vault.ts

1/**2 * vault.ts — sole owner of vault state and chrome.storage vault keys.3 *4 * Every read/write of `peach_vault_a`, `peach_vault_b`, and `peach_settings`5 * goes through this module. No other file accesses those keys directly.6 * External callers reach vault operations via `messages.ts` — never by7 * importing from here cross-boundary (popup/content must not). Invariants8 * for the two-slot schema, unlock timing, and key/disk atomicity are in9 * Projects.md §3.2–§3.6.10 */1112import { deriveKey, generateSalt } from "../crypto/argon2";13import { extractDomain } from "../shared/domain";14import {15  rootKeyToWords,16  wordsToRootKeyMaterial,17  deriveRecoveryKey,18} from "../shared/recovery-words";19import type {20  AccentColorName,21  LegacyVaultEntry,22  ManualSummonRecord,23  SavedIdentity,24  StoredVault,25  VaultEntry,26  VaultHistory,27  VaultSnapshot,28} from "../shared/types";29import { decrypt, encrypt, zeroKey } from "./aes";30import { clearAutoLock, touchAutoLock } from "./alarms";3132type EntryDraft = Omit<33  VaultEntry,34  "id" | "createdAt" | "modifiedAt" | "deletedAt"35>;3637// Slot-neutral storage keys (v1.4.24+). Both slots always exist; slot B38// either holds the decoy vault (when duress is configured) or random noise39// that looks identical at rest. No external indicator is stored — duress40// configuration is recorded only inside the encrypted payload of slot A.41const SLOT_A = "peach_vault_a";42const SLOT_B = "peach_vault_b";4344// Legacy keys, migrated away on first access.45const LEGACY_MAIN = "peach_vault";46const LEGACY_DECOY = "peach_decoy_vault";47const LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG = "peach_duress";4849// Plaintext is padded to the next multiple of this size before encryption.50// This coarsens ciphertext-length leakage into 1 KiB buckets.51const PAD_BLOCK = 1024;5253// How many past passwords to retain per entry. Generous enough to be useful as54// a recovery aid while bounding the secret material we hold (and the ciphertext55// growth) for an entry whose password is rotated frequently.56const PASSWORD_HISTORY_MAX = 50;5758// When duress is configured, BOTH slots are padded to this fixed ceiling so59// their ciphertext lengths are identical and cannot reveal that a hidden decoy60// vault exists (audit MEDIUM — plausible-deniability leak). 256 KiB comfortably61// holds a very large vault (thousands of entries incl. passkeys). The decoy62// slot can't be re-encrypted on every real-vault save (the real session has no63// decoy key), so a fixed ceiling — rather than size-matching on each write — is64// what keeps the two slots equal. A real vault whose plaintext exceeds this65// would grow past the ceiling and re-expose the bit; that is an extreme,66// documented edge well beyond normal use.67const DURESS_SLOT_SIZE = 262_144;6869let derivedKey: Uint8Array | null = null;70// 32-byte random root key, separate from the derivedKey used for vault encryption.71// The root key is wrapped (encrypted) under the recovery key derived from the72// 12-word phrase. When the user changes their password, only the wrapping changes;73// the root key and recovery words remain stable.74let rootKey: Uint8Array | null = null;75let entries: VaultEntry[] = [];76let domainIndex: Map<string, VaultEntry[]> = new Map();77let vaultMode: "real" | "decoy" = "real";78// Cached post-unlock view of whether the real vault records that duress is79// configured. Only meaningful after a real-mode unlock; for decoy-mode unlock80// this stays false because we never see slot A's plaintext.81let duressConfigured = false;8283let migrationRan = false;8485// Set to a corruption reason during the last unlock() attempt when both slots86// decrypted but failed schema validation. Consumed and cleared by87// consumeLastUnlockFailureReason() so messages.ts can surface vault_corrupted88// distinctly from wrong-password (M7/COR-007).89//90// NOTE: module-level state — if vault.ts is ever moved to a worker context,91// this must be replaced with a structured return value from unlock() or a92// postMessage channel. The signal is invisible across module-instance93// boundaries.94let lastUnlockFailureReason: string | null = null;9596export function consumeLastUnlockFailureReason(): string | null {97  const r = lastUnlockFailureReason;98  lastUnlockFailureReason = null;99  return r;100}101102// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------103// Settings (persisted inside the encrypted vault store as a sidecar key)104// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------105106export type TextSize = "small" | "medium" | "large";107108export interface VaultSettings {109  accentColor?: AccentColorName;110  theme?: "dark" | "light";111  autoLockMinutes?: number;112  clipboardClearSeconds?: number;113  lockOnClose?: boolean;114  breachMonitoring?: boolean;115  passkeyProviderEnabled?: boolean;116  trashRetentionDays?: number;117  manualSummonDomains?: Record<string, ManualSummonRecord>;118  declinedCardFingerprints?: string[];119  /**120   * Text size scale for body copy and entry titles. Stops at "large" by121   * design — XL clips dense screens (Vault, Health) inside the fixed122   * 330×480 popup surface.123   */124  textSize?: TextSize;125  /**126   * When true, all entrance/exit transitions and ambient animations are127   * collapsed to instant. Honoured alongside the user's OS-level128   * `prefers-reduced-motion`.129   */130  reduceMotion?: boolean;131  /**132   * Android-only: when true, the master key is escrowed in AndroidKeyStore133   * and the lock screen offers biometric unlock. Toggled from Settings →134   * Security → Biometrics. Has no effect on desktop builds.135   */136  biometricsEnabled?: boolean;137  /**138   * User overrides for keyboard shortcuts. Keys are ShortcutAction names139   * (see src/shared/shortcuts.ts). Missing actions fall through to140   * DEFAULT_BINDINGS — `getActiveBindings(settings.shortcuts)` is the141   * canonical lookup. Storing only the deltas keeps the vault payload142   * small and lets default updates land for users who never rebind.143   */144  shortcuts?: Record<string, { key: string; ctrl?: boolean; meta?: boolean; shift?: boolean; alt?: boolean }>;145}146147let settings: VaultSettings = {};148149export function getSettings(): VaultSettings {150  return settings;151}152153export async function ensureSettingsLoaded(): Promise<VaultSettings> {154  await loadSettings();155  return settings;156}157158export async function updateSettings(patch: Partial<VaultSettings>): Promise<void> {159  await loadSettings();160  settings = { ...settings, ...patch };161  await persistSettings();162}163164async function persistSettings(): Promise<void> {165  try {166    await chrome.storage.local.set({ peach_settings: settings });167  } catch (err) {168    throw mapStorageError(err);169  }170}171172function mapStorageError(err: unknown): Error {173  const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);174  if (/QUOTA_BYTES|quota/i.test(message)) {175    return new Error("STORAGE_QUOTA_EXCEEDED");176  }177  return err instanceof Error ? err : new Error(message);178}179180async function loadSettings(): Promise<void> {181  const result = await chrome.storage.local.get("peach_settings");182  settings = (result as { peach_settings?: VaultSettings }).peach_settings ?? {};183}184185// Fire-and-forget sync trigger after a committed vault write. Lazy186// dynamic import avoids a circular dependency between vault.ts and187// sync-trigger.ts (the trigger imports paired-devices, which only reads188// storage, but the lazy load also gives us a clean opt-out path in189// tests where sync-trigger has not been initialised).190function fireSyncTrigger(reason: "vault_change"): void {191  void import("./sync-trigger")192    .then((mod) => mod.triggerSyncIfReachable({ reason }))193    .catch(() => {194      /* sync trigger module not available — non-fatal */195    });196}197198// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------199// HIBP breach check (k-anonymity model)200// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------201202export async function checkBreach(password: string): Promise<number> {203  // HIBP k-anonymity API is keyed on SHA-1 prefixes — this is dictated by204  // the public API, not a security choice. Do not migrate to SHA-256 here.205  const encoder = new TextEncoder();206  const hashBuffer = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-1", encoder.encode(password));207  const hashHex = Array.from(new Uint8Array(hashBuffer))208    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))209    .join("")210    .toUpperCase();211212  const prefix = hashHex.slice(0, 5);213  const suffix = hashHex.slice(5);214215  try {216    const res = await fetch(`https://api.pwnedpasswords.com/range/${prefix}`);217    if (!res.ok) return 0;218    const text = await res.text();219    const match = text.split("\r\n").find((l) => l.startsWith(suffix));220    return match ? parseInt(match.split(":")[1], 10) : 0;221  } catch {222    return 0; // Network unavailable — don't block223  }224}225226export async function declineCardSaveOffer(last4: string, expMonth: string, expYear: string): Promise<void> {227  const fingerprint = await cardFingerprint(last4, expMonth, expYear);228  await loadSettings();229  settings = {230    ...settings,231    declinedCardFingerprints: [...(settings.declinedCardFingerprints ?? []), fingerprint],232  };233  await persistSettings();234}235236export async function isCardDeclined(last4: string, expMonth: string, expYear: string): Promise<boolean> {237  await loadSettings();238  const fingerprint = await cardFingerprint(last4, expMonth, expYear);239  return (settings.declinedCardFingerprints ?? []).includes(fingerprint);240}241242async function cardFingerprint(last4: string, expMonth: string, expYear: string): Promise<string> {243  const encoder = new TextEncoder();244  const buf = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", encoder.encode(`${last4}|${expMonth}|${expYear}`));245  return Array.from(new Uint8Array(buf).slice(0, 8))246    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))247    .join("");248}249250function hex(buf: Uint8Array): string {251  return Array.from(buf)252    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))253    .join("");254}255256function unhex(s: string): Uint8Array {257  const out = new Uint8Array(s.length / 2);258  for (let i = 0; i < s.length; i += 2) {259    out[i / 2] = parseInt(s.slice(i, i + 2), 16);260  }261  return out;262}263264// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------265// Root key generation and recovery word wrapping266// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------267268/**269 * Generate a random 32-byte root key and wrap it (AES-256-GCM) under a key270 * derived from the recovery word material via HKDF-SHA256. The wrapped blob271 * fields are stored in slot A alongside the password-wrapped ciphertext. The272 * root key itself is kept in memory for the session so getRecoveryWords() can273 * encode it without re-deriving.274 */275async function generateAndWrapRootKey(): Promise<{276  rawRootKey: string; // hex of the plaintext root key — caller stores in rootKey277  recoverySalt: string;278  wrappedRootKey: string;279  wrappedNonce: string;280  wrappedTag: string;281}> {282  const rootKeyBytes = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32));283284  // Derive the recovery key from the BIP39 words encoding of the root key.285  const words = await rootKeyToWords(rootKeyBytes);286  const wordMaterial = await wordsToRootKeyMaterial(words);287  const recoverySalt = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));288  const recoveryKey = await deriveRecoveryKey(wordMaterial, recoverySalt);289290  // Wrap the root key with the recovery key using AES-256-GCM directly.291  // We hex-encode rootKeyBytes so the plaintext is always valid UTF-8.292  const nonce = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));293  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(hex(rootKeyBytes));294  const raw = await crypto.subtle.encrypt(295    {296      name: "AES-GCM",297      iv: nonce,298      additionalData: new Uint8Array([1]).buffer as ArrayBuffer,299      tagLength: 128,300    },301    recoveryKey,302    encoded303  );304  // WebCrypto returns ciphertext || auth tag concatenated; split them.305  const rawU8 = new Uint8Array(raw);306  const ciphertext = hex(rawU8.slice(0, rawU8.length - 16));307  const tag = hex(rawU8.slice(rawU8.length - 16));308309  return {310    rawRootKey: hex(rootKeyBytes),311    recoverySalt: hex(recoverySalt),312    wrappedRootKey: ciphertext,313    wrappedNonce: hex(nonce),314    wrappedTag: tag,315  };316}317318/**319 * Unwrap the root key using recovery words. Called during recovery flow when320 * the user provides their 12-word phrase and a new password.321 * Exported for use by the RECOVER_WITH_WORDS message handler.322 */323export async function unwrapRootKeyForRecovery(324  wrappedRootKey: string,325  wrappedNonce: string,326  wrappedTag: string,327  recoverySaltHex: string,328  words: string[]329): Promise<void> {330  const wordMaterial = await wordsToRootKeyMaterial(words);331  const recoverySalt = unhex(recoverySaltHex);332  const recoveryKey = await deriveRecoveryKey(wordMaterial, recoverySalt);333334  // Decrypt and cache the root key. The root key bytes were hex-encoded before335  // encryption so the ciphertext is valid UTF-8. We inline the AES-GCM decrypt336  // here to avoid passing a CryptoKey to the string-based encrypt/decrypt helpers.337  // Each component is stored separately in the vault slot; decode them individually338  // so the nonce is always exactly the 12 bytes from wrappedNonce.339  const nonceRaw = unhex(wrappedNonce);340  const ciphertextRaw = unhex(wrappedRootKey);341  const tagRaw = unhex(wrappedTag);342  // Combine ciphertext and tag for AES-GCM (expects ciphertext||tag).343  // Use explicit ArrayBuffer allocations to satisfy TS BufferSource constraints.344  const nonceU8 = nonceRaw as unknown as Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>;345  const combined = new Uint8Array(ciphertextRaw.length + tagRaw.length);346  combined.set(ciphertextRaw, 0);347  combined.set(tagRaw, ciphertextRaw.length);348  const raw = await crypto.subtle.decrypt(349    { name: "AES-GCM", iv: nonceU8, additionalData: new Uint8Array([1]).buffer as ArrayBuffer, tagLength: 128 },350    recoveryKey,351    combined352  );353  const decryptedHex = new TextDecoder().decode(raw);354  rootKey = unhex(decryptedHex);355}356357/**358 * Re-wrap the cached root key under a new derived key (from the user's new359 * password). Called after password change and after recovery re-key so the360 * same recovery words continue to work with the updated password — and so361 * subsequent unlocks can rehydrate rootKey via deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey.362 *363 * recovery_* fields are intentionally not touched: those wrap rootKey under364 * the recovery words, which do not change when the password changes.365 */366export async function rewrapRootKeyForPassword(367  newDerivedKey: Uint8Array,368  _newSalt: Uint8Array369): Promise<void> {370  if (!rootKey) throw new Error("root key not set");371  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);372  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");373  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(newDerivedKey, rootKey);374  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, { ...slotA, ...pwRoot });375}376377/**378 * Change the vault encryption to a new derived key (already derived from379 * the user's new password). Used by RECOVER_WITH_WORDS and changePassword.380 * Caller is responsible for key swap and snapshot.381 */382async function reencryptVaultForNewKey(383  newKey: Uint8Array,384  slotA: StoredVault385): Promise<void> {386  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured, duressConfigured ? DURESS_SLOT_SIZE : 0);387  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(newKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");388  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, {389    ...slotA,390    nonce,391    ciphertext,392    tag,393  });394}395396/**397 * Full password change with an already-derived key (used after recovery).398 * Unlike changePassword(), this skips re-verification of current password399 * since recovery flow has already validated the user's identity via words.400 */401export async function changePasswordWithNewKey(402  newSalt: Uint8Array,403  newKey: Uint8Array404): Promise<void> {405  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);406  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");407  // reencryptVaultForNewKey must receive the updated salt so that subsequent408  // UNLOCK calls with the new password can re-derive the correct key.409  await reencryptVaultForNewKey(newKey, { ...slotA, salt: hex(newSalt) });410  if (derivedKey) zeroKey(derivedKey);411  derivedKey = newKey;412  // Refresh pw_root_* under the new key so deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey works413  // on the next unlock (H2/COR-006). If rootKey is missing — recovery flow414  // should have populated it — fall back silently rather than blowing up the415  // recovery path; migrateToRecovery will rehydrate on the next unlock.416  if (rootKey) {417    const slotAfter = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);418    if (slotAfter) {419      const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(newKey, rootKey);420      await writeSlot(SLOT_A, { ...slotAfter, ...pwRoot });421    }422  }423  if (!duressConfigured) {424    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(slotA.ciphertext.length / 2));425  }426  await stampLocalVaultMutation();427}428429// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------430// Salt generation --- exported so the RECOVER_WITH_WORDS handler can derive431// a new key after password reset without re-importing the crypto module.432// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------433434export { deriveKey, generateSalt };435436export async function loadSlotA(): Promise<StoredVault | null> {437  return loadSlot(SLOT_A);438}439440/**441 * Recover the session root key by AES-GCM-decrypting the pw_root_* fields442 * (a second wrapping of the root key under the password-derived key). This443 * is what makes GET_RECOVERY_WORDS work across lock/unlock cycles without444 * the user re-entering their recovery phrase: the same root key bytes —445 * and therefore the same 12 words — survive every unlock.446 *447 * Returns null when the pw_root fields are absent (pre-v2.12 vault that448 * hasn't been migrated yet) or when decryption fails (wrong derived key,449 * tampered ciphertext). On null the caller should fall through to450 * migrateToRecovery() to populate the fields.451 */452async function deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(453  derivedKeyBytes: Uint8Array,454  slotA: StoredVault,455): Promise<Uint8Array | null> {456  if (!slotA.pw_root_ciphertext || !slotA.pw_root_nonce || !slotA.pw_root_tag) {457    return null;458  }459  try {460    const rootHex = await decrypt(461      derivedKeyBytes,462      slotA.pw_root_nonce,463      slotA.pw_root_ciphertext,464      slotA.pw_root_tag,465      "pw_root_v1",466    );467    return unhex(rootHex);468  } catch {469    return null;470  }471}472473// AES-GCM-wrap rootKey under derivedKey for the pw_root_* fields. Returns the474// hex-encoded ciphertext/nonce/tag triple ready to embed in StoredVault.475async function wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(476  derivedKeyBytes: Uint8Array,477  rootKeyBytes: Uint8Array,478): Promise<{ pw_root_ciphertext: string; pw_root_nonce: string; pw_root_tag: string }> {479  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKeyBytes, hex(rootKeyBytes), "pw_root_v1");480  return {481    pw_root_ciphertext: ciphertext,482    pw_root_nonce: nonce,483    pw_root_tag: tag,484  };485}486487/**488 * For vaults created before v2.12 (no recovery_salt/recovery_wrapped_root_key),489 * generate the root key, wrap it under the recovery words, and persist the490 * recovery escrow into slot A. The caller must show the recovery words to the491 * user before calling this — once called, those words are the vault's recovery492 * path. This runs once, on the first unlock of an upgraded vault.493 */494export async function migrateToRecovery(): Promise<void> {495  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {496    throw new Error("vault must be unlocked in real mode");497  }498  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);499  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");500  const hasRecoveryEscrow =501    !!slotA.recovery_salt && !!slotA.recovery_wrapped_root_key;502  const hasPwRoot = !!slotA.pw_root_ciphertext && !!slotA.pw_root_nonce;503  if (hasRecoveryEscrow && hasPwRoot) return; // already done504505  // If recovery escrow already exists but pw_root doesn't, we cannot recover506  // the original rootKey without the user's words. The least-surprising path507  // is to rotate to a fresh root key — the user's old recovery words become508  // invalid but we surface peach_recovery_pending so the popup re-presents509  // the words. The unlock-path callers all set that flag.510  const { rawRootKey, recoverySalt, wrappedRootKey, wrappedNonce, wrappedTag } =511    await generateAndWrapRootKey();512  rootKey = unhex(rawRootKey);513514  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(derivedKey, rootKey);515  const nextSlotA: StoredVault = {516    ...slotA,517    recovery_salt: recoverySalt,518    recovery_wrapped_root_key: wrappedRootKey,519    recovery_nonce: wrappedNonce,520    recovery_tag: wrappedTag,521    ...pwRoot,522  };523  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, nextSlotA);524  await stampLocalVaultMutation();525}526527/**528 * Returns the 12 recovery words for the current session's root key.529 * Must be called while the vault is unlocked. Throws if recovery has not530 * been set up (pre-v2.12 vault that hasn't migrated yet).531 */532export async function getRecoveryWords(): Promise<string[]> {533  if (!rootKey) {534    throw new Error("recovery not set up — vault may need migration");535  }536  return rootKeyToWords(rootKey);537}538539async function loadSlot(key: string): Promise<StoredVault | null> {540  const result = await chrome.storage.local.get(key);541  return (result as Record<string, StoredVault | undefined>)[key] ?? null;542}543544async function writeSlot(key: string, vault: StoredVault): Promise<void> {545  try {546    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [key]: vault });547  } catch (err) {548    throw mapStorageError(err);549  }550}551552// Monotonic clock for per-entry modifiedAt / deletedAt timestamps. Guards the553// sync layer's last-write-wins merge against wall-clock regressions (NTP step,554// manual clock change, DST glitch): a backwards Date.now() must never produce555// an entry timestamp that's <= the entry's existing modifiedAt, or a genuine556// local edit would lose to a stale remote copy. The returned value is always557// strictly greater than both the entry's current modifiedAt and the previous558// call's result (SEV-2-E).559let lastEntryTimestamp = 0;560function monotonicEntryTimestamp(currentModifiedAt?: number): number {561  const base = Math.max(562    Date.now(),563    (currentModifiedAt ?? 0) + 1,564    lastEntryTimestamp + 1,565  );566  lastEntryTimestamp = base;567  return base;568}569570async function stampLocalVaultMutation(): Promise<void> {571  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get("peach_last_modified_at");572  const previous = Number(573    (raw as Record<string, unknown>).peach_last_modified_at,574  );575  const next = Math.max(576    Date.now(),577    Number.isFinite(previous) ? previous + 1 : 0,578  );579  await chrome.storage.local.set({580    peach_last_modified_at: String(next),581  });582}583584/**585 * One-shot migration from the pre-A-2 schema (peach_vault + peach_decoy_vault586 * + peach_duress flag) to the slot-neutral schema (peach_vault_a +587 * peach_vault_b). Runs at most once per session; safe to call repeatedly.588 */589async function ensureMigrated(): Promise<void> {590  if (migrationRan) return;591  migrationRan = true;592593  const keys = [LEGACY_MAIN, LEGACY_DECOY, LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG, SLOT_A, SLOT_B];594  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get(keys);595  const slotAExists = raw[SLOT_A] !== undefined;596  const slotBExists = raw[SLOT_B] !== undefined;597  const legacyMain = raw[LEGACY_MAIN] as StoredVault | undefined;598  const legacyDecoy = raw[LEGACY_DECOY] as StoredVault | undefined;599600  // Fresh install with nothing in storage — nothing to do; createVault() sets up both slots.601  if (!slotAExists && !legacyMain) return;602603  // Already migrated.604  if (slotAExists && slotBExists && !legacyMain && !legacyDecoy) return;605606  let didMigrate = false;607  if (legacyMain && !slotAExists) {608    await writeSlot(SLOT_A, legacyMain);609    didMigrate = true;610  }611612  // If slot B isn't set, populate it: use legacy decoy when present, else noise.613  if (!slotBExists) {614    const target = (legacyMain ?? raw[SLOT_A]) as StoredVault | undefined;615    if (legacyDecoy) {616      await writeSlot(SLOT_B, legacyDecoy);617      didMigrate = true;618    } else if (target) {619      await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(target.ciphertext.length / 2));620      didMigrate = true;621    }622  }623624  const toRemove: string[] = [];625  if (legacyMain) toRemove.push(LEGACY_MAIN);626  if (legacyDecoy) toRemove.push(LEGACY_DECOY);627  if (raw[LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG] !== undefined) toRemove.push(LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG);628  if (toRemove.length > 0) {629    await chrome.storage.local.remove(toRemove);630    didMigrate = true;631  }632  if (didMigrate) {633    await stampLocalVaultMutation();634  }635}636637// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------638// Padding + noise helpers639// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------640641/**642 * Pads the plaintext string with trailing spaces so that the encoded byte643 * length is a multiple of PAD_BLOCK. JSON.parse tolerates trailing644 * whitespace after a complete document, so the padding is transparent on645 * decode. Ciphertext length equals plaintext length plus a 16-byte tag.646 */647function padPlaintext(json: string, minBytes = 0): string {648  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(json);649  const bucket = Math.max(PAD_BLOCK, Math.ceil(encoded.length / PAD_BLOCK) * PAD_BLOCK);650  // minBytes lets the duress path force a fixed ceiling so both slots match.651  const target = Math.max(bucket, minBytes);652  const padLen = target - encoded.length;653  return json + " ".repeat(padLen);654}655656/**657 * Produces a StoredVault-shaped record filled with CSPRNG bytes. The658 * ciphertext length matches the given byte count. Because GCM ciphertext is659 * pseudo-random, this blob is indistinguishable at rest from a real660 * encrypted vault without the key.661 *662 * crypto.getRandomValues() caps each call at 65536 bytes (the Web Crypto663 * spec hard limit). Chunk the fill so vaults larger than that — common once664 * the user has dozens of entries or any passkey — don't throw.665 */666const CSPRNG_CHUNK = 65_536;667668function fillRandom(buf: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {669  for (let offset = 0; offset < buf.length; offset += CSPRNG_CHUNK) {670    const end = Math.min(offset + CSPRNG_CHUNK, buf.length);671    const chunk = new Uint8Array(end - offset);672    crypto.getRandomValues(chunk);673    buf.set(chunk, offset);674  }675  return buf;676}677678function generateNoiseBlob(ciphertextBytes: number): StoredVault {679  const salt = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));680  const nonce = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));681  const cipher = fillRandom(new Uint8Array(ciphertextBytes));682  const tag = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));683  return {684    version: 1,685    salt: hex(salt),686    nonce: hex(nonce),687    ciphertext: hex(cipher),688    tag: hex(tag),689  };690}691692// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------693// Encrypted plaintext envelope694// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------695696type VaultPayload = {697  entries: VaultEntry[];698  duressConfigured?: boolean;699};700701type DecryptedPayload = {702  entries: VaultEntry[];703  duressConfigured: boolean;704  /**705   * True when at least one entry in the on-disk payload had a legacy shape706   * (pre-v2.11.0 passkey type/flat fields, or pre-A-2 created/updated keys)707   * and got rewritten by normalizeEntry. The unlock path uses this to708   * persist the new shape immediately — without it, the migration would709   * re-run on every unlock and old shape never disappears from disk.710   */711  migratedFromLegacy: boolean;712};713714function encodePayload(entries: VaultEntry[], duress: boolean, minBytes = 0): string {715  const envelope: VaultPayload = { entries, duressConfigured: duress };716  return padPlaintext(JSON.stringify(envelope), minBytes);717}718719function rawNeedsMigration(raw: VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry): boolean {720  if ("created" in raw || "updated" in raw) return true;721  const flat = raw as Partial<VaultEntry>;722  if (flat.type === "passkey") return true;723  // Flat rpId without a passkey sub-object means pre-v2.11.0 schema.724  if (flat.rpId !== undefined && flat.passkey === undefined) return true;725  return false;726}727728function decodePayload(plain: string): DecryptedPayload {729  const parsed = JSON.parse(plain) as730    | Array<VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry>731    | VaultPayload;732733  const rawEntries = Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed : parsed.entries ?? [];734  const flatMigrationNeeded = rawEntries.some(rawNeedsMigration);735736  const normalized = rawEntries.map(normalizeEntry);737  const { merged } = mergePasskeyOnlyIntoLogins(normalized);738739  if (Array.isArray(parsed)) {740    return {741      entries: normalized,742      duressConfigured: false,743      migratedFromLegacy: true, // pre-A-2 array shape always needs save744    };745  }746747  return {748    entries: normalized,749    duressConfigured: parsed.duressConfigured === true,750    migratedFromLegacy: flatMigrationNeeded || merged,751  };752}753754/**755 * One-time consolidation pass run alongside the legacy passkey migration.756 *757 * Pre-v2.11.0 the Chrome passkey path always created a fresh `type:"passkey"`758 * entry per registration — so users who tested registration multiple times759 * accumulated several passkey-bearing entries for the same RP, and the760 * migration to the unified shape carried that duplication forward. This761 * pass collapses the duplicates:762 *763 *   1. Group passkey-bearing (and not deleted) entries by `passkey.rpId`.764 *   2. Within each group, the most recently-active credential wins (prefer765 *      lastUsedAt, fall back to passkey.createdAt, fall back to modifiedAt).766 *   3. If a NON-passkey login entry exists for that RP (matched by url or767 *      additionalUrls hostname), attach the winning passkey to it and768 *      soft-delete every passkey-bearing entry in the group.769 *   4. Otherwise, soft-delete every loser in the group, keeping the winner770 *      as a passkey-only entry.771 *772 * Soft delete (deletedAt) rather than splice — the trash flow keeps the773 * record around for retention and the user can restore if the heuristic774 * picked wrong. The `merged` flag goes back to decodePayload so the775 * unlock path persists the consolidated shape immediately.776 */777function mergePasskeyOnlyIntoLogins(entries: VaultEntry[]): { merged: boolean } {778  let merged = false;779  const now = Date.now();780781  const candidates = entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt && e.passkey);782  const byRpId = new Map<string, VaultEntry[]>();783  for (const e of candidates) {784    const rpId = e.passkey!.rpId;785    const list = byRpId.get(rpId);786    if (list) list.push(e);787    else byRpId.set(rpId, [e]);788  }789790  for (const [rpId, group] of byRpId) {791    if (group.length === 0) continue;792    group.sort((a, b) => {793      const aT =794        a.passkey!.lastUsedAt ?? a.passkey!.createdAt ?? a.modifiedAt ?? a.createdAt;795      const bT =796        b.passkey!.lastUsedAt ?? b.passkey!.createdAt ?? b.modifiedAt ?? b.createdAt;797      return bT - aT;798    });799    const winner = group[0]!;800801    // Look for a NON-passkey login entry matching this RP. Use the URL802    // hostname rather than a substring search so a "login.foo.com" entry803    // doesn't accidentally absorb a passkey for "foo.com".804    const loginTarget = entries.find((e) => {805      if (e.deletedAt || e.passkey || e.type !== "login") return false;806      if (e.url && extractDomain(e.url) === rpId) return true;807      for (const extra of e.additionalUrls ?? []) {808        if (extractDomain(extra) === rpId) return true;809      }810      return false;811    });812813    if (loginTarget) {814      loginTarget.passkey = winner.passkey;815      loginTarget.modifiedAt = now;816      for (const dup of group) {817        if (!dup.deletedAt) {818          dup.deletedAt = now;819          dup.modifiedAt = now;820        }821      }822      merged = true;823    } else if (group.length > 1) {824      for (let i = 1; i < group.length; i += 1) {825        const dup = group[i]!;826        if (!dup.deletedAt) {827          dup.deletedAt = now;828          dup.modifiedAt = now;829        }830      }831      merged = true;832    }833  }834835  return { merged };836}837838// Validates that a `StoredVault` record on disk has the field shape we expect839// before treating an AES-GCM decrypt success as a clean unlock. AES-GCM only840// authenticates the static VERSION_BYTE AAD, not the `version` field on the841// outer record — a corrupted `version: 42` slot still decrypts cleanly. This842// check surfaces that as `corrupted` (M7/COR-007) so the popup can offer a843// history-restore path instead of falsely reporting "wrong password".844function hasValidVaultSchema(v: unknown): v is StoredVault {845  if (typeof v !== "object" || v === null) return false;846  const r = v as Record<string, unknown>;847  return (848    r.version === 1 &&849    typeof r.salt === "string" &&850    typeof r.nonce === "string" &&851    typeof r.ciphertext === "string" &&852    typeof r.tag === "string"853  );854}855856export type TryDecryptResult =857  | { status: "ok"; payload: DecryptedPayload }858  | { status: "wrong_key" }859  | { status: "corrupted"; reason: string };860861// Exported solely for `unlockFromCodex` below, which needs to verify a862// supplied passphrase against a slotA blob *without* committing anything to863// storage. Keep this internal otherwise — callers crossing the messages.ts864// boundary should always go through `unlock` / `verifyMainPassword` so the865// constant-time invariants in Projects.md §3.4 are not bypassed.866export async function tryDecryptSlot(867  vault: StoredVault,868  key: Uint8Array,869  aadTag?: string,870): Promise<DecryptedPayload | null> {871  const res = await tryDecryptSlotResult(vault, key, aadTag);872  return res.status === "ok" ? res.payload : null;873}874875export async function tryDecryptSlotResult(876  vault: StoredVault,877  key: Uint8Array,878  aadTag?: string,879): Promise<TryDecryptResult> {880  if (!hasValidVaultSchema(vault)) {881    return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_slot_schema" };882  }883  let plain: string;884  try {885    plain = await decrypt(key, vault.nonce, vault.ciphertext, vault.tag, aadTag);886  } catch {887    return { status: "wrong_key" };888  }889  try {890    const parsed = JSON.parse(plain) as unknown;891    if (typeof parsed !== "object" || parsed === null) {892      return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_payload_shape" };893    }894    if (!Array.isArray(parsed) && !Array.isArray((parsed as VaultPayload).entries)) {895      return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_payload_shape" };896    }897    return { status: "ok", payload: decodePayload(plain) };898  } catch {899    return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_payload_json" };900  }901}902903// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------904// Core operations905// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------906907function buildDomainIndexSync(all: VaultEntry[]): void {908  domainIndex = new Map();909910  for (const entry of all) {911    if (entry.deletedAt) continue;912    if (entry.type === "note" || entry.type === "card") continue;913914    // An entry can match multiple sites via `additionalUrls`. Index each915    // hostname so `queryDomain` returns the entry regardless of which alias916    // the user is currently visiting. Dedupe per-entry so a single entry917    // never appears twice in one bucket.918    const domains = new Set<string>();919    const primary = extractDomain(entry.url ?? "");920    if (primary) domains.add(primary);921    for (const extra of entry.additionalUrls ?? []) {922      const d = extractDomain(extra);923      if (d) domains.add(d);924    }925    if (domains.size === 0) continue;926927    for (const domain of domains) {928      const bucket = domainIndex.get(domain) ?? [];929      bucket.push(entry);930      domainIndex.set(domain, bucket);931    }932  }933}934935export async function createVault(password: string): Promise<void> {936  await ensureMigrated();937938  const salt = generateSalt();939  derivedKey = await deriveKey(password, salt);940  entries = [];941  vaultMode = "real";942  duressConfigured = false;943  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);944945  // Generate and wrap the root key for recovery word escrow.946  const { rawRootKey, recoverySalt, wrappedRootKey, wrappedNonce, wrappedTag } =947    await generateAndWrapRootKey();948  rootKey = unhex(rawRootKey);949950  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured, duressConfigured ? DURESS_SLOT_SIZE : 0);951  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");952953  // Second wrapping of rootKey under derivedKey so future unlocks can rehydrate954  // it without recovery words (H2/COR-006).955  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(derivedKey, rootKey);956957  const slotA: StoredVault = {958    version: 1,959    salt: hex(salt),960    nonce,961    ciphertext,962    tag,963    recovery_salt: recoverySalt,964    recovery_wrapped_root_key: wrappedRootKey,965    recovery_nonce: wrappedNonce,966    recovery_tag: wrappedTag,967    ...pwRoot,968  };969  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, slotA);970971  // Matching-size noise blob for slot B, so a fresh install shows two972  // similarly-shaped records regardless of whether duress is ever set up.973  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2));974  await stampLocalVaultMutation();975976  touchAutoLock();977}978979export async function hasVault(): Promise<boolean> {980  await ensureMigrated();981  return (await loadSlot(SLOT_A)) !== null;982}983984/**985 * Returns whether the real vault has recorded that a duress passphrase is986 * configured. Reliable only after a real-mode unlock — before unlock or in987 * decoy mode, returns false because we cannot read slot A's plaintext.988 */989export async function isDuressEnabled(): Promise<boolean> {990  return vaultMode === "real" && duressConfigured;991}992993export async function setupDuress(duressPassword: string): Promise<void> {994  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {995    throw new Error("vault must be unlocked in real mode");996  }997  await ensureMigrated();998999  // Encrypt the decoy payload (empty entries) under the duress key. Pad to1000  // at least the current slot A ciphertext size so the two slots look the1001  // same at rest at setup time.1002  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1003  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");10041005  const decoySalt = generateSalt();1006  const decoyKey = await deriveKey(duressPassword, decoySalt);1007  try {1008    // Pad the decoy to the fixed duress ceiling. Slot A is re-encrypted to the1009    // same ceiling by the persistSlotA() call below (duressConfigured is now1010    // true), so both slots are exactly DURESS_SLOT_SIZE+tag at rest and their1011    // lengths cannot reveal that duress is configured (audit MEDIUM).1012    const plaintext = encodePayload([], false, DURESS_SLOT_SIZE);1013    const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(decoyKey, plaintext, "slot_b_v1");1014    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, {1015      version: 1,1016      salt: hex(decoySalt),1017      nonce,1018      ciphertext,1019      tag,1020    });1021  } finally {1022    zeroKey(decoyKey);1023  }10241025  // Re-encrypt slot A with the duressConfigured flag set to true. No external1026  // flag is written — the bit lives inside the encrypted envelope.1027  duressConfigured = true;1028  await persistSlotA();1029}10301031export async function disableDuress(): Promise<void> {1032  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {1033    throw new Error("vault must be unlocked in real mode");1034  }1035  await ensureMigrated();10361037  // Overwrite slot B with fresh noise that matches slot A's size. The slot1038  // remains occupied so its mere existence does not signal that duress was1039  // ever configured.1040  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1041  if (slotA) {1042    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(slotA.ciphertext.length / 2));1043  }10441045  duressConfigured = false;1046  await persistSlotA();1047}10481049// L14/COR-015: this function intentionally checks slot A (real vault) only.1050// A duress-mode user attempting changePassword is rejected earlier by the1051// vaultMode === 'decoy' check at changePassword. The real-vs-decoy1052// distinction here is by design — duress users cannot rotate the real1053// password by guessing it, and the asymmetry in error timing is acceptable1054// because duress mode is opt-in and the user knows their own decoy key.1055export async function verifyMainPassword(password: string): Promise<boolean> {1056  await ensureMigrated();1057  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1058  if (!slotA) return false;1059  const key = await deriveKey(password, unhex(slotA.salt));1060  try {1061    return (await tryDecryptSlot(slotA, key, "slot_a_v1")) !== null;1062  } finally {1063    zeroKey(key);1064  }1065}10661067export async function unlock(password: string): Promise<boolean> {1068  await ensureMigrated();10691070  // Load both slots in parallel. Both always exist post-migration; the1071  // parallel load and the parallel derivation below keep wall-clock time1072  // constant regardless of which slot's passphrase (real or decoy) the1073  // caller supplied, so a timing side channel cannot distinguish the1074  // duress path from the real-unlock path (DUR-002).1075  const [slotA, slotB] = await Promise.all([1076    loadSlot(SLOT_A),1077    loadSlot(SLOT_B),1078  ]);10791080  // Derive both keys in parallel, unconditionally.1081  const [keyA, keyB] = await Promise.all([1082    slotA ? deriveKey(password, unhex(slotA.salt)) : Promise.resolve(null),1083    slotB ? deriveKey(password, unhex(slotB.salt)) : Promise.resolve(null),1084  ]);10851086  // Attempt both decrypts in parallel. The Result variant lets us distinguish1087  // 'wrong_key' from 'corrupted' so callers can offer a history-restore path1088  // when a slot's schema is invalid even though AES-GCM authenticated (M7).1089  const [resultA, resultB] = await Promise.all([1090    keyA && slotA1091      ? tryDecryptSlotResult(slotA, keyA, "slot_a_v1")1092      : Promise.resolve({ status: "wrong_key" } as TryDecryptResult),1093    keyB && slotB1094      ? tryDecryptSlotResult(slotB, keyB, "slot_b_v1")1095      : Promise.resolve({ status: "wrong_key" } as TryDecryptResult),1096  ]);1097  const payloadA = resultA.status === "ok" ? resultA.payload : null;1098  const payloadB = resultB.status === "ok" ? resultB.payload : null;10991100  if (payloadA && keyA) {1101    derivedKey = keyA;1102    void saveSessionKey(keyA, "real");1103    vaultMode = "real";1104    entries = payloadA.entries;1105    duressConfigured = payloadA.duressConfigured;1106    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1107    await loadSettings();1108    touchAutoLock();1109    if (keyB) zeroKey(keyB);11101111    // slotA is non-null when payloadA is truthy (keyA was derived from slotA).1112    if (slotA) {1113      const needsRecoverySetup =1114        !slotA.recovery_salt || !slotA.recovery_wrapped_root_key;1115      if (!needsRecoverySetup) {1116        rootKey = await deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(keyA, slotA);1117      }1118      // Pre-v2.12 vault, or a vault whose pw_root_* fields haven't been written1119      // yet: generate the recovery escrow and seed pw_root_* so subsequent1120      // unlocks can rehydrate rootKey without the user's recovery words.1121      // Best-effort — a failure here must not block unlock.1122      if (needsRecoverySetup || !rootKey) {1123        try {1124          await migrateToRecovery();1125          if (needsRecoverySetup) {1126            // String "1" matches the popup's existing peach_recovery_pending1127            // check; surfaced so the user re-confirms recovery words after a1128            // legacy-vault unlock (H2/COR-006).1129            await chrome.storage.local.set({ peach_recovery_pending: '1' });1130          }1131        } catch (migrationErr) {1132          console.warn('[Peach] recovery migration failed:', migrationErr);1133        }1134      }1135    }11361137    // If the payload had a pre-v2.11.0 shape (legacy passkey type, flat1138    // passkey fields, or pre-A-2 created/updated keys), rewrite it now so1139    // the next save uses the new format and migration doesn't re-run forever.1140    if (payloadA.migratedFromLegacy) {1141      await persistSlotA();1142    }1143    return true;1144  }11451146  if (payloadB && keyB) {1147    derivedKey = keyB;1148    void saveSessionKey(keyB, "decoy");1149    vaultMode = "decoy";1150    entries = payloadB.entries;1151    duressConfigured = false;1152    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1153    await loadSettings();1154    touchAutoLock();1155    if (keyA) zeroKey(keyA);1156    return true;1157  }11581159  if (keyA) zeroKey(keyA);1160  if (keyB) zeroKey(keyB);1161  // Surface corruption (good AES tag, broken schema) distinctly from1162  // wrong-password so the popup can offer history-restore (M7/COR-007).1163  if (resultA.status === "corrupted") {1164    lastUnlockFailureReason = resultA.reason;1165  } else if (resultB.status === "corrupted") {1166    lastUnlockFailureReason = resultB.reason;1167  }1168  return false;1169}11701171// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------1172// MV3 service worker session key — survives SW restarts within a browser session1173// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------11741175// chrome.storage.session is cleared on browser close; survives SW restart.1176// Firefox does not implement it (persistent background script, no restart risk).1177const SESSION_KEY_STORAGE = "peach_session_dk";11781179async function saveSessionKey(key: Uint8Array, mode: "real" | "decoy"): Promise<void> {1180  if (!chrome.storage.session) return;1181  await chrome.storage.session.set({ [SESSION_KEY_STORAGE]: { keyHex: hex(key), mode } });1182}11831184async function clearSessionKey(): Promise<void> {1185  if (!chrome.storage.session) return;1186  await chrome.storage.session.remove(SESSION_KEY_STORAGE);1187}11881189/**1190 * On SW restart, re-derive all in-memory vault state from the session key1191 * stored in chrome.storage.session (set at unlock time, cleared on lock).1192 * Returns true if the vault was restored, false if no session key was found.1193 * No-ops if the vault is already unlocked.1194 */1195export async function restoreFromSession(): Promise<boolean> {1196  if (derivedKey !== null) return true;1197  if (!chrome.storage.session) return false;1198  const stored = await chrome.storage.session.get(SESSION_KEY_STORAGE);1199  const entry = stored[SESSION_KEY_STORAGE] as { keyHex: string; mode: "real" | "decoy" } | undefined;1200  if (!entry?.keyHex) return false;12011202  const key = unhex(entry.keyHex);1203  const slotKey = entry.mode === "real" ? SLOT_A : SLOT_B;1204  const aadTag = entry.mode === "real" ? "slot_a_v1" : "slot_b_v1";1205  const slot = await loadSlot(slotKey);1206  if (!slot) { await clearSessionKey(); return false; }12071208  const result = await tryDecryptSlotResult(slot, key, aadTag);1209  if (result.status !== "ok") { await clearSessionKey(); return false; }12101211  derivedKey = key;1212  vaultMode = entry.mode;1213  entries = result.payload.entries;1214  duressConfigured = entry.mode === "real" ? result.payload.duressConfigured : false;1215  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1216  await loadSettings();1217  touchAutoLock();12181219  if (entry.mode === "real" && slot.recovery_salt && slot.recovery_wrapped_root_key) {1220    try { rootKey = await deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(key, slot); } catch { /* non-fatal */ }1221  }12221223  return true;1224}12251226export function lock(): void {1227  void clearSessionKey();1228  if (derivedKey) {1229    zeroKey(derivedKey);1230    derivedKey = null;1231  }1232  if (rootKey) {1233    rootKey.fill(0);1234    rootKey = null;1235  }12361237  entries = [];1238  domainIndex = new Map();1239  vaultMode = "real";1240  duressConfigured = false;1241  clearAutoLock();1242}12431244export function isUnlocked(): boolean {1245  return derivedKey !== null;1246}12471248// Opens the vault using a pre-derived AES-256 key (skipping Argon2id).1249// Used by Android biometric unlock — the key was derived on the native side.1250export async function unlockWithKey(1251  masterKeyHex: string,1252): Promise<{ ok: true; entries: VaultEntry[] } | { ok: false; error: string }> {1253  try {1254    const masterKeyBytes = unhex(masterKeyHex);1255    const stored = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1256    if (!stored) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };1257    const payload = await tryDecryptSlot(stored, masterKeyBytes, "slot_a_v1");1258    if (!payload) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };12591260    derivedKey = masterKeyBytes;1261    vaultMode = "real";1262    entries = payload.entries;1263    duressConfigured = payload.duressConfigured;1264    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1265    await loadSettings();1266    touchAutoLock();1267    return { ok: true, entries };1268  } catch {1269    return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };1270  }1271}12721273/**1274 * Restore the vault from a parsed Peach Codex payload.1275 *1276 * The supplied passphrase is verified against the Codex's slotA *before* any1277 * storage mutation — wrong passphrases return without touching disk. On1278 * success, the current vault state is snapshotted (reason: "restore") so the1279 * user can revert via Settings -> Vault History, then slotA/slotB are written1280 * and `peach_last_modified_at` is set to the Codex's recorded timestamp. A1281 * regular `unlock()` follows so the rest of the SW sees the standard1282 * post-unlock state.1283 *1284 * Intentionally non-Pro-gated — see peach_codex_v2.md "Pro gating". A Codex1285 * printed by a Pro user must always be restorable, even on a free device.1286 *1287 * Timing is not held constant here (in contrast to `unlock`): the Codex flow1288 * is an explicit user action with a known passphrase, not a passive lock1289 * screen, so the duress-vs-real timing side channel does not apply.1290 */1291export async function unlockFromCodex(params: {1292  slotA: string; // JSON string of StoredVault for slot A1293  slotB: string | null; // JSON string of StoredVault for slot B, or null1294  timestamp: number;1295  masterPassphrase: string;1296}): Promise<1297  | { ok: true; entryCount: number }1298  | { ok: false; reason: "wrong_passphrase" | "invalid_slot_format" }1299> {1300  let parsedSlotA: StoredVault;1301  let parsedSlotB: StoredVault | null = null;1302  try {1303    const rawA = JSON.parse(params.slotA) as unknown;1304    if (!hasValidVaultSchema(rawA)) {1305      return { ok: false, reason: "invalid_slot_format" };1306    }1307    parsedSlotA = rawA;1308    if (params.slotB !== null) {1309      const rawB = JSON.parse(params.slotB) as unknown;1310      if (!hasValidVaultSchema(rawB)) {1311        return { ok: false, reason: "invalid_slot_format" };1312      }1313      parsedSlotB = rawB;1314    }1315  } catch {1316    return { ok: false, reason: "invalid_slot_format" };1317  }13181319  // Verify the passphrase against the supplied slotA WITHOUT writing anything.1320  // If this fails the on-disk vault is left completely untouched.1321  const trialKey = await deriveKey(params.masterPassphrase, unhex(parsedSlotA.salt));1322  const trialPayload = await tryDecryptSlot(parsedSlotA, trialKey, "slot_a_v1");1323  if (!trialPayload) {1324    zeroKey(trialKey);1325    return { ok: false, reason: "wrong_passphrase" };1326  }1327  // Drop the trial key; `unlock()` below derives its own copy. Holding two1328  // copies of the master key in memory at once would be a needless surface.1329  zeroKey(trialKey);13301331  // Snapshot the about-to-be-overwritten on-disk state so the user can revert1332  // a mistaken Codex restore via the Vault History UI. Non-fatal if it fails.1333  await takeVaultSnapshot("restore");13341335  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, parsedSlotA);1336  if (parsedSlotB) {1337    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, parsedSlotB);1338  } else {1339    // Slot B must always exist with ciphertext length matching slot A1340    // (Projects.md §3.2). Codex prints may omit slot B (duress wasn't1341    // configured); regenerate noise to satisfy the invariant.1342    await writeSlot(1343      SLOT_B,1344      generateNoiseBlob(parsedSlotA.ciphertext.length / 2),1345    );1346  }1347  await chrome.storage.local.set({1348    peach_last_modified_at: String(params.timestamp),1349  });13501351  // Standard unlock path so domain index, settings, auto-lock, and1352  // recovery-key state all populate exactly as a normal unlock would.1353  const ok = await unlock(params.masterPassphrase);1354  if (!ok) {1355    // Should be unreachable — we just verified the passphrase against the1356    // same slotA we wrote. Treat as wrong_passphrase to keep the contract1357    // simple if some race or storage anomaly intrudes.1358    return { ok: false, reason: "wrong_passphrase" };1359  }1360  return { ok: true, entryCount: getEntries().length };1361}13621363// Returns the current in-memory derived key as a hex string.1364// Used by the biometric enable flow in Settings to store the key in Android Keystore.1365export function getDerivedKeyHex(): string {1366  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_not_unlocked");1367  return hex(derivedKey);1368}13691370/**1371 * Returns the vault's stable root key as hex, or null when locked / not yet1372 * populated. The root key is random per-vault, generated at creation, escrowed1373 * under the recovery words, and re-wrapped (not regenerated) on every password1374 * change — so it is INVARIANT across password rotation, unlike getDerivedKeyHex.1375 *1376 * This is the correct input for sync identity derivation (vault_id, the Noise1377 * XX static key, the Ed25519 manifest signing key, and per-entry envelope1378 * keys): paired devices keep the same identity and can still decrypt each1379 * other's entries after either side rotates its master password (SEV-2-B).1380 *1381 * Returns null rather than throwing so sync callers degrade to VAULT_LOCKED1382 * instead of crashing; rootKey is populated on every real-mode unlock via1383 * deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey / migrateToRecovery.1384 */1385export function getRootKeyHex(): string | null {1386  return rootKey ? hex(rootKey) : null;1387}13881389export function getEntries(): VaultEntry[] {1390  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1391  return entries.filter((entry) => !entry.deletedAt);1392}13931394const EMAIL_RE = /^[^\s@]+@[^\s@]+\.[^\s@]+$/;13951396export function getIdentities(): SavedIdentity[] {1397  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1398  const active = entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt && e.type === "login");13991400  const emailMap = new Map<string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }>();1401  const usernameMap = new Map<string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }>();14021403  for (const entry of active) {1404    const domain = extractDomain(entry.url ?? "") ?? "";1405    const modifiedAt = entry.modifiedAt ?? entry.createdAt ?? 0;14061407    function tally(map: Map<string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }>, v: string) {1408      const existing = map.get(v);1409      if (!existing || modifiedAt > existing.lastUsed) {1410        map.set(v, { lastUsed: modifiedAt, count: (existing?.count ?? 0) + 1, domain });1411      } else {1412        map.set(v, { ...existing, count: existing.count + 1 });1413      }1414    }14151416    const uVal = entry.username?.trim();1417    if (uVal) tally(EMAIL_RE.test(uVal) ? emailMap : usernameMap, uVal);14181419    // Also count the dedicated email field — entries created via the inline1420    // popup new-entry form store email here rather than in username.1421    const eVal = entry.email?.trim();1422    if (eVal) tally(emailMap, eVal);1423  }14241425  const toIdentity = (type: "email" | "username") =>1426    ([value, d]: [string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }]): SavedIdentity => ({1427      value, type, lastUsed: d.lastUsed, useCount: d.count, exampleDomain: d.domain || undefined,1428    });14291430  return [1431    ...[...emailMap.entries()].map(toIdentity("email")).sort((a, b) => b.useCount - a.useCount),1432    ...[...usernameMap.entries()].map(toIdentity("username")).sort((a, b) => b.useCount - a.useCount),1433  ];1434}14351436export async function batchAddEntries(drafts: EntryDraft[]): Promise<VaultEntry[]> {1437  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");14381439  const now = Date.now();1440  const added: VaultEntry[] = [];1441  for (const draft of drafts) {1442    try {1443      const sanitized = sanitizeEntryDraft(draft);1444      const nextEntry: VaultEntry = {1445        ...sanitized,1446        id: crypto.randomUUID(),1447        createdAt: now,1448        modifiedAt: monotonicEntryTimestamp(),1449      };1450      entries.push(nextEntry);1451      added.push(nextEntry);1452    } catch {1453      // Skip invalid drafts silently — caller can see diff between input and output length1454    }1455  }14561457  if (added.length > 0) {1458    await persistEntries();1459  }14601461  return added;1462}14631464/**1465 * Restore a set of entries in full fidelity — preserves id, createdAt,1466 * modifiedAt, and every other field unlike `batchAddEntries` which1467 * assigns fresh identity. Used by restore paths where the backup is the1468 * authoritative source of truth. `mode` controls how entries already in1469 * the vault are treated.1470 */1471export async function restoreEntries(1472  incoming: VaultEntry[],1473  mode: "replace" | "merge"1474): Promise<{ added: number; updated: number; skipped: number }> {1475  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");14761477  // A replace with zero incoming entries is almost certainly a caller bug1478  // (e.g. an import that silently dropped everything). Refuse rather than1479  // wipe the vault.1480  if (mode === "replace" && incoming.length === 0) {1481    throw new Error("refuse to replace with empty entry set");1482  }14831484  let added = 0;1485  let updated = 0;1486  let skipped = 0;14871488  if (mode === "replace") {1489    entries = [];1490    for (const entry of incoming) {1491      const normalized = sanitizeRestoredEntry(entry);1492      if (!normalized) {1493        skipped += 1;1494        continue;1495      }1496      entries.push(normalized);1497      added += 1;1498    }1499  } else {1500    const byId = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();1501    for (const e of entries) byId.set(e.id, e);15021503    for (const entry of incoming) {1504      const normalized = sanitizeRestoredEntry(entry);1505      if (!normalized) {1506        skipped += 1;1507        continue;1508      }1509      const existing = byId.get(normalized.id);1510      if (!existing) {1511        entries.push(normalized);1512        added += 1;1513      } else if (normalized.modifiedAt > existing.modifiedAt) {1514        const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === existing.id);1515        if (idx !== -1) {1516          entries[idx] = normalized;1517          updated += 1;1518        }1519      } else {1520        skipped += 1;1521      }1522    }1523  }15241525  await persistEntries("import");1526  return { added, updated, skipped };1527}15281529/**1530 * Validate + normalise a VaultEntry coming from a backup. Accepts1531 * anything structurally sound; keeps all metadata verbatim. Returns1532 * null for values the live vault shouldn't accept (e.g., missing title).1533 */1534function sanitizeRestoredEntry(entry: VaultEntry): VaultEntry | null {1535  if (!entry || typeof entry !== "object") return null;1536  const title = typeof entry.title === "string" ? entry.title.trim() : "";1537  if (!title) return null;1538  const id = typeof entry.id === "string" && entry.id ? entry.id : crypto.randomUUID();1539  const now = Date.now();1540  const createdAt = typeof entry.createdAt === "number" ? entry.createdAt : now;1541  const modifiedAt = typeof entry.modifiedAt === "number" ? entry.modifiedAt : createdAt;15421543  // Migrate legacy passkey shape on import (same logic as on-disk read).1544  // Imports from pre-v2.11.0 vault backups still carry type:"passkey" with1545  // flat fields; bring them into the new shape immediately.1546  const migrated: VaultEntry = migrateLegacyPasskey(1547    {1548      ...entry,1549      id,1550      title,1551      type: entry.type ?? "login",1552      createdAt,1553      modifiedAt,1554    },1555    entry1556  );15571558  // Login entries from backup must carry a password (or be passkey-only,1559  // in which case the passkey sub-object replaces the password requirement).1560  if (1561    migrated.type === "login" &&1562    !migrated.passkey &&1563    typeof migrated.password !== "string"1564  ) {1565    return null;1566  }1567  if (migrated.passkey && !migrated.passkey.credentialId) {1568    return null;1569  }15701571  return migrated;1572}15731574// Soft-deletes every non-deleted entry in one call. The literal string1575// argument is a tripwire against accidental calls — any caller that would1576// wipe the vault has to consciously type "REPLACE_ALL". Do not relax this1577// to a boolean.1578export async function clearVaultEntries(1579  confirmation: "REPLACE_ALL"1580): Promise<void> {1581  if (confirmation !== "REPLACE_ALL") {1582    throw new Error("clearVaultEntries requires explicit confirmation");1583  }1584  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1585  for (const entry of entries) {1586    if (!entry.deletedAt) {1587      const stamp = monotonicEntryTimestamp(entry.modifiedAt);1588      entry.deletedAt = stamp;1589      entry.modifiedAt = stamp;1590    }1591  }1592  await persistEntries();1593}15941595export async function addEntry(entry: EntryDraft): Promise<VaultEntry> {1596  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");15971598  const sanitized = sanitizeEntryDraft(entry);1599  const now = Date.now();1600  const stamp = monotonicEntryTimestamp();1601  const nextEntry: VaultEntry = {1602    ...sanitized,1603    id: crypto.randomUUID(),1604    createdAt: now,1605    modifiedAt: stamp,1606    // Stamp passwordChangedAt at creation so age tracking is accurate from1607    // day one. Non-login entries carry the same stamp harmlessly.1608    passwordChangedAt: sanitized.password ? stamp : undefined,1609  };16101611  // Clone-and-replace so a failed persist rolls back the in-memory state1612  // (COR-008). Without this, a quota-full or storage error leaves the1613  // module-level `entries` ahead of what's actually on disk.1614  const rollback = entries;1615  entries = [...entries, nextEntry];1616  try {1617    await persistEntries();1618  } catch (err) {1619    entries = rollback;1620    throw err;1621  }16221623  // Fire-and-forget breach check (only for login entries if breach monitoring is enabled or not set)1624  if (settings.breachMonitoring !== false && nextEntry.type === "login" && nextEntry.password) {1625    checkBreach(nextEntry.password).then(async (count) => {1626      if (count > 0) {1627        const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === nextEntry.id);1628        if (idx !== -1) {1629          entries[idx] = { ...entries[idx], breach: count, modifiedAt: monotonicEntryTimestamp(entries[idx].modifiedAt) };1630          await persistEntries();1631        }1632      }1633    });1634  }16351636  fireSyncTrigger("vault_change");16371638  return nextEntry;1639}16401641/**1642 * Run the passkey-merge pass on the live in-memory entries and persist if1643 * anything changed. Called immediately after any passkey registration so that1644 * a same-domain TOTP-only entry already in the vault gets consolidated right1645 * away instead of waiting until the next lock/unlock cycle.1646 */1647export async function consolidatePasskeyEntries(): Promise<void> {1648  if (!derivedKey) return;1649  const { merged } = mergePasskeyOnlyIntoLogins(entries);1650  if (merged) {1651    await persistEntries();1652  }1653}16541655export async function updateEntry(1656  id: string,1657  patch: Partial<VaultEntry>1658): Promise<void> {1659  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");16601661  const idx = entries.findIndex((entry) => entry.id === id);1662  if (idx === -1 || entries[idx].deletedAt) {1663    throw new Error("entry_not_found");1664  }16651666  const current = entries[idx];1667  const sanitizedPatch = sanitizeEntryPatch(patch);1668  // Refresh passwordChangedAt only when the password value actually changes —1669  // a metadata-only update (title, tags, etc.) must not reset the age clock1670  // that drives the Pro health rotation recommendation.1671  const passwordChanged =1672    "password" in patch &&1673    typeof sanitizedPatch.password === "string" &&1674    sanitizedPatch.password !== current.password;1675  const stamp = monotonicEntryTimestamp(current.modifiedAt);1676  // When the password actually changes, push the outgoing one onto the history1677  // (newest first) so the user can reveal/copy/restore it later. We record the1678  // age it carried (passwordChangedAt, falling back to createdAt) rather than1679  // `now`, so the list reflects when each password was last in effect. Only1680  // capture a non-empty prior value — clearing a password leaves no secret to1681  // keep, and we skip an immediate exact duplicate (e.g. restore-then-restore)1682  // to avoid noise.1683  const priorPassword = current.password;1684  const shouldCapture =1685    passwordChanged &&1686    typeof priorPassword === "string" &&1687    priorPassword.length > 0 &&1688    current.passwordHistory?.[0]?.password !== priorPassword;1689  const nextHistory = shouldCapture1690    ? [1691        { password: priorPassword!, changedAt: current.passwordChangedAt ?? current.createdAt },1692        ...(current.passwordHistory ?? []),1693      ].slice(0, PASSWORD_HISTORY_MAX)1694    : current.passwordHistory;1695  entries[idx] = {1696    ...current,1697    ...sanitizedPatch,1698    modifiedAt: stamp,1699    ...(passwordChanged ? { passwordChangedAt: stamp, passwordHistory: nextHistory } : {}),1700  };1701170217031704  // Card entries must retain their card number1705  if (entries[idx].type === "card" && !entries[idx].cardNumber) {1706    entries[idx] = current;1707    throw new Error("card number is required for card entries");1708  }17091710  // Roll the in-memory entry back to its pre-edit state if the disk write1711  // fails (e.g. storage quota). Without this the module-level `entries` array1712  // would hold an edit that never landed on disk, diverging from the vault1713  // until the next unlock silently reverts it (SEV-3-A). Mirrors addEntry.1714  try {1715    await persistEntries();1716  } catch (err) {1717    entries[idx] = current;1718    throw err;1719  }17201721  // Breach check when password changes: clear immediately so old breach doesn't linger,1722  // then async-check the new password and only re-set if it's also found.1723  if ("password" in patch && settings.breachMonitoring !== false && entries[idx].type === "login") {1724    entries[idx] = { ...entries[idx], breach: undefined };1725    await persistEntries();1726    const password = entries[idx].password;1727    if (password) {1728      checkBreach(password).then(async (count) => {1729        const i = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id);1730        if (i !== -1 && count > 0) {1731          entries[i] = { ...entries[i], breach: count, modifiedAt: monotonicEntryTimestamp(entries[i].modifiedAt) };1732          await persistEntries();1733        }1734      });1735    }1736  }17371738  fireSyncTrigger("vault_change");1739}17401741export async function deleteEntry(id: string): Promise<void> {1742  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");17431744  const entry = entries.find((item) => item.id === id);1745  if (!entry || entry.deletedAt) {1746    throw new Error("entry_not_found");1747  }17481749  // Tombstone timestamp must be strictly greater than the entry's last1750  // modification so the deletion wins LWW against any in-flight edit, even1751  // under clock skew (SEV-2-E).1752  const previousModifiedAt = entry.modifiedAt;1753  const stamp = monotonicEntryTimestamp(entry.modifiedAt);1754  entry.deletedAt = stamp;1755  entry.modifiedAt = stamp;1756  // Roll the tombstone back if the disk write fails, so a quota error doesn't1757  // leave the entry deleted in memory but alive on disk (SEV-3-A).1758  try {1759    await persistEntries();1760  } catch (err) {1761    delete entry.deletedAt;1762    entry.modifiedAt = previousModifiedAt;1763    throw err;1764  }1765  fireSyncTrigger("vault_change");1766}17671768export function getDeletedEntries(): VaultEntry[] {1769  if (!derivedKey) return [];1770  return entries.filter((e) => !!e.deletedAt);1771}17721773/**1774 * Returns the vault's monotonic version — the `peach_last_modified_at` value1775 * stamped on every user-initiated write. Remote (sync) writes do NOT advance1776 * this version so a sync round never cascades into a second outbound sync.1777 */1778export async function getVaultVersion(): Promise<number> {1779  try {1780    const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get("peach_last_modified_at");1781    const v = (raw as Record<string, unknown>).peach_last_modified_at;1782    if (typeof v === "number") return v;1783    if (typeof v === "string" && v !== "") {1784      const n = Number.parseInt(v, 10);1785      return Number.isFinite(n) ? n : 0;1786    }1787    return 0;1788  } catch {1789    return 0;1790  }1791}17921793/**1794 * Internal write variants — bypass `fireSyncTrigger` so the sync layer can1795 * apply entries without cascading into another outbound sync round.1796 *1797 * INVARIANT: callers must not pass entries whose IDs collide with existing1798 * active (non-deleted) entries unless the intent is an explicit overwrite.1799 * These functions do not validate field-level constraints (password required,1800 * card number required, etc.) — they are trust-the-caller paths for sync and1801 * test harness use only.1802 */1803export async function addEntryDirect(entry: VaultEntry): Promise<void> {1804  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1805  entries = [...entries, entry];1806  await persistEntries("sync_received");1807}18081809export async function updateEntryDirect(patch: VaultEntry): Promise<void> {1810  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1811  const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === patch.id);1812  if (idx === -1) throw new Error("entry_not_found");1813  entries[idx] = { ...entries[idx], ...patch };1814  await persistEntries("sync_received");1815}18161817export async function deleteEntryDirect(id: string, deletedAt: number): Promise<void> {1818  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1819  const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id);1820  if (idx === -1) throw new Error("entry_not_found");1821  entries[idx] = { ...entries[idx], deletedAt, modifiedAt: deletedAt };1822  await persistEntries("sync_received");1823}18241825/**1826 * Apply a batch of remote entries + tombstones from a chirp-sync peer.1827 * Last-write-wins by `modifiedAt`; a tombstone supersedes a live entry when1828 * `deletedAt > modifiedAt` on the local side. Mutates `entries` directly and1829 * persists with reason `sync_received` — does NOT fire the sync dispatcher, so1830 * applying a sync round cannot cascade into another outbound sync.1831 *1832 * `applied` counts entries that actually changed local state (new add,1833 * overwrite-by-newer, or new tombstone). `received` is the raw payload size1834 * the caller can surface in the sync result UI.1835 */1836export async function applyMergedRemoteEntries(1837  remoteEntries: VaultEntry[],1838  remoteTombstones: Record<string, number>,1839): Promise<{ received: number; applied: number; conflicts: number }> {1840  // DESIGN: last-write-wins is applied PER-ENTRY, not per-field. If two devices1841  // concurrently edit different fields of the same entry, the one with the1842  // newer modifiedAt wins the whole entry and the other device's field edits1843  // are dropped silently. This is the deliberate trade-off for a simple,1844  // conflict-free merge — per-field CRDT merge is out of scope. Guidance for1845  // users: edit a given entry on one device at a time.1846  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");18471848  const received = remoteEntries.length + Object.keys(remoteTombstones).length;1849  let applied = 0;1850  let conflicts = 0;18511852  const byId = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();1853  for (const e of entries) byId.set(e.id, e);18541855  for (const remote of remoteEntries) {1856    const sanitized = sanitizeRestoredEntry(remote);1857    if (!sanitized) continue;1858    const tombstoneTs = remoteTombstones[sanitized.id];1859    if (tombstoneTs !== undefined && tombstoneTs >= sanitized.modifiedAt) {1860      continue;1861    }1862    const local = byId.get(sanitized.id);1863    if (!local) {1864      entries.push(sanitized);1865      byId.set(sanitized.id, sanitized);1866      applied += 1;1867    } else if (sanitized.modifiedAt > local.modifiedAt) {1868      const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === local.id);1869      if (idx !== -1) {1870        entries[idx] = sanitized;1871        byId.set(sanitized.id, sanitized);1872        applied += 1;1873        if (!local.deletedAt) conflicts += 1;1874      }1875    }1876  }18771878  for (const [id, deletedAt] of Object.entries(remoteTombstones)) {1879    if (typeof deletedAt !== "number" || !Number.isFinite(deletedAt)) continue;1880    const local = byId.get(id);1881    if (!local) continue;1882    if (local.deletedAt && local.deletedAt >= deletedAt) continue;1883    if (deletedAt < local.modifiedAt) continue;1884    const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id);1885    if (idx !== -1) {1886      entries[idx] = { ...local, deletedAt, modifiedAt: deletedAt };1887      applied += 1;1888    }1889  }18901891  if (applied > 0) {1892    await persistEntries("sync_received");1893    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1894  }1895  return { received, applied, conflicts };1896}18971898export async function restoreEntry(id: string): Promise<void> {1899  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1900  const entry = entries.find((e) => e.id === id && e.deletedAt);1901  if (!entry) throw new Error("deleted entry not found");1902  delete entry.deletedAt;1903  entry.modifiedAt = monotonicEntryTimestamp(entry.modifiedAt);1904  await persistEntries();1905  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1906}19071908export async function purgeEntry(id: string): Promise<void> {1909  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1910  const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id && e.deletedAt);1911  if (idx === -1) throw new Error("deleted entry not found");1912  entries.splice(idx, 1);1913  await persistEntries();1914}19151916/** Permanently delete entries whose deletedAt is older than retentionMs. 0 = keep forever. */1917export async function purgeExpiredTrash(retentionMs: number): Promise<number> {1918  if (!derivedKey || retentionMs === 0) return 0;1919  const cutoff = Date.now() - retentionMs;1920  const before = entries.length;1921  entries = entries.filter((e) => !(e.deletedAt && e.deletedAt < cutoff));1922  const purged = before - entries.length;1923  if (purged > 0) await persistEntries();1924  return purged;1925}19261927export function queryDomain(domain: string): VaultEntry[] {1928  return domainIndex.get(domain) ?? [];1929}19301931export function getEntryById(id: string): VaultEntry | undefined {1932  return entries.find((entry) => entry.id === id && !entry.deletedAt);1933}19341935async function persistSlotA(1936  reason: VaultSnapshot["reason"] = "local_save",1937): Promise<StoredVault> {1938  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");19391940  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1941  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");19421943  // Snapshot the about-to-be-overwritten state BEFORE we mutate disk. Failures1944  // are swallowed by takeVaultSnapshot — history must never block a save.1945  await takeVaultSnapshot(reason);19461947  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured, duressConfigured ? DURESS_SLOT_SIZE : 0);1948  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");19491950  // Preserve existing recovery escrow fields.1951  const nextSlotA: StoredVault = {1952    ...slotA,1953    nonce,1954    ciphertext,1955    tag,1956    // recovery_salt and recovery_wrapped_root_key are already set from loadSlot1957  };1958  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, nextSlotA);19591960  // Slot A (the real vault) is now committed. Wrap every later write so a1961  // mid-persist failure (e.g. a storage error after slot A landed) restores the1962  // prior slot A before rethrowing. Without this, a "failed" save that already1963  // wrote slot A leaves disk ahead of the in-memory rollback in addEntry/1964  // updateEntry/deleteEntry — the entry stays silently on disk and resurfaces1965  // as a duplicate on the next unlock (observed under storage-quota pressure).1966  try {1967    // When duress is not configured, keep slot B size-matched with slot A by1968    // regenerating its noise. When duress IS configured, leave slot B alone —1969    // we don't have the decoy key to re-encrypt it. This is a known trade-off.1970    if (!duressConfigured) {1971      await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2));1972    }1973    // Only advance the vault version for locally-originated writes. Entries1974    // applied from a sync peer ("sync_received") must NOT bump the counter —1975    // otherwise applying a remote round makes us look newer than the peer and1976    // triggers a redundant outbound sync, defeating the no-op optimisation1977    // and risking a ping-pong between two devices (SEV-2-C).1978    if (reason !== "sync_received") {1979      await stampLocalVaultMutation();1980    }1981  } catch (err) {1982    // Best-effort restore — the prior slot A is smaller-or-equal, so this write1983    // fits even when the failure was a quota overflow.1984    await writeSlot(SLOT_A, slotA).catch(() => {});1985    throw err;1986  }19871988  return nextSlotA;1989}19901991async function persistSlotB(): Promise<void> {1992  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");19931994  const slotB = await loadSlot(SLOT_B);1995  if (!slotB) throw new Error("missing slot B");19961997  // Decoy plaintext always reports duressConfigured=false — the decoy user1998  // sees a clean slate. persistSlotB only runs in decoy mode, which only1999  // exists once duress is configured, so pad to the fixed duress ceiling to2000  // keep slot B's length equal to slot A's (audit MEDIUM — deniability).2001  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, false, DURESS_SLOT_SIZE);2002  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKey, plaintext, "slot_b_v1");20032004  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, { ...slotB, nonce, ciphertext, tag });2005  // Symmetric with persistSlotA: if the version stamp fails after the decoy2006  // slot committed, restore the prior slot B so a failed decoy-mode save can't2007  // leave disk ahead of the in-memory rollback.2008  try {2009    await stampLocalVaultMutation();2010  } catch (err) {2011    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, slotB).catch(() => {});2012    throw err;2013  }2014}20152016async function persistEntries(2017  reason: VaultSnapshot["reason"] = "local_save",2018): Promise<void> {2019  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");20202021  if (vaultMode === "decoy") {2022    await persistSlotB();2023  } else {2024    await persistSlotA(reason);2025  }2026  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);2027}20282029function cleanAdditionalUrls(values: string[] | undefined): string[] | undefined {2030  if (!Array.isArray(values)) return undefined;2031  const seen = new Set<string>();2032  const cleaned: string[] = [];2033  for (const value of values) {2034    const trimmed = typeof value === "string" ? value.trim() : "";2035    if (!trimmed) continue;2036    const key = trimmed.toLowerCase();2037    if (seen.has(key)) continue;2038    seen.add(key);2039    cleaned.push(trimmed);2040  }2041  return cleaned.length > 0 ? cleaned : undefined;2042}20432044function sanitizeEntryDraft(entry: EntryDraft): EntryDraft {2045  const title = entry.title.trim();2046  // Accept legacy `type:"passkey"` drafts but rewrite to "login" — the new2047  // model is "any entry, optionally with a passkey sub-object." Imports and2048  // any in-flight callers from before v2.11.0 keep working without throwing.2049  let type: VaultEntry["type"] = entry.type ?? "login";2050  if (type === "passkey") type = "login";20512052  if (!title) throw new Error("title is required");20532054  if (entry.passkey) {2055    const p = entry.passkey;2056    if (2057      !p.rpId ||2058      !p.credentialId ||2059      !p.publicKeyCose ||2060      !p.userHandle ||2061      !p.userName ||2062      (p.algorithm !== -7 && p.algorithm !== -8)2063    ) {2064      throw new Error("invalid passkey credential");2065    }2066  }2067  if (type === "card") {2068    if (!entry.cardholderName?.trim() || !entry.cardNumber?.trim()) {2069      throw new Error("cardholder name and card number are required");2070    }2071  }20722073  return {2074    type,2075    title,2076    username: type === "login" ? entry.username?.trim() ?? "" : undefined,2077    email: type === "login" ? entry.email?.trim() || undefined : undefined,2078    password: type === "login" ? entry.password : undefined,2079    url: type === "login" ? entry.url?.trim() ?? "" : undefined,2080    additionalUrls: type === "login" ? cleanAdditionalUrls(entry.additionalUrls) : undefined,2081    totp: type === "login" ? entry.totp?.trim() || undefined : undefined,2082    notes: entry.notes?.trim() || undefined,2083    breach: type === "login" ? entry.breach : undefined,2084    canary: type === "login" ? entry.canary : undefined,2085    tags: entry.tags,2086    passkey: entry.passkey,2087    cardholderName: type === "card" ? entry.cardholderName?.trim() : undefined,2088    cardNumber: type === "card" ? entry.cardNumber?.trim() : undefined,2089    expMonth: type === "card" ? entry.expMonth?.trim() : undefined,2090    expYear: type === "card" ? entry.expYear?.trim() : undefined,2091    cvc: type === "card" ? entry.cvc?.trim() : undefined,2092    cardNickname: type === "card" ? entry.cardNickname?.trim() || undefined : undefined,2093    network: type === "card" ? entry.network : undefined,2094    last4: type === "card" ? entry.last4?.trim() : undefined,2095  };2096}20972098function sanitizeEntryPatch(patch: Partial<VaultEntry>): Partial<VaultEntry> {2099  const nextPatch: Partial<VaultEntry> = {};21002101  if ("type" in patch) {2102    nextPatch.type = patch.type;2103  }21042105  if ("title" in patch) {2106    const title = patch.title?.trim() ?? "";2107    if (!title) throw new Error("title is required");2108    nextPatch.title = title;2109  }21102111  if ("url" in patch) {2112    nextPatch.url = patch.url?.trim() ?? "";2113  }21142115  if ("additionalUrls" in patch) {2116    const incoming = Array.isArray(patch.additionalUrls) ? patch.additionalUrls : [];2117    const seen = new Set<string>();2118    const cleaned: string[] = [];2119    for (const value of incoming) {2120      const trimmed = typeof value === "string" ? value.trim() : "";2121      if (!trimmed) continue;2122      const key = trimmed.toLowerCase();2123      if (seen.has(key)) continue;2124      seen.add(key);2125      cleaned.push(trimmed);2126    }2127    nextPatch.additionalUrls = cleaned.length > 0 ? cleaned : undefined;2128  }21292130  if ("username" in patch) {2131    nextPatch.username = patch.username?.trim() ?? "";2132  }21332134  if ("email" in patch) {2135    nextPatch.email = patch.email?.trim() || undefined;2136  }21372138  if ("password" in patch) {2139    const password = patch.password ?? "";2140    // Allow clearing a password (e.g. on passkey-only entries)2141    nextPatch.password = password || undefined;2142  }21432144  if ("totp" in patch) {2145    nextPatch.totp = patch.totp?.trim() || undefined;2146  }21472148  if ("notes" in patch) {2149    nextPatch.notes = patch.notes?.trim() || undefined;2150  }21512152  if ("breach" in patch) {2153    nextPatch.breach = patch.breach;2154  }21552156  if ("canary" in patch) {2157    nextPatch.canary = patch.canary;2158  }21592160  if ("passkey" in patch) {2161    // Passkey sub-object replaces all the legacy flat passkey fields. A2162    // patch with `passkey: undefined` removes the credential from the entry2163    // (used by "remove passkey" without deleting the whole entry).2164    nextPatch.passkey = patch.passkey;2165  }21662167  if ("tags" in patch) {2168    nextPatch.tags = patch.tags;2169  }21702171  if ("cardholderName" in patch) {2172    nextPatch.cardholderName = patch.cardholderName?.trim() || undefined;2173  }2174  if ("cardNumber" in patch) {2175    const n = patch.cardNumber ?? "";2176    nextPatch.cardNumber = n || undefined;2177  }2178  if ("expMonth" in patch) {2179    nextPatch.expMonth = patch.expMonth?.trim() || undefined;2180  }2181  if ("expYear" in patch) {2182    nextPatch.expYear = patch.expYear?.trim() || undefined;2183  }2184  if ("cvc" in patch) {2185    nextPatch.cvc = patch.cvc?.trim() || undefined;2186  }2187  if ("cardNickname" in patch) {2188    nextPatch.cardNickname = patch.cardNickname?.trim() || undefined;2189  }2190  if ("network" in patch) {2191    nextPatch.network = patch.network;2192  }2193  if ("last4" in patch) {2194    nextPatch.last4 = patch.last4?.trim() || undefined;2195  }21962197  return nextPatch;2198}21992200function normalizeEntry(entry: VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry): VaultEntry {2201  const createdAt = "createdAt" in entry ? entry.createdAt : entry.created;2202  const modifiedAt =2203    "modifiedAt" in entry ? entry.modifiedAt : entry.updated;22042205  const base: VaultEntry = {2206    id: entry.id,2207    type: "type" in entry ? entry.type : "login",2208    title: entry.title,2209    username: entry.username,2210    email: "email" in entry ? entry.email : undefined,2211    password: entry.password,2212    url: entry.url,2213    additionalUrls:2214      "additionalUrls" in entry && Array.isArray(entry.additionalUrls)2215        ? entry.additionalUrls2216        : undefined,2217    totp: entry.totp,2218    notes: entry.notes,2219    breach: entry.breach,2220    // Preserve the password-age clock across lock/unlock. Without this the2221    // field is dropped on every decode and the advanced-health "aged password"2222    // signal silently resets to createdAt on each unlock (SEV-2-A).2223    passwordChangedAt:2224      "passwordChangedAt" in entry ? entry.passwordChangedAt : undefined,2225    // Preserve past-password history across lock/unlock. normalizeEntry is a2226    // field whitelist, so an unlisted field is silently dropped on every decode2227    // (same class as the passwordChangedAt SEV-2-A above).2228    passwordHistory:2229      "passwordHistory" in entry && Array.isArray(entry.passwordHistory)2230        ? entry.passwordHistory2231        : undefined,2232    canary: "canary" in entry ? entry.canary : undefined,2233    passkey: "passkey" in entry ? entry.passkey : undefined,2234    createdAt,2235    modifiedAt,2236    deletedAt: entry.deletedAt,2237    tags: "tags" in entry ? entry.tags : undefined,2238    cardholderName: "cardholderName" in entry ? entry.cardholderName : undefined,2239    cardNumber: "cardNumber" in entry ? entry.cardNumber : undefined,2240    expMonth: "expMonth" in entry ? entry.expMonth : undefined,2241    expYear: "expYear" in entry ? entry.expYear : undefined,2242    cvc: "cvc" in entry ? entry.cvc : undefined,2243    cardNickname: "cardNickname" in entry ? entry.cardNickname : undefined,2244    network: "network" in entry ? entry.network : undefined,2245    last4: "last4" in entry ? entry.last4 : undefined,2246  };22472248  return migrateLegacyPasskey(base, entry);2249}22502251/**2252 * v2.11.0 read migration. Pre-v2.11.0 passkey entries used `type:"passkey"`2253 * with flat top-level fields (rpId, credentialId, etc.). This converts them2254 * to the new shape — `type:"login"` with a `passkey` sub-object — so all2255 * downstream consumers can rely on the new model. The result is rewritten2256 * to disk on next vault save (hasLegacyShape detects the un-migrated case).2257 */2258function migrateLegacyPasskey(2259  base: VaultEntry,2260  raw: VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry2261): VaultEntry {2262  if (base.passkey) return base;2263  const flat = raw as Partial<VaultEntry>;2264  const isPasskeyType = base.type === "passkey";2265  const hasFlatPasskeyFields =2266    typeof flat.rpId === "string" &&2267    typeof flat.credentialId === "string" &&2268    typeof flat.publicKeyCose === "string" &&2269    typeof flat.userHandle === "string" &&2270    typeof flat.userName === "string";2271  if (!isPasskeyType && !hasFlatPasskeyFields) return base;2272  if (!hasFlatPasskeyFields) return base;22732274  const algorithm: -7 | -8 = flat.algorithm === -8 ? -8 : -7;2275  base.passkey = {2276    rpId: flat.rpId!,2277    rpName: flat.rpName ?? flat.rpId!,2278    credentialId: flat.credentialId!,2279    publicKeyCose: flat.publicKeyCose!,2280    privateKeyJwk: flat.privateKeyJwk,2281    userHandle: flat.userHandle!,2282    userName: flat.userName!,2283    userDisplayName: flat.userDisplayName ?? flat.userName!,2284    algorithm,2285    signCount: flat.signCount ?? 0,2286    aaguid: flat.aaguid ?? "",2287    backupEligible: flat.backupEligible === true,2288    backupState: flat.backupState === true,2289    lastUsedAt: flat.lastUsedAt,2290    browser: flat.browser,2291    transports: flat.transports,2292    createdAt: base.createdAt,2293  };2294  // Promote to "login" so the unified Entry view renders. Username gets2295  // populated from the passkey's userName so the entry is searchable in the2296  // existing autofill flow without a separate code path.2297  if (isPasskeyType) base.type = "login";2298  if (!base.username) base.username = flat.userName;2299  if (!base.url) base.url = `https://${flat.rpId}`;2300  return base;2301}230223032304// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------2305// Deduplication2306// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------23072308function entryDupeKey(e: VaultEntry): string {2309  if (e.type === "note") return `note|${e.title.toLowerCase()}`;2310  // Passkey-bearing entries dedupe by the credential's RP + user. Two logins2311  // on different sites that happen to share a username are still distinct;2312  // two passkey credentials for the same RP+user are duplicates regardless2313  // of any login fields they may also carry.2314  if (e.passkey) {2315    return `passkey|${e.passkey.rpId.toLowerCase()}|${e.passkey.userName.toLowerCase()}`;2316  }2317  return `login|${e.title.toLowerCase()}|${(e.url ?? "").toLowerCase()}|${(e.username ?? "").toLowerCase()}`;2318}23192320/** Returns the number of duplicate entries (those that would be removed). */2321export function countDuplicates(): number {2322  const best = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();2323  let dupeCount = 0;2324  for (const e of entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt)) {2325    const key = entryDupeKey(e);2326    const existing = best.get(key);2327    if (!existing) {2328      best.set(key, e);2329    } else {2330      dupeCount++;2331      // Keep the more recently modified one in the map2332      if ((e.modifiedAt ?? e.createdAt ?? 0) > (existing.modifiedAt ?? existing.createdAt ?? 0)) {2333        best.set(key, e);2334      }2335    }2336  }2337  return dupeCount;2338}23392340/**2341 * Soft-deletes duplicate entries, keeping the most recently modified copy of2342 * each group. Returns the number of entries moved to trash.2343 */2344export async function deduplicateEntries(): Promise<number> {2345  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");2346  // Dedup reshapes slot B permanently under the decoy key, which is2347  // forensically distinguishable from a freshly-seeded decoy vault. Refuse.2348  if (vaultMode === "decoy") {2349    throw new Error("deduplicate disabled in decoy mode");2350  }23512352  const best = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();2353  for (const e of entries.filter((en) => !en.deletedAt)) {2354    const key = entryDupeKey(e);2355    const existing = best.get(key);2356    if (!existing) {2357      best.set(key, e);2358    } else if ((e.modifiedAt ?? e.createdAt ?? 0) > (existing.modifiedAt ?? existing.createdAt ?? 0)) {2359      best.set(key, e);2360    }2361  }23622363  const keepIds = new Set(Array.from(best.values()).map((e) => e.id));2364  let removed = 0;2365  entries = entries.map((e) => {2366    if (!e.deletedAt && !keepIds.has(e.id)) {2367      removed++;2368      return { ...e, deletedAt: monotonicEntryTimestamp(e.modifiedAt) };2369    }2370    return e;2371  });23722373  if (removed > 0) await persistEntries();2374  return removed;2375}23762377// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------2378// Vault history — snapshot BEFORE every vault write so the saved blob is2379// what is about to be lost, not what was just written. Capped at 5. The2380// stored blobs are AES-256-GCM ciphertext under the master password, so2381// history adds zero security surface.2382// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------23832384const HISTORY_KEY = "peach_vault_history";2385const HISTORY_MAX = 5;23862387/**2388 * Snapshot the CURRENT on-disk vault state into history. Call this BEFORE2389 * overwriting peach_vault_a so the saved blob captures the about-to-be-lost2390 * state. Identical-to-most-recent blobs are skipped to avoid filling history2391 * with no-op writes.2392 */2393export async function takeVaultSnapshot(2394  reason: VaultSnapshot["reason"],2395): Promise<void> {2396  try {2397    const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get([SLOT_A, SLOT_B, HISTORY_KEY]);2398    const slotA = (raw as Record<string, StoredVault | undefined>)[SLOT_A];2399    const slotB = (raw as Record<string, StoredVault | undefined>)[SLOT_B];24002401    // Nothing to snapshot if the real slot doesn't exist yet (fresh install,2402    // pre-createVault). createVault skips snapshots intentionally — there is2403    // no prior state to preserve.2404    if (!slotA) return;24052406    const vault_a = JSON.stringify(slotA);2407    const vault_b = JSON.stringify(slotB ?? slotA);24082409    // Best-effort entry count: only meaningful when the in-memory state is2410    // unlocked AND in real mode. Decoy mode would leak the decoy entry2411    // count; locked mode has no entries to count. Both fall through to null.2412    let entryCount: number | null = null;2413    if (derivedKey && vaultMode === "real") {2414      try {2415        entryCount = entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt).length;2416      } catch {2417        entryCount = null;2418      }2419    }24202421    const existingRaw = (raw as Record<string, VaultHistory | undefined>)[HISTORY_KEY];2422    const history: VaultHistory = existingRaw && Array.isArray(existingRaw.snapshots)2423      ? existingRaw2424      : { snapshots: [] };24252426    // Deduplication: if the most recent snapshot has byte-identical blobs,2427    // skip — saves the same vault N times in a row would otherwise burn the2428    // entire history window with no recovery value.2429    const latest = history.snapshots[0];2430    if (latest && latest.vault_a === vault_a && latest.vault_b === vault_b) {2431      return;2432    }24332434    const snapshot: VaultSnapshot = {2435      id: crypto.randomUUID(),2436      savedAt: Date.now(),2437      reason,2438      vault_a,2439      vault_b,2440      entryCount,2441    };24422443    history.snapshots = [snapshot, ...history.snapshots].slice(0, HISTORY_MAX);2444    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [HISTORY_KEY]: history });2445  } catch (err) {2446    // Non-fatal — history must never block a save. A failed snapshot just2447    // means the user loses one rung of the safety ladder for this write.2448    // M4/QUA-006: log so the failure is visible; if it looks like a quota2449    // problem, notify the popup so the user can prune history themselves.2450    console.warn('[Peach] takeVaultSnapshot failed:', err);2451    if (String(err).includes('QUOTA') || String(err).includes('quota')) {2452      try {2453        await chrome.runtime.sendMessage({ type: 'VAULT_STORAGE_QUOTA_WARNING' });2454      } catch {2455        // popup may be closed; surfaced via console.warn above2456      }2457    }2458  }2459}24602461/** Wipe all vault history. Called by Panic / DESTROY_VAULT. */2462export async function clearVaultHistory(): Promise<void> {2463  try {2464    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [HISTORY_KEY]: { snapshots: [] } satisfies VaultHistory });2465  } catch {2466    // Non-fatal — DESTROY_VAULT also runs storage.local.clear().2467  }2468}24692470/** Read all snapshots, newest first, for the Settings vault history view. */2471export async function getVaultHistory(): Promise<VaultSnapshot[]> {2472  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get(HISTORY_KEY);2473  const history = (raw as Record<string, VaultHistory | undefined>)[HISTORY_KEY];2474  if (!history || !Array.isArray(history.snapshots)) return [];2475  return history.snapshots;2476}24772478/**2479 * Replace the on-disk vault with the chosen snapshot's blobs and lock the2480 * vault. The current state is itself snapshotted with reason 'restore' first2481 * so the restore is reversible. After this returns, the user must unlock2482 * with the password that matches the restored blob.2483 */2484export async function restoreVaultSnapshot(2485  snapshotId: string,2486): Promise<{ ok: true } | { ok: false; error: string }> {2487  const history = await getVaultHistory();2488  const snapshot = history.find((s) => s.id === snapshotId);2489  if (!snapshot) return { ok: false, error: "snapshot_not_found" };24902491  // Snapshot the about-to-be-replaced current state so the restore is2492  // reversible. takeVaultSnapshot is no-op when the most recent entry is2493  // byte-identical, so a restore-of-a-restore stays clean.2494  await takeVaultSnapshot("restore");24952496  let restoredA: StoredVault;2497  let restoredB: StoredVault;2498  try {2499    restoredA = JSON.parse(snapshot.vault_a) as StoredVault;2500    restoredB = JSON.parse(snapshot.vault_b) as StoredVault;2501  } catch {2502    return { ok: false, error: "snapshot_corrupt" };2503  }25042505  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, restoredA);2506  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, restoredB);2507  await stampLocalVaultMutation();25082509  // Lock so the user must prove they can decrypt the restored blob. If they2510  // restored a pre-password-change snapshot they discover it immediately at2511  // the lock screen rather than silently holding an inaccessible vault.2512  lock();25132514  return { ok: true };2515}25162517/**2518 * Change the master password. Re-encrypts slot A with a fresh salt + new2519 * derived key. Slot B (duress or noise) is left untouched when duress is2520 * configured — it uses an independent key derived from the duress password —2521 * and regenerated as noise when duress is not configured.2522 */2523export async function changePassword(2524  currentPassword: string,2525  newPassword: string2526): Promise<boolean> {2527  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") return false;25282529  // Verify current password before allowing any change2530  const valid = await verifyMainPassword(currentPassword);2531  if (!valid) return false;25322533  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);2534  if (!slotA) return false;2535  if (!rootKey) return false;25362537  // Derive fresh key from new password + new random salt2538  const newSalt = generateSalt();2539  const newKey = await deriveKey(newPassword, newSalt);25402541  // Re-encrypt the in-memory entries with the new key2542  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured, duressConfigured ? DURESS_SLOT_SIZE : 0);2543  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(newKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");25442545  // Pre-wrap root key under the new derived key. Recovery fields wrap rootKey2546  // under recovery words and remain untouched — recovery phrase keeps working2547  // across password changes (H4/COR-002).2548  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(newKey, rootKey);25492550  const finalSlotA: StoredVault = {2551    ...slotA,2552    salt: hex(newSalt),2553    nonce,2554    ciphertext,2555    tag,2556    ...pwRoot,2557  };25582559  // Snapshot the OLD-key blob before overwriting it. If the user later2560  // restores from this snapshot they will need the OLD password — the2561  // post-restore lock surfaces that immediately.2562  await takeVaultSnapshot("local_save");25632564  // Single atomic write: ciphertext, salt, and pw_root_* fields all land in2565  // one storage transaction. An SW kill before this point leaves the old2566  // slot intact; after this point everything tied to the new password is2567  // already on disk together (M6/COR-004).2568  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, finalSlotA);25692570  // Swap the in-memory key synchronously before any further await. If we2571  // threw between the Slot A write and this swap, the next persistEntries()2572  // would overwrite Slot A with old-key ciphertext, locking the user out.2573  zeroKey(derivedKey);2574  derivedKey = newKey;25752576  // Regenerate noise for slot B when duress is not in use. Runs after the2577  // key swap so a failure here is a disposable noise regeneration, not a2578  // lockout.2579  if (!duressConfigured) {2580    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2));2581  }2582  await stampLocalVaultMutation();25832584  return true;2585}