127    await persistEntries();2128    const password = entries[idx].password;2129    if (password) {2130      checkBreach(password).then(async (count) => {2131        const i = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id);2132        if (i !== -1 && count > 0) {2133          entries[i] = { ...entries[i], breach: count, modifiedAt: monotonicEntryTimestamp(entries[i].modifiedAt) };2134          await persistEntries();2135        }2136      });2137    }2138  }21392140  fireSyncTrigger("vault_change");2141}21422143export async function deleteEntry(id: string): Promise<void> {2144  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");21452146  const entry = entries.find((item) => item.id === id);2147  if (!entry || entry.deletedAt) {2148    throw new Error("entry_not_found");2149  }21502151  // Tombstone timestamp must be strictly greater than the entry's last2152  // modification so the deletion wins LWW against any in-flight edit, even2153  // under clock skew (SEV-2-E).2154  const previousModifiedAt = entry.modifiedAt;2155  const stamp = monotonicEntryTimestamp(entry.modifiedAt);2156  entry.deletedAt = stamp;2157  entry.modifiedAt = stamp;2158  // Roll the tombstone back if the disk write fails, so a quota error doesn't2159  // leave the entry deleted in memory but alive on disk (SEV-3-A).2160  try {2161    await persistEntries();2162  } catch (err) {2163    delete entry.deletedAt;2164    entry.modifiedAt = previousModifiedAt;2165    throw err;2166  }2167  fireSyncTrigger("vault_change");2168}21692170export function getDeletedEntries(): VaultEntry[] {2171  if (!derivedKey) return [];2172  return entries.filter((e) => !!e.deletedAt);2173}21742175/**2176 * Returns the vault's monotonic version — the `peach_last_modified_at` value2177 * stamped on every user-initiated write. Remote (sync) writes do NOT advance2178 * this version so a sync round never cascades into a second outbound sync.2179 */2180export async function getVaultVersion(): Promise<number> {2181  try {2182    const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get("peach_last_modified_at");2183    const v = (raw as Record<string, unknown>).peach_last_modified_at;2184    if (typeof v === "number") return v;2185    if (typeof v === "string" && v !== "") {2186      const n = Number.parseInt(v, 10);2187      return Number.isFinite(n) ? n : 0;2188    }2189    return 0;2190  } catch {2191    return 0;2192  }2193}21942195/**2196 * Internal write variants — bypass `fireSyncTrigger` so the sync layer can2197 * apply entries without cascading into another outbound sync round.2198 *2199 * INVARIANT: callers must not pass entries whose IDs collide with existing2200 * active (non-deleted) entries unless the intent is an explicit overwrite.2201 * These functions do not validate field-level constraints (password required,2202 * card number required, etc.) — they are trust-the-caller paths for sync and2203 * test harness use only.2204 */2205export async function addEntryDirect(entry: VaultEntry): Promise<void> {2206  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");2207  entries = [...entries, entry];2208  await persistEntries("sync_received");2209}22102211export async function updateEntryDirect(patch: VaultEntry): Promise<void> {2212  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");2213  const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === patch.id);2214  if (idx === -1) throw new Error("entry_not_found");2215  entries[idx] = { ...entries[idx], ...patch };2216  await persistEntries("sync_received");2217}22182219export async function deleteEntryDirect(id: string, deletedAt: number): Promise<void> {2220  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");2221  const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id);2222  if (idx === -1) throw new Error("entry_not_found");2223  entries[idx] = { ...entries[idx], deletedAt, modifiedAt: deletedAt };2224  await persistEntries("sync_received");2225}22262227/**2228 * Apply a batch of remote entries + tombstones from a sync peer.2229 * Last-write-wins by `modifiedAt`; a tombstone supersedes a live entry when2230 * `deletedAt > modifiedAt` on the local side. Mutates `entries` directly and2231 * persists with reason `sync_received` — does NOT fire the sync dispatcher, so2232 * applying a sync round cannot cascade into another outbound sync.2233 *2234 * `applied` counts entries that actually changed local state (new add,2235 * overwrite-by-newer, or new tombstone). `received` is the raw payload size2236 * the caller can surface in the sync result UI.2237 */2238export async function applyMergedRemoteEntries(2239  remoteEntries: VaultEntry[],2240  remoteTombstones: Record<string, number>,2241  _context: { deviceName?: string } = {},2242): Promise<{ received: number; applied: number; conflicts: number }> {2243  // DESIGN: last-write-wins is applied PER-ENTRY, not per-field. If two devices2244  // concurrently edit different fields of the same entry, the one with the2245  // newer modifiedAt wins the whole entry and the other device's field edits2246  // are dropped silently. This is the deliberate trade-off for a simple,2247  // conflict-free merge — per-field CRDT merge is out of scope. Guidance for2248  // users: edit a given entry on one device at a time.2249  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");22502251  const received = remoteEntries.length + Object.keys(remoteTombstones).length;2252  let applied = 0;2253  let conflicts = 0;22542255  const byId = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();2256  for (const e of entries) byId.set(e.id, e);22572258  const mergeNow = Date.now();22592260  for (const remote of remoteEntries) {2261    const sanitized = sanitizeRestoredEntry(remote);2262    if (!sanitized) continue;2263    // HV-1a: a far-future remote modifiedAt must not permanently pin a2264    // malicious value against honest local edits. Clamp BEFORE any2265    // comparison against local timestamps.2266    sanitized.modifiedAt = clampSyncTimestamp(sanitized.modifiedAt, mergeNow);2267    if (typeof sanitized.deletedAt === "number") {2268      sanitized.deletedAt = clampSyncTimestamp(sanitized.deletedAt, mergeNow);2269    }2270    const tombstoneTs = remoteTombstones[sanitized.id];2271    if (tombstoneTs !== undefined && clampSyncTimestamp(tombstoneTs, mergeNow) >= sanitized.modifiedAt) {2272      continue;2273    }2274    const local = byId.get(sanitized.id);2275    if (!local) {2276      entries.push(sanitized);2277      byId.set(sanitized.id, sanitized);2278      applied += 1;2279    } else if (sanitized.modifiedAt > local.modifiedAt) {2280      const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === local.id);2281      if (idx !== -1) {2282        entries[idx] = sanitized;2283        byId.set(sanitized.id, sanitized);2284        applied += 1;2285        if (!local.deletedAt) conflicts += 1;2286      }2287    }2288  }22892290  for (const [id, rawDeletedAt] of Object.entries(remoteTombstones)) {2291    if (typeof rawDeletedAt !== "number" || !Number.isFinite(rawDeletedAt)) continue;2292    // HV-1a/1c: clamp the tombstone timestamp before every comparison.2293    const deletedAt = clampSyncTimestamp(rawDeletedAt, mergeNow);2294    const local = byId.get(id);2295    if (!local) continue;2296    if (local.deletedAt && local.deletedAt >= deletedAt) continue;2297    if (deletedAt < local.modifiedAt) continue;2298    const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id);2299    if (idx !== -1) {2300      entries[idx] = { ...local, deletedAt, modifiedAt: deletedAt };2301      applied += 1;2302    }2303  }23042305  if (applied > 0) {2306    await persistEntries("sync_received");2307    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);2308  }2309  return { received, applied, conflicts };2310}23112312export async function restoreEntry(id: string): Promise<void> {2313  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");2314  const entry = entries.find((e) => e.id === id && e.deletedAt);2315  if (!entry) throw new Error("deleted entry not found");2316  delete entry.deletedAt;2317  entry.modifiedAt = monotonicEntryTimestamp(entry.modifiedAt);2318  await persistEntries();2319  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);2320}23212322export async function purgeEntry(id: string): Promise<void> {2323  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");2324  const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id && e.deletedAt);2325  if (idx === -1) throw new Error("deleted entry not found");2326  entries.splice(idx, 1);2327  await persistEntries();2328}23292330/** Permanently delete entries whose deletedAt is older than retentionMs. 0 = keep forever. */2331export async function purgeExpiredTrash(retentionMs: number): Promise<number> {2332  if (!derivedKey || retentionMs === 0) return 0;2333  const cutoff = Date.now() - retentionMs;2334  const before = entries.length;2335  entries = entries.filter((e) => !(e.deletedAt && e.deletedAt < cutoff));2336  const purged = before - entries.length;2337  if (purged > 0) await persistEntries();2338  return purged;2339}23402341export function queryDomain(domain: string): VaultEntry[] {2342  return domainIndex.get(domain) ?? [];2343}23442345export function getEntryById(id: string): VaultEntry | undefined {2346  return entries.find((entry) => entry.id === id && !entry.deletedAt);2347}23482349async function persistSlotA(2350  reason: VaultSnapshot["reason"] = "local_save",2351): Promise<StoredVault> {2352  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");23532354  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);2355  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");23562357  // Snapshot the about-to-be-overwritten state BEFORE we mutate disk. Failures2358  // are swallowed by takeVaultSnapshot — history must never block a save.2359  await takeVaultSnapshot(reason);23602361  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured, duressConfigured ? DURESS_SLOT_SIZE : 0);2362  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");23632364  // Preserve existing recovery escrow fields.2365  const nextSlotA: StoredVault = {2366    ...slotA,2367    nonce,2368    ciphertext,2369    tag,2370    // recovery_salt and recovery_wrapped_root_key are already set from loadSlot2371  };2372  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, nextSlotA);23732374  // Slot A (the real vault) is now committed. Wrap every later write so a2375  // mid-persist failure (e.g. a storage error after slot A landed) restores the2376  // prior slot A before rethrowing. Without this, a "failed" save that already2377  // wrote slot A leaves disk ahead of the in-memory rollback in addEntry/2378  // updateEntry/deleteEntry — the entry stays silently on disk and resurfaces2379  // as a duplicate on the next unlock (observed under storage-quota pressure).2380  try {2381    // When duress is not configured, keep slot B size-matched with slot A by2382    // regenerating its noise. When duress IS configured, leave slot B alone —2383    // we don't have the decoy key to re-encrypt it. This is a known trade-off.2384    if (!duressConfigured) {2385      await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2));2386    }2387    // Only advance the vault version for locally-originated writes. Entries2388    // applied from a sync peer ("sync_received") must NOT bump the counter —2389    // otherwise applying a remote round makes us look newer than the peer and2390    // triggers a redundant outbound sync, defeating the no-op optimisation2391    // and risking a ping-pong between two devices (SEV-2-C).2392    if (reason !== "sync_received") {2393      await stampLocalVaultMutation();2394    }2395  } catch (err) {2396    // Best-effort restore — the prior slot A is smaller-or-equal, so this write2397    // fits even when the failure was a quota overflow.2398    await writeSlot(SLOT_A, slotA).catch(() => {});2399    throw err;2400  }24012402  return nextSlotA;2403}24042405async function persistSlotB(): Promise<void> {2406  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");24072408  const slotB = await loadSlot(SLOT_B);2409  if (!slotB) throw new Error("missing slot B");24102411  // Decoy plaintext always reports duressConfigured=false — the decoy user2412  // sees a clean slate. persistSlotB only runs in decoy mode, which only2413  // exists once duress is configured, so pad to the fixed duress ceiling to2414  // keep slot B's length equal to slot A's (audit MEDIUM — deniability).2415  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, false, DURESS_SLOT_SIZE);2416  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKey, plaintext, "slot_b_v1");24172418  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, { ...slotB, nonce, ciphertext, tag });2419  // Symmetric with persistSlotA: if the version stamp fails after the decoy2420  // slot committed, restore the prior slot B so a failed decoy-mode save can't2421  // leave disk ahead of the in-memory rollback.2422  try {2423    await stampLocalVaultMutation();2424  } catch (err) {2425    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, slotB).catch(() => {});2426    throw err;2427  }2428}24292430async function persistEntries(2431  reason: VaultSnapshot["reason"] = "local_save",2432): Promise<void> {2433  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");24342435  if (vaultMode === "decoy") {2436    await persistSlotB();2437  } else {2438    await persistSlotA(reason);2439  }2440  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);2441}24422443function cleanAdditionalUrls(values: string[] | undefined): string[] | undefined {2444  if (!Array.isArray(values)) return undefined;2445  const seen = new Set<string>();2446  const cleaned: string[] = [];2447  for (const value of values) {2448    const trimmed = typeof value === "string" ? value.trim() : "";2449    if (!trimmed) continue;2450    const key = trimmed.toLowerCase();2451    if (seen.has(key)) continue;2452    seen.add(key);2453    cleaned.push(trimmed);2454  }2455  return cleaned.length > 0 ? cleaned : undefined;2456}24572458function sanitizeEntryDraft(entry: EntryDraft): EntryDraft {2459  const title = entry.title.trim();2460  // Accept legacy `type:"passkey"` drafts but rewrite to "login" — the new2461  // model is "any entry, optionally with a passkey sub-object." Imports and2462  // any in-flight callers from before v2.11.0 keep working without throwing.2463  let type: VaultEntry["type"] = entry.type ?? "login";2464  if (type === "passkey") type = "login";24652466  if (!title) throw new Error("title is required");24672468  if (entry.passkey) {2469    const p = entry.passkey;2470    if (2471      !p.rpId ||2472      !p.credentialId ||2473      !p.publicKeyCose ||2474      !p.userHandle ||2475      !p.userName ||2476      (p.algorithm !== -7 && p.algorithm !== -8)2477    ) {2478      throw new Error("invalid passkey credential");2479    }2480  }2481  if (type === "card") {2482    if (!entry.cardholderName?.trim() || !entry.cardNumber?.trim()) {2483      throw new Error("cardholder name and card number are required");2484    }2485  }24862487  return {2488    type,2489    title,2490    username: type === "login" ? entry.username?.trim() ?? "" : undefined,2491    email: type === "login" ? entry.email?.trim() || undefined : undefined,2492    password: type === "login" ? entry.password : undefined,2493    url: type === "login" ? entry.url?.trim() ?? "" : undefined,2494    additionalUrls: type === "login" ? cleanAdditionalUrls(entry.additionalUrls) : undefined,2495    totp: type === "login" ? entry.totp?.trim() || undefined : undefined,2496    // PCH-01-019: preserve non-default TOTP params through batch-add/import so2497    // they are not silently stripped (they fall back to SHA-1/6/30 when absent).2498    totpAlgorithm: type === "login" ? entry.totpAlgorithm : undefined,2499    totpDigits: type === "login" ? entry.totpDigits : undefined,2500    totpPeriod: type === "login" ? entry.totpPeriod : undefined,2501    notes: entry.notes?.trim() || undefined,2502    breach: type === "login" ? entry.breach : undefined,2503    // PCH-01-016: the batch-add path was bypassing the MV-6 canary/tags2504    // whitelist applied on the RESTORE_ENTRIES path. Run both sanitizers here.2505    canary: type === "login" ? sanitizeCanary(entry.canary) : undefined,2506    tags: sanitizeTags(entry.tags),2507    passkey: entry.passkey,2508    cardholderName: type === "card" ? entry.cardholderName?.trim() : undefined,2509    cardNumber: type === "card" ? entry.cardNumber?.trim() : undefined,2510    expMonth: type === "card" ? entry.expMonth?.trim() : undefined,2511    expYear: type === "card" ? entry.expYear?.trim() : undefined,2512    cvc: type === "card" ? entry.cvc?.trim() : undefined,2513    cardNickname: type === "card" ? entry.cardNickname?.trim() || undefined : undefined,2514    network: type === "card" ? entry.network : undefined,2515    last4: type === "card" ? entry.last4?.trim() : undefined,2516  };2517}25182519function sanitizeEntryPatch(patch: Partial<VaultEntry>): Partial<VaultEntry> {2520  const nextPatch: Partial<VaultEntry> = {};25212522  if ("type" in patch) {2523    nextPatch.type = patch.type;2524  }25252526  if ("title" in patch) {2527    const title = patch.title?.trim() ?? "";2528    if (!title) throw new Error("title is required");2529    nextPatch.title = title;2530  }25312532  if ("url" in patch) {2533    nextPatch.url = patch.url?.trim() ?? "";2534  }25352536  if ("additionalUrls" in patch) {2537    const incoming = Array.isArray(patch.additionalUrls) ? patch.additionalUrls : [];2538    const seen = new Set<string>();2539    const cleaned: string[] = [];2540    for (const value of incoming) {2541      const trimmed = typeof value === "string" ? value.trim() : "";2542      if (!trimmed) continue;2543      const key = trimmed.toLowerCase();2544      if (seen.has(key)) continue;2545      seen.add(key);2546      cleaned.push(trimmed);2547    }2548    nextPatch.additionalUrls = cleaned.length > 0 ? cleaned : undefined;2549  }25502551  if ("username" in patch) {2552    nextPatch.username = patch.username?.trim() ?? "";2553  }25542555  if ("email" in patch) {2556    nextPatch.email = patch.email?.trim() || undefined;2557  }25582559  if ("password" in patch) {2560    const password = patch.password ?? "";2561    // Allow clearing a password (e.g. on passkey-only entries)2562    nextPatch.password = password || undefined;2563  }25642565  if ("totp" in patch) {2566    nextPatch.totp = patch.totp?.trim() || undefined;2567  }25682569  if ("notes" in patch) {2570    nextPatch.notes = patch.notes?.trim() || undefined;2571  }25722573  if ("breach" in patch) {2574    nextPatch.breach = patch.breach;2575  }25762577  if ("canary" in patch) {2578    // PCH-02-001: route update patches through the same canary whitelist used2579    // by add/restore/sync. Invalid shapes drop the canary; `undefined` clears it.2580    nextPatch.canary = patch.canary ? sanitizeCanary(patch.canary) : undefined;2581  }25822583  if ("passkey" in patch) {2584    // Passkey sub-object replaces all the legacy flat passkey fields. A2585    // patch with `passkey: undefined` removes the credential from the entry2586    // (used by "remove passkey" without deleting the whole entry).2587    if (patch.passkey === undefined || patch.passkey === null) {2588      nextPatch.passkey = undefined;2589    } else {2590      const sanitized = sanitizePasskey(patch.passkey);2591      if (!sanitized) throw new Error("invalid passkey credential");2592      nextPatch.passkey = sanitized;2593    }2594  }25952596  if ("tags" in patch) {2597    // PCH-02-001: bound tags exactly like both import funnels.2598    nextPatch.tags = sanitizeTags(patch.tags);2599  }26002601  if ("cardholderName" in patch) {2602    nextPatch.cardholderName = patch.cardholderName?.trim() || undefined;2603  }2604  if ("cardNumber" in patch) {2605    const n = patch.cardNumber ?? "";2606    nextPatch.cardNumber = n || undefined;2607  }2608  if ("expMonth" in patch) {2609    nextPatch.expMonth = patch.expMonth?.trim() || undefined;2610  }2611  if ("expYear" in patch) {2612    nextPatch.expYear = patch.expYear?.trim() || undefined;2613  }2614  if ("cvc" in patch) {2615    nextPatch.cvc = patch.cvc?.trim() || undefined;2616  }2617  if ("cardNickname" in patch) {2618    nextPatch.cardNickname = patch.cardNickname?.trim() || undefined;2619  }2620  if ("network" in patch) {2621    nextPatch.network = patch.network;2622  }2623  if ("last4" in patch) {2624    nextPatch.last4 = patch.last4?.trim() || undefined;2625  }26262627  return nextPatch;2628}26292630function normalizeEntry(entry: VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry): VaultEntry {2631  const createdAt = "createdAt" in entry ? entry.createdAt : entry.created;2632  const modifiedAt =2633    "modifiedAt" in entry ? entry.modifiedAt : entry.updated;26342635  const base: VaultEntry = {2636    id: entry.id,2637    type: "type" in entry ? entry.type : "login",2638    title: entry.title,2639    username: entry.username,2640    email: "email" in entry ? entry.email : undefined,2641    password: entry.password,2642    url: entry.url,2643    additionalUrls:2644      "additionalUrls" in entry && Array.isArray(entry.additionalUrls)2645        ? entry.additionalUrls2646        : undefined,2647    totp: entry.totp,2648    // PCH-01-019: carry TOTP params through the normalize/restore path too.2649    totpAlgorithm: entry.totpAlgorithm,2650    totpDigits: entry.totpDigits,2651    totpPeriod: entry.totpPeriod,2652    notes: entry.notes,2653    breach: entry.breach,2654    // Preserve the password-age clock across lock/unlock. Without this the2655    // field is dropped on every decode and the advanced-health "aged password"2656    // signal silently resets to createdAt on each unlock (SEV-2-A).2657    passwordChangedAt:2658      "passwordChangedAt" in entry ? entry.passwordChangedAt : undefined,2659    // Preserve past-password history across lock/unlock. normalizeEntry is a2660    // field whitelist, so an unlisted field is silently dropped on every decode2661    // (same class as the passwordChangedAt SEV-2-A above).2662    passwordHistory:2663      "passwordHistory" in entry && Array.isArray(entry.passwordHistory)2664        ? entry.passwordHistory2665        : undefined,2666    canary: "canary" in entry ? entry.canary : undefined,2667    passkey: "passkey" in entry ? entry.passkey : undefined,2668    createdAt,2669    modifiedAt,2670    deletedAt: entry.deletedAt,2671    tags: "tags" in entry ? entry.tags : undefined,2672    cardholderName: "cardholderName" in entry ? entry.cardholderName : undefined,2673    cardNumber: "cardNumber" in entry ? entry.cardNumber : undefined,2674    expMonth: "expMonth" in entry ? entry.expMonth : undefined,2675    expYear: "expYear" in entry ? entry.expYear : undefined,2676    cvc: "cvc" in entry ? entry.cvc : undefined,2677    cardNickname: "cardNickname" in entry ? entry.cardNickname : undefined,2678    network: "network" in entry ? entry.network : undefined,2679    last4: "last4" in entry ? entry.last4 : undefined,2680  };26812682  return migrateLegacyPasskey(base, entry);2683}26842685/**2686 * v2.11.0 read migration. Pre-v2.11.0 passkey entries used `type:"passkey"`2687 * with flat top-level fields (rpId, credentialId, etc.). This converts them2688 * to the new shape — `type:"login"` with a `passkey` sub-object — so all2689 * downstream consumers can rely on the new model. The result is rewritten2690 * to disk on next vault save (hasLegacyShape detects the un-migrated case).2691 */2692function migrateLegacyPasskey(2693  base: VaultEntry,2694  raw: VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry2695): VaultEntry {2696  if (base.passkey) return base;2697  const flat = raw as Partial<VaultEntry>;2698  const isPasskeyType = base.type === "passkey";2699  const hasFlatPasskeyFields =2700    typeof flat.rpId === "string" &&2701    typeof flat.credentialId === "string" &&2702    typeof flat.publicKeyCose === "string" &&2703    typeof flat.userHandle === "string" &&2704    typeof flat.userName === "string";2705  if (!isPasskeyType && !hasFlatPasskeyFields) return base;2706  if (!hasFlatPasskeyFields) return base;27072708  const algorithm: -7 | -8 = flat.algorithm === -8 ? -8 : -7;2709  base.passkey = {2710    rpId: flat.rpId!,2711    rpName: flat.rpName ?? flat.rpId!,2712    credentialId: flat.credentialId!,2713    publicKeyCose: flat.publicKeyCose!,2714    privateKeyJwk: flat.privateKeyJwk,2715    userHandle: flat.userHandle!,2716    userName: flat.userName!,2717    userDisplayName: flat.userDisplayName ?? flat.userName!,2718    algorithm,2719    signCount: flat.signCount ?? 0,2720    aaguid: flat.aaguid ?? "",2721    backupEligible: flat.backupEligible === true,2722    backupState: flat.backupState === true,2723    lastUsedAt: flat.lastUsedAt,2724    browser: flat.browser,2725    transports: flat.transports,2726    createdAt: base.createdAt,2727  };2728  // Promote to "login" so the unified Entry view renders. Username gets2729  // populated from the passkey's userName so the entry is searchable in the2730  // existing autofill flow without a separate code path.2731  if (isPasskeyType) base.type = "login";2732  if (!base.username) base.username = flat.userName;2733  if (!base.url) base.url = `https://${flat.rpId}`;2734  return base;2735}273627372738// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------2739// Deduplication2740// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------27412742function entryDupeKey(e: VaultEntry): string {2743  if (e.type === "note") return `note|${e.title.toLowerCase()}`;2744  // Passkey-bearing entries dedupe by the credential's RP + user. Two logins2745  // on different sites that happen to share a username are still distinct;2746  // two passkey credentials for the same RP+user are duplicates regardless2747  // of any login fields they may also carry.2748  if (e.passkey) {2749    return `passkey|${e.passkey.rpId.toLowerCase()}|${e.passkey.userName.toLowerCase()}`;2750  }2751  return `login|${e.title.toLowerCase()}|${(e.url ?? "").toLowerCase()}|${(e.username ?? "").toLowerCase()}`;2752}27532754/** Returns the number of duplicate entries (those that would be removed). */2755export function countDuplicates(): number {2756  const best = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();2757  let dupeCount = 0;2758  for (const e of entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt)) {2759    const key = entryDupeKey(e);2760    const existing = best.get(key);2761    if (!existing) {2762      best.set(key, e);2763    } else {2764      dupeCount++;2765      // Keep the more recently modified one in the map2766      if ((e.modifiedAt ?? e.createdAt ?? 0) > (existing.modifiedAt ?? existing.createdAt ?? 0)) {2767        best.set(key, e);2768      }2769    }2770  }2771  return dupeCount;2772}27732774/**2775 * Soft-deletes duplicate entries, keeping the most recently modified copy of2776 * each group. Returns the number of entries moved to trash.2777 */2778export async function deduplicateEntries(): Promise<number> {2779  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");2780  // Dedup reshapes slot B permanently under the decoy key, which is2781  // forensically distinguishable from a freshly-seeded decoy vault. Refuse.2782  if (vaultMode === "decoy") {2783    throw new Error("deduplicate disabled in decoy mode");2784  }27852786  const best = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();2787  for (const e of entries.filter((en) => !en.deletedAt)) {2788    const key = entryDupeKey(e);2789    const existing = best.get(key);2790    if (!existing) {2791      best.set(key, e);2792    } else if ((e.modifiedAt ?? e.createdAt ?? 0) > (existing.modifiedAt ?? existing.createdAt ?? 0)) {2793      best.set(key, e);2794    }2795  }27962797  const keepIds = new Set(Array.from(best.values()).map((e) => e.id));2798  let removed = 0;2799  entries = entries.map((e) => {2800    if (!e.deletedAt && !keepIds.has(e.id)) {2801      removed++;2802      return { ...e, deletedAt: monotonicEntryTimestamp(e.modifiedAt) };2803    }2804    return e;2805  });28062807  if (removed > 0) await persistEntries();2808  return removed;2809}28102811// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------2812// Vault history — snapshot BEFORE every vault write so the saved blob is2813// what is about to be lost, not what was just written. Capped at 5. The2814// stored blobs are AES-256-GCM ciphertext under the master password, so2815// history adds zero security surface.2816// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------28172818const HISTORY_KEY = "peach_vault_history";2819const HISTORY_MAX = 5;28202821// PCH-01-023: coarsen a live-entry count into a low-resolution bucket so the2822// plaintext snapshot field cannot reveal exact vault size or single-entry change2823// deltas. Buckets widen as the vault grows so absolute leakage stays roughly2824// proportional rather than exact.2825function bucketEntryCount(n: number): number {2826  if (n <= 0) return 0;2827  if (n <= 10) return 10;2828  if (n <= 25) return 25;2829  if (n <= 50) return 50;2830  if (n <= 100) return 100;2831  if (n <= 250) return 250;2832  if (n <= 500) return 500;2833  return Math.ceil(n / 500) * 500;2834}28352836/**2837 * Snapshot the CURRENT on-disk vault state into history. Call this BEFORE2838 * overwriting peach_vault_a so the saved blob captures the about-to-be-lost2839 * state. Identical-to-most-recent blobs are skipped to avoid filling history2840 * with no-op writes.2841 */2842export async function takeVaultSnapshot(2843  reason: VaultSnapshot["reason"],2844): Promise<void> {2845  try {2846    const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get([SLOT_A, SLOT_B, HISTORY_KEY]);2847    const slotA = (raw as Record<string, StoredVault | undefined>)[SLOT_A];2848    const slotB = (raw as Record<string, StoredVault | undefined>)[SLOT_B];28492850    // Nothing to snapshot if the real slot doesn't exist yet (fresh install,2851    // pre-createVault). createVault skips snapshots intentionally — there is2852    // no prior state to preserve.2853    if (!slotA) return;28542855    const vault_a = JSON.stringify(slotA);2856    const vault_b = JSON.stringify(slotB ?? slotA);28572858    // Best-effort entry count: only meaningful when the in-memory state is2859    // unlocked AND in real mode. Decoy mode would leak the decoy entry2860    // count; locked mode has no entries to count. Both fall through to null.2861    // PCH-01-023: store a coarse bucket, not the exact count — chrome.storage2862    // .local sits next to the AES-GCM blobs in plaintext, so an exact count would2863    // leak vault size and per-write deltas (the metadata padding hides this).2864    let entryCount: number | null = null;2865    if (derivedKey && vaultMode === "real") {2866      try {2867        entryCount = bucketEntryCount(entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt).length);2868      } catch {2869        entryCount = null;2870      }2871    }28722873    const existingRaw = (raw as Record<string, VaultHistory | undefined>)[HISTORY_KEY];2874    const history: VaultHistory = existingRaw && Array.isArray(existingRaw.snapshots)2875      ? existingRaw2876      : { snapshots: [] };28772878    // Deduplication: if the most recent snapshot has byte-identical blobs,2879    // skip — saves the same vault N times in a row would otherwise burn the2880    // entire history window with no recovery value.2881    const latest = history.snapshots[0];2882    if (latest && latest.vault_a === vault_a && latest.vault_b === vault_b) {2883      return;2884    }28852886    const snapshot: VaultSnapshot = {2887      id: crypto.randomUUID(),2888      savedAt: Date.now(),2889      reason,2890      vault_a,2891      vault_b,2892      entryCount,2893    };28942895    history.snapshots = [snapshot, ...history.snapshots].slice(0, HISTORY_MAX);2896    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [HISTORY_KEY]: history });2897  } catch (err) {2898    // Non-fatal — history must never block a save. A failed snapshot just2899    // means the user loses one rung of the safety ladder for this write.2900    // M4/QUA-006: log so the failure is visible; if it looks like a quota2901    // problem, notify the popup so the user can prune history themselves.2902    console.warn('[Peach] takeVaultSnapshot failed:', err);2903    if (String(err).includes('QUOTA') || String(err).includes('quota')) {2904      try {2905        await chrome.runtime.sendMessage({ type: 'VAULT_STORAGE_QUOTA_WARNING' });2906      } catch {2907        // popup may be closed; surfaced via console.warn above2908      }2909    }2910  }2911}29122913/** Wipe all vault history. Called by Panic / DESTROY_VAULT. */2914export async function clearVaultHistory(): Promise<void> {2915  try {2916    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [HISTORY_KEY]: { snapshots: [] } satisfies VaultHistory });2917  } catch {2918    // Non-fatal — DESTROY_VAULT also runs storage.local.clear().2919  }2920}29212922/** Read all snapshots, newest first, for the Settings vault history view. */2923export async function getVaultHistory(): Promise<VaultSnapshot[]> {2924  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get(HISTORY_KEY);2925  const history = (raw as Record<string, VaultHistory | undefined>)[HISTORY_KEY];2926  if (!history || !Array.isArray(history.snapshots)) return [];2927  return history.snapshots;2928}29292930/**2931 * Replace the on-disk vault with the chosen snapshot's blobs and lock the2932 * vault. The current state is itself snapshotted with reason 'restore' first2933 * so the restore is reversible. After this returns, the user must unlock2934 * with the password that matches the restored blob.2935 */2936export async function restoreVaultSnapshot(2937  snapshotId: string,2938): Promise<{ ok: true } | { ok: false; error: string }> {2939  const history = await getVaultHistory();2940  const snapshot = history.find((s) => s.id === snapshotId);2941  if (!snapshot) return { ok: false, error: "snapshot_not_found" };29422943  // Snapshot the about-to-be-replaced current state so the restore is2944  // reversible. takeVaultSnapshot is no-op when the most recent entry is2945  // byte-identical, so a restore-of-a-restore stays clean.2946  await takeVaultSnapshot("restore");29472948  let restoredA: StoredVault;2949  let restoredB: StoredVault;2950  try {2951    restoredA = JSON.parse(snapshot.vault_a) as StoredVault;2952    restoredB = JSON.parse(snapshot.vault_b) as StoredVault;2953  } catch {2954    return { ok: false, error: "snapshot_corrupt" };2955  }29562957  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, restoredA);2958  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, restoredB);2959  await stampLocalVaultMutation();29602961  // Lock so the user must prove they can decrypt the restored blob. If they2962  // restored a pre-password-change snapshot they discover it immediately at2963  // the lock screen rather than silently holding an inaccessible vault.2964  lock();29652966  return { ok: true };2967}29682969/**2970 * Rotate the vault's sync identity by generating a FRESH ROOT KEY and2971 * re-wrapping everything under it (MV-8). Because every sync credential —2972 * vault_id, the Noise static keypair, the Ed25519 manifest signing key,2973 * and the per-entry envelope keys — derives from the root key, rotation2974 * makes a lost/stolen device's retained key material useless. All paired2975 * devices must re-pair afterwards.2976 *2977 * CONSEQUENCE THE UI MUST SURFACE: the 12 recovery words also derive from2978 * the root key, so rotation INVALIDATES the old recovery phrase. The flow2979 * sets peach_recovery_pending so the popup re-presents the new words for2980 * confirmation, same as the migrateToRecovery rotate path.2981 */2982export async function rotateSyncIdentity(): Promise<{ ok: boolean; error?: string }> {2983  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {2984    return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };2985  }2986  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);2987  if (!slotA) return { ok: false, error: "missing_slot_a" };29882989  // 1. Fresh root key + recovery escrow (new words).2990  const { rawRootKey, recoverySalt, wrappedRootKey, wrappedNonce, wrappedTag } =2991    await generateAndWrapRootKey();29922993  // 2. Re-wrap the new root key under the current password-derived key.2994  const newRootKey = unhex(rawRootKey);2995  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(derivedKey, newRootKey);29962997  // 3. Snapshot, then single atomic slot write — both escrow wrappings of2998  //    the new root key land together (same transactional rule as2999  //    changePassword). Entries are untouched: they are sealed under the3000  //    password-derived key, not the root key.3001  await takeVaultSnapshot("local_save");3002  const nextSlotA: StoredVault = {3003    ...slotA,3004    recovery_salt: recoverySalt,3005    recovery_wrapped_root_key: wrappedRootKey,3006    recovery_nonce: wrappedNonce,3007    recovery_tag: wrappedTag,3008    ...pwRoot,3009  };3010  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, nextSlotA);30113012  // 4. Swap in memory only after disk committed.3013  if (rootKey) zeroKey(rootKey);3014  rootKey = newRootKey;30153016  // 5. Old peers' identities derive from the dead root key — drop them all.3017  await clearPairedDevices();30183019  // 6. Force re-presentation of the NEW recovery words on next popup view.3020  await setRecoveryConfirmPending(); // same flag the create-vault flow uses30213022  await stampLocalVaultMutation();3023  return { ok: true };3024}30253026/**3027 * Change the master password. Re-encrypts slot A with a fresh salt + new3028 * derived key. Slot B (duress or noise) is left untouched when duress is3029 * configured — it uses an independent key derived from the duress password —3030 * and regenerated as noise when duress is not configured.3031 */3032export async function changePassword(3033  currentPassword: string,3034  newPassword: string3035): Promise<boolean> {3036  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") return false;30373038  // Verify current password before allowing any change3039  const valid = await verifyMainPassword(currentPassword);3040  if (!valid) return false;30413042  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);3043  if (!slotA) return false;3044  if (!rootKey) return false;30453046  // Derive fresh key from new password + new random salt3047  const newSalt = generateSalt();3048  const newKey = await deriveKey(newPassword, newSalt);30493050  // Re-encrypt the in-memory entries with the new key3051  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured, duressConfigured ? DURESS_SLOT_SIZE : 0);3052  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(newKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");30533054  // Pre-wrap root key under the new derived key. Recovery fields wrap rootKey3055  // under recovery words and remain untouched — recovery phrase keeps working3056  // across password changes (H4/COR-002).3057  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(newKey, rootKey);30583059  const finalSlotA: StoredVault = {3060    ...slotA,3061    salt: hex(newSalt),3062    nonce,3063    ciphertext,3064    tag,3065    ...pwRoot,3066  };30673068  // Snapshot the OLD-key blob before overwriting it. If the user later3069  // restores from this snapshot they will need the OLD password — the3070  // post-restore lock surfaces that immediately.3071  await takeVaultSnapshot("local_save");30723073  // Single atomic write: ciphertext, salt, and pw_root_* fields all land in3074  // one storage transaction. An SW kill before this point leaves the old3075  // slot intact; after this point everything tied to the new password is3076  // already on disk together (M6/COR-004).3077  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, finalSlotA);30783079  // Swap the in-memory key synchronously before any further await. If we3080  // threw between the Slot A write and this swap, the next persistEntries()3081  // would overwrite Slot A with old-key ciphertext, locking the user out.3082  zeroKey(derivedKey);3083  derivedKey = newKey;30843085  // PCH-01-008: the MV3 session escrow still holds the OLD key. Without this,3086  // the next service-worker restore decrypts the new-key Slot A with the stale3087  // key, fails tryDecryptSlotResult, and silently drops the user to a lock3088  // screen. Re-escrow the new key so restore survives a password change.3089  void saveSessionKey(newKey, "real");30903091  // Regenerate noise for slot B when duress is not in use. Runs after the3092  // key swap so a failure here is a disposable noise regeneration, not a3093  // lockout.3094  if (!duressConfigured) {3095    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2));3096  }3097  await stampLocalVaultMutation();30983099  return true;3100}