vault.ts

1/**2 * vault.ts — sole owner of vault state and chrome.storage vault keys.3 *4 * Every read/write of `peach_vault_a`, `peach_vault_b`, and `peach_settings`5 * goes through this module. No other file accesses those keys directly.6 * External callers reach vault operations via `messages.ts` — never by7 * importing from here cross-boundary (popup/content must not). Invariants8 * for the two-slot schema, unlock timing, and key/disk atomicity are in9 * Projects.md §3.2–§3.6.10 */1112import { deriveKey, deriveKeyRaw, generateSalt } from "../crypto/argon2";13import { extractDomain } from "../shared/domain";14import { clampSyncTimestamp } from "../shared/sync-limits";15import { recordSyncAlerts, type SyncAlert } from "./sync-alerts";16import {17  rootKeyToWords,18  wordsToRootKeyMaterial,19  deriveRecoveryKey,20} from "../shared/recovery-words";21import type {22  AccentColorName,23  Canary,24  LegacyVaultEntry,25  ManualSummonRecord,26  PasskeyData,27  SavedIdentity,28  StoredVault,29  VaultEntry,30  VaultHistory,31  VaultSnapshot,32} from "../shared/types";33import { decrypt, encrypt, zeroKey } from "./aes";34import { clearAutoLock, touchAutoLock } from "./alarms";35import { setRecoveryConfirmPending } from "./recovery-pending";3637type EntryDraft = Omit<38  VaultEntry,39  "id" | "createdAt" | "modifiedAt" | "deletedAt"40>;4142// Slot-neutral storage keys (v1.4.24+). Both slots always exist; slot B43// either holds the decoy vault (when duress is configured) or random noise44// that looks identical at rest. No external indicator is stored — duress45// configuration is recorded only inside the encrypted payload of slot A.46const SLOT_A = "peach_vault_a";47const SLOT_B = "peach_vault_b";4849// Legacy keys, migrated away on first access.50const LEGACY_MAIN = "peach_vault";51const LEGACY_DECOY = "peach_decoy_vault";52const LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG = "peach_duress";5354// Plaintext is padded to the next multiple of this size before encryption.55// This coarsens ciphertext-length leakage into 1 KiB buckets.56const PAD_BLOCK = 1024;5758// How many past passwords to retain per entry. Generous enough to be useful as59// a recovery aid while bounding the secret material we hold (and the ciphertext60// growth) for an entry whose password is rotated frequently.61const PASSWORD_HISTORY_MAX = 50;6263// When duress is configured, BOTH slots are padded to this fixed ceiling so64// their ciphertext lengths are identical and cannot reveal that a hidden decoy65// vault exists (audit MEDIUM — plausible-deniability leak). 256 KiB comfortably66// holds a very large vault (thousands of entries incl. passkeys). The decoy67// slot can't be re-encrypted on every real-vault save (the real session has no68// decoy key), so a fixed ceiling — rather than size-matching on each write — is69// what keeps the two slots equal. A real vault whose plaintext exceeds this70// would grow past the ceiling and re-expose the bit; that is an extreme,71// documented edge well beyond normal use.72const DURESS_SLOT_SIZE = 262_144;7374let derivedKey: Uint8Array | null = null;75// 32-byte random root key, separate from the derivedKey used for vault encryption.76// The root key is wrapped (encrypted) under the recovery key derived from the77// 12-word phrase. When the user changes their password, only the wrapping changes;78// the root key and recovery words remain stable.79let rootKey: Uint8Array | null = null;80let entries: VaultEntry[] = [];81let domainIndex: Map<string, VaultEntry[]> = new Map();82let vaultMode: "real" | "decoy" = "real";83// Cached post-unlock view of whether the real vault records that duress is84// configured. Only meaningful after a real-mode unlock; for decoy-mode unlock85// this stays false because we never see slot A's plaintext.86let duressConfigured = false;8788let migrationRan = false;8990// Set to a corruption reason during the last unlock() attempt when both slots91// decrypted but failed schema validation. Consumed and cleared by92// consumeLastUnlockFailureReason() so messages.ts can surface vault_corrupted93// distinctly from wrong-password (M7/COR-007).94//95// NOTE: module-level state — if vault.ts is ever moved to a worker context,96// this must be replaced with a structured return value from unlock() or a97// postMessage channel. The signal is invisible across module-instance98// boundaries.99let lastUnlockFailureReason: string | null = null;100101export function consumeLastUnlockFailureReason(): string | null {102  const r = lastUnlockFailureReason;103  lastUnlockFailureReason = null;104  return r;105}106107// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------108// Settings (persisted inside the encrypted vault store as a sidecar key)109// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------110111export type TextSize = "small" | "medium" | "large";112113export interface VaultSettings {114  accentColor?: AccentColorName;115  theme?: "dark" | "light";116  autoLockMinutes?: number;117  clipboardClearSeconds?: number;118  lockOnClose?: boolean;119  breachMonitoring?: boolean;120  passkeyProviderEnabled?: boolean;121  trashRetentionDays?: number;122  manualSummonDomains?: Record<string, ManualSummonRecord>;123  declinedCardFingerprints?: string[];124  /**125   * Text size scale for body copy and entry titles. Stops at "large" by126   * design — XL clips dense screens (Vault, Health) inside the fixed127   * 330×480 popup surface.128   */129  textSize?: TextSize;130  /**131   * When true, all entrance/exit transitions and ambient animations are132   * collapsed to instant. Honoured alongside the user's OS-level133   * `prefers-reduced-motion`.134   */135  reduceMotion?: boolean;136  /**137   * Android-only: when true, the master key is escrowed in AndroidKeyStore138   * and the lock screen offers biometric unlock. Toggled from Settings →139   * Security → Biometrics. Has no effect on desktop builds.140   */141  biometricsEnabled?: boolean;142  /**143   * User overrides for keyboard shortcuts. Keys are ShortcutAction names144   * (see src/shared/shortcuts.ts). Missing actions fall through to145   * DEFAULT_BINDINGS — `getActiveBindings(settings.shortcuts)` is the146   * canonical lookup. Storing only the deltas keeps the vault payload147   * small and lets default updates land for users who never rebind.148   */149  shortcuts?: Record<string, { key: string; ctrl?: boolean; meta?: boolean; shift?: boolean; alt?: boolean }>;150}151152let settings: VaultSettings = {};153154export function getSettings(): VaultSettings {155  return settings;156}157158export async function ensureSettingsLoaded(): Promise<VaultSettings> {159  await loadSettings();160  return settings;161}162163export async function updateSettings(patch: Partial<VaultSettings>): Promise<void> {164  await loadSettings();165  // LV-7: cheap insurance against prototype pollution if a future caller ever166  // feeds parsed external JSON here (native spread keeps __proto__ an own-167  // property today, but Object.assign-style consumers and JSON revivers have168  // been burned before).169  const safe = Object.fromEntries(170    Object.entries(patch).filter(171      ([k]) => !["__proto__", "constructor", "prototype"].includes(k),172    ),173  ) as Partial<VaultSettings>;174  settings = { ...settings, ...safe };175  await persistSettings();176}177178async function persistSettings(): Promise<void> {179  try {180    await chrome.storage.local.set({ peach_settings: settings });181  } catch (err) {182    throw mapStorageError(err);183  }184}185186function mapStorageError(err: unknown): Error {187  const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);188  if (/QUOTA_BYTES|quota/i.test(message)) {189    return new Error("STORAGE_QUOTA_EXCEEDED");190  }191  return err instanceof Error ? err : new Error(message);192}193194async function loadSettings(): Promise<void> {195  const result = await chrome.storage.local.get("peach_settings");196  settings = (result as { peach_settings?: VaultSettings }).peach_settings ?? {};197}198199// Fire-and-forget sync trigger after a committed vault write. Lazy200// dynamic import avoids a circular dependency between vault.ts and201// sync-trigger.ts (the trigger imports paired-devices, which only reads202// storage, but the lazy load also gives us a clean opt-out path in203// tests where sync-trigger has not been initialised).204function fireSyncTrigger(reason: "vault_change"): void {205  void import("./sync-trigger")206    .then((mod) => mod.triggerSyncIfReachable({ reason }))207    .catch(() => {208      /* sync trigger module not available — non-fatal */209    });210}211212// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------213// HIBP breach check (k-anonymity model)214// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------215216export async function checkBreach(password: string): Promise<number> {217  // HIBP k-anonymity API is keyed on SHA-1 prefixes — this is dictated by218  // the public API, not a security choice. Do not migrate to SHA-256 here.219  const encoder = new TextEncoder();220  const hashBuffer = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-1", encoder.encode(password));221  const hashHex = Array.from(new Uint8Array(hashBuffer))222    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))223    .join("")224    .toUpperCase();225226  const prefix = hashHex.slice(0, 5);227  const suffix = hashHex.slice(5);228229  try {230    const res = await fetch(`https://api.pwnedpasswords.com/range/${prefix}`);231    if (!res.ok) return 0;232    const text = await res.text();233    const match = text.split("\r\n").find((l) => l.startsWith(suffix));234    return match ? parseInt(match.split(":")[1], 10) : 0;235  } catch {236    return 0; // Network unavailable — don't block237  }238}239240export async function declineCardSaveOffer(last4: string, expMonth: string, expYear: string): Promise<void> {241  const fingerprint = await cardFingerprint(last4, expMonth, expYear);242  await loadSettings();243  settings = {244    ...settings,245    declinedCardFingerprints: [...(settings.declinedCardFingerprints ?? []), fingerprint],246  };247  await persistSettings();248}249250export async function isCardDeclined(last4: string, expMonth: string, expYear: string): Promise<boolean> {251  await loadSettings();252  const fingerprint = await cardFingerprint(last4, expMonth, expYear);253  return (settings.declinedCardFingerprints ?? []).includes(fingerprint);254}255256async function cardFingerprint(last4: string, expMonth: string, expYear: string): Promise<string> {257  const encoder = new TextEncoder();258  const buf = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", encoder.encode(`${last4}|${expMonth}|${expYear}`));259  return Array.from(new Uint8Array(buf).slice(0, 8))260    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))261    .join("");262}263264function hex(buf: Uint8Array): string {265  return Array.from(buf)266    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))267    .join("");268}269270function unhex(s: string): Uint8Array {271  const out = new Uint8Array(s.length / 2);272  for (let i = 0; i < s.length; i += 2) {273    out[i / 2] = parseInt(s.slice(i, i + 2), 16);274  }275  return out;276}277278// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------279// Root key generation and recovery word wrapping280// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------281282/**283 * Generate a random 32-byte root key and wrap it (AES-256-GCM) under a key284 * derived from the recovery word material via HKDF-SHA256. The wrapped blob285 * fields are stored in slot A alongside the password-wrapped ciphertext. The286 * root key itself is kept in memory for the session so getRecoveryWords() can287 * encode it without re-deriving.288 */289async function generateAndWrapRootKey(): Promise<{290  rawRootKey: string; // hex of the plaintext root key — caller stores in rootKey291  recoverySalt: string;292  wrappedRootKey: string;293  wrappedNonce: string;294  wrappedTag: string;295}> {296  const rootKeyBytes = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32));297298  // Derive the recovery key from the BIP39 words encoding of the root key.299  const words = await rootKeyToWords(rootKeyBytes);300  const wordMaterial = await wordsToRootKeyMaterial(words);301  const recoverySalt = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));302  const recoveryKey = await deriveRecoveryKey(wordMaterial, recoverySalt);303304  // Wrap the root key with the recovery key using AES-256-GCM directly.305  // We hex-encode rootKeyBytes so the plaintext is always valid UTF-8.306  const nonce = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));307  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(hex(rootKeyBytes));308  const raw = await crypto.subtle.encrypt(309    {310      name: "AES-GCM",311      iv: nonce,312      additionalData: new Uint8Array([1]).buffer as ArrayBuffer,313      tagLength: 128,314    },315    recoveryKey,316    encoded317  );318  // WebCrypto returns ciphertext || auth tag concatenated; split them.319  const rawU8 = new Uint8Array(raw);320  const ciphertext = hex(rawU8.slice(0, rawU8.length - 16));321  const tag = hex(rawU8.slice(rawU8.length - 16));322323  return {324    rawRootKey: hex(rootKeyBytes),325    recoverySalt: hex(recoverySalt),326    wrappedRootKey: ciphertext,327    wrappedNonce: hex(nonce),328    wrappedTag: tag,329  };330}331332/**333 * Unwrap the root key using recovery words. Called during recovery flow when334 * the user provides their 12-word phrase and a new password.335 * Exported for use by the RECOVER_WITH_WORDS message handler.336 */337export async function unwrapRootKeyForRecovery(338  wrappedRootKey: string,339  wrappedNonce: string,340  wrappedTag: string,341  recoverySaltHex: string,342  words: string[]343): Promise<void> {344  const wordMaterial = await wordsToRootKeyMaterial(words);345  const recoverySalt = unhex(recoverySaltHex);346  const recoveryKey = await deriveRecoveryKey(wordMaterial, recoverySalt);347348  // Decrypt and cache the root key. The root key bytes were hex-encoded before349  // encryption so the ciphertext is valid UTF-8. We inline the AES-GCM decrypt350  // here to avoid passing a CryptoKey to the string-based encrypt/decrypt helpers.351  // Each component is stored separately in the vault slot; decode them individually352  // so the nonce is always exactly the 12 bytes from wrappedNonce.353  const nonceRaw = unhex(wrappedNonce);354  const ciphertextRaw = unhex(wrappedRootKey);355  const tagRaw = unhex(wrappedTag);356  // Combine ciphertext and tag for AES-GCM (expects ciphertext||tag).357  // Use explicit ArrayBuffer allocations to satisfy TS BufferSource constraints.358  const nonceU8 = nonceRaw as unknown as Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>;359  const combined = new Uint8Array(ciphertextRaw.length + tagRaw.length);360  combined.set(ciphertextRaw, 0);361  combined.set(tagRaw, ciphertextRaw.length);362  const raw = await crypto.subtle.decrypt(363    { name: "AES-GCM", iv: nonceU8, additionalData: new Uint8Array([1]).buffer as ArrayBuffer, tagLength: 128 },364    recoveryKey,365    combined366  );367  const decryptedHex = new TextDecoder().decode(raw);368  rootKey = unhex(decryptedHex);369}370371/**372 * Re-wrap the cached root key under a new derived key (from the user's new373 * password). Called after password change and after recovery re-key so the374 * same recovery words continue to work with the updated password — and so375 * subsequent unlocks can rehydrate rootKey via deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey.376 *377 * recovery_* fields are intentionally not touched: those wrap rootKey under378 * the recovery words, which do not change when the password changes.379 */380export async function rewrapRootKeyForPassword(381  newDerivedKey: Uint8Array,382  _newSalt: Uint8Array383): Promise<void> {384  if (!rootKey) throw new Error("root key not set");385  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);386  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");387  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(newDerivedKey, rootKey);388  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, { ...slotA, ...pwRoot });389}390391/**392 * Change the vault encryption to a new derived key (already derived from393 * the user's new password). Used by RECOVER_WITH_WORDS and changePassword.394 * Caller is responsible for key swap and snapshot.395 */396async function reencryptVaultForNewKey(397  newKey: Uint8Array,398  slotA: StoredVault399): Promise<void> {400  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured, duressConfigured ? DURESS_SLOT_SIZE : 0);401  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(newKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");402  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, {403    ...slotA,404    nonce,405    ciphertext,406    tag,407  });408}409410/**411 * Full password change with an already-derived key (used after recovery).412 * Unlike changePassword(), this skips re-verification of current password413 * since recovery flow has already validated the user's identity via words.414 */415export async function changePasswordWithNewKey(416  newSalt: Uint8Array,417  newKey: Uint8Array418): Promise<void> {419  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);420  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");421  // reencryptVaultForNewKey must receive the updated salt so that subsequent422  // UNLOCK calls with the new password can re-derive the correct key.423  await reencryptVaultForNewKey(newKey, { ...slotA, salt: hex(newSalt) });424  if (derivedKey) zeroKey(derivedKey);425  derivedKey = newKey;426  // Refresh pw_root_* under the new key so deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey works427  // on the next unlock (H2/COR-006). If rootKey is missing — recovery flow428  // should have populated it — fall back silently rather than blowing up the429  // recovery path; migrateToRecovery will rehydrate on the next unlock.430  if (rootKey) {431    const slotAfter = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);432    if (slotAfter) {433      const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(newKey, rootKey);434      await writeSlot(SLOT_A, { ...slotAfter, ...pwRoot });435    }436  }437  if (!duressConfigured) {438    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(slotA.ciphertext.length / 2));439  }440  await stampLocalVaultMutation();441}442443// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------444// Salt generation --- exported so the RECOVER_WITH_WORDS handler can derive445// a new key after password reset without re-importing the crypto module.446// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------447448export { deriveKey, generateSalt };449450export async function loadSlotA(): Promise<StoredVault | null> {451  return loadSlot(SLOT_A);452}453454/**455 * Recover the session root key by AES-GCM-decrypting the pw_root_* fields456 * (a second wrapping of the root key under the password-derived key). This457 * is what makes GET_RECOVERY_WORDS work across lock/unlock cycles without458 * the user re-entering their recovery phrase: the same root key bytes —459 * and therefore the same 12 words — survive every unlock.460 *461 * Returns null when the pw_root fields are absent (pre-v2.12 vault that462 * hasn't been migrated yet) or when decryption fails (wrong derived key,463 * tampered ciphertext). On null the caller should fall through to464 * migrateToRecovery() to populate the fields.465 */466async function deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(467  derivedKeyBytes: Uint8Array,468  slotA: StoredVault,469): Promise<Uint8Array | null> {470  if (!slotA.pw_root_ciphertext || !slotA.pw_root_nonce || !slotA.pw_root_tag) {471    return null;472  }473  try {474    const rootHex = await decrypt(475      derivedKeyBytes,476      slotA.pw_root_nonce,477      slotA.pw_root_ciphertext,478      slotA.pw_root_tag,479      "pw_root_v1",480    );481    return unhex(rootHex);482  } catch {483    return null;484  }485}486487// AES-GCM-wrap rootKey under derivedKey for the pw_root_* fields. Returns the488// hex-encoded ciphertext/nonce/tag triple ready to embed in StoredVault.489async function wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(490  derivedKeyBytes: Uint8Array,491  rootKeyBytes: Uint8Array,492): Promise<{ pw_root_ciphertext: string; pw_root_nonce: string; pw_root_tag: string }> {493  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKeyBytes, hex(rootKeyBytes), "pw_root_v1");494  return {495    pw_root_ciphertext: ciphertext,496    pw_root_nonce: nonce,497    pw_root_tag: tag,498  };499}500501/**502 * For vaults created before v2.12 (no recovery_salt/recovery_wrapped_root_key),503 * generate the root key, wrap it under the recovery words, and persist the504 * recovery escrow into slot A. The caller must show the recovery words to the505 * user before calling this — once called, those words are the vault's recovery506 * path. This runs once, on the first unlock of an upgraded vault.507 */508export async function migrateToRecovery(): Promise<void> {509  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {510    throw new Error("vault must be unlocked in real mode");511  }512  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);513  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");514  const hasRecoveryEscrow =515    !!slotA.recovery_salt && !!slotA.recovery_wrapped_root_key;516  const hasPwRoot = !!slotA.pw_root_ciphertext && !!slotA.pw_root_nonce;517  if (hasRecoveryEscrow && hasPwRoot) return; // already done518519  // If recovery escrow already exists but pw_root doesn't, we cannot recover520  // the original rootKey without the user's words. The least-surprising path521  // is to rotate to a fresh root key — the user's old recovery words become522  // invalid but we surface peach_recovery_pending so the popup re-presents523  // the words. The unlock-path callers all set that flag.524  const { rawRootKey, recoverySalt, wrappedRootKey, wrappedNonce, wrappedTag } =525    await generateAndWrapRootKey();526  rootKey = unhex(rawRootKey);527528  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(derivedKey, rootKey);529  const nextSlotA: StoredVault = {530    ...slotA,531    recovery_salt: recoverySalt,532    recovery_wrapped_root_key: wrappedRootKey,533    recovery_nonce: wrappedNonce,534    recovery_tag: wrappedTag,535    ...pwRoot,536  };537  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, nextSlotA);538  await stampLocalVaultMutation();539}540541/**542 * Returns the 12 recovery words for the current session's root key.543 * Must be called while the vault is unlocked. Throws if recovery has not544 * been set up (pre-v2.12 vault that hasn't migrated yet).545 */546export async function getRecoveryWords(): Promise<string[]> {547  if (!rootKey) {548    throw new Error("recovery not set up — vault may need migration");549  }550  return rootKeyToWords(rootKey);551}552553async function loadSlot(key: string): Promise<StoredVault | null> {554  const result = await chrome.storage.local.get(key);555  return (result as Record<string, StoredVault | undefined>)[key] ?? null;556}557558async function writeSlot(key: string, vault: StoredVault): Promise<void> {559  try {560    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [key]: vault });561  } catch (err) {562    throw mapStorageError(err);563  }564}565566// Monotonic clock for per-entry modifiedAt / deletedAt timestamps. Guards the567// sync layer's last-write-wins merge against wall-clock regressions (NTP step,568// manual clock change, DST glitch): a backwards Date.now() must never produce569// an entry timestamp that's <= the entry's existing modifiedAt, or a genuine570// local edit would lose to a stale remote copy. The returned value is always571// strictly greater than both the entry's current modifiedAt and the previous572// call's result (SEV-2-E).573let lastEntryTimestamp = 0;574function monotonicEntryTimestamp(currentModifiedAt?: number): number {575  const base = Math.max(576    Date.now(),577    (currentModifiedAt ?? 0) + 1,578    lastEntryTimestamp + 1,579  );580  lastEntryTimestamp = base;581  return base;582}583584async function stampLocalVaultMutation(): Promise<void> {585  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get("peach_last_modified_at");586  const previous = Number(587    (raw as Record<string, unknown>).peach_last_modified_at,588  );589  const next = Math.max(590    Date.now(),591    Number.isFinite(previous) ? previous + 1 : 0,592  );593  await chrome.storage.local.set({594    peach_last_modified_at: String(next),595  });596}597598/**599 * One-shot migration from the pre-A-2 schema (peach_vault + peach_decoy_vault600 * + peach_duress flag) to the slot-neutral schema (peach_vault_a +601 * peach_vault_b). Runs at most once per session; safe to call repeatedly.602 */603async function ensureMigrated(): Promise<void> {604  if (migrationRan) return;605  migrationRan = true;606607  const keys = [LEGACY_MAIN, LEGACY_DECOY, LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG, SLOT_A, SLOT_B];608  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get(keys);609  const slotAExists = raw[SLOT_A] !== undefined;610  const slotBExists = raw[SLOT_B] !== undefined;611  const legacyMain = raw[LEGACY_MAIN] as StoredVault | undefined;612  const legacyDecoy = raw[LEGACY_DECOY] as StoredVault | undefined;613614  // Fresh install with nothing in storage — nothing to do; createVault() sets up both slots.615  if (!slotAExists && !legacyMain) return;616617  // Already migrated.618  if (slotAExists && slotBExists && !legacyMain && !legacyDecoy) return;619620  let didMigrate = false;621  if (legacyMain && !slotAExists) {622    await writeSlot(SLOT_A, legacyMain);623    didMigrate = true;624  }625626  // If slot B isn't set, populate it: use legacy decoy when present, else noise.627  if (!slotBExists) {628    const target = (legacyMain ?? raw[SLOT_A]) as StoredVault | undefined;629    if (legacyDecoy) {630      await writeSlot(SLOT_B, legacyDecoy);631      didMigrate = true;632    } else if (target) {633      await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(target.ciphertext.length / 2));634      didMigrate = true;635    }636  }637638  const toRemove: string[] = [];639  if (legacyMain) toRemove.push(LEGACY_MAIN);640  if (legacyDecoy) toRemove.push(LEGACY_DECOY);641  if (raw[LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG] !== undefined) toRemove.push(LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG);642  if (toRemove.length > 0) {643    await chrome.storage.local.remove(toRemove);644    didMigrate = true;645  }646  if (didMigrate) {647    await stampLocalVaultMutation();648  }649}650651// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------652// Padding + noise helpers653// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------654655/**656 * Pads the plaintext string with trailing spaces so that the encoded byte657 * length is a multiple of PAD_BLOCK. JSON.parse tolerates trailing658 * whitespace after a complete document, so the padding is transparent on659 * decode. Ciphertext length equals plaintext length plus a 16-byte tag.660 */661function padPlaintext(json: string, minBytes = 0): string {662  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(json);663  const bucket = Math.max(PAD_BLOCK, Math.ceil(encoded.length / PAD_BLOCK) * PAD_BLOCK);664  // minBytes lets the duress path force a fixed ceiling so both slots match.665  const target = Math.max(bucket, minBytes);666  const padLen = target - encoded.length;667  return json + " ".repeat(padLen);668}669670/**671 * Produces a StoredVault-shaped record filled with CSPRNG bytes. The672 * ciphertext length matches the given byte count. Because GCM ciphertext is673 * pseudo-random, this blob is indistinguishable at rest from a real674 * encrypted vault without the key.675 *676 * crypto.getRandomValues() caps each call at 65536 bytes (the Web Crypto677 * spec hard limit). Chunk the fill so vaults larger than that — common once678 * the user has dozens of entries or any passkey — don't throw.679 */680const CSPRNG_CHUNK = 65_536;681682function fillRandom(buf: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {683  for (let offset = 0; offset < buf.length; offset += CSPRNG_CHUNK) {684    const end = Math.min(offset + CSPRNG_CHUNK, buf.length);685    const chunk = new Uint8Array(end - offset);686    crypto.getRandomValues(chunk);687    buf.set(chunk, offset);688  }689  return buf;690}691692function generateNoiseBlob(ciphertextBytes: number): StoredVault {693  const salt = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));694  const nonce = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));695  const cipher = fillRandom(new Uint8Array(ciphertextBytes));696  const tag = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));697  return {698    version: 1,699    salt: hex(salt),700    nonce: hex(nonce),701    ciphertext: hex(cipher),702    tag: hex(tag),703  };704}705706// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------707// Encrypted plaintext envelope708// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------709710type VaultPayload = {711  entries: VaultEntry[];712  duressConfigured?: boolean;713};714715type DecryptedPayload = {716  entries: VaultEntry[];717  duressConfigured: boolean;718  /**719   * True when at least one entry in the on-disk payload had a legacy shape720   * (pre-v2.11.0 passkey type/flat fields, or pre-A-2 created/updated keys)721   * and got rewritten by normalizeEntry. The unlock path uses this to722   * persist the new shape immediately — without it, the migration would723   * re-run on every unlock and old shape never disappears from disk.724   */725  migratedFromLegacy: boolean;726};727728function encodePayload(entries: VaultEntry[], duress: boolean, minBytes = 0): string {729  const envelope: VaultPayload = { entries, duressConfigured: duress };730  return padPlaintext(JSON.stringify(envelope), minBytes);731}732733function rawNeedsMigration(raw: VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry): boolean {734  if ("created" in raw || "updated" in raw) return true;735  const flat = raw as Partial<VaultEntry>;736  if (flat.type === "passkey") return true;737  // Flat rpId without a passkey sub-object means pre-v2.11.0 schema.738  if (flat.rpId !== undefined && flat.passkey === undefined) return true;739  return false;740}741742function decodePayload(plain: string): DecryptedPayload {743  const parsed = JSON.parse(plain) as744    | Array<VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry>745    | VaultPayload;746747  const rawEntries = Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed : parsed.entries ?? [];748  const flatMigrationNeeded = rawEntries.some(rawNeedsMigration);749750  const normalized = rawEntries.map(normalizeEntry);751  const { merged } = mergePasskeyOnlyIntoLogins(normalized);752753  if (Array.isArray(parsed)) {754    return {755      entries: normalized,756      duressConfigured: false,757      migratedFromLegacy: true, // pre-A-2 array shape always needs save758    };759  }760761  return {762    entries: normalized,763    duressConfigured: parsed.duressConfigured === true,764    migratedFromLegacy: flatMigrationNeeded || merged,765  };766}767768/**769 * One-time consolidation pass run alongside the legacy passkey migration.770 *771 * Pre-v2.11.0 the Chrome passkey path always created a fresh `type:"passkey"`772 * entry per registration — so users who tested registration multiple times773 * accumulated several passkey-bearing entries for the same RP, and the774 * migration to the unified shape carried that duplication forward. This775 * pass collapses the duplicates:776 *777 *   1. Group passkey-bearing (and not deleted) entries by `passkey.rpId`.778 *   2. Within each group, the most recently-active credential wins (prefer779 *      lastUsedAt, fall back to passkey.createdAt, fall back to modifiedAt).780 *   3. If a NON-passkey login entry exists for that RP (matched by url or781 *      additionalUrls hostname), attach the winning passkey to it and782 *      soft-delete every passkey-bearing entry in the group.783 *   4. Otherwise, soft-delete every loser in the group, keeping the winner784 *      as a passkey-only entry.785 *786 * Soft delete (deletedAt) rather than splice — the trash flow keeps the787 * record around for retention and the user can restore if the heuristic788 * picked wrong. The `merged` flag goes back to decodePayload so the789 * unlock path persists the consolidated shape immediately.790 */791function mergePasskeyOnlyIntoLogins(entries: VaultEntry[]): { merged: boolean } {792  let merged = false;793  const now = Date.now();794795  const candidates = entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt && e.passkey);796  const byRpId = new Map<string, VaultEntry[]>();797  for (const e of candidates) {798    const rpId = e.passkey!.rpId;799    const list = byRpId.get(rpId);800    if (list) list.push(e);801    else byRpId.set(rpId, [e]);802  }803804  for (const [rpId, group] of byRpId) {805    if (group.length === 0) continue;806    group.sort((a, b) => {807      const aT =808        a.passkey!.lastUsedAt ?? a.passkey!.createdAt ?? a.modifiedAt ?? a.createdAt;809      const bT =810        b.passkey!.lastUsedAt ?? b.passkey!.createdAt ?? b.modifiedAt ?? b.createdAt;811      return bT - aT;812    });813    const winner = group[0]!;814815    // Look for a NON-passkey login entry matching this RP. Use the URL816    // hostname rather than a substring search so a "login.foo.com" entry817    // doesn't accidentally absorb a passkey for "foo.com".818    const loginTarget = entries.find((e) => {819      if (e.deletedAt || e.passkey || e.type !== "login") return false;820      if (e.url && extractDomain(e.url) === rpId) return true;821      for (const extra of e.additionalUrls ?? []) {822        if (extractDomain(extra) === rpId) return true;823      }824      return false;825    });826827    if (loginTarget) {828      loginTarget.passkey = winner.passkey;829      loginTarget.modifiedAt = now;830      for (const dup of group) {831        if (!dup.deletedAt) {832          dup.deletedAt = now;833          dup.modifiedAt = now;834        }835      }836      merged = true;837    } else if (group.length > 1) {838      for (let i = 1; i < group.length; i += 1) {839        const dup = group[i]!;840        if (!dup.deletedAt) {841          dup.deletedAt = now;842          dup.modifiedAt = now;843        }844      }845      merged = true;846    }847  }848849  return { merged };850}851852// Validates that a `StoredVault` record on disk has the field shape we expect853// before treating an AES-GCM decrypt success as a clean unlock. AES-GCM only854// authenticates the static VERSION_BYTE AAD, not the `version` field on the855// outer record — a corrupted `version: 42` slot still decrypts cleanly. This856// check surfaces that as `corrupted` (M7/COR-007) so the popup can offer a857// history-restore path instead of falsely reporting "wrong password".858function hasValidVaultSchema(v: unknown): v is StoredVault {859  if (typeof v !== "object" || v === null) return false;860  const r = v as Record<string, unknown>;861  return (862    r.version === 1 &&863    typeof r.salt === "string" &&864    typeof r.nonce === "string" &&865    typeof r.ciphertext === "string" &&866    typeof r.tag === "string"867  );868}869870export type TryDecryptResult =871  | { status: "ok"; payload: DecryptedPayload }872  | { status: "wrong_key" }873  | { status: "corrupted"; reason: string };874875// Exported solely for `unlockFromCodex` below, which needs to verify a876// supplied passphrase against a slotA blob *without* committing anything to877// storage. Keep this internal otherwise — callers crossing the messages.ts878// boundary should always go through `unlock` / `verifyMainPassword` so the879// constant-time invariants in Projects.md §3.4 are not bypassed.880export async function tryDecryptSlot(881  vault: StoredVault,882  key: Uint8Array,883  aadTag?: string,884): Promise<DecryptedPayload | null> {885  const res = await tryDecryptSlotResult(vault, key, aadTag);886  return res.status === "ok" ? res.payload : null;887}888889export async function tryDecryptSlotResult(890  vault: StoredVault,891  key: Uint8Array,892  aadTag?: string,893): Promise<TryDecryptResult> {894  if (!hasValidVaultSchema(vault)) {895    return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_slot_schema" };896  }897  let plain: string;898  try {899    plain = await decrypt(key, vault.nonce, vault.ciphertext, vault.tag, aadTag);900  } catch {901    return { status: "wrong_key" };902  }903  try {904    const parsed = JSON.parse(plain) as unknown;905    if (typeof parsed !== "object" || parsed === null) {906      return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_payload_shape" };907    }908    if (!Array.isArray(parsed) && !Array.isArray((parsed as VaultPayload).entries)) {909      return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_payload_shape" };910    }911    return { status: "ok", payload: decodePayload(plain) };912  } catch {913    return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_payload_json" };914  }915}916917// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------918// Core operations919// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------920921function buildDomainIndexSync(all: VaultEntry[]): void {922  domainIndex = new Map();923924  for (const entry of all) {925    if (entry.deletedAt) continue;926    if (entry.type === "note" || entry.type === "card") continue;927928    // An entry can match multiple sites via `additionalUrls`. Index each929    // hostname so `queryDomain` returns the entry regardless of which alias930    // the user is currently visiting. Dedupe per-entry so a single entry931    // never appears twice in one bucket.932    const domains = new Set<string>();933    const primary = extractDomain(entry.url ?? "");934    if (primary) domains.add(primary);935    for (const extra of entry.additionalUrls ?? []) {936      const d = extractDomain(extra);937      if (d) domains.add(d);938    }939    if (domains.size === 0) continue;940941    for (const domain of domains) {942      const bucket = domainIndex.get(domain) ?? [];943      bucket.push(entry);944      domainIndex.set(domain, bucket);945    }946  }947}948949export async function createVault(password: string): Promise<void> {950  await ensureMigrated();951952  const salt = generateSalt();953  derivedKey = await deriveKey(password, salt);954  entries = [];955  vaultMode = "real";956  duressConfigured = false;957  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);958959  // Generate and wrap the root key for recovery word escrow.960  const { rawRootKey, recoverySalt, wrappedRootKey, wrappedNonce, wrappedTag } =961    await generateAndWrapRootKey();962  rootKey = unhex(rawRootKey);963964  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured, duressConfigured ? DURESS_SLOT_SIZE : 0);965  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");966967  // Second wrapping of rootKey under derivedKey so future unlocks can rehydrate968  // it without recovery words (H2/COR-006).969  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(derivedKey, rootKey);970971  const slotA: StoredVault = {972    version: 1,973    salt: hex(salt),974    nonce,975    ciphertext,976    tag,977    recovery_salt: recoverySalt,978    recovery_wrapped_root_key: wrappedRootKey,979    recovery_nonce: wrappedNonce,980    recovery_tag: wrappedTag,981    ...pwRoot,982  };983  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, slotA);984985  // Matching-size noise blob for slot B, so a fresh install shows two986  // similarly-shaped records regardless of whether duress is ever set up.987  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2));988  await stampLocalVaultMutation();989990  touchAutoLock();991}992993export async function hasVault(): Promise<boolean> {994  await ensureMigrated();995  return (await loadSlot(SLOT_A)) !== null;996}997998/**999 * Returns whether the real vault has recorded that a duress passphrase is1000 * configured. Reliable only after a real-mode unlock — before unlock or in1001 * decoy mode, returns false because we cannot read slot A's plaintext.1002 */1003export async function isDuressEnabled(): Promise<boolean> {1004  return vaultMode === "real" && duressConfigured;1005}10061007export async function setupDuress(duressPassword: string): Promise<void> {1008  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {1009    throw new Error("vault must be unlocked in real mode");1010  }1011  await ensureMigrated();10121013  // Encrypt the decoy payload (empty entries) under the duress key. Pad to1014  // at least the current slot A ciphertext size so the two slots look the1015  // same at rest at setup time.1016  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1017  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");10181019  const decoySalt = generateSalt();1020  const decoyKey = await deriveKey(duressPassword, decoySalt);1021  try {1022    // Pad the decoy to the fixed duress ceiling. Slot A is re-encrypted to the1023    // same ceiling by the persistSlotA() call below (duressConfigured is now1024    // true), so both slots are exactly DURESS_SLOT_SIZE+tag at rest and their1025    // lengths cannot reveal that duress is configured (audit MEDIUM).1026    const plaintext = encodePayload([], false, DURESS_SLOT_SIZE);1027    const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(decoyKey, plaintext, "slot_b_v1");1028    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, {1029      version: 1,1030      salt: hex(decoySalt),1031      nonce,1032      ciphertext,1033      tag,1034    });1035  } finally {1036    zeroKey(decoyKey);1037  }10381039  // Re-encrypt slot A with the duressConfigured flag set to true. No external1040  // flag is written — the bit lives inside the encrypted envelope.1041  duressConfigured = true;1042  await persistSlotA();1043}10441045export async function disableDuress(): Promise<void> {1046  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {1047    throw new Error("vault must be unlocked in real mode");1048  }1049  await ensureMigrated();10501051  // Overwrite slot B with fresh noise that matches slot A's size. The slot1052  // remains occupied so its mere existence does not signal that duress was1053  // ever configured.1054  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1055  if (slotA) {1056    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(slotA.ciphertext.length / 2));1057  }10581059  duressConfigured = false;1060  await persistSlotA();1061}10621063// L14/COR-015: this function intentionally checks slot A (real vault) only.1064// A duress-mode user attempting changePassword is rejected earlier by the1065// vaultMode === 'decoy' check at changePassword. The real-vs-decoy1066// distinction here is by design — duress users cannot rotate the real1067// password by guessing it, and the asymmetry in error timing is acceptable1068// because duress mode is opt-in and the user knows their own decoy key.1069export async function verifyMainPassword(password: string): Promise<boolean> {1070  await ensureMigrated();1071  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1072  if (!slotA) return false;1073  const key = await deriveKey(password, unhex(slotA.salt));1074  try {1075    return (await tryDecryptSlot(slotA, key, "slot_a_v1")) !== null;1076  } finally {1077    zeroKey(key);1078  }1079}10801081export async function unlock(password: string): Promise<boolean> {1082  // LV-1: the normal path NFC-normalizes inside deriveKey. If that fails and1083  // the supplied password is not already in NFC form, the vault may have been1084  // sealed (pre-LV-1) with the raw, un-normalized bytes — retry with those.1085  if (await attemptUnlockWithDerive(password, deriveKey)) return true;10861087  const nfc = password.normalize("NFC");1088  if (password === nfc) return false; // ASCII/NFC password — no legacy form to try10891090  if (await attemptUnlockWithDerive(password, deriveKeyRaw)) {1091    // Heal: re-seal the real slot under the NFC-normalized key so every1092    // future unlock takes the normal path. Only the real vault is re-sealed;1093    // a non-NFC duress password keeps working through this fallback.1094    if (vaultMode === "real") {1095      try {1096        const newSalt = generateSalt();1097        const newKey = await deriveKey(password, newSalt);1098        await changePasswordWithNewKey(newSalt, newKey);1099      } catch (healErr) {1100        console.warn("[Peach] LV-1 NFC heal failed:", healErr);1101      }1102    }1103    return true;1104  }1105  return false;1106}11071108async function attemptUnlockWithDerive(1109  password: string,1110  derive: typeof deriveKey,1111): Promise<boolean> {1112  await ensureMigrated();11131114  // Load both slots in parallel. Both always exist post-migration; the1115  // parallel load and the parallel derivation below keep wall-clock time1116  // constant regardless of which slot's passphrase (real or decoy) the1117  // caller supplied, so a timing side channel cannot distinguish the1118  // duress path from the real-unlock path (DUR-002).1119  const [slotA, slotB] = await Promise.all([1120    loadSlot(SLOT_A),1121    loadSlot(SLOT_B),1122  ]);11231124  // Derive both keys in parallel, unconditionally.1125  const [keyA, keyB] = await Promise.all([1126    slotA ? derive(password, unhex(slotA.salt)) : Promise.resolve(null),1127    slotB ? derive(password, unhex(slotB.salt)) : Promise.resolve(null),1128  ]);11291130  // Attempt both decrypts in parallel. The Result variant lets us distinguish1131  // 'wrong_key' from 'corrupted' so callers can offer a history-restore path1132  // when a slot's schema is invalid even though AES-GCM authenticated (M7).1133  const [resultA, resultB] = await Promise.all([1134    keyA && slotA1135      ? tryDecryptSlotResult(slotA, keyA, "slot_a_v1")1136      : Promise.resolve({ status: "wrong_key" } as TryDecryptResult),1137    keyB && slotB1138      ? tryDecryptSlotResult(slotB, keyB, "slot_b_v1")1139      : Promise.resolve({ status: "wrong_key" } as TryDecryptResult),1140  ]);1141  const payloadA = resultA.status === "ok" ? resultA.payload : null;1142  const payloadB = resultB.status === "ok" ? resultB.payload : null;11431144  if (payloadA && keyA) {1145    derivedKey = keyA;1146    void saveSessionKey(keyA, "real");1147    vaultMode = "real";1148    entries = payloadA.entries;1149    duressConfigured = payloadA.duressConfigured;1150    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1151    await loadSettings();1152    touchAutoLock();1153    if (keyB) zeroKey(keyB);11541155    // slotA is non-null when payloadA is truthy (keyA was derived from slotA).1156    if (slotA) {1157      const needsRecoverySetup =1158        !slotA.recovery_salt || !slotA.recovery_wrapped_root_key;1159      if (!needsRecoverySetup) {1160        rootKey = await deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(keyA, slotA);1161      }1162      // Pre-v2.12 vault, or a vault whose pw_root_* fields haven't been written1163      // yet: generate the recovery escrow and seed pw_root_* so subsequent1164      // unlocks can rehydrate rootKey without the user's recovery words.1165      // Best-effort — a failure here must not block unlock.1166      if (needsRecoverySetup || !rootKey) {1167        try {1168          await migrateToRecovery();1169          if (needsRecoverySetup) {1170            // String "1" matches the popup's existing peach_recovery_pending1171            // check; surfaced so the user re-confirms recovery words after a1172            // legacy-vault unlock (H2/COR-006).1173            await chrome.storage.local.set({ peach_recovery_pending: '1' });1174          }1175        } catch (migrationErr) {1176          console.warn('[Peach] recovery migration failed:', migrationErr);1177        }1178      }1179    }11801181    // If the payload had a pre-v2.11.0 shape (legacy passkey type, flat1182    // passkey fields, or pre-A-2 created/updated keys), rewrite it now so1183    // the next save uses the new format and migration doesn't re-run forever.1184    if (payloadA.migratedFromLegacy) {1185      await persistSlotA();1186    }1187    return true;1188  }11891190  if (payloadB && keyB) {1191    derivedKey = keyB;1192    void saveSessionKey(keyB, "decoy");1193    vaultMode = "decoy";1194    entries = payloadB.entries;1195    duressConfigured = false;1196    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1197    await loadSettings();1198    touchAutoLock();1199    if (keyA) zeroKey(keyA);1200    return true;1201  }12021203  if (keyA) zeroKey(keyA);1204  if (keyB) zeroKey(keyB);1205  // Surface corruption (good AES tag, broken schema) distinctly from1206  // wrong-password so the popup can offer history-restore (M7/COR-007).1207  if (resultA.status === "corrupted") {1208    lastUnlockFailureReason = resultA.reason;1209  } else if (resultB.status === "corrupted") {1210    lastUnlockFailureReason = resultB.reason;1211  }1212  return false;1213}12141215// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------1216// MV3 service worker session key — survives SW restarts within a browser session1217// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------12181219// chrome.storage.session is cleared on browser close; survives SW restart.1220// Firefox does not implement it (persistent background script, no restart risk).1221const SESSION_KEY_STORAGE = "peach_session_dk";12221223async function saveSessionKey(key: Uint8Array, mode: "real" | "decoy"): Promise<void> {1224  if (!chrome.storage.session) return;1225  await chrome.storage.session.set({ [SESSION_KEY_STORAGE]: { keyHex: hex(key), mode } });1226}12271228async function clearSessionKey(): Promise<void> {1229  if (!chrome.storage.session) return;1230  await chrome.storage.session.remove(SESSION_KEY_STORAGE);1231}12321233/**1234 * On SW restart, re-derive all in-memory vault state from the session key1235 * stored in chrome.storage.session (set at unlock time, cleared on lock).1236 * Returns true if the vault was restored, false if no session key was found.1237 * No-ops if the vault is already unlocked.1238 */1239export async function restoreFromSession(): Promise<boolean> {1240  if (derivedKey !== null) return true;1241  if (!chrome.storage.session) return false;1242  const stored = await chrome.storage.session.get(SESSION_KEY_STORAGE);1243  const entry = stored[SESSION_KEY_STORAGE] as { keyHex: string; mode: "real" | "decoy" } | undefined;1244  if (!entry?.keyHex) return false;12451246  const key = unhex(entry.keyHex);1247  const slotKey = entry.mode === "real" ? SLOT_A : SLOT_B;1248  const aadTag = entry.mode === "real" ? "slot_a_v1" : "slot_b_v1";1249  const slot = await loadSlot(slotKey);1250  if (!slot) { await clearSessionKey(); return false; }12511252  const result = await tryDecryptSlotResult(slot, key, aadTag);1253  if (result.status !== "ok") { await clearSessionKey(); return false; }12541255  derivedKey = key;1256  vaultMode = entry.mode;1257  entries = result.payload.entries;1258  duressConfigured = entry.mode === "real" ? result.payload.duressConfigured : false;1259  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1260  await loadSettings();1261  touchAutoLock();12621263  if (entry.mode === "real" && slot.recovery_salt && slot.recovery_wrapped_root_key) {1264    try { rootKey = await deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(key, slot); } catch { /* non-fatal */ }1265  }12661267  return true;1268}12691270export function lock(): void {1271  void clearSessionKey();1272  if (derivedKey) {1273    zeroKey(derivedKey);1274    derivedKey = null;1275  }1276  if (rootKey) {1277    rootKey.fill(0);1278    rootKey = null;1279  }12801281  entries = [];1282  domainIndex = new Map();1283  vaultMode = "real";1284  duressConfigured = false;1285  clearAutoLock();1286}12871288export function isUnlocked(): boolean {1289  return derivedKey !== null;1290}12911292// Opens the vault using a pre-derived AES-256 key (skipping Argon2id).1293// Used by Android biometric unlock — the key was derived on the native side.1294export async function unlockWithKey(1295  masterKeyHex: string,1296): Promise<{ ok: true; entries: VaultEntry[] } | { ok: false; error: string }> {1297  try {1298    const masterKeyBytes = unhex(masterKeyHex);1299    const stored = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1300    if (!stored) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };1301    const payload = await tryDecryptSlot(stored, masterKeyBytes, "slot_a_v1");1302    if (!payload) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };13031304    derivedKey = masterKeyBytes;1305    vaultMode = "real";1306    entries = payload.entries;1307    duressConfigured = payload.duressConfigured;1308    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1309    await loadSettings();1310    touchAutoLock();1311    return { ok: true, entries };1312  } catch {1313    return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };1314  }1315}13161317/**1318 * Restore the vault from a parsed Peach Codex payload.1319 *1320 * The supplied passphrase is verified against the Codex's slotA *before* any1321 * storage mutation — wrong passphrases return without touching disk. On1322 * success, the current vault state is snapshotted (reason: "restore") so the1323 * user can revert via Settings -> Vault History, then slotA/slotB are written1324 * and `peach_last_modified_at` is set to the Codex's recorded timestamp. A1325 * regular `unlock()` follows so the rest of the SW sees the standard1326 * post-unlock state.1327 *1328 * Intentionally non-Pro-gated — see peach_codex_v2.md "Pro gating". A Codex1329 * printed by a Pro user must always be restorable, even on a free device.1330 *1331 * Timing is not held constant here (in contrast to `unlock`): the Codex flow1332 * is an explicit user action with a known passphrase, not a passive lock1333 * screen, so the duress-vs-real timing side channel does not apply.1334 */1335export async function unlockFromCodex(params: {1336  slotA: string; // JSON string of StoredVault for slot A1337  slotB: string | null; // JSON string of StoredVault for slot B, or null1338  timestamp: number;1339  masterPassphrase: string;1340}): Promise<1341  | { ok: true; entryCount: number }1342  | { ok: false; reason: "wrong_passphrase" | "invalid_slot_format" }1343> {1344  let parsedSlotA: StoredVault;1345  let parsedSlotB: StoredVault | null = null;1346  try {1347    const rawA = JSON.parse(params.slotA) as unknown;1348    if (!hasValidVaultSchema(rawA)) {1349      return { ok: false, reason: "invalid_slot_format" };1350    }1351    parsedSlotA = rawA;1352    if (params.slotB !== null) {1353      const rawB = JSON.parse(params.slotB) as unknown;1354      if (!hasValidVaultSchema(rawB)) {1355        return { ok: false, reason: "invalid_slot_format" };1356      }1357      parsedSlotB = rawB;1358    }1359  } catch {1360    return { ok: false, reason: "invalid_slot_format" };1361  }13621363  // Verify the passphrase against the supplied slotA WITHOUT writing anything.1364  // If this fails the on-disk vault is left completely untouched.1365  const trialKey = await deriveKey(params.masterPassphrase, unhex(parsedSlotA.salt));1366  const trialPayload = await tryDecryptSlot(parsedSlotA, trialKey, "slot_a_v1");1367  if (!trialPayload) {1368    zeroKey(trialKey);1369    return { ok: false, reason: "wrong_passphrase" };1370  }1371  // Drop the trial key; `unlock()` below derives its own copy. Holding two1372  // copies of the master key in memory at once would be a needless surface.1373  zeroKey(trialKey);13741375  // Snapshot the about-to-be-overwritten on-disk state so the user can revert1376  // a mistaken Codex restore via the Vault History UI. Non-fatal if it fails.1377  await takeVaultSnapshot("restore");13781379  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, parsedSlotA);1380  if (parsedSlotB) {1381    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, parsedSlotB);1382  } else {1383    // Slot B must always exist with ciphertext length matching slot A1384    // (Projects.md §3.2). Codex prints may omit slot B (duress wasn't1385    // configured); regenerate noise to satisfy the invariant.1386    await writeSlot(1387      SLOT_B,1388      generateNoiseBlob(parsedSlotA.ciphertext.length / 2),1389    );1390  }1391  await chrome.storage.local.set({1392    peach_last_modified_at: String(params.timestamp),1393  });13941395  // Standard unlock path so domain index, settings, auto-lock, and1396  // recovery-key state all populate exactly as a normal unlock would.1397  const ok = await unlock(params.masterPassphrase);1398  if (!ok) {1399    // Should be unreachable — we just verified the passphrase against the1400    // same slotA we wrote. Treat as wrong_passphrase to keep the contract1401    // simple if some race or storage anomaly intrudes.1402    return { ok: false, reason: "wrong_passphrase" };1403  }1404  return { ok: true, entryCount: getEntries().length };1405}14061407// Returns the current in-memory derived key as a hex string.1408// Used by the biometric enable flow in Settings to store the key in Android Keystore.1409export function getDerivedKeyHex(): string {1410  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_not_unlocked");1411  return hex(derivedKey);1412}14131414/**1415 * Returns the vault's stable root key as hex, or null when locked / not yet1416 * populated. The root key is random per-vault, generated at creation, escrowed1417 * under the recovery words, and re-wrapped (not regenerated) on every password1418 * change — so it is INVARIANT across password rotation, unlike getDerivedKeyHex.1419 *1420 * This is the correct input for sync identity derivation (vault_id, the Noise1421 * XX static key, the Ed25519 manifest signing key, and per-entry envelope1422 * keys): paired devices keep the same identity and can still decrypt each1423 * other's entries after either side rotates its master password (SEV-2-B).1424 *1425 * Returns null rather than throwing so sync callers degrade to VAULT_LOCKED1426 * instead of crashing; rootKey is populated on every real-mode unlock via1427 * deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey / migrateToRecovery.1428 */1429export function getRootKeyHex(): string | null {1430  return rootKey ? hex(rootKey) : null;1431}14321433export function getEntries(): VaultEntry[] {1434  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1435  return entries.filter((entry) => !entry.deletedAt);1436}14371438const EMAIL_RE = /^[^\s@]+@[^\s@]+\.[^\s@]+$/;14391440export function getIdentities(): SavedIdentity[] {1441  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1442  const active = entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt && e.type === "login");14431444  const emailMap = new Map<string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }>();1445  const usernameMap = new Map<string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }>();14461447  for (const entry of active) {1448    const domain = extractDomain(entry.url ?? "") ?? "";1449    const modifiedAt = entry.modifiedAt ?? entry.createdAt ?? 0;14501451    function tally(map: Map<string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }>, v: string) {1452      const existing = map.get(v);1453      if (!existing || modifiedAt > existing.lastUsed) {1454        map.set(v, { lastUsed: modifiedAt, count: (existing?.count ?? 0) + 1, domain });1455      } else {1456        map.set(v, { ...existing, count: existing.count + 1 });1457      }1458    }14591460    const uVal = entry.username?.trim();1461    if (uVal) tally(EMAIL_RE.test(uVal) ? emailMap : usernameMap, uVal);14621463    // Also count the dedicated email field — entries created via the inline1464    // popup new-entry form store email here rather than in username.1465    const eVal = entry.email?.trim();1466    if (eVal) tally(emailMap, eVal);1467  }14681469  const toIdentity = (type: "email" | "username") =>1470    ([value, d]: [string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }]): SavedIdentity => ({1471      value, type, lastUsed: d.lastUsed, useCount: d.count, exampleDomain: d.domain || undefined,1472    });14731474  return [1475    ...[...emailMap.entries()].map(toIdentity("email")).sort((a, b) => b.useCount - a.useCount),1476    ...[...usernameMap.entries()].map(toIdentity("username")).sort((a, b) => b.useCount - a.useCount),1477  ];1478}14791480export async function batchAddEntries(drafts: EntryDraft[]): Promise<VaultEntry[]> {1481  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");14821483  const now = Date.now();1484  const added: VaultEntry[] = [];1485  for (const draft of drafts) {1486    try {1487      const sanitized = sanitizeEntryDraft(draft);1488      const nextEntry: VaultEntry = {1489        ...sanitized,1490        id: crypto.randomUUID(),1491        createdAt: now,1492        modifiedAt: monotonicEntryTimestamp(),1493      };1494      entries.push(nextEntry);1495      added.push(nextEntry);1496    } catch {1497      // Skip invalid drafts silently — caller can see diff between input and output length1498    }1499  }15001501  if (added.length > 0) {1502    await persistEntries();1503  }15041505  return added;1506}15071508/**1509 * Restore a set of entries in full fidelity — preserves id, createdAt,1510 * modifiedAt, and every other field unlike `batchAddEntries` which1511 * assigns fresh identity. Used by restore paths where the backup is the1512 * authoritative source of truth. `mode` controls how entries already in1513 * the vault are treated.1514 */1515export async function restoreEntries(1516  incoming: VaultEntry[],1517  mode: "replace" | "merge"1518): Promise<{ added: number; updated: number; skipped: number }> {1519  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");15201521  // A replace with zero incoming entries is almost certainly a caller bug1522  // (e.g. an import that silently dropped everything). Refuse rather than1523  // wipe the vault.1524  if (mode === "replace" && incoming.length === 0) {1525    throw new Error("refuse to replace with empty entry set");1526  }15271528  let added = 0;1529  let updated = 0;1530  let skipped = 0;15311532  if (mode === "replace") {1533    entries = [];1534    for (const entry of incoming) {1535      const normalized = sanitizeRestoredEntry(entry);1536      if (!normalized) {1537        skipped += 1;1538        continue;1539      }1540      entries.push(normalized);1541      added += 1;1542    }1543  } else {1544    const byId = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();1545    for (const e of entries) byId.set(e.id, e);15461547    for (const entry of incoming) {1548      const normalized = sanitizeRestoredEntry(entry);1549      if (!normalized) {1550        skipped += 1;1551        continue;1552      }1553      const existing = byId.get(normalized.id);1554      if (!existing) {1555        entries.push(normalized);1556        added += 1;1557      } else if (normalized.modifiedAt > existing.modifiedAt) {1558        const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === existing.id);1559        if (idx !== -1) {1560          entries[idx] = normalized;1561          updated += 1;1562        }1563      } else {1564        skipped += 1;1565      }1566    }1567  }15681569  await persistEntries("import");1570  return { added, updated, skipped };1571}15721573/**1574 * Validate + normalise a VaultEntry coming from a backup, import, or sync1575 * peer. MV-6: this is a strict field WHITELIST — `normalizeEntry` copies1576 * only known VaultEntry fields (unknown/attacker keys are dropped), and1577 * nested `passkey`/`canary` shapes are rebuilt field-by-field, never1578 * spread. Returns null for values the live vault shouldn't accept.1579 */1580function sanitizeRestoredEntry(entry: VaultEntry): VaultEntry | null {1581  if (!entry || typeof entry !== "object") return null;1582  const title = typeof entry.title === "string" ? entry.title.trim() : "";1583  if (!title) return null;1584  const id = typeof entry.id === "string" && entry.id ? entry.id : crypto.randomUUID();1585  const now = Date.now();1586  const createdAt = typeof entry.createdAt === "number" ? entry.createdAt : now;1587  const modifiedAt = typeof entry.modifiedAt === "number" ? entry.modifiedAt : createdAt;15881589  // normalizeEntry whitelists every known VaultEntry field and runs the1590  // same legacy-passkey migration as the on-disk read path — pre-v2.11.01591  // backups with flat passkey fields still import correctly because the1592  // legacy flat fields are themselves whitelisted VaultEntry members.1593  const normalized = normalizeEntry({1594    ...entry,1595    id,1596    title,1597    type: entry.type ?? "login",1598    createdAt,1599    modifiedAt,1600  });16011602  if (normalized.passkey) {1603    normalized.passkey = sanitizePasskey(normalized.passkey);1604  }1605  if (normalized.canary) {1606    normalized.canary = sanitizeCanary(normalized.canary);1607  }16081609  // Login entries from backup must carry a password (or be passkey-only,1610  // in which case the passkey sub-object replaces the password requirement).1611  if (1612    normalized.type === "login" &&1613    !normalized.passkey &&1614    typeof normalized.password !== "string"1615  ) {1616    return null;1617  }1618  if (entry.passkey && !normalized.passkey) {1619    // Entry claimed a passkey but the shape didn't validate — refuse the1620    // whole entry rather than silently importing a credential-less husk.1621    return null;1622  }16231624  return normalized;1625}16261627/**1628 * Rebuild a PasskeyData object from untrusted input, field by field.1629 * Returns undefined when required fields are missing/mistyped — a rogue1630 * passkey credential must not activate via import (MV-6 attack scenario).1631 */1632function sanitizePasskey(pk: unknown): PasskeyData | undefined {1633  if (!pk || typeof pk !== "object") return undefined;1634  const r = pk as Record<string, unknown>;1635  if (1636    typeof r.rpId !== "string" || !r.rpId ||1637    typeof r.credentialId !== "string" || !r.credentialId ||1638    typeof r.publicKeyCose !== "string" ||1639    typeof r.userHandle !== "string" ||1640    typeof r.userName !== "string"1641  ) {1642    return undefined;1643  }1644  return {1645    rpId: r.rpId,1646    rpName: typeof r.rpName === "string" ? r.rpName : r.rpId,1647    credentialId: r.credentialId,1648    publicKeyCose: r.publicKeyCose,1649    privateKeyJwk:1650      r.privateKeyJwk && typeof r.privateKeyJwk === "object"1651        ? (r.privateKeyJwk as JsonWebKey)1652        : undefined,1653    userHandle: r.userHandle,1654    userName: r.userName,1655    userDisplayName:1656      typeof r.userDisplayName === "string" ? r.userDisplayName : r.userName,1657    algorithm: r.algorithm === -8 ? -8 : -7,1658    signCount: typeof r.signCount === "number" ? r.signCount : 0,1659    aaguid: typeof r.aaguid === "string" ? r.aaguid : "",1660    backupEligible: r.backupEligible === true,1661    backupState: r.backupState === true,1662    lastUsedAt: typeof r.lastUsedAt === "number" ? r.lastUsedAt : undefined,1663    browser: r.browser === "chrome" || r.browser === "firefox" ? r.browser : undefined,1664    transports: Array.isArray(r.transports)1665      ? r.transports.filter((t): t is string => typeof t === "string")1666      : undefined,1667    createdAt: typeof r.createdAt === "number" ? r.createdAt : Date.now(),1668  };1669}16701671/**1672 * Rebuild a Canary object from untrusted input. The webhook must be a1673 * well-formed HTTPS URL — a poisoned canary.webhookUrl is a standing1674 * exfiltration endpoint that the canary subsystem will POST entry titles1675 * to (MV-6 attack scenario). Invalid → the canary is dropped, not the1676 * entry. FIRE_CANARY_PING re-validates with the full SSRF guard at fire1677 * time (isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl), so this import-time check is the1678 * outer of two gates.1679 */1680function sanitizeCanary(c: unknown): Canary | undefined {1681  if (!c || typeof c !== "object") return undefined;1682  const r = c as Record<string, unknown>;1683  if (typeof r.webhookUrl !== "string") return undefined;1684  let url: URL;1685  try {1686    url = new URL(r.webhookUrl);1687  } catch {1688    return undefined;1689  }1690  if (url.protocol !== "https:") return undefined;1691  return {1692    webhookUrl: url.toString(),1693    label: typeof r.label === "string" ? r.label : undefined,1694    lastPinged: typeof r.lastPinged === "number" ? r.lastPinged : undefined,1695    pingCount: typeof r.pingCount === "number" ? r.pingCount : undefined,1696  };1697}16981699// Soft-deletes every non-deleted entry in one call. The literal string1700// argument is a tripwire against accidental calls — any caller that would1701// wipe the vault has to consciously type "REPLACE_ALL". Do not relax this1702// to a boolean.1703export async function clearVaultEntries(1704  confirmation: "REPLACE_ALL"1705): Promise<void> {1706  if (confirmation !== "REPLACE_ALL") {1707    throw new Error("clearVaultEntries requires explicit confirmation");1708  }1709  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1710  for (const entry of entries) {1711    if (!entry.deletedAt) {1712      const stamp = monotonicEntryTimestamp(entry.modifiedAt);1713      entry.deletedAt = stamp;1714      entry.modifiedAt = stamp;1715    }1716  }1717  await persistEntries();1718}17191720export async function addEntry(entry: EntryDraft): Promise<VaultEntry> {1721  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");17221723  const sanitized = sanitizeEntryDraft(entry);1724  const now = Date.now();1725  const stamp = monotonicEntryTimestamp();1726  const nextEntry: VaultEntry = {1727    ...sanitized,1728    id: crypto.randomUUID(),1729    createdAt: now,1730    modifiedAt: stamp,1731    // Stamp passwordChangedAt at creation so age tracking is accurate from1732    // day one. Non-login entries carry the same stamp harmlessly.1733    passwordChangedAt: sanitized.password ? stamp : undefined,1734  };17351736  // Clone-and-replace so a failed persist rolls back the in-memory state1737  // (COR-008). Without this, a quota-full or storage error leaves the1738  // module-level `entries` ahead of what's actually on disk.1739  const rollback = entries;1740  entries = [...entries, nextEntry];1741  try {1742    await persistEntries();1743  } catch (err) {1744    entries = rollback;1745    throw err;1746  }17471748  // Fire-and-forget breach check (only for login entries if breach monitoring is enabled or not set)1749  if (settings.breachMonitoring !== false && nextEntry.type === "login" && nextEntry.password) {1750    checkBreach(nextEntry.password).then(async (count) => {1751      if (count > 0) {1752        const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === nextEntry.id);1753        if (idx !== -1) {1754          entries[idx] = { ...entries[idx], breach: count, modifiedAt: monotonicEntryTimestamp(entries[idx].modifiedAt) };1755          await persistEntries();1756        }1757      }1758    });1759  }17601761  fireSyncTrigger("vault_change");17621763  return nextEntry;1764}17651766/**1767 * Run the passkey-merge pass on the live in-memory entries and persist if1768 * anything changed. Called immediately after any passkey registration so that1769 * a same-domain TOTP-only entry already in the vault gets consolidated right1770 * away instead of waiting until the next lock/unlock cycle.1771 */1772export async function consolidatePasskeyEntries(): Promise<void> {1773  if (!derivedKey) return;1774  const { merged } = mergePasskeyOnlyIntoLogins(entries);1775  if (merged) {1776    await persistEntries();1777  }1778}17791780export async function updateEntry(1781  id: string,1782  patch: Partial<VaultEntry>1783): Promise<void> {1784  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");17851786  const idx = entries.findIndex((entry) => entry.id === id);1787  if (idx === -1 || entries[idx].deletedAt) {1788    throw new Error("entry_not_found");1789  }17901791  const current = entries[idx];1792  const sanitizedPatch = sanitizeEntryPatch(patch);1793  // Refresh passwordChangedAt only when the password value actually changes —1794  // a metadata-only update (title, tags, etc.) must not reset the age clock1795  // that drives the Pro health rotation recommendation.1796  const passwordChanged =1797    "password" in patch &&1798    typeof sanitizedPatch.password === "string" &&1799    sanitizedPatch.password !== current.password;1800  const stamp = monotonicEntryTimestamp(current.modifiedAt);1801  // When the password actually changes, push the outgoing one onto the history1802  // (newest first) so the user can reveal/copy/restore it later. We record the1803  // age it carried (passwordChangedAt, falling back to createdAt) rather than1804  // `now`, so the list reflects when each password was last in effect. Only1805  // capture a non-empty prior value — clearing a password leaves no secret to1806  // keep, and we skip an immediate exact duplicate (e.g. restore-then-restore)1807  // to avoid noise.1808  const priorPassword = current.password;1809  const shouldCapture =1810    passwordChanged &&1811    typeof priorPassword === "string" &&1812    priorPassword.length > 0 &&1813    current.passwordHistory?.[0]?.password !== priorPassword;1814  const nextHistory = shouldCapture1815    ? [1816        { password: priorPassword!, changedAt: current.passwordChangedAt ?? current.createdAt },1817        ...(current.passwordHistory ?? []),1818      ].slice(0, PASSWORD_HISTORY_MAX)1819    : current.passwordHistory;1820  entries[idx] = {1821    ...current,1822    ...sanitizedPatch,1823    modifiedAt: stamp,1824    ...(passwordChanged ? { passwordChangedAt: stamp, passwordHistory: nextHistory } : {}),1825  };1826182718281829  // Card entries must retain their card number1830  if (entries[idx].type === "card" && !entries[idx].cardNumber) {1831    entries[idx] = current;1832    throw new Error("card number is required for card entries");1833  }18341835  // Roll the in-memory entry back to its pre-edit state if the disk write1836  // fails (e.g. storage quota). Without this the module-level `entries` array1837  // would hold an edit that never landed on disk, diverging from the vault1838  // until the next unlock silently reverts it (SEV-3-A). Mirrors addEntry.1839  try {1840    await persistEntries();1841  } catch (err) {1842    entries[idx] = current;1843    throw err;1844  }18451846  // Breach check when password changes: clear immediately so old breach doesn't linger,1847  // then async-check the new password and only re-set if it's also found.1848  if ("password" in patch && settings.breachMonitoring !== false && entries[idx].type === "login") {1849    entries[idx] = { ...entries[idx], breach: undefined };1850    await persistEntries();1851    const password = entries[idx].password;1852    if (password) {1853      checkBreach(password).then(async (count) => {1854        const i = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id);1855        if (i !== -1 && count > 0) {1856          entries[i] = { ...entries[i], breach: count, modifiedAt: monotonicEntryTimestamp(entries[i].modifiedAt) };1857          await persistEntries();1858        }1859      });1860    }1861  }18621863  fireSyncTrigger("vault_change");1864}18651866export async function deleteEntry(id: string): Promise<void> {1867  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");18681869  const entry = entries.find((item) => item.id === id);1870  if (!entry || entry.deletedAt) {1871    throw new Error("entry_not_found");1872  }18731874  // Tombstone timestamp must be strictly greater than the entry's last1875  // modification so the deletion wins LWW against any in-flight edit, even1876  // under clock skew (SEV-2-E).1877  const previousModifiedAt = entry.modifiedAt;1878  const stamp = monotonicEntryTimestamp(entry.modifiedAt);1879  entry.deletedAt = stamp;1880  entry.modifiedAt = stamp;1881  // Roll the tombstone back if the disk write fails, so a quota error doesn't1882  // leave the entry deleted in memory but alive on disk (SEV-3-A).1883  try {1884    await persistEntries();1885  } catch (err) {1886    delete entry.deletedAt;1887    entry.modifiedAt = previousModifiedAt;1888    throw err;1889  }1890  fireSyncTrigger("vault_change");1891}18921893export function getDeletedEntries(): VaultEntry[] {1894  if (!derivedKey) return [];1895  return entries.filter((e) => !!e.deletedAt);1896}18971898/**1899 * Returns the vault's monotonic version — the `peach_last_modified_at` value1900 * stamped on every user-initiated write. Remote (sync) writes do NOT advance1901 * this version so a sync round never cascades into a second outbound sync.1902 */1903export async function getVaultVersion(): Promise<number> {1904  try {1905    const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get("peach_last_modified_at");1906    const v = (raw as Record<string, unknown>).peach_last_modified_at;1907    if (typeof v === "number") return v;1908    if (typeof v === "string" && v !== "") {1909      const n = Number.parseInt(v, 10);1910      return Number.isFinite(n) ? n : 0;1911    }1912    return 0;1913  } catch {1914    return 0;1915  }1916}19171918/**1919 * Internal write variants — bypass `fireSyncTrigger` so the sync layer can1920 * apply entries without cascading into another outbound sync round.1921 *1922 * INVARIANT: callers must not pass entries whose IDs collide with existing1923 * active (non-deleted) entries unless the intent is an explicit overwrite.1924 * These functions do not validate field-level constraints (password required,1925 * card number required, etc.) — they are trust-the-caller paths for sync and1926 * test harness use only.1927 */1928export async function addEntryDirect(entry: VaultEntry): Promise<void> {1929  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1930  entries = [...entries, entry];1931  await persistEntries("sync_received");1932}19331934export async function updateEntryDirect(patch: VaultEntry): Promise<void> {1935  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1936  const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === patch.id);1937  if (idx === -1) throw new Error("entry_not_found");1938  entries[idx] = { ...entries[idx], ...patch };1939  await persistEntries("sync_received");1940}19411942export async function deleteEntryDirect(id: string, deletedAt: number): Promise<void> {1943  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1944  const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id);1945  if (idx === -1) throw new Error("entry_not_found");1946  entries[idx] = { ...entries[idx], deletedAt, modifiedAt: deletedAt };1947  await persistEntries("sync_received");1948}19491950/**1951 * Apply a batch of remote entries + tombstones from a chirp-sync peer.1952 * Last-write-wins by `modifiedAt`; a tombstone supersedes a live entry when1953 * `deletedAt > modifiedAt` on the local side. Mutates `entries` directly and1954 * persists with reason `sync_received` — does NOT fire the sync dispatcher, so1955 * applying a sync round cannot cascade into another outbound sync.1956 *1957 * `applied` counts entries that actually changed local state (new add,1958 * overwrite-by-newer, or new tombstone). `received` is the raw payload size1959 * the caller can surface in the sync result UI.1960 */1961export async function applyMergedRemoteEntries(1962  remoteEntries: VaultEntry[],1963  remoteTombstones: Record<string, number>,1964  context: { deviceName?: string } = {},1965): Promise<{ received: number; applied: number; conflicts: number }> {1966  // DESIGN: last-write-wins is applied PER-ENTRY, not per-field. If two devices1967  // concurrently edit different fields of the same entry, the one with the1968  // newer modifiedAt wins the whole entry and the other device's field edits1969  // are dropped silently. This is the deliberate trade-off for a simple,1970  // conflict-free merge — per-field CRDT merge is out of scope. Guidance for1971  // users: edit a given entry on one device at a time.1972  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");19731974  const received = remoteEntries.length + Object.keys(remoteTombstones).length;1975  let applied = 0;1976  let conflicts = 0;19771978  const byId = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();1979  for (const e of entries) byId.set(e.id, e);19801981  const alerts: SyncAlert[] = [];1982  const deviceName = context.deviceName ?? "paired device";1983  const mergeNow = Date.now();19841985  for (const remote of remoteEntries) {1986    const sanitized = sanitizeRestoredEntry(remote);1987    if (!sanitized) continue;1988    // HV-1a: a far-future remote modifiedAt must not permanently pin a1989    // malicious value against honest local edits. Clamp BEFORE any1990    // comparison against local timestamps.1991    sanitized.modifiedAt = clampSyncTimestamp(sanitized.modifiedAt, mergeNow);1992    if (typeof sanitized.deletedAt === "number") {1993      sanitized.deletedAt = clampSyncTimestamp(sanitized.deletedAt, mergeNow);1994    }1995    const tombstoneTs = remoteTombstones[sanitized.id];1996    if (tombstoneTs !== undefined && clampSyncTimestamp(tombstoneTs, mergeNow) >= sanitized.modifiedAt) {1997      continue;1998    }1999    const local = byId.get(sanitized.id);2000    if (!local) {2001      entries.push(sanitized);2002      byId.set(sanitized.id, sanitized);2003      applied += 1;2004    } else if (sanitized.modifiedAt > local.modifiedAt) {2005      const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === local.id);2006      if (idx !== -1) {2007        // HV-1b: surface remote password REPLACEMENTS (existing id, password2008        // differs) so a compromised peer can't silently rewrite credentials.2009        if (2010          !local.deletedAt &&2011          typeof sanitized.password === "string" &&2012          typeof local.password === "string" &&2013          sanitized.password !== local.password2014        ) {2015          alerts.push({2016            type: "REMOTE_PASSWORD_CHANGE",2017            entryId: sanitized.id,2018            entryTitle: sanitized.title,2019            deviceName,2020            timestamp: mergeNow,2021          });2022        }2023        entries[idx] = sanitized;2024        byId.set(sanitized.id, sanitized);2025        applied += 1;2026        if (!local.deletedAt) conflicts += 1;2027      }2028    }2029  }20302031  for (const [id, rawDeletedAt] of Object.entries(remoteTombstones)) {2032    if (typeof rawDeletedAt !== "number" || !Number.isFinite(rawDeletedAt)) continue;2033    // HV-1a/1c: clamp the tombstone timestamp before every comparison.2034    const deletedAt = clampSyncTimestamp(rawDeletedAt, mergeNow);2035    const local = byId.get(id);2036    if (!local) continue;2037    if (local.deletedAt && local.deletedAt >= deletedAt) continue;2038    if (deletedAt < local.modifiedAt) continue;2039    const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id);2040    if (idx !== -1) {2041      // HV-1b: surface remote deletes of live local entries.2042      if (!local.deletedAt) {2043        alerts.push({2044          type: "REMOTE_DELETE",2045          entryId: id,2046          entryTitle: local.title,2047          deviceName,2048          timestamp: mergeNow,2049        });2050      }2051      entries[idx] = { ...local, deletedAt, modifiedAt: deletedAt };2052      applied += 1;2053    }2054  }20552056  if (applied > 0) {2057    await persistEntries("sync_received");2058    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);2059  }2060  // Queued after the merge committed — an alert must describe a mutation2061  // that actually landed. recordSyncAlerts never throws.2062  await recordSyncAlerts(alerts);2063  return { received, applied, conflicts };2064}20652066export async function restoreEntry(id: string): Promise<void> {2067  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");2068  const entry = entries.find((e) => e.id === id && e.deletedAt);2069  if (!entry) throw new Error("deleted entry not found");2070  delete entry.deletedAt;2071  entry.modifiedAt = monotonicEntryTimestamp(entry.modifiedAt);2072  await persistEntries();2073  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);2074}20752076export async function purgeEntry(id: string): Promise<void> {2077  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");2078  const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id && e.deletedAt);2079  if (idx === -1) throw new Error("deleted entry not found");2080  entries.splice(idx, 1);2081  await persistEntries();2082}20832084/** Permanently delete entries whose deletedAt is older than retentionMs. 0 = keep forever. */2085export async function purgeExpiredTrash(retentionMs: number): Promise<number> {2086  if (!derivedKey || retentionMs === 0) return 0;2087  const cutoff = Date.now() - retentionMs;2088  const before = entries.length;2089  entries = entries.filter((e) => !(e.deletedAt && e.deletedAt < cutoff));2090  const purged = before - entries.length;2091  if (purged > 0) await persistEntries();2092  return purged;2093}20942095export function queryDomain(domain: string): VaultEntry[] {2096  return domainIndex.get(domain) ?? [];2097}20982099export function getEntryById(id: string): VaultEntry | undefined {2100  return entries.find((entry) => entry.id === id && !entry.deletedAt);2101}21022103async function persistSlotA(2104  reason: VaultSnapshot["reason"] = "local_save",2105): Promise<StoredVault> {2106  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");21072108  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);2109  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");21102111  // Snapshot the about-to-be-overwritten state BEFORE we mutate disk. Failures2112  // are swallowed by takeVaultSnapshot — history must never block a save.2113  await takeVaultSnapshot(reason);21142115  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured, duressConfigured ? DURESS_SLOT_SIZE : 0);2116  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");21172118  // Preserve existing recovery escrow fields.2119  const nextSlotA: StoredVault = {2120    ...slotA,2121    nonce,2122    ciphertext,2123    tag,2124    // recovery_salt and recovery_wrapped_root_key are already set from loadSlot2125  };2126  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, nextSlotA);21272128  // Slot A (the real vault) is now committed. Wrap every later write so a2129  // mid-persist failure (e.g. a storage error after slot A landed) restores the2130  // prior slot A before rethrowing. Without this, a "failed" save that already2131  // wrote slot A leaves disk ahead of the in-memory rollback in addEntry/2132  // updateEntry/deleteEntry — the entry stays silently on disk and resurfaces2133  // as a duplicate on the next unlock (observed under storage-quota pressure).2134  try {2135    // When duress is not configured, keep slot B size-matched with slot A by2136    // regenerating its noise. When duress IS configured, leave slot B alone —2137    // we don't have the decoy key to re-encrypt it. This is a known trade-off.2138    if (!duressConfigured) {2139      await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2));2140    }2141    // Only advance the vault version for locally-originated writes. Entries2142    // applied from a sync peer ("sync_received") must NOT bump the counter —2143    // otherwise applying a remote round makes us look newer than the peer and2144    // triggers a redundant outbound sync, defeating the no-op optimisation2145    // and risking a ping-pong between two devices (SEV-2-C).2146    if (reason !== "sync_received") {2147      await stampLocalVaultMutation();2148    }2149  } catch (err) {2150    // Best-effort restore — the prior slot A is smaller-or-equal, so this write2151    // fits even when the failure was a quota overflow.2152    await writeSlot(SLOT_A, slotA).catch(() => {});2153    throw err;2154  }21552156  return nextSlotA;2157}21582159async function persistSlotB(): Promise<void> {2160  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");21612162  const slotB = await loadSlot(SLOT_B);2163  if (!slotB) throw new Error("missing slot B");21642165  // Decoy plaintext always reports duressConfigured=false — the decoy user2166  // sees a clean slate. persistSlotB only runs in decoy mode, which only2167  // exists once duress is configured, so pad to the fixed duress ceiling to2168  // keep slot B's length equal to slot A's (audit MEDIUM — deniability).2169  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, false, DURESS_SLOT_SIZE);2170  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKey, plaintext, "slot_b_v1");21712172  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, { ...slotB, nonce, ciphertext, tag });2173  // Symmetric with persistSlotA: if the version stamp fails after the decoy2174  // slot committed, restore the prior slot B so a failed decoy-mode save can't2175  // leave disk ahead of the in-memory rollback.2176  try {2177    await stampLocalVaultMutation();2178  } catch (err) {2179    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, slotB).catch(() => {});2180    throw err;2181  }2182}21832184async function persistEntries(2185  reason: VaultSnapshot["reason"] = "local_save",2186): Promise<void> {2187  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");21882189  if (vaultMode === "decoy") {2190    await persistSlotB();2191  } else {2192    await persistSlotA(reason);2193  }2194  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);2195}21962197function cleanAdditionalUrls(values: string[] | undefined): string[] | undefined {2198  if (!Array.isArray(values)) return undefined;2199  const seen = new Set<string>();2200  const cleaned: string[] = [];2201  for (const value of values) {2202    const trimmed = typeof value === "string" ? value.trim() : "";2203    if (!trimmed) continue;2204    const key = trimmed.toLowerCase();2205    if (seen.has(key)) continue;2206    seen.add(key);2207    cleaned.push(trimmed);2208  }2209  return cleaned.length > 0 ? cleaned : undefined;2210}22112212function sanitizeEntryDraft(entry: EntryDraft): EntryDraft {2213  const title = entry.title.trim();2214  // Accept legacy `type:"passkey"` drafts but rewrite to "login" — the new2215  // model is "any entry, optionally with a passkey sub-object." Imports and2216  // any in-flight callers from before v2.11.0 keep working without throwing.2217  let type: VaultEntry["type"] = entry.type ?? "login";2218  if (type === "passkey") type = "login";22192220  if (!title) throw new Error("title is required");22212222  if (entry.passkey) {2223    const p = entry.passkey;2224    if (2225      !p.rpId ||2226      !p.credentialId ||2227      !p.publicKeyCose ||2228      !p.userHandle ||2229      !p.userName ||2230      (p.algorithm !== -7 && p.algorithm !== -8)2231    ) {2232      throw new Error("invalid passkey credential");2233    }2234  }2235  if (type === "card") {2236    if (!entry.cardholderName?.trim() || !entry.cardNumber?.trim()) {2237      throw new Error("cardholder name and card number are required");2238    }2239  }22402241  return {2242    type,2243    title,2244    username: type === "login" ? entry.username?.trim() ?? "" : undefined,2245    email: type === "login" ? entry.email?.trim() || undefined : undefined,2246    password: type === "login" ? entry.password : undefined,2247    url: type === "login" ? entry.url?.trim() ?? "" : undefined,2248    additionalUrls: type === "login" ? cleanAdditionalUrls(entry.additionalUrls) : undefined,2249    totp: type === "login" ? entry.totp?.trim() || undefined : undefined,2250    notes: entry.notes?.trim() || undefined,2251    breach: type === "login" ? entry.breach : undefined,2252    canary: type === "login" ? entry.canary : undefined,2253    tags: entry.tags,2254    passkey: entry.passkey,2255    cardholderName: type === "card" ? entry.cardholderName?.trim() : undefined,2256    cardNumber: type === "card" ? entry.cardNumber?.trim() : undefined,2257    expMonth: type === "card" ? entry.expMonth?.trim() : undefined,2258    expYear: type === "card" ? entry.expYear?.trim() : undefined,2259    cvc: type === "card" ? entry.cvc?.trim() : undefined,2260    cardNickname: type === "card" ? entry.cardNickname?.trim() || undefined : undefined,2261    network: type === "card" ? entry.network : undefined,2262    last4: type === "card" ? entry.last4?.trim() : undefined,2263  };2264}22652266function sanitizeEntryPatch(patch: Partial<VaultEntry>): Partial<VaultEntry> {2267  const nextPatch: Partial<VaultEntry> = {};22682269  if ("type" in patch) {2270    nextPatch.type = patch.type;2271  }22722273  if ("title" in patch) {2274    const title = patch.title?.trim() ?? "";2275    if (!title) throw new Error("title is required");2276    nextPatch.title = title;2277  }22782279  if ("url" in patch) {2280    nextPatch.url = patch.url?.trim() ?? "";2281  }22822283  if ("additionalUrls" in patch) {2284    const incoming = Array.isArray(patch.additionalUrls) ? patch.additionalUrls : [];2285    const seen = new Set<string>();2286    const cleaned: string[] = [];2287    for (const value of incoming) {2288      const trimmed = typeof value === "string" ? value.trim() : "";2289      if (!trimmed) continue;2290      const key = trimmed.toLowerCase();2291      if (seen.has(key)) continue;2292      seen.add(key);2293      cleaned.push(trimmed);2294    }2295    nextPatch.additionalUrls = cleaned.length > 0 ? cleaned : undefined;2296  }22972298  if ("username" in patch) {2299    nextPatch.username = patch.username?.trim() ?? "";2300  }23012302  if ("email" in patch) {2303    nextPatch.email = patch.email?.trim() || undefined;2304  }23052306  if ("password" in patch) {2307    const password = patch.password ?? "";2308    // Allow clearing a password (e.g. on passkey-only entries)2309    nextPatch.password = password || undefined;2310  }23112312  if ("totp" in patch) {2313    nextPatch.totp = patch.totp?.trim() || undefined;2314  }23152316  if ("notes" in patch) {2317    nextPatch.notes = patch.notes?.trim() || undefined;2318  }23192320  if ("breach" in patch) {2321    nextPatch.breach = patch.breach;2322  }23232324  if ("canary" in patch) {2325    nextPatch.canary = patch.canary;2326  }23272328  if ("passkey" in patch) {2329    // Passkey sub-object replaces all the legacy flat passkey fields. A2330    // patch with `passkey: undefined` removes the credential from the entry2331    // (used by "remove passkey" without deleting the whole entry).2332    nextPatch.passkey = patch.passkey;2333  }23342335  if ("tags" in patch) {2336    nextPatch.tags = patch.tags;2337  }23382339  if ("cardholderName" in patch) {2340    nextPatch.cardholderName = patch.cardholderName?.trim() || undefined;2341  }2342  if ("cardNumber" in patch) {2343    const n = patch.cardNumber ?? "";2344    nextPatch.cardNumber = n || undefined;2345  }2346  if ("expMonth" in patch) {2347    nextPatch.expMonth = patch.expMonth?.trim() || undefined;2348  }2349  if ("expYear" in patch) {2350    nextPatch.expYear = patch.expYear?.trim() || undefined;2351  }2352  if ("cvc" in patch) {2353    nextPatch.cvc = patch.cvc?.trim() || undefined;2354  }2355  if ("cardNickname" in patch) {2356    nextPatch.cardNickname = patch.cardNickname?.trim() || undefined;2357  }2358  if ("network" in patch) {2359    nextPatch.network = patch.network;2360  }2361  if ("last4" in patch) {2362    nextPatch.last4 = patch.last4?.trim() || undefined;2363  }23642365  return nextPatch;2366}23672368function normalizeEntry(entry: VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry): VaultEntry {2369  const createdAt = "createdAt" in entry ? entry.createdAt : entry.created;2370  const modifiedAt =2371    "modifiedAt" in entry ? entry.modifiedAt : entry.updated;23722373  const base: VaultEntry = {2374    id: entry.id,2375    type: "type" in entry ? entry.type : "login",2376    title: entry.title,2377    username: entry.username,2378    email: "email" in entry ? entry.email : undefined,2379    password: entry.password,2380    url: entry.url,2381    additionalUrls:2382      "additionalUrls" in entry && Array.isArray(entry.additionalUrls)2383        ? entry.additionalUrls2384        : undefined,2385    totp: entry.totp,2386    notes: entry.notes,2387    breach: entry.breach,2388    // Preserve the password-age clock across lock/unlock. Without this the2389    // field is dropped on every decode and the advanced-health "aged password"2390    // signal silently resets to createdAt on each unlock (SEV-2-A).2391    passwordChangedAt:2392      "passwordChangedAt" in entry ? entry.passwordChangedAt : undefined,2393    // Preserve past-password history across lock/unlock. normalizeEntry is a2394    // field whitelist, so an unlisted field is silently dropped on every decode2395    // (same class as the passwordChangedAt SEV-2-A above).2396    passwordHistory:2397      "passwordHistory" in entry && Array.isArray(entry.passwordHistory)2398        ? entry.passwordHistory2399        : undefined,2400    canary: "canary" in entry ? entry.canary : undefined,2401    passkey: "passkey" in entry ? entry.passkey : undefined,2402    createdAt,2403    modifiedAt,2404    deletedAt: entry.deletedAt,2405    tags: "tags" in entry ? entry.tags : undefined,2406    cardholderName: "cardholderName" in entry ? entry.cardholderName : undefined,2407    cardNumber: "cardNumber" in entry ? entry.cardNumber : undefined,2408    expMonth: "expMonth" in entry ? entry.expMonth : undefined,2409    expYear: "expYear" in entry ? entry.expYear : undefined,2410    cvc: "cvc" in entry ? entry.cvc : undefined,2411    cardNickname: "cardNickname" in entry ? entry.cardNickname : undefined,2412    network: "network" in entry ? entry.network : undefined,2413    last4: "last4" in entry ? entry.last4 : undefined,2414  };24152416  return migrateLegacyPasskey(base, entry);2417}24182419/**2420 * v2.11.0 read migration. Pre-v2.11.0 passkey entries used `type:"passkey"`2421 * with flat top-level fields (rpId, credentialId, etc.). This converts them2422 * to the new shape — `type:"login"` with a `passkey` sub-object — so all2423 * downstream consumers can rely on the new model. The result is rewritten2424 * to disk on next vault save (hasLegacyShape detects the un-migrated case).2425 */2426function migrateLegacyPasskey(2427  base: VaultEntry,2428  raw: VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry2429): VaultEntry {2430  if (base.passkey) return base;2431  const flat = raw as Partial<VaultEntry>;2432  const isPasskeyType = base.type === "passkey";2433  const hasFlatPasskeyFields =2434    typeof flat.rpId === "string" &&2435    typeof flat.credentialId === "string" &&2436    typeof flat.publicKeyCose === "string" &&2437    typeof flat.userHandle === "string" &&2438    typeof flat.userName === "string";2439  if (!isPasskeyType && !hasFlatPasskeyFields) return base;2440  if (!hasFlatPasskeyFields) return base;24412442  const algorithm: -7 | -8 = flat.algorithm === -8 ? -8 : -7;2443  base.passkey = {2444    rpId: flat.rpId!,2445    rpName: flat.rpName ?? flat.rpId!,2446    credentialId: flat.credentialId!,2447    publicKeyCose: flat.publicKeyCose!,2448    privateKeyJwk: flat.privateKeyJwk,2449    userHandle: flat.userHandle!,2450    userName: flat.userName!,2451    userDisplayName: flat.userDisplayName ?? flat.userName!,2452    algorithm,2453    signCount: flat.signCount ?? 0,2454    aaguid: flat.aaguid ?? "",2455    backupEligible: flat.backupEligible === true,2456    backupState: flat.backupState === true,2457    lastUsedAt: flat.lastUsedAt,2458    browser: flat.browser,2459    transports: flat.transports,2460    createdAt: base.createdAt,2461  };2462  // Promote to "login" so the unified Entry view renders. Username gets2463  // populated from the passkey's userName so the entry is searchable in the2464  // existing autofill flow without a separate code path.2465  if (isPasskeyType) base.type = "login";2466  if (!base.username) base.username = flat.userName;2467  if (!base.url) base.url = `https://${flat.rpId}`;2468  return base;2469}247024712472// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------2473// Deduplication2474// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------24752476function entryDupeKey(e: VaultEntry): string {2477  if (e.type === "note") return `note|${e.title.toLowerCase()}`;2478  // Passkey-bearing entries dedupe by the credential's RP + user. Two logins2479  // on different sites that happen to share a username are still distinct;2480  // two passkey credentials for the same RP+user are duplicates regardless2481  // of any login fields they may also carry.2482  if (e.passkey) {2483    return `passkey|${e.passkey.rpId.toLowerCase()}|${e.passkey.userName.toLowerCase()}`;2484  }2485  return `login|${e.title.toLowerCase()}|${(e.url ?? "").toLowerCase()}|${(e.username ?? "").toLowerCase()}`;2486}24872488/** Returns the number of duplicate entries (those that would be removed). */2489export function countDuplicates(): number {2490  const best = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();2491  let dupeCount = 0;2492  for (const e of entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt)) {2493    const key = entryDupeKey(e);2494    const existing = best.get(key);2495    if (!existing) {2496      best.set(key, e);2497    } else {2498      dupeCount++;2499      // Keep the more recently modified one in the map2500      if ((e.modifiedAt ?? e.createdAt ?? 0) > (existing.modifiedAt ?? existing.createdAt ?? 0)) {2501        best.set(key, e);2502      }2503    }2504  }2505  return dupeCount;2506}25072508/**2509 * Soft-deletes duplicate entries, keeping the most recently modified copy of2510 * each group. Returns the number of entries moved to trash.2511 */2512export async function deduplicateEntries(): Promise<number> {2513  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");2514  // Dedup reshapes slot B permanently under the decoy key, which is2515  // forensically distinguishable from a freshly-seeded decoy vault. Refuse.2516  if (vaultMode === "decoy") {2517    throw new Error("deduplicate disabled in decoy mode");2518  }25192520  const best = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();2521  for (const e of entries.filter((en) => !en.deletedAt)) {2522    const key = entryDupeKey(e);2523    const existing = best.get(key);2524    if (!existing) {2525      best.set(key, e);2526    } else if ((e.modifiedAt ?? e.createdAt ?? 0) > (existing.modifiedAt ?? existing.createdAt ?? 0)) {2527      best.set(key, e);2528    }2529  }25302531  const keepIds = new Set(Array.from(best.values()).map((e) => e.id));2532  let removed = 0;2533  entries = entries.map((e) => {2534    if (!e.deletedAt && !keepIds.has(e.id)) {2535      removed++;2536      return { ...e, deletedAt: monotonicEntryTimestamp(e.modifiedAt) };2537    }2538    return e;2539  });25402541  if (removed > 0) await persistEntries();2542  return removed;2543}25442545// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------2546// Vault history — snapshot BEFORE every vault write so the saved blob is2547// what is about to be lost, not what was just written. Capped at 5. The2548// stored blobs are AES-256-GCM ciphertext under the master password, so2549// history adds zero security surface.2550// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------25512552const HISTORY_KEY = "peach_vault_history";2553const HISTORY_MAX = 5;25542555/**2556 * Snapshot the CURRENT on-disk vault state into history. Call this BEFORE2557 * overwriting peach_vault_a so the saved blob captures the about-to-be-lost2558 * state. Identical-to-most-recent blobs are skipped to avoid filling history2559 * with no-op writes.2560 */2561export async function takeVaultSnapshot(2562  reason: VaultSnapshot["reason"],2563): Promise<void> {2564  try {2565    const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get([SLOT_A, SLOT_B, HISTORY_KEY]);2566    const slotA = (raw as Record<string, StoredVault | undefined>)[SLOT_A];2567    const slotB = (raw as Record<string, StoredVault | undefined>)[SLOT_B];25682569    // Nothing to snapshot if the real slot doesn't exist yet (fresh install,2570    // pre-createVault). createVault skips snapshots intentionally — there is2571    // no prior state to preserve.2572    if (!slotA) return;25732574    const vault_a = JSON.stringify(slotA);2575    const vault_b = JSON.stringify(slotB ?? slotA);25762577    // Best-effort entry count: only meaningful when the in-memory state is2578    // unlocked AND in real mode. Decoy mode would leak the decoy entry2579    // count; locked mode has no entries to count. Both fall through to null.2580    let entryCount: number | null = null;2581    if (derivedKey && vaultMode === "real") {2582      try {2583        entryCount = entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt).length;2584      } catch {2585        entryCount = null;2586      }2587    }25882589    const existingRaw = (raw as Record<string, VaultHistory | undefined>)[HISTORY_KEY];2590    const history: VaultHistory = existingRaw && Array.isArray(existingRaw.snapshots)2591      ? existingRaw2592      : { snapshots: [] };25932594    // Deduplication: if the most recent snapshot has byte-identical blobs,2595    // skip — saves the same vault N times in a row would otherwise burn the2596    // entire history window with no recovery value.2597    const latest = history.snapshots[0];2598    if (latest && latest.vault_a === vault_a && latest.vault_b === vault_b) {2599      return;2600    }26012602    const snapshot: VaultSnapshot = {2603      id: crypto.randomUUID(),2604      savedAt: Date.now(),2605      reason,2606      vault_a,2607      vault_b,2608      entryCount,2609    };26102611    history.snapshots = [snapshot, ...history.snapshots].slice(0, HISTORY_MAX);2612    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [HISTORY_KEY]: history });2613  } catch (err) {2614    // Non-fatal — history must never block a save. A failed snapshot just2615    // means the user loses one rung of the safety ladder for this write.2616    // M4/QUA-006: log so the failure is visible; if it looks like a quota2617    // problem, notify the popup so the user can prune history themselves.2618    console.warn('[Peach] takeVaultSnapshot failed:', err);2619    if (String(err).includes('QUOTA') || String(err).includes('quota')) {2620      try {2621        await chrome.runtime.sendMessage({ type: 'VAULT_STORAGE_QUOTA_WARNING' });2622      } catch {2623        // popup may be closed; surfaced via console.warn above2624      }2625    }2626  }2627}26282629/** Wipe all vault history. Called by Panic / DESTROY_VAULT. */2630export async function clearVaultHistory(): Promise<void> {2631  try {2632    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [HISTORY_KEY]: { snapshots: [] } satisfies VaultHistory });2633  } catch {2634    // Non-fatal — DESTROY_VAULT also runs storage.local.clear().2635  }2636}26372638/** Read all snapshots, newest first, for the Settings vault history view. */2639export async function getVaultHistory(): Promise<VaultSnapshot[]> {2640  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get(HISTORY_KEY);2641  const history = (raw as Record<string, VaultHistory | undefined>)[HISTORY_KEY];2642  if (!history || !Array.isArray(history.snapshots)) return [];2643  return history.snapshots;2644}26452646/**2647 * Replace the on-disk vault with the chosen snapshot's blobs and lock the2648 * vault. The current state is itself snapshotted with reason 'restore' first2649 * so the restore is reversible. After this returns, the user must unlock2650 * with the password that matches the restored blob.2651 */2652export async function restoreVaultSnapshot(2653  snapshotId: string,2654): Promise<{ ok: true } | { ok: false; error: string }> {2655  const history = await getVaultHistory();2656  const snapshot = history.find((s) => s.id === snapshotId);2657  if (!snapshot) return { ok: false, error: "snapshot_not_found" };26582659  // Snapshot the about-to-be-replaced current state so the restore is2660  // reversible. takeVaultSnapshot is no-op when the most recent entry is2661  // byte-identical, so a restore-of-a-restore stays clean.2662  await takeVaultSnapshot("restore");26632664  let restoredA: StoredVault;2665  let restoredB: StoredVault;2666  try {2667    restoredA = JSON.parse(snapshot.vault_a) as StoredVault;2668    restoredB = JSON.parse(snapshot.vault_b) as StoredVault;2669  } catch {2670    return { ok: false, error: "snapshot_corrupt" };2671  }26722673  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, restoredA);2674  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, restoredB);2675  await stampLocalVaultMutation();26762677  // Lock so the user must prove they can decrypt the restored blob. If they2678  // restored a pre-password-change snapshot they discover it immediately at2679  // the lock screen rather than silently holding an inaccessible vault.2680  lock();26812682  return { ok: true };2683}26842685/**2686 * Rotate the vault's sync identity by generating a FRESH ROOT KEY and2687 * re-wrapping everything under it (MV-8). Because every sync credential —2688 * vault_id, the Noise XX static keypair, the Ed25519 manifest signing key,2689 * and the per-entry envelope keys — derives from the root key, rotation2690 * makes a lost/stolen device's retained key material useless. All paired2691 * devices must re-pair afterwards.2692 *2693 * CONSEQUENCE THE UI MUST SURFACE: the 12 recovery words also derive from2694 * the root key, so rotation INVALIDATES the old recovery phrase. The flow2695 * sets peach_recovery_pending so the popup re-presents the new words for2696 * confirmation, same as the migrateToRecovery rotate path.2697 */2698export async function rotateSyncIdentity(): Promise<{ ok: boolean; error?: string }> {2699  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {2700    return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };2701  }2702  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);2703  if (!slotA) return { ok: false, error: "missing_slot_a" };27042705  // 1. Fresh root key + recovery escrow (new words).2706  const { rawRootKey, recoverySalt, wrappedRootKey, wrappedNonce, wrappedTag } =2707    await generateAndWrapRootKey();27082709  // 2. Re-wrap the new root key under the current password-derived key.2710  const newRootKey = unhex(rawRootKey);2711  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(derivedKey, newRootKey);27122713  // 3. Snapshot, then single atomic slot write — both escrow wrappings of2714  //    the new root key land together (same transactional rule as2715  //    changePassword). Entries are untouched: they are sealed under the2716  //    password-derived key, not the root key.2717  await takeVaultSnapshot("local_save");2718  const nextSlotA: StoredVault = {2719    ...slotA,2720    recovery_salt: recoverySalt,2721    recovery_wrapped_root_key: wrappedRootKey,2722    recovery_nonce: wrappedNonce,2723    recovery_tag: wrappedTag,2724    ...pwRoot,2725  };2726  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, nextSlotA);27272728  // 4. Swap in memory only after disk committed.2729  if (rootKey) zeroKey(rootKey);2730  rootKey = newRootKey;27312732  // 5. Old peers' identities derive from the dead root key — drop them all.2733  const { clearPairedDevices } = await import("./paired-devices");2734  await clearPairedDevices();27352736  // 6. Force re-presentation of the NEW recovery words on next popup view.2737  await setRecoveryConfirmPending(); // same flag the create-vault flow uses27382739  await stampLocalVaultMutation();2740  return { ok: true };2741}27422743/**2744 * Change the master password. Re-encrypts slot A with a fresh salt + new2745 * derived key. Slot B (duress or noise) is left untouched when duress is2746 * configured — it uses an independent key derived from the duress password —2747 * and regenerated as noise when duress is not configured.2748 */2749export async function changePassword(2750  currentPassword: string,2751  newPassword: string2752): Promise<boolean> {2753  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") return false;27542755  // Verify current password before allowing any change2756  const valid = await verifyMainPassword(currentPassword);2757  if (!valid) return false;27582759  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);2760  if (!slotA) return false;2761  if (!rootKey) return false;27622763  // Derive fresh key from new password + new random salt2764  const newSalt = generateSalt();2765  const newKey = await deriveKey(newPassword, newSalt);27662767  // Re-encrypt the in-memory entries with the new key2768  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured, duressConfigured ? DURESS_SLOT_SIZE : 0);2769  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(newKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");27702771  // Pre-wrap root key under the new derived key. Recovery fields wrap rootKey2772  // under recovery words and remain untouched — recovery phrase keeps working2773  // across password changes (H4/COR-002).2774  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(newKey, rootKey);27752776  const finalSlotA: StoredVault = {2777    ...slotA,2778    salt: hex(newSalt),2779    nonce,2780    ciphertext,2781    tag,2782    ...pwRoot,2783  };27842785  // Snapshot the OLD-key blob before overwriting it. If the user later2786  // restores from this snapshot they will need the OLD password — the2787  // post-restore lock surfaces that immediately.2788  await takeVaultSnapshot("local_save");27892790  // Single atomic write: ciphertext, salt, and pw_root_* fields all land in2791  // one storage transaction. An SW kill before this point leaves the old2792  // slot intact; after this point everything tied to the new password is2793  // already on disk together (M6/COR-004).2794  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, finalSlotA);27952796  // Swap the in-memory key synchronously before any further await. If we2797  // threw between the Slot A write and this swap, the next persistEntries()2798  // would overwrite Slot A with old-key ciphertext, locking the user out.2799  zeroKey(derivedKey);2800  derivedKey = newKey;28012802  // Regenerate noise for slot B when duress is not in use. Runs after the2803  // key swap so a failure here is a disposable noise regeneration, not a2804  // lockout.2805  if (!duressConfigured) {2806    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2));2807  }2808  await stampLocalVaultMutation();28092810  return true;2811}