vault.ts

1/**2 * vault.ts — sole owner of vault state and chrome.storage vault keys.3 *4 * Every read/write of `peach_vault_a`, `peach_vault_b`, and `peach_settings`5 * goes through this module. No other file accesses those keys directly.6 * External callers reach vault operations via `messages.ts` — never by7 * importing from here cross-boundary (popup/content must not). Invariants8 * for the two-slot schema, unlock timing, and key/disk atomicity are in9 * Projects.md §3.2–§3.6.10 */1112import { deriveKey, deriveKeyRaw, generateSalt } from "../crypto/argon2";13import { extractDomain } from "../shared/domain";14import { clampSyncTimestamp } from "../shared/sync-limits";15import { recordSyncAlerts, type SyncAlert } from "./sync-alerts";16import {17  rootKeyToWords,18  wordsToRootKeyMaterial,19  deriveRecoveryKey,20} from "../shared/recovery-words";21import type {22  AccentColorName,23  Canary,24  LegacyVaultEntry,25  ManualSummonRecord,26  PasskeyData,27  SavedIdentity,28  StoredVault,29  VaultEntry,30  VaultHistory,31  VaultSnapshot,32} from "../shared/types";33import { decrypt, encrypt, zeroKey } from "./aes";34import { clearAutoLock, touchAutoLock } from "./alarms";35import { setRecoveryConfirmPending } from "./recovery-pending";3637type EntryDraft = Omit<38  VaultEntry,39  "id" | "createdAt" | "modifiedAt" | "deletedAt"40>;4142// Slot-neutral storage keys (v1.4.24+). Both slots always exist; slot B43// either holds the decoy vault (when duress is configured) or random noise44// that looks identical at rest. No external indicator is stored — duress45// configuration is recorded only inside the encrypted payload of slot A.46const SLOT_A = "peach_vault_a";47const SLOT_B = "peach_vault_b";4849// Legacy keys, migrated away on first access.50const LEGACY_MAIN = "peach_vault";51const LEGACY_DECOY = "peach_decoy_vault";52const LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG = "peach_duress";5354// Plaintext is padded to the next multiple of this size before encryption.55// This coarsens ciphertext-length leakage into 1 KiB buckets.56const PAD_BLOCK = 1024;5758// How many past passwords to retain per entry. Generous enough to be useful as59// a recovery aid while bounding the secret material we hold (and the ciphertext60// growth) for an entry whose password is rotated frequently.61const PASSWORD_HISTORY_MAX = 50;6263// When duress is configured, BOTH slots are padded to this fixed ceiling so64// their ciphertext lengths are identical and cannot reveal that a hidden decoy65// vault exists (audit MEDIUM — plausible-deniability leak). 256 KiB comfortably66// holds a very large vault (thousands of entries incl. passkeys). The decoy67// slot can't be re-encrypted on every real-vault save (the real session has no68// decoy key), so a fixed ceiling — rather than size-matching on each write — is69// what keeps the two slots equal. A real vault whose plaintext exceeds this70// would grow past the ceiling and re-expose the bit; that is an extreme,71// documented edge well beyond normal use.72const DURESS_SLOT_SIZE = 262_144;7374let derivedKey: Uint8Array | null = null;75// 32-byte random root key, separate from the derivedKey used for vault encryption.76// The root key is wrapped (encrypted) under the recovery key derived from the77// 12-word phrase. When the user changes their password, only the wrapping changes;78// the root key and recovery words remain stable.79let rootKey: Uint8Array | null = null;80let entries: VaultEntry[] = [];81let domainIndex: Map<string, VaultEntry[]> = new Map();82let vaultMode: "real" | "decoy" = "real";83// Cached post-unlock view of whether the real vault records that duress is84// configured. Only meaningful after a real-mode unlock; for decoy-mode unlock85// this stays false because we never see slot A's plaintext.86let duressConfigured = false;8788let migrationRan = false;8990// Set to a corruption reason during the last unlock() attempt when both slots91// decrypted but failed schema validation. Consumed and cleared by92// consumeLastUnlockFailureReason() so messages.ts can surface vault_corrupted93// distinctly from wrong-password (M7/COR-007).94//95// NOTE: module-level state — if vault.ts is ever moved to a worker context,96// this must be replaced with a structured return value from unlock() or a97// postMessage channel. The signal is invisible across module-instance98// boundaries.99let lastUnlockFailureReason: string | null = null;100101export function consumeLastUnlockFailureReason(): string | null {102  const r = lastUnlockFailureReason;103  lastUnlockFailureReason = null;104  return r;105}106107// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------108// Settings (persisted inside the encrypted vault store as a sidecar key)109// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------110111export type TextSize = "small" | "medium" | "large";112113export interface VaultSettings {114  accentColor?: AccentColorName;115  theme?: "dark" | "light";116  autoLockMinutes?: number;117  clipboardClearSeconds?: number;118  lockOnClose?: boolean;119  breachMonitoring?: boolean;120  passkeyProviderEnabled?: boolean;121  trashRetentionDays?: number;122  manualSummonDomains?: Record<string, ManualSummonRecord>;123  declinedCardFingerprints?: string[];124  /**125   * Text size scale for body copy and entry titles. Stops at "large" by126   * design — XL clips dense screens (Vault, Health) inside the fixed127   * 330×480 popup surface.128   */129  textSize?: TextSize;130  /**131   * When true, all entrance/exit transitions and ambient animations are132   * collapsed to instant. Honoured alongside the user's OS-level133   * `prefers-reduced-motion`.134   */135  reduceMotion?: boolean;136  /**137   * Android-only: when true, the master key is escrowed in AndroidKeyStore138   * and the lock screen offers biometric unlock. Toggled from Settings →139   * Security → Biometrics. Has no effect on desktop builds.140   */141  biometricsEnabled?: boolean;142  /**143   * User overrides for keyboard shortcuts. Keys are ShortcutAction names144   * (see src/shared/shortcuts.ts). Missing actions fall through to145   * DEFAULT_BINDINGS — `getActiveBindings(settings.shortcuts)` is the146   * canonical lookup. Storing only the deltas keeps the vault payload147   * small and lets default updates land for users who never rebind.148   */149  shortcuts?: Record<string, { key: string; ctrl?: boolean; meta?: boolean; shift?: boolean; alt?: boolean }>;150}151152let settings: VaultSettings = {};153154export function getSettings(): VaultSettings {155  return settings;156}157158export async function ensureSettingsLoaded(): Promise<VaultSettings> {159  await loadSettings();160  return settings;161}162163export async function updateSettings(patch: Partial<VaultSettings>): Promise<void> {164  await loadSettings();165  // LV-7: cheap insurance against prototype pollution if a future caller ever166  // feeds parsed external JSON here (native spread keeps __proto__ an own-167  // property today, but Object.assign-style consumers and JSON revivers have168  // been burned before).169  const safe = Object.fromEntries(170    Object.entries(patch).filter(171      ([k]) => !["__proto__", "constructor", "prototype"].includes(k),172    ),173  ) as Partial<VaultSettings>;174  settings = { ...settings, ...safe };175  await persistSettings();176}177178async function persistSettings(): Promise<void> {179  try {180    await chrome.storage.local.set({ peach_settings: settings });181  } catch (err) {182    throw mapStorageError(err);183  }184}185186function mapStorageError(err: unknown): Error {187  const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);188  if (/QUOTA_BYTES|quota/i.test(message)) {189    return new Error("STORAGE_QUOTA_EXCEEDED");190  }191  return err instanceof Error ? err : new Error(message);192}193194async function loadSettings(): Promise<void> {195  const result = await chrome.storage.local.get("peach_settings");196  settings = (result as { peach_settings?: VaultSettings }).peach_settings ?? {};197}198199// Fire-and-forget sync trigger after a committed vault write. Lazy200// dynamic import avoids a circular dependency between vault.ts and201// sync-trigger.ts (the trigger imports paired-devices, which only reads202// storage, but the lazy load also gives us a clean opt-out path in203// tests where sync-trigger has not been initialised).204function fireSyncTrigger(reason: "vault_change"): void {205  void import("./sync-trigger")206    .then((mod) => mod.triggerSyncIfReachable({ reason }))207    .catch(() => {208      /* sync trigger module not available — non-fatal */209    });210}211212// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------213// HIBP breach check (k-anonymity model)214// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------215216export async function checkBreach(password: string): Promise<number> {217  // HIBP k-anonymity API is keyed on SHA-1 prefixes — this is dictated by218  // the public API, not a security choice. Do not migrate to SHA-256 here.219  const encoder = new TextEncoder();220  const hashBuffer = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-1", encoder.encode(password));221  const hashHex = Array.from(new Uint8Array(hashBuffer))222    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))223    .join("")224    .toUpperCase();225226  const prefix = hashHex.slice(0, 5);227  const suffix = hashHex.slice(5);228229  try {230    // PCH-02-007: request HIBP response padding so response length does not231    // reveal how many suffixes a queried prefix returned.232    const res = await fetch(`https://api.pwnedpasswords.com/range/${prefix}`, {233      headers: { "Add-Padding": "true" },234    });235    if (!res.ok) return 0;236    const text = await res.text();237    const match = text.split("\r\n").find((l) => l.startsWith(suffix));238    return match ? parseInt(match.split(":")[1], 10) : 0;239  } catch {240    return 0; // Network unavailable — don't block241  }242}243244export async function declineCardSaveOffer(last4: string, expMonth: string, expYear: string): Promise<void> {245  const fingerprint = await cardFingerprint(last4, expMonth, expYear);246  await loadSettings();247  settings = {248    ...settings,249    declinedCardFingerprints: [...(settings.declinedCardFingerprints ?? []), fingerprint],250  };251  await persistSettings();252}253254export async function isCardDeclined(last4: string, expMonth: string, expYear: string): Promise<boolean> {255  await loadSettings();256  const fingerprint = await cardFingerprint(last4, expMonth, expYear);257  return (settings.declinedCardFingerprints ?? []).includes(fingerprint);258}259260async function cardFingerprint(last4: string, expMonth: string, expYear: string): Promise<string> {261  const encoder = new TextEncoder();262  const buf = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", encoder.encode(`${last4}|${expMonth}|${expYear}`));263  return Array.from(new Uint8Array(buf).slice(0, 8))264    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))265    .join("");266}267268function hex(buf: Uint8Array): string {269  return Array.from(buf)270    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))271    .join("");272}273274function unhex(s: string): Uint8Array {275  const out = new Uint8Array(s.length / 2);276  for (let i = 0; i < s.length; i += 2) {277    out[i / 2] = parseInt(s.slice(i, i + 2), 16);278  }279  return out;280}281282// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------283// Root key generation and recovery word wrapping284// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------285286/**287 * Generate a random 32-byte root key and wrap it (AES-256-GCM) under a key288 * derived from the recovery word material via HKDF-SHA256. The wrapped blob289 * fields are stored in slot A alongside the password-wrapped ciphertext. The290 * root key itself is kept in memory for the session so getRecoveryWords() can291 * encode it without re-deriving.292 *293 * SECURITY MODEL (PCH-01-005): the recovery KEK is derived from the 12-word294 * material, which encodes only rootKey[0..16] (recovery-words.ts). The KEK is thus295 * derived from a PREFIX of the very plaintext it wraps, and effective recovery296 * security is 128-bit (standard for a 12-word phrase), NOT 256-bit. This is safe —297 * unwrapping requires the words, and the GCM ciphertext leaks nothing without them —298 * but it is intentional, not an oversight. A future escrow version wanting 256-bit299 * recovery must derive the words from INDEPENDENT entropy, not from the root key.300 */301async function generateAndWrapRootKey(): Promise<{302  rawRootKey: string; // hex of the plaintext root key — caller stores in rootKey303  recoverySalt: string;304  wrappedRootKey: string;305  wrappedNonce: string;306  wrappedTag: string;307}> {308  const rootKeyBytes = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32));309310  // Derive the recovery key from the BIP39 words encoding of the root key.311  const words = await rootKeyToWords(rootKeyBytes);312  const wordMaterial = await wordsToRootKeyMaterial(words);313  const recoverySalt = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));314  const recoveryKey = await deriveRecoveryKey(wordMaterial, recoverySalt);315316  // Wrap the root key with the recovery key using AES-256-GCM directly.317  // We hex-encode rootKeyBytes so the plaintext is always valid UTF-8.318  const nonce = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));319  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(hex(rootKeyBytes));320  const raw = await crypto.subtle.encrypt(321    {322      name: "AES-GCM",323      iv: nonce,324      additionalData: new Uint8Array([1]).buffer as ArrayBuffer,325      tagLength: 128,326    },327    recoveryKey,328    encoded329  );330  // WebCrypto returns ciphertext || auth tag concatenated; split them.331  const rawU8 = new Uint8Array(raw);332  const ciphertext = hex(rawU8.slice(0, rawU8.length - 16));333  const tag = hex(rawU8.slice(rawU8.length - 16));334335  return {336    rawRootKey: hex(rootKeyBytes),337    recoverySalt: hex(recoverySalt),338    wrappedRootKey: ciphertext,339    wrappedNonce: hex(nonce),340    wrappedTag: tag,341  };342}343344/**345 * Unwrap the root key using recovery words. Called during recovery flow when346 * the user provides their 12-word phrase and a new password.347 * Exported for use by the RECOVER_WITH_WORDS message handler.348 */349export async function unwrapRootKeyForRecovery(350  wrappedRootKey: string,351  wrappedNonce: string,352  wrappedTag: string,353  recoverySaltHex: string,354  words: string[]355): Promise<void> {356  const wordMaterial = await wordsToRootKeyMaterial(words);357  const recoverySalt = unhex(recoverySaltHex);358  const recoveryKey = await deriveRecoveryKey(wordMaterial, recoverySalt);359360  // Decrypt and cache the root key. The root key bytes were hex-encoded before361  // encryption so the ciphertext is valid UTF-8. We inline the AES-GCM decrypt362  // here to avoid passing a CryptoKey to the string-based encrypt/decrypt helpers.363  // Each component is stored separately in the vault slot; decode them individually364  // so the nonce is always exactly the 12 bytes from wrappedNonce.365  const nonceRaw = unhex(wrappedNonce);366  const ciphertextRaw = unhex(wrappedRootKey);367  const tagRaw = unhex(wrappedTag);368  // Combine ciphertext and tag for AES-GCM (expects ciphertext||tag).369  // Use explicit ArrayBuffer allocations to satisfy TS BufferSource constraints.370  const nonceU8 = nonceRaw as unknown as Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>;371  const combined = new Uint8Array(ciphertextRaw.length + tagRaw.length);372  combined.set(ciphertextRaw, 0);373  combined.set(tagRaw, ciphertextRaw.length);374  const raw = await crypto.subtle.decrypt(375    { name: "AES-GCM", iv: nonceU8, additionalData: new Uint8Array([1]).buffer as ArrayBuffer, tagLength: 128 },376    recoveryKey,377    combined378  );379  const decryptedHex = new TextDecoder().decode(raw);380  rootKey = unhex(decryptedHex);381}382383/**384 * Re-wrap the cached root key under a new derived key (from the user's new385 * password). Called after password change and after recovery re-key so the386 * same recovery words continue to work with the updated password — and so387 * subsequent unlocks can rehydrate rootKey via deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey.388 *389 * recovery_* fields are intentionally not touched: those wrap rootKey under390 * the recovery words, which do not change when the password changes.391 */392export async function rewrapRootKeyForPassword(393  newDerivedKey: Uint8Array,394  _newSalt: Uint8Array395): Promise<void> {396  if (!rootKey) throw new Error("root key not set");397  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);398  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");399  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(newDerivedKey, rootKey);400  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, { ...slotA, ...pwRoot });401}402403/**404 * Change the vault encryption to a new derived key (already derived from405 * the user's new password). Used by RECOVER_WITH_WORDS and changePassword.406 * Caller is responsible for key swap and snapshot.407 */408async function reencryptVaultForNewKey(409  newKey: Uint8Array,410  slotA: StoredVault411): Promise<void> {412  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured, duressConfigured ? DURESS_SLOT_SIZE : 0);413  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(newKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");414  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, {415    ...slotA,416    nonce,417    ciphertext,418    tag,419  });420}421422/**423 * Full password change with an already-derived key (used after recovery).424 * Unlike changePassword(), this skips re-verification of current password425 * since recovery flow has already validated the user's identity via words.426 */427export async function changePasswordWithNewKey(428  newSalt: Uint8Array,429  newKey: Uint8Array430): Promise<void> {431  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);432  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");433  // reencryptVaultForNewKey must receive the updated salt so that subsequent434  // UNLOCK calls with the new password can re-derive the correct key.435  await reencryptVaultForNewKey(newKey, { ...slotA, salt: hex(newSalt) });436  if (derivedKey) zeroKey(derivedKey);437  derivedKey = newKey;438  // PCH-01-008: re-escrow the new key (see changePassword). The recovery flow439  // reaches this path, so a post-recovery SW restart would otherwise lock out440  // a user who just reset their password.441  void saveSessionKey(newKey, "real");442  // Refresh pw_root_* under the new key so deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey works443  // on the next unlock (H2/COR-006). If rootKey is missing — recovery flow444  // should have populated it — fall back silently rather than blowing up the445  // recovery path; migrateToRecovery will rehydrate on the next unlock.446  if (rootKey) {447    const slotAfter = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);448    if (slotAfter) {449      const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(newKey, rootKey);450      await writeSlot(SLOT_A, { ...slotAfter, ...pwRoot });451    }452  }453  if (!duressConfigured) {454    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(slotA.ciphertext.length / 2));455  }456  await stampLocalVaultMutation();457}458459// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------460// Salt generation --- exported so the RECOVER_WITH_WORDS handler can derive461// a new key after password reset without re-importing the crypto module.462// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------463464export { deriveKey, generateSalt };465466export async function loadSlotA(): Promise<StoredVault | null> {467  return loadSlot(SLOT_A);468}469470/**471 * Recover the session root key by AES-GCM-decrypting the pw_root_* fields472 * (a second wrapping of the root key under the password-derived key). This473 * is what makes GET_RECOVERY_WORDS work across lock/unlock cycles without474 * the user re-entering their recovery phrase: the same root key bytes —475 * and therefore the same 12 words — survive every unlock.476 *477 * Returns null when the pw_root fields are absent (pre-v2.12 vault that478 * hasn't been migrated yet) or when decryption fails (wrong derived key,479 * tampered ciphertext). On null the caller should fall through to480 * migrateToRecovery() to populate the fields.481 */482async function deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(483  derivedKeyBytes: Uint8Array,484  slotA: StoredVault,485): Promise<Uint8Array | null> {486  if (!slotA.pw_root_ciphertext || !slotA.pw_root_nonce || !slotA.pw_root_tag) {487    return null;488  }489  try {490    const rootHex = await decrypt(491      derivedKeyBytes,492      slotA.pw_root_nonce,493      slotA.pw_root_ciphertext,494      slotA.pw_root_tag,495      "pw_root_v1",496    );497    return unhex(rootHex);498  } catch {499    return null;500  }501}502503// AES-GCM-wrap rootKey under derivedKey for the pw_root_* fields. Returns the504// hex-encoded ciphertext/nonce/tag triple ready to embed in StoredVault.505async function wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(506  derivedKeyBytes: Uint8Array,507  rootKeyBytes: Uint8Array,508): Promise<{ pw_root_ciphertext: string; pw_root_nonce: string; pw_root_tag: string }> {509  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKeyBytes, hex(rootKeyBytes), "pw_root_v1");510  return {511    pw_root_ciphertext: ciphertext,512    pw_root_nonce: nonce,513    pw_root_tag: tag,514  };515}516517/**518 * For vaults created before v2.12 (no recovery_salt/recovery_wrapped_root_key),519 * generate the root key, wrap it under the recovery words, and persist the520 * recovery escrow into slot A. The caller must show the recovery words to the521 * user before calling this — once called, those words are the vault's recovery522 * path. This runs once, on the first unlock of an upgraded vault.523 */524export async function migrateToRecovery(): Promise<void> {525  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {526    throw new Error("vault must be unlocked in real mode");527  }528  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);529  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");530  const hasRecoveryEscrow =531    !!slotA.recovery_salt && !!slotA.recovery_wrapped_root_key;532  const hasPwRoot = !!slotA.pw_root_ciphertext && !!slotA.pw_root_nonce;533  if (hasRecoveryEscrow && hasPwRoot) return; // already done534535  // If recovery escrow already exists but pw_root doesn't, we cannot recover536  // the original rootKey without the user's words. The least-surprising path537  // is to rotate to a fresh root key — the user's old recovery words become538  // invalid but we surface peach_recovery_pending so the popup re-presents539  // the words. The unlock-path callers all set that flag.540  const { rawRootKey, recoverySalt, wrappedRootKey, wrappedNonce, wrappedTag } =541    await generateAndWrapRootKey();542  rootKey = unhex(rawRootKey);543544  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(derivedKey, rootKey);545  const nextSlotA: StoredVault = {546    ...slotA,547    recovery_salt: recoverySalt,548    recovery_wrapped_root_key: wrappedRootKey,549    recovery_nonce: wrappedNonce,550    recovery_tag: wrappedTag,551    ...pwRoot,552  };553  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, nextSlotA);554  await stampLocalVaultMutation();555}556557/**558 * Returns the 12 recovery words for the current session's root key.559 * Must be called while the vault is unlocked. Throws if recovery has not560 * been set up (pre-v2.12 vault that hasn't migrated yet).561 */562export async function getRecoveryWords(): Promise<string[]> {563  if (!rootKey) {564    throw new Error("recovery not set up — vault may need migration");565  }566  return rootKeyToWords(rootKey);567}568569async function loadSlot(key: string): Promise<StoredVault | null> {570  const result = await chrome.storage.local.get(key);571  return (result as Record<string, StoredVault | undefined>)[key] ?? null;572}573574async function writeSlot(key: string, vault: StoredVault): Promise<void> {575  try {576    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [key]: vault });577  } catch (err) {578    throw mapStorageError(err);579  }580}581582// Monotonic clock for per-entry modifiedAt / deletedAt timestamps. Guards the583// sync layer's last-write-wins merge against wall-clock regressions (NTP step,584// manual clock change, DST glitch): a backwards Date.now() must never produce585// an entry timestamp that's <= the entry's existing modifiedAt, or a genuine586// local edit would lose to a stale remote copy. The returned value is always587// strictly greater than both the entry's current modifiedAt and the previous588// call's result (SEV-2-E).589let lastEntryTimestamp = 0;590function monotonicEntryTimestamp(currentModifiedAt?: number): number {591  const base = Math.max(592    Date.now(),593    (currentModifiedAt ?? 0) + 1,594    lastEntryTimestamp + 1,595  );596  lastEntryTimestamp = base;597  return base;598}599600async function stampLocalVaultMutation(): Promise<void> {601  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get("peach_last_modified_at");602  const previous = Number(603    (raw as Record<string, unknown>).peach_last_modified_at,604  );605  const next = Math.max(606    Date.now(),607    Number.isFinite(previous) ? previous + 1 : 0,608  );609  await chrome.storage.local.set({610    peach_last_modified_at: String(next),611  });612}613614/**615 * One-shot migration from the pre-A-2 schema (peach_vault + peach_decoy_vault616 * + peach_duress flag) to the slot-neutral schema (peach_vault_a +617 * peach_vault_b). Runs at most once per session; safe to call repeatedly.618 */619async function ensureMigrated(): Promise<void> {620  if (migrationRan) return;621  migrationRan = true;622623  const keys = [LEGACY_MAIN, LEGACY_DECOY, LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG, SLOT_A, SLOT_B];624  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get(keys);625  const slotAExists = raw[SLOT_A] !== undefined;626  const slotBExists = raw[SLOT_B] !== undefined;627  const legacyMain = raw[LEGACY_MAIN] as StoredVault | undefined;628  const legacyDecoy = raw[LEGACY_DECOY] as StoredVault | undefined;629630  // Fresh install with nothing in storage — nothing to do; createVault() sets up both slots.631  if (!slotAExists && !legacyMain) return;632633  // Already migrated.634  if (slotAExists && slotBExists && !legacyMain && !legacyDecoy) return;635636  let didMigrate = false;637  if (legacyMain && !slotAExists) {638    await writeSlot(SLOT_A, legacyMain);639    didMigrate = true;640  }641642  // If slot B isn't set, populate it: use legacy decoy when present, else noise.643  if (!slotBExists) {644    const target = (legacyMain ?? raw[SLOT_A]) as StoredVault | undefined;645    if (legacyDecoy) {646      await writeSlot(SLOT_B, legacyDecoy);647      didMigrate = true;648    } else if (target) {649      await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(target.ciphertext.length / 2));650      didMigrate = true;651    }652  }653654  const toRemove: string[] = [];655  if (legacyMain) toRemove.push(LEGACY_MAIN);656  if (legacyDecoy) toRemove.push(LEGACY_DECOY);657  if (raw[LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG] !== undefined) toRemove.push(LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG);658  if (toRemove.length > 0) {659    await chrome.storage.local.remove(toRemove);660    didMigrate = true;661  }662  if (didMigrate) {663    await stampLocalVaultMutation();664  }665}666667// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------668// Padding + noise helpers669// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------670671/**672 * Pads the plaintext string with trailing spaces so that the encoded byte673 * length is a multiple of PAD_BLOCK. JSON.parse tolerates trailing674 * whitespace after a complete document, so the padding is transparent on675 * decode. Ciphertext length equals plaintext length plus a 16-byte tag.676 */677function padPlaintext(json: string, minBytes = 0): string {678  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(json);679  const bucket = Math.max(PAD_BLOCK, Math.ceil(encoded.length / PAD_BLOCK) * PAD_BLOCK);680  // minBytes lets the duress path force a fixed ceiling so both slots match.681  const target = Math.max(bucket, minBytes);682  const padLen = target - encoded.length;683  return json + " ".repeat(padLen);684}685686/**687 * Produces a StoredVault-shaped record filled with CSPRNG bytes. The688 * ciphertext length matches the given byte count. Because GCM ciphertext is689 * pseudo-random, this blob is indistinguishable at rest from a real690 * encrypted vault without the key.691 *692 * crypto.getRandomValues() caps each call at 65536 bytes (the Web Crypto693 * spec hard limit). Chunk the fill so vaults larger than that — common once694 * the user has dozens of entries or any passkey — don't throw.695 */696const CSPRNG_CHUNK = 65_536;697698function fillRandom(buf: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {699  for (let offset = 0; offset < buf.length; offset += CSPRNG_CHUNK) {700    const end = Math.min(offset + CSPRNG_CHUNK, buf.length);701    const chunk = new Uint8Array(end - offset);702    crypto.getRandomValues(chunk);703    buf.set(chunk, offset);704  }705  return buf;706}707708function generateNoiseBlob(ciphertextBytes: number): StoredVault {709  const salt = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));710  const nonce = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));711  const cipher = fillRandom(new Uint8Array(ciphertextBytes));712  const tag = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));713  return {714    version: 1,715    salt: hex(salt),716    nonce: hex(nonce),717    ciphertext: hex(cipher),718    tag: hex(tag),719  };720}721722// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------723// Encrypted plaintext envelope724// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------725726type VaultPayload = {727  entries: VaultEntry[];728  duressConfigured?: boolean;729};730731type DecryptedPayload = {732  entries: VaultEntry[];733  duressConfigured: boolean;734  /**735   * True when at least one entry in the on-disk payload had a legacy shape736   * (pre-v2.11.0 passkey type/flat fields, or pre-A-2 created/updated keys)737   * and got rewritten by normalizeEntry. The unlock path uses this to738   * persist the new shape immediately — without it, the migration would739   * re-run on every unlock and old shape never disappears from disk.740   */741  migratedFromLegacy: boolean;742};743744function encodePayload(entries: VaultEntry[], duress: boolean, minBytes = 0): string {745  const envelope: VaultPayload = { entries, duressConfigured: duress };746  return padPlaintext(JSON.stringify(envelope), minBytes);747}748749function rawNeedsMigration(raw: VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry): boolean {750  if ("created" in raw || "updated" in raw) return true;751  const flat = raw as Partial<VaultEntry>;752  if (flat.type === "passkey") return true;753  // Flat rpId without a passkey sub-object means pre-v2.11.0 schema.754  if (flat.rpId !== undefined && flat.passkey === undefined) return true;755  return false;756}757758function decodePayload(plain: string): DecryptedPayload {759  const parsed = JSON.parse(plain) as760    | Array<VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry>761    | VaultPayload;762763  const rawEntries = Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed : parsed.entries ?? [];764  const flatMigrationNeeded = rawEntries.some(rawNeedsMigration);765766  const normalized = rawEntries.map(normalizeEntry);767  const { merged } = mergePasskeyOnlyIntoLogins(normalized);768769  if (Array.isArray(parsed)) {770    return {771      entries: normalized,772      duressConfigured: false,773      migratedFromLegacy: true, // pre-A-2 array shape always needs save774    };775  }776777  return {778    entries: normalized,779    duressConfigured: parsed.duressConfigured === true,780    migratedFromLegacy: flatMigrationNeeded || merged,781  };782}783784/**785 * One-time consolidation pass run alongside the legacy passkey migration.786 *787 * Pre-v2.11.0 the Chrome passkey path always created a fresh `type:"passkey"`788 * entry per registration — so users who tested registration multiple times789 * accumulated several passkey-bearing entries for the same RP, and the790 * migration to the unified shape carried that duplication forward. This791 * pass collapses the duplicates:792 *793 *   1. Group passkey-bearing (and not deleted) entries by `passkey.rpId`.794 *   2. Within each group, the most recently-active credential wins (prefer795 *      lastUsedAt, fall back to passkey.createdAt, fall back to modifiedAt).796 *   3. If a NON-passkey login entry exists for that RP (matched by url or797 *      additionalUrls hostname), attach the winning passkey to it and798 *      soft-delete every passkey-bearing entry in the group.799 *   4. Otherwise, soft-delete every loser in the group, keeping the winner800 *      as a passkey-only entry.801 *802 * Soft delete (deletedAt) rather than splice — the trash flow keeps the803 * record around for retention and the user can restore if the heuristic804 * picked wrong. The `merged` flag goes back to decodePayload so the805 * unlock path persists the consolidated shape immediately.806 */807function mergePasskeyOnlyIntoLogins(entries: VaultEntry[]): { merged: boolean } {808  let merged = false;809  const now = Date.now();810811  const candidates = entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt && e.passkey);812  const byRpId = new Map<string, VaultEntry[]>();813  for (const e of candidates) {814    const rpId = e.passkey!.rpId;815    const list = byRpId.get(rpId);816    if (list) list.push(e);817    else byRpId.set(rpId, [e]);818  }819820  for (const [rpId, group] of byRpId) {821    if (group.length === 0) continue;822    group.sort((a, b) => {823      const aT =824        a.passkey!.lastUsedAt ?? a.passkey!.createdAt ?? a.modifiedAt ?? a.createdAt;825      const bT =826        b.passkey!.lastUsedAt ?? b.passkey!.createdAt ?? b.modifiedAt ?? b.createdAt;827      return bT - aT;828    });829    const winner = group[0]!;830831    // Look for a NON-passkey login entry matching this RP. Use the URL832    // hostname rather than a substring search so a "login.foo.com" entry833    // doesn't accidentally absorb a passkey for "foo.com".834    const loginTarget = entries.find((e) => {835      if (e.deletedAt || e.passkey || e.type !== "login") return false;836      if (e.url && extractDomain(e.url) === rpId) return true;837      for (const extra of e.additionalUrls ?? []) {838        if (extractDomain(extra) === rpId) return true;839      }840      return false;841    });842843    if (loginTarget) {844      loginTarget.passkey = winner.passkey;845      loginTarget.modifiedAt = now;846      for (const dup of group) {847        if (!dup.deletedAt) {848          dup.deletedAt = now;849          dup.modifiedAt = now;850        }851      }852      merged = true;853    } else if (group.length > 1) {854      for (let i = 1; i < group.length; i += 1) {855        const dup = group[i]!;856        if (!dup.deletedAt) {857          dup.deletedAt = now;858          dup.modifiedAt = now;859        }860      }861      merged = true;862    }863  }864865  return { merged };866}867868// Validates that a `StoredVault` record on disk has the field shape we expect869// before treating an AES-GCM decrypt success as a clean unlock. AES-GCM only870// authenticates the static VERSION_BYTE AAD, not the `version` field on the871// outer record — a corrupted `version: 42` slot still decrypts cleanly. This872// check surfaces that as `corrupted` (M7/COR-007) so the popup can offer a873// history-restore path instead of falsely reporting "wrong password".874function hasValidVaultSchema(v: unknown): v is StoredVault {875  if (typeof v !== "object" || v === null) return false;876  const r = v as Record<string, unknown>;877  return (878    r.version === 1 &&879    typeof r.salt === "string" &&880    typeof r.nonce === "string" &&881    typeof r.ciphertext === "string" &&882    typeof r.tag === "string"883  );884}885886export type TryDecryptResult =887  | { status: "ok"; payload: DecryptedPayload }888  | { status: "wrong_key" }889  | { status: "corrupted"; reason: string };890891// Exported solely for `unlockFromCodex` below, which needs to verify a892// supplied passphrase against a slotA blob *without* committing anything to893// storage. Keep this internal otherwise — callers crossing the messages.ts894// boundary should always go through `unlock` / `verifyMainPassword` so the895// constant-time invariants in Projects.md §3.4 are not bypassed.896export async function tryDecryptSlot(897  vault: StoredVault,898  key: Uint8Array,899  aadTag?: string,900): Promise<DecryptedPayload | null> {901  const res = await tryDecryptSlotResult(vault, key, aadTag);902  return res.status === "ok" ? res.payload : null;903}904905export async function tryDecryptSlotResult(906  vault: StoredVault,907  key: Uint8Array,908  aadTag?: string,909): Promise<TryDecryptResult> {910  if (!hasValidVaultSchema(vault)) {911    return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_slot_schema" };912  }913  let plain: string;914  try {915    plain = await decrypt(key, vault.nonce, vault.ciphertext, vault.tag, aadTag);916  } catch {917    return { status: "wrong_key" };918  }919  try {920    const parsed = JSON.parse(plain) as unknown;921    if (typeof parsed !== "object" || parsed === null) {922      return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_payload_shape" };923    }924    if (!Array.isArray(parsed) && !Array.isArray((parsed as VaultPayload).entries)) {925      return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_payload_shape" };926    }927    return { status: "ok", payload: decodePayload(plain) };928  } catch {929    return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_payload_json" };930  }931}932933// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------934// Core operations935// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------936937function buildDomainIndexSync(all: VaultEntry[]): void {938  domainIndex = new Map();939940  for (const entry of all) {941    if (entry.deletedAt) continue;942    if (entry.type === "note" || entry.type === "card") continue;943944    // An entry can match multiple sites via `additionalUrls`. Index each945    // hostname so `queryDomain` returns the entry regardless of which alias946    // the user is currently visiting. Dedupe per-entry so a single entry947    // never appears twice in one bucket.948    const domains = new Set<string>();949    const primary = extractDomain(entry.url ?? "");950    if (primary) domains.add(primary);951    for (const extra of entry.additionalUrls ?? []) {952      const d = extractDomain(extra);953      if (d) domains.add(d);954    }955    if (domains.size === 0) continue;956957    for (const domain of domains) {958      const bucket = domainIndex.get(domain) ?? [];959      bucket.push(entry);960      domainIndex.set(domain, bucket);961    }962  }963}964965export async function createVault(password: string): Promise<void> {966  await ensureMigrated();967968  const salt = generateSalt();969  derivedKey = await deriveKey(password, salt);970  entries = [];971  vaultMode = "real";972  duressConfigured = false;973  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);974975  // Generate and wrap the root key for recovery word escrow.976  const { rawRootKey, recoverySalt, wrappedRootKey, wrappedNonce, wrappedTag } =977    await generateAndWrapRootKey();978  rootKey = unhex(rawRootKey);979980  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured, duressConfigured ? DURESS_SLOT_SIZE : 0);981  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");982983  // Second wrapping of rootKey under derivedKey so future unlocks can rehydrate984  // it without recovery words (H2/COR-006).985  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(derivedKey, rootKey);986987  const slotA: StoredVault = {988    version: 1,989    salt: hex(salt),990    nonce,991    ciphertext,992    tag,993    recovery_salt: recoverySalt,994    recovery_wrapped_root_key: wrappedRootKey,995    recovery_nonce: wrappedNonce,996    recovery_tag: wrappedTag,997    ...pwRoot,998  };999  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, slotA);10001001  // Matching-size noise blob for slot B, so a fresh install shows two1002  // similarly-shaped records regardless of whether duress is ever set up.1003  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2));1004  await stampLocalVaultMutation();10051006  touchAutoLock();1007}10081009export async function hasVault(): Promise<boolean> {1010  await ensureMigrated();1011  return (await loadSlot(SLOT_A)) !== null;1012}10131014/**1015 * Returns whether the real vault has recorded that a duress passphrase is1016 * configured. Reliable only after a real-mode unlock — before unlock or in1017 * decoy mode, returns false because we cannot read slot A's plaintext.1018 */1019export async function isDuressEnabled(): Promise<boolean> {1020  return vaultMode === "real" && duressConfigured;1021}10221023export async function setupDuress(duressPassword: string): Promise<void> {1024  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {1025    throw new Error("vault must be unlocked in real mode");1026  }1027  await ensureMigrated();10281029  // Encrypt the decoy payload (empty entries) under the duress key. Pad to1030  // at least the current slot A ciphertext size so the two slots look the1031  // same at rest at setup time.1032  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1033  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");10341035  const decoySalt = generateSalt();1036  const decoyKey = await deriveKey(duressPassword, decoySalt);1037  try {1038    // Pad the decoy to the fixed duress ceiling. Slot A is re-encrypted to the1039    // same ceiling by the persistSlotA() call below (duressConfigured is now1040    // true), so both slots are exactly DURESS_SLOT_SIZE+tag at rest and their1041    // lengths cannot reveal that duress is configured (audit MEDIUM).1042    const plaintext = encodePayload([], false, DURESS_SLOT_SIZE);1043    const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(decoyKey, plaintext, "slot_b_v1");1044    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, {1045      version: 1,1046      salt: hex(decoySalt),1047      nonce,1048      ciphertext,1049      tag,1050    });1051  } finally {1052    zeroKey(decoyKey);1053  }10541055  // Re-encrypt slot A with the duressConfigured flag set to true. No external1056  // flag is written — the bit lives inside the encrypted envelope.1057  duressConfigured = true;1058  await persistSlotA();1059}10601061export async function disableDuress(): Promise<void> {1062  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {1063    throw new Error("vault must be unlocked in real mode");1064  }1065  await ensureMigrated();10661067  // Overwrite slot B with fresh noise that matches slot A's size. The slot1068  // remains occupied so its mere existence does not signal that duress was1069  // ever configured.1070  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1071  if (slotA) {1072    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(slotA.ciphertext.length / 2));1073  }10741075  duressConfigured = false;1076  await persistSlotA();1077}10781079// L14/COR-015: this function intentionally checks slot A (real vault) only.1080// A duress-mode user attempting changePassword is rejected earlier by the1081// vaultMode === 'decoy' check at changePassword. The real-vs-decoy1082// distinction here is by design — duress users cannot rotate the real1083// password by guessing it, and the asymmetry in error timing is acceptable1084// because duress mode is opt-in and the user knows their own decoy key.1085export async function verifyMainPassword(password: string): Promise<boolean> {1086  await ensureMigrated();1087  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1088  if (!slotA) return false;1089  const key = await deriveKey(password, unhex(slotA.salt));1090  try {1091    return (await tryDecryptSlot(slotA, key, "slot_a_v1")) !== null;1092  } finally {1093    zeroKey(key);1094  }1095}10961097export async function unlock(password: string): Promise<boolean> {1098  // LV-1: the normal path NFC-normalizes inside deriveKey. If that fails and1099  // the supplied password is not already in NFC form, the vault may have been1100  // sealed (pre-LV-1) with the raw, un-normalized bytes — retry with those.1101  if (await attemptUnlockWithDerive(password, deriveKey)) return true;11021103  const nfc = password.normalize("NFC");1104  if (password === nfc) return false; // ASCII/NFC password — no legacy form to try11051106  if (await attemptUnlockWithDerive(password, deriveKeyRaw)) {1107    // Heal: re-seal the real slot under the NFC-normalized key so every1108    // future unlock takes the normal path. Only the real vault is re-sealed;1109    // a non-NFC duress password keeps working through this fallback.1110    if (vaultMode === "real") {1111      try {1112        const newSalt = generateSalt();1113        const newKey = await deriveKey(password, newSalt);1114        await changePasswordWithNewKey(newSalt, newKey);1115      } catch (healErr) {1116        console.warn("[Peach] LV-1 NFC heal failed:", healErr);1117      }1118    }1119    return true;1120  }1121  return false;1122}11231124async function attemptUnlockWithDerive(1125  password: string,1126  derive: typeof deriveKey,1127): Promise<boolean> {1128  await ensureMigrated();11291130  // Load both slots in parallel. Both always exist post-migration; the1131  // parallel load and the parallel derivation below keep wall-clock time1132  // constant regardless of which slot's passphrase (real or decoy) the1133  // caller supplied, so a timing side channel cannot distinguish the1134  // duress path from the real-unlock path (DUR-002).1135  const [slotA, slotB] = await Promise.all([1136    loadSlot(SLOT_A),1137    loadSlot(SLOT_B),1138  ]);11391140  // Derive both keys in parallel, unconditionally.1141  const [keyA, keyB] = await Promise.all([1142    slotA ? derive(password, unhex(slotA.salt)) : Promise.resolve(null),1143    slotB ? derive(password, unhex(slotB.salt)) : Promise.resolve(null),1144  ]);11451146  // Attempt both decrypts in parallel. The Result variant lets us distinguish1147  // 'wrong_key' from 'corrupted' so callers can offer a history-restore path1148  // when a slot's schema is invalid even though AES-GCM authenticated (M7).1149  const [resultA, resultB] = await Promise.all([1150    keyA && slotA1151      ? tryDecryptSlotResult(slotA, keyA, "slot_a_v1")1152      : Promise.resolve({ status: "wrong_key" } as TryDecryptResult),1153    keyB && slotB1154      ? tryDecryptSlotResult(slotB, keyB, "slot_b_v1")1155      : Promise.resolve({ status: "wrong_key" } as TryDecryptResult),1156  ]);1157  const payloadA = resultA.status === "ok" ? resultA.payload : null;1158  const payloadB = resultB.status === "ok" ? resultB.payload : null;11591160  if (payloadA && keyA) {1161    derivedKey = keyA;1162    void saveSessionKey(keyA, "real");1163    vaultMode = "real";1164    entries = payloadA.entries;1165    duressConfigured = payloadA.duressConfigured;1166    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1167    await loadSettings();1168    touchAutoLock();1169    if (keyB) zeroKey(keyB);11701171    // slotA is non-null when payloadA is truthy (keyA was derived from slotA).1172    if (slotA) {1173      const needsRecoverySetup =1174        !slotA.recovery_salt || !slotA.recovery_wrapped_root_key;1175      if (!needsRecoverySetup) {1176        rootKey = await deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(keyA, slotA);1177      }1178      // Pre-v2.12 vault, or a vault whose pw_root_* fields haven't been written1179      // yet: generate the recovery escrow and seed pw_root_* so subsequent1180      // unlocks can rehydrate rootKey without the user's recovery words.1181      // Best-effort — a failure here must not block unlock.1182      if (needsRecoverySetup || !rootKey) {1183        try {1184          await migrateToRecovery();1185          if (needsRecoverySetup) {1186            // String "1" matches the popup's existing peach_recovery_pending1187            // check; surfaced so the user re-confirms recovery words after a1188            // legacy-vault unlock (H2/COR-006).1189            await chrome.storage.local.set({ peach_recovery_pending: '1' });1190          }1191        } catch (migrationErr) {1192          console.warn('[Peach] recovery migration failed:', migrationErr);1193        }1194      }1195    }11961197    // If the payload had a pre-v2.11.0 shape (legacy passkey type, flat1198    // passkey fields, or pre-A-2 created/updated keys), rewrite it now so1199    // the next save uses the new format and migration doesn't re-run forever.1200    if (payloadA.migratedFromLegacy) {1201      await persistSlotA();1202    }1203    return true;1204  }12051206  if (payloadB && keyB) {1207    derivedKey = keyB;1208    void saveSessionKey(keyB, "decoy");1209    vaultMode = "decoy";1210    entries = payloadB.entries;1211    duressConfigured = false;1212    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1213    await loadSettings();1214    touchAutoLock();1215    if (keyA) zeroKey(keyA);1216    return true;1217  }12181219  if (keyA) zeroKey(keyA);1220  if (keyB) zeroKey(keyB);1221  // Surface corruption (good AES tag, broken schema) distinctly from1222  // wrong-password so the popup can offer history-restore (M7/COR-007).1223  if (resultA.status === "corrupted") {1224    lastUnlockFailureReason = resultA.reason;1225  } else if (resultB.status === "corrupted") {1226    lastUnlockFailureReason = resultB.reason;1227  }1228  return false;1229}12301231// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------1232// MV3 service worker session key — survives SW restarts within a browser session1233// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------12341235// chrome.storage.session is cleared on browser close; survives SW restart.1236// Firefox does not implement it (persistent background script, no restart risk).1237const SESSION_KEY_STORAGE = "peach_session_dk";12381239async function saveSessionKey(key: Uint8Array, mode: "real" | "decoy"): Promise<void> {1240  if (!chrome.storage.session) return;1241  await chrome.storage.session.set({ [SESSION_KEY_STORAGE]: { keyHex: hex(key), mode } });1242}12431244async function clearSessionKey(): Promise<void> {1245  if (!chrome.storage.session) return;1246  await chrome.storage.session.remove(SESSION_KEY_STORAGE);1247}12481249/**1250 * On SW restart, re-derive all in-memory vault state from the session key1251 * stored in chrome.storage.session (set at unlock time, cleared on lock).1252 * Returns true if the vault was restored, false if no session key was found.1253 * No-ops if the vault is already unlocked.1254 */1255export async function restoreFromSession(): Promise<boolean> {1256  if (derivedKey !== null) return true;1257  if (!chrome.storage.session) return false;1258  const stored = await chrome.storage.session.get(SESSION_KEY_STORAGE);1259  const entry = stored[SESSION_KEY_STORAGE] as { keyHex: string; mode: "real" | "decoy" } | undefined;1260  if (!entry?.keyHex) return false;12611262  const key = unhex(entry.keyHex);1263  const slotKey = entry.mode === "real" ? SLOT_A : SLOT_B;1264  const aadTag = entry.mode === "real" ? "slot_a_v1" : "slot_b_v1";1265  const slot = await loadSlot(slotKey);1266  if (!slot) { await clearSessionKey(); return false; }12671268  const result = await tryDecryptSlotResult(slot, key, aadTag);1269  if (result.status !== "ok") { await clearSessionKey(); return false; }12701271  derivedKey = key;1272  vaultMode = entry.mode;1273  entries = result.payload.entries;1274  duressConfigured = entry.mode === "real" ? result.payload.duressConfigured : false;1275  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1276  await loadSettings();1277  touchAutoLock();12781279  if (entry.mode === "real" && slot.recovery_salt && slot.recovery_wrapped_root_key) {1280    try { rootKey = await deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(key, slot); } catch { /* non-fatal */ }1281  }12821283  return true;1284}12851286export function lock(): void {1287  void clearSessionKey();1288  if (derivedKey) {1289    zeroKey(derivedKey);1290    derivedKey = null;1291  }1292  if (rootKey) {1293    rootKey.fill(0);1294    rootKey = null;1295  }12961297  entries = [];1298  domainIndex = new Map();1299  vaultMode = "real";1300  duressConfigured = false;1301  clearAutoLock();1302}13031304export function isUnlocked(): boolean {1305  return derivedKey !== null;1306}13071308// Opens the vault using a pre-derived AES-256 key (skipping Argon2id).1309// Used by Android biometric unlock — the key was derived on the native side.1310export async function unlockWithKey(1311  masterKeyHex: string,1312): Promise<{ ok: true; entries: VaultEntry[] } | { ok: false; error: string }> {1313  try {1314    const masterKeyBytes = unhex(masterKeyHex);1315    const stored = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1316    if (!stored) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };1317    const payload = await tryDecryptSlot(stored, masterKeyBytes, "slot_a_v1");1318    if (!payload) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };13191320    derivedKey = masterKeyBytes;1321    vaultMode = "real";1322    entries = payload.entries;1323    duressConfigured = payload.duressConfigured;1324    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1325    await loadSettings();1326    touchAutoLock();13271328    // PCH-01-009: the biometric path skips Argon2id but must still rehydrate the1329    // root key, exactly like attemptUnlockWithDerive and restoreFromSession.1330    // Without it, rootKey stays null after a biometric unlock and chirp sync +1331    // GET_RECOVERY_WORDS report the open vault as locked. Guarded and non-fatal:1332    // a missing/legacy escrow must not fail the unlock itself.1333    if (stored.recovery_salt && stored.recovery_wrapped_root_key) {1334      try {1335        rootKey = await deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(masterKeyBytes, stored);1336      } catch { /* non-fatal — unlock still succeeds without rootKey */ }1337    }1338    return { ok: true, entries };1339  } catch {1340    return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };1341  }1342}13431344/**1345 * Restore the vault from a parsed Peach Codex payload.1346 *1347 * The supplied passphrase is verified against the Codex's slotA *before* any1348 * storage mutation — wrong passphrases return without touching disk. On1349 * success, the current vault state is snapshotted (reason: "restore") so the1350 * user can revert via Settings -> Vault History, then slotA/slotB are written1351 * and `peach_last_modified_at` is set to the Codex's recorded timestamp. A1352 * regular `unlock()` follows so the rest of the SW sees the standard1353 * post-unlock state.1354 *1355 * Intentionally non-Pro-gated — see peach_codex_v2.md "Pro gating". A Codex1356 * printed by a Pro user must always be restorable, even on a free device.1357 *1358 * Timing is not held constant here (in contrast to `unlock`): the Codex flow1359 * is an explicit user action with a known passphrase, not a passive lock1360 * screen, so the duress-vs-real timing side channel does not apply.1361 */1362export async function unlockFromCodex(params: {1363  slotA: string; // JSON string of StoredVault for slot A1364  slotB: string | null; // JSON string of StoredVault for slot B, or null1365  timestamp: number;1366  masterPassphrase: string;1367}): Promise<1368  | { ok: true; entryCount: number }1369  | { ok: false; reason: "wrong_passphrase" | "invalid_slot_format" }1370> {1371  let parsedSlotA: StoredVault;1372  let parsedSlotB: StoredVault | null = null;1373  try {1374    const rawA = JSON.parse(params.slotA) as unknown;1375    if (!hasValidVaultSchema(rawA)) {1376      return { ok: false, reason: "invalid_slot_format" };1377    }1378    parsedSlotA = rawA;1379    if (params.slotB !== null) {1380      const rawB = JSON.parse(params.slotB) as unknown;1381      if (!hasValidVaultSchema(rawB)) {1382        return { ok: false, reason: "invalid_slot_format" };1383      }1384      parsedSlotB = rawB;1385    }1386  } catch {1387    return { ok: false, reason: "invalid_slot_format" };1388  }13891390  // Verify the passphrase against the supplied slotA WITHOUT writing anything.1391  // If this fails the on-disk vault is left completely untouched.1392  const trialKey = await deriveKey(params.masterPassphrase, unhex(parsedSlotA.salt));1393  const trialPayload = await tryDecryptSlot(parsedSlotA, trialKey, "slot_a_v1");1394  if (!trialPayload) {1395    zeroKey(trialKey);1396    return { ok: false, reason: "wrong_passphrase" };1397  }1398  // Drop the trial key; `unlock()` below derives its own copy. Holding two1399  // copies of the master key in memory at once would be a needless surface.1400  zeroKey(trialKey);14011402  // Snapshot the about-to-be-overwritten on-disk state so the user can revert1403  // a mistaken Codex restore via the Vault History UI. Non-fatal if it fails.1404  await takeVaultSnapshot("restore");14051406  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, parsedSlotA);1407  if (parsedSlotB) {1408    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, parsedSlotB);1409  } else {1410    // Slot B must always exist with ciphertext length matching slot A1411    // (Projects.md §3.2). Codex prints may omit slot B (duress wasn't1412    // configured); regenerate noise to satisfy the invariant.1413    await writeSlot(1414      SLOT_B,1415      generateNoiseBlob(parsedSlotA.ciphertext.length / 2),1416    );1417  }1418  await chrome.storage.local.set({1419    peach_last_modified_at: String(params.timestamp),1420  });14211422  // Standard unlock path so domain index, settings, auto-lock, and1423  // recovery-key state all populate exactly as a normal unlock would.1424  const ok = await unlock(params.masterPassphrase);1425  if (!ok) {1426    // Should be unreachable — we just verified the passphrase against the1427    // same slotA we wrote. Treat as wrong_passphrase to keep the contract1428    // simple if some race or storage anomaly intrudes.1429    return { ok: false, reason: "wrong_passphrase" };1430  }1431  return { ok: true, entryCount: getEntries().length };1432}14331434// Returns the current in-memory derived key as a hex string.1435// Used by the biometric enable flow in Settings to store the key in Android Keystore.1436export function getDerivedKeyHex(): string {1437  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_not_unlocked");1438  return hex(derivedKey);1439}14401441/**1442 * Returns the vault's stable root key as hex, or null when locked / not yet1443 * populated. The root key is random per-vault, generated at creation, escrowed1444 * under the recovery words, and re-wrapped (not regenerated) on every password1445 * change — so it is INVARIANT across password rotation, unlike getDerivedKeyHex.1446 *1447 * This is the correct input for sync identity derivation (vault_id, the Noise1448 * XX static key, the Ed25519 manifest signing key, and per-entry envelope1449 * keys): paired devices keep the same identity and can still decrypt each1450 * other's entries after either side rotates its master password (SEV-2-B).1451 *1452 * Returns null rather than throwing so sync callers degrade to VAULT_LOCKED1453 * instead of crashing; rootKey is populated on every real-mode unlock via1454 * deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey / migrateToRecovery.1455 */1456export function getRootKeyHex(): string | null {1457  return rootKey ? hex(rootKey) : null;1458}14591460export function getEntries(): VaultEntry[] {1461  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1462  return entries.filter((entry) => !entry.deletedAt);1463}14641465const EMAIL_RE = /^[^\s@]+@[^\s@]+\.[^\s@]+$/;14661467export function getIdentities(): SavedIdentity[] {1468  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1469  const active = entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt && e.type === "login");14701471  const emailMap = new Map<string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }>();1472  const usernameMap = new Map<string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }>();14731474  for (const entry of active) {1475    const domain = extractDomain(entry.url ?? "") ?? "";1476    const modifiedAt = entry.modifiedAt ?? entry.createdAt ?? 0;14771478    function tally(map: Map<string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }>, v: string) {1479      const existing = map.get(v);1480      if (!existing || modifiedAt > existing.lastUsed) {1481        map.set(v, { lastUsed: modifiedAt, count: (existing?.count ?? 0) + 1, domain });1482      } else {1483        map.set(v, { ...existing, count: existing.count + 1 });1484      }1485    }14861487    const uVal = entry.username?.trim();1488    if (uVal) tally(EMAIL_RE.test(uVal) ? emailMap : usernameMap, uVal);14891490    // Also count the dedicated email field — entries created via the inline1491    // popup new-entry form store email here rather than in username.1492    const eVal = entry.email?.trim();1493    if (eVal) tally(emailMap, eVal);1494  }14951496  const toIdentity = (type: "email" | "username") =>1497    ([value, d]: [string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }]): SavedIdentity => ({1498      value, type, lastUsed: d.lastUsed, useCount: d.count, exampleDomain: d.domain || undefined,1499    });15001501  return [1502    ...[...emailMap.entries()].map(toIdentity("email")).sort((a, b) => b.useCount - a.useCount),1503    ...[...usernameMap.entries()].map(toIdentity("username")).sort((a, b) => b.useCount - a.useCount),1504  ];1505}15061507export async function batchAddEntries(drafts: EntryDraft[]): Promise<VaultEntry[]> {1508  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");15091510  const now = Date.now();1511  const added: VaultEntry[] = [];1512  for (const draft of drafts) {1513    try {1514      const sanitized = sanitizeEntryDraft(draft);1515      const nextEntry: VaultEntry = {1516        ...sanitized,1517        id: crypto.randomUUID(),1518        createdAt: now,1519        modifiedAt: monotonicEntryTimestamp(),1520      };1521      entries.push(nextEntry);1522      added.push(nextEntry);1523    } catch {1524      // Skip invalid drafts silently — caller can see diff between input and output length1525    }1526  }15271528  if (added.length > 0) {1529    await persistEntries();1530  }15311532  return added;1533}15341535/**1536 * Restore a set of entries in full fidelity — preserves id, createdAt,1537 * modifiedAt, and every other field unlike `batchAddEntries` which1538 * assigns fresh identity. Used by restore paths where the backup is the1539 * authoritative source of truth. `mode` controls how entries already in1540 * the vault are treated.1541 */1542export async function restoreEntries(1543  incoming: VaultEntry[],1544  mode: "replace" | "merge"1545): Promise<{ added: number; updated: number; skipped: number }> {1546  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");15471548  // A replace with zero incoming entries is almost certainly a caller bug1549  // (e.g. an import that silently dropped everything). Refuse rather than1550  // wipe the vault.1551  if (mode === "replace" && incoming.length === 0) {1552    throw new Error("refuse to replace with empty entry set");1553  }15541555  let added = 0;1556  let updated = 0;1557  let skipped = 0;15581559  if (mode === "replace") {1560    entries = [];1561    for (const entry of incoming) {1562      const normalized = sanitizeRestoredEntry(entry);1563      if (!normalized) {1564        skipped += 1;1565        continue;1566      }1567      entries.push(normalized);1568      added += 1;1569    }1570  } else {1571    const byId = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();1572    for (const e of entries) byId.set(e.id, e);15731574    for (const entry of incoming) {1575      const normalized = sanitizeRestoredEntry(entry);1576      if (!normalized) {1577        skipped += 1;1578        continue;1579      }1580      const existing = byId.get(normalized.id);1581      if (!existing) {1582        entries.push(normalized);1583        added += 1;1584      } else if (normalized.modifiedAt > existing.modifiedAt) {1585        const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === existing.id);1586        if (idx !== -1) {1587          entries[idx] = normalized;1588          updated += 1;1589        }1590      } else {1591        skipped += 1;1592      }1593    }1594  }15951596  await persistEntries("import");1597  return { added, updated, skipped };1598}15991600/**1601 * Validate + normalise a VaultEntry coming from a backup, import, or sync1602 * peer. MV-6: this is a strict field WHITELIST — `normalizeEntry` copies1603 * only known VaultEntry fields (unknown/attacker keys are dropped), and1604 * nested `passkey`/`canary` shapes are rebuilt field-by-field, never1605 * spread. Returns null for values the live vault shouldn't accept.1606 */1607function sanitizeRestoredEntry(entry: VaultEntry): VaultEntry | null {1608  if (!entry || typeof entry !== "object") return null;1609  const title = typeof entry.title === "string" ? entry.title.trim() : "";1610  if (!title) return null;1611  const id = typeof entry.id === "string" && entry.id ? entry.id : crypto.randomUUID();1612  const now = Date.now();1613  const createdAt = typeof entry.createdAt === "number" ? entry.createdAt : now;1614  const modifiedAt = typeof entry.modifiedAt === "number" ? entry.modifiedAt : createdAt;16151616  // normalizeEntry whitelists every known VaultEntry field and runs the1617  // same legacy-passkey migration as the on-disk read path — pre-v2.11.01618  // backups with flat passkey fields still import correctly because the1619  // legacy flat fields are themselves whitelisted VaultEntry members.1620  const normalized = normalizeEntry({1621    ...entry,1622    id,1623    title,1624    type: entry.type ?? "login",1625    createdAt,1626    modifiedAt,1627  });16281629  if (normalized.passkey) {1630    normalized.passkey = sanitizePasskey(normalized.passkey);1631  }1632  if (normalized.canary) {1633    normalized.canary = sanitizeCanary(normalized.canary);1634  }1635  // PCH-01-016: bound tags on the restore path too, so both import funnels agree.1636  normalized.tags = sanitizeTags(normalized.tags);16371638  // Login entries from backup must carry a password (or be passkey-only,1639  // in which case the passkey sub-object replaces the password requirement).1640  if (1641    normalized.type === "login" &&1642    !normalized.passkey &&1643    typeof normalized.password !== "string"1644  ) {1645    return null;1646  }1647  if (entry.passkey && !normalized.passkey) {1648    // Entry claimed a passkey but the shape didn't validate — refuse the1649    // whole entry rather than silently importing a credential-less husk.1650    return null;1651  }16521653  return normalized;1654}16551656/**1657 * Rebuild a PasskeyData object from untrusted input, field by field.1658 * Returns undefined when required fields are missing/mistyped — a rogue1659 * passkey credential must not activate via import (MV-6 attack scenario).1660 */1661function sanitizePasskey(pk: unknown): PasskeyData | undefined {1662  if (!pk || typeof pk !== "object") return undefined;1663  const r = pk as Record<string, unknown>;1664  if (1665    typeof r.rpId !== "string" || !r.rpId ||1666    typeof r.credentialId !== "string" || !r.credentialId ||1667    typeof r.publicKeyCose !== "string" ||1668    typeof r.userHandle !== "string" ||1669    typeof r.userName !== "string"1670  ) {1671    return undefined;1672  }1673  return {1674    rpId: r.rpId,1675    rpName: typeof r.rpName === "string" ? r.rpName : r.rpId,1676    credentialId: r.credentialId,1677    publicKeyCose: r.publicKeyCose,1678    privateKeyJwk:1679      r.privateKeyJwk && typeof r.privateKeyJwk === "object"1680        ? (r.privateKeyJwk as JsonWebKey)1681        : undefined,1682    userHandle: r.userHandle,1683    userName: r.userName,1684    userDisplayName:1685      typeof r.userDisplayName === "string" ? r.userDisplayName : r.userName,1686    algorithm: r.algorithm === -8 ? -8 : -7,1687    signCount: typeof r.signCount === "number" ? r.signCount : 0,1688    aaguid: typeof r.aaguid === "string" ? r.aaguid : "",1689    backupEligible: r.backupEligible === true,1690    backupState: r.backupState === true,1691    lastUsedAt: typeof r.lastUsedAt === "number" ? r.lastUsedAt : undefined,1692    browser: r.browser === "chrome" || r.browser === "firefox" ? r.browser : undefined,1693    transports: Array.isArray(r.transports)1694      ? r.transports.filter((t): t is string => typeof t === "string")1695      : undefined,1696    createdAt: typeof r.createdAt === "number" ? r.createdAt : Date.now(),1697  };1698}16991700/**1701 * Rebuild a Canary object from untrusted input. The webhook must be a1702 * well-formed HTTPS URL — a poisoned canary.webhookUrl is a standing1703 * exfiltration endpoint that the canary subsystem will POST entry titles1704 * to (MV-6 attack scenario). Invalid → the canary is dropped, not the1705 * entry. FIRE_CANARY_PING re-validates with the full SSRF guard at fire1706 * time (isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl), so this import-time check is the1707 * outer of two gates.1708 */1709function sanitizeCanary(c: unknown): Canary | undefined {1710  if (!c || typeof c !== "object") return undefined;1711  const r = c as Record<string, unknown>;1712  if (typeof r.webhookUrl !== "string") return undefined;1713  let url: URL;1714  try {1715    url = new URL(r.webhookUrl);1716  } catch {1717    return undefined;1718  }1719  if (url.protocol !== "https:") return undefined;1720  return {1721    webhookUrl: url.toString(),1722    label: typeof r.label === "string" ? r.label : undefined,1723    lastPinged: typeof r.lastPinged === "number" ? r.lastPinged : undefined,1724    pingCount: typeof r.pingCount === "number" ? r.pingCount : undefined,1725  };1726}17271728/**1729 * MV-6 / PCH-01-016: tags from imported / batch-added entries are untrusted.1730 * Keep only non-empty strings, cap each at 256 chars, and cap the count at 2551731 * (the same per-entry ceiling the export codec enforces, peachPayload.ts).1732 * Non-array or all-invalid input collapses to undefined.1733 */1734function sanitizeTags(tags: unknown): string[] | undefined {1735  if (!Array.isArray(tags)) return undefined;1736  const out: string[] = [];1737  for (const t of tags) {1738    if (typeof t !== "string") continue;1739    const trimmed = t.trim();1740    if (!trimmed) continue;1741    out.push(trimmed.slice(0, 256));1742    if (out.length >= 255) break;1743  }1744  return out.length > 0 ? out : undefined;1745}17461747// Soft-deletes every non-deleted entry in one call. The literal string1748// argument is a tripwire against accidental calls — any caller that would1749// wipe the vault has to consciously type "REPLACE_ALL". Do not relax this1750// to a boolean.1751export async function clearVaultEntries(1752  confirmation: "REPLACE_ALL"1753): Promise<void> {1754  if (confirmation !== "REPLACE_ALL") {1755    throw new Error("clearVaultEntries requires explicit confirmation");1756  }1757  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1758  for (const entry of entries) {1759    if (!entry.deletedAt) {1760      const stamp = monotonicEntryTimestamp(entry.modifiedAt);1761      entry.deletedAt = stamp;1762      entry.modifiedAt = stamp;1763    }1764  }1765  await persistEntries();1766}17671768export async function addEntry(entry: EntryDraft): Promise<VaultEntry> {1769  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");17701771  const sanitized = sanitizeEntryDraft(entry);1772  const now = Date.now();1773  const stamp = monotonicEntryTimestamp();1774  const nextEntry: VaultEntry = {1775    ...sanitized,1776    id: crypto.randomUUID(),1777    createdAt: now,1778    modifiedAt: stamp,1779    // Stamp passwordChangedAt at creation so age tracking is accurate from1780    // day one. Non-login entries carry the same stamp harmlessly.1781    passwordChangedAt: sanitized.password ? stamp : undefined,1782  };17831784  // Clone-and-replace so a failed persist rolls back the in-memory state1785  // (COR-008). Without this, a quota-full or storage error leaves the1786  // module-level `entries` ahead of what's actually on disk.1787  const rollback = entries;1788  entries = [...entries, nextEntry];1789  try {1790    await persistEntries();1791  } catch (err) {1792    entries = rollback;1793    throw err;1794  }17951796  // Fire-and-forget breach check (only for login entries if breach monitoring is enabled or not set)1797  if (settings.breachMonitoring !== false && nextEntry.type === "login" && nextEntry.password) {1798    checkBreach(nextEntry.password).then(async (count) => {1799      if (count > 0) {1800        const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === nextEntry.id);1801        if (idx !== -1) {1802          entries[idx] = { ...entries[idx], breach: count, modifiedAt: monotonicEntryTimestamp(entries[idx].modifiedAt) };1803          await persistEntries();1804        }1805      }1806    });1807  }18081809  fireSyncTrigger("vault_change");18101811  return nextEntry;1812}18131814/**1815 * Run the passkey-merge pass on the live in-memory entries and persist if1816 * anything changed. Called immediately after any passkey registration so that1817 * a same-domain TOTP-only entry already in the vault gets consolidated right1818 * away instead of waiting until the next lock/unlock cycle.1819 */1820export async function consolidatePasskeyEntries(): Promise<void> {1821  if (!derivedKey) return;1822  const { merged } = mergePasskeyOnlyIntoLogins(entries);1823  if (merged) {1824    await persistEntries();1825  }1826}18271828export async function updateEntry(1829  id: string,1830  patch: Partial<VaultEntry>1831): Promise<void> {1832  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");18331834  const idx = entries.findIndex((entry) => entry.id === id);1835  if (idx === -1 || entries[idx].deletedAt) {1836    throw new Error("entry_not_found");1837  }18381839  const current = entries[idx];1840  const sanitizedPatch = sanitizeEntryPatch(patch);1841  // Refresh passwordChangedAt only when the password value actually changes —1842  // a metadata-only update (title, tags, etc.) must not reset the age clock1843  // that drives the Pro health rotation recommendation.1844  const passwordChanged =1845    "password" in patch &&1846    typeof sanitizedPatch.password === "string" &&1847    sanitizedPatch.password !== current.password;1848  const stamp = monotonicEntryTimestamp(current.modifiedAt);1849  // When the password actually changes, push the outgoing one onto the history1850  // (newest first) so the user can reveal/copy/restore it later. We record the1851  // age it carried (passwordChangedAt, falling back to createdAt) rather than1852  // `now`, so the list reflects when each password was last in effect. Only1853  // capture a non-empty prior value — clearing a password leaves no secret to1854  // keep, and we skip an immediate exact duplicate (e.g. restore-then-restore)1855  // to avoid noise.1856  const priorPassword = current.password;1857  const shouldCapture =1858    passwordChanged &&1859    typeof priorPassword === "string" &&1860    priorPassword.length > 0 &&1861    current.passwordHistory?.[0]?.password !== priorPassword;1862  const nextHistory = shouldCapture1863    ? [1864        { password: priorPassword!, changedAt: current.passwordChangedAt ?? current.createdAt },1865        ...(current.passwordHistory ?? []),1866      ].slice(0, PASSWORD_HISTORY_MAX)1867    : current.passwordHistory;1868  entries[idx] = {1869    ...current,1870    ...sanitizedPatch,1871    modifiedAt: stamp,1872    ...(passwordChanged ? { passwordChangedAt: stamp, passwordHistory: nextHistory } : {}),1873  };1874187518761877  // Card entries must retain their card number1878  if (entries[idx].type === "card" && !entries[idx].cardNumber) {1879    entries[idx] = current;1880    throw new Error("card number is required for card entries");1881  }18821883  // Roll the in-memory entry back to its pre-edit state if the disk write1884  // fails (e.g. storage quota). Without this the module-level `entries` array1885  // would hold an edit that never landed on disk, diverging from the vault1886  // until the next unlock silently reverts it (SEV-3-A). Mirrors addEntry.1887  try {1888    await persistEntries();1889  } catch (err) {1890    entries[idx] = current;1891    throw err;1892  }18931894  // Breach check when password changes: clear immediately so old breach doesn't linger,1895  // then async-check the new password and only re-set if it's also found.1896  if ("password" in patch && settings.breachMonitoring !== false && entries[idx].type === "login") {1897    entries[idx] = { ...entries[idx], breach: undefined };1898    await persistEntries();1899    const password = entries[idx].password;1900    if (password) {1901      checkBreach(password).then(async (count) => {1902        const i = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id);1903        if (i !== -1 && count > 0) {1904          entries[i] = { ...entries[i], breach: count, modifiedAt: monotonicEntryTimestamp(entries[i].modifiedAt) };1905          await persistEntries();1906        }1907      });1908    }1909  }19101911  fireSyncTrigger("vault_change");1912}19131914export async function deleteEntry(id: string): Promise<void> {1915  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");19161917  const entry = entries.find((item) => item.id === id);1918  if (!entry || entry.deletedAt) {1919    throw new Error("entry_not_found");1920  }19211922  // Tombstone timestamp must be strictly greater than the entry's last1923  // modification so the deletion wins LWW against any in-flight edit, even1924  // under clock skew (SEV-2-E).1925  const previousModifiedAt = entry.modifiedAt;1926  const stamp = monotonicEntryTimestamp(entry.modifiedAt);1927  entry.deletedAt = stamp;1928  entry.modifiedAt = stamp;1929  // Roll the tombstone back if the disk write fails, so a quota error doesn't1930  // leave the entry deleted in memory but alive on disk (SEV-3-A).1931  try {1932    await persistEntries();1933  } catch (err) {1934    delete entry.deletedAt;1935    entry.modifiedAt = previousModifiedAt;1936    throw err;1937  }1938  fireSyncTrigger("vault_change");1939}19401941export function getDeletedEntries(): VaultEntry[] {1942  if (!derivedKey) return [];1943  return entries.filter((e) => !!e.deletedAt);1944}19451946/**1947 * Returns the vault's monotonic version — the `peach_last_modified_at` value1948 * stamped on every user-initiated write. Remote (sync) writes do NOT advance1949 * this version so a sync round never cascades into a second outbound sync.1950 */1951export async function getVaultVersion(): Promise<number> {1952  try {1953    const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get("peach_last_modified_at");1954    const v = (raw as Record<string, unknown>).peach_last_modified_at;1955    if (typeof v === "number") return v;1956    if (typeof v === "string" && v !== "") {1957      const n = Number.parseInt(v, 10);1958      return Number.isFinite(n) ? n : 0;1959    }1960    return 0;1961  } catch {1962    return 0;1963  }1964}19651966/**1967 * Internal write variants — bypass `fireSyncTrigger` so the sync layer can1968 * apply entries without cascading into another outbound sync round.1969 *1970 * INVARIANT: callers must not pass entries whose IDs collide with existing1971 * active (non-deleted) entries unless the intent is an explicit overwrite.1972 * These functions do not validate field-level constraints (password required,1973 * card number required, etc.) — they are trust-the-caller paths for sync and1974 * test harness use only.1975 */1976export async function addEntryDirect(entry: VaultEntry): Promise<void> {1977  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1978  entries = [...entries, entry];1979  await persistEntries("sync_received");1980}19811982export async function updateEntryDirect(patch: VaultEntry): Promise<void> {1983  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1984  const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === patch.id);1985  if (idx === -1) throw new Error("entry_not_found");1986  entries[idx] = { ...entries[idx], ...patch };1987  await persistEntries("sync_received");1988}19891990export async function deleteEntryDirect(id: string, deletedAt: number): Promise<void> {1991  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1992  const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id);1993  if (idx === -1) throw new Error("entry_not_found");1994  entries[idx] = { ...entries[idx], deletedAt, modifiedAt: deletedAt };1995  await persistEntries("sync_received");1996}19971998/**1999 * Apply a batch of remote entries + tombstones from a chirp-sync peer.2000 * Last-write-wins by `modifiedAt`; a tombstone supersedes a live entry when2001 * `deletedAt > modifiedAt` on the local side. Mutates `entries` directly and2002 * persists with reason `sync_received` — does NOT fire the sync dispatcher, so2003 * applying a sync round cannot cascade into another outbound sync.2004 *2005 * `applied` counts entries that actually changed local state (new add,2006 * overwrite-by-newer, or new tombstone). `received` is the raw payload size2007 * the caller can surface in the sync result UI.2008 */2009export async function applyMergedRemoteEntries(2010  remoteEntries: VaultEntry[],2011  remoteTombstones: Record<string, number>,2012  context: { deviceName?: string } = {},2013): Promise<{ received: number; applied: number; conflicts: number }> {2014  // DESIGN: last-write-wins is applied PER-ENTRY, not per-field. If two devices2015  // concurrently edit different fields of the same entry, the one with the2016  // newer modifiedAt wins the whole entry and the other device's field edits2017  // are dropped silently. This is the deliberate trade-off for a simple,2018  // conflict-free merge — per-field CRDT merge is out of scope. Guidance for2019  // users: edit a given entry on one device at a time.2020  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");20212022  const received = remoteEntries.length + Object.keys(remoteTombstones).length;2023  let applied = 0;2024  let conflicts = 0;20252026  const byId = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();2027  for (const e of entries) byId.set(e.id, e);20282029  const alerts: SyncAlert[] = [];2030  const deviceName = context.deviceName ?? "paired device";2031  const mergeNow = Date.now();20322033  for (const remote of remoteEntries) {2034    const sanitized = sanitizeRestoredEntry(remote);2035    if (!sanitized) continue;2036    // HV-1a: a far-future remote modifiedAt must not permanently pin a2037    // malicious value against honest local edits. Clamp BEFORE any2038    // comparison against local timestamps.2039    sanitized.modifiedAt = clampSyncTimestamp(sanitized.modifiedAt, mergeNow);2040    if (typeof sanitized.deletedAt === "number") {2041      sanitized.deletedAt = clampSyncTimestamp(sanitized.deletedAt, mergeNow);2042    }2043    const tombstoneTs = remoteTombstones[sanitized.id];2044    if (tombstoneTs !== undefined && clampSyncTimestamp(tombstoneTs, mergeNow) >= sanitized.modifiedAt) {2045      continue;2046    }2047    const local = byId.get(sanitized.id);2048    if (!local) {2049      entries.push(sanitized);2050      byId.set(sanitized.id, sanitized);2051      applied += 1;2052    } else if (sanitized.modifiedAt > local.modifiedAt) {2053      const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === local.id);2054      if (idx !== -1) {2055        // HV-1b: surface remote password REPLACEMENTS (existing id, password2056        // differs) so a compromised peer can't silently rewrite credentials.2057        if (2058          !local.deletedAt &&2059          typeof sanitized.password === "string" &&2060          typeof local.password === "string" &&2061          sanitized.password !== local.password2062        ) {2063          alerts.push({2064            type: "REMOTE_PASSWORD_CHANGE",2065            entryId: sanitized.id,2066            entryTitle: sanitized.title,2067            deviceName,2068            timestamp: mergeNow,2069          });2070        }2071        entries[idx] = sanitized;2072        byId.set(sanitized.id, sanitized);2073        applied += 1;2074        if (!local.deletedAt) conflicts += 1;2075      }2076    }2077  }20782079  for (const [id, rawDeletedAt] of Object.entries(remoteTombstones)) {2080    if (typeof rawDeletedAt !== "number" || !Number.isFinite(rawDeletedAt)) continue;2081    // HV-1a/1c: clamp the tombstone timestamp before every comparison.2082    const deletedAt = clampSyncTimestamp(rawDeletedAt, mergeNow);2083    const local = byId.get(id);2084    if (!local) continue;2085    if (local.deletedAt && local.deletedAt >= deletedAt) continue;2086    if (deletedAt < local.modifiedAt) continue;2087    const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id);2088    if (idx !== -1) {2089      // HV-1b: surface remote deletes of live local entries.2090      if (!local.deletedAt) {2091        alerts.push({2092          type: "REMOTE_DELETE",2093          entryId: id,2094          entryTitle: local.title,2095          deviceName,2096          timestamp: mergeNow,2097        });2098      }2099      entries[idx] = { ...local, deletedAt, modifiedAt: deletedAt };2100      applied += 1;2101    }2102  }21032104  if (applied > 0) {2105    await persistEntries("sync_received");2106    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);2107  }2108  // Queued after the merge committed — an alert must describe a mutation2109  // that actually landed. recordSyncAlerts never throws.2110  await recordSyncAlerts(alerts);2111  return { received, applied, conflicts };2112}21132114export async function restoreEntry(id: string): Promise<void> {2115  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");2116  const entry = entries.find((e) => e.id === id && e.deletedAt);2117  if (!entry) throw new Error("deleted entry not found");2118  delete entry.deletedAt;2119  entry.modifiedAt = monotonicEntryTimestamp(entry.modifiedAt);2120  await persistEntries();2121  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);2122}21232124export async function purgeEntry(id: string): Promise<void> {2125  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");2126  const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id && e.deletedAt);2127  if (idx === -1) throw new Error("deleted entry not found");2128  entries.splice(idx, 1);2129  await persistEntries();2130}21312132/** Permanently delete entries whose deletedAt is older than retentionMs. 0 = keep forever. */2133export async function purgeExpiredTrash(retentionMs: number): Promise<number> {2134  if (!derivedKey || retentionMs === 0) return 0;2135  const cutoff = Date.now() - retentionMs;2136  const before = entries.length;2137  entries = entries.filter((e) => !(e.deletedAt && e.deletedAt < cutoff));2138  const purged = before - entries.length;2139  if (purged > 0) await persistEntries();2140  return purged;2141}21422143export function queryDomain(domain: string): VaultEntry[] {2144  return domainIndex.get(domain) ?? [];2145}21462147export function getEntryById(id: string): VaultEntry | undefined {2148  return entries.find((entry) => entry.id === id && !entry.deletedAt);2149}21502151async function persistSlotA(2152  reason: VaultSnapshot["reason"] = "local_save",2153): Promise<StoredVault> {2154  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");21552156  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);2157  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");21582159  // Snapshot the about-to-be-overwritten state BEFORE we mutate disk. Failures2160  // are swallowed by takeVaultSnapshot — history must never block a save.2161  await takeVaultSnapshot(reason);21622163  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured, duressConfigured ? DURESS_SLOT_SIZE : 0);2164  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");21652166  // Preserve existing recovery escrow fields.2167  const nextSlotA: StoredVault = {2168    ...slotA,2169    nonce,2170    ciphertext,2171    tag,2172    // recovery_salt and recovery_wrapped_root_key are already set from loadSlot2173  };2174  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, nextSlotA);21752176  // Slot A (the real vault) is now committed. Wrap every later write so a2177  // mid-persist failure (e.g. a storage error after slot A landed) restores the2178  // prior slot A before rethrowing. Without this, a "failed" save that already2179  // wrote slot A leaves disk ahead of the in-memory rollback in addEntry/2180  // updateEntry/deleteEntry — the entry stays silently on disk and resurfaces2181  // as a duplicate on the next unlock (observed under storage-quota pressure).2182  try {2183    // When duress is not configured, keep slot B size-matched with slot A by2184    // regenerating its noise. When duress IS configured, leave slot B alone —2185    // we don't have the decoy key to re-encrypt it. This is a known trade-off.2186    if (!duressConfigured) {2187      await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2));2188    }2189    // Only advance the vault version for locally-originated writes. Entries2190    // applied from a sync peer ("sync_received") must NOT bump the counter —2191    // otherwise applying a remote round makes us look newer than the peer and2192    // triggers a redundant outbound sync, defeating the no-op optimisation2193    // and risking a ping-pong between two devices (SEV-2-C).2194    if (reason !== "sync_received") {2195      await stampLocalVaultMutation();2196    }2197  } catch (err) {2198    // Best-effort restore — the prior slot A is smaller-or-equal, so this write2199    // fits even when the failure was a quota overflow.2200    await writeSlot(SLOT_A, slotA).catch(() => {});2201    throw err;2202  }22032204  return nextSlotA;2205}22062207async function persistSlotB(): Promise<void> {2208  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");22092210  const slotB = await loadSlot(SLOT_B);2211  if (!slotB) throw new Error("missing slot B");22122213  // Decoy plaintext always reports duressConfigured=false — the decoy user2214  // sees a clean slate. persistSlotB only runs in decoy mode, which only2215  // exists once duress is configured, so pad to the fixed duress ceiling to2216  // keep slot B's length equal to slot A's (audit MEDIUM — deniability).2217  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, false, DURESS_SLOT_SIZE);2218  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKey, plaintext, "slot_b_v1");22192220  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, { ...slotB, nonce, ciphertext, tag });2221  // Symmetric with persistSlotA: if the version stamp fails after the decoy2222  // slot committed, restore the prior slot B so a failed decoy-mode save can't2223  // leave disk ahead of the in-memory rollback.2224  try {2225    await stampLocalVaultMutation();2226  } catch (err) {2227    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, slotB).catch(() => {});2228    throw err;2229  }2230}22312232async function persistEntries(2233  reason: VaultSnapshot["reason"] = "local_save",2234): Promise<void> {2235  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");22362237  if (vaultMode === "decoy") {2238    await persistSlotB();2239  } else {2240    await persistSlotA(reason);2241  }2242  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);2243}22442245function cleanAdditionalUrls(values: string[] | undefined): string[] | undefined {2246  if (!Array.isArray(values)) return undefined;2247  const seen = new Set<string>();2248  const cleaned: string[] = [];2249  for (const value of values) {2250    const trimmed = typeof value === "string" ? value.trim() : "";2251    if (!trimmed) continue;2252    const key = trimmed.toLowerCase();2253    if (seen.has(key)) continue;2254    seen.add(key);2255    cleaned.push(trimmed);2256  }2257  return cleaned.length > 0 ? cleaned : undefined;2258}22592260function sanitizeEntryDraft(entry: EntryDraft): EntryDraft {2261  const title = entry.title.trim();2262  // Accept legacy `type:"passkey"` drafts but rewrite to "login" — the new2263  // model is "any entry, optionally with a passkey sub-object." Imports and2264  // any in-flight callers from before v2.11.0 keep working without throwing.2265  let type: VaultEntry["type"] = entry.type ?? "login";2266  if (type === "passkey") type = "login";22672268  if (!title) throw new Error("title is required");22692270  if (entry.passkey) {2271    const p = entry.passkey;2272    if (2273      !p.rpId ||2274      !p.credentialId ||2275      !p.publicKeyCose ||2276      !p.userHandle ||2277      !p.userName ||2278      (p.algorithm !== -7 && p.algorithm !== -8)2279    ) {2280      throw new Error("invalid passkey credential");2281    }2282  }2283  if (type === "card") {2284    if (!entry.cardholderName?.trim() || !entry.cardNumber?.trim()) {2285      throw new Error("cardholder name and card number are required");2286    }2287  }22882289  return {2290    type,2291    title,2292    username: type === "login" ? entry.username?.trim() ?? "" : undefined,2293    email: type === "login" ? entry.email?.trim() || undefined : undefined,2294    password: type === "login" ? entry.password : undefined,2295    url: type === "login" ? entry.url?.trim() ?? "" : undefined,2296    additionalUrls: type === "login" ? cleanAdditionalUrls(entry.additionalUrls) : undefined,2297    totp: type === "login" ? entry.totp?.trim() || undefined : undefined,2298    // PCH-01-019: preserve non-default TOTP params through batch-add/import so2299    // they are not silently stripped (they fall back to SHA-1/6/30 when absent).2300    totpAlgorithm: type === "login" ? entry.totpAlgorithm : undefined,2301    totpDigits: type === "login" ? entry.totpDigits : undefined,2302    totpPeriod: type === "login" ? entry.totpPeriod : undefined,2303    notes: entry.notes?.trim() || undefined,2304    breach: type === "login" ? entry.breach : undefined,2305    // PCH-01-016: the batch-add path was bypassing the MV-6 canary/tags2306    // whitelist applied on the RESTORE_ENTRIES path. Run both sanitizers here.2307    canary: type === "login" ? sanitizeCanary(entry.canary) : undefined,2308    tags: sanitizeTags(entry.tags),2309    passkey: entry.passkey,2310    cardholderName: type === "card" ? entry.cardholderName?.trim() : undefined,2311    cardNumber: type === "card" ? entry.cardNumber?.trim() : undefined,2312    expMonth: type === "card" ? entry.expMonth?.trim() : undefined,2313    expYear: type === "card" ? entry.expYear?.trim() : undefined,2314    cvc: type === "card" ? entry.cvc?.trim() : undefined,2315    cardNickname: type === "card" ? entry.cardNickname?.trim() || undefined : undefined,2316    network: type === "card" ? entry.network : undefined,2317    last4: type === "card" ? entry.last4?.trim() : undefined,2318  };2319}23202321function sanitizeEntryPatch(patch: Partial<VaultEntry>): Partial<VaultEntry> {2322  const nextPatch: Partial<VaultEntry> = {};23232324  if ("type" in patch) {2325    nextPatch.type = patch.type;2326  }23272328  if ("title" in patch) {2329    const title = patch.title?.trim() ?? "";2330    if (!title) throw new Error("title is required");2331    nextPatch.title = title;2332  }23332334  if ("url" in patch) {2335    nextPatch.url = patch.url?.trim() ?? "";2336  }23372338  if ("additionalUrls" in patch) {2339    const incoming = Array.isArray(patch.additionalUrls) ? patch.additionalUrls : [];2340    const seen = new Set<string>();2341    const cleaned: string[] = [];2342    for (const value of incoming) {2343      const trimmed = typeof value === "string" ? value.trim() : "";2344      if (!trimmed) continue;2345      const key = trimmed.toLowerCase();2346      if (seen.has(key)) continue;2347      seen.add(key);2348      cleaned.push(trimmed);2349    }2350    nextPatch.additionalUrls = cleaned.length > 0 ? cleaned : undefined;2351  }23522353  if ("username" in patch) {2354    nextPatch.username = patch.username?.trim() ?? "";2355  }23562357  if ("email" in patch) {2358    nextPatch.email = patch.email?.trim() || undefined;2359  }23602361  if ("password" in patch) {2362    const password = patch.password ?? "";2363    // Allow clearing a password (e.g. on passkey-only entries)2364    nextPatch.password = password || undefined;2365  }23662367  if ("totp" in patch) {2368    nextPatch.totp = patch.totp?.trim() || undefined;2369  }23702371  if ("notes" in patch) {2372    nextPatch.notes = patch.notes?.trim() || undefined;2373  }23742375  if ("breach" in patch) {2376    nextPatch.breach = patch.breach;2377  }23782379  if ("canary" in patch) {2380    // PCH-02-001: route update patches through the same canary whitelist used2381    // by add/restore/sync. Invalid shapes drop the canary; `undefined` clears it.2382    nextPatch.canary = patch.canary ? sanitizeCanary(patch.canary) : undefined;2383  }23842385  if ("passkey" in patch) {2386    // Passkey sub-object replaces all the legacy flat passkey fields. A2387    // patch with `passkey: undefined` removes the credential from the entry2388    // (used by "remove passkey" without deleting the whole entry).2389    if (patch.passkey === undefined || patch.passkey === null) {2390      nextPatch.passkey = undefined;2391    } else {2392      const sanitized = sanitizePasskey(patch.passkey);2393      if (!sanitized) throw new Error("invalid passkey credential");2394      nextPatch.passkey = sanitized;2395    }2396  }23972398  if ("tags" in patch) {2399    // PCH-02-001: bound tags exactly like both import funnels.2400    nextPatch.tags = sanitizeTags(patch.tags);2401  }24022403  if ("cardholderName" in patch) {2404    nextPatch.cardholderName = patch.cardholderName?.trim() || undefined;2405  }2406  if ("cardNumber" in patch) {2407    const n = patch.cardNumber ?? "";2408    nextPatch.cardNumber = n || undefined;2409  }2410  if ("expMonth" in patch) {2411    nextPatch.expMonth = patch.expMonth?.trim() || undefined;2412  }2413  if ("expYear" in patch) {2414    nextPatch.expYear = patch.expYear?.trim() || undefined;2415  }2416  if ("cvc" in patch) {2417    nextPatch.cvc = patch.cvc?.trim() || undefined;2418  }2419  if ("cardNickname" in patch) {2420    nextPatch.cardNickname = patch.cardNickname?.trim() || undefined;2421  }2422  if ("network" in patch) {2423    nextPatch.network = patch.network;2424  }2425  if ("last4" in patch) {2426    nextPatch.last4 = patch.last4?.trim() || undefined;2427  }24282429  return nextPatch;2430}24312432function normalizeEntry(entry: VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry): VaultEntry {2433  const createdAt = "createdAt" in entry ? entry.createdAt : entry.created;2434  const modifiedAt =2435    "modifiedAt" in entry ? entry.modifiedAt : entry.updated;24362437  const base: VaultEntry = {2438    id: entry.id,2439    type: "type" in entry ? entry.type : "login",2440    title: entry.title,2441    username: entry.username,2442    email: "email" in entry ? entry.email : undefined,2443    password: entry.password,2444    url: entry.url,2445    additionalUrls:2446      "additionalUrls" in entry && Array.isArray(entry.additionalUrls)2447        ? entry.additionalUrls2448        : undefined,2449    totp: entry.totp,2450    // PCH-01-019: carry TOTP params through the normalize/restore path too.2451    totpAlgorithm: entry.totpAlgorithm,2452    totpDigits: entry.totpDigits,2453    totpPeriod: entry.totpPeriod,2454    notes: entry.notes,2455    breach: entry.breach,2456    // Preserve the password-age clock across lock/unlock. Without this the2457    // field is dropped on every decode and the advanced-health "aged password"2458    // signal silently resets to createdAt on each unlock (SEV-2-A).2459    passwordChangedAt:2460      "passwordChangedAt" in entry ? entry.passwordChangedAt : undefined,2461    // Preserve past-password history across lock/unlock. normalizeEntry is a2462    // field whitelist, so an unlisted field is silently dropped on every decode2463    // (same class as the passwordChangedAt SEV-2-A above).2464    passwordHistory:2465      "passwordHistory" in entry && Array.isArray(entry.passwordHistory)2466        ? entry.passwordHistory2467        : undefined,2468    canary: "canary" in entry ? entry.canary : undefined,2469    passkey: "passkey" in entry ? entry.passkey : undefined,2470    createdAt,2471    modifiedAt,2472    deletedAt: entry.deletedAt,2473    tags: "tags" in entry ? entry.tags : undefined,2474    cardholderName: "cardholderName" in entry ? entry.cardholderName : undefined,2475    cardNumber: "cardNumber" in entry ? entry.cardNumber : undefined,2476    expMonth: "expMonth" in entry ? entry.expMonth : undefined,2477    expYear: "expYear" in entry ? entry.expYear : undefined,2478    cvc: "cvc" in entry ? entry.cvc : undefined,2479    cardNickname: "cardNickname" in entry ? entry.cardNickname : undefined,2480    network: "network" in entry ? entry.network : undefined,2481    last4: "last4" in entry ? entry.last4 : undefined,2482  };24832484  return migrateLegacyPasskey(base, entry);2485}24862487/**2488 * v2.11.0 read migration. Pre-v2.11.0 passkey entries used `type:"passkey"`2489 * with flat top-level fields (rpId, credentialId, etc.). This converts them2490 * to the new shape — `type:"login"` with a `passkey` sub-object — so all2491 * downstream consumers can rely on the new model. The result is rewritten2492 * to disk on next vault save (hasLegacyShape detects the un-migrated case).2493 */2494function migrateLegacyPasskey(2495  base: VaultEntry,2496  raw: VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry2497): VaultEntry {2498  if (base.passkey) return base;2499  const flat = raw as Partial<VaultEntry>;2500  const isPasskeyType = base.type === "passkey";2501  const hasFlatPasskeyFields =2502    typeof flat.rpId === "string" &&2503    typeof flat.credentialId === "string" &&2504    typeof flat.publicKeyCose === "string" &&2505    typeof flat.userHandle === "string" &&2506    typeof flat.userName === "string";2507  if (!isPasskeyType && !hasFlatPasskeyFields) return base;2508  if (!hasFlatPasskeyFields) return base;25092510  const algorithm: -7 | -8 = flat.algorithm === -8 ? -8 : -7;2511  base.passkey = {2512    rpId: flat.rpId!,2513    rpName: flat.rpName ?? flat.rpId!,2514    credentialId: flat.credentialId!,2515    publicKeyCose: flat.publicKeyCose!,2516    privateKeyJwk: flat.privateKeyJwk,2517    userHandle: flat.userHandle!,2518    userName: flat.userName!,2519    userDisplayName: flat.userDisplayName ?? flat.userName!,2520    algorithm,2521    signCount: flat.signCount ?? 0,2522    aaguid: flat.aaguid ?? "",2523    backupEligible: flat.backupEligible === true,2524    backupState: flat.backupState === true,2525    lastUsedAt: flat.lastUsedAt,2526    browser: flat.browser,2527    transports: flat.transports,2528    createdAt: base.createdAt,2529  };2530  // Promote to "login" so the unified Entry view renders. Username gets2531  // populated from the passkey's userName so the entry is searchable in the2532  // existing autofill flow without a separate code path.2533  if (isPasskeyType) base.type = "login";2534  if (!base.username) base.username = flat.userName;2535  if (!base.url) base.url = `https://${flat.rpId}`;2536  return base;2537}253825392540// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------2541// Deduplication2542// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------25432544function entryDupeKey(e: VaultEntry): string {2545  if (e.type === "note") return `note|${e.title.toLowerCase()}`;2546  // Passkey-bearing entries dedupe by the credential's RP + user. Two logins2547  // on different sites that happen to share a username are still distinct;2548  // two passkey credentials for the same RP+user are duplicates regardless2549  // of any login fields they may also carry.2550  if (e.passkey) {2551    return `passkey|${e.passkey.rpId.toLowerCase()}|${e.passkey.userName.toLowerCase()}`;2552  }2553  return `login|${e.title.toLowerCase()}|${(e.url ?? "").toLowerCase()}|${(e.username ?? "").toLowerCase()}`;2554}25552556/** Returns the number of duplicate entries (those that would be removed). */2557export function countDuplicates(): number {2558  const best = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();2559  let dupeCount = 0;2560  for (const e of entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt)) {2561    const key = entryDupeKey(e);2562    const existing = best.get(key);2563    if (!existing) {2564      best.set(key, e);2565    } else {2566      dupeCount++;2567      // Keep the more recently modified one in the map2568      if ((e.modifiedAt ?? e.createdAt ?? 0) > (existing.modifiedAt ?? existing.createdAt ?? 0)) {2569        best.set(key, e);2570      }2571    }2572  }2573  return dupeCount;2574}25752576/**2577 * Soft-deletes duplicate entries, keeping the most recently modified copy of2578 * each group. Returns the number of entries moved to trash.2579 */2580export async function deduplicateEntries(): Promise<number> {2581  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");2582  // Dedup reshapes slot B permanently under the decoy key, which is2583  // forensically distinguishable from a freshly-seeded decoy vault. Refuse.2584  if (vaultMode === "decoy") {2585    throw new Error("deduplicate disabled in decoy mode");2586  }25872588  const best = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();2589  for (const e of entries.filter((en) => !en.deletedAt)) {2590    const key = entryDupeKey(e);2591    const existing = best.get(key);2592    if (!existing) {2593      best.set(key, e);2594    } else if ((e.modifiedAt ?? e.createdAt ?? 0) > (existing.modifiedAt ?? existing.createdAt ?? 0)) {2595      best.set(key, e);2596    }2597  }25982599  const keepIds = new Set(Array.from(best.values()).map((e) => e.id));2600  let removed = 0;2601  entries = entries.map((e) => {2602    if (!e.deletedAt && !keepIds.has(e.id)) {2603      removed++;2604      return { ...e, deletedAt: monotonicEntryTimestamp(e.modifiedAt) };2605    }2606    return e;2607  });26082609  if (removed > 0) await persistEntries();2610  return removed;2611}26122613// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------2614// Vault history — snapshot BEFORE every vault write so the saved blob is2615// what is about to be lost, not what was just written. Capped at 5. The2616// stored blobs are AES-256-GCM ciphertext under the master password, so2617// history adds zero security surface.2618// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------26192620const HISTORY_KEY = "peach_vault_history";2621const HISTORY_MAX = 5;26222623// PCH-01-023: coarsen a live-entry count into a low-resolution bucket so the2624// plaintext snapshot field cannot reveal exact vault size or single-entry change2625// deltas. Buckets widen as the vault grows so absolute leakage stays roughly2626// proportional rather than exact.2627function bucketEntryCount(n: number): number {2628  if (n <= 0) return 0;2629  if (n <= 10) return 10;2630  if (n <= 25) return 25;2631  if (n <= 50) return 50;2632  if (n <= 100) return 100;2633  if (n <= 250) return 250;2634  if (n <= 500) return 500;2635  return Math.ceil(n / 500) * 500;2636}26372638/**2639 * Snapshot the CURRENT on-disk vault state into history. Call this BEFORE2640 * overwriting peach_vault_a so the saved blob captures the about-to-be-lost2641 * state. Identical-to-most-recent blobs are skipped to avoid filling history2642 * with no-op writes.2643 */2644export async function takeVaultSnapshot(2645  reason: VaultSnapshot["reason"],2646): Promise<void> {2647  try {2648    const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get([SLOT_A, SLOT_B, HISTORY_KEY]);2649    const slotA = (raw as Record<string, StoredVault | undefined>)[SLOT_A];2650    const slotB = (raw as Record<string, StoredVault | undefined>)[SLOT_B];26512652    // Nothing to snapshot if the real slot doesn't exist yet (fresh install,2653    // pre-createVault). createVault skips snapshots intentionally — there is2654    // no prior state to preserve.2655    if (!slotA) return;26562657    const vault_a = JSON.stringify(slotA);2658    const vault_b = JSON.stringify(slotB ?? slotA);26592660    // Best-effort entry count: only meaningful when the in-memory state is2661    // unlocked AND in real mode. Decoy mode would leak the decoy entry2662    // count; locked mode has no entries to count. Both fall through to null.2663    // PCH-01-023: store a coarse bucket, not the exact count — chrome.storage2664    // .local sits next to the AES-GCM blobs in plaintext, so an exact count would2665    // leak vault size and per-write deltas (the metadata padding hides this).2666    let entryCount: number | null = null;2667    if (derivedKey && vaultMode === "real") {2668      try {2669        entryCount = bucketEntryCount(entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt).length);2670      } catch {2671        entryCount = null;2672      }2673    }26742675    const existingRaw = (raw as Record<string, VaultHistory | undefined>)[HISTORY_KEY];2676    const history: VaultHistory = existingRaw && Array.isArray(existingRaw.snapshots)2677      ? existingRaw2678      : { snapshots: [] };26792680    // Deduplication: if the most recent snapshot has byte-identical blobs,2681    // skip — saves the same vault N times in a row would otherwise burn the2682    // entire history window with no recovery value.2683    const latest = history.snapshots[0];2684    if (latest && latest.vault_a === vault_a && latest.vault_b === vault_b) {2685      return;2686    }26872688    const snapshot: VaultSnapshot = {2689      id: crypto.randomUUID(),2690      savedAt: Date.now(),2691      reason,2692      vault_a,2693      vault_b,2694      entryCount,2695    };26962697    history.snapshots = [snapshot, ...history.snapshots].slice(0, HISTORY_MAX);2698    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [HISTORY_KEY]: history });2699  } catch (err) {2700    // Non-fatal — history must never block a save. A failed snapshot just2701    // means the user loses one rung of the safety ladder for this write.2702    // M4/QUA-006: log so the failure is visible; if it looks like a quota2703    // problem, notify the popup so the user can prune history themselves.2704    console.warn('[Peach] takeVaultSnapshot failed:', err);2705    if (String(err).includes('QUOTA') || String(err).includes('quota')) {2706      try {2707        await chrome.runtime.sendMessage({ type: 'VAULT_STORAGE_QUOTA_WARNING' });2708      } catch {2709        // popup may be closed; surfaced via console.warn above2710      }2711    }2712  }2713}27142715/** Wipe all vault history. Called by Panic / DESTROY_VAULT. */2716export async function clearVaultHistory(): Promise<void> {2717  try {2718    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [HISTORY_KEY]: { snapshots: [] } satisfies VaultHistory });2719  } catch {2720    // Non-fatal — DESTROY_VAULT also runs storage.local.clear().2721  }2722}27232724/** Read all snapshots, newest first, for the Settings vault history view. */2725export async function getVaultHistory(): Promise<VaultSnapshot[]> {2726  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get(HISTORY_KEY);2727  const history = (raw as Record<string, VaultHistory | undefined>)[HISTORY_KEY];2728  if (!history || !Array.isArray(history.snapshots)) return [];2729  return history.snapshots;2730}27312732/**2733 * Replace the on-disk vault with the chosen snapshot's blobs and lock the2734 * vault. The current state is itself snapshotted with reason 'restore' first2735 * so the restore is reversible. After this returns, the user must unlock2736 * with the password that matches the restored blob.2737 */2738export async function restoreVaultSnapshot(2739  snapshotId: string,2740): Promise<{ ok: true } | { ok: false; error: string }> {2741  const history = await getVaultHistory();2742  const snapshot = history.find((s) => s.id === snapshotId);2743  if (!snapshot) return { ok: false, error: "snapshot_not_found" };27442745  // Snapshot the about-to-be-replaced current state so the restore is2746  // reversible. takeVaultSnapshot is no-op when the most recent entry is2747  // byte-identical, so a restore-of-a-restore stays clean.2748  await takeVaultSnapshot("restore");27492750  let restoredA: StoredVault;2751  let restoredB: StoredVault;2752  try {2753    restoredA = JSON.parse(snapshot.vault_a) as StoredVault;2754    restoredB = JSON.parse(snapshot.vault_b) as StoredVault;2755  } catch {2756    return { ok: false, error: "snapshot_corrupt" };2757  }27582759  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, restoredA);2760  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, restoredB);2761  await stampLocalVaultMutation();27622763  // Lock so the user must prove they can decrypt the restored blob. If they2764  // restored a pre-password-change snapshot they discover it immediately at2765  // the lock screen rather than silently holding an inaccessible vault.2766  lock();27672768  return { ok: true };2769}27702771/**2772 * Rotate the vault's sync identity by generating a FRESH ROOT KEY and2773 * re-wrapping everything under it (MV-8). Because every sync credential —2774 * vault_id, the Noise XX static keypair, the Ed25519 manifest signing key,2775 * and the per-entry envelope keys — derives from the root key, rotation2776 * makes a lost/stolen device's retained key material useless. All paired2777 * devices must re-pair afterwards.2778 *2779 * CONSEQUENCE THE UI MUST SURFACE: the 12 recovery words also derive from2780 * the root key, so rotation INVALIDATES the old recovery phrase. The flow2781 * sets peach_recovery_pending so the popup re-presents the new words for2782 * confirmation, same as the migrateToRecovery rotate path.2783 */2784export async function rotateSyncIdentity(): Promise<{ ok: boolean; error?: string }> {2785  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {2786    return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };2787  }2788  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);2789  if (!slotA) return { ok: false, error: "missing_slot_a" };27902791  // 1. Fresh root key + recovery escrow (new words).2792  const { rawRootKey, recoverySalt, wrappedRootKey, wrappedNonce, wrappedTag } =2793    await generateAndWrapRootKey();27942795  // 2. Re-wrap the new root key under the current password-derived key.2796  const newRootKey = unhex(rawRootKey);2797  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(derivedKey, newRootKey);27982799  // 3. Snapshot, then single atomic slot write — both escrow wrappings of2800  //    the new root key land together (same transactional rule as2801  //    changePassword). Entries are untouched: they are sealed under the2802  //    password-derived key, not the root key.2803  await takeVaultSnapshot("local_save");2804  const nextSlotA: StoredVault = {2805    ...slotA,2806    recovery_salt: recoverySalt,2807    recovery_wrapped_root_key: wrappedRootKey,2808    recovery_nonce: wrappedNonce,2809    recovery_tag: wrappedTag,2810    ...pwRoot,2811  };2812  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, nextSlotA);28132814  // 4. Swap in memory only after disk committed.2815  if (rootKey) zeroKey(rootKey);2816  rootKey = newRootKey;28172818  // 5. Old peers' identities derive from the dead root key — drop them all.2819  const { clearPairedDevices } = await import("./paired-devices");2820  await clearPairedDevices();28212822  // 6. Force re-presentation of the NEW recovery words on next popup view.2823  await setRecoveryConfirmPending(); // same flag the create-vault flow uses28242825  await stampLocalVaultMutation();2826  return { ok: true };2827}28282829/**2830 * Change the master password. Re-encrypts slot A with a fresh salt + new2831 * derived key. Slot B (duress or noise) is left untouched when duress is2832 * configured — it uses an independent key derived from the duress password —2833 * and regenerated as noise when duress is not configured.2834 */2835export async function changePassword(2836  currentPassword: string,2837  newPassword: string2838): Promise<boolean> {2839  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") return false;28402841  // Verify current password before allowing any change2842  const valid = await verifyMainPassword(currentPassword);2843  if (!valid) return false;28442845  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);2846  if (!slotA) return false;2847  if (!rootKey) return false;28482849  // Derive fresh key from new password + new random salt2850  const newSalt = generateSalt();2851  const newKey = await deriveKey(newPassword, newSalt);28522853  // Re-encrypt the in-memory entries with the new key2854  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured, duressConfigured ? DURESS_SLOT_SIZE : 0);2855  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(newKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");28562857  // Pre-wrap root key under the new derived key. Recovery fields wrap rootKey2858  // under recovery words and remain untouched — recovery phrase keeps working2859  // across password changes (H4/COR-002).2860  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(newKey, rootKey);28612862  const finalSlotA: StoredVault = {2863    ...slotA,2864    salt: hex(newSalt),2865    nonce,2866    ciphertext,2867    tag,2868    ...pwRoot,2869  };28702871  // Snapshot the OLD-key blob before overwriting it. If the user later2872  // restores from this snapshot they will need the OLD password — the2873  // post-restore lock surfaces that immediately.2874  await takeVaultSnapshot("local_save");28752876  // Single atomic write: ciphertext, salt, and pw_root_* fields all land in2877  // one storage transaction. An SW kill before this point leaves the old2878  // slot intact; after this point everything tied to the new password is2879  // already on disk together (M6/COR-004).2880  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, finalSlotA);28812882  // Swap the in-memory key synchronously before any further await. If we2883  // threw between the Slot A write and this swap, the next persistEntries()2884  // would overwrite Slot A with old-key ciphertext, locking the user out.2885  zeroKey(derivedKey);2886  derivedKey = newKey;28872888  // PCH-01-008: the MV3 session escrow still holds the OLD key. Without this,2889  // the next service-worker restore decrypts the new-key Slot A with the stale2890  // key, fails tryDecryptSlotResult, and silently drops the user to a lock2891  // screen. Re-escrow the new key so restore survives a password change.2892  void saveSessionKey(newKey, "real");28932894  // Regenerate noise for slot B when duress is not in use. Runs after the2895  // key swap so a failure here is a disposable noise regeneration, not a2896  // lockout.2897  if (!duressConfigured) {2898    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2));2899  }2900  await stampLocalVaultMutation();29012902  return true;2903}