vault.ts

1/**2 * vault.ts — sole owner of vault state and chrome.storage vault keys.3 *4 * Every read/write of `peach_vault_a`, `peach_vault_b`, and `peach_settings`5 * goes through this module. No other file accesses those keys directly.6 * External callers reach vault operations via `messages.ts` — never by7 * importing from here cross-boundary (popup/content must not). Invariants8 * for the two-slot schema, unlock timing, and key/disk atomicity are in9 * Projects.md §3.2–§3.6.10 */1112import { deriveKey, generateSalt } from "../crypto/argon2";13import { extractDomain } from "../shared/domain";14import {15  rootKeyToWords,16  wordsToRootKeyMaterial,17  deriveRecoveryKey,18} from "../shared/recovery-words";19import type {20  AccentColorName,21  LegacyVaultEntry,22  ManualSummonRecord,23  SavedIdentity,24  StoredVault,25  VaultEntry,26  VaultHistory,27  VaultSnapshot,28} from "../shared/types";29import { decrypt, encrypt, zeroKey } from "./aes";30import { clearAutoLock, touchAutoLock } from "./alarms";3132type EntryDraft = Omit<33  VaultEntry,34  "id" | "createdAt" | "modifiedAt" | "deletedAt"35>;3637// Slot-neutral storage keys (v1.4.24+). Both slots always exist; slot B38// either holds the decoy vault (when duress is configured) or random noise39// that looks identical at rest. No external indicator is stored — duress40// configuration is recorded only inside the encrypted payload of slot A.41const SLOT_A = "peach_vault_a";42const SLOT_B = "peach_vault_b";4344// Legacy keys, migrated away on first access.45const LEGACY_MAIN = "peach_vault";46const LEGACY_DECOY = "peach_decoy_vault";47const LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG = "peach_duress";4849// Plaintext is padded to the next multiple of this size before encryption.50// This coarsens ciphertext-length leakage into 1 KiB buckets.51const PAD_BLOCK = 1024;5253let derivedKey: Uint8Array | null = null;54// 32-byte random root key, separate from the derivedKey used for vault encryption.55// The root key is wrapped (encrypted) under the recovery key derived from the56// 12-word phrase. When the user changes their password, only the wrapping changes;57// the root key and recovery words remain stable.58let rootKey: Uint8Array | null = null;59let entries: VaultEntry[] = [];60let domainIndex: Map<string, VaultEntry[]> = new Map();61let vaultMode: "real" | "decoy" = "real";62// Cached post-unlock view of whether the real vault records that duress is63// configured. Only meaningful after a real-mode unlock; for decoy-mode unlock64// this stays false because we never see slot A's plaintext.65let duressConfigured = false;6667let migrationRan = false;6869// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------70// Settings (persisted inside the encrypted vault store as a sidecar key)71// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------7273export type DisplayFont = "cormorant-italic" | "cormorant" | "inter" | "system";74export type TextSize = "small" | "medium" | "large";7576export interface VaultSettings {77  accentColor?: AccentColorName;78  theme?: "dark" | "light";79  autoLockMinutes?: number;80  clipboardClearSeconds?: number;81  lockOnClose?: boolean;82  breachMonitoring?: boolean;83  passkeyProviderEnabled?: boolean;84  trashRetentionDays?: number;85  manualSummonDomains?: Record<string, ManualSummonRecord>;86  declinedCardFingerprints?: string[];87  /**88   * Display font for headlines, brand wordmark, and narrative copy. Default89   * is "cormorant-italic" — the bold italic serif that ships as Peach's90   * voice. Non-italic options exist for users who prefer upright type.91   */92  displayFont?: DisplayFont;93  /**94   * Text size scale for body copy and entry titles. Stops at "large" by95   * design — XL clips dense screens (Vault, Health) inside the fixed96   * 330×480 popup surface.97   */98  textSize?: TextSize;99  /**100   * When true, all entrance/exit transitions and ambient animations are101   * collapsed to instant. Honoured alongside the user's OS-level102   * `prefers-reduced-motion`.103   */104  reduceMotion?: boolean;105  /**106   * Android-only: when true, the master key is escrowed in AndroidKeyStore107   * and the lock screen offers biometric unlock. Toggled from Settings →108   * Security → Biometrics. Has no effect on desktop builds.109   */110  biometricsEnabled?: boolean;111  /**112   * User overrides for keyboard shortcuts. Keys are ShortcutAction names113   * (see src/shared/shortcuts.ts). Missing actions fall through to114   * DEFAULT_BINDINGS — `getActiveBindings(settings.shortcuts)` is the115   * canonical lookup. Storing only the deltas keeps the vault payload116   * small and lets default updates land for users who never rebind.117   */118  shortcuts?: Record<string, { key: string; ctrl?: boolean; meta?: boolean; shift?: boolean; alt?: boolean }>;119}120121let settings: VaultSettings = {};122123export function getSettings(): VaultSettings {124  return settings;125}126127export async function ensureSettingsLoaded(): Promise<VaultSettings> {128  await loadSettings();129  return settings;130}131132export async function updateSettings(patch: Partial<VaultSettings>): Promise<void> {133  await loadSettings();134  settings = { ...settings, ...patch };135  await persistSettings();136}137138async function persistSettings(): Promise<void> {139  try {140    await chrome.storage.local.set({ peach_settings: settings });141  } catch (err) {142    throw mapStorageError(err);143  }144}145146function mapStorageError(err: unknown): Error {147  const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);148  if (/QUOTA_BYTES|quota/i.test(message)) {149    return new Error("STORAGE_QUOTA_EXCEEDED");150  }151  return err instanceof Error ? err : new Error(message);152}153154async function loadSettings(): Promise<void> {155  const result = await chrome.storage.local.get("peach_settings");156  settings = (result as { peach_settings?: VaultSettings }).peach_settings ?? {};157}158159// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------160// HIBP breach check (k-anonymity model)161// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------162163export async function checkBreach(password: string): Promise<number> {164  const encoder = new TextEncoder();165  const hashBuffer = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-1", encoder.encode(password));166  const hashHex = Array.from(new Uint8Array(hashBuffer))167    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))168    .join("")169    .toUpperCase();170171  const prefix = hashHex.slice(0, 5);172  const suffix = hashHex.slice(5);173174  try {175    const res = await fetch(`https://api.pwnedpasswords.com/range/${prefix}`);176    if (!res.ok) return 0;177    const text = await res.text();178    const match = text.split("\r\n").find((l) => l.startsWith(suffix));179    return match ? parseInt(match.split(":")[1], 10) : 0;180  } catch {181    return 0; // Network unavailable — don't block182  }183}184185export async function declineCardSaveOffer(last4: string, expMonth: string, expYear: string): Promise<void> {186  const fingerprint = await cardFingerprint(last4, expMonth, expYear);187  await loadSettings();188  settings = {189    ...settings,190    declinedCardFingerprints: [...(settings.declinedCardFingerprints ?? []), fingerprint],191  };192  await persistSettings();193}194195export async function isCardDeclined(last4: string, expMonth: string, expYear: string): Promise<boolean> {196  await loadSettings();197  const fingerprint = await cardFingerprint(last4, expMonth, expYear);198  return (settings.declinedCardFingerprints ?? []).includes(fingerprint);199}200201async function cardFingerprint(last4: string, expMonth: string, expYear: string): Promise<string> {202  const encoder = new TextEncoder();203  const buf = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-1", encoder.encode(`${last4}${expMonth}${expYear}`));204  return Array.from(new Uint8Array(buf)).map(b => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0")).join("");205}206207function hex(buf: Uint8Array): string {208  return Array.from(buf)209    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))210    .join("");211}212213function unhex(s: string): Uint8Array {214  const out = new Uint8Array(s.length / 2);215  for (let i = 0; i < s.length; i += 2) {216    out[i / 2] = parseInt(s.slice(i, i + 2), 16);217  }218  return out;219}220221// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------222// Root key generation and recovery word wrapping223// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------224225/**226 * Generate a random 32-byte root key and wrap it (AES-256-GCM) under a key227 * derived from the recovery word material via HKDF-SHA256. The wrapped blob228 * fields are stored in slot A alongside the password-wrapped ciphertext. The229 * root key itself is kept in memory for the session so getRecoveryWords() can230 * encode it without re-deriving.231 */232async function generateAndWrapRootKey(): Promise<{233  rawRootKey: string; // hex of the plaintext root key — caller stores in rootKey234  recoverySalt: string;235  wrappedRootKey: string;236  wrappedNonce: string;237  wrappedTag: string;238}> {239  const rootKeyBytes = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32));240241  // Derive the recovery key from the BIP39 words encoding of the root key.242  const words = await rootKeyToWords(rootKeyBytes);243  const wordMaterial = await wordsToRootKeyMaterial(words);244  const recoverySalt = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));245  const recoveryKey = await deriveRecoveryKey(wordMaterial, recoverySalt);246247  // Wrap the root key with the recovery key using AES-256-GCM directly.248  // We hex-encode rootKeyBytes so the plaintext is always valid UTF-8.249  const nonce = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));250  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(hex(rootKeyBytes));251  const raw = await crypto.subtle.encrypt(252    {253      name: "AES-GCM",254      iv: nonce,255      additionalData: new Uint8Array([1]).buffer as ArrayBuffer,256      tagLength: 128,257    },258    recoveryKey,259    encoded260  );261  // WebCrypto returns ciphertext || auth tag concatenated; split them.262  const rawU8 = new Uint8Array(raw);263  const ciphertext = hex(rawU8.slice(0, rawU8.length - 16));264  const tag = hex(rawU8.slice(rawU8.length - 16));265266  return {267    rawRootKey: hex(rootKeyBytes),268    recoverySalt: hex(recoverySalt),269    wrappedRootKey: ciphertext,270    wrappedNonce: hex(nonce),271    wrappedTag: tag,272  };273}274275/**276 * Unwrap the root key using recovery words. Called during recovery flow when277 * the user provides their 12-word phrase and a new password.278 * Exported for use by the RECOVER_WITH_WORDS message handler.279 */280export async function unwrapRootKeyForRecovery(281  wrappedRootKey: string,282  wrappedNonce: string,283  wrappedTag: string,284  recoverySaltHex: string,285  words: string[]286): Promise<void> {287  const wordMaterial = await wordsToRootKeyMaterial(words);288  const recoverySalt = unhex(recoverySaltHex);289  const recoveryKey = await deriveRecoveryKey(wordMaterial, recoverySalt);290291  // Decrypt and cache the root key. The root key bytes were hex-encoded before292  // encryption so the ciphertext is valid UTF-8. We inline the AES-GCM decrypt293  // here to avoid passing a CryptoKey to the string-based encrypt/decrypt helpers.294  // Each component is stored separately in the vault slot; decode them individually295  // so the nonce is always exactly the 12 bytes from wrappedNonce.296  const nonceRaw = unhex(wrappedNonce);297  const ciphertextRaw = unhex(wrappedRootKey);298  const tagRaw = unhex(wrappedTag);299  // Combine ciphertext and tag for AES-GCM (expects ciphertext||tag).300  // Use explicit ArrayBuffer allocations to satisfy TS BufferSource constraints.301  const nonceU8 = nonceRaw as unknown as Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>;302  const combined = new Uint8Array(ciphertextRaw.length + tagRaw.length);303  combined.set(ciphertextRaw, 0);304  combined.set(tagRaw, ciphertextRaw.length);305  const raw = await crypto.subtle.decrypt(306    { name: "AES-GCM", iv: nonceU8, additionalData: new Uint8Array([1]).buffer as ArrayBuffer, tagLength: 128 },307    recoveryKey,308    combined309  );310  const decryptedHex = new TextDecoder().decode(raw);311  rootKey = unhex(decryptedHex);312}313314/**315 * Re-wrap the cached root key under a new derived key (from the user's new316 * password). Called after password change and after recovery re-key so the317 * same recovery words continue to work with the updated password.318 */319export async function rewrapRootKeyForPassword(320  newDerivedKey: Uint8Array,321  _newSalt: Uint8Array322): Promise<void> {323  if (!rootKey) throw new Error("root key not set");324  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(325    newDerivedKey,326    hex(rootKey)327  );328  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);329  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");330  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, {331    ...slotA,332    recovery_wrapped_root_key: ciphertext,333    recovery_nonce: nonce,334    recovery_tag: tag,335    // recovery_salt does NOT change when password changes — the recovery336    // words always derive the same key; only the wrapping key changes.337  });338}339340/**341 * Change the vault encryption to a new derived key (already derived from342 * the user's new password). Used by RECOVER_WITH_WORDS and changePassword.343 * Caller is responsible for key swap and snapshot.344 */345async function reencryptVaultForNewKey(346  newKey: Uint8Array,347  slotA: StoredVault348): Promise<void> {349  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured);350  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(newKey, plaintext);351  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, {352    ...slotA,353    nonce,354    ciphertext,355    tag,356  });357}358359/**360 * Full password change with an already-derived key (used after recovery).361 * Unlike changePassword(), this skips re-verification of current password362 * since recovery flow has already validated the user's identity via words.363 */364export async function changePasswordWithNewKey(365  newSalt: Uint8Array,366  newKey: Uint8Array367): Promise<void> {368  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);369  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");370  // reencryptVaultForNewKey must receive the updated salt so that subsequent371  // UNLOCK calls with the new password can re-derive the correct key.372  await reencryptVaultForNewKey(newKey, { ...slotA, salt: hex(newSalt) });373  if (derivedKey) zeroKey(derivedKey);374  derivedKey = newKey;375  if (!duressConfigured) {376    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(slotA.ciphertext.length / 2));377  }378}379380// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------381// Salt generation --- exported so the RECOVER_WITH_WORDS handler can derive382// a new key after password reset without re-importing the crypto module.383// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------384385export { deriveKey, generateSalt };386387export async function loadSlotA(): Promise<StoredVault | null> {388  return loadSlot(SLOT_A);389}390391/**392 * Re-derive the session root key from the already-derived AES key (keyA from393 * unlock) and the recovery salt stored in slot A. This is the inverse of394 * generateAndWrapRootKey() — both operations use the same HKDF with the same395 * salt and info string, so they cancel out.396 *397 * The derivedKey and rootKey are related by:398 *   derivedKey = Argon2id(password, slotA.salt)   → AES key for vault payload399 *   rootKey    = HKDF-SHA256(recovery_words, recovery_salt)  → wrapped by HKDF400 *401 * Since we only store the wrapped root key and the recovery salt, we can402 * only re-derive rootKey during an active (unlocked) session where we have403 * the derivedKey already. On lock, rootKey is zeroed.404 *405 * For pre-v2.12 vaults that have no recovery_salt, this returns null and406 * the caller must invoke migrateToRecovery() to generate the recovery escrow.407 */408async function deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(409  _derivedKey: Uint8Array,410  _recoverySaltHex: string411): Promise<Uint8Array | null> {412  // The root key is stored wrapped under the recovery key derived from the413  // 12-word phrase. It cannot be re-derived from derivedKey alone — that would414  // require knowing the original recovery words. The in-memory rootKey is set415  // during unlock if recovery data is present.416  // This function exists as a potential future path if we ever store an417  // additional derived-key → root-key relationship. Currently rootKey is418  // cached directly during unlock.419  return null;420}421422/**423 * For vaults created before v2.12 (no recovery_salt/recovery_wrapped_root_key),424 * generate the root key, wrap it under the recovery words, and persist the425 * recovery escrow into slot A. The caller must show the recovery words to the426 * user before calling this — once called, those words are the vault's recovery427 * path. This runs once, on the first unlock of an upgraded vault.428 */429export async function migrateToRecovery(): Promise<void> {430  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {431    throw new Error("vault must be unlocked in real mode");432  }433  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);434  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");435  if (slotA.recovery_salt && slotA.recovery_wrapped_root_key) return; // already done436437  const { rawRootKey, recoverySalt, wrappedRootKey, wrappedNonce, wrappedTag } =438    await generateAndWrapRootKey();439440  rootKey = unhex(rawRootKey);441442  const nextSlotA: StoredVault = {443    ...slotA,444    recovery_salt: recoverySalt,445    recovery_wrapped_root_key: wrappedRootKey,446    recovery_nonce: wrappedNonce,447    recovery_tag: wrappedTag,448  };449  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, nextSlotA);450}451452/**453 * Returns the 12 recovery words for the current session's root key.454 * Must be called while the vault is unlocked. Throws if recovery has not455 * been set up (pre-v2.12 vault that hasn't migrated yet).456 */457export async function getRecoveryWords(): Promise<string[]> {458  if (!rootKey) {459    throw new Error("recovery not set up — vault may need migration");460  }461  return rootKeyToWords(rootKey);462}463464async function loadSlot(key: string): Promise<StoredVault | null> {465  const result = await chrome.storage.local.get(key);466  return (result as Record<string, StoredVault | undefined>)[key] ?? null;467}468469async function writeSlot(key: string, vault: StoredVault): Promise<void> {470  try {471    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [key]: vault });472  } catch (err) {473    throw mapStorageError(err);474  }475}476477/**478 * One-shot migration from the pre-A-2 schema (peach_vault + peach_decoy_vault479 * + peach_duress flag) to the slot-neutral schema (peach_vault_a +480 * peach_vault_b). Runs at most once per session; safe to call repeatedly.481 */482async function ensureMigrated(): Promise<void> {483  if (migrationRan) return;484  migrationRan = true;485486  const keys = [LEGACY_MAIN, LEGACY_DECOY, LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG, SLOT_A, SLOT_B];487  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get(keys);488  const slotAExists = raw[SLOT_A] !== undefined;489  const slotBExists = raw[SLOT_B] !== undefined;490  const legacyMain = raw[LEGACY_MAIN] as StoredVault | undefined;491  const legacyDecoy = raw[LEGACY_DECOY] as StoredVault | undefined;492493  // Fresh install with nothing in storage — nothing to do; createVault() sets up both slots.494  if (!slotAExists && !legacyMain) return;495496  // Already migrated.497  if (slotAExists && slotBExists && !legacyMain && !legacyDecoy) return;498499  if (legacyMain && !slotAExists) {500    await writeSlot(SLOT_A, legacyMain);501  }502503  // If slot B isn't set, populate it: use legacy decoy when present, else noise.504  if (!slotBExists) {505    const target = (legacyMain ?? raw[SLOT_A]) as StoredVault | undefined;506    if (legacyDecoy) {507      await writeSlot(SLOT_B, legacyDecoy);508    } else if (target) {509      await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(target.ciphertext.length / 2));510    }511  }512513  const toRemove: string[] = [];514  if (legacyMain) toRemove.push(LEGACY_MAIN);515  if (legacyDecoy) toRemove.push(LEGACY_DECOY);516  if (raw[LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG] !== undefined) toRemove.push(LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG);517  if (toRemove.length > 0) {518    await chrome.storage.local.remove(toRemove);519  }520}521522// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------523// Padding + noise helpers524// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------525526/**527 * Pads the plaintext string with trailing spaces so that the encoded byte528 * length is a multiple of PAD_BLOCK. JSON.parse tolerates trailing529 * whitespace after a complete document, so the padding is transparent on530 * decode. Ciphertext length equals plaintext length plus a 16-byte tag.531 */532function padPlaintext(json: string): string {533  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(json);534  const target = Math.max(PAD_BLOCK, Math.ceil(encoded.length / PAD_BLOCK) * PAD_BLOCK);535  const padLen = target - encoded.length;536  return json + " ".repeat(padLen);537}538539/**540 * Produces a StoredVault-shaped record filled with CSPRNG bytes. The541 * ciphertext length matches the given byte count. Because GCM ciphertext is542 * pseudo-random, this blob is indistinguishable at rest from a real543 * encrypted vault without the key.544 *545 * crypto.getRandomValues() caps each call at 65536 bytes (the Web Crypto546 * spec hard limit). Chunk the fill so vaults larger than that — common once547 * the user has dozens of entries or any passkey — don't throw.548 */549const CSPRNG_CHUNK = 65_536;550551function fillRandom(buf: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {552  for (let offset = 0; offset < buf.length; offset += CSPRNG_CHUNK) {553    const end = Math.min(offset + CSPRNG_CHUNK, buf.length);554    const chunk = new Uint8Array(end - offset);555    crypto.getRandomValues(chunk);556    buf.set(chunk, offset);557  }558  return buf;559}560561function generateNoiseBlob(ciphertextBytes: number): StoredVault {562  const salt = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));563  const nonce = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));564  const cipher = fillRandom(new Uint8Array(ciphertextBytes));565  const tag = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));566  return {567    version: 1,568    salt: hex(salt),569    nonce: hex(nonce),570    ciphertext: hex(cipher),571    tag: hex(tag),572  };573}574575// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------576// Encrypted plaintext envelope577// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------578579type VaultPayload = {580  entries: VaultEntry[];581  duressConfigured?: boolean;582};583584type DecryptedPayload = {585  entries: VaultEntry[];586  duressConfigured: boolean;587  /**588   * True when at least one entry in the on-disk payload had a legacy shape589   * (pre-v2.11.0 passkey type/flat fields, or pre-A-2 created/updated keys)590   * and got rewritten by normalizeEntry. The unlock path uses this to591   * persist the new shape immediately — without it, the migration would592   * re-run on every unlock and old shape never disappears from disk.593   */594  migratedFromLegacy: boolean;595};596597function encodePayload(entries: VaultEntry[], duress: boolean): string {598  const envelope: VaultPayload = { entries, duressConfigured: duress };599  return padPlaintext(JSON.stringify(envelope));600}601602function rawNeedsMigration(raw: VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry): boolean {603  if ("created" in raw || "updated" in raw) return true;604  const flat = raw as Partial<VaultEntry>;605  if (flat.type === "passkey") return true;606  // Flat rpId without a passkey sub-object means pre-v2.11.0 schema.607  if (flat.rpId !== undefined && flat.passkey === undefined) return true;608  return false;609}610611function decodePayload(plain: string): DecryptedPayload {612  const parsed = JSON.parse(plain) as613    | Array<VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry>614    | VaultPayload;615616  const rawEntries = Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed : parsed.entries ?? [];617  const flatMigrationNeeded = rawEntries.some(rawNeedsMigration);618619  const normalized = rawEntries.map(normalizeEntry);620  const { merged } = mergePasskeyOnlyIntoLogins(normalized);621622  if (Array.isArray(parsed)) {623    return {624      entries: normalized,625      duressConfigured: false,626      migratedFromLegacy: true, // pre-A-2 array shape always needs save627    };628  }629630  return {631    entries: normalized,632    duressConfigured: parsed.duressConfigured === true,633    migratedFromLegacy: flatMigrationNeeded || merged,634  };635}636637/**638 * One-time consolidation pass run alongside the legacy passkey migration.639 *640 * Pre-v2.11.0 the Chrome passkey path always created a fresh `type:"passkey"`641 * entry per registration — so users who tested registration multiple times642 * accumulated several passkey-bearing entries for the same RP, and the643 * migration to the unified shape carried that duplication forward. This644 * pass collapses the duplicates:645 *646 *   1. Group passkey-bearing (and not deleted) entries by `passkey.rpId`.647 *   2. Within each group, the most recently-active credential wins (prefer648 *      lastUsedAt, fall back to passkey.createdAt, fall back to modifiedAt).649 *   3. If a NON-passkey login entry exists for that RP (matched by url or650 *      additionalUrls hostname), attach the winning passkey to it and651 *      soft-delete every passkey-bearing entry in the group.652 *   4. Otherwise, soft-delete every loser in the group, keeping the winner653 *      as a passkey-only entry.654 *655 * Soft delete (deletedAt) rather than splice — the trash flow keeps the656 * record around for retention and the user can restore if the heuristic657 * picked wrong. The `merged` flag goes back to decodePayload so the658 * unlock path persists the consolidated shape immediately.659 */660function mergePasskeyOnlyIntoLogins(entries: VaultEntry[]): { merged: boolean } {661  let merged = false;662  const now = Date.now();663664  const candidates = entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt && e.passkey);665  const byRpId = new Map<string, VaultEntry[]>();666  for (const e of candidates) {667    const rpId = e.passkey!.rpId;668    const list = byRpId.get(rpId);669    if (list) list.push(e);670    else byRpId.set(rpId, [e]);671  }672673  for (const [rpId, group] of byRpId) {674    if (group.length === 0) continue;675    group.sort((a, b) => {676      const aT =677        a.passkey!.lastUsedAt ?? a.passkey!.createdAt ?? a.modifiedAt ?? a.createdAt;678      const bT =679        b.passkey!.lastUsedAt ?? b.passkey!.createdAt ?? b.modifiedAt ?? b.createdAt;680      return bT - aT;681    });682    const winner = group[0]!;683684    // Look for a NON-passkey login entry matching this RP. Use the URL685    // hostname rather than a substring search so a "login.foo.com" entry686    // doesn't accidentally absorb a passkey for "foo.com".687    const loginTarget = entries.find((e) => {688      if (e.deletedAt || e.passkey || e.type !== "login") return false;689      if (e.url && extractDomain(e.url) === rpId) return true;690      for (const extra of e.additionalUrls ?? []) {691        if (extractDomain(extra) === rpId) return true;692      }693      return false;694    });695696    if (loginTarget) {697      loginTarget.passkey = winner.passkey;698      loginTarget.modifiedAt = now;699      for (const dup of group) {700        if (!dup.deletedAt) {701          dup.deletedAt = now;702          dup.modifiedAt = now;703        }704      }705      merged = true;706    } else if (group.length > 1) {707      for (let i = 1; i < group.length; i += 1) {708        const dup = group[i]!;709        if (!dup.deletedAt) {710          dup.deletedAt = now;711          dup.modifiedAt = now;712        }713      }714      merged = true;715    }716  }717718  return { merged };719}720721// Exported solely for `unlockFromCodex` below, which needs to verify a722// supplied passphrase against a slotA blob *without* committing anything to723// storage. Keep this internal otherwise — callers crossing the messages.ts724// boundary should always go through `unlock` / `verifyMainPassword` so the725// constant-time invariants in Projects.md §3.4 are not bypassed.726export async function tryDecryptSlot(727  vault: StoredVault,728  key: Uint8Array729): Promise<DecryptedPayload | null> {730  try {731    const plain = await decrypt(key, vault.nonce, vault.ciphertext, vault.tag);732    return decodePayload(plain);733  } catch {734    return null;735  }736}737738// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------739// Core operations740// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------741742function buildDomainIndexSync(all: VaultEntry[]): void {743  domainIndex = new Map();744745  for (const entry of all) {746    if (entry.deletedAt) continue;747    if (entry.type === "note" || entry.type === "card") continue;748749    // An entry can match multiple sites via `additionalUrls`. Index each750    // hostname so `queryDomain` returns the entry regardless of which alias751    // the user is currently visiting. Dedupe per-entry so a single entry752    // never appears twice in one bucket.753    const domains = new Set<string>();754    const primary = extractDomain(entry.url ?? "");755    if (primary) domains.add(primary);756    for (const extra of entry.additionalUrls ?? []) {757      const d = extractDomain(extra);758      if (d) domains.add(d);759    }760    if (domains.size === 0) continue;761762    for (const domain of domains) {763      const bucket = domainIndex.get(domain) ?? [];764      bucket.push(entry);765      domainIndex.set(domain, bucket);766    }767  }768}769770export async function createVault(password: string): Promise<void> {771  await ensureMigrated();772773  const salt = generateSalt();774  derivedKey = await deriveKey(password, salt);775  entries = [];776  vaultMode = "real";777  duressConfigured = false;778  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);779780  // Generate and wrap the root key for recovery word escrow.781  const { rawRootKey, recoverySalt, wrappedRootKey, wrappedNonce, wrappedTag } =782    await generateAndWrapRootKey();783  rootKey = unhex(rawRootKey);784785  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured);786  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKey, plaintext);787788  const slotA: StoredVault = {789    version: 1,790    salt: hex(salt),791    nonce,792    ciphertext,793    tag,794    recovery_salt: recoverySalt,795    recovery_wrapped_root_key: wrappedRootKey,796    recovery_nonce: wrappedNonce,797    recovery_tag: wrappedTag,798  };799  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, slotA);800801  // Matching-size noise blob for slot B, so a fresh install shows two802  // similarly-shaped records regardless of whether duress is ever set up.803  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2));804805  touchAutoLock();806}807808export async function hasVault(): Promise<boolean> {809  await ensureMigrated();810  return (await loadSlot(SLOT_A)) !== null;811}812813/**814 * Returns whether the real vault has recorded that a duress passphrase is815 * configured. Reliable only after a real-mode unlock — before unlock or in816 * decoy mode, returns false because we cannot read slot A's plaintext.817 */818export async function isDuressEnabled(): Promise<boolean> {819  return vaultMode === "real" && duressConfigured;820}821822export async function setupDuress(duressPassword: string): Promise<void> {823  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {824    throw new Error("vault must be unlocked in real mode");825  }826  await ensureMigrated();827828  // Encrypt the decoy payload (empty entries) under the duress key. Pad to829  // at least the current slot A ciphertext size so the two slots look the830  // same at rest at setup time.831  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);832  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");833834  const decoySalt = generateSalt();835  const decoyKey = await deriveKey(duressPassword, decoySalt);836  try {837    // Pad the decoy plaintext to match slot A's ciphertext length (minus the838    // 16-byte tag) so encrypted sizes align exactly.839    const targetBytes = slotA.ciphertext.length / 2;840    let plaintext = encodePayload([], false);841    const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(plaintext);842    if (encoded.length < targetBytes) {843      plaintext = plaintext + " ".repeat(targetBytes - encoded.length);844    }845    const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(decoyKey, plaintext);846    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, {847      version: 1,848      salt: hex(decoySalt),849      nonce,850      ciphertext,851      tag,852    });853  } finally {854    zeroKey(decoyKey);855  }856857  // Re-encrypt slot A with the duressConfigured flag set to true. No external858  // flag is written — the bit lives inside the encrypted envelope.859  duressConfigured = true;860  await persistSlotA();861}862863export async function disableDuress(): Promise<void> {864  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {865    throw new Error("vault must be unlocked in real mode");866  }867  await ensureMigrated();868869  // Overwrite slot B with fresh noise that matches slot A's size. The slot870  // remains occupied so its mere existence does not signal that duress was871  // ever configured.872  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);873  if (slotA) {874    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(slotA.ciphertext.length / 2));875  }876877  duressConfigured = false;878  await persistSlotA();879}880881export async function verifyMainPassword(password: string): Promise<boolean> {882  await ensureMigrated();883  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);884  if (!slotA) return false;885  const key = await deriveKey(password, unhex(slotA.salt));886  try {887    return (await tryDecryptSlot(slotA, key)) !== null;888  } finally {889    zeroKey(key);890  }891}892893export async function unlock(password: string): Promise<boolean> {894  await ensureMigrated();895896  // Load both slots in parallel. Both always exist post-migration; the897  // parallel load and the parallel derivation below keep wall-clock time898  // constant regardless of which slot's passphrase (real or decoy) the899  // caller supplied, so a timing side channel cannot distinguish the900  // duress path from the real-unlock path (DUR-002).901  const [slotA, slotB] = await Promise.all([902    loadSlot(SLOT_A),903    loadSlot(SLOT_B),904  ]);905906  // Derive both keys in parallel, unconditionally.907  const [keyA, keyB] = await Promise.all([908    slotA ? deriveKey(password, unhex(slotA.salt)) : Promise.resolve(null),909    slotB ? deriveKey(password, unhex(slotB.salt)) : Promise.resolve(null),910  ]);911912  // Attempt both decrypts in parallel.913  const [payloadA, payloadB] = await Promise.all([914    keyA && slotA ? tryDecryptSlot(slotA, keyA) : Promise.resolve(null),915    keyB && slotB ? tryDecryptSlot(slotB, keyB) : Promise.resolve(null),916  ]);917918  if (payloadA && keyA) {919    derivedKey = keyA;920    vaultMode = "real";921    entries = payloadA.entries;922    duressConfigured = payloadA.duressConfigured;923    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);924    await loadSettings();925    touchAutoLock();926    if (keyB) zeroKey(keyB);927928    // slotA is non-null when payloadA is truthy (keyA was derived from slotA).929    if (slotA) {930      const needsRecoverySetup =931        !slotA.recovery_salt || !slotA.recovery_wrapped_root_key;932      if (!needsRecoverySetup) {933        rootKey = await deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(934          keyA,935          slotA.recovery_salt!936        );937      }938    }939940    // If the payload had a pre-v2.11.0 shape (legacy passkey type, flat941    // passkey fields, or pre-A-2 created/updated keys), rewrite it now so942    // the next save uses the new format and migration doesn't re-run forever.943    if (payloadA.migratedFromLegacy) {944      await persistSlotA();945    }946    return true;947  }948949  if (payloadB && keyB) {950    derivedKey = keyB;951    vaultMode = "decoy";952    entries = payloadB.entries;953    duressConfigured = false;954    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);955    await loadSettings();956    touchAutoLock();957    if (keyA) zeroKey(keyA);958    return true;959  }960961  if (keyA) zeroKey(keyA);962  if (keyB) zeroKey(keyB);963  return false;964}965966export function lock(): void {967  if (derivedKey) {968    zeroKey(derivedKey);969    derivedKey = null;970  }971  if (rootKey) {972    rootKey.fill(0);973    rootKey = null;974  }975976  entries = [];977  domainIndex = new Map();978  vaultMode = "real";979  duressConfigured = false;980  clearAutoLock();981}982983export function isUnlocked(): boolean {984  return derivedKey !== null;985}986987// Opens the vault using a pre-derived AES-256 key (skipping Argon2id).988// Used by Android biometric unlock — the key was derived on the native side.989export async function unlockWithKey(990  masterKeyHex: string,991): Promise<{ ok: true; entries: VaultEntry[] } | { ok: false; error: string }> {992  try {993    const masterKeyBytes = unhex(masterKeyHex);994    const stored = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);995    if (!stored) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };996    const payload = await tryDecryptSlot(stored, masterKeyBytes);997    if (!payload) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };998999    derivedKey = masterKeyBytes;1000    vaultMode = "real";1001    entries = payload.entries;1002    duressConfigured = payload.duressConfigured;1003    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1004    await loadSettings();1005    touchAutoLock();1006    return { ok: true, entries };1007  } catch {1008    return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };1009  }1010}10111012/**1013 * Restore the vault from a parsed Peach Codex payload.1014 *1015 * The supplied passphrase is verified against the Codex's slotA *before* any1016 * storage mutation — wrong passphrases return without touching disk. On1017 * success, the current vault state is snapshotted (reason: "restore") so the1018 * user can revert via Settings -> Vault History, then slotA/slotB are written1019 * and `peach_last_modified_at` is set to the Codex's recorded timestamp. A1020 * regular `unlock()` follows so the rest of the SW sees the standard1021 * post-unlock state.1022 *1023 * Intentionally non-Pro-gated — see peach_codex_v2.md "Pro gating". A Codex1024 * printed by a Pro user must always be restorable, even on a free device.1025 *1026 * Timing is not held constant here (in contrast to `unlock`): the Codex flow1027 * is an explicit user action with a known passphrase, not a passive lock1028 * screen, so the duress-vs-real timing side channel does not apply.1029 */1030export async function unlockFromCodex(params: {1031  slotA: string; // JSON string of StoredVault for slot A1032  slotB: string | null; // JSON string of StoredVault for slot B, or null1033  timestamp: number;1034  masterPassphrase: string;1035}): Promise<1036  | { ok: true; entryCount: number }1037  | { ok: false; reason: "wrong_passphrase" | "invalid_slot_format" }1038> {1039  let parsedSlotA: StoredVault;1040  let parsedSlotB: StoredVault | null = null;1041  try {1042    parsedSlotA = JSON.parse(params.slotA) as StoredVault;1043    if (params.slotB !== null) {1044      parsedSlotB = JSON.parse(params.slotB) as StoredVault;1045    }1046    // Minimal structural validation — the decrypt step below catches deeper1047    // corruption, but bail early on obviously-bad shapes so we don't reach1048    // storage with junk.1049    if (1050      typeof parsedSlotA?.salt !== "string" ||1051      typeof parsedSlotA?.nonce !== "string" ||1052      typeof parsedSlotA?.ciphertext !== "string" ||1053      typeof parsedSlotA?.tag !== "string"1054    ) {1055      return { ok: false, reason: "invalid_slot_format" };1056    }1057  } catch {1058    return { ok: false, reason: "invalid_slot_format" };1059  }10601061  // Verify the passphrase against the supplied slotA WITHOUT writing anything.1062  // If this fails the on-disk vault is left completely untouched.1063  const trialKey = await deriveKey(params.masterPassphrase, unhex(parsedSlotA.salt));1064  const trialPayload = await tryDecryptSlot(parsedSlotA, trialKey);1065  if (!trialPayload) {1066    zeroKey(trialKey);1067    return { ok: false, reason: "wrong_passphrase" };1068  }1069  // Drop the trial key; `unlock()` below derives its own copy. Holding two1070  // copies of the master key in memory at once would be a needless surface.1071  zeroKey(trialKey);10721073  // Snapshot the about-to-be-overwritten on-disk state so the user can revert1074  // a mistaken Codex restore via the Vault History UI. Non-fatal if it fails.1075  await takeVaultSnapshot("restore");10761077  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, parsedSlotA);1078  if (parsedSlotB) {1079    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, parsedSlotB);1080  } else {1081    // Slot B must always exist with ciphertext length matching slot A1082    // (Projects.md §3.2). Codex prints may omit slot B (duress wasn't1083    // configured); regenerate noise to satisfy the invariant.1084    await writeSlot(1085      SLOT_B,1086      generateNoiseBlob(parsedSlotA.ciphertext.length / 2),1087    );1088  }1089  await chrome.storage.local.set({1090    peach_last_modified_at: String(params.timestamp),1091  });10921093  // Standard unlock path so domain index, settings, auto-lock, and1094  // recovery-key state all populate exactly as a normal unlock would.1095  const ok = await unlock(params.masterPassphrase);1096  if (!ok) {1097    // Should be unreachable — we just verified the passphrase against the1098    // same slotA we wrote. Treat as wrong_passphrase to keep the contract1099    // simple if some race or storage anomaly intrudes.1100    return { ok: false, reason: "wrong_passphrase" };1101  }1102  return { ok: true, entryCount: getEntries().length };1103}11041105// Returns the current in-memory derived key as a hex string.1106// Used by the biometric enable flow in Settings to store the key in Android Keystore.1107export function getDerivedKeyHex(): string {1108  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_not_unlocked");1109  return hex(derivedKey);1110}11111112export function getEntries(): VaultEntry[] {1113  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");1114  return entries.filter((entry) => !entry.deletedAt);1115}11161117const EMAIL_RE = /^[^\s@]+@[^\s@]+\.[^\s@]+$/;11181119export function getIdentities(): SavedIdentity[] {1120  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");1121  const active = entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt && e.type === "login");11221123  const emailMap = new Map<string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }>();1124  const usernameMap = new Map<string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }>();11251126  for (const entry of active) {1127    const value = entry.username?.trim();1128    if (!value) continue;1129    const map = EMAIL_RE.test(value) ? emailMap : usernameMap;1130    const existing = map.get(value);1131    const domain = extractDomain(entry.url ?? "") ?? "";1132    const modifiedAt = entry.modifiedAt ?? entry.createdAt ?? 0;1133    if (!existing || modifiedAt > existing.lastUsed) {1134      map.set(value, { lastUsed: modifiedAt, count: (existing?.count ?? 0) + 1, domain });1135    } else {1136      map.set(value, { ...existing, count: existing.count + 1 });1137    }1138  }11391140  const toIdentity = (type: "email" | "username") =>1141    ([value, d]: [string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }]): SavedIdentity => ({1142      value, type, lastUsed: d.lastUsed, useCount: d.count, exampleDomain: d.domain || undefined,1143    });11441145  return [1146    ...[...emailMap.entries()].map(toIdentity("email")).sort((a, b) => b.useCount - a.useCount),1147    ...[...usernameMap.entries()].map(toIdentity("username")).sort((a, b) => b.useCount - a.useCount),1148  ];1149}11501151export async function batchAddEntries(drafts: EntryDraft[]): Promise<VaultEntry[]> {1152  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");11531154  const now = Date.now();1155  const added: VaultEntry[] = [];1156  for (const draft of drafts) {1157    try {1158      const sanitized = sanitizeEntryDraft(draft);1159      const nextEntry: VaultEntry = {1160        ...sanitized,1161        id: crypto.randomUUID(),1162        createdAt: now,1163        modifiedAt: now,1164      };1165      entries.push(nextEntry);1166      added.push(nextEntry);1167    } catch {1168      // Skip invalid drafts silently — caller can see diff between input and output length1169    }1170  }11711172  if (added.length > 0) {1173    await persistEntries();1174  }11751176  return added;1177}11781179/**1180 * Restore a set of entries in full fidelity — preserves id, createdAt,1181 * modifiedAt, and every other field unlike `batchAddEntries` which1182 * assigns fresh identity. Used by restore paths where the backup is the1183 * authoritative source of truth. `mode` controls how entries already in1184 * the vault are treated.1185 */1186export async function restoreEntries(1187  incoming: VaultEntry[],1188  mode: "replace" | "merge"1189): Promise<{ added: number; updated: number; skipped: number }> {1190  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");11911192  // A replace with zero incoming entries is almost certainly a caller bug1193  // (e.g. an import that silently dropped everything). Refuse rather than1194  // wipe the vault.1195  if (mode === "replace" && incoming.length === 0) {1196    throw new Error("refuse to replace with empty entry set");1197  }11981199  let added = 0;1200  let updated = 0;1201  let skipped = 0;12021203  if (mode === "replace") {1204    entries = [];1205    for (const entry of incoming) {1206      const normalized = sanitizeRestoredEntry(entry);1207      if (!normalized) {1208        skipped += 1;1209        continue;1210      }1211      entries.push(normalized);1212      added += 1;1213    }1214  } else {1215    const byId = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();1216    for (const e of entries) byId.set(e.id, e);12171218    for (const entry of incoming) {1219      const normalized = sanitizeRestoredEntry(entry);1220      if (!normalized) {1221        skipped += 1;1222        continue;1223      }1224      const existing = byId.get(normalized.id);1225      if (!existing) {1226        entries.push(normalized);1227        added += 1;1228      } else if (normalized.modifiedAt > existing.modifiedAt) {1229        const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === existing.id);1230        if (idx !== -1) {1231          entries[idx] = normalized;1232          updated += 1;1233        }1234      } else {1235        skipped += 1;1236      }1237    }1238  }12391240  await persistEntries("import");1241  return { added, updated, skipped };1242}12431244/**1245 * Validate + normalise a VaultEntry coming from a backup. Accepts1246 * anything structurally sound; keeps all metadata verbatim. Returns1247 * null for values the live vault shouldn't accept (e.g., missing title).1248 */1249function sanitizeRestoredEntry(entry: VaultEntry): VaultEntry | null {1250  if (!entry || typeof entry !== "object") return null;1251  const title = typeof entry.title === "string" ? entry.title.trim() : "";1252  if (!title) return null;1253  const id = typeof entry.id === "string" && entry.id ? entry.id : crypto.randomUUID();1254  const now = Date.now();1255  const createdAt = typeof entry.createdAt === "number" ? entry.createdAt : now;1256  const modifiedAt = typeof entry.modifiedAt === "number" ? entry.modifiedAt : createdAt;12571258  // Migrate legacy passkey shape on import (same logic as on-disk read).1259  // Imports from pre-v2.11.0 vault backups still carry type:"passkey" with1260  // flat fields; bring them into the new shape immediately.1261  const migrated: VaultEntry = migrateLegacyPasskey(1262    {1263      ...entry,1264      id,1265      title,1266      type: entry.type ?? "login",1267      createdAt,1268      modifiedAt,1269    },1270    entry1271  );12721273  // Login entries from backup must carry a password (or be passkey-only,1274  // in which case the passkey sub-object replaces the password requirement).1275  if (1276    migrated.type === "login" &&1277    !migrated.passkey &&1278    typeof migrated.password !== "string"1279  ) {1280    return null;1281  }1282  if (migrated.passkey && !migrated.passkey.credentialId) {1283    return null;1284  }12851286  return migrated;1287}12881289// Soft-deletes every non-deleted entry in one call. The literal string1290// argument is a tripwire against accidental calls — any caller that would1291// wipe the vault has to consciously type "REPLACE_ALL". Do not relax this1292// to a boolean.1293export async function clearVaultEntries(1294  confirmation: "REPLACE_ALL"1295): Promise<void> {1296  if (confirmation !== "REPLACE_ALL") {1297    throw new Error("clearVaultEntries requires explicit confirmation");1298  }1299  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");1300  for (const entry of entries) {1301    if (!entry.deletedAt) {1302      entry.deletedAt = Date.now();1303      entry.modifiedAt = Date.now();1304    }1305  }1306  await persistEntries();1307}13081309export async function addEntry(entry: EntryDraft): Promise<VaultEntry> {1310  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");13111312  const sanitized = sanitizeEntryDraft(entry);1313  const now = Date.now();1314  const nextEntry: VaultEntry = {1315    ...sanitized,1316    id: crypto.randomUUID(),1317    createdAt: now,1318    modifiedAt: now,1319    // Stamp passwordChangedAt at creation so age tracking is accurate from1320    // day one. Non-login entries carry the same stamp harmlessly.1321    passwordChangedAt: sanitized.password ? now : undefined,1322  };13231324  entries.push(nextEntry);1325  await persistEntries();13261327  // Fire-and-forget breach check (only for login entries if breach monitoring is enabled or not set)1328  if (settings.breachMonitoring !== false && nextEntry.type === "login" && nextEntry.password) {1329    checkBreach(nextEntry.password).then(async (count) => {1330      if (count > 0) {1331        const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === nextEntry.id);1332        if (idx !== -1) {1333          entries[idx] = { ...entries[idx], breach: count, modifiedAt: Date.now() };1334          await persistEntries();1335        }1336      }1337    });1338  }13391340  return nextEntry;1341}13421343export async function updateEntry(1344  id: string,1345  patch: Partial<VaultEntry>1346): Promise<void> {1347  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");13481349  const idx = entries.findIndex((entry) => entry.id === id);1350  if (idx === -1 || entries[idx].deletedAt) {1351    throw new Error("entry not found");1352  }13531354  const current = entries[idx];1355  const sanitizedPatch = sanitizeEntryPatch(patch);1356  // Refresh passwordChangedAt only when the password value actually changes —1357  // a metadata-only update (title, tags, etc.) must not reset the age clock1358  // that drives the Pro health rotation recommendation.1359  const passwordChanged =1360    "password" in patch &&1361    typeof sanitizedPatch.password === "string" &&1362    sanitizedPatch.password !== current.password;1363  entries[idx] = {1364    ...current,1365    ...sanitizedPatch,1366    modifiedAt: Date.now(),1367    ...(passwordChanged ? { passwordChangedAt: Date.now() } : {}),1368  };13691370  // A login entry must carry SOMETHING fillable — either a password or a1371  // passkey credential. An empty-password login with no passkey is dead1372  // state. Permit the password-clear when a passkey is attached (that's1373  // the legitimate "drop the password, keep the passkey" path).1374  if (1375    entries[idx].type === "login" &&1376    !entries[idx].password &&1377    !entries[idx].passkey1378  ) {1379    entries[idx] = current;1380    throw new Error("password or passkey required");1381  }13821383  // Card entries must retain their card number1384  if (entries[idx].type === "card" && !entries[idx].cardNumber) {1385    entries[idx] = current;1386    throw new Error("card number is required for card entries");1387  }13881389  await persistEntries();13901391  // Breach check when password changes: clear immediately so old breach doesn't linger,1392  // then async-check the new password and only re-set if it's also found.1393  if ("password" in patch && settings.breachMonitoring !== false && entries[idx].type === "login") {1394    entries[idx] = { ...entries[idx], breach: undefined };1395    await persistEntries();1396    const password = entries[idx].password;1397    if (password) {1398      checkBreach(password).then(async (count) => {1399        const i = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id);1400        if (i !== -1 && count > 0) {1401          entries[i] = { ...entries[i], breach: count, modifiedAt: Date.now() };1402          await persistEntries();1403        }1404      });1405    }1406  }1407}14081409export async function deleteEntry(id: string): Promise<void> {1410  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");14111412  const entry = entries.find((item) => item.id === id);1413  if (!entry || entry.deletedAt) {1414    throw new Error("entry not found");1415  }14161417  entry.deletedAt = Date.now();1418  entry.modifiedAt = Date.now();1419  await persistEntries();1420}14211422export function getDeletedEntries(): VaultEntry[] {1423  if (!derivedKey) return [];1424  return entries.filter((e) => !!e.deletedAt);1425}14261427export async function restoreEntry(id: string): Promise<void> {1428  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");1429  const entry = entries.find((e) => e.id === id && e.deletedAt);1430  if (!entry) throw new Error("deleted entry not found");1431  delete entry.deletedAt;1432  entry.modifiedAt = Date.now();1433  await persistEntries();1434  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1435}14361437export async function purgeEntry(id: string): Promise<void> {1438  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");1439  const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id && e.deletedAt);1440  if (idx === -1) throw new Error("deleted entry not found");1441  entries.splice(idx, 1);1442  await persistEntries();1443}14441445/** Permanently delete entries whose deletedAt is older than retentionMs. 0 = keep forever. */1446export async function purgeExpiredTrash(retentionMs: number): Promise<number> {1447  if (!derivedKey || retentionMs === 0) return 0;1448  const cutoff = Date.now() - retentionMs;1449  const before = entries.length;1450  entries = entries.filter((e) => !(e.deletedAt && e.deletedAt < cutoff));1451  const purged = before - entries.length;1452  if (purged > 0) await persistEntries();1453  return purged;1454}14551456export function queryDomain(domain: string): VaultEntry[] {1457  return domainIndex.get(domain) ?? [];1458}14591460export function getEntryById(id: string): VaultEntry | undefined {1461  return entries.find((entry) => entry.id === id && !entry.deletedAt);1462}14631464async function persistSlotA(1465  reason: VaultSnapshot["reason"] = "local_save",1466): Promise<StoredVault> {1467  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");14681469  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1470  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");14711472  // Snapshot the about-to-be-overwritten state BEFORE we mutate disk. Failures1473  // are swallowed by takeVaultSnapshot — history must never block a save.1474  await takeVaultSnapshot(reason);14751476  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured);1477  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKey, plaintext);14781479  // Preserve existing recovery escrow fields.1480  const nextSlotA: StoredVault = {1481    ...slotA,1482    nonce,1483    ciphertext,1484    tag,1485    // recovery_salt and recovery_wrapped_root_key are already set from loadSlot1486  };1487  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, nextSlotA);14881489  // When duress is not configured, keep slot B size-matched with slot A by1490  // regenerating its noise. When duress IS configured, leave slot B alone —1491  // we don't have the decoy key to re-encrypt it. This is a known trade-off.1492  if (!duressConfigured) {1493    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2));1494  }14951496  return nextSlotA;1497}14981499async function persistSlotB(): Promise<void> {1500  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");15011502  const slotB = await loadSlot(SLOT_B);1503  if (!slotB) throw new Error("missing slot B");15041505  // Decoy plaintext always reports duressConfigured=false — the decoy user1506  // sees a clean slate.1507  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, false);1508  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKey, plaintext);15091510  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, { ...slotB, nonce, ciphertext, tag });1511}15121513async function persistEntries(1514  reason: VaultSnapshot["reason"] = "local_save",1515): Promise<void> {1516  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");15171518  if (vaultMode === "decoy") {1519    await persistSlotB();1520  } else {1521    await persistSlotA(reason);1522  }1523  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1524}15251526function cleanAdditionalUrls(values: string[] | undefined): string[] | undefined {1527  if (!Array.isArray(values)) return undefined;1528  const seen = new Set<string>();1529  const cleaned: string[] = [];1530  for (const value of values) {1531    const trimmed = typeof value === "string" ? value.trim() : "";1532    if (!trimmed) continue;1533    const key = trimmed.toLowerCase();1534    if (seen.has(key)) continue;1535    seen.add(key);1536    cleaned.push(trimmed);1537  }1538  return cleaned.length > 0 ? cleaned : undefined;1539}15401541function sanitizeEntryDraft(entry: EntryDraft): EntryDraft {1542  const title = entry.title.trim();1543  // Accept legacy `type:"passkey"` drafts but rewrite to "login" — the new1544  // model is "any entry, optionally with a passkey sub-object." Imports and1545  // any in-flight callers from before v2.11.0 keep working without throwing.1546  let type: VaultEntry["type"] = entry.type ?? "login";1547  if (type === "passkey") type = "login";15481549  if (!title) throw new Error("title is required");1550  // A login entry needs either a password or a passkey credential to be useful.1551  // Passkey-only entries (passkey present, no password) are valid.1552  if (type === "login" && !entry.password?.trim() && !entry.passkey) {1553    throw new Error("password or passkey required");1554  }1555  if (entry.passkey) {1556    const p = entry.passkey;1557    if (1558      !p.rpId ||1559      !p.credentialId ||1560      !p.publicKeyCose ||1561      !p.userHandle ||1562      !p.userName ||1563      (p.algorithm !== -7 && p.algorithm !== -8)1564    ) {1565      throw new Error("invalid passkey credential");1566    }1567  }1568  if (type === "card") {1569    if (!entry.cardholderName?.trim() || !entry.cardNumber?.trim()) {1570      throw new Error("cardholder name and card number are required");1571    }1572  }15731574  return {1575    type,1576    title,1577    username: type === "login" ? entry.username?.trim() ?? "" : undefined,1578    password: type === "login" ? entry.password : undefined,1579    url: type === "login" ? entry.url?.trim() ?? "" : undefined,1580    additionalUrls: type === "login" ? cleanAdditionalUrls(entry.additionalUrls) : undefined,1581    totp: type === "login" ? entry.totp?.trim() || undefined : undefined,1582    notes: entry.notes?.trim() || undefined,1583    breach: type === "login" ? entry.breach : undefined,1584    canary: type === "login" ? entry.canary : undefined,1585    tags: entry.tags,1586    passkey: entry.passkey,1587    cardholderName: type === "card" ? entry.cardholderName?.trim() : undefined,1588    cardNumber: type === "card" ? entry.cardNumber?.trim() : undefined,1589    expMonth: type === "card" ? entry.expMonth?.trim() : undefined,1590    expYear: type === "card" ? entry.expYear?.trim() : undefined,1591    cvc: type === "card" ? entry.cvc?.trim() : undefined,1592    cardNickname: type === "card" ? entry.cardNickname?.trim() || undefined : undefined,1593    network: type === "card" ? entry.network : undefined,1594    last4: type === "card" ? entry.last4?.trim() : undefined,1595  };1596}15971598function sanitizeEntryPatch(patch: Partial<VaultEntry>): Partial<VaultEntry> {1599  const nextPatch: Partial<VaultEntry> = {};16001601  if ("type" in patch) {1602    nextPatch.type = patch.type;1603  }16041605  if ("title" in patch) {1606    const title = patch.title?.trim() ?? "";1607    if (!title) throw new Error("title is required");1608    nextPatch.title = title;1609  }16101611  if ("url" in patch) {1612    nextPatch.url = patch.url?.trim() ?? "";1613  }16141615  if ("additionalUrls" in patch) {1616    const incoming = Array.isArray(patch.additionalUrls) ? patch.additionalUrls : [];1617    const seen = new Set<string>();1618    const cleaned: string[] = [];1619    for (const value of incoming) {1620      const trimmed = typeof value === "string" ? value.trim() : "";1621      if (!trimmed) continue;1622      const key = trimmed.toLowerCase();1623      if (seen.has(key)) continue;1624      seen.add(key);1625      cleaned.push(trimmed);1626    }1627    nextPatch.additionalUrls = cleaned.length > 0 ? cleaned : undefined;1628  }16291630  if ("username" in patch) {1631    nextPatch.username = patch.username?.trim() ?? "";1632  }16331634  if ("email" in patch) {1635    nextPatch.email = patch.email?.trim() || undefined;1636  }16371638  if ("password" in patch) {1639    const password = patch.password ?? "";1640    // Allow clearing a password (e.g. on passkey-only entries)1641    nextPatch.password = password || undefined;1642  }16431644  if ("totp" in patch) {1645    nextPatch.totp = patch.totp?.trim() || undefined;1646  }16471648  if ("notes" in patch) {1649    nextPatch.notes = patch.notes?.trim() || undefined;1650  }16511652  if ("breach" in patch) {1653    nextPatch.breach = patch.breach;1654  }16551656  if ("canary" in patch) {1657    nextPatch.canary = patch.canary;1658  }16591660  if ("passkey" in patch) {1661    // Passkey sub-object replaces all the legacy flat passkey fields. A1662    // patch with `passkey: undefined` removes the credential from the entry1663    // (used by "remove passkey" without deleting the whole entry).1664    nextPatch.passkey = patch.passkey;1665  }16661667  if ("tags" in patch) {1668    nextPatch.tags = patch.tags;1669  }16701671  if ("cardholderName" in patch) {1672    nextPatch.cardholderName = patch.cardholderName?.trim() || undefined;1673  }1674  if ("cardNumber" in patch) {1675    const n = patch.cardNumber ?? "";1676    nextPatch.cardNumber = n || undefined;1677  }1678  if ("expMonth" in patch) {1679    nextPatch.expMonth = patch.expMonth?.trim() || undefined;1680  }1681  if ("expYear" in patch) {1682    nextPatch.expYear = patch.expYear?.trim() || undefined;1683  }1684  if ("cvc" in patch) {1685    nextPatch.cvc = patch.cvc?.trim() || undefined;1686  }1687  if ("cardNickname" in patch) {1688    nextPatch.cardNickname = patch.cardNickname?.trim() || undefined;1689  }1690  if ("network" in patch) {1691    nextPatch.network = patch.network;1692  }1693  if ("last4" in patch) {1694    nextPatch.last4 = patch.last4?.trim() || undefined;1695  }16961697  return nextPatch;1698}16991700function normalizeEntry(entry: VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry): VaultEntry {1701  const createdAt = "createdAt" in entry ? entry.createdAt : entry.created;1702  const modifiedAt =1703    "modifiedAt" in entry ? entry.modifiedAt : entry.updated;17041705  const base: VaultEntry = {1706    id: entry.id,1707    type: "type" in entry ? entry.type : "login",1708    title: entry.title,1709    username: entry.username,1710    password: entry.password,1711    url: entry.url,1712    totp: entry.totp,1713    notes: entry.notes,1714    breach: entry.breach,1715    canary: "canary" in entry ? entry.canary : undefined,1716    passkey: "passkey" in entry ? entry.passkey : undefined,1717    createdAt,1718    modifiedAt,1719    deletedAt: entry.deletedAt,1720    tags: "tags" in entry ? entry.tags : undefined,1721    cardholderName: "cardholderName" in entry ? entry.cardholderName : undefined,1722    cardNumber: "cardNumber" in entry ? entry.cardNumber : undefined,1723    expMonth: "expMonth" in entry ? entry.expMonth : undefined,1724    expYear: "expYear" in entry ? entry.expYear : undefined,1725    cvc: "cvc" in entry ? entry.cvc : undefined,1726    cardNickname: "cardNickname" in entry ? entry.cardNickname : undefined,1727    network: "network" in entry ? entry.network : undefined,1728    last4: "last4" in entry ? entry.last4 : undefined,1729  };17301731  return migrateLegacyPasskey(base, entry);1732}17331734/**1735 * v2.11.0 read migration. Pre-v2.11.0 passkey entries used `type:"passkey"`1736 * with flat top-level fields (rpId, credentialId, etc.). This converts them1737 * to the new shape — `type:"login"` with a `passkey` sub-object — so all1738 * downstream consumers can rely on the new model. The result is rewritten1739 * to disk on next vault save (hasLegacyShape detects the un-migrated case).1740 */1741function migrateLegacyPasskey(1742  base: VaultEntry,1743  raw: VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry1744): VaultEntry {1745  if (base.passkey) return base;1746  const flat = raw as Partial<VaultEntry>;1747  const isPasskeyType = base.type === "passkey";1748  const hasFlatPasskeyFields =1749    typeof flat.rpId === "string" &&1750    typeof flat.credentialId === "string" &&1751    typeof flat.publicKeyCose === "string" &&1752    typeof flat.userHandle === "string" &&1753    typeof flat.userName === "string";1754  if (!isPasskeyType && !hasFlatPasskeyFields) return base;1755  if (!hasFlatPasskeyFields) return base;17561757  const algorithm: -7 | -8 = flat.algorithm === -8 ? -8 : -7;1758  base.passkey = {1759    rpId: flat.rpId!,1760    rpName: flat.rpName ?? flat.rpId!,1761    credentialId: flat.credentialId!,1762    publicKeyCose: flat.publicKeyCose!,1763    privateKeyJwk: flat.privateKeyJwk,1764    userHandle: flat.userHandle!,1765    userName: flat.userName!,1766    userDisplayName: flat.userDisplayName ?? flat.userName!,1767    algorithm,1768    signCount: flat.signCount ?? 0,1769    aaguid: flat.aaguid ?? "",1770    backupEligible: flat.backupEligible === true,1771    backupState: flat.backupState === true,1772    lastUsedAt: flat.lastUsedAt,1773    browser: flat.browser,1774    transports: flat.transports,1775    createdAt: base.createdAt,1776  };1777  // Promote to "login" so the unified Entry view renders. Username gets1778  // populated from the passkey's userName so the entry is searchable in the1779  // existing autofill flow without a separate code path.1780  if (isPasskeyType) base.type = "login";1781  if (!base.username) base.username = flat.userName;1782  if (!base.url) base.url = `https://${flat.rpId}`;1783  return base;1784}178517861787// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------1788// Deduplication1789// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------17901791function entryDupeKey(e: VaultEntry): string {1792  if (e.type === "note") return `note|${e.title.toLowerCase()}`;1793  // Passkey-bearing entries dedupe by the credential's RP + user. Two logins1794  // on different sites that happen to share a username are still distinct;1795  // two passkey credentials for the same RP+user are duplicates regardless1796  // of any login fields they may also carry.1797  if (e.passkey) {1798    return `passkey|${e.passkey.rpId.toLowerCase()}|${e.passkey.userName.toLowerCase()}`;1799  }1800  return `login|${e.title.toLowerCase()}|${(e.url ?? "").toLowerCase()}|${(e.username ?? "").toLowerCase()}`;1801}18021803/** Returns the number of duplicate entries (those that would be removed). */1804export function countDuplicates(): number {1805  const best = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();1806  let dupeCount = 0;1807  for (const e of entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt)) {1808    const key = entryDupeKey(e);1809    const existing = best.get(key);1810    if (!existing) {1811      best.set(key, e);1812    } else {1813      dupeCount++;1814      // Keep the more recently modified one in the map1815      if ((e.modifiedAt ?? e.createdAt ?? 0) > (existing.modifiedAt ?? existing.createdAt ?? 0)) {1816        best.set(key, e);1817      }1818    }1819  }1820  return dupeCount;1821}18221823/**1824 * Soft-deletes duplicate entries, keeping the most recently modified copy of1825 * each group. Returns the number of entries moved to trash.1826 */1827export async function deduplicateEntries(): Promise<number> {1828  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");1829  // Dedup reshapes slot B permanently under the decoy key, which is1830  // forensically distinguishable from a freshly-seeded decoy vault. Refuse.1831  if (vaultMode === "decoy") {1832    throw new Error("deduplicate disabled in decoy mode");1833  }18341835  const best = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();1836  for (const e of entries.filter((en) => !en.deletedAt)) {1837    const key = entryDupeKey(e);1838    const existing = best.get(key);1839    if (!existing) {1840      best.set(key, e);1841    } else if ((e.modifiedAt ?? e.createdAt ?? 0) > (existing.modifiedAt ?? existing.createdAt ?? 0)) {1842      best.set(key, e);1843    }1844  }18451846  const keepIds = new Set(Array.from(best.values()).map((e) => e.id));1847  const now = Date.now();1848  let removed = 0;1849  entries = entries.map((e) => {1850    if (!e.deletedAt && !keepIds.has(e.id)) {1851      removed++;1852      return { ...e, deletedAt: now };1853    }1854    return e;1855  });18561857  if (removed > 0) await persistEntries();1858  return removed;1859}18601861// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------1862// Vault history — snapshot BEFORE every vault write so the saved blob is1863// what is about to be lost, not what was just written. Capped at 10. The1864// stored blobs are AES-256-GCM ciphertext under the master password, so1865// history adds zero security surface.1866// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------18671868const HISTORY_KEY = "peach_vault_history";1869const HISTORY_MAX = 10;18701871/**1872 * Snapshot the CURRENT on-disk vault state into history. Call this BEFORE1873 * overwriting peach_vault_a so the saved blob captures the about-to-be-lost1874 * state. Identical-to-most-recent blobs are skipped to avoid filling history1875 * with no-op writes.1876 */1877export async function takeVaultSnapshot(1878  reason: VaultSnapshot["reason"],1879): Promise<void> {1880  try {1881    const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get([SLOT_A, SLOT_B, HISTORY_KEY]);1882    const slotA = (raw as Record<string, StoredVault | undefined>)[SLOT_A];1883    const slotB = (raw as Record<string, StoredVault | undefined>)[SLOT_B];18841885    // Nothing to snapshot if the real slot doesn't exist yet (fresh install,1886    // pre-createVault). createVault skips snapshots intentionally — there is1887    // no prior state to preserve.1888    if (!slotA) return;18891890    const vault_a = JSON.stringify(slotA);1891    const vault_b = JSON.stringify(slotB ?? slotA);18921893    // Best-effort entry count: only meaningful when the in-memory state is1894    // unlocked AND in real mode. Decoy mode would leak the decoy entry1895    // count; locked mode has no entries to count. Both fall through to null.1896    let entryCount: number | null = null;1897    if (derivedKey && vaultMode === "real") {1898      try {1899        entryCount = entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt).length;1900      } catch {1901        entryCount = null;1902      }1903    }19041905    const existingRaw = (raw as Record<string, VaultHistory | undefined>)[HISTORY_KEY];1906    const history: VaultHistory = existingRaw && Array.isArray(existingRaw.snapshots)1907      ? existingRaw1908      : { snapshots: [] };19091910    // Deduplication: if the most recent snapshot has byte-identical blobs,1911    // skip — saves the same vault N times in a row would otherwise burn the1912    // entire history window with no recovery value.1913    const latest = history.snapshots[0];1914    if (latest && latest.vault_a === vault_a && latest.vault_b === vault_b) {1915      return;1916    }19171918    const snapshot: VaultSnapshot = {1919      id: crypto.randomUUID(),1920      savedAt: Date.now(),1921      reason,1922      vault_a,1923      vault_b,1924      entryCount,1925    };19261927    history.snapshots = [snapshot, ...history.snapshots].slice(0, HISTORY_MAX);1928    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [HISTORY_KEY]: history });1929  } catch {1930    // Non-fatal — history must never block a save. A failed snapshot just1931    // means the user loses one rung of the safety ladder for this write.1932  }1933}19341935/** Wipe all vault history. Called by Panic / DESTROY_VAULT. */1936export async function clearVaultHistory(): Promise<void> {1937  try {1938    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [HISTORY_KEY]: { snapshots: [] } satisfies VaultHistory });1939  } catch {1940    // Non-fatal — DESTROY_VAULT also runs storage.local.clear().1941  }1942}19431944/** Read all snapshots, newest first, for the Settings vault history view. */1945export async function getVaultHistory(): Promise<VaultSnapshot[]> {1946  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get(HISTORY_KEY);1947  const history = (raw as Record<string, VaultHistory | undefined>)[HISTORY_KEY];1948  if (!history || !Array.isArray(history.snapshots)) return [];1949  return history.snapshots;1950}19511952/**1953 * Replace the on-disk vault with the chosen snapshot's blobs and lock the1954 * vault. The current state is itself snapshotted with reason 'restore' first1955 * so the restore is reversible. After this returns, the user must unlock1956 * with the password that matches the restored blob.1957 */1958export async function restoreVaultSnapshot(1959  snapshotId: string,1960): Promise<{ ok: true } | { ok: false; error: string }> {1961  const history = await getVaultHistory();1962  const snapshot = history.find((s) => s.id === snapshotId);1963  if (!snapshot) return { ok: false, error: "snapshot_not_found" };19641965  // Snapshot the about-to-be-replaced current state so the restore is1966  // reversible. takeVaultSnapshot is no-op when the most recent entry is1967  // byte-identical, so a restore-of-a-restore stays clean.1968  await takeVaultSnapshot("restore");19691970  let restoredA: StoredVault;1971  let restoredB: StoredVault;1972  try {1973    restoredA = JSON.parse(snapshot.vault_a) as StoredVault;1974    restoredB = JSON.parse(snapshot.vault_b) as StoredVault;1975  } catch {1976    return { ok: false, error: "snapshot_corrupt" };1977  }19781979  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, restoredA);1980  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, restoredB);19811982  // Lock so the user must prove they can decrypt the restored blob. If they1983  // restored a pre-password-change snapshot they discover it immediately at1984  // the lock screen rather than silently holding an inaccessible vault.1985  lock();19861987  return { ok: true };1988}19891990/**1991 * Change the master password. Re-encrypts slot A with a fresh salt + new1992 * derived key. Slot B (duress or noise) is left untouched when duress is1993 * configured — it uses an independent key derived from the duress password —1994 * and regenerated as noise when duress is not configured.1995 */1996export async function changePassword(1997  currentPassword: string,1998  newPassword: string1999): Promise<boolean> {2000  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") return false;20012002  // Verify current password before allowing any change2003  const valid = await verifyMainPassword(currentPassword);2004  if (!valid) return false;20052006  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);2007  if (!slotA) return false;20082009  // Derive fresh key from new password + new random salt2010  const newSalt = generateSalt();2011  const newKey = await deriveKey(newPassword, newSalt);20122013  // Re-encrypt the in-memory entries with the new key2014  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured);2015  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(newKey, plaintext);20162017  const freshSlotA: StoredVault = {2018    ...slotA,2019    salt: hex(newSalt),2020    nonce,2021    ciphertext,2022    tag,2023  };2024  // Snapshot the OLD-key blob before overwriting it. If the user later2025  // restores from this snapshot they will need the OLD password — the2026  // post-restore lock surfaces that immediately.2027  await takeVaultSnapshot("local_save");2028  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, freshSlotA);20292030  // Swap the in-memory key synchronously before any further await. If we2031  // threw between the Slot A write and this swap, the next persistEntries()2032  // would overwrite Slot A with old-key ciphertext, locking the user out.2033  zeroKey(derivedKey);2034  derivedKey = newKey;20352036  // Rotate the root key so the old recovery words are immediately invalidated.2037  // After this point getRecoveryWords() returns a fresh 12-word set.2038  const {2039    rawRootKey: freshRawKey,2040    recoverySalt: freshSalt,2041    wrappedRootKey: freshWrapped,2042    wrappedNonce: freshNonce,2043    wrappedTag: freshTag,2044  } = await generateAndWrapRootKey();2045  rootKey = unhex(freshRawKey);2046  const slotAfterRekey = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);2047  if (slotAfterRekey) {2048    await writeSlot(SLOT_A, {2049      ...slotAfterRekey,2050      recovery_salt: freshSalt,2051      recovery_wrapped_root_key: freshWrapped,2052      recovery_nonce: freshNonce,2053      recovery_tag: freshTag,2054    });2055  }20562057  // Regenerate noise for slot B when duress is not in use. Runs after the2058  // key swap so a failure here is a disposable noise regeneration, not a2059  // lockout.2060  if (!duressConfigured) {2061    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2));2062  }20632064  return true;2065}20662067// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------2068// Sync helpers2069// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------20702071export async function getVaultBlobForSync(): Promise<{2072  blob: string;2073  timestamp: number;2074  license?: string;2075} | null> {2076  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get([SLOT_A, SLOT_B, 'peach_last_modified_at', 'peach_license']);2077  const slotA = (raw as Record<string, unknown>)[SLOT_A];2078  if (!slotA) return null;2079  const slotB = (raw as Record<string, unknown>)[SLOT_B];2080  const blob = JSON.stringify({ a: slotA, b: slotB });2081  const rawTs = (raw as Record<string, unknown>)['peach_last_modified_at'];2082  const timestamp = typeof rawTs === 'string' ? parseInt(rawTs) : 0;2083  const license = (raw as Record<string, unknown>)['peach_license'];2084  return {2085    blob,2086    timestamp,2087    license: typeof license === 'string' ? license : undefined,2088  };2089}20902091export async function applyIncomingVault(2092  blobJson: string,2093  remoteTimestamp: number,2094  remoteLicense?: string,2095): Promise<boolean> {2096  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get('peach_last_modified_at');2097  const rawTs = (raw as Record<string, unknown>)['peach_last_modified_at'];2098  const localTimestamp = typeof rawTs === 'string' ? parseInt(rawTs) : 0;20992100  if (remoteLicense) {2101    const licenseRaw = await chrome.storage.local.get('peach_license');2102    const existing = (licenseRaw as Record<string, unknown>)['peach_license'];2103    if (!existing) {2104      await chrome.storage.local.set({ peach_license: remoteLicense });2105    }2106  }21072108  if (remoteTimestamp <= localTimestamp) return false;21092110  // Snapshot before overwriting — failure is non-fatal2111  await takeVaultSnapshot('sync_received').catch(() => {});21122113  const { a, b } = JSON.parse(blobJson) as { a: unknown; b?: unknown };2114  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, a as StoredVault);2115  if (b) await writeSlot(SLOT_B, b as StoredVault);2116  await chrome.storage.local.set({2117    peach_last_sync_at: String(Date.now()),2118    peach_last_modified_at: String(remoteTimestamp),2119  });21202121  return true;2122}21232124export async function getSyncIdentity(): Promise<{2125  privateKeyBytes: Uint8Array;2126  publicKeyBytes: Uint8Array;2127  publicKeyHex: string;2128}> {2129  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get('peach_sync_identity');2130  const stored = (raw as Record<string, unknown>)['peach_sync_identity'];2131  if (typeof stored === 'string') {2132    const { priv, pub } = JSON.parse(stored) as { priv: string; pub: string };2133    const privateKeyBytes = base64DecodeBytes(priv);2134    const publicKeyBytes = base64DecodeBytes(pub);2135    return { privateKeyBytes, publicKeyBytes, publicKeyHex: bytesToHex(publicKeyBytes) };2136  }21372138  // Generate a fresh X25519 keypair and persist it.2139  const { generateKeyPair } = await import('@stablelib/x25519');2140  const keypair = generateKeyPair();2141  await chrome.storage.local.set({2142    peach_sync_identity: JSON.stringify({2143      priv: base64EncodeBytes(keypair.secretKey),2144      pub: base64EncodeBytes(keypair.publicKey),2145    }),2146  });2147  return {2148    privateKeyBytes: keypair.secretKey,2149    publicKeyBytes: keypair.publicKey,2150    publicKeyHex: bytesToHex(keypair.publicKey),2151  };2152}21532154// Re-decrypt vault entries from storage using the current in-memory key.2155// Called after applyIncomingVault so the in-memory state stays consistent2156// with what was just written to storage.2157export async function reloadEntriesAfterSync(): Promise<boolean> {2158  if (!derivedKey) return false;2159  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);2160  if (!slotA) return false;2161  try {2162    const payload = await tryDecryptSlot(slotA, derivedKey);2163    if (!payload) return false;2164    entries = payload.entries;2165    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);2166    return true;2167  } catch {2168    return false;2169  }2170}21712172function bytesToHex(bytes: Uint8Array): string {2173  return Array.from(bytes).map(b => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('');2174}21752176function base64EncodeBytes(bytes: Uint8Array): string {2177  let binary = '';2178  for (let i = 0; i < bytes.length; i++) binary += String.fromCharCode(bytes[i]);2179  return btoa(binary);2180}21812182function base64DecodeBytes(b64: string): Uint8Array {2183  const binary = atob(b64);2184  const bytes = new Uint8Array(binary.length);2185  for (let i = 0; i < binary.length; i++) bytes[i] = binary.charCodeAt(i);2186  return bytes;2187}