vault.ts

1/**2 * vault.ts — sole owner of vault state and chrome.storage vault keys.3 *4 * Every read/write of `peach_vault_a`, `peach_vault_b`, and `peach_settings`5 * goes through this module. No other file accesses those keys directly.6 * External callers reach vault operations via `messages.ts` — never by7 * importing from here cross-boundary (popup/content must not). Invariants8 * for the two-slot schema, unlock timing, and key/disk atomicity are in9 * Projects.md §3.2–§3.6.10 */1112import { deriveKey, generateSalt } from "../crypto/argon2";13import { extractDomain } from "../shared/domain";14import {15  rootKeyToWords,16  wordsToRootKeyMaterial,17  deriveRecoveryKey,18} from "../shared/recovery-words";19import type {20  AccentColorName,21  LegacyVaultEntry,22  ManualSummonRecord,23  SavedIdentity,24  StoredVault,25  VaultEntry,26  VaultHistory,27  VaultSnapshot,28} from "../shared/types";29import { decrypt, encrypt, zeroKey } from "./aes";30import { clearAutoLock, touchAutoLock } from "./alarms";3132type EntryDraft = Omit<33  VaultEntry,34  "id" | "createdAt" | "modifiedAt" | "deletedAt"35>;3637// Slot-neutral storage keys (v1.4.24+). Both slots always exist; slot B38// either holds the decoy vault (when duress is configured) or random noise39// that looks identical at rest. No external indicator is stored — duress40// configuration is recorded only inside the encrypted payload of slot A.41const SLOT_A = "peach_vault_a";42const SLOT_B = "peach_vault_b";4344// Legacy keys, migrated away on first access.45const LEGACY_MAIN = "peach_vault";46const LEGACY_DECOY = "peach_decoy_vault";47const LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG = "peach_duress";4849// Plaintext is padded to the next multiple of this size before encryption.50// This coarsens ciphertext-length leakage into 1 KiB buckets.51const PAD_BLOCK = 1024;5253let derivedKey: Uint8Array | null = null;54// 32-byte random root key, separate from the derivedKey used for vault encryption.55// The root key is wrapped (encrypted) under the recovery key derived from the56// 12-word phrase. When the user changes their password, only the wrapping changes;57// the root key and recovery words remain stable.58let rootKey: Uint8Array | null = null;59let entries: VaultEntry[] = [];60let domainIndex: Map<string, VaultEntry[]> = new Map();61let vaultMode: "real" | "decoy" = "real";62// Cached post-unlock view of whether the real vault records that duress is63// configured. Only meaningful after a real-mode unlock; for decoy-mode unlock64// this stays false because we never see slot A's plaintext.65let duressConfigured = false;6667let migrationRan = false;6869// Set to a corruption reason during the last unlock() attempt when both slots70// decrypted but failed schema validation. Consumed and cleared by71// consumeLastUnlockFailureReason() so messages.ts can surface vault_corrupted72// distinctly from wrong-password (M7/COR-007).73//74// NOTE: module-level state — if vault.ts is ever moved to a worker context,75// this must be replaced with a structured return value from unlock() or a76// postMessage channel. The signal is invisible across module-instance77// boundaries.78let lastUnlockFailureReason: string | null = null;7980export function consumeLastUnlockFailureReason(): string | null {81  const r = lastUnlockFailureReason;82  lastUnlockFailureReason = null;83  return r;84}8586// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------87// Settings (persisted inside the encrypted vault store as a sidecar key)88// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------8990export type TextSize = "small" | "medium" | "large";9192export interface VaultSettings {93  accentColor?: AccentColorName;94  theme?: "dark" | "light";95  autoLockMinutes?: number;96  clipboardClearSeconds?: number;97  lockOnClose?: boolean;98  breachMonitoring?: boolean;99  passkeyProviderEnabled?: boolean;100  trashRetentionDays?: number;101  manualSummonDomains?: Record<string, ManualSummonRecord>;102  declinedCardFingerprints?: string[];103  /**104   * Text size scale for body copy and entry titles. Stops at "large" by105   * design — XL clips dense screens (Vault, Health) inside the fixed106   * 330×480 popup surface.107   */108  textSize?: TextSize;109  /**110   * When true, all entrance/exit transitions and ambient animations are111   * collapsed to instant. Honoured alongside the user's OS-level112   * `prefers-reduced-motion`.113   */114  reduceMotion?: boolean;115  /**116   * Android-only: when true, the master key is escrowed in AndroidKeyStore117   * and the lock screen offers biometric unlock. Toggled from Settings →118   * Security → Biometrics. Has no effect on desktop builds.119   */120  biometricsEnabled?: boolean;121  /**122   * User overrides for keyboard shortcuts. Keys are ShortcutAction names123   * (see src/shared/shortcuts.ts). Missing actions fall through to124   * DEFAULT_BINDINGS — `getActiveBindings(settings.shortcuts)` is the125   * canonical lookup. Storing only the deltas keeps the vault payload126   * small and lets default updates land for users who never rebind.127   */128  shortcuts?: Record<string, { key: string; ctrl?: boolean; meta?: boolean; shift?: boolean; alt?: boolean }>;129}130131let settings: VaultSettings = {};132133export function getSettings(): VaultSettings {134  return settings;135}136137export async function ensureSettingsLoaded(): Promise<VaultSettings> {138  await loadSettings();139  return settings;140}141142export async function updateSettings(patch: Partial<VaultSettings>): Promise<void> {143  await loadSettings();144  settings = { ...settings, ...patch };145  await persistSettings();146}147148async function persistSettings(): Promise<void> {149  try {150    await chrome.storage.local.set({ peach_settings: settings });151  } catch (err) {152    throw mapStorageError(err);153  }154}155156function mapStorageError(err: unknown): Error {157  const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);158  if (/QUOTA_BYTES|quota/i.test(message)) {159    return new Error("STORAGE_QUOTA_EXCEEDED");160  }161  return err instanceof Error ? err : new Error(message);162}163164async function loadSettings(): Promise<void> {165  const result = await chrome.storage.local.get("peach_settings");166  settings = (result as { peach_settings?: VaultSettings }).peach_settings ?? {};167}168169// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------170// HIBP breach check (k-anonymity model)171// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------172173export async function checkBreach(password: string): Promise<number> {174  // HIBP k-anonymity API is keyed on SHA-1 prefixes — this is dictated by175  // the public API, not a security choice. Do not migrate to SHA-256 here.176  const encoder = new TextEncoder();177  const hashBuffer = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-1", encoder.encode(password));178  const hashHex = Array.from(new Uint8Array(hashBuffer))179    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))180    .join("")181    .toUpperCase();182183  const prefix = hashHex.slice(0, 5);184  const suffix = hashHex.slice(5);185186  try {187    const res = await fetch(`https://api.pwnedpasswords.com/range/${prefix}`);188    if (!res.ok) return 0;189    const text = await res.text();190    const match = text.split("\r\n").find((l) => l.startsWith(suffix));191    return match ? parseInt(match.split(":")[1], 10) : 0;192  } catch {193    return 0; // Network unavailable — don't block194  }195}196197export async function declineCardSaveOffer(last4: string, expMonth: string, expYear: string): Promise<void> {198  const fingerprint = await cardFingerprint(last4, expMonth, expYear);199  await loadSettings();200  settings = {201    ...settings,202    declinedCardFingerprints: [...(settings.declinedCardFingerprints ?? []), fingerprint],203  };204  await persistSettings();205}206207export async function isCardDeclined(last4: string, expMonth: string, expYear: string): Promise<boolean> {208  await loadSettings();209  const fingerprint = await cardFingerprint(last4, expMonth, expYear);210  return (settings.declinedCardFingerprints ?? []).includes(fingerprint);211}212213async function cardFingerprint(last4: string, expMonth: string, expYear: string): Promise<string> {214  const encoder = new TextEncoder();215  const buf = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", encoder.encode(`${last4}|${expMonth}|${expYear}`));216  return Array.from(new Uint8Array(buf).slice(0, 8))217    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))218    .join("");219}220221function hex(buf: Uint8Array): string {222  return Array.from(buf)223    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))224    .join("");225}226227function unhex(s: string): Uint8Array {228  const out = new Uint8Array(s.length / 2);229  for (let i = 0; i < s.length; i += 2) {230    out[i / 2] = parseInt(s.slice(i, i + 2), 16);231  }232  return out;233}234235// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------236// Root key generation and recovery word wrapping237// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------238239/**240 * Generate a random 32-byte root key and wrap it (AES-256-GCM) under a key241 * derived from the recovery word material via HKDF-SHA256. The wrapped blob242 * fields are stored in slot A alongside the password-wrapped ciphertext. The243 * root key itself is kept in memory for the session so getRecoveryWords() can244 * encode it without re-deriving.245 */246async function generateAndWrapRootKey(): Promise<{247  rawRootKey: string; // hex of the plaintext root key — caller stores in rootKey248  recoverySalt: string;249  wrappedRootKey: string;250  wrappedNonce: string;251  wrappedTag: string;252}> {253  const rootKeyBytes = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32));254255  // Derive the recovery key from the BIP39 words encoding of the root key.256  const words = await rootKeyToWords(rootKeyBytes);257  const wordMaterial = await wordsToRootKeyMaterial(words);258  const recoverySalt = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));259  const recoveryKey = await deriveRecoveryKey(wordMaterial, recoverySalt);260261  // Wrap the root key with the recovery key using AES-256-GCM directly.262  // We hex-encode rootKeyBytes so the plaintext is always valid UTF-8.263  const nonce = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));264  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(hex(rootKeyBytes));265  const raw = await crypto.subtle.encrypt(266    {267      name: "AES-GCM",268      iv: nonce,269      additionalData: new Uint8Array([1]).buffer as ArrayBuffer,270      tagLength: 128,271    },272    recoveryKey,273    encoded274  );275  // WebCrypto returns ciphertext || auth tag concatenated; split them.276  const rawU8 = new Uint8Array(raw);277  const ciphertext = hex(rawU8.slice(0, rawU8.length - 16));278  const tag = hex(rawU8.slice(rawU8.length - 16));279280  return {281    rawRootKey: hex(rootKeyBytes),282    recoverySalt: hex(recoverySalt),283    wrappedRootKey: ciphertext,284    wrappedNonce: hex(nonce),285    wrappedTag: tag,286  };287}288289/**290 * Unwrap the root key using recovery words. Called during recovery flow when291 * the user provides their 12-word phrase and a new password.292 * Exported for use by the RECOVER_WITH_WORDS message handler.293 */294export async function unwrapRootKeyForRecovery(295  wrappedRootKey: string,296  wrappedNonce: string,297  wrappedTag: string,298  recoverySaltHex: string,299  words: string[]300): Promise<void> {301  const wordMaterial = await wordsToRootKeyMaterial(words);302  const recoverySalt = unhex(recoverySaltHex);303  const recoveryKey = await deriveRecoveryKey(wordMaterial, recoverySalt);304305  // Decrypt and cache the root key. The root key bytes were hex-encoded before306  // encryption so the ciphertext is valid UTF-8. We inline the AES-GCM decrypt307  // here to avoid passing a CryptoKey to the string-based encrypt/decrypt helpers.308  // Each component is stored separately in the vault slot; decode them individually309  // so the nonce is always exactly the 12 bytes from wrappedNonce.310  const nonceRaw = unhex(wrappedNonce);311  const ciphertextRaw = unhex(wrappedRootKey);312  const tagRaw = unhex(wrappedTag);313  // Combine ciphertext and tag for AES-GCM (expects ciphertext||tag).314  // Use explicit ArrayBuffer allocations to satisfy TS BufferSource constraints.315  const nonceU8 = nonceRaw as unknown as Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>;316  const combined = new Uint8Array(ciphertextRaw.length + tagRaw.length);317  combined.set(ciphertextRaw, 0);318  combined.set(tagRaw, ciphertextRaw.length);319  const raw = await crypto.subtle.decrypt(320    { name: "AES-GCM", iv: nonceU8, additionalData: new Uint8Array([1]).buffer as ArrayBuffer, tagLength: 128 },321    recoveryKey,322    combined323  );324  const decryptedHex = new TextDecoder().decode(raw);325  rootKey = unhex(decryptedHex);326}327328/**329 * Re-wrap the cached root key under a new derived key (from the user's new330 * password). Called after password change and after recovery re-key so the331 * same recovery words continue to work with the updated password — and so332 * subsequent unlocks can rehydrate rootKey via deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey.333 *334 * recovery_* fields are intentionally not touched: those wrap rootKey under335 * the recovery words, which do not change when the password changes.336 */337export async function rewrapRootKeyForPassword(338  newDerivedKey: Uint8Array,339  _newSalt: Uint8Array340): Promise<void> {341  if (!rootKey) throw new Error("root key not set");342  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);343  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");344  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(newDerivedKey, rootKey);345  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, { ...slotA, ...pwRoot });346}347348/**349 * Change the vault encryption to a new derived key (already derived from350 * the user's new password). Used by RECOVER_WITH_WORDS and changePassword.351 * Caller is responsible for key swap and snapshot.352 */353async function reencryptVaultForNewKey(354  newKey: Uint8Array,355  slotA: StoredVault356): Promise<void> {357  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured);358  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(newKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");359  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, {360    ...slotA,361    nonce,362    ciphertext,363    tag,364  });365}366367/**368 * Full password change with an already-derived key (used after recovery).369 * Unlike changePassword(), this skips re-verification of current password370 * since recovery flow has already validated the user's identity via words.371 */372export async function changePasswordWithNewKey(373  newSalt: Uint8Array,374  newKey: Uint8Array375): Promise<void> {376  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);377  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");378  // reencryptVaultForNewKey must receive the updated salt so that subsequent379  // UNLOCK calls with the new password can re-derive the correct key.380  await reencryptVaultForNewKey(newKey, { ...slotA, salt: hex(newSalt) });381  if (derivedKey) zeroKey(derivedKey);382  derivedKey = newKey;383  // Refresh pw_root_* under the new key so deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey works384  // on the next unlock (H2/COR-006). If rootKey is missing — recovery flow385  // should have populated it — fall back silently rather than blowing up the386  // recovery path; migrateToRecovery will rehydrate on the next unlock.387  if (rootKey) {388    const slotAfter = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);389    if (slotAfter) {390      const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(newKey, rootKey);391      await writeSlot(SLOT_A, { ...slotAfter, ...pwRoot });392    }393  }394  if (!duressConfigured) {395    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(slotA.ciphertext.length / 2));396  }397  await stampLocalVaultMutation();398}399400// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------401// Salt generation --- exported so the RECOVER_WITH_WORDS handler can derive402// a new key after password reset without re-importing the crypto module.403// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------404405export { deriveKey, generateSalt };406407export async function loadSlotA(): Promise<StoredVault | null> {408  return loadSlot(SLOT_A);409}410411/**412 * Recover the session root key by AES-GCM-decrypting the pw_root_* fields413 * (a second wrapping of the root key under the password-derived key). This414 * is what makes GET_RECOVERY_WORDS work across lock/unlock cycles without415 * the user re-entering their recovery phrase: the same root key bytes —416 * and therefore the same 12 words — survive every unlock.417 *418 * Returns null when the pw_root fields are absent (pre-v2.12 vault that419 * hasn't been migrated yet) or when decryption fails (wrong derived key,420 * tampered ciphertext). On null the caller should fall through to421 * migrateToRecovery() to populate the fields.422 */423async function deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(424  derivedKeyBytes: Uint8Array,425  slotA: StoredVault,426): Promise<Uint8Array | null> {427  if (!slotA.pw_root_ciphertext || !slotA.pw_root_nonce || !slotA.pw_root_tag) {428    return null;429  }430  try {431    const rootHex = await decrypt(432      derivedKeyBytes,433      slotA.pw_root_nonce,434      slotA.pw_root_ciphertext,435      slotA.pw_root_tag,436      "pw_root_v1",437    );438    return unhex(rootHex);439  } catch {440    return null;441  }442}443444// AES-GCM-wrap rootKey under derivedKey for the pw_root_* fields. Returns the445// hex-encoded ciphertext/nonce/tag triple ready to embed in StoredVault.446async function wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(447  derivedKeyBytes: Uint8Array,448  rootKeyBytes: Uint8Array,449): Promise<{ pw_root_ciphertext: string; pw_root_nonce: string; pw_root_tag: string }> {450  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKeyBytes, hex(rootKeyBytes), "pw_root_v1");451  return {452    pw_root_ciphertext: ciphertext,453    pw_root_nonce: nonce,454    pw_root_tag: tag,455  };456}457458/**459 * For vaults created before v2.12 (no recovery_salt/recovery_wrapped_root_key),460 * generate the root key, wrap it under the recovery words, and persist the461 * recovery escrow into slot A. The caller must show the recovery words to the462 * user before calling this — once called, those words are the vault's recovery463 * path. This runs once, on the first unlock of an upgraded vault.464 */465export async function migrateToRecovery(): Promise<void> {466  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {467    throw new Error("vault must be unlocked in real mode");468  }469  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);470  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");471  const hasRecoveryEscrow =472    !!slotA.recovery_salt && !!slotA.recovery_wrapped_root_key;473  const hasPwRoot = !!slotA.pw_root_ciphertext && !!slotA.pw_root_nonce;474  if (hasRecoveryEscrow && hasPwRoot) return; // already done475476  // If recovery escrow already exists but pw_root doesn't, we cannot recover477  // the original rootKey without the user's words. The least-surprising path478  // is to rotate to a fresh root key — the user's old recovery words become479  // invalid but we surface peach_recovery_pending so the popup re-presents480  // the words. The unlock-path callers all set that flag.481  const { rawRootKey, recoverySalt, wrappedRootKey, wrappedNonce, wrappedTag } =482    await generateAndWrapRootKey();483  rootKey = unhex(rawRootKey);484485  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(derivedKey, rootKey);486  const nextSlotA: StoredVault = {487    ...slotA,488    recovery_salt: recoverySalt,489    recovery_wrapped_root_key: wrappedRootKey,490    recovery_nonce: wrappedNonce,491    recovery_tag: wrappedTag,492    ...pwRoot,493  };494  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, nextSlotA);495  await stampLocalVaultMutation();496}497498/**499 * Returns the 12 recovery words for the current session's root key.500 * Must be called while the vault is unlocked. Throws if recovery has not501 * been set up (pre-v2.12 vault that hasn't migrated yet).502 */503export async function getRecoveryWords(): Promise<string[]> {504  if (!rootKey) {505    throw new Error("recovery not set up — vault may need migration");506  }507  return rootKeyToWords(rootKey);508}509510async function loadSlot(key: string): Promise<StoredVault | null> {511  const result = await chrome.storage.local.get(key);512  return (result as Record<string, StoredVault | undefined>)[key] ?? null;513}514515async function writeSlot(key: string, vault: StoredVault): Promise<void> {516  try {517    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [key]: vault });518  } catch (err) {519    throw mapStorageError(err);520  }521}522523async function stampLocalVaultMutation(): Promise<void> {524  await chrome.storage.local.set({525    peach_last_modified_at: String(Date.now()),526  });527}528529/**530 * One-shot migration from the pre-A-2 schema (peach_vault + peach_decoy_vault531 * + peach_duress flag) to the slot-neutral schema (peach_vault_a +532 * peach_vault_b). Runs at most once per session; safe to call repeatedly.533 */534async function ensureMigrated(): Promise<void> {535  if (migrationRan) return;536  migrationRan = true;537538  const keys = [LEGACY_MAIN, LEGACY_DECOY, LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG, SLOT_A, SLOT_B];539  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get(keys);540  const slotAExists = raw[SLOT_A] !== undefined;541  const slotBExists = raw[SLOT_B] !== undefined;542  const legacyMain = raw[LEGACY_MAIN] as StoredVault | undefined;543  const legacyDecoy = raw[LEGACY_DECOY] as StoredVault | undefined;544545  // Fresh install with nothing in storage — nothing to do; createVault() sets up both slots.546  if (!slotAExists && !legacyMain) return;547548  // Already migrated.549  if (slotAExists && slotBExists && !legacyMain && !legacyDecoy) return;550551  let didMigrate = false;552  if (legacyMain && !slotAExists) {553    await writeSlot(SLOT_A, legacyMain);554    didMigrate = true;555  }556557  // If slot B isn't set, populate it: use legacy decoy when present, else noise.558  if (!slotBExists) {559    const target = (legacyMain ?? raw[SLOT_A]) as StoredVault | undefined;560    if (legacyDecoy) {561      await writeSlot(SLOT_B, legacyDecoy);562      didMigrate = true;563    } else if (target) {564      await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(target.ciphertext.length / 2));565      didMigrate = true;566    }567  }568569  const toRemove: string[] = [];570  if (legacyMain) toRemove.push(LEGACY_MAIN);571  if (legacyDecoy) toRemove.push(LEGACY_DECOY);572  if (raw[LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG] !== undefined) toRemove.push(LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG);573  if (toRemove.length > 0) {574    await chrome.storage.local.remove(toRemove);575    didMigrate = true;576  }577  if (didMigrate) {578    await stampLocalVaultMutation();579  }580}581582// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------583// Padding + noise helpers584// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------585586/**587 * Pads the plaintext string with trailing spaces so that the encoded byte588 * length is a multiple of PAD_BLOCK. JSON.parse tolerates trailing589 * whitespace after a complete document, so the padding is transparent on590 * decode. Ciphertext length equals plaintext length plus a 16-byte tag.591 */592function padPlaintext(json: string): string {593  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(json);594  const target = Math.max(PAD_BLOCK, Math.ceil(encoded.length / PAD_BLOCK) * PAD_BLOCK);595  const padLen = target - encoded.length;596  return json + " ".repeat(padLen);597}598599/**600 * Produces a StoredVault-shaped record filled with CSPRNG bytes. The601 * ciphertext length matches the given byte count. Because GCM ciphertext is602 * pseudo-random, this blob is indistinguishable at rest from a real603 * encrypted vault without the key.604 *605 * crypto.getRandomValues() caps each call at 65536 bytes (the Web Crypto606 * spec hard limit). Chunk the fill so vaults larger than that — common once607 * the user has dozens of entries or any passkey — don't throw.608 */609const CSPRNG_CHUNK = 65_536;610611function fillRandom(buf: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {612  for (let offset = 0; offset < buf.length; offset += CSPRNG_CHUNK) {613    const end = Math.min(offset + CSPRNG_CHUNK, buf.length);614    const chunk = new Uint8Array(end - offset);615    crypto.getRandomValues(chunk);616    buf.set(chunk, offset);617  }618  return buf;619}620621function generateNoiseBlob(ciphertextBytes: number): StoredVault {622  const salt = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));623  const nonce = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));624  const cipher = fillRandom(new Uint8Array(ciphertextBytes));625  const tag = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));626  return {627    version: 1,628    salt: hex(salt),629    nonce: hex(nonce),630    ciphertext: hex(cipher),631    tag: hex(tag),632  };633}634635// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------636// Encrypted plaintext envelope637// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------638639type VaultPayload = {640  entries: VaultEntry[];641  duressConfigured?: boolean;642};643644type DecryptedPayload = {645  entries: VaultEntry[];646  duressConfigured: boolean;647  /**648   * True when at least one entry in the on-disk payload had a legacy shape649   * (pre-v2.11.0 passkey type/flat fields, or pre-A-2 created/updated keys)650   * and got rewritten by normalizeEntry. The unlock path uses this to651   * persist the new shape immediately — without it, the migration would652   * re-run on every unlock and old shape never disappears from disk.653   */654  migratedFromLegacy: boolean;655};656657function encodePayload(entries: VaultEntry[], duress: boolean): string {658  const envelope: VaultPayload = { entries, duressConfigured: duress };659  return padPlaintext(JSON.stringify(envelope));660}661662function rawNeedsMigration(raw: VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry): boolean {663  if ("created" in raw || "updated" in raw) return true;664  const flat = raw as Partial<VaultEntry>;665  if (flat.type === "passkey") return true;666  // Flat rpId without a passkey sub-object means pre-v2.11.0 schema.667  if (flat.rpId !== undefined && flat.passkey === undefined) return true;668  return false;669}670671function decodePayload(plain: string): DecryptedPayload {672  const parsed = JSON.parse(plain) as673    | Array<VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry>674    | VaultPayload;675676  const rawEntries = Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed : parsed.entries ?? [];677  const flatMigrationNeeded = rawEntries.some(rawNeedsMigration);678679  const normalized = rawEntries.map(normalizeEntry);680  const { merged } = mergePasskeyOnlyIntoLogins(normalized);681682  if (Array.isArray(parsed)) {683    return {684      entries: normalized,685      duressConfigured: false,686      migratedFromLegacy: true, // pre-A-2 array shape always needs save687    };688  }689690  return {691    entries: normalized,692    duressConfigured: parsed.duressConfigured === true,693    migratedFromLegacy: flatMigrationNeeded || merged,694  };695}696697/**698 * One-time consolidation pass run alongside the legacy passkey migration.699 *700 * Pre-v2.11.0 the Chrome passkey path always created a fresh `type:"passkey"`701 * entry per registration — so users who tested registration multiple times702 * accumulated several passkey-bearing entries for the same RP, and the703 * migration to the unified shape carried that duplication forward. This704 * pass collapses the duplicates:705 *706 *   1. Group passkey-bearing (and not deleted) entries by `passkey.rpId`.707 *   2. Within each group, the most recently-active credential wins (prefer708 *      lastUsedAt, fall back to passkey.createdAt, fall back to modifiedAt).709 *   3. If a NON-passkey login entry exists for that RP (matched by url or710 *      additionalUrls hostname), attach the winning passkey to it and711 *      soft-delete every passkey-bearing entry in the group.712 *   4. Otherwise, soft-delete every loser in the group, keeping the winner713 *      as a passkey-only entry.714 *715 * Soft delete (deletedAt) rather than splice — the trash flow keeps the716 * record around for retention and the user can restore if the heuristic717 * picked wrong. The `merged` flag goes back to decodePayload so the718 * unlock path persists the consolidated shape immediately.719 */720function mergePasskeyOnlyIntoLogins(entries: VaultEntry[]): { merged: boolean } {721  let merged = false;722  const now = Date.now();723724  const candidates = entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt && e.passkey);725  const byRpId = new Map<string, VaultEntry[]>();726  for (const e of candidates) {727    const rpId = e.passkey!.rpId;728    const list = byRpId.get(rpId);729    if (list) list.push(e);730    else byRpId.set(rpId, [e]);731  }732733  for (const [rpId, group] of byRpId) {734    if (group.length === 0) continue;735    group.sort((a, b) => {736      const aT =737        a.passkey!.lastUsedAt ?? a.passkey!.createdAt ?? a.modifiedAt ?? a.createdAt;738      const bT =739        b.passkey!.lastUsedAt ?? b.passkey!.createdAt ?? b.modifiedAt ?? b.createdAt;740      return bT - aT;741    });742    const winner = group[0]!;743744    // Look for a NON-passkey login entry matching this RP. Use the URL745    // hostname rather than a substring search so a "login.foo.com" entry746    // doesn't accidentally absorb a passkey for "foo.com".747    const loginTarget = entries.find((e) => {748      if (e.deletedAt || e.passkey || e.type !== "login") return false;749      if (e.url && extractDomain(e.url) === rpId) return true;750      for (const extra of e.additionalUrls ?? []) {751        if (extractDomain(extra) === rpId) return true;752      }753      return false;754    });755756    if (loginTarget) {757      loginTarget.passkey = winner.passkey;758      loginTarget.modifiedAt = now;759      for (const dup of group) {760        if (!dup.deletedAt) {761          dup.deletedAt = now;762          dup.modifiedAt = now;763        }764      }765      merged = true;766    } else if (group.length > 1) {767      for (let i = 1; i < group.length; i += 1) {768        const dup = group[i]!;769        if (!dup.deletedAt) {770          dup.deletedAt = now;771          dup.modifiedAt = now;772        }773      }774      merged = true;775    }776  }777778  return { merged };779}780781// Validates that a `StoredVault` record on disk has the field shape we expect782// before treating an AES-GCM decrypt success as a clean unlock. AES-GCM only783// authenticates the static VERSION_BYTE AAD, not the `version` field on the784// outer record — a corrupted `version: 42` slot still decrypts cleanly. This785// check surfaces that as `corrupted` (M7/COR-007) so the popup can offer a786// history-restore path instead of falsely reporting "wrong password".787function hasValidVaultSchema(v: unknown): v is StoredVault {788  if (typeof v !== "object" || v === null) return false;789  const r = v as Record<string, unknown>;790  return (791    r.version === 1 &&792    typeof r.salt === "string" &&793    typeof r.nonce === "string" &&794    typeof r.ciphertext === "string" &&795    typeof r.tag === "string"796  );797}798799export type TryDecryptResult =800  | { status: "ok"; payload: DecryptedPayload }801  | { status: "wrong_key" }802  | { status: "corrupted"; reason: string };803804// Exported solely for `unlockFromCodex` below, which needs to verify a805// supplied passphrase against a slotA blob *without* committing anything to806// storage. Keep this internal otherwise — callers crossing the messages.ts807// boundary should always go through `unlock` / `verifyMainPassword` so the808// constant-time invariants in Projects.md §3.4 are not bypassed.809export async function tryDecryptSlot(810  vault: StoredVault,811  key: Uint8Array,812  aadTag?: string,813): Promise<DecryptedPayload | null> {814  const res = await tryDecryptSlotResult(vault, key, aadTag);815  return res.status === "ok" ? res.payload : null;816}817818export async function tryDecryptSlotResult(819  vault: StoredVault,820  key: Uint8Array,821  aadTag?: string,822): Promise<TryDecryptResult> {823  if (!hasValidVaultSchema(vault)) {824    return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_slot_schema" };825  }826  let plain: string;827  try {828    plain = await decrypt(key, vault.nonce, vault.ciphertext, vault.tag, aadTag);829  } catch {830    return { status: "wrong_key" };831  }832  try {833    const parsed = JSON.parse(plain) as unknown;834    if (typeof parsed !== "object" || parsed === null) {835      return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_payload_shape" };836    }837    if (!Array.isArray(parsed) && !Array.isArray((parsed as VaultPayload).entries)) {838      return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_payload_shape" };839    }840    return { status: "ok", payload: decodePayload(plain) };841  } catch {842    return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_payload_json" };843  }844}845846// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------847// Core operations848// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------849850function buildDomainIndexSync(all: VaultEntry[]): void {851  domainIndex = new Map();852853  for (const entry of all) {854    if (entry.deletedAt) continue;855    if (entry.type === "note" || entry.type === "card") continue;856857    // An entry can match multiple sites via `additionalUrls`. Index each858    // hostname so `queryDomain` returns the entry regardless of which alias859    // the user is currently visiting. Dedupe per-entry so a single entry860    // never appears twice in one bucket.861    const domains = new Set<string>();862    const primary = extractDomain(entry.url ?? "");863    if (primary) domains.add(primary);864    for (const extra of entry.additionalUrls ?? []) {865      const d = extractDomain(extra);866      if (d) domains.add(d);867    }868    if (domains.size === 0) continue;869870    for (const domain of domains) {871      const bucket = domainIndex.get(domain) ?? [];872      bucket.push(entry);873      domainIndex.set(domain, bucket);874    }875  }876}877878export async function createVault(password: string): Promise<void> {879  await ensureMigrated();880881  const salt = generateSalt();882  derivedKey = await deriveKey(password, salt);883  entries = [];884  vaultMode = "real";885  duressConfigured = false;886  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);887888  // Generate and wrap the root key for recovery word escrow.889  const { rawRootKey, recoverySalt, wrappedRootKey, wrappedNonce, wrappedTag } =890    await generateAndWrapRootKey();891  rootKey = unhex(rawRootKey);892893  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured);894  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");895896  // Second wrapping of rootKey under derivedKey so future unlocks can rehydrate897  // it without recovery words (H2/COR-006).898  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(derivedKey, rootKey);899900  const slotA: StoredVault = {901    version: 1,902    salt: hex(salt),903    nonce,904    ciphertext,905    tag,906    recovery_salt: recoverySalt,907    recovery_wrapped_root_key: wrappedRootKey,908    recovery_nonce: wrappedNonce,909    recovery_tag: wrappedTag,910    ...pwRoot,911  };912  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, slotA);913914  // Matching-size noise blob for slot B, so a fresh install shows two915  // similarly-shaped records regardless of whether duress is ever set up.916  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2));917  await stampLocalVaultMutation();918919  touchAutoLock();920}921922export async function hasVault(): Promise<boolean> {923  await ensureMigrated();924  return (await loadSlot(SLOT_A)) !== null;925}926927/**928 * Returns whether the real vault has recorded that a duress passphrase is929 * configured. Reliable only after a real-mode unlock — before unlock or in930 * decoy mode, returns false because we cannot read slot A's plaintext.931 */932export async function isDuressEnabled(): Promise<boolean> {933  return vaultMode === "real" && duressConfigured;934}935936export async function setupDuress(duressPassword: string): Promise<void> {937  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {938    throw new Error("vault must be unlocked in real mode");939  }940  await ensureMigrated();941942  // Encrypt the decoy payload (empty entries) under the duress key. Pad to943  // at least the current slot A ciphertext size so the two slots look the944  // same at rest at setup time.945  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);946  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");947948  const decoySalt = generateSalt();949  const decoyKey = await deriveKey(duressPassword, decoySalt);950  try {951    // Pad the decoy plaintext to match slot A's ciphertext length (minus the952    // 16-byte tag) so encrypted sizes align exactly.953    const targetBytes = slotA.ciphertext.length / 2;954    let plaintext = encodePayload([], false);955    const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(plaintext);956    if (encoded.length < targetBytes) {957      plaintext = plaintext + " ".repeat(targetBytes - encoded.length);958    }959    const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(decoyKey, plaintext, "slot_b_v1");960    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, {961      version: 1,962      salt: hex(decoySalt),963      nonce,964      ciphertext,965      tag,966    });967  } finally {968    zeroKey(decoyKey);969  }970971  // Re-encrypt slot A with the duressConfigured flag set to true. No external972  // flag is written — the bit lives inside the encrypted envelope.973  duressConfigured = true;974  await persistSlotA();975}976977export async function disableDuress(): Promise<void> {978  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {979    throw new Error("vault must be unlocked in real mode");980  }981  await ensureMigrated();982983  // Overwrite slot B with fresh noise that matches slot A's size. The slot984  // remains occupied so its mere existence does not signal that duress was985  // ever configured.986  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);987  if (slotA) {988    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(slotA.ciphertext.length / 2));989  }990991  duressConfigured = false;992  await persistSlotA();993}994995// L14/COR-015: this function intentionally checks slot A (real vault) only.996// A duress-mode user attempting changePassword is rejected earlier by the997// vaultMode === 'decoy' check at changePassword. The real-vs-decoy998// distinction here is by design — duress users cannot rotate the real999// password by guessing it, and the asymmetry in error timing is acceptable1000// because duress mode is opt-in and the user knows their own decoy key.1001export async function verifyMainPassword(password: string): Promise<boolean> {1002  await ensureMigrated();1003  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1004  if (!slotA) return false;1005  const key = await deriveKey(password, unhex(slotA.salt));1006  try {1007    return (await tryDecryptSlot(slotA, key, "slot_a_v1")) !== null;1008  } finally {1009    zeroKey(key);1010  }1011}10121013export async function unlock(password: string): Promise<boolean> {1014  await ensureMigrated();10151016  // Load both slots in parallel. Both always exist post-migration; the1017  // parallel load and the parallel derivation below keep wall-clock time1018  // constant regardless of which slot's passphrase (real or decoy) the1019  // caller supplied, so a timing side channel cannot distinguish the1020  // duress path from the real-unlock path (DUR-002).1021  const [slotA, slotB] = await Promise.all([1022    loadSlot(SLOT_A),1023    loadSlot(SLOT_B),1024  ]);10251026  // Derive both keys in parallel, unconditionally.1027  const [keyA, keyB] = await Promise.all([1028    slotA ? deriveKey(password, unhex(slotA.salt)) : Promise.resolve(null),1029    slotB ? deriveKey(password, unhex(slotB.salt)) : Promise.resolve(null),1030  ]);10311032  // Attempt both decrypts in parallel. The Result variant lets us distinguish1033  // 'wrong_key' from 'corrupted' so callers can offer a history-restore path1034  // when a slot's schema is invalid even though AES-GCM authenticated (M7).1035  const [resultA, resultB] = await Promise.all([1036    keyA && slotA1037      ? tryDecryptSlotResult(slotA, keyA, "slot_a_v1")1038      : Promise.resolve({ status: "wrong_key" } as TryDecryptResult),1039    keyB && slotB1040      ? tryDecryptSlotResult(slotB, keyB, "slot_b_v1")1041      : Promise.resolve({ status: "wrong_key" } as TryDecryptResult),1042  ]);1043  const payloadA = resultA.status === "ok" ? resultA.payload : null;1044  const payloadB = resultB.status === "ok" ? resultB.payload : null;10451046  if (payloadA && keyA) {1047    derivedKey = keyA;1048    void saveSessionKey(keyA, "real");1049    vaultMode = "real";1050    entries = payloadA.entries;1051    duressConfigured = payloadA.duressConfigured;1052    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1053    await loadSettings();1054    touchAutoLock();1055    if (keyB) zeroKey(keyB);10561057    // slotA is non-null when payloadA is truthy (keyA was derived from slotA).1058    if (slotA) {1059      const needsRecoverySetup =1060        !slotA.recovery_salt || !slotA.recovery_wrapped_root_key;1061      if (!needsRecoverySetup) {1062        rootKey = await deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(keyA, slotA);1063      }1064      // Pre-v2.12 vault, or a vault whose pw_root_* fields haven't been written1065      // yet: generate the recovery escrow and seed pw_root_* so subsequent1066      // unlocks can rehydrate rootKey without the user's recovery words.1067      // Best-effort — a failure here must not block unlock.1068      if (needsRecoverySetup || !rootKey) {1069        try {1070          await migrateToRecovery();1071          if (needsRecoverySetup) {1072            // String "1" matches the popup's existing peach_recovery_pending1073            // check; surfaced so the user re-confirms recovery words after a1074            // legacy-vault unlock (H2/COR-006).1075            await chrome.storage.local.set({ peach_recovery_pending: '1' });1076          }1077        } catch (migrationErr) {1078          console.warn('[Peach] recovery migration failed:', migrationErr);1079        }1080      }1081    }10821083    // If the payload had a pre-v2.11.0 shape (legacy passkey type, flat1084    // passkey fields, or pre-A-2 created/updated keys), rewrite it now so1085    // the next save uses the new format and migration doesn't re-run forever.1086    if (payloadA.migratedFromLegacy) {1087      await persistSlotA();1088    }1089    return true;1090  }10911092  if (payloadB && keyB) {1093    derivedKey = keyB;1094    void saveSessionKey(keyB, "decoy");1095    vaultMode = "decoy";1096    entries = payloadB.entries;1097    duressConfigured = false;1098    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1099    await loadSettings();1100    touchAutoLock();1101    if (keyA) zeroKey(keyA);1102    return true;1103  }11041105  if (keyA) zeroKey(keyA);1106  if (keyB) zeroKey(keyB);1107  // Surface corruption (good AES tag, broken schema) distinctly from1108  // wrong-password so the popup can offer history-restore (M7/COR-007).1109  if (resultA.status === "corrupted") {1110    lastUnlockFailureReason = resultA.reason;1111  } else if (resultB.status === "corrupted") {1112    lastUnlockFailureReason = resultB.reason;1113  }1114  return false;1115}11161117// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------1118// MV3 service worker session key — survives SW restarts within a browser session1119// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------11201121// chrome.storage.session is cleared on browser close; survives SW restart.1122// Firefox does not implement it (persistent background script, no restart risk).1123const SESSION_KEY_STORAGE = "peach_session_dk";11241125async function saveSessionKey(key: Uint8Array, mode: "real" | "decoy"): Promise<void> {1126  if (!chrome.storage.session) return;1127  await chrome.storage.session.set({ [SESSION_KEY_STORAGE]: { keyHex: hex(key), mode } });1128}11291130async function clearSessionKey(): Promise<void> {1131  if (!chrome.storage.session) return;1132  await chrome.storage.session.remove(SESSION_KEY_STORAGE);1133}11341135/**1136 * On SW restart, re-derive all in-memory vault state from the session key1137 * stored in chrome.storage.session (set at unlock time, cleared on lock).1138 * Returns true if the vault was restored, false if no session key was found.1139 * No-ops if the vault is already unlocked.1140 */1141export async function restoreFromSession(): Promise<boolean> {1142  if (derivedKey !== null) return true;1143  if (!chrome.storage.session) return false;1144  const stored = await chrome.storage.session.get(SESSION_KEY_STORAGE);1145  const entry = stored[SESSION_KEY_STORAGE] as { keyHex: string; mode: "real" | "decoy" } | undefined;1146  if (!entry?.keyHex) return false;11471148  const key = unhex(entry.keyHex);1149  const slotKey = entry.mode === "real" ? SLOT_A : SLOT_B;1150  const aadTag = entry.mode === "real" ? "slot_a_v1" : "slot_b_v1";1151  const slot = await loadSlot(slotKey);1152  if (!slot) { await clearSessionKey(); return false; }11531154  const result = await tryDecryptSlotResult(slot, key, aadTag);1155  if (result.status !== "ok") { await clearSessionKey(); return false; }11561157  derivedKey = key;1158  vaultMode = entry.mode;1159  entries = result.payload.entries;1160  duressConfigured = entry.mode === "real" ? result.payload.duressConfigured : false;1161  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1162  await loadSettings();1163  touchAutoLock();11641165  if (entry.mode === "real" && slot.recovery_salt && slot.recovery_wrapped_root_key) {1166    try { rootKey = await deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(key, slot); } catch { /* non-fatal */ }1167  }11681169  return true;1170}11711172export function lock(): void {1173  void clearSessionKey();1174  if (derivedKey) {1175    zeroKey(derivedKey);1176    derivedKey = null;1177  }1178  if (rootKey) {1179    rootKey.fill(0);1180    rootKey = null;1181  }11821183  entries = [];1184  domainIndex = new Map();1185  vaultMode = "real";1186  duressConfigured = false;1187  clearAutoLock();1188}11891190export function isUnlocked(): boolean {1191  return derivedKey !== null;1192}11931194// Opens the vault using a pre-derived AES-256 key (skipping Argon2id).1195// Used by Android biometric unlock — the key was derived on the native side.1196export async function unlockWithKey(1197  masterKeyHex: string,1198): Promise<{ ok: true; entries: VaultEntry[] } | { ok: false; error: string }> {1199  try {1200    const masterKeyBytes = unhex(masterKeyHex);1201    const stored = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1202    if (!stored) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };1203    const payload = await tryDecryptSlot(stored, masterKeyBytes, "slot_a_v1");1204    if (!payload) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };12051206    derivedKey = masterKeyBytes;1207    vaultMode = "real";1208    entries = payload.entries;1209    duressConfigured = payload.duressConfigured;1210    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1211    await loadSettings();1212    touchAutoLock();1213    return { ok: true, entries };1214  } catch {1215    return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };1216  }1217}12181219/**1220 * Restore the vault from a parsed Peach Codex payload.1221 *1222 * The supplied passphrase is verified against the Codex's slotA *before* any1223 * storage mutation — wrong passphrases return without touching disk. On1224 * success, the current vault state is snapshotted (reason: "restore") so the1225 * user can revert via Settings -> Vault History, then slotA/slotB are written1226 * and `peach_last_modified_at` is set to the Codex's recorded timestamp. A1227 * regular `unlock()` follows so the rest of the SW sees the standard1228 * post-unlock state.1229 *1230 * Intentionally non-Pro-gated — see peach_codex_v2.md "Pro gating". A Codex1231 * printed by a Pro user must always be restorable, even on a free device.1232 *1233 * Timing is not held constant here (in contrast to `unlock`): the Codex flow1234 * is an explicit user action with a known passphrase, not a passive lock1235 * screen, so the duress-vs-real timing side channel does not apply.1236 */1237export async function unlockFromCodex(params: {1238  slotA: string; // JSON string of StoredVault for slot A1239  slotB: string | null; // JSON string of StoredVault for slot B, or null1240  timestamp: number;1241  masterPassphrase: string;1242}): Promise<1243  | { ok: true; entryCount: number }1244  | { ok: false; reason: "wrong_passphrase" | "invalid_slot_format" }1245> {1246  let parsedSlotA: StoredVault;1247  let parsedSlotB: StoredVault | null = null;1248  try {1249    const rawA = JSON.parse(params.slotA) as unknown;1250    if (!hasValidVaultSchema(rawA)) {1251      return { ok: false, reason: "invalid_slot_format" };1252    }1253    parsedSlotA = rawA;1254    if (params.slotB !== null) {1255      const rawB = JSON.parse(params.slotB) as unknown;1256      if (!hasValidVaultSchema(rawB)) {1257        return { ok: false, reason: "invalid_slot_format" };1258      }1259      parsedSlotB = rawB;1260    }1261  } catch {1262    return { ok: false, reason: "invalid_slot_format" };1263  }12641265  // Verify the passphrase against the supplied slotA WITHOUT writing anything.1266  // If this fails the on-disk vault is left completely untouched.1267  const trialKey = await deriveKey(params.masterPassphrase, unhex(parsedSlotA.salt));1268  const trialPayload = await tryDecryptSlot(parsedSlotA, trialKey, "slot_a_v1");1269  if (!trialPayload) {1270    zeroKey(trialKey);1271    return { ok: false, reason: "wrong_passphrase" };1272  }1273  // Drop the trial key; `unlock()` below derives its own copy. Holding two1274  // copies of the master key in memory at once would be a needless surface.1275  zeroKey(trialKey);12761277  // Snapshot the about-to-be-overwritten on-disk state so the user can revert1278  // a mistaken Codex restore via the Vault History UI. Non-fatal if it fails.1279  await takeVaultSnapshot("restore");12801281  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, parsedSlotA);1282  if (parsedSlotB) {1283    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, parsedSlotB);1284  } else {1285    // Slot B must always exist with ciphertext length matching slot A1286    // (Projects.md §3.2). Codex prints may omit slot B (duress wasn't1287    // configured); regenerate noise to satisfy the invariant.1288    await writeSlot(1289      SLOT_B,1290      generateNoiseBlob(parsedSlotA.ciphertext.length / 2),1291    );1292  }1293  await chrome.storage.local.set({1294    peach_last_modified_at: String(params.timestamp),1295  });12961297  // Standard unlock path so domain index, settings, auto-lock, and1298  // recovery-key state all populate exactly as a normal unlock would.1299  const ok = await unlock(params.masterPassphrase);1300  if (!ok) {1301    // Should be unreachable — we just verified the passphrase against the1302    // same slotA we wrote. Treat as wrong_passphrase to keep the contract1303    // simple if some race or storage anomaly intrudes.1304    return { ok: false, reason: "wrong_passphrase" };1305  }1306  return { ok: true, entryCount: getEntries().length };1307}13081309// Returns the current in-memory derived key as a hex string.1310// Used by the biometric enable flow in Settings to store the key in Android Keystore.1311export function getDerivedKeyHex(): string {1312  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_not_unlocked");1313  return hex(derivedKey);1314}13151316export function getEntries(): VaultEntry[] {1317  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1318  return entries.filter((entry) => !entry.deletedAt);1319}13201321const EMAIL_RE = /^[^\s@]+@[^\s@]+\.[^\s@]+$/;13221323export function getIdentities(): SavedIdentity[] {1324  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1325  const active = entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt && e.type === "login");13261327  const emailMap = new Map<string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }>();1328  const usernameMap = new Map<string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }>();13291330  for (const entry of active) {1331    const value = entry.username?.trim();1332    if (!value) continue;1333    const map = EMAIL_RE.test(value) ? emailMap : usernameMap;1334    const existing = map.get(value);1335    const domain = extractDomain(entry.url ?? "") ?? "";1336    const modifiedAt = entry.modifiedAt ?? entry.createdAt ?? 0;1337    if (!existing || modifiedAt > existing.lastUsed) {1338      map.set(value, { lastUsed: modifiedAt, count: (existing?.count ?? 0) + 1, domain });1339    } else {1340      map.set(value, { ...existing, count: existing.count + 1 });1341    }1342  }13431344  const toIdentity = (type: "email" | "username") =>1345    ([value, d]: [string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }]): SavedIdentity => ({1346      value, type, lastUsed: d.lastUsed, useCount: d.count, exampleDomain: d.domain || undefined,1347    });13481349  return [1350    ...[...emailMap.entries()].map(toIdentity("email")).sort((a, b) => b.useCount - a.useCount),1351    ...[...usernameMap.entries()].map(toIdentity("username")).sort((a, b) => b.useCount - a.useCount),1352  ];1353}13541355export async function batchAddEntries(drafts: EntryDraft[]): Promise<VaultEntry[]> {1356  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");13571358  const now = Date.now();1359  const added: VaultEntry[] = [];1360  for (const draft of drafts) {1361    try {1362      const sanitized = sanitizeEntryDraft(draft);1363      const nextEntry: VaultEntry = {1364        ...sanitized,1365        id: crypto.randomUUID(),1366        createdAt: now,1367        modifiedAt: now,1368      };1369      entries.push(nextEntry);1370      added.push(nextEntry);1371    } catch {1372      // Skip invalid drafts silently — caller can see diff between input and output length1373    }1374  }13751376  if (added.length > 0) {1377    await persistEntries();1378  }13791380  return added;1381}13821383/**1384 * Restore a set of entries in full fidelity — preserves id, createdAt,1385 * modifiedAt, and every other field unlike `batchAddEntries` which1386 * assigns fresh identity. Used by restore paths where the backup is the1387 * authoritative source of truth. `mode` controls how entries already in1388 * the vault are treated.1389 */1390export async function restoreEntries(1391  incoming: VaultEntry[],1392  mode: "replace" | "merge"1393): Promise<{ added: number; updated: number; skipped: number }> {1394  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");13951396  // A replace with zero incoming entries is almost certainly a caller bug1397  // (e.g. an import that silently dropped everything). Refuse rather than1398  // wipe the vault.1399  if (mode === "replace" && incoming.length === 0) {1400    throw new Error("refuse to replace with empty entry set");1401  }14021403  let added = 0;1404  let updated = 0;1405  let skipped = 0;14061407  if (mode === "replace") {1408    entries = [];1409    for (const entry of incoming) {1410      const normalized = sanitizeRestoredEntry(entry);1411      if (!normalized) {1412        skipped += 1;1413        continue;1414      }1415      entries.push(normalized);1416      added += 1;1417    }1418  } else {1419    const byId = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();1420    for (const e of entries) byId.set(e.id, e);14211422    for (const entry of incoming) {1423      const normalized = sanitizeRestoredEntry(entry);1424      if (!normalized) {1425        skipped += 1;1426        continue;1427      }1428      const existing = byId.get(normalized.id);1429      if (!existing) {1430        entries.push(normalized);1431        added += 1;1432      } else if (normalized.modifiedAt > existing.modifiedAt) {1433        const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === existing.id);1434        if (idx !== -1) {1435          entries[idx] = normalized;1436          updated += 1;1437        }1438      } else {1439        skipped += 1;1440      }1441    }1442  }14431444  await persistEntries("import");1445  return { added, updated, skipped };1446}14471448/**1449 * Validate + normalise a VaultEntry coming from a backup. Accepts1450 * anything structurally sound; keeps all metadata verbatim. Returns1451 * null for values the live vault shouldn't accept (e.g., missing title).1452 */1453function sanitizeRestoredEntry(entry: VaultEntry): VaultEntry | null {1454  if (!entry || typeof entry !== "object") return null;1455  const title = typeof entry.title === "string" ? entry.title.trim() : "";1456  if (!title) return null;1457  const id = typeof entry.id === "string" && entry.id ? entry.id : crypto.randomUUID();1458  const now = Date.now();1459  const createdAt = typeof entry.createdAt === "number" ? entry.createdAt : now;1460  const modifiedAt = typeof entry.modifiedAt === "number" ? entry.modifiedAt : createdAt;14611462  // Migrate legacy passkey shape on import (same logic as on-disk read).1463  // Imports from pre-v2.11.0 vault backups still carry type:"passkey" with1464  // flat fields; bring them into the new shape immediately.1465  const migrated: VaultEntry = migrateLegacyPasskey(1466    {1467      ...entry,1468      id,1469      title,1470      type: entry.type ?? "login",1471      createdAt,1472      modifiedAt,1473    },1474    entry1475  );14761477  // Login entries from backup must carry a password (or be passkey-only,1478  // in which case the passkey sub-object replaces the password requirement).1479  if (1480    migrated.type === "login" &&1481    !migrated.passkey &&1482    typeof migrated.password !== "string"1483  ) {1484    return null;1485  }1486  if (migrated.passkey && !migrated.passkey.credentialId) {1487    return null;1488  }14891490  return migrated;1491}14921493// Soft-deletes every non-deleted entry in one call. The literal string1494// argument is a tripwire against accidental calls — any caller that would1495// wipe the vault has to consciously type "REPLACE_ALL". Do not relax this1496// to a boolean.1497export async function clearVaultEntries(1498  confirmation: "REPLACE_ALL"1499): Promise<void> {1500  if (confirmation !== "REPLACE_ALL") {1501    throw new Error("clearVaultEntries requires explicit confirmation");1502  }1503  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1504  for (const entry of entries) {1505    if (!entry.deletedAt) {1506      entry.deletedAt = Date.now();1507      entry.modifiedAt = Date.now();1508    }1509  }1510  await persistEntries();1511}15121513export async function addEntry(entry: EntryDraft): Promise<VaultEntry> {1514  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");15151516  const sanitized = sanitizeEntryDraft(entry);1517  const now = Date.now();1518  const nextEntry: VaultEntry = {1519    ...sanitized,1520    id: crypto.randomUUID(),1521    createdAt: now,1522    modifiedAt: now,1523    // Stamp passwordChangedAt at creation so age tracking is accurate from1524    // day one. Non-login entries carry the same stamp harmlessly.1525    passwordChangedAt: sanitized.password ? now : undefined,1526  };15271528  // Clone-and-replace so a failed persist rolls back the in-memory state1529  // (COR-008). Without this, a quota-full or storage error leaves the1530  // module-level `entries` ahead of what's actually on disk.1531  const rollback = entries;1532  entries = [...entries, nextEntry];1533  try {1534    await persistEntries();1535  } catch (err) {1536    entries = rollback;1537    throw err;1538  }15391540  // Fire-and-forget breach check (only for login entries if breach monitoring is enabled or not set)1541  if (settings.breachMonitoring !== false && nextEntry.type === "login" && nextEntry.password) {1542    checkBreach(nextEntry.password).then(async (count) => {1543      if (count > 0) {1544        const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === nextEntry.id);1545        if (idx !== -1) {1546          entries[idx] = { ...entries[idx], breach: count, modifiedAt: Date.now() };1547          await persistEntries();1548        }1549      }1550    });1551  }15521553  return nextEntry;1554}15551556export async function updateEntry(1557  id: string,1558  patch: Partial<VaultEntry>1559): Promise<void> {1560  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");15611562  const idx = entries.findIndex((entry) => entry.id === id);1563  if (idx === -1 || entries[idx].deletedAt) {1564    throw new Error("entry_not_found");1565  }15661567  const current = entries[idx];1568  const sanitizedPatch = sanitizeEntryPatch(patch);1569  // Refresh passwordChangedAt only when the password value actually changes —1570  // a metadata-only update (title, tags, etc.) must not reset the age clock1571  // that drives the Pro health rotation recommendation.1572  const passwordChanged =1573    "password" in patch &&1574    typeof sanitizedPatch.password === "string" &&1575    sanitizedPatch.password !== current.password;1576  entries[idx] = {1577    ...current,1578    ...sanitizedPatch,1579    modifiedAt: Date.now(),1580    ...(passwordChanged ? { passwordChangedAt: Date.now() } : {}),1581  };15821583  // A login entry must carry SOMETHING fillable — either a password or a1584  // passkey credential. An empty-password login with no passkey is dead1585  // state. Permit the password-clear when a passkey is attached (that's1586  // the legitimate "drop the password, keep the passkey" path).1587  if (1588    entries[idx].type === "login" &&1589    !entries[idx].password &&1590    !entries[idx].passkey1591  ) {1592    entries[idx] = current;1593    throw new Error("password or passkey required");1594  }15951596  // Card entries must retain their card number1597  if (entries[idx].type === "card" && !entries[idx].cardNumber) {1598    entries[idx] = current;1599    throw new Error("card number is required for card entries");1600  }16011602  await persistEntries();16031604  // Breach check when password changes: clear immediately so old breach doesn't linger,1605  // then async-check the new password and only re-set if it's also found.1606  if ("password" in patch && settings.breachMonitoring !== false && entries[idx].type === "login") {1607    entries[idx] = { ...entries[idx], breach: undefined };1608    await persistEntries();1609    const password = entries[idx].password;1610    if (password) {1611      checkBreach(password).then(async (count) => {1612        const i = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id);1613        if (i !== -1 && count > 0) {1614          entries[i] = { ...entries[i], breach: count, modifiedAt: Date.now() };1615          await persistEntries();1616        }1617      });1618    }1619  }1620}16211622export async function deleteEntry(id: string): Promise<void> {1623  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");16241625  const entry = entries.find((item) => item.id === id);1626  if (!entry || entry.deletedAt) {1627    throw new Error("entry_not_found");1628  }16291630  entry.deletedAt = Date.now();1631  entry.modifiedAt = Date.now();1632  await persistEntries();1633}16341635export function getDeletedEntries(): VaultEntry[] {1636  if (!derivedKey) return [];1637  return entries.filter((e) => !!e.deletedAt);1638}16391640export async function restoreEntry(id: string): Promise<void> {1641  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1642  const entry = entries.find((e) => e.id === id && e.deletedAt);1643  if (!entry) throw new Error("deleted entry not found");1644  delete entry.deletedAt;1645  entry.modifiedAt = Date.now();1646  await persistEntries();1647  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1648}16491650export async function purgeEntry(id: string): Promise<void> {1651  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1652  const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id && e.deletedAt);1653  if (idx === -1) throw new Error("deleted entry not found");1654  entries.splice(idx, 1);1655  await persistEntries();1656}16571658/** Permanently delete entries whose deletedAt is older than retentionMs. 0 = keep forever. */1659export async function purgeExpiredTrash(retentionMs: number): Promise<number> {1660  if (!derivedKey || retentionMs === 0) return 0;1661  const cutoff = Date.now() - retentionMs;1662  const before = entries.length;1663  entries = entries.filter((e) => !(e.deletedAt && e.deletedAt < cutoff));1664  const purged = before - entries.length;1665  if (purged > 0) await persistEntries();1666  return purged;1667}16681669export function queryDomain(domain: string): VaultEntry[] {1670  return domainIndex.get(domain) ?? [];1671}16721673export function getEntryById(id: string): VaultEntry | undefined {1674  return entries.find((entry) => entry.id === id && !entry.deletedAt);1675}16761677async function persistSlotA(1678  reason: VaultSnapshot["reason"] = "local_save",1679): Promise<StoredVault> {1680  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");16811682  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1683  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");16841685  // Snapshot the about-to-be-overwritten state BEFORE we mutate disk. Failures1686  // are swallowed by takeVaultSnapshot — history must never block a save.1687  await takeVaultSnapshot(reason);16881689  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured);1690  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");16911692  // Preserve existing recovery escrow fields.1693  const nextSlotA: StoredVault = {1694    ...slotA,1695    nonce,1696    ciphertext,1697    tag,1698    // recovery_salt and recovery_wrapped_root_key are already set from loadSlot1699  };1700  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, nextSlotA);17011702  // When duress is not configured, keep slot B size-matched with slot A by1703  // regenerating its noise. When duress IS configured, leave slot B alone —1704  // we don't have the decoy key to re-encrypt it. This is a known trade-off.1705  if (!duressConfigured) {1706    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2));1707  }1708  await stampLocalVaultMutation();17091710  return nextSlotA;1711}17121713async function persistSlotB(): Promise<void> {1714  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");17151716  const slotB = await loadSlot(SLOT_B);1717  if (!slotB) throw new Error("missing slot B");17181719  // Decoy plaintext always reports duressConfigured=false — the decoy user1720  // sees a clean slate.1721  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, false);1722  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKey, plaintext, "slot_b_v1");17231724  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, { ...slotB, nonce, ciphertext, tag });1725  await stampLocalVaultMutation();1726}17271728async function persistEntries(1729  reason: VaultSnapshot["reason"] = "local_save",1730): Promise<void> {1731  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");17321733  if (vaultMode === "decoy") {1734    await persistSlotB();1735  } else {1736    await persistSlotA(reason);1737  }1738  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1739}17401741function cleanAdditionalUrls(values: string[] | undefined): string[] | undefined {1742  if (!Array.isArray(values)) return undefined;1743  const seen = new Set<string>();1744  const cleaned: string[] = [];1745  for (const value of values) {1746    const trimmed = typeof value === "string" ? value.trim() : "";1747    if (!trimmed) continue;1748    const key = trimmed.toLowerCase();1749    if (seen.has(key)) continue;1750    seen.add(key);1751    cleaned.push(trimmed);1752  }1753  return cleaned.length > 0 ? cleaned : undefined;1754}17551756function sanitizeEntryDraft(entry: EntryDraft): EntryDraft {1757  const title = entry.title.trim();1758  // Accept legacy `type:"passkey"` drafts but rewrite to "login" — the new1759  // model is "any entry, optionally with a passkey sub-object." Imports and1760  // any in-flight callers from before v2.11.0 keep working without throwing.1761  let type: VaultEntry["type"] = entry.type ?? "login";1762  if (type === "passkey") type = "login";17631764  if (!title) throw new Error("title is required");1765  // A login entry needs either a password or a passkey credential to be useful.1766  // Passkey-only entries (passkey present, no password) are valid.1767  if (type === "login" && !entry.password?.trim() && !entry.passkey) {1768    throw new Error("password or passkey required");1769  }1770  if (entry.passkey) {1771    const p = entry.passkey;1772    if (1773      !p.rpId ||1774      !p.credentialId ||1775      !p.publicKeyCose ||1776      !p.userHandle ||1777      !p.userName ||1778      (p.algorithm !== -7 && p.algorithm !== -8)1779    ) {1780      throw new Error("invalid passkey credential");1781    }1782  }1783  if (type === "card") {1784    if (!entry.cardholderName?.trim() || !entry.cardNumber?.trim()) {1785      throw new Error("cardholder name and card number are required");1786    }1787  }17881789  return {1790    type,1791    title,1792    username: type === "login" ? entry.username?.trim() ?? "" : undefined,1793    password: type === "login" ? entry.password : undefined,1794    url: type === "login" ? entry.url?.trim() ?? "" : undefined,1795    additionalUrls: type === "login" ? cleanAdditionalUrls(entry.additionalUrls) : undefined,1796    totp: type === "login" ? entry.totp?.trim() || undefined : undefined,1797    notes: entry.notes?.trim() || undefined,1798    breach: type === "login" ? entry.breach : undefined,1799    canary: type === "login" ? entry.canary : undefined,1800    tags: entry.tags,1801    passkey: entry.passkey,1802    cardholderName: type === "card" ? entry.cardholderName?.trim() : undefined,1803    cardNumber: type === "card" ? entry.cardNumber?.trim() : undefined,1804    expMonth: type === "card" ? entry.expMonth?.trim() : undefined,1805    expYear: type === "card" ? entry.expYear?.trim() : undefined,1806    cvc: type === "card" ? entry.cvc?.trim() : undefined,1807    cardNickname: type === "card" ? entry.cardNickname?.trim() || undefined : undefined,1808    network: type === "card" ? entry.network : undefined,1809    last4: type === "card" ? entry.last4?.trim() : undefined,1810  };1811}18121813function sanitizeEntryPatch(patch: Partial<VaultEntry>): Partial<VaultEntry> {1814  const nextPatch: Partial<VaultEntry> = {};18151816  if ("type" in patch) {1817    nextPatch.type = patch.type;1818  }18191820  if ("title" in patch) {1821    const title = patch.title?.trim() ?? "";1822    if (!title) throw new Error("title is required");1823    nextPatch.title = title;1824  }18251826  if ("url" in patch) {1827    nextPatch.url = patch.url?.trim() ?? "";1828  }18291830  if ("additionalUrls" in patch) {1831    const incoming = Array.isArray(patch.additionalUrls) ? patch.additionalUrls : [];1832    const seen = new Set<string>();1833    const cleaned: string[] = [];1834    for (const value of incoming) {1835      const trimmed = typeof value === "string" ? value.trim() : "";1836      if (!trimmed) continue;1837      const key = trimmed.toLowerCase();1838      if (seen.has(key)) continue;1839      seen.add(key);1840      cleaned.push(trimmed);1841    }1842    nextPatch.additionalUrls = cleaned.length > 0 ? cleaned : undefined;1843  }18441845  if ("username" in patch) {1846    nextPatch.username = patch.username?.trim() ?? "";1847  }18481849  if ("email" in patch) {1850    nextPatch.email = patch.email?.trim() || undefined;1851  }18521853  if ("password" in patch) {1854    const password = patch.password ?? "";1855    // Allow clearing a password (e.g. on passkey-only entries)1856    nextPatch.password = password || undefined;1857  }18581859  if ("totp" in patch) {1860    nextPatch.totp = patch.totp?.trim() || undefined;1861  }18621863  if ("notes" in patch) {1864    nextPatch.notes = patch.notes?.trim() || undefined;1865  }18661867  if ("breach" in patch) {1868    nextPatch.breach = patch.breach;1869  }18701871  if ("canary" in patch) {1872    nextPatch.canary = patch.canary;1873  }18741875  if ("passkey" in patch) {1876    // Passkey sub-object replaces all the legacy flat passkey fields. A1877    // patch with `passkey: undefined` removes the credential from the entry1878    // (used by "remove passkey" without deleting the whole entry).1879    nextPatch.passkey = patch.passkey;1880  }18811882  if ("tags" in patch) {1883    nextPatch.tags = patch.tags;1884  }18851886  if ("cardholderName" in patch) {1887    nextPatch.cardholderName = patch.cardholderName?.trim() || undefined;1888  }1889  if ("cardNumber" in patch) {1890    const n = patch.cardNumber ?? "";1891    nextPatch.cardNumber = n || undefined;1892  }1893  if ("expMonth" in patch) {1894    nextPatch.expMonth = patch.expMonth?.trim() || undefined;1895  }1896  if ("expYear" in patch) {1897    nextPatch.expYear = patch.expYear?.trim() || undefined;1898  }1899  if ("cvc" in patch) {1900    nextPatch.cvc = patch.cvc?.trim() || undefined;1901  }1902  if ("cardNickname" in patch) {1903    nextPatch.cardNickname = patch.cardNickname?.trim() || undefined;1904  }1905  if ("network" in patch) {1906    nextPatch.network = patch.network;1907  }1908  if ("last4" in patch) {1909    nextPatch.last4 = patch.last4?.trim() || undefined;1910  }19111912  return nextPatch;1913}19141915function normalizeEntry(entry: VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry): VaultEntry {1916  const createdAt = "createdAt" in entry ? entry.createdAt : entry.created;1917  const modifiedAt =1918    "modifiedAt" in entry ? entry.modifiedAt : entry.updated;19191920  const base: VaultEntry = {1921    id: entry.id,1922    type: "type" in entry ? entry.type : "login",1923    title: entry.title,1924    username: entry.username,1925    password: entry.password,1926    url: entry.url,1927    totp: entry.totp,1928    notes: entry.notes,1929    breach: entry.breach,1930    canary: "canary" in entry ? entry.canary : undefined,1931    passkey: "passkey" in entry ? entry.passkey : undefined,1932    createdAt,1933    modifiedAt,1934    deletedAt: entry.deletedAt,1935    tags: "tags" in entry ? entry.tags : undefined,1936    cardholderName: "cardholderName" in entry ? entry.cardholderName : undefined,1937    cardNumber: "cardNumber" in entry ? entry.cardNumber : undefined,1938    expMonth: "expMonth" in entry ? entry.expMonth : undefined,1939    expYear: "expYear" in entry ? entry.expYear : undefined,1940    cvc: "cvc" in entry ? entry.cvc : undefined,1941    cardNickname: "cardNickname" in entry ? entry.cardNickname : undefined,1942    network: "network" in entry ? entry.network : undefined,1943    last4: "last4" in entry ? entry.last4 : undefined,1944  };19451946  return migrateLegacyPasskey(base, entry);1947}19481949/**1950 * v2.11.0 read migration. Pre-v2.11.0 passkey entries used `type:"passkey"`1951 * with flat top-level fields (rpId, credentialId, etc.). This converts them1952 * to the new shape — `type:"login"` with a `passkey` sub-object — so all1953 * downstream consumers can rely on the new model. The result is rewritten1954 * to disk on next vault save (hasLegacyShape detects the un-migrated case).1955 */1956function migrateLegacyPasskey(1957  base: VaultEntry,1958  raw: VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry1959): VaultEntry {1960  if (base.passkey) return base;1961  const flat = raw as Partial<VaultEntry>;1962  const isPasskeyType = base.type === "passkey";1963  const hasFlatPasskeyFields =1964    typeof flat.rpId === "string" &&1965    typeof flat.credentialId === "string" &&1966    typeof flat.publicKeyCose === "string" &&1967    typeof flat.userHandle === "string" &&1968    typeof flat.userName === "string";1969  if (!isPasskeyType && !hasFlatPasskeyFields) return base;1970  if (!hasFlatPasskeyFields) return base;19711972  const algorithm: -7 | -8 = flat.algorithm === -8 ? -8 : -7;1973  base.passkey = {1974    rpId: flat.rpId!,1975    rpName: flat.rpName ?? flat.rpId!,1976    credentialId: flat.credentialId!,1977    publicKeyCose: flat.publicKeyCose!,1978    privateKeyJwk: flat.privateKeyJwk,1979    userHandle: flat.userHandle!,1980    userName: flat.userName!,1981    userDisplayName: flat.userDisplayName ?? flat.userName!,1982    algorithm,1983    signCount: flat.signCount ?? 0,1984    aaguid: flat.aaguid ?? "",1985    backupEligible: flat.backupEligible === true,1986    backupState: flat.backupState === true,1987    lastUsedAt: flat.lastUsedAt,1988    browser: flat.browser,1989    transports: flat.transports,1990    createdAt: base.createdAt,1991  };1992  // Promote to "login" so the unified Entry view renders. Username gets1993  // populated from the passkey's userName so the entry is searchable in the1994  // existing autofill flow without a separate code path.1995  if (isPasskeyType) base.type = "login";1996  if (!base.username) base.username = flat.userName;1997  if (!base.url) base.url = `https://${flat.rpId}`;1998  return base;1999}200020012002// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------2003// Deduplication2004// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------20052006function entryDupeKey(e: VaultEntry): string {2007  if (e.type === "note") return `note|${e.title.toLowerCase()}`;2008  // Passkey-bearing entries dedupe by the credential's RP + user. Two logins2009  // on different sites that happen to share a username are still distinct;2010  // two passkey credentials for the same RP+user are duplicates regardless2011  // of any login fields they may also carry.2012  if (e.passkey) {2013    return `passkey|${e.passkey.rpId.toLowerCase()}|${e.passkey.userName.toLowerCase()}`;2014  }2015  return `login|${e.title.toLowerCase()}|${(e.url ?? "").toLowerCase()}|${(e.username ?? "").toLowerCase()}`;2016}20172018/** Returns the number of duplicate entries (those that would be removed). */2019export function countDuplicates(): number {2020  const best = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();2021  let dupeCount = 0;2022  for (const e of entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt)) {2023    const key = entryDupeKey(e);2024    const existing = best.get(key);2025    if (!existing) {2026      best.set(key, e);2027    } else {2028      dupeCount++;2029      // Keep the more recently modified one in the map2030      if ((e.modifiedAt ?? e.createdAt ?? 0) > (existing.modifiedAt ?? existing.createdAt ?? 0)) {2031        best.set(key, e);2032      }2033    }2034  }2035  return dupeCount;2036}20372038/**2039 * Soft-deletes duplicate entries, keeping the most recently modified copy of2040 * each group. Returns the number of entries moved to trash.2041 */2042export async function deduplicateEntries(): Promise<number> {2043  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");2044  // Dedup reshapes slot B permanently under the decoy key, which is2045  // forensically distinguishable from a freshly-seeded decoy vault. Refuse.2046  if (vaultMode === "decoy") {2047    throw new Error("deduplicate disabled in decoy mode");2048  }20492050  const best = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();2051  for (const e of entries.filter((en) => !en.deletedAt)) {2052    const key = entryDupeKey(e);2053    const existing = best.get(key);2054    if (!existing) {2055      best.set(key, e);2056    } else if ((e.modifiedAt ?? e.createdAt ?? 0) > (existing.modifiedAt ?? existing.createdAt ?? 0)) {2057      best.set(key, e);2058    }2059  }20602061  const keepIds = new Set(Array.from(best.values()).map((e) => e.id));2062  const now = Date.now();2063  let removed = 0;2064  entries = entries.map((e) => {2065    if (!e.deletedAt && !keepIds.has(e.id)) {2066      removed++;2067      return { ...e, deletedAt: now };2068    }2069    return e;2070  });20712072  if (removed > 0) await persistEntries();2073  return removed;2074}20752076// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------2077// Vault history — snapshot BEFORE every vault write so the saved blob is2078// what is about to be lost, not what was just written. Capped at 10. The2079// stored blobs are AES-256-GCM ciphertext under the master password, so2080// history adds zero security surface.2081// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------20822083const HISTORY_KEY = "peach_vault_history";2084const HISTORY_MAX = 10;20852086/**2087 * Snapshot the CURRENT on-disk vault state into history. Call this BEFORE2088 * overwriting peach_vault_a so the saved blob captures the about-to-be-lost2089 * state. Identical-to-most-recent blobs are skipped to avoid filling history2090 * with no-op writes.2091 */2092export async function takeVaultSnapshot(2093  reason: VaultSnapshot["reason"],2094): Promise<void> {2095  try {2096    const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get([SLOT_A, SLOT_B, HISTORY_KEY]);2097    const slotA = (raw as Record<string, StoredVault | undefined>)[SLOT_A];2098    const slotB = (raw as Record<string, StoredVault | undefined>)[SLOT_B];20992100    // Nothing to snapshot if the real slot doesn't exist yet (fresh install,2101    // pre-createVault). createVault skips snapshots intentionally — there is2102    // no prior state to preserve.2103    if (!slotA) return;21042105    const vault_a = JSON.stringify(slotA);2106    const vault_b = JSON.stringify(slotB ?? slotA);21072108    // Best-effort entry count: only meaningful when the in-memory state is2109    // unlocked AND in real mode. Decoy mode would leak the decoy entry2110    // count; locked mode has no entries to count. Both fall through to null.2111    let entryCount: number | null = null;2112    if (derivedKey && vaultMode === "real") {2113      try {2114        entryCount = entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt).length;2115      } catch {2116        entryCount = null;2117      }2118    }21192120    const existingRaw = (raw as Record<string, VaultHistory | undefined>)[HISTORY_KEY];2121    const history: VaultHistory = existingRaw && Array.isArray(existingRaw.snapshots)2122      ? existingRaw2123      : { snapshots: [] };21242125    // Deduplication: if the most recent snapshot has byte-identical blobs,2126    // skip — saves the same vault N times in a row would otherwise burn the2127    // entire history window with no recovery value.2128    const latest = history.snapshots[0];2129    if (latest && latest.vault_a === vault_a && latest.vault_b === vault_b) {2130      return;2131    }21322133    const snapshot: VaultSnapshot = {2134      id: crypto.randomUUID(),2135      savedAt: Date.now(),2136      reason,2137      vault_a,2138      vault_b,2139      entryCount,2140    };21412142    history.snapshots = [snapshot, ...history.snapshots].slice(0, HISTORY_MAX);2143    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [HISTORY_KEY]: history });2144  } catch (err) {2145    // Non-fatal — history must never block a save. A failed snapshot just2146    // means the user loses one rung of the safety ladder for this write.2147    // M4/QUA-006: log so the failure is visible; if it looks like a quota2148    // problem, notify the popup so the user can prune history themselves.2149    console.warn('[Peach] takeVaultSnapshot failed:', err);2150    if (String(err).includes('QUOTA') || String(err).includes('quota')) {2151      try {2152        await chrome.runtime.sendMessage({ type: 'VAULT_STORAGE_QUOTA_WARNING' });2153      } catch {2154        // popup may be closed; surfaced via console.warn above2155      }2156    }2157  }2158}21592160/** Wipe all vault history. Called by Panic / DESTROY_VAULT. */2161export async function clearVaultHistory(): Promise<void> {2162  try {2163    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [HISTORY_KEY]: { snapshots: [] } satisfies VaultHistory });2164  } catch {2165    // Non-fatal — DESTROY_VAULT also runs storage.local.clear().2166  }2167}21682169/** Read all snapshots, newest first, for the Settings vault history view. */2170export async function getVaultHistory(): Promise<VaultSnapshot[]> {2171  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get(HISTORY_KEY);2172  const history = (raw as Record<string, VaultHistory | undefined>)[HISTORY_KEY];2173  if (!history || !Array.isArray(history.snapshots)) return [];2174  return history.snapshots;2175}21762177/**2178 * Replace the on-disk vault with the chosen snapshot's blobs and lock the2179 * vault. The current state is itself snapshotted with reason 'restore' first2180 * so the restore is reversible. After this returns, the user must unlock2181 * with the password that matches the restored blob.2182 */2183export async function restoreVaultSnapshot(2184  snapshotId: string,2185): Promise<{ ok: true } | { ok: false; error: string }> {2186  const history = await getVaultHistory();2187  const snapshot = history.find((s) => s.id === snapshotId);2188  if (!snapshot) return { ok: false, error: "snapshot_not_found" };21892190  // Snapshot the about-to-be-replaced current state so the restore is2191  // reversible. takeVaultSnapshot is no-op when the most recent entry is2192  // byte-identical, so a restore-of-a-restore stays clean.2193  await takeVaultSnapshot("restore");21942195  let restoredA: StoredVault;2196  let restoredB: StoredVault;2197  try {2198    restoredA = JSON.parse(snapshot.vault_a) as StoredVault;2199    restoredB = JSON.parse(snapshot.vault_b) as StoredVault;2200  } catch {2201    return { ok: false, error: "snapshot_corrupt" };2202  }22032204  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, restoredA);2205  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, restoredB);2206  await stampLocalVaultMutation();22072208  // Lock so the user must prove they can decrypt the restored blob. If they2209  // restored a pre-password-change snapshot they discover it immediately at2210  // the lock screen rather than silently holding an inaccessible vault.2211  lock();22122213  return { ok: true };2214}22152216/**2217 * Change the master password. Re-encrypts slot A with a fresh salt + new2218 * derived key. Slot B (duress or noise) is left untouched when duress is2219 * configured — it uses an independent key derived from the duress password —2220 * and regenerated as noise when duress is not configured.2221 */2222export async function changePassword(2223  currentPassword: string,2224  newPassword: string2225): Promise<boolean> {2226  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") return false;22272228  // Verify current password before allowing any change2229  const valid = await verifyMainPassword(currentPassword);2230  if (!valid) return false;22312232  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);2233  if (!slotA) return false;2234  if (!rootKey) return false;22352236  // Derive fresh key from new password + new random salt2237  const newSalt = generateSalt();2238  const newKey = await deriveKey(newPassword, newSalt);22392240  // Re-encrypt the in-memory entries with the new key2241  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured);2242  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(newKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");22432244  // Pre-wrap root key under the new derived key. Recovery fields wrap rootKey2245  // under recovery words and remain untouched — recovery phrase keeps working2246  // across password changes (H4/COR-002).2247  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(newKey, rootKey);22482249  const finalSlotA: StoredVault = {2250    ...slotA,2251    salt: hex(newSalt),2252    nonce,2253    ciphertext,2254    tag,2255    ...pwRoot,2256  };22572258  // Snapshot the OLD-key blob before overwriting it. If the user later2259  // restores from this snapshot they will need the OLD password — the2260  // post-restore lock surfaces that immediately.2261  await takeVaultSnapshot("local_save");22622263  // Single atomic write: ciphertext, salt, and pw_root_* fields all land in2264  // one storage transaction. An SW kill before this point leaves the old2265  // slot intact; after this point everything tied to the new password is2266  // already on disk together (M6/COR-004).2267  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, finalSlotA);22682269  // Swap the in-memory key synchronously before any further await. If we2270  // threw between the Slot A write and this swap, the next persistEntries()2271  // would overwrite Slot A with old-key ciphertext, locking the user out.2272  zeroKey(derivedKey);2273  derivedKey = newKey;22742275  // Regenerate noise for slot B when duress is not in use. Runs after the2276  // key swap so a failure here is a disposable noise regeneration, not a2277  // lockout.2278  if (!duressConfigured) {2279    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2));2280  }2281  await stampLocalVaultMutation();22822283  return true;2284}2285