vault.ts

1/**2 * vault.ts — sole owner of vault state and chrome.storage vault keys.3 *4 * Every read/write of `peach_vault_a`, `peach_vault_b`, and `peach_settings`5 * goes through this module. No other file accesses those keys directly.6 * External callers reach vault operations via `messages.ts` — never by7 * importing from here cross-boundary (popup/content must not). Invariants8 * for the two-slot schema, unlock timing, and key/disk atomicity are in9 * Projects.md §3.2–§3.6.10 */1112import { deriveKey, generateSalt } from "../crypto/argon2";13import { extractDomain } from "../shared/domain";14import {15  rootKeyToWords,16  wordsToRootKeyMaterial,17  deriveRecoveryKey,18} from "../shared/recovery-words";19import type {20  AccentColorName,21  LegacyVaultEntry,22  ManualSummonRecord,23  SavedIdentity,24  StoredVault,25  VaultEntry,26  VaultHistory,27  VaultSnapshot,28} from "../shared/types";29import { decrypt, encrypt, zeroKey } from "./aes";30import { clearAutoLock, touchAutoLock } from "./alarms";3132type EntryDraft = Omit<33  VaultEntry,34  "id" | "createdAt" | "modifiedAt" | "deletedAt"35>;3637// Slot-neutral storage keys (v1.4.24+). Both slots always exist; slot B38// either holds the decoy vault (when duress is configured) or random noise39// that looks identical at rest. No external indicator is stored — duress40// configuration is recorded only inside the encrypted payload of slot A.41const SLOT_A = "peach_vault_a";42const SLOT_B = "peach_vault_b";4344// Legacy keys, migrated away on first access.45const LEGACY_MAIN = "peach_vault";46const LEGACY_DECOY = "peach_decoy_vault";47const LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG = "peach_duress";4849// Plaintext is padded to the next multiple of this size before encryption.50// This coarsens ciphertext-length leakage into 1 KiB buckets.51const PAD_BLOCK = 1024;5253let derivedKey: Uint8Array | null = null;54// 32-byte random root key, separate from the derivedKey used for vault encryption.55// The root key is wrapped (encrypted) under the recovery key derived from the56// 12-word phrase. When the user changes their password, only the wrapping changes;57// the root key and recovery words remain stable.58let rootKey: Uint8Array | null = null;59let entries: VaultEntry[] = [];60let domainIndex: Map<string, VaultEntry[]> = new Map();61let vaultMode: "real" | "decoy" = "real";62// Cached post-unlock view of whether the real vault records that duress is63// configured. Only meaningful after a real-mode unlock; for decoy-mode unlock64// this stays false because we never see slot A's plaintext.65let duressConfigured = false;6667let migrationRan = false;6869// Set to a corruption reason during the last unlock() attempt when both slots70// decrypted but failed schema validation. Consumed and cleared by71// consumeLastUnlockFailureReason() so messages.ts can surface vault_corrupted72// distinctly from wrong-password (M7/COR-007).73//74// NOTE: module-level state — if vault.ts is ever moved to a worker context,75// this must be replaced with a structured return value from unlock() or a76// postMessage channel. The signal is invisible across module-instance77// boundaries.78let lastUnlockFailureReason: string | null = null;7980export function consumeLastUnlockFailureReason(): string | null {81  const r = lastUnlockFailureReason;82  lastUnlockFailureReason = null;83  return r;84}8586// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------87// Settings (persisted inside the encrypted vault store as a sidecar key)88// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------8990export type TextSize = "small" | "medium" | "large";9192export interface VaultSettings {93  accentColor?: AccentColorName;94  theme?: "dark" | "light";95  autoLockMinutes?: number;96  clipboardClearSeconds?: number;97  lockOnClose?: boolean;98  breachMonitoring?: boolean;99  passkeyProviderEnabled?: boolean;100  trashRetentionDays?: number;101  manualSummonDomains?: Record<string, ManualSummonRecord>;102  declinedCardFingerprints?: string[];103  /**104   * Text size scale for body copy and entry titles. Stops at "large" by105   * design — XL clips dense screens (Vault, Health) inside the fixed106   * 330×480 popup surface.107   */108  textSize?: TextSize;109  /**110   * When true, all entrance/exit transitions and ambient animations are111   * collapsed to instant. Honoured alongside the user's OS-level112   * `prefers-reduced-motion`.113   */114  reduceMotion?: boolean;115  /**116   * Android-only: when true, the master key is escrowed in AndroidKeyStore117   * and the lock screen offers biometric unlock. Toggled from Settings →118   * Security → Biometrics. Has no effect on desktop builds.119   */120  biometricsEnabled?: boolean;121  /**122   * User overrides for keyboard shortcuts. Keys are ShortcutAction names123   * (see src/shared/shortcuts.ts). Missing actions fall through to124   * DEFAULT_BINDINGS — `getActiveBindings(settings.shortcuts)` is the125   * canonical lookup. Storing only the deltas keeps the vault payload126   * small and lets default updates land for users who never rebind.127   */128  shortcuts?: Record<string, { key: string; ctrl?: boolean; meta?: boolean; shift?: boolean; alt?: boolean }>;129}130131let settings: VaultSettings = {};132133export function getSettings(): VaultSettings {134  return settings;135}136137export async function ensureSettingsLoaded(): Promise<VaultSettings> {138  await loadSettings();139  return settings;140}141142export async function updateSettings(patch: Partial<VaultSettings>): Promise<void> {143  await loadSettings();144  settings = { ...settings, ...patch };145  await persistSettings();146}147148async function persistSettings(): Promise<void> {149  try {150    await chrome.storage.local.set({ peach_settings: settings });151  } catch (err) {152    throw mapStorageError(err);153  }154}155156function mapStorageError(err: unknown): Error {157  const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);158  if (/QUOTA_BYTES|quota/i.test(message)) {159    return new Error("STORAGE_QUOTA_EXCEEDED");160  }161  return err instanceof Error ? err : new Error(message);162}163164async function loadSettings(): Promise<void> {165  const result = await chrome.storage.local.get("peach_settings");166  settings = (result as { peach_settings?: VaultSettings }).peach_settings ?? {};167}168169// Fire-and-forget sync trigger after a committed vault write. Lazy170// dynamic import avoids a circular dependency between vault.ts and171// sync-trigger.ts (the trigger imports paired-devices, which only reads172// storage, but the lazy load also gives us a clean opt-out path in173// tests where sync-trigger has not been initialised).174function fireSyncTrigger(reason: "vault_change"): void {175  void import("./sync-trigger")176    .then((mod) => mod.triggerSyncIfReachable({ reason }))177    .catch(() => {178      /* sync trigger module not available — non-fatal */179    });180}181182// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------183// HIBP breach check (k-anonymity model)184// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------185186export async function checkBreach(password: string): Promise<number> {187  // HIBP k-anonymity API is keyed on SHA-1 prefixes — this is dictated by188  // the public API, not a security choice. Do not migrate to SHA-256 here.189  const encoder = new TextEncoder();190  const hashBuffer = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-1", encoder.encode(password));191  const hashHex = Array.from(new Uint8Array(hashBuffer))192    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))193    .join("")194    .toUpperCase();195196  const prefix = hashHex.slice(0, 5);197  const suffix = hashHex.slice(5);198199  try {200    const res = await fetch(`https://api.pwnedpasswords.com/range/${prefix}`);201    if (!res.ok) return 0;202    const text = await res.text();203    const match = text.split("\r\n").find((l) => l.startsWith(suffix));204    return match ? parseInt(match.split(":")[1], 10) : 0;205  } catch {206    return 0; // Network unavailable — don't block207  }208}209210export async function declineCardSaveOffer(last4: string, expMonth: string, expYear: string): Promise<void> {211  const fingerprint = await cardFingerprint(last4, expMonth, expYear);212  await loadSettings();213  settings = {214    ...settings,215    declinedCardFingerprints: [...(settings.declinedCardFingerprints ?? []), fingerprint],216  };217  await persistSettings();218}219220export async function isCardDeclined(last4: string, expMonth: string, expYear: string): Promise<boolean> {221  await loadSettings();222  const fingerprint = await cardFingerprint(last4, expMonth, expYear);223  return (settings.declinedCardFingerprints ?? []).includes(fingerprint);224}225226async function cardFingerprint(last4: string, expMonth: string, expYear: string): Promise<string> {227  const encoder = new TextEncoder();228  const buf = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", encoder.encode(`${last4}|${expMonth}|${expYear}`));229  return Array.from(new Uint8Array(buf).slice(0, 8))230    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))231    .join("");232}233234function hex(buf: Uint8Array): string {235  return Array.from(buf)236    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))237    .join("");238}239240function unhex(s: string): Uint8Array {241  const out = new Uint8Array(s.length / 2);242  for (let i = 0; i < s.length; i += 2) {243    out[i / 2] = parseInt(s.slice(i, i + 2), 16);244  }245  return out;246}247248// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------249// Root key generation and recovery word wrapping250// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------251252/**253 * Generate a random 32-byte root key and wrap it (AES-256-GCM) under a key254 * derived from the recovery word material via HKDF-SHA256. The wrapped blob255 * fields are stored in slot A alongside the password-wrapped ciphertext. The256 * root key itself is kept in memory for the session so getRecoveryWords() can257 * encode it without re-deriving.258 */259async function generateAndWrapRootKey(): Promise<{260  rawRootKey: string; // hex of the plaintext root key — caller stores in rootKey261  recoverySalt: string;262  wrappedRootKey: string;263  wrappedNonce: string;264  wrappedTag: string;265}> {266  const rootKeyBytes = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32));267268  // Derive the recovery key from the BIP39 words encoding of the root key.269  const words = await rootKeyToWords(rootKeyBytes);270  const wordMaterial = await wordsToRootKeyMaterial(words);271  const recoverySalt = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));272  const recoveryKey = await deriveRecoveryKey(wordMaterial, recoverySalt);273274  // Wrap the root key with the recovery key using AES-256-GCM directly.275  // We hex-encode rootKeyBytes so the plaintext is always valid UTF-8.276  const nonce = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));277  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(hex(rootKeyBytes));278  const raw = await crypto.subtle.encrypt(279    {280      name: "AES-GCM",281      iv: nonce,282      additionalData: new Uint8Array([1]).buffer as ArrayBuffer,283      tagLength: 128,284    },285    recoveryKey,286    encoded287  );288  // WebCrypto returns ciphertext || auth tag concatenated; split them.289  const rawU8 = new Uint8Array(raw);290  const ciphertext = hex(rawU8.slice(0, rawU8.length - 16));291  const tag = hex(rawU8.slice(rawU8.length - 16));292293  return {294    rawRootKey: hex(rootKeyBytes),295    recoverySalt: hex(recoverySalt),296    wrappedRootKey: ciphertext,297    wrappedNonce: hex(nonce),298    wrappedTag: tag,299  };300}301302/**303 * Unwrap the root key using recovery words. Called during recovery flow when304 * the user provides their 12-word phrase and a new password.305 * Exported for use by the RECOVER_WITH_WORDS message handler.306 */307export async function unwrapRootKeyForRecovery(308  wrappedRootKey: string,309  wrappedNonce: string,310  wrappedTag: string,311  recoverySaltHex: string,312  words: string[]313): Promise<void> {314  const wordMaterial = await wordsToRootKeyMaterial(words);315  const recoverySalt = unhex(recoverySaltHex);316  const recoveryKey = await deriveRecoveryKey(wordMaterial, recoverySalt);317318  // Decrypt and cache the root key. The root key bytes were hex-encoded before319  // encryption so the ciphertext is valid UTF-8. We inline the AES-GCM decrypt320  // here to avoid passing a CryptoKey to the string-based encrypt/decrypt helpers.321  // Each component is stored separately in the vault slot; decode them individually322  // so the nonce is always exactly the 12 bytes from wrappedNonce.323  const nonceRaw = unhex(wrappedNonce);324  const ciphertextRaw = unhex(wrappedRootKey);325  const tagRaw = unhex(wrappedTag);326  // Combine ciphertext and tag for AES-GCM (expects ciphertext||tag).327  // Use explicit ArrayBuffer allocations to satisfy TS BufferSource constraints.328  const nonceU8 = nonceRaw as unknown as Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>;329  const combined = new Uint8Array(ciphertextRaw.length + tagRaw.length);330  combined.set(ciphertextRaw, 0);331  combined.set(tagRaw, ciphertextRaw.length);332  const raw = await crypto.subtle.decrypt(333    { name: "AES-GCM", iv: nonceU8, additionalData: new Uint8Array([1]).buffer as ArrayBuffer, tagLength: 128 },334    recoveryKey,335    combined336  );337  const decryptedHex = new TextDecoder().decode(raw);338  rootKey = unhex(decryptedHex);339}340341/**342 * Re-wrap the cached root key under a new derived key (from the user's new343 * password). Called after password change and after recovery re-key so the344 * same recovery words continue to work with the updated password — and so345 * subsequent unlocks can rehydrate rootKey via deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey.346 *347 * recovery_* fields are intentionally not touched: those wrap rootKey under348 * the recovery words, which do not change when the password changes.349 */350export async function rewrapRootKeyForPassword(351  newDerivedKey: Uint8Array,352  _newSalt: Uint8Array353): Promise<void> {354  if (!rootKey) throw new Error("root key not set");355  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);356  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");357  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(newDerivedKey, rootKey);358  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, { ...slotA, ...pwRoot });359}360361/**362 * Change the vault encryption to a new derived key (already derived from363 * the user's new password). Used by RECOVER_WITH_WORDS and changePassword.364 * Caller is responsible for key swap and snapshot.365 */366async function reencryptVaultForNewKey(367  newKey: Uint8Array,368  slotA: StoredVault369): Promise<void> {370  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured);371  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(newKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");372  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, {373    ...slotA,374    nonce,375    ciphertext,376    tag,377  });378}379380/**381 * Full password change with an already-derived key (used after recovery).382 * Unlike changePassword(), this skips re-verification of current password383 * since recovery flow has already validated the user's identity via words.384 */385export async function changePasswordWithNewKey(386  newSalt: Uint8Array,387  newKey: Uint8Array388): Promise<void> {389  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);390  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");391  // reencryptVaultForNewKey must receive the updated salt so that subsequent392  // UNLOCK calls with the new password can re-derive the correct key.393  await reencryptVaultForNewKey(newKey, { ...slotA, salt: hex(newSalt) });394  if (derivedKey) zeroKey(derivedKey);395  derivedKey = newKey;396  // Refresh pw_root_* under the new key so deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey works397  // on the next unlock (H2/COR-006). If rootKey is missing — recovery flow398  // should have populated it — fall back silently rather than blowing up the399  // recovery path; migrateToRecovery will rehydrate on the next unlock.400  if (rootKey) {401    const slotAfter = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);402    if (slotAfter) {403      const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(newKey, rootKey);404      await writeSlot(SLOT_A, { ...slotAfter, ...pwRoot });405    }406  }407  if (!duressConfigured) {408    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(slotA.ciphertext.length / 2));409  }410  await stampLocalVaultMutation();411}412413// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------414// Salt generation --- exported so the RECOVER_WITH_WORDS handler can derive415// a new key after password reset without re-importing the crypto module.416// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------417418export { deriveKey, generateSalt };419420export async function loadSlotA(): Promise<StoredVault | null> {421  return loadSlot(SLOT_A);422}423424/**425 * Recover the session root key by AES-GCM-decrypting the pw_root_* fields426 * (a second wrapping of the root key under the password-derived key). This427 * is what makes GET_RECOVERY_WORDS work across lock/unlock cycles without428 * the user re-entering their recovery phrase: the same root key bytes —429 * and therefore the same 12 words — survive every unlock.430 *431 * Returns null when the pw_root fields are absent (pre-v2.12 vault that432 * hasn't been migrated yet) or when decryption fails (wrong derived key,433 * tampered ciphertext). On null the caller should fall through to434 * migrateToRecovery() to populate the fields.435 */436async function deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(437  derivedKeyBytes: Uint8Array,438  slotA: StoredVault,439): Promise<Uint8Array | null> {440  if (!slotA.pw_root_ciphertext || !slotA.pw_root_nonce || !slotA.pw_root_tag) {441    return null;442  }443  try {444    const rootHex = await decrypt(445      derivedKeyBytes,446      slotA.pw_root_nonce,447      slotA.pw_root_ciphertext,448      slotA.pw_root_tag,449      "pw_root_v1",450    );451    return unhex(rootHex);452  } catch {453    return null;454  }455}456457// AES-GCM-wrap rootKey under derivedKey for the pw_root_* fields. Returns the458// hex-encoded ciphertext/nonce/tag triple ready to embed in StoredVault.459async function wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(460  derivedKeyBytes: Uint8Array,461  rootKeyBytes: Uint8Array,462): Promise<{ pw_root_ciphertext: string; pw_root_nonce: string; pw_root_tag: string }> {463  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKeyBytes, hex(rootKeyBytes), "pw_root_v1");464  return {465    pw_root_ciphertext: ciphertext,466    pw_root_nonce: nonce,467    pw_root_tag: tag,468  };469}470471/**472 * For vaults created before v2.12 (no recovery_salt/recovery_wrapped_root_key),473 * generate the root key, wrap it under the recovery words, and persist the474 * recovery escrow into slot A. The caller must show the recovery words to the475 * user before calling this — once called, those words are the vault's recovery476 * path. This runs once, on the first unlock of an upgraded vault.477 */478export async function migrateToRecovery(): Promise<void> {479  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {480    throw new Error("vault must be unlocked in real mode");481  }482  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);483  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");484  const hasRecoveryEscrow =485    !!slotA.recovery_salt && !!slotA.recovery_wrapped_root_key;486  const hasPwRoot = !!slotA.pw_root_ciphertext && !!slotA.pw_root_nonce;487  if (hasRecoveryEscrow && hasPwRoot) return; // already done488489  // If recovery escrow already exists but pw_root doesn't, we cannot recover490  // the original rootKey without the user's words. The least-surprising path491  // is to rotate to a fresh root key — the user's old recovery words become492  // invalid but we surface peach_recovery_pending so the popup re-presents493  // the words. The unlock-path callers all set that flag.494  const { rawRootKey, recoverySalt, wrappedRootKey, wrappedNonce, wrappedTag } =495    await generateAndWrapRootKey();496  rootKey = unhex(rawRootKey);497498  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(derivedKey, rootKey);499  const nextSlotA: StoredVault = {500    ...slotA,501    recovery_salt: recoverySalt,502    recovery_wrapped_root_key: wrappedRootKey,503    recovery_nonce: wrappedNonce,504    recovery_tag: wrappedTag,505    ...pwRoot,506  };507  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, nextSlotA);508  await stampLocalVaultMutation();509}510511/**512 * Returns the 12 recovery words for the current session's root key.513 * Must be called while the vault is unlocked. Throws if recovery has not514 * been set up (pre-v2.12 vault that hasn't migrated yet).515 */516export async function getRecoveryWords(): Promise<string[]> {517  if (!rootKey) {518    throw new Error("recovery not set up — vault may need migration");519  }520  return rootKeyToWords(rootKey);521}522523async function loadSlot(key: string): Promise<StoredVault | null> {524  const result = await chrome.storage.local.get(key);525  return (result as Record<string, StoredVault | undefined>)[key] ?? null;526}527528async function writeSlot(key: string, vault: StoredVault): Promise<void> {529  try {530    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [key]: vault });531  } catch (err) {532    throw mapStorageError(err);533  }534}535536// Monotonic clock for per-entry modifiedAt / deletedAt timestamps. Guards the537// sync layer's last-write-wins merge against wall-clock regressions (NTP step,538// manual clock change, DST glitch): a backwards Date.now() must never produce539// an entry timestamp that's <= the entry's existing modifiedAt, or a genuine540// local edit would lose to a stale remote copy. The returned value is always541// strictly greater than both the entry's current modifiedAt and the previous542// call's result (SEV-2-E).543let lastEntryTimestamp = 0;544function monotonicEntryTimestamp(currentModifiedAt?: number): number {545  const base = Math.max(546    Date.now(),547    (currentModifiedAt ?? 0) + 1,548    lastEntryTimestamp + 1,549  );550  lastEntryTimestamp = base;551  return base;552}553554async function stampLocalVaultMutation(): Promise<void> {555  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get("peach_last_modified_at");556  const previous = Number(557    (raw as Record<string, unknown>).peach_last_modified_at,558  );559  const next = Math.max(560    Date.now(),561    Number.isFinite(previous) ? previous + 1 : 0,562  );563  await chrome.storage.local.set({564    peach_last_modified_at: String(next),565  });566}567568/**569 * One-shot migration from the pre-A-2 schema (peach_vault + peach_decoy_vault570 * + peach_duress flag) to the slot-neutral schema (peach_vault_a +571 * peach_vault_b). Runs at most once per session; safe to call repeatedly.572 */573async function ensureMigrated(): Promise<void> {574  if (migrationRan) return;575  migrationRan = true;576577  const keys = [LEGACY_MAIN, LEGACY_DECOY, LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG, SLOT_A, SLOT_B];578  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get(keys);579  const slotAExists = raw[SLOT_A] !== undefined;580  const slotBExists = raw[SLOT_B] !== undefined;581  const legacyMain = raw[LEGACY_MAIN] as StoredVault | undefined;582  const legacyDecoy = raw[LEGACY_DECOY] as StoredVault | undefined;583584  // Fresh install with nothing in storage — nothing to do; createVault() sets up both slots.585  if (!slotAExists && !legacyMain) return;586587  // Already migrated.588  if (slotAExists && slotBExists && !legacyMain && !legacyDecoy) return;589590  let didMigrate = false;591  if (legacyMain && !slotAExists) {592    await writeSlot(SLOT_A, legacyMain);593    didMigrate = true;594  }595596  // If slot B isn't set, populate it: use legacy decoy when present, else noise.597  if (!slotBExists) {598    const target = (legacyMain ?? raw[SLOT_A]) as StoredVault | undefined;599    if (legacyDecoy) {600      await writeSlot(SLOT_B, legacyDecoy);601      didMigrate = true;602    } else if (target) {603      await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(target.ciphertext.length / 2));604      didMigrate = true;605    }606  }607608  const toRemove: string[] = [];609  if (legacyMain) toRemove.push(LEGACY_MAIN);610  if (legacyDecoy) toRemove.push(LEGACY_DECOY);611  if (raw[LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG] !== undefined) toRemove.push(LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG);612  if (toRemove.length > 0) {613    await chrome.storage.local.remove(toRemove);614    didMigrate = true;615  }616  if (didMigrate) {617    await stampLocalVaultMutation();618  }619}620621// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------622// Padding + noise helpers623// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------624625/**626 * Pads the plaintext string with trailing spaces so that the encoded byte627 * length is a multiple of PAD_BLOCK. JSON.parse tolerates trailing628 * whitespace after a complete document, so the padding is transparent on629 * decode. Ciphertext length equals plaintext length plus a 16-byte tag.630 */631function padPlaintext(json: string): string {632  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(json);633  const target = Math.max(PAD_BLOCK, Math.ceil(encoded.length / PAD_BLOCK) * PAD_BLOCK);634  const padLen = target - encoded.length;635  return json + " ".repeat(padLen);636}637638/**639 * Produces a StoredVault-shaped record filled with CSPRNG bytes. The640 * ciphertext length matches the given byte count. Because GCM ciphertext is641 * pseudo-random, this blob is indistinguishable at rest from a real642 * encrypted vault without the key.643 *644 * crypto.getRandomValues() caps each call at 65536 bytes (the Web Crypto645 * spec hard limit). Chunk the fill so vaults larger than that — common once646 * the user has dozens of entries or any passkey — don't throw.647 */648const CSPRNG_CHUNK = 65_536;649650function fillRandom(buf: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {651  for (let offset = 0; offset < buf.length; offset += CSPRNG_CHUNK) {652    const end = Math.min(offset + CSPRNG_CHUNK, buf.length);653    const chunk = new Uint8Array(end - offset);654    crypto.getRandomValues(chunk);655    buf.set(chunk, offset);656  }657  return buf;658}659660function generateNoiseBlob(ciphertextBytes: number): StoredVault {661  const salt = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));662  const nonce = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));663  const cipher = fillRandom(new Uint8Array(ciphertextBytes));664  const tag = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));665  return {666    version: 1,667    salt: hex(salt),668    nonce: hex(nonce),669    ciphertext: hex(cipher),670    tag: hex(tag),671  };672}673674// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------675// Encrypted plaintext envelope676// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------677678type VaultPayload = {679  entries: VaultEntry[];680  duressConfigured?: boolean;681};682683type DecryptedPayload = {684  entries: VaultEntry[];685  duressConfigured: boolean;686  /**687   * True when at least one entry in the on-disk payload had a legacy shape688   * (pre-v2.11.0 passkey type/flat fields, or pre-A-2 created/updated keys)689   * and got rewritten by normalizeEntry. The unlock path uses this to690   * persist the new shape immediately — without it, the migration would691   * re-run on every unlock and old shape never disappears from disk.692   */693  migratedFromLegacy: boolean;694};695696function encodePayload(entries: VaultEntry[], duress: boolean): string {697  const envelope: VaultPayload = { entries, duressConfigured: duress };698  return padPlaintext(JSON.stringify(envelope));699}700701function rawNeedsMigration(raw: VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry): boolean {702  if ("created" in raw || "updated" in raw) return true;703  const flat = raw as Partial<VaultEntry>;704  if (flat.type === "passkey") return true;705  // Flat rpId without a passkey sub-object means pre-v2.11.0 schema.706  if (flat.rpId !== undefined && flat.passkey === undefined) return true;707  return false;708}709710function decodePayload(plain: string): DecryptedPayload {711  const parsed = JSON.parse(plain) as712    | Array<VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry>713    | VaultPayload;714715  const rawEntries = Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed : parsed.entries ?? [];716  const flatMigrationNeeded = rawEntries.some(rawNeedsMigration);717718  const normalized = rawEntries.map(normalizeEntry);719  const { merged } = mergePasskeyOnlyIntoLogins(normalized);720721  if (Array.isArray(parsed)) {722    return {723      entries: normalized,724      duressConfigured: false,725      migratedFromLegacy: true, // pre-A-2 array shape always needs save726    };727  }728729  return {730    entries: normalized,731    duressConfigured: parsed.duressConfigured === true,732    migratedFromLegacy: flatMigrationNeeded || merged,733  };734}735736/**737 * One-time consolidation pass run alongside the legacy passkey migration.738 *739 * Pre-v2.11.0 the Chrome passkey path always created a fresh `type:"passkey"`740 * entry per registration — so users who tested registration multiple times741 * accumulated several passkey-bearing entries for the same RP, and the742 * migration to the unified shape carried that duplication forward. This743 * pass collapses the duplicates:744 *745 *   1. Group passkey-bearing (and not deleted) entries by `passkey.rpId`.746 *   2. Within each group, the most recently-active credential wins (prefer747 *      lastUsedAt, fall back to passkey.createdAt, fall back to modifiedAt).748 *   3. If a NON-passkey login entry exists for that RP (matched by url or749 *      additionalUrls hostname), attach the winning passkey to it and750 *      soft-delete every passkey-bearing entry in the group.751 *   4. Otherwise, soft-delete every loser in the group, keeping the winner752 *      as a passkey-only entry.753 *754 * Soft delete (deletedAt) rather than splice — the trash flow keeps the755 * record around for retention and the user can restore if the heuristic756 * picked wrong. The `merged` flag goes back to decodePayload so the757 * unlock path persists the consolidated shape immediately.758 */759function mergePasskeyOnlyIntoLogins(entries: VaultEntry[]): { merged: boolean } {760  let merged = false;761  const now = Date.now();762763  const candidates = entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt && e.passkey);764  const byRpId = new Map<string, VaultEntry[]>();765  for (const e of candidates) {766    const rpId = e.passkey!.rpId;767    const list = byRpId.get(rpId);768    if (list) list.push(e);769    else byRpId.set(rpId, [e]);770  }771772  for (const [rpId, group] of byRpId) {773    if (group.length === 0) continue;774    group.sort((a, b) => {775      const aT =776        a.passkey!.lastUsedAt ?? a.passkey!.createdAt ?? a.modifiedAt ?? a.createdAt;777      const bT =778        b.passkey!.lastUsedAt ?? b.passkey!.createdAt ?? b.modifiedAt ?? b.createdAt;779      return bT - aT;780    });781    const winner = group[0]!;782783    // Look for a NON-passkey login entry matching this RP. Use the URL784    // hostname rather than a substring search so a "login.foo.com" entry785    // doesn't accidentally absorb a passkey for "foo.com".786    const loginTarget = entries.find((e) => {787      if (e.deletedAt || e.passkey || e.type !== "login") return false;788      if (e.url && extractDomain(e.url) === rpId) return true;789      for (const extra of e.additionalUrls ?? []) {790        if (extractDomain(extra) === rpId) return true;791      }792      return false;793    });794795    if (loginTarget) {796      loginTarget.passkey = winner.passkey;797      loginTarget.modifiedAt = now;798      for (const dup of group) {799        if (!dup.deletedAt) {800          dup.deletedAt = now;801          dup.modifiedAt = now;802        }803      }804      merged = true;805    } else if (group.length > 1) {806      for (let i = 1; i < group.length; i += 1) {807        const dup = group[i]!;808        if (!dup.deletedAt) {809          dup.deletedAt = now;810          dup.modifiedAt = now;811        }812      }813      merged = true;814    }815  }816817  return { merged };818}819820// Validates that a `StoredVault` record on disk has the field shape we expect821// before treating an AES-GCM decrypt success as a clean unlock. AES-GCM only822// authenticates the static VERSION_BYTE AAD, not the `version` field on the823// outer record — a corrupted `version: 42` slot still decrypts cleanly. This824// check surfaces that as `corrupted` (M7/COR-007) so the popup can offer a825// history-restore path instead of falsely reporting "wrong password".826function hasValidVaultSchema(v: unknown): v is StoredVault {827  if (typeof v !== "object" || v === null) return false;828  const r = v as Record<string, unknown>;829  return (830    r.version === 1 &&831    typeof r.salt === "string" &&832    typeof r.nonce === "string" &&833    typeof r.ciphertext === "string" &&834    typeof r.tag === "string"835  );836}837838export type TryDecryptResult =839  | { status: "ok"; payload: DecryptedPayload }840  | { status: "wrong_key" }841  | { status: "corrupted"; reason: string };842843// Exported solely for `unlockFromCodex` below, which needs to verify a844// supplied passphrase against a slotA blob *without* committing anything to845// storage. Keep this internal otherwise — callers crossing the messages.ts846// boundary should always go through `unlock` / `verifyMainPassword` so the847// constant-time invariants in Projects.md §3.4 are not bypassed.848export async function tryDecryptSlot(849  vault: StoredVault,850  key: Uint8Array,851  aadTag?: string,852): Promise<DecryptedPayload | null> {853  const res = await tryDecryptSlotResult(vault, key, aadTag);854  return res.status === "ok" ? res.payload : null;855}856857export async function tryDecryptSlotResult(858  vault: StoredVault,859  key: Uint8Array,860  aadTag?: string,861): Promise<TryDecryptResult> {862  if (!hasValidVaultSchema(vault)) {863    return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_slot_schema" };864  }865  let plain: string;866  try {867    plain = await decrypt(key, vault.nonce, vault.ciphertext, vault.tag, aadTag);868  } catch {869    return { status: "wrong_key" };870  }871  try {872    const parsed = JSON.parse(plain) as unknown;873    if (typeof parsed !== "object" || parsed === null) {874      return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_payload_shape" };875    }876    if (!Array.isArray(parsed) && !Array.isArray((parsed as VaultPayload).entries)) {877      return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_payload_shape" };878    }879    return { status: "ok", payload: decodePayload(plain) };880  } catch {881    return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_payload_json" };882  }883}884885// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------886// Core operations887// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------888889function buildDomainIndexSync(all: VaultEntry[]): void {890  domainIndex = new Map();891892  for (const entry of all) {893    if (entry.deletedAt) continue;894    if (entry.type === "note" || entry.type === "card") continue;895896    // An entry can match multiple sites via `additionalUrls`. Index each897    // hostname so `queryDomain` returns the entry regardless of which alias898    // the user is currently visiting. Dedupe per-entry so a single entry899    // never appears twice in one bucket.900    const domains = new Set<string>();901    const primary = extractDomain(entry.url ?? "");902    if (primary) domains.add(primary);903    for (const extra of entry.additionalUrls ?? []) {904      const d = extractDomain(extra);905      if (d) domains.add(d);906    }907    if (domains.size === 0) continue;908909    for (const domain of domains) {910      const bucket = domainIndex.get(domain) ?? [];911      bucket.push(entry);912      domainIndex.set(domain, bucket);913    }914  }915}916917export async function createVault(password: string): Promise<void> {918  await ensureMigrated();919920  const salt = generateSalt();921  derivedKey = await deriveKey(password, salt);922  entries = [];923  vaultMode = "real";924  duressConfigured = false;925  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);926927  // Generate and wrap the root key for recovery word escrow.928  const { rawRootKey, recoverySalt, wrappedRootKey, wrappedNonce, wrappedTag } =929    await generateAndWrapRootKey();930  rootKey = unhex(rawRootKey);931932  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured);933  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");934935  // Second wrapping of rootKey under derivedKey so future unlocks can rehydrate936  // it without recovery words (H2/COR-006).937  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(derivedKey, rootKey);938939  const slotA: StoredVault = {940    version: 1,941    salt: hex(salt),942    nonce,943    ciphertext,944    tag,945    recovery_salt: recoverySalt,946    recovery_wrapped_root_key: wrappedRootKey,947    recovery_nonce: wrappedNonce,948    recovery_tag: wrappedTag,949    ...pwRoot,950  };951  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, slotA);952953  // Matching-size noise blob for slot B, so a fresh install shows two954  // similarly-shaped records regardless of whether duress is ever set up.955  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2));956  await stampLocalVaultMutation();957958  touchAutoLock();959}960961export async function hasVault(): Promise<boolean> {962  await ensureMigrated();963  return (await loadSlot(SLOT_A)) !== null;964}965966/**967 * Returns whether the real vault has recorded that a duress passphrase is968 * configured. Reliable only after a real-mode unlock — before unlock or in969 * decoy mode, returns false because we cannot read slot A's plaintext.970 */971export async function isDuressEnabled(): Promise<boolean> {972  return vaultMode === "real" && duressConfigured;973}974975export async function setupDuress(duressPassword: string): Promise<void> {976  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {977    throw new Error("vault must be unlocked in real mode");978  }979  await ensureMigrated();980981  // Encrypt the decoy payload (empty entries) under the duress key. Pad to982  // at least the current slot A ciphertext size so the two slots look the983  // same at rest at setup time.984  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);985  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");986987  const decoySalt = generateSalt();988  const decoyKey = await deriveKey(duressPassword, decoySalt);989  try {990    // Pad the decoy plaintext to match slot A's ciphertext length (minus the991    // 16-byte tag) so encrypted sizes align exactly.992    const targetBytes = slotA.ciphertext.length / 2;993    let plaintext = encodePayload([], false);994    const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(plaintext);995    if (encoded.length < targetBytes) {996      plaintext = plaintext + " ".repeat(targetBytes - encoded.length);997    }998    const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(decoyKey, plaintext, "slot_b_v1");999    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, {1000      version: 1,1001      salt: hex(decoySalt),1002      nonce,1003      ciphertext,1004      tag,1005    });1006  } finally {1007    zeroKey(decoyKey);1008  }10091010  // Re-encrypt slot A with the duressConfigured flag set to true. No external1011  // flag is written — the bit lives inside the encrypted envelope.1012  duressConfigured = true;1013  await persistSlotA();1014}10151016export async function disableDuress(): Promise<void> {1017  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {1018    throw new Error("vault must be unlocked in real mode");1019  }1020  await ensureMigrated();10211022  // Overwrite slot B with fresh noise that matches slot A's size. The slot1023  // remains occupied so its mere existence does not signal that duress was1024  // ever configured.1025  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1026  if (slotA) {1027    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(slotA.ciphertext.length / 2));1028  }10291030  duressConfigured = false;1031  await persistSlotA();1032}10331034// L14/COR-015: this function intentionally checks slot A (real vault) only.1035// A duress-mode user attempting changePassword is rejected earlier by the1036// vaultMode === 'decoy' check at changePassword. The real-vs-decoy1037// distinction here is by design — duress users cannot rotate the real1038// password by guessing it, and the asymmetry in error timing is acceptable1039// because duress mode is opt-in and the user knows their own decoy key.1040export async function verifyMainPassword(password: string): Promise<boolean> {1041  await ensureMigrated();1042  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1043  if (!slotA) return false;1044  const key = await deriveKey(password, unhex(slotA.salt));1045  try {1046    return (await tryDecryptSlot(slotA, key, "slot_a_v1")) !== null;1047  } finally {1048    zeroKey(key);1049  }1050}10511052export async function unlock(password: string): Promise<boolean> {1053  await ensureMigrated();10541055  // Load both slots in parallel. Both always exist post-migration; the1056  // parallel load and the parallel derivation below keep wall-clock time1057  // constant regardless of which slot's passphrase (real or decoy) the1058  // caller supplied, so a timing side channel cannot distinguish the1059  // duress path from the real-unlock path (DUR-002).1060  const [slotA, slotB] = await Promise.all([1061    loadSlot(SLOT_A),1062    loadSlot(SLOT_B),1063  ]);10641065  // Derive both keys in parallel, unconditionally.1066  const [keyA, keyB] = await Promise.all([1067    slotA ? deriveKey(password, unhex(slotA.salt)) : Promise.resolve(null),1068    slotB ? deriveKey(password, unhex(slotB.salt)) : Promise.resolve(null),1069  ]);10701071  // Attempt both decrypts in parallel. The Result variant lets us distinguish1072  // 'wrong_key' from 'corrupted' so callers can offer a history-restore path1073  // when a slot's schema is invalid even though AES-GCM authenticated (M7).1074  const [resultA, resultB] = await Promise.all([1075    keyA && slotA1076      ? tryDecryptSlotResult(slotA, keyA, "slot_a_v1")1077      : Promise.resolve({ status: "wrong_key" } as TryDecryptResult),1078    keyB && slotB1079      ? tryDecryptSlotResult(slotB, keyB, "slot_b_v1")1080      : Promise.resolve({ status: "wrong_key" } as TryDecryptResult),1081  ]);1082  const payloadA = resultA.status === "ok" ? resultA.payload : null;1083  const payloadB = resultB.status === "ok" ? resultB.payload : null;10841085  if (payloadA && keyA) {1086    derivedKey = keyA;1087    void saveSessionKey(keyA, "real");1088    vaultMode = "real";1089    entries = payloadA.entries;1090    duressConfigured = payloadA.duressConfigured;1091    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1092    await loadSettings();1093    touchAutoLock();1094    if (keyB) zeroKey(keyB);10951096    // slotA is non-null when payloadA is truthy (keyA was derived from slotA).1097    if (slotA) {1098      const needsRecoverySetup =1099        !slotA.recovery_salt || !slotA.recovery_wrapped_root_key;1100      if (!needsRecoverySetup) {1101        rootKey = await deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(keyA, slotA);1102      }1103      // Pre-v2.12 vault, or a vault whose pw_root_* fields haven't been written1104      // yet: generate the recovery escrow and seed pw_root_* so subsequent1105      // unlocks can rehydrate rootKey without the user's recovery words.1106      // Best-effort — a failure here must not block unlock.1107      if (needsRecoverySetup || !rootKey) {1108        try {1109          await migrateToRecovery();1110          if (needsRecoverySetup) {1111            // String "1" matches the popup's existing peach_recovery_pending1112            // check; surfaced so the user re-confirms recovery words after a1113            // legacy-vault unlock (H2/COR-006).1114            await chrome.storage.local.set({ peach_recovery_pending: '1' });1115          }1116        } catch (migrationErr) {1117          console.warn('[Peach] recovery migration failed:', migrationErr);1118        }1119      }1120    }11211122    // If the payload had a pre-v2.11.0 shape (legacy passkey type, flat1123    // passkey fields, or pre-A-2 created/updated keys), rewrite it now so1124    // the next save uses the new format and migration doesn't re-run forever.1125    if (payloadA.migratedFromLegacy) {1126      await persistSlotA();1127    }1128    return true;1129  }11301131  if (payloadB && keyB) {1132    derivedKey = keyB;1133    void saveSessionKey(keyB, "decoy");1134    vaultMode = "decoy";1135    entries = payloadB.entries;1136    duressConfigured = false;1137    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1138    await loadSettings();1139    touchAutoLock();1140    if (keyA) zeroKey(keyA);1141    return true;1142  }11431144  if (keyA) zeroKey(keyA);1145  if (keyB) zeroKey(keyB);1146  // Surface corruption (good AES tag, broken schema) distinctly from1147  // wrong-password so the popup can offer history-restore (M7/COR-007).1148  if (resultA.status === "corrupted") {1149    lastUnlockFailureReason = resultA.reason;1150  } else if (resultB.status === "corrupted") {1151    lastUnlockFailureReason = resultB.reason;1152  }1153  return false;1154}11551156// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------1157// MV3 service worker session key — survives SW restarts within a browser session1158// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------11591160// chrome.storage.session is cleared on browser close; survives SW restart.1161// Firefox does not implement it (persistent background script, no restart risk).1162const SESSION_KEY_STORAGE = "peach_session_dk";11631164async function saveSessionKey(key: Uint8Array, mode: "real" | "decoy"): Promise<void> {1165  if (!chrome.storage.session) return;1166  await chrome.storage.session.set({ [SESSION_KEY_STORAGE]: { keyHex: hex(key), mode } });1167}11681169async function clearSessionKey(): Promise<void> {1170  if (!chrome.storage.session) return;1171  await chrome.storage.session.remove(SESSION_KEY_STORAGE);1172}11731174/**1175 * On SW restart, re-derive all in-memory vault state from the session key1176 * stored in chrome.storage.session (set at unlock time, cleared on lock).1177 * Returns true if the vault was restored, false if no session key was found.1178 * No-ops if the vault is already unlocked.1179 */1180export async function restoreFromSession(): Promise<boolean> {1181  if (derivedKey !== null) return true;1182  if (!chrome.storage.session) return false;1183  const stored = await chrome.storage.session.get(SESSION_KEY_STORAGE);1184  const entry = stored[SESSION_KEY_STORAGE] as { keyHex: string; mode: "real" | "decoy" } | undefined;1185  if (!entry?.keyHex) return false;11861187  const key = unhex(entry.keyHex);1188  const slotKey = entry.mode === "real" ? SLOT_A : SLOT_B;1189  const aadTag = entry.mode === "real" ? "slot_a_v1" : "slot_b_v1";1190  const slot = await loadSlot(slotKey);1191  if (!slot) { await clearSessionKey(); return false; }11921193  const result = await tryDecryptSlotResult(slot, key, aadTag);1194  if (result.status !== "ok") { await clearSessionKey(); return false; }11951196  derivedKey = key;1197  vaultMode = entry.mode;1198  entries = result.payload.entries;1199  duressConfigured = entry.mode === "real" ? result.payload.duressConfigured : false;1200  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1201  await loadSettings();1202  touchAutoLock();12031204  if (entry.mode === "real" && slot.recovery_salt && slot.recovery_wrapped_root_key) {1205    try { rootKey = await deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(key, slot); } catch { /* non-fatal */ }1206  }12071208  return true;1209}12101211export function lock(): void {1212  void clearSessionKey();1213  if (derivedKey) {1214    zeroKey(derivedKey);1215    derivedKey = null;1216  }1217  if (rootKey) {1218    rootKey.fill(0);1219    rootKey = null;1220  }12211222  entries = [];1223  domainIndex = new Map();1224  vaultMode = "real";1225  duressConfigured = false;1226  clearAutoLock();1227}12281229export function isUnlocked(): boolean {1230  return derivedKey !== null;1231}12321233// Opens the vault using a pre-derived AES-256 key (skipping Argon2id).1234// Used by Android biometric unlock — the key was derived on the native side.1235export async function unlockWithKey(1236  masterKeyHex: string,1237): Promise<{ ok: true; entries: VaultEntry[] } | { ok: false; error: string }> {1238  try {1239    const masterKeyBytes = unhex(masterKeyHex);1240    const stored = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1241    if (!stored) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };1242    const payload = await tryDecryptSlot(stored, masterKeyBytes, "slot_a_v1");1243    if (!payload) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };12441245    derivedKey = masterKeyBytes;1246    vaultMode = "real";1247    entries = payload.entries;1248    duressConfigured = payload.duressConfigured;1249    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1250    await loadSettings();1251    touchAutoLock();1252    return { ok: true, entries };1253  } catch {1254    return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };1255  }1256}12571258/**1259 * Restore the vault from a parsed Peach Codex payload.1260 *1261 * The supplied passphrase is verified against the Codex's slotA *before* any1262 * storage mutation — wrong passphrases return without touching disk. On1263 * success, the current vault state is snapshotted (reason: "restore") so the1264 * user can revert via Settings -> Vault History, then slotA/slotB are written1265 * and `peach_last_modified_at` is set to the Codex's recorded timestamp. A1266 * regular `unlock()` follows so the rest of the SW sees the standard1267 * post-unlock state.1268 *1269 * Intentionally non-Pro-gated — see peach_codex_v2.md "Pro gating". A Codex1270 * printed by a Pro user must always be restorable, even on a free device.1271 *1272 * Timing is not held constant here (in contrast to `unlock`): the Codex flow1273 * is an explicit user action with a known passphrase, not a passive lock1274 * screen, so the duress-vs-real timing side channel does not apply.1275 */1276export async function unlockFromCodex(params: {1277  slotA: string; // JSON string of StoredVault for slot A1278  slotB: string | null; // JSON string of StoredVault for slot B, or null1279  timestamp: number;1280  masterPassphrase: string;1281}): Promise<1282  | { ok: true; entryCount: number }1283  | { ok: false; reason: "wrong_passphrase" | "invalid_slot_format" }1284> {1285  let parsedSlotA: StoredVault;1286  let parsedSlotB: StoredVault | null = null;1287  try {1288    const rawA = JSON.parse(params.slotA) as unknown;1289    if (!hasValidVaultSchema(rawA)) {1290      return { ok: false, reason: "invalid_slot_format" };1291    }1292    parsedSlotA = rawA;1293    if (params.slotB !== null) {1294      const rawB = JSON.parse(params.slotB) as unknown;1295      if (!hasValidVaultSchema(rawB)) {1296        return { ok: false, reason: "invalid_slot_format" };1297      }1298      parsedSlotB = rawB;1299    }1300  } catch {1301    return { ok: false, reason: "invalid_slot_format" };1302  }13031304  // Verify the passphrase against the supplied slotA WITHOUT writing anything.1305  // If this fails the on-disk vault is left completely untouched.1306  const trialKey = await deriveKey(params.masterPassphrase, unhex(parsedSlotA.salt));1307  const trialPayload = await tryDecryptSlot(parsedSlotA, trialKey, "slot_a_v1");1308  if (!trialPayload) {1309    zeroKey(trialKey);1310    return { ok: false, reason: "wrong_passphrase" };1311  }1312  // Drop the trial key; `unlock()` below derives its own copy. Holding two1313  // copies of the master key in memory at once would be a needless surface.1314  zeroKey(trialKey);13151316  // Snapshot the about-to-be-overwritten on-disk state so the user can revert1317  // a mistaken Codex restore via the Vault History UI. Non-fatal if it fails.1318  await takeVaultSnapshot("restore");13191320  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, parsedSlotA);1321  if (parsedSlotB) {1322    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, parsedSlotB);1323  } else {1324    // Slot B must always exist with ciphertext length matching slot A1325    // (Projects.md §3.2). Codex prints may omit slot B (duress wasn't1326    // configured); regenerate noise to satisfy the invariant.1327    await writeSlot(1328      SLOT_B,1329      generateNoiseBlob(parsedSlotA.ciphertext.length / 2),1330    );1331  }1332  await chrome.storage.local.set({1333    peach_last_modified_at: String(params.timestamp),1334  });13351336  // Standard unlock path so domain index, settings, auto-lock, and1337  // recovery-key state all populate exactly as a normal unlock would.1338  const ok = await unlock(params.masterPassphrase);1339  if (!ok) {1340    // Should be unreachable — we just verified the passphrase against the1341    // same slotA we wrote. Treat as wrong_passphrase to keep the contract1342    // simple if some race or storage anomaly intrudes.1343    return { ok: false, reason: "wrong_passphrase" };1344  }1345  return { ok: true, entryCount: getEntries().length };1346}13471348// Returns the current in-memory derived key as a hex string.1349// Used by the biometric enable flow in Settings to store the key in Android Keystore.1350export function getDerivedKeyHex(): string {1351  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_not_unlocked");1352  return hex(derivedKey);1353}13541355/**1356 * Returns the vault's stable root key as hex, or null when locked / not yet1357 * populated. The root key is random per-vault, generated at creation, escrowed1358 * under the recovery words, and re-wrapped (not regenerated) on every password1359 * change — so it is INVARIANT across password rotation, unlike getDerivedKeyHex.1360 *1361 * This is the correct input for sync identity derivation (vault_id, the Noise1362 * XX static key, the Ed25519 manifest signing key, and per-entry envelope1363 * keys): paired devices keep the same identity and can still decrypt each1364 * other's entries after either side rotates its master password (SEV-2-B).1365 *1366 * Returns null rather than throwing so sync callers degrade to VAULT_LOCKED1367 * instead of crashing; rootKey is populated on every real-mode unlock via1368 * deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey / migrateToRecovery.1369 */1370export function getRootKeyHex(): string | null {1371  return rootKey ? hex(rootKey) : null;1372}13731374export function getEntries(): VaultEntry[] {1375  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1376  return entries.filter((entry) => !entry.deletedAt);1377}13781379const EMAIL_RE = /^[^\s@]+@[^\s@]+\.[^\s@]+$/;13801381export function getIdentities(): SavedIdentity[] {1382  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1383  const active = entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt && e.type === "login");13841385  const emailMap = new Map<string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }>();1386  const usernameMap = new Map<string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }>();13871388  for (const entry of active) {1389    const domain = extractDomain(entry.url ?? "") ?? "";1390    const modifiedAt = entry.modifiedAt ?? entry.createdAt ?? 0;13911392    function tally(map: Map<string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }>, v: string) {1393      const existing = map.get(v);1394      if (!existing || modifiedAt > existing.lastUsed) {1395        map.set(v, { lastUsed: modifiedAt, count: (existing?.count ?? 0) + 1, domain });1396      } else {1397        map.set(v, { ...existing, count: existing.count + 1 });1398      }1399    }14001401    const uVal = entry.username?.trim();1402    if (uVal) tally(EMAIL_RE.test(uVal) ? emailMap : usernameMap, uVal);14031404    // Also count the dedicated email field — entries created via the inline1405    // popup new-entry form store email here rather than in username.1406    const eVal = entry.email?.trim();1407    if (eVal) tally(emailMap, eVal);1408  }14091410  const toIdentity = (type: "email" | "username") =>1411    ([value, d]: [string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }]): SavedIdentity => ({1412      value, type, lastUsed: d.lastUsed, useCount: d.count, exampleDomain: d.domain || undefined,1413    });14141415  return [1416    ...[...emailMap.entries()].map(toIdentity("email")).sort((a, b) => b.useCount - a.useCount),1417    ...[...usernameMap.entries()].map(toIdentity("username")).sort((a, b) => b.useCount - a.useCount),1418  ];1419}14201421export async function batchAddEntries(drafts: EntryDraft[]): Promise<VaultEntry[]> {1422  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");14231424  const now = Date.now();1425  const added: VaultEntry[] = [];1426  for (const draft of drafts) {1427    try {1428      const sanitized = sanitizeEntryDraft(draft);1429      const nextEntry: VaultEntry = {1430        ...sanitized,1431        id: crypto.randomUUID(),1432        createdAt: now,1433        modifiedAt: monotonicEntryTimestamp(),1434      };1435      entries.push(nextEntry);1436      added.push(nextEntry);1437    } catch {1438      // Skip invalid drafts silently — caller can see diff between input and output length1439    }1440  }14411442  if (added.length > 0) {1443    await persistEntries();1444  }14451446  return added;1447}14481449/**1450 * Restore a set of entries in full fidelity — preserves id, createdAt,1451 * modifiedAt, and every other field unlike `batchAddEntries` which1452 * assigns fresh identity. Used by restore paths where the backup is the1453 * authoritative source of truth. `mode` controls how entries already in1454 * the vault are treated.1455 */1456export async function restoreEntries(1457  incoming: VaultEntry[],1458  mode: "replace" | "merge"1459): Promise<{ added: number; updated: number; skipped: number }> {1460  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");14611462  // A replace with zero incoming entries is almost certainly a caller bug1463  // (e.g. an import that silently dropped everything). Refuse rather than1464  // wipe the vault.1465  if (mode === "replace" && incoming.length === 0) {1466    throw new Error("refuse to replace with empty entry set");1467  }14681469  let added = 0;1470  let updated = 0;1471  let skipped = 0;14721473  if (mode === "replace") {1474    entries = [];1475    for (const entry of incoming) {1476      const normalized = sanitizeRestoredEntry(entry);1477      if (!normalized) {1478        skipped += 1;1479        continue;1480      }1481      entries.push(normalized);1482      added += 1;1483    }1484  } else {1485    const byId = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();1486    for (const e of entries) byId.set(e.id, e);14871488    for (const entry of incoming) {1489      const normalized = sanitizeRestoredEntry(entry);1490      if (!normalized) {1491        skipped += 1;1492        continue;1493      }1494      const existing = byId.get(normalized.id);1495      if (!existing) {1496        entries.push(normalized);1497        added += 1;1498      } else if (normalized.modifiedAt > existing.modifiedAt) {1499        const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === existing.id);1500        if (idx !== -1) {1501          entries[idx] = normalized;1502          updated += 1;1503        }1504      } else {1505        skipped += 1;1506      }1507    }1508  }15091510  await persistEntries("import");1511  return { added, updated, skipped };1512}15131514/**1515 * Validate + normalise a VaultEntry coming from a backup. Accepts1516 * anything structurally sound; keeps all metadata verbatim. Returns1517 * null for values the live vault shouldn't accept (e.g., missing title).1518 */1519function sanitizeRestoredEntry(entry: VaultEntry): VaultEntry | null {1520  if (!entry || typeof entry !== "object") return null;1521  const title = typeof entry.title === "string" ? entry.title.trim() : "";1522  if (!title) return null;1523  const id = typeof entry.id === "string" && entry.id ? entry.id : crypto.randomUUID();1524  const now = Date.now();1525  const createdAt = typeof entry.createdAt === "number" ? entry.createdAt : now;1526  const modifiedAt = typeof entry.modifiedAt === "number" ? entry.modifiedAt : createdAt;15271528  // Migrate legacy passkey shape on import (same logic as on-disk read).1529  // Imports from pre-v2.11.0 vault backups still carry type:"passkey" with1530  // flat fields; bring them into the new shape immediately.1531  const migrated: VaultEntry = migrateLegacyPasskey(1532    {1533      ...entry,1534      id,1535      title,1536      type: entry.type ?? "login",1537      createdAt,1538      modifiedAt,1539    },1540    entry1541  );15421543  // Login entries from backup must carry a password (or be passkey-only,1544  // in which case the passkey sub-object replaces the password requirement).1545  if (1546    migrated.type === "login" &&1547    !migrated.passkey &&1548    typeof migrated.password !== "string"1549  ) {1550    return null;1551  }1552  if (migrated.passkey && !migrated.passkey.credentialId) {1553    return null;1554  }15551556  return migrated;1557}15581559// Soft-deletes every non-deleted entry in one call. The literal string1560// argument is a tripwire against accidental calls — any caller that would1561// wipe the vault has to consciously type "REPLACE_ALL". Do not relax this1562// to a boolean.1563export async function clearVaultEntries(1564  confirmation: "REPLACE_ALL"1565): Promise<void> {1566  if (confirmation !== "REPLACE_ALL") {1567    throw new Error("clearVaultEntries requires explicit confirmation");1568  }1569  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1570  for (const entry of entries) {1571    if (!entry.deletedAt) {1572      const stamp = monotonicEntryTimestamp(entry.modifiedAt);1573      entry.deletedAt = stamp;1574      entry.modifiedAt = stamp;1575    }1576  }1577  await persistEntries();1578}15791580export async function addEntry(entry: EntryDraft): Promise<VaultEntry> {1581  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");15821583  const sanitized = sanitizeEntryDraft(entry);1584  const now = Date.now();1585  const stamp = monotonicEntryTimestamp();1586  const nextEntry: VaultEntry = {1587    ...sanitized,1588    id: crypto.randomUUID(),1589    createdAt: now,1590    modifiedAt: stamp,1591    // Stamp passwordChangedAt at creation so age tracking is accurate from1592    // day one. Non-login entries carry the same stamp harmlessly.1593    passwordChangedAt: sanitized.password ? stamp : undefined,1594  };15951596  // Clone-and-replace so a failed persist rolls back the in-memory state1597  // (COR-008). Without this, a quota-full or storage error leaves the1598  // module-level `entries` ahead of what's actually on disk.1599  const rollback = entries;1600  entries = [...entries, nextEntry];1601  try {1602    await persistEntries();1603  } catch (err) {1604    entries = rollback;1605    throw err;1606  }16071608  // Fire-and-forget breach check (only for login entries if breach monitoring is enabled or not set)1609  if (settings.breachMonitoring !== false && nextEntry.type === "login" && nextEntry.password) {1610    checkBreach(nextEntry.password).then(async (count) => {1611      if (count > 0) {1612        const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === nextEntry.id);1613        if (idx !== -1) {1614          entries[idx] = { ...entries[idx], breach: count, modifiedAt: monotonicEntryTimestamp(entries[idx].modifiedAt) };1615          await persistEntries();1616        }1617      }1618    });1619  }16201621  fireSyncTrigger("vault_change");16221623  return nextEntry;1624}16251626export async function updateEntry(1627  id: string,1628  patch: Partial<VaultEntry>1629): Promise<void> {1630  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");16311632  const idx = entries.findIndex((entry) => entry.id === id);1633  if (idx === -1 || entries[idx].deletedAt) {1634    throw new Error("entry_not_found");1635  }16361637  const current = entries[idx];1638  const sanitizedPatch = sanitizeEntryPatch(patch);1639  // Refresh passwordChangedAt only when the password value actually changes —1640  // a metadata-only update (title, tags, etc.) must not reset the age clock1641  // that drives the Pro health rotation recommendation.1642  const passwordChanged =1643    "password" in patch &&1644    typeof sanitizedPatch.password === "string" &&1645    sanitizedPatch.password !== current.password;1646  const stamp = monotonicEntryTimestamp(current.modifiedAt);1647  entries[idx] = {1648    ...current,1649    ...sanitizedPatch,1650    modifiedAt: stamp,1651    ...(passwordChanged ? { passwordChangedAt: stamp } : {}),1652  };1653165416551656  // Card entries must retain their card number1657  if (entries[idx].type === "card" && !entries[idx].cardNumber) {1658    entries[idx] = current;1659    throw new Error("card number is required for card entries");1660  }16611662  // Roll the in-memory entry back to its pre-edit state if the disk write1663  // fails (e.g. storage quota). Without this the module-level `entries` array1664  // would hold an edit that never landed on disk, diverging from the vault1665  // until the next unlock silently reverts it (SEV-3-A). Mirrors addEntry.1666  try {1667    await persistEntries();1668  } catch (err) {1669    entries[idx] = current;1670    throw err;1671  }16721673  // Breach check when password changes: clear immediately so old breach doesn't linger,1674  // then async-check the new password and only re-set if it's also found.1675  if ("password" in patch && settings.breachMonitoring !== false && entries[idx].type === "login") {1676    entries[idx] = { ...entries[idx], breach: undefined };1677    await persistEntries();1678    const password = entries[idx].password;1679    if (password) {1680      checkBreach(password).then(async (count) => {1681        const i = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id);1682        if (i !== -1 && count > 0) {1683          entries[i] = { ...entries[i], breach: count, modifiedAt: monotonicEntryTimestamp(entries[i].modifiedAt) };1684          await persistEntries();1685        }1686      });1687    }1688  }16891690  fireSyncTrigger("vault_change");1691}16921693export async function deleteEntry(id: string): Promise<void> {1694  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");16951696  const entry = entries.find((item) => item.id === id);1697  if (!entry || entry.deletedAt) {1698    throw new Error("entry_not_found");1699  }17001701  // Tombstone timestamp must be strictly greater than the entry's last1702  // modification so the deletion wins LWW against any in-flight edit, even1703  // under clock skew (SEV-2-E).1704  const previousModifiedAt = entry.modifiedAt;1705  const stamp = monotonicEntryTimestamp(entry.modifiedAt);1706  entry.deletedAt = stamp;1707  entry.modifiedAt = stamp;1708  // Roll the tombstone back if the disk write fails, so a quota error doesn't1709  // leave the entry deleted in memory but alive on disk (SEV-3-A).1710  try {1711    await persistEntries();1712  } catch (err) {1713    delete entry.deletedAt;1714    entry.modifiedAt = previousModifiedAt;1715    throw err;1716  }1717  fireSyncTrigger("vault_change");1718}17191720export function getDeletedEntries(): VaultEntry[] {1721  if (!derivedKey) return [];1722  return entries.filter((e) => !!e.deletedAt);1723}17241725/**1726 * Returns the vault's monotonic version — the `peach_last_modified_at` value1727 * stamped on every user-initiated write. Remote (sync) writes do NOT advance1728 * this version so a sync round never cascades into a second outbound sync.1729 */1730export async function getVaultVersion(): Promise<number> {1731  try {1732    const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get("peach_last_modified_at");1733    const v = (raw as Record<string, unknown>).peach_last_modified_at;1734    if (typeof v === "number") return v;1735    if (typeof v === "string" && v !== "") {1736      const n = Number.parseInt(v, 10);1737      return Number.isFinite(n) ? n : 0;1738    }1739    return 0;1740  } catch {1741    return 0;1742  }1743}17441745/**1746 * Internal write variants — bypass `fireSyncTrigger` so the sync layer can1747 * apply entries without cascading into another outbound sync round.1748 *1749 * INVARIANT: callers must not pass entries whose IDs collide with existing1750 * active (non-deleted) entries unless the intent is an explicit overwrite.1751 * These functions do not validate field-level constraints (password required,1752 * card number required, etc.) — they are trust-the-caller paths for sync and1753 * test harness use only.1754 */1755export async function addEntryDirect(entry: VaultEntry): Promise<void> {1756  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1757  entries = [...entries, entry];1758  await persistEntries("sync_received");1759}17601761export async function updateEntryDirect(patch: VaultEntry): Promise<void> {1762  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1763  const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === patch.id);1764  if (idx === -1) throw new Error("entry_not_found");1765  entries[idx] = { ...entries[idx], ...patch };1766  await persistEntries("sync_received");1767}17681769export async function deleteEntryDirect(id: string, deletedAt: number): Promise<void> {1770  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1771  const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id);1772  if (idx === -1) throw new Error("entry_not_found");1773  entries[idx] = { ...entries[idx], deletedAt, modifiedAt: deletedAt };1774  await persistEntries("sync_received");1775}17761777/**1778 * Apply a batch of remote entries + tombstones from a chirp-sync peer.1779 * Last-write-wins by `modifiedAt`; a tombstone supersedes a live entry when1780 * `deletedAt > modifiedAt` on the local side. Mutates `entries` directly and1781 * persists with reason `sync_received` — does NOT fire the sync dispatcher, so1782 * applying a sync round cannot cascade into another outbound sync.1783 *1784 * `applied` counts entries that actually changed local state (new add,1785 * overwrite-by-newer, or new tombstone). `received` is the raw payload size1786 * the caller can surface in the sync result UI.1787 */1788export async function applyMergedRemoteEntries(1789  remoteEntries: VaultEntry[],1790  remoteTombstones: Record<string, number>,1791): Promise<{ received: number; applied: number; conflicts: number }> {1792  // DESIGN: last-write-wins is applied PER-ENTRY, not per-field. If two devices1793  // concurrently edit different fields of the same entry, the one with the1794  // newer modifiedAt wins the whole entry and the other device's field edits1795  // are dropped silently. This is the deliberate trade-off for a simple,1796  // conflict-free merge — per-field CRDT merge is out of scope. Guidance for1797  // users: edit a given entry on one device at a time.1798  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");17991800  const received = remoteEntries.length + Object.keys(remoteTombstones).length;1801  let applied = 0;1802  let conflicts = 0;18031804  const byId = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();1805  for (const e of entries) byId.set(e.id, e);18061807  for (const remote of remoteEntries) {1808    const sanitized = sanitizeRestoredEntry(remote);1809    if (!sanitized) continue;1810    const tombstoneTs = remoteTombstones[sanitized.id];1811    if (tombstoneTs !== undefined && tombstoneTs >= sanitized.modifiedAt) {1812      continue;1813    }1814    const local = byId.get(sanitized.id);1815    if (!local) {1816      entries.push(sanitized);1817      byId.set(sanitized.id, sanitized);1818      applied += 1;1819    } else if (sanitized.modifiedAt > local.modifiedAt) {1820      const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === local.id);1821      if (idx !== -1) {1822        entries[idx] = sanitized;1823        byId.set(sanitized.id, sanitized);1824        applied += 1;1825        if (!local.deletedAt) conflicts += 1;1826      }1827    }1828  }18291830  for (const [id, deletedAt] of Object.entries(remoteTombstones)) {1831    if (typeof deletedAt !== "number" || !Number.isFinite(deletedAt)) continue;1832    const local = byId.get(id);1833    if (!local) continue;1834    if (local.deletedAt && local.deletedAt >= deletedAt) continue;1835    if (deletedAt < local.modifiedAt) continue;1836    const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id);1837    if (idx !== -1) {1838      entries[idx] = { ...local, deletedAt, modifiedAt: deletedAt };1839      applied += 1;1840    }1841  }18421843  if (applied > 0) {1844    await persistEntries("sync_received");1845    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1846  }1847  return { received, applied, conflicts };1848}18491850export async function restoreEntry(id: string): Promise<void> {1851  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1852  const entry = entries.find((e) => e.id === id && e.deletedAt);1853  if (!entry) throw new Error("deleted entry not found");1854  delete entry.deletedAt;1855  entry.modifiedAt = monotonicEntryTimestamp(entry.modifiedAt);1856  await persistEntries();1857  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1858}18591860export async function purgeEntry(id: string): Promise<void> {1861  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1862  const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id && e.deletedAt);1863  if (idx === -1) throw new Error("deleted entry not found");1864  entries.splice(idx, 1);1865  await persistEntries();1866}18671868/** Permanently delete entries whose deletedAt is older than retentionMs. 0 = keep forever. */1869export async function purgeExpiredTrash(retentionMs: number): Promise<number> {1870  if (!derivedKey || retentionMs === 0) return 0;1871  const cutoff = Date.now() - retentionMs;1872  const before = entries.length;1873  entries = entries.filter((e) => !(e.deletedAt && e.deletedAt < cutoff));1874  const purged = before - entries.length;1875  if (purged > 0) await persistEntries();1876  return purged;1877}18781879export function queryDomain(domain: string): VaultEntry[] {1880  return domainIndex.get(domain) ?? [];1881}18821883export function getEntryById(id: string): VaultEntry | undefined {1884  return entries.find((entry) => entry.id === id && !entry.deletedAt);1885}18861887async function persistSlotA(1888  reason: VaultSnapshot["reason"] = "local_save",1889): Promise<StoredVault> {1890  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");18911892  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1893  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");18941895  // Snapshot the about-to-be-overwritten state BEFORE we mutate disk. Failures1896  // are swallowed by takeVaultSnapshot — history must never block a save.1897  await takeVaultSnapshot(reason);18981899  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured);1900  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");19011902  // Preserve existing recovery escrow fields.1903  const nextSlotA: StoredVault = {1904    ...slotA,1905    nonce,1906    ciphertext,1907    tag,1908    // recovery_salt and recovery_wrapped_root_key are already set from loadSlot1909  };1910  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, nextSlotA);19111912  // When duress is not configured, keep slot B size-matched with slot A by1913  // regenerating its noise. When duress IS configured, leave slot B alone —1914  // we don't have the decoy key to re-encrypt it. This is a known trade-off.1915  if (!duressConfigured) {1916    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2));1917  }1918  // Only advance the vault version for locally-originated writes. Entries1919  // applied from a sync peer ("sync_received") must NOT bump the counter —1920  // otherwise applying a remote round makes us look newer than the peer and1921  // triggers a redundant outbound sync, defeating the no-op optimisation1922  // and risking a ping-pong between two devices (SEV-2-C).1923  if (reason !== "sync_received") {1924    await stampLocalVaultMutation();1925  }19261927  return nextSlotA;1928}19291930async function persistSlotB(): Promise<void> {1931  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");19321933  const slotB = await loadSlot(SLOT_B);1934  if (!slotB) throw new Error("missing slot B");19351936  // Decoy plaintext always reports duressConfigured=false — the decoy user1937  // sees a clean slate.1938  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, false);1939  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKey, plaintext, "slot_b_v1");19401941  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, { ...slotB, nonce, ciphertext, tag });1942  await stampLocalVaultMutation();1943}19441945async function persistEntries(1946  reason: VaultSnapshot["reason"] = "local_save",1947): Promise<void> {1948  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");19491950  if (vaultMode === "decoy") {1951    await persistSlotB();1952  } else {1953    await persistSlotA(reason);1954  }1955  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1956}19571958function cleanAdditionalUrls(values: string[] | undefined): string[] | undefined {1959  if (!Array.isArray(values)) return undefined;1960  const seen = new Set<string>();1961  const cleaned: string[] = [];1962  for (const value of values) {1963    const trimmed = typeof value === "string" ? value.trim() : "";1964    if (!trimmed) continue;1965    const key = trimmed.toLowerCase();1966    if (seen.has(key)) continue;1967    seen.add(key);1968    cleaned.push(trimmed);1969  }1970  return cleaned.length > 0 ? cleaned : undefined;1971}19721973function sanitizeEntryDraft(entry: EntryDraft): EntryDraft {1974  const title = entry.title.trim();1975  // Accept legacy `type:"passkey"` drafts but rewrite to "login" — the new1976  // model is "any entry, optionally with a passkey sub-object." Imports and1977  // any in-flight callers from before v2.11.0 keep working without throwing.1978  let type: VaultEntry["type"] = entry.type ?? "login";1979  if (type === "passkey") type = "login";19801981  if (!title) throw new Error("title is required");19821983  if (entry.passkey) {1984    const p = entry.passkey;1985    if (1986      !p.rpId ||1987      !p.credentialId ||1988      !p.publicKeyCose ||1989      !p.userHandle ||1990      !p.userName ||1991      (p.algorithm !== -7 && p.algorithm !== -8)1992    ) {1993      throw new Error("invalid passkey credential");1994    }1995  }1996  if (type === "card") {1997    if (!entry.cardholderName?.trim() || !entry.cardNumber?.trim()) {1998      throw new Error("cardholder name and card number are required");1999    }2000  }20012002  return {2003    type,2004    title,2005    username: type === "login" ? entry.username?.trim() ?? "" : undefined,2006    email: type === "login" ? entry.email?.trim() || undefined : undefined,2007    password: type === "login" ? entry.password : undefined,2008    url: type === "login" ? entry.url?.trim() ?? "" : undefined,2009    additionalUrls: type === "login" ? cleanAdditionalUrls(entry.additionalUrls) : undefined,2010    totp: type === "login" ? entry.totp?.trim() || undefined : undefined,2011    notes: entry.notes?.trim() || undefined,2012    breach: type === "login" ? entry.breach : undefined,2013    canary: type === "login" ? entry.canary : undefined,2014    tags: entry.tags,2015    passkey: entry.passkey,2016    cardholderName: type === "card" ? entry.cardholderName?.trim() : undefined,2017    cardNumber: type === "card" ? entry.cardNumber?.trim() : undefined,2018    expMonth: type === "card" ? entry.expMonth?.trim() : undefined,2019    expYear: type === "card" ? entry.expYear?.trim() : undefined,2020    cvc: type === "card" ? entry.cvc?.trim() : undefined,2021    cardNickname: type === "card" ? entry.cardNickname?.trim() || undefined : undefined,2022    network: type === "card" ? entry.network : undefined,2023    last4: type === "card" ? entry.last4?.trim() : undefined,2024  };2025}20262027function sanitizeEntryPatch(patch: Partial<VaultEntry>): Partial<VaultEntry> {2028  const nextPatch: Partial<VaultEntry> = {};20292030  if ("type" in patch) {2031    nextPatch.type = patch.type;2032  }20332034  if ("title" in patch) {2035    const title = patch.title?.trim() ?? "";2036    if (!title) throw new Error("title is required");2037    nextPatch.title = title;2038  }20392040  if ("url" in patch) {2041    nextPatch.url = patch.url?.trim() ?? "";2042  }20432044  if ("additionalUrls" in patch) {2045    const incoming = Array.isArray(patch.additionalUrls) ? patch.additionalUrls : [];2046    const seen = new Set<string>();2047    const cleaned: string[] = [];2048    for (const value of incoming) {2049      const trimmed = typeof value === "string" ? value.trim() : "";2050      if (!trimmed) continue;2051      const key = trimmed.toLowerCase();2052      if (seen.has(key)) continue;2053      seen.add(key);2054      cleaned.push(trimmed);2055    }2056    nextPatch.additionalUrls = cleaned.length > 0 ? cleaned : undefined;2057  }20582059  if ("username" in patch) {2060    nextPatch.username = patch.username?.trim() ?? "";2061  }20622063  if ("email" in patch) {2064    nextPatch.email = patch.email?.trim() || undefined;2065  }20662067  if ("password" in patch) {2068    const password = patch.password ?? "";2069    // Allow clearing a password (e.g. on passkey-only entries)2070    nextPatch.password = password || undefined;2071  }20722073  if ("totp" in patch) {2074    nextPatch.totp = patch.totp?.trim() || undefined;2075  }20762077  if ("notes" in patch) {2078    nextPatch.notes = patch.notes?.trim() || undefined;2079  }20802081  if ("breach" in patch) {2082    nextPatch.breach = patch.breach;2083  }20842085  if ("canary" in patch) {2086    nextPatch.canary = patch.canary;2087  }20882089  if ("passkey" in patch) {2090    // Passkey sub-object replaces all the legacy flat passkey fields. A2091    // patch with `passkey: undefined` removes the credential from the entry2092    // (used by "remove passkey" without deleting the whole entry).2093    nextPatch.passkey = patch.passkey;2094  }20952096  if ("tags" in patch) {2097    nextPatch.tags = patch.tags;2098  }20992100  if ("cardholderName" in patch) {2101    nextPatch.cardholderName = patch.cardholderName?.trim() || undefined;2102  }2103  if ("cardNumber" in patch) {2104    const n = patch.cardNumber ?? "";2105    nextPatch.cardNumber = n || undefined;2106  }2107  if ("expMonth" in patch) {2108    nextPatch.expMonth = patch.expMonth?.trim() || undefined;2109  }2110  if ("expYear" in patch) {2111    nextPatch.expYear = patch.expYear?.trim() || undefined;2112  }2113  if ("cvc" in patch) {2114    nextPatch.cvc = patch.cvc?.trim() || undefined;2115  }2116  if ("cardNickname" in patch) {2117    nextPatch.cardNickname = patch.cardNickname?.trim() || undefined;2118  }2119  if ("network" in patch) {2120    nextPatch.network = patch.network;2121  }2122  if ("last4" in patch) {2123    nextPatch.last4 = patch.last4?.trim() || undefined;2124  }21252126  return nextPatch;2127}21282129function normalizeEntry(entry: VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry): VaultEntry {2130  const createdAt = "createdAt" in entry ? entry.createdAt : entry.created;2131  const modifiedAt =2132    "modifiedAt" in entry ? entry.modifiedAt : entry.updated;21332134  const base: VaultEntry = {2135    id: entry.id,2136    type: "type" in entry ? entry.type : "login",2137    title: entry.title,2138    username: entry.username,2139    email: "email" in entry ? entry.email : undefined,2140    password: entry.password,2141    url: entry.url,2142    additionalUrls:2143      "additionalUrls" in entry && Array.isArray(entry.additionalUrls)2144        ? entry.additionalUrls2145        : undefined,2146    totp: entry.totp,2147    notes: entry.notes,2148    breach: entry.breach,2149    // Preserve the password-age clock across lock/unlock. Without this the2150    // field is dropped on every decode and the advanced-health "aged password"2151    // signal silently resets to createdAt on each unlock (SEV-2-A).2152    passwordChangedAt:2153      "passwordChangedAt" in entry ? entry.passwordChangedAt : undefined,2154    canary: "canary" in entry ? entry.canary : undefined,2155    passkey: "passkey" in entry ? entry.passkey : undefined,2156    createdAt,2157    modifiedAt,2158    deletedAt: entry.deletedAt,2159    tags: "tags" in entry ? entry.tags : undefined,2160    cardholderName: "cardholderName" in entry ? entry.cardholderName : undefined,2161    cardNumber: "cardNumber" in entry ? entry.cardNumber : undefined,2162    expMonth: "expMonth" in entry ? entry.expMonth : undefined,2163    expYear: "expYear" in entry ? entry.expYear : undefined,2164    cvc: "cvc" in entry ? entry.cvc : undefined,2165    cardNickname: "cardNickname" in entry ? entry.cardNickname : undefined,2166    network: "network" in entry ? entry.network : undefined,2167    last4: "last4" in entry ? entry.last4 : undefined,2168  };21692170  return migrateLegacyPasskey(base, entry);2171}21722173/**2174 * v2.11.0 read migration. Pre-v2.11.0 passkey entries used `type:"passkey"`2175 * with flat top-level fields (rpId, credentialId, etc.). This converts them2176 * to the new shape — `type:"login"` with a `passkey` sub-object — so all2177 * downstream consumers can rely on the new model. The result is rewritten2178 * to disk on next vault save (hasLegacyShape detects the un-migrated case).2179 */2180function migrateLegacyPasskey(2181  base: VaultEntry,2182  raw: VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry2183): VaultEntry {2184  if (base.passkey) return base;2185  const flat = raw as Partial<VaultEntry>;2186  const isPasskeyType = base.type === "passkey";2187  const hasFlatPasskeyFields =2188    typeof flat.rpId === "string" &&2189    typeof flat.credentialId === "string" &&2190    typeof flat.publicKeyCose === "string" &&2191    typeof flat.userHandle === "string" &&2192    typeof flat.userName === "string";2193  if (!isPasskeyType && !hasFlatPasskeyFields) return base;2194  if (!hasFlatPasskeyFields) return base;21952196  const algorithm: -7 | -8 = flat.algorithm === -8 ? -8 : -7;2197  base.passkey = {2198    rpId: flat.rpId!,2199    rpName: flat.rpName ?? flat.rpId!,2200    credentialId: flat.credentialId!,2201    publicKeyCose: flat.publicKeyCose!,2202    privateKeyJwk: flat.privateKeyJwk,2203    userHandle: flat.userHandle!,2204    userName: flat.userName!,2205    userDisplayName: flat.userDisplayName ?? flat.userName!,2206    algorithm,2207    signCount: flat.signCount ?? 0,2208    aaguid: flat.aaguid ?? "",2209    backupEligible: flat.backupEligible === true,2210    backupState: flat.backupState === true,2211    lastUsedAt: flat.lastUsedAt,2212    browser: flat.browser,2213    transports: flat.transports,2214    createdAt: base.createdAt,2215  };2216  // Promote to "login" so the unified Entry view renders. Username gets2217  // populated from the passkey's userName so the entry is searchable in the2218  // existing autofill flow without a separate code path.2219  if (isPasskeyType) base.type = "login";2220  if (!base.username) base.username = flat.userName;2221  if (!base.url) base.url = `https://${flat.rpId}`;2222  return base;2223}222422252226// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------2227// Deduplication2228// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------22292230function entryDupeKey(e: VaultEntry): string {2231  if (e.type === "note") return `note|${e.title.toLowerCase()}`;2232  // Passkey-bearing entries dedupe by the credential's RP + user. Two logins2233  // on different sites that happen to share a username are still distinct;2234  // two passkey credentials for the same RP+user are duplicates regardless2235  // of any login fields they may also carry.2236  if (e.passkey) {2237    return `passkey|${e.passkey.rpId.toLowerCase()}|${e.passkey.userName.toLowerCase()}`;2238  }2239  return `login|${e.title.toLowerCase()}|${(e.url ?? "").toLowerCase()}|${(e.username ?? "").toLowerCase()}`;2240}22412242/** Returns the number of duplicate entries (those that would be removed). */2243export function countDuplicates(): number {2244  const best = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();2245  let dupeCount = 0;2246  for (const e of entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt)) {2247    const key = entryDupeKey(e);2248    const existing = best.get(key);2249    if (!existing) {2250      best.set(key, e);2251    } else {2252      dupeCount++;2253      // Keep the more recently modified one in the map2254      if ((e.modifiedAt ?? e.createdAt ?? 0) > (existing.modifiedAt ?? existing.createdAt ?? 0)) {2255        best.set(key, e);2256      }2257    }2258  }2259  return dupeCount;2260}22612262/**2263 * Soft-deletes duplicate entries, keeping the most recently modified copy of2264 * each group. Returns the number of entries moved to trash.2265 */2266export async function deduplicateEntries(): Promise<number> {2267  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");2268  // Dedup reshapes slot B permanently under the decoy key, which is2269  // forensically distinguishable from a freshly-seeded decoy vault. Refuse.2270  if (vaultMode === "decoy") {2271    throw new Error("deduplicate disabled in decoy mode");2272  }22732274  const best = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();2275  for (const e of entries.filter((en) => !en.deletedAt)) {2276    const key = entryDupeKey(e);2277    const existing = best.get(key);2278    if (!existing) {2279      best.set(key, e);2280    } else if ((e.modifiedAt ?? e.createdAt ?? 0) > (existing.modifiedAt ?? existing.createdAt ?? 0)) {2281      best.set(key, e);2282    }2283  }22842285  const keepIds = new Set(Array.from(best.values()).map((e) => e.id));2286  let removed = 0;2287  entries = entries.map((e) => {2288    if (!e.deletedAt && !keepIds.has(e.id)) {2289      removed++;2290      return { ...e, deletedAt: monotonicEntryTimestamp(e.modifiedAt) };2291    }2292    return e;2293  });22942295  if (removed > 0) await persistEntries();2296  return removed;2297}22982299// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------2300// Vault history — snapshot BEFORE every vault write so the saved blob is2301// what is about to be lost, not what was just written. Capped at 10. The2302// stored blobs are AES-256-GCM ciphertext under the master password, so2303// history adds zero security surface.2304// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------23052306const HISTORY_KEY = "peach_vault_history";2307const HISTORY_MAX = 10;23082309/**2310 * Snapshot the CURRENT on-disk vault state into history. Call this BEFORE2311 * overwriting peach_vault_a so the saved blob captures the about-to-be-lost2312 * state. Identical-to-most-recent blobs are skipped to avoid filling history2313 * with no-op writes.2314 */2315export async function takeVaultSnapshot(2316  reason: VaultSnapshot["reason"],2317): Promise<void> {2318  try {2319    const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get([SLOT_A, SLOT_B, HISTORY_KEY]);2320    const slotA = (raw as Record<string, StoredVault | undefined>)[SLOT_A];2321    const slotB = (raw as Record<string, StoredVault | undefined>)[SLOT_B];23222323    // Nothing to snapshot if the real slot doesn't exist yet (fresh install,2324    // pre-createVault). createVault skips snapshots intentionally — there is2325    // no prior state to preserve.2326    if (!slotA) return;23272328    const vault_a = JSON.stringify(slotA);2329    const vault_b = JSON.stringify(slotB ?? slotA);23302331    // Best-effort entry count: only meaningful when the in-memory state is2332    // unlocked AND in real mode. Decoy mode would leak the decoy entry2333    // count; locked mode has no entries to count. Both fall through to null.2334    let entryCount: number | null = null;2335    if (derivedKey && vaultMode === "real") {2336      try {2337        entryCount = entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt).length;2338      } catch {2339        entryCount = null;2340      }2341    }23422343    const existingRaw = (raw as Record<string, VaultHistory | undefined>)[HISTORY_KEY];2344    const history: VaultHistory = existingRaw && Array.isArray(existingRaw.snapshots)2345      ? existingRaw2346      : { snapshots: [] };23472348    // Deduplication: if the most recent snapshot has byte-identical blobs,2349    // skip — saves the same vault N times in a row would otherwise burn the2350    // entire history window with no recovery value.2351    const latest = history.snapshots[0];2352    if (latest && latest.vault_a === vault_a && latest.vault_b === vault_b) {2353      return;2354    }23552356    const snapshot: VaultSnapshot = {2357      id: crypto.randomUUID(),2358      savedAt: Date.now(),2359      reason,2360      vault_a,2361      vault_b,2362      entryCount,2363    };23642365    history.snapshots = [snapshot, ...history.snapshots].slice(0, HISTORY_MAX);2366    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [HISTORY_KEY]: history });2367  } catch (err) {2368    // Non-fatal — history must never block a save. A failed snapshot just2369    // means the user loses one rung of the safety ladder for this write.2370    // M4/QUA-006: log so the failure is visible; if it looks like a quota2371    // problem, notify the popup so the user can prune history themselves.2372    console.warn('[Peach] takeVaultSnapshot failed:', err);2373    if (String(err).includes('QUOTA') || String(err).includes('quota')) {2374      try {2375        await chrome.runtime.sendMessage({ type: 'VAULT_STORAGE_QUOTA_WARNING' });2376      } catch {2377        // popup may be closed; surfaced via console.warn above2378      }2379    }2380  }2381}23822383/** Wipe all vault history. Called by Panic / DESTROY_VAULT. */2384export async function clearVaultHistory(): Promise<void> {2385  try {2386    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [HISTORY_KEY]: { snapshots: [] } satisfies VaultHistory });2387  } catch {2388    // Non-fatal — DESTROY_VAULT also runs storage.local.clear().2389  }2390}23912392/** Read all snapshots, newest first, for the Settings vault history view. */2393export async function getVaultHistory(): Promise<VaultSnapshot[]> {2394  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get(HISTORY_KEY);2395  const history = (raw as Record<string, VaultHistory | undefined>)[HISTORY_KEY];2396  if (!history || !Array.isArray(history.snapshots)) return [];2397  return history.snapshots;2398}23992400/**2401 * Replace the on-disk vault with the chosen snapshot's blobs and lock the2402 * vault. The current state is itself snapshotted with reason 'restore' first2403 * so the restore is reversible. After this returns, the user must unlock2404 * with the password that matches the restored blob.2405 */2406export async function restoreVaultSnapshot(2407  snapshotId: string,2408): Promise<{ ok: true } | { ok: false; error: string }> {2409  const history = await getVaultHistory();2410  const snapshot = history.find((s) => s.id === snapshotId);2411  if (!snapshot) return { ok: false, error: "snapshot_not_found" };24122413  // Snapshot the about-to-be-replaced current state so the restore is2414  // reversible. takeVaultSnapshot is no-op when the most recent entry is2415  // byte-identical, so a restore-of-a-restore stays clean.2416  await takeVaultSnapshot("restore");24172418  let restoredA: StoredVault;2419  let restoredB: StoredVault;2420  try {2421    restoredA = JSON.parse(snapshot.vault_a) as StoredVault;2422    restoredB = JSON.parse(snapshot.vault_b) as StoredVault;2423  } catch {2424    return { ok: false, error: "snapshot_corrupt" };2425  }24262427  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, restoredA);2428  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, restoredB);2429  await stampLocalVaultMutation();24302431  // Lock so the user must prove they can decrypt the restored blob. If they2432  // restored a pre-password-change snapshot they discover it immediately at2433  // the lock screen rather than silently holding an inaccessible vault.2434  lock();24352436  return { ok: true };2437}24382439/**2440 * Change the master password. Re-encrypts slot A with a fresh salt + new2441 * derived key. Slot B (duress or noise) is left untouched when duress is2442 * configured — it uses an independent key derived from the duress password —2443 * and regenerated as noise when duress is not configured.2444 */2445export async function changePassword(2446  currentPassword: string,2447  newPassword: string2448): Promise<boolean> {2449  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") return false;24502451  // Verify current password before allowing any change2452  const valid = await verifyMainPassword(currentPassword);2453  if (!valid) return false;24542455  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);2456  if (!slotA) return false;2457  if (!rootKey) return false;24582459  // Derive fresh key from new password + new random salt2460  const newSalt = generateSalt();2461  const newKey = await deriveKey(newPassword, newSalt);24622463  // Re-encrypt the in-memory entries with the new key2464  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured);2465  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(newKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");24662467  // Pre-wrap root key under the new derived key. Recovery fields wrap rootKey2468  // under recovery words and remain untouched — recovery phrase keeps working2469  // across password changes (H4/COR-002).2470  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(newKey, rootKey);24712472  const finalSlotA: StoredVault = {2473    ...slotA,2474    salt: hex(newSalt),2475    nonce,2476    ciphertext,2477    tag,2478    ...pwRoot,2479  };24802481  // Snapshot the OLD-key blob before overwriting it. If the user later2482  // restores from this snapshot they will need the OLD password — the2483  // post-restore lock surfaces that immediately.2484  await takeVaultSnapshot("local_save");24852486  // Single atomic write: ciphertext, salt, and pw_root_* fields all land in2487  // one storage transaction. An SW kill before this point leaves the old2488  // slot intact; after this point everything tied to the new password is2489  // already on disk together (M6/COR-004).2490  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, finalSlotA);24912492  // Swap the in-memory key synchronously before any further await. If we2493  // threw between the Slot A write and this swap, the next persistEntries()2494  // would overwrite Slot A with old-key ciphertext, locking the user out.2495  zeroKey(derivedKey);2496  derivedKey = newKey;24972498  // Regenerate noise for slot B when duress is not in use. Runs after the2499  // key swap so a failure here is a disposable noise regeneration, not a2500  // lockout.2501  if (!duressConfigured) {2502    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2));2503  }2504  await stampLocalVaultMutation();25052506  return true;2507}