vault.ts

1/**2 * vault.ts — sole owner of vault state and chrome.storage vault keys.3 *4 * Every read/write of `peach_vault_a`, `peach_vault_b`, and `peach_settings`5 * goes through this module. No other file accesses those keys directly.6 * External callers reach vault operations via `messages.ts` — never by7 * importing from here cross-boundary (popup/content must not). Invariants8 * for the two-slot schema, unlock timing, and key/disk atomicity are in9 * Projects.md §3.2–§3.6.10 */1112import { deriveKey, generateSalt } from "../crypto/argon2";13import { extractDomain } from "../shared/domain";14import {15  rootKeyToWords,16  wordsToRootKeyMaterial,17  deriveRecoveryKey,18} from "../shared/recovery-words";19import type {20  AccentColorName,21  LegacyVaultEntry,22  ManualSummonRecord,23  SavedIdentity,24  StoredVault,25  VaultEntry,26  VaultHistory,27  VaultSnapshot,28} from "../shared/types";29import { decrypt, encrypt, zeroKey } from "./aes";30import { clearAutoLock, touchAutoLock } from "./alarms";3132type EntryDraft = Omit<33  VaultEntry,34  "id" | "createdAt" | "modifiedAt" | "deletedAt"35>;3637// Slot-neutral storage keys (v1.4.24+). Both slots always exist; slot B38// either holds the decoy vault (when duress is configured) or random noise39// that looks identical at rest. No external indicator is stored — duress40// configuration is recorded only inside the encrypted payload of slot A.41const SLOT_A = "peach_vault_a";42const SLOT_B = "peach_vault_b";4344// Legacy keys, migrated away on first access.45const LEGACY_MAIN = "peach_vault";46const LEGACY_DECOY = "peach_decoy_vault";47const LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG = "peach_duress";4849// Plaintext is padded to the next multiple of this size before encryption.50// This coarsens ciphertext-length leakage into 1 KiB buckets.51const PAD_BLOCK = 1024;5253let derivedKey: Uint8Array | null = null;54// 32-byte random root key, separate from the derivedKey used for vault encryption.55// The root key is wrapped (encrypted) under the recovery key derived from the56// 12-word phrase. When the user changes their password, only the wrapping changes;57// the root key and recovery words remain stable.58let rootKey: Uint8Array | null = null;59let entries: VaultEntry[] = [];60let domainIndex: Map<string, VaultEntry[]> = new Map();61let vaultMode: "real" | "decoy" = "real";62// Cached post-unlock view of whether the real vault records that duress is63// configured. Only meaningful after a real-mode unlock; for decoy-mode unlock64// this stays false because we never see slot A's plaintext.65let duressConfigured = false;6667let migrationRan = false;6869// Set to a corruption reason during the last unlock() attempt when both slots70// decrypted but failed schema validation. Consumed and cleared by71// consumeLastUnlockFailureReason() so messages.ts can surface vault_corrupted72// distinctly from wrong-password (M7/COR-007).73//74// NOTE: module-level state — if vault.ts is ever moved to a worker context,75// this must be replaced with a structured return value from unlock() or a76// postMessage channel. The signal is invisible across module-instance77// boundaries.78let lastUnlockFailureReason: string | null = null;7980export function consumeLastUnlockFailureReason(): string | null {81  const r = lastUnlockFailureReason;82  lastUnlockFailureReason = null;83  return r;84}8586// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------87// Settings (persisted inside the encrypted vault store as a sidecar key)88// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------8990export type TextSize = "small" | "medium" | "large";9192export interface VaultSettings {93  accentColor?: AccentColorName;94  theme?: "dark" | "light";95  autoLockMinutes?: number;96  clipboardClearSeconds?: number;97  lockOnClose?: boolean;98  breachMonitoring?: boolean;99  passkeyProviderEnabled?: boolean;100  trashRetentionDays?: number;101  manualSummonDomains?: Record<string, ManualSummonRecord>;102  declinedCardFingerprints?: string[];103  /**104   * Text size scale for body copy and entry titles. Stops at "large" by105   * design — XL clips dense screens (Vault, Health) inside the fixed106   * 330×480 popup surface.107   */108  textSize?: TextSize;109  /**110   * When true, all entrance/exit transitions and ambient animations are111   * collapsed to instant. Honoured alongside the user's OS-level112   * `prefers-reduced-motion`.113   */114  reduceMotion?: boolean;115  /**116   * Android-only: when true, the master key is escrowed in AndroidKeyStore117   * and the lock screen offers biometric unlock. Toggled from Settings →118   * Security → Biometrics. Has no effect on desktop builds.119   */120  biometricsEnabled?: boolean;121  /**122   * User overrides for keyboard shortcuts. Keys are ShortcutAction names123   * (see src/shared/shortcuts.ts). Missing actions fall through to124   * DEFAULT_BINDINGS — `getActiveBindings(settings.shortcuts)` is the125   * canonical lookup. Storing only the deltas keeps the vault payload126   * small and lets default updates land for users who never rebind.127   */128  shortcuts?: Record<string, { key: string; ctrl?: boolean; meta?: boolean; shift?: boolean; alt?: boolean }>;129}130131let settings: VaultSettings = {};132133export function getSettings(): VaultSettings {134  return settings;135}136137export async function ensureSettingsLoaded(): Promise<VaultSettings> {138  await loadSettings();139  return settings;140}141142export async function updateSettings(patch: Partial<VaultSettings>): Promise<void> {143  await loadSettings();144  settings = { ...settings, ...patch };145  await persistSettings();146}147148async function persistSettings(): Promise<void> {149  try {150    await chrome.storage.local.set({ peach_settings: settings });151  } catch (err) {152    throw mapStorageError(err);153  }154}155156function mapStorageError(err: unknown): Error {157  const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);158  if (/QUOTA_BYTES|quota/i.test(message)) {159    return new Error("STORAGE_QUOTA_EXCEEDED");160  }161  return err instanceof Error ? err : new Error(message);162}163164async function loadSettings(): Promise<void> {165  const result = await chrome.storage.local.get("peach_settings");166  settings = (result as { peach_settings?: VaultSettings }).peach_settings ?? {};167}168169// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------170// HIBP breach check (k-anonymity model)171// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------172173export async function checkBreach(password: string): Promise<number> {174  // HIBP k-anonymity API is keyed on SHA-1 prefixes — this is dictated by175  // the public API, not a security choice. Do not migrate to SHA-256 here.176  const encoder = new TextEncoder();177  const hashBuffer = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-1", encoder.encode(password));178  const hashHex = Array.from(new Uint8Array(hashBuffer))179    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))180    .join("")181    .toUpperCase();182183  const prefix = hashHex.slice(0, 5);184  const suffix = hashHex.slice(5);185186  try {187    const res = await fetch(`https://api.pwnedpasswords.com/range/${prefix}`);188    if (!res.ok) return 0;189    const text = await res.text();190    const match = text.split("\r\n").find((l) => l.startsWith(suffix));191    return match ? parseInt(match.split(":")[1], 10) : 0;192  } catch {193    return 0; // Network unavailable — don't block194  }195}196197export async function declineCardSaveOffer(last4: string, expMonth: string, expYear: string): Promise<void> {198  const fingerprint = await cardFingerprint(last4, expMonth, expYear);199  await loadSettings();200  settings = {201    ...settings,202    declinedCardFingerprints: [...(settings.declinedCardFingerprints ?? []), fingerprint],203  };204  await persistSettings();205}206207export async function isCardDeclined(last4: string, expMonth: string, expYear: string): Promise<boolean> {208  await loadSettings();209  const fingerprint = await cardFingerprint(last4, expMonth, expYear);210  return (settings.declinedCardFingerprints ?? []).includes(fingerprint);211}212213async function cardFingerprint(last4: string, expMonth: string, expYear: string): Promise<string> {214  const encoder = new TextEncoder();215  const buf = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", encoder.encode(`${last4}|${expMonth}|${expYear}`));216  return Array.from(new Uint8Array(buf).slice(0, 8))217    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))218    .join("");219}220221function hex(buf: Uint8Array): string {222  return Array.from(buf)223    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))224    .join("");225}226227function unhex(s: string): Uint8Array {228  const out = new Uint8Array(s.length / 2);229  for (let i = 0; i < s.length; i += 2) {230    out[i / 2] = parseInt(s.slice(i, i + 2), 16);231  }232  return out;233}234235// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------236// Root key generation and recovery word wrapping237// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------238239/**240 * Generate a random 32-byte root key and wrap it (AES-256-GCM) under a key241 * derived from the recovery word material via HKDF-SHA256. The wrapped blob242 * fields are stored in slot A alongside the password-wrapped ciphertext. The243 * root key itself is kept in memory for the session so getRecoveryWords() can244 * encode it without re-deriving.245 */246async function generateAndWrapRootKey(): Promise<{247  rawRootKey: string; // hex of the plaintext root key — caller stores in rootKey248  recoverySalt: string;249  wrappedRootKey: string;250  wrappedNonce: string;251  wrappedTag: string;252}> {253  const rootKeyBytes = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32));254255  // Derive the recovery key from the BIP39 words encoding of the root key.256  const words = await rootKeyToWords(rootKeyBytes);257  const wordMaterial = await wordsToRootKeyMaterial(words);258  const recoverySalt = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));259  const recoveryKey = await deriveRecoveryKey(wordMaterial, recoverySalt);260261  // Wrap the root key with the recovery key using AES-256-GCM directly.262  // We hex-encode rootKeyBytes so the plaintext is always valid UTF-8.263  const nonce = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));264  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(hex(rootKeyBytes));265  const raw = await crypto.subtle.encrypt(266    {267      name: "AES-GCM",268      iv: nonce,269      additionalData: new Uint8Array([1]).buffer as ArrayBuffer,270      tagLength: 128,271    },272    recoveryKey,273    encoded274  );275  // WebCrypto returns ciphertext || auth tag concatenated; split them.276  const rawU8 = new Uint8Array(raw);277  const ciphertext = hex(rawU8.slice(0, rawU8.length - 16));278  const tag = hex(rawU8.slice(rawU8.length - 16));279280  return {281    rawRootKey: hex(rootKeyBytes),282    recoverySalt: hex(recoverySalt),283    wrappedRootKey: ciphertext,284    wrappedNonce: hex(nonce),285    wrappedTag: tag,286  };287}288289/**290 * Unwrap the root key using recovery words. Called during recovery flow when291 * the user provides their 12-word phrase and a new password.292 * Exported for use by the RECOVER_WITH_WORDS message handler.293 */294export async function unwrapRootKeyForRecovery(295  wrappedRootKey: string,296  wrappedNonce: string,297  wrappedTag: string,298  recoverySaltHex: string,299  words: string[]300): Promise<void> {301  const wordMaterial = await wordsToRootKeyMaterial(words);302  const recoverySalt = unhex(recoverySaltHex);303  const recoveryKey = await deriveRecoveryKey(wordMaterial, recoverySalt);304305  // Decrypt and cache the root key. The root key bytes were hex-encoded before306  // encryption so the ciphertext is valid UTF-8. We inline the AES-GCM decrypt307  // here to avoid passing a CryptoKey to the string-based encrypt/decrypt helpers.308  // Each component is stored separately in the vault slot; decode them individually309  // so the nonce is always exactly the 12 bytes from wrappedNonce.310  const nonceRaw = unhex(wrappedNonce);311  const ciphertextRaw = unhex(wrappedRootKey);312  const tagRaw = unhex(wrappedTag);313  // Combine ciphertext and tag for AES-GCM (expects ciphertext||tag).314  // Use explicit ArrayBuffer allocations to satisfy TS BufferSource constraints.315  const nonceU8 = nonceRaw as unknown as Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>;316  const combined = new Uint8Array(ciphertextRaw.length + tagRaw.length);317  combined.set(ciphertextRaw, 0);318  combined.set(tagRaw, ciphertextRaw.length);319  const raw = await crypto.subtle.decrypt(320    { name: "AES-GCM", iv: nonceU8, additionalData: new Uint8Array([1]).buffer as ArrayBuffer, tagLength: 128 },321    recoveryKey,322    combined323  );324  const decryptedHex = new TextDecoder().decode(raw);325  rootKey = unhex(decryptedHex);326}327328/**329 * Re-wrap the cached root key under a new derived key (from the user's new330 * password). Called after password change and after recovery re-key so the331 * same recovery words continue to work with the updated password — and so332 * subsequent unlocks can rehydrate rootKey via deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey.333 *334 * recovery_* fields are intentionally not touched: those wrap rootKey under335 * the recovery words, which do not change when the password changes.336 */337export async function rewrapRootKeyForPassword(338  newDerivedKey: Uint8Array,339  _newSalt: Uint8Array340): Promise<void> {341  if (!rootKey) throw new Error("root key not set");342  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);343  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");344  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(newDerivedKey, rootKey);345  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, { ...slotA, ...pwRoot });346}347348/**349 * Change the vault encryption to a new derived key (already derived from350 * the user's new password). Used by RECOVER_WITH_WORDS and changePassword.351 * Caller is responsible for key swap and snapshot.352 */353async function reencryptVaultForNewKey(354  newKey: Uint8Array,355  slotA: StoredVault356): Promise<void> {357  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured);358  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(newKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");359  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, {360    ...slotA,361    nonce,362    ciphertext,363    tag,364  });365}366367/**368 * Full password change with an already-derived key (used after recovery).369 * Unlike changePassword(), this skips re-verification of current password370 * since recovery flow has already validated the user's identity via words.371 */372export async function changePasswordWithNewKey(373  newSalt: Uint8Array,374  newKey: Uint8Array375): Promise<void> {376  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);377  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");378  // reencryptVaultForNewKey must receive the updated salt so that subsequent379  // UNLOCK calls with the new password can re-derive the correct key.380  await reencryptVaultForNewKey(newKey, { ...slotA, salt: hex(newSalt) });381  if (derivedKey) zeroKey(derivedKey);382  derivedKey = newKey;383  // Refresh pw_root_* under the new key so deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey works384  // on the next unlock (H2/COR-006). If rootKey is missing — recovery flow385  // should have populated it — fall back silently rather than blowing up the386  // recovery path; migrateToRecovery will rehydrate on the next unlock.387  if (rootKey) {388    const slotAfter = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);389    if (slotAfter) {390      const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(newKey, rootKey);391      await writeSlot(SLOT_A, { ...slotAfter, ...pwRoot });392    }393  }394  if (!duressConfigured) {395    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(slotA.ciphertext.length / 2));396  }397  await stampLocalVaultMutation();398}399400// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------401// Salt generation --- exported so the RECOVER_WITH_WORDS handler can derive402// a new key after password reset without re-importing the crypto module.403// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------404405export { deriveKey, generateSalt };406407export async function loadSlotA(): Promise<StoredVault | null> {408  return loadSlot(SLOT_A);409}410411/**412 * Recover the session root key by AES-GCM-decrypting the pw_root_* fields413 * (a second wrapping of the root key under the password-derived key). This414 * is what makes GET_RECOVERY_WORDS work across lock/unlock cycles without415 * the user re-entering their recovery phrase: the same root key bytes —416 * and therefore the same 12 words — survive every unlock.417 *418 * Returns null when the pw_root fields are absent (pre-v2.12 vault that419 * hasn't been migrated yet) or when decryption fails (wrong derived key,420 * tampered ciphertext). On null the caller should fall through to421 * migrateToRecovery() to populate the fields.422 */423async function deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(424  derivedKeyBytes: Uint8Array,425  slotA: StoredVault,426): Promise<Uint8Array | null> {427  if (!slotA.pw_root_ciphertext || !slotA.pw_root_nonce || !slotA.pw_root_tag) {428    return null;429  }430  try {431    const rootHex = await decrypt(432      derivedKeyBytes,433      slotA.pw_root_nonce,434      slotA.pw_root_ciphertext,435      slotA.pw_root_tag,436      "pw_root_v1",437    );438    return unhex(rootHex);439  } catch {440    return null;441  }442}443444// AES-GCM-wrap rootKey under derivedKey for the pw_root_* fields. Returns the445// hex-encoded ciphertext/nonce/tag triple ready to embed in StoredVault.446async function wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(447  derivedKeyBytes: Uint8Array,448  rootKeyBytes: Uint8Array,449): Promise<{ pw_root_ciphertext: string; pw_root_nonce: string; pw_root_tag: string }> {450  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKeyBytes, hex(rootKeyBytes), "pw_root_v1");451  return {452    pw_root_ciphertext: ciphertext,453    pw_root_nonce: nonce,454    pw_root_tag: tag,455  };456}457458/**459 * For vaults created before v2.12 (no recovery_salt/recovery_wrapped_root_key),460 * generate the root key, wrap it under the recovery words, and persist the461 * recovery escrow into slot A. The caller must show the recovery words to the462 * user before calling this — once called, those words are the vault's recovery463 * path. This runs once, on the first unlock of an upgraded vault.464 */465export async function migrateToRecovery(): Promise<void> {466  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {467    throw new Error("vault must be unlocked in real mode");468  }469  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);470  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");471  const hasRecoveryEscrow =472    !!slotA.recovery_salt && !!slotA.recovery_wrapped_root_key;473  const hasPwRoot = !!slotA.pw_root_ciphertext && !!slotA.pw_root_nonce;474  if (hasRecoveryEscrow && hasPwRoot) return; // already done475476  // If recovery escrow already exists but pw_root doesn't, we cannot recover477  // the original rootKey without the user's words. The least-surprising path478  // is to rotate to a fresh root key — the user's old recovery words become479  // invalid but we surface peach_recovery_pending so the popup re-presents480  // the words. The unlock-path callers all set that flag.481  const { rawRootKey, recoverySalt, wrappedRootKey, wrappedNonce, wrappedTag } =482    await generateAndWrapRootKey();483  rootKey = unhex(rawRootKey);484485  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(derivedKey, rootKey);486  const nextSlotA: StoredVault = {487    ...slotA,488    recovery_salt: recoverySalt,489    recovery_wrapped_root_key: wrappedRootKey,490    recovery_nonce: wrappedNonce,491    recovery_tag: wrappedTag,492    ...pwRoot,493  };494  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, nextSlotA);495  await stampLocalVaultMutation();496}497498/**499 * Returns the 12 recovery words for the current session's root key.500 * Must be called while the vault is unlocked. Throws if recovery has not501 * been set up (pre-v2.12 vault that hasn't migrated yet).502 */503export async function getRecoveryWords(): Promise<string[]> {504  if (!rootKey) {505    throw new Error("recovery not set up — vault may need migration");506  }507  return rootKeyToWords(rootKey);508}509510async function loadSlot(key: string): Promise<StoredVault | null> {511  const result = await chrome.storage.local.get(key);512  return (result as Record<string, StoredVault | undefined>)[key] ?? null;513}514515async function writeSlot(key: string, vault: StoredVault): Promise<void> {516  try {517    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [key]: vault });518  } catch (err) {519    throw mapStorageError(err);520  }521}522523async function stampLocalVaultMutation(): Promise<void> {524  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get("peach_last_modified_at");525  const previous = Number(526    (raw as Record<string, unknown>).peach_last_modified_at,527  );528  const next = Math.max(529    Date.now(),530    Number.isFinite(previous) ? previous + 1 : 0,531  );532  await chrome.storage.local.set({533    peach_last_modified_at: String(next),534  });535}536537/**538 * One-shot migration from the pre-A-2 schema (peach_vault + peach_decoy_vault539 * + peach_duress flag) to the slot-neutral schema (peach_vault_a +540 * peach_vault_b). Runs at most once per session; safe to call repeatedly.541 */542async function ensureMigrated(): Promise<void> {543  if (migrationRan) return;544  migrationRan = true;545546  const keys = [LEGACY_MAIN, LEGACY_DECOY, LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG, SLOT_A, SLOT_B];547  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get(keys);548  const slotAExists = raw[SLOT_A] !== undefined;549  const slotBExists = raw[SLOT_B] !== undefined;550  const legacyMain = raw[LEGACY_MAIN] as StoredVault | undefined;551  const legacyDecoy = raw[LEGACY_DECOY] as StoredVault | undefined;552553  // Fresh install with nothing in storage — nothing to do; createVault() sets up both slots.554  if (!slotAExists && !legacyMain) return;555556  // Already migrated.557  if (slotAExists && slotBExists && !legacyMain && !legacyDecoy) return;558559  let didMigrate = false;560  if (legacyMain && !slotAExists) {561    await writeSlot(SLOT_A, legacyMain);562    didMigrate = true;563  }564565  // If slot B isn't set, populate it: use legacy decoy when present, else noise.566  if (!slotBExists) {567    const target = (legacyMain ?? raw[SLOT_A]) as StoredVault | undefined;568    if (legacyDecoy) {569      await writeSlot(SLOT_B, legacyDecoy);570      didMigrate = true;571    } else if (target) {572      await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(target.ciphertext.length / 2));573      didMigrate = true;574    }575  }576577  const toRemove: string[] = [];578  if (legacyMain) toRemove.push(LEGACY_MAIN);579  if (legacyDecoy) toRemove.push(LEGACY_DECOY);580  if (raw[LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG] !== undefined) toRemove.push(LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG);581  if (toRemove.length > 0) {582    await chrome.storage.local.remove(toRemove);583    didMigrate = true;584  }585  if (didMigrate) {586    await stampLocalVaultMutation();587  }588}589590// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------591// Padding + noise helpers592// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------593594/**595 * Pads the plaintext string with trailing spaces so that the encoded byte596 * length is a multiple of PAD_BLOCK. JSON.parse tolerates trailing597 * whitespace after a complete document, so the padding is transparent on598 * decode. Ciphertext length equals plaintext length plus a 16-byte tag.599 */600function padPlaintext(json: string): string {601  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(json);602  const target = Math.max(PAD_BLOCK, Math.ceil(encoded.length / PAD_BLOCK) * PAD_BLOCK);603  const padLen = target - encoded.length;604  return json + " ".repeat(padLen);605}606607/**608 * Produces a StoredVault-shaped record filled with CSPRNG bytes. The609 * ciphertext length matches the given byte count. Because GCM ciphertext is610 * pseudo-random, this blob is indistinguishable at rest from a real611 * encrypted vault without the key.612 *613 * crypto.getRandomValues() caps each call at 65536 bytes (the Web Crypto614 * spec hard limit). Chunk the fill so vaults larger than that — common once615 * the user has dozens of entries or any passkey — don't throw.616 */617const CSPRNG_CHUNK = 65_536;618619function fillRandom(buf: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {620  for (let offset = 0; offset < buf.length; offset += CSPRNG_CHUNK) {621    const end = Math.min(offset + CSPRNG_CHUNK, buf.length);622    const chunk = new Uint8Array(end - offset);623    crypto.getRandomValues(chunk);624    buf.set(chunk, offset);625  }626  return buf;627}628629function generateNoiseBlob(ciphertextBytes: number): StoredVault {630  const salt = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));631  const nonce = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));632  const cipher = fillRandom(new Uint8Array(ciphertextBytes));633  const tag = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));634  return {635    version: 1,636    salt: hex(salt),637    nonce: hex(nonce),638    ciphertext: hex(cipher),639    tag: hex(tag),640  };641}642643// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------644// Encrypted plaintext envelope645// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------646647type VaultPayload = {648  entries: VaultEntry[];649  duressConfigured?: boolean;650};651652type DecryptedPayload = {653  entries: VaultEntry[];654  duressConfigured: boolean;655  /**656   * True when at least one entry in the on-disk payload had a legacy shape657   * (pre-v2.11.0 passkey type/flat fields, or pre-A-2 created/updated keys)658   * and got rewritten by normalizeEntry. The unlock path uses this to659   * persist the new shape immediately — without it, the migration would660   * re-run on every unlock and old shape never disappears from disk.661   */662  migratedFromLegacy: boolean;663};664665function encodePayload(entries: VaultEntry[], duress: boolean): string {666  const envelope: VaultPayload = { entries, duressConfigured: duress };667  return padPlaintext(JSON.stringify(envelope));668}669670function rawNeedsMigration(raw: VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry): boolean {671  if ("created" in raw || "updated" in raw) return true;672  const flat = raw as Partial<VaultEntry>;673  if (flat.type === "passkey") return true;674  // Flat rpId without a passkey sub-object means pre-v2.11.0 schema.675  if (flat.rpId !== undefined && flat.passkey === undefined) return true;676  return false;677}678679function decodePayload(plain: string): DecryptedPayload {680  const parsed = JSON.parse(plain) as681    | Array<VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry>682    | VaultPayload;683684  const rawEntries = Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed : parsed.entries ?? [];685  const flatMigrationNeeded = rawEntries.some(rawNeedsMigration);686687  const normalized = rawEntries.map(normalizeEntry);688  const { merged } = mergePasskeyOnlyIntoLogins(normalized);689690  if (Array.isArray(parsed)) {691    return {692      entries: normalized,693      duressConfigured: false,694      migratedFromLegacy: true, // pre-A-2 array shape always needs save695    };696  }697698  return {699    entries: normalized,700    duressConfigured: parsed.duressConfigured === true,701    migratedFromLegacy: flatMigrationNeeded || merged,702  };703}704705/**706 * One-time consolidation pass run alongside the legacy passkey migration.707 *708 * Pre-v2.11.0 the Chrome passkey path always created a fresh `type:"passkey"`709 * entry per registration — so users who tested registration multiple times710 * accumulated several passkey-bearing entries for the same RP, and the711 * migration to the unified shape carried that duplication forward. This712 * pass collapses the duplicates:713 *714 *   1. Group passkey-bearing (and not deleted) entries by `passkey.rpId`.715 *   2. Within each group, the most recently-active credential wins (prefer716 *      lastUsedAt, fall back to passkey.createdAt, fall back to modifiedAt).717 *   3. If a NON-passkey login entry exists for that RP (matched by url or718 *      additionalUrls hostname), attach the winning passkey to it and719 *      soft-delete every passkey-bearing entry in the group.720 *   4. Otherwise, soft-delete every loser in the group, keeping the winner721 *      as a passkey-only entry.722 *723 * Soft delete (deletedAt) rather than splice — the trash flow keeps the724 * record around for retention and the user can restore if the heuristic725 * picked wrong. The `merged` flag goes back to decodePayload so the726 * unlock path persists the consolidated shape immediately.727 */728function mergePasskeyOnlyIntoLogins(entries: VaultEntry[]): { merged: boolean } {729  let merged = false;730  const now = Date.now();731732  const candidates = entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt && e.passkey);733  const byRpId = new Map<string, VaultEntry[]>();734  for (const e of candidates) {735    const rpId = e.passkey!.rpId;736    const list = byRpId.get(rpId);737    if (list) list.push(e);738    else byRpId.set(rpId, [e]);739  }740741  for (const [rpId, group] of byRpId) {742    if (group.length === 0) continue;743    group.sort((a, b) => {744      const aT =745        a.passkey!.lastUsedAt ?? a.passkey!.createdAt ?? a.modifiedAt ?? a.createdAt;746      const bT =747        b.passkey!.lastUsedAt ?? b.passkey!.createdAt ?? b.modifiedAt ?? b.createdAt;748      return bT - aT;749    });750    const winner = group[0]!;751752    // Look for a NON-passkey login entry matching this RP. Use the URL753    // hostname rather than a substring search so a "login.foo.com" entry754    // doesn't accidentally absorb a passkey for "foo.com".755    const loginTarget = entries.find((e) => {756      if (e.deletedAt || e.passkey || e.type !== "login") return false;757      if (e.url && extractDomain(e.url) === rpId) return true;758      for (const extra of e.additionalUrls ?? []) {759        if (extractDomain(extra) === rpId) return true;760      }761      return false;762    });763764    if (loginTarget) {765      loginTarget.passkey = winner.passkey;766      loginTarget.modifiedAt = now;767      for (const dup of group) {768        if (!dup.deletedAt) {769          dup.deletedAt = now;770          dup.modifiedAt = now;771        }772      }773      merged = true;774    } else if (group.length > 1) {775      for (let i = 1; i < group.length; i += 1) {776        const dup = group[i]!;777        if (!dup.deletedAt) {778          dup.deletedAt = now;779          dup.modifiedAt = now;780        }781      }782      merged = true;783    }784  }785786  return { merged };787}788789// Validates that a `StoredVault` record on disk has the field shape we expect790// before treating an AES-GCM decrypt success as a clean unlock. AES-GCM only791// authenticates the static VERSION_BYTE AAD, not the `version` field on the792// outer record — a corrupted `version: 42` slot still decrypts cleanly. This793// check surfaces that as `corrupted` (M7/COR-007) so the popup can offer a794// history-restore path instead of falsely reporting "wrong password".795function hasValidVaultSchema(v: unknown): v is StoredVault {796  if (typeof v !== "object" || v === null) return false;797  const r = v as Record<string, unknown>;798  return (799    r.version === 1 &&800    typeof r.salt === "string" &&801    typeof r.nonce === "string" &&802    typeof r.ciphertext === "string" &&803    typeof r.tag === "string"804  );805}806807export type TryDecryptResult =808  | { status: "ok"; payload: DecryptedPayload }809  | { status: "wrong_key" }810  | { status: "corrupted"; reason: string };811812// Exported solely for `unlockFromCodex` below, which needs to verify a813// supplied passphrase against a slotA blob *without* committing anything to814// storage. Keep this internal otherwise — callers crossing the messages.ts815// boundary should always go through `unlock` / `verifyMainPassword` so the816// constant-time invariants in Projects.md §3.4 are not bypassed.817export async function tryDecryptSlot(818  vault: StoredVault,819  key: Uint8Array,820  aadTag?: string,821): Promise<DecryptedPayload | null> {822  const res = await tryDecryptSlotResult(vault, key, aadTag);823  return res.status === "ok" ? res.payload : null;824}825826export async function tryDecryptSlotResult(827  vault: StoredVault,828  key: Uint8Array,829  aadTag?: string,830): Promise<TryDecryptResult> {831  if (!hasValidVaultSchema(vault)) {832    return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_slot_schema" };833  }834  let plain: string;835  try {836    plain = await decrypt(key, vault.nonce, vault.ciphertext, vault.tag, aadTag);837  } catch {838    return { status: "wrong_key" };839  }840  try {841    const parsed = JSON.parse(plain) as unknown;842    if (typeof parsed !== "object" || parsed === null) {843      return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_payload_shape" };844    }845    if (!Array.isArray(parsed) && !Array.isArray((parsed as VaultPayload).entries)) {846      return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_payload_shape" };847    }848    return { status: "ok", payload: decodePayload(plain) };849  } catch {850    return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_payload_json" };851  }852}853854// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------855// Core operations856// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------857858function buildDomainIndexSync(all: VaultEntry[]): void {859  domainIndex = new Map();860861  for (const entry of all) {862    if (entry.deletedAt) continue;863    if (entry.type === "note" || entry.type === "card") continue;864865    // An entry can match multiple sites via `additionalUrls`. Index each866    // hostname so `queryDomain` returns the entry regardless of which alias867    // the user is currently visiting. Dedupe per-entry so a single entry868    // never appears twice in one bucket.869    const domains = new Set<string>();870    const primary = extractDomain(entry.url ?? "");871    if (primary) domains.add(primary);872    for (const extra of entry.additionalUrls ?? []) {873      const d = extractDomain(extra);874      if (d) domains.add(d);875    }876    if (domains.size === 0) continue;877878    for (const domain of domains) {879      const bucket = domainIndex.get(domain) ?? [];880      bucket.push(entry);881      domainIndex.set(domain, bucket);882    }883  }884}885886export async function createVault(password: string): Promise<void> {887  await ensureMigrated();888889  const salt = generateSalt();890  derivedKey = await deriveKey(password, salt);891  entries = [];892  vaultMode = "real";893  duressConfigured = false;894  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);895896  // Generate and wrap the root key for recovery word escrow.897  const { rawRootKey, recoverySalt, wrappedRootKey, wrappedNonce, wrappedTag } =898    await generateAndWrapRootKey();899  rootKey = unhex(rawRootKey);900901  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured);902  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");903904  // Second wrapping of rootKey under derivedKey so future unlocks can rehydrate905  // it without recovery words (H2/COR-006).906  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(derivedKey, rootKey);907908  const slotA: StoredVault = {909    version: 1,910    salt: hex(salt),911    nonce,912    ciphertext,913    tag,914    recovery_salt: recoverySalt,915    recovery_wrapped_root_key: wrappedRootKey,916    recovery_nonce: wrappedNonce,917    recovery_tag: wrappedTag,918    ...pwRoot,919  };920  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, slotA);921922  // Matching-size noise blob for slot B, so a fresh install shows two923  // similarly-shaped records regardless of whether duress is ever set up.924  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2));925  await stampLocalVaultMutation();926927  touchAutoLock();928}929930export async function hasVault(): Promise<boolean> {931  await ensureMigrated();932  return (await loadSlot(SLOT_A)) !== null;933}934935/**936 * Returns whether the real vault has recorded that a duress passphrase is937 * configured. Reliable only after a real-mode unlock — before unlock or in938 * decoy mode, returns false because we cannot read slot A's plaintext.939 */940export async function isDuressEnabled(): Promise<boolean> {941  return vaultMode === "real" && duressConfigured;942}943944export async function setupDuress(duressPassword: string): Promise<void> {945  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {946    throw new Error("vault must be unlocked in real mode");947  }948  await ensureMigrated();949950  // Encrypt the decoy payload (empty entries) under the duress key. Pad to951  // at least the current slot A ciphertext size so the two slots look the952  // same at rest at setup time.953  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);954  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");955956  const decoySalt = generateSalt();957  const decoyKey = await deriveKey(duressPassword, decoySalt);958  try {959    // Pad the decoy plaintext to match slot A's ciphertext length (minus the960    // 16-byte tag) so encrypted sizes align exactly.961    const targetBytes = slotA.ciphertext.length / 2;962    let plaintext = encodePayload([], false);963    const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(plaintext);964    if (encoded.length < targetBytes) {965      plaintext = plaintext + " ".repeat(targetBytes - encoded.length);966    }967    const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(decoyKey, plaintext, "slot_b_v1");968    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, {969      version: 1,970      salt: hex(decoySalt),971      nonce,972      ciphertext,973      tag,974    });975  } finally {976    zeroKey(decoyKey);977  }978979  // Re-encrypt slot A with the duressConfigured flag set to true. No external980  // flag is written — the bit lives inside the encrypted envelope.981  duressConfigured = true;982  await persistSlotA();983}984985export async function disableDuress(): Promise<void> {986  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {987    throw new Error("vault must be unlocked in real mode");988  }989  await ensureMigrated();990991  // Overwrite slot B with fresh noise that matches slot A's size. The slot992  // remains occupied so its mere existence does not signal that duress was993  // ever configured.994  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);995  if (slotA) {996    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(slotA.ciphertext.length / 2));997  }998999  duressConfigured = false;1000  await persistSlotA();1001}10021003// L14/COR-015: this function intentionally checks slot A (real vault) only.1004// A duress-mode user attempting changePassword is rejected earlier by the1005// vaultMode === 'decoy' check at changePassword. The real-vs-decoy1006// distinction here is by design — duress users cannot rotate the real1007// password by guessing it, and the asymmetry in error timing is acceptable1008// because duress mode is opt-in and the user knows their own decoy key.1009export async function verifyMainPassword(password: string): Promise<boolean> {1010  await ensureMigrated();1011  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1012  if (!slotA) return false;1013  const key = await deriveKey(password, unhex(slotA.salt));1014  try {1015    return (await tryDecryptSlot(slotA, key, "slot_a_v1")) !== null;1016  } finally {1017    zeroKey(key);1018  }1019}10201021export async function unlock(password: string): Promise<boolean> {1022  await ensureMigrated();10231024  // Load both slots in parallel. Both always exist post-migration; the1025  // parallel load and the parallel derivation below keep wall-clock time1026  // constant regardless of which slot's passphrase (real or decoy) the1027  // caller supplied, so a timing side channel cannot distinguish the1028  // duress path from the real-unlock path (DUR-002).1029  const [slotA, slotB] = await Promise.all([1030    loadSlot(SLOT_A),1031    loadSlot(SLOT_B),1032  ]);10331034  // Derive both keys in parallel, unconditionally.1035  const [keyA, keyB] = await Promise.all([1036    slotA ? deriveKey(password, unhex(slotA.salt)) : Promise.resolve(null),1037    slotB ? deriveKey(password, unhex(slotB.salt)) : Promise.resolve(null),1038  ]);10391040  // Attempt both decrypts in parallel. The Result variant lets us distinguish1041  // 'wrong_key' from 'corrupted' so callers can offer a history-restore path1042  // when a slot's schema is invalid even though AES-GCM authenticated (M7).1043  const [resultA, resultB] = await Promise.all([1044    keyA && slotA1045      ? tryDecryptSlotResult(slotA, keyA, "slot_a_v1")1046      : Promise.resolve({ status: "wrong_key" } as TryDecryptResult),1047    keyB && slotB1048      ? tryDecryptSlotResult(slotB, keyB, "slot_b_v1")1049      : Promise.resolve({ status: "wrong_key" } as TryDecryptResult),1050  ]);1051  const payloadA = resultA.status === "ok" ? resultA.payload : null;1052  const payloadB = resultB.status === "ok" ? resultB.payload : null;10531054  if (payloadA && keyA) {1055    derivedKey = keyA;1056    void saveSessionKey(keyA, "real");1057    vaultMode = "real";1058    entries = payloadA.entries;1059    duressConfigured = payloadA.duressConfigured;1060    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1061    await loadSettings();1062    touchAutoLock();1063    if (keyB) zeroKey(keyB);10641065    // slotA is non-null when payloadA is truthy (keyA was derived from slotA).1066    if (slotA) {1067      const needsRecoverySetup =1068        !slotA.recovery_salt || !slotA.recovery_wrapped_root_key;1069      if (!needsRecoverySetup) {1070        rootKey = await deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(keyA, slotA);1071      }1072      // Pre-v2.12 vault, or a vault whose pw_root_* fields haven't been written1073      // yet: generate the recovery escrow and seed pw_root_* so subsequent1074      // unlocks can rehydrate rootKey without the user's recovery words.1075      // Best-effort — a failure here must not block unlock.1076      if (needsRecoverySetup || !rootKey) {1077        try {1078          await migrateToRecovery();1079          if (needsRecoverySetup) {1080            // String "1" matches the popup's existing peach_recovery_pending1081            // check; surfaced so the user re-confirms recovery words after a1082            // legacy-vault unlock (H2/COR-006).1083            await chrome.storage.local.set({ peach_recovery_pending: '1' });1084          }1085        } catch (migrationErr) {1086          console.warn('[Peach] recovery migration failed:', migrationErr);1087        }1088      }1089    }10901091    // If the payload had a pre-v2.11.0 shape (legacy passkey type, flat1092    // passkey fields, or pre-A-2 created/updated keys), rewrite it now so1093    // the next save uses the new format and migration doesn't re-run forever.1094    if (payloadA.migratedFromLegacy) {1095      await persistSlotA();1096    }1097    return true;1098  }10991100  if (payloadB && keyB) {1101    derivedKey = keyB;1102    void saveSessionKey(keyB, "decoy");1103    vaultMode = "decoy";1104    entries = payloadB.entries;1105    duressConfigured = false;1106    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1107    await loadSettings();1108    touchAutoLock();1109    if (keyA) zeroKey(keyA);1110    return true;1111  }11121113  if (keyA) zeroKey(keyA);1114  if (keyB) zeroKey(keyB);1115  // Surface corruption (good AES tag, broken schema) distinctly from1116  // wrong-password so the popup can offer history-restore (M7/COR-007).1117  if (resultA.status === "corrupted") {1118    lastUnlockFailureReason = resultA.reason;1119  } else if (resultB.status === "corrupted") {1120    lastUnlockFailureReason = resultB.reason;1121  }1122  return false;1123}11241125// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------1126// MV3 service worker session key — survives SW restarts within a browser session1127// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------11281129// chrome.storage.session is cleared on browser close; survives SW restart.1130// Firefox does not implement it (persistent background script, no restart risk).1131const SESSION_KEY_STORAGE = "peach_session_dk";11321133async function saveSessionKey(key: Uint8Array, mode: "real" | "decoy"): Promise<void> {1134  if (!chrome.storage.session) return;1135  await chrome.storage.session.set({ [SESSION_KEY_STORAGE]: { keyHex: hex(key), mode } });1136}11371138async function clearSessionKey(): Promise<void> {1139  if (!chrome.storage.session) return;1140  await chrome.storage.session.remove(SESSION_KEY_STORAGE);1141}11421143/**1144 * On SW restart, re-derive all in-memory vault state from the session key1145 * stored in chrome.storage.session (set at unlock time, cleared on lock).1146 * Returns true if the vault was restored, false if no session key was found.1147 * No-ops if the vault is already unlocked.1148 */1149export async function restoreFromSession(): Promise<boolean> {1150  if (derivedKey !== null) return true;1151  if (!chrome.storage.session) return false;1152  const stored = await chrome.storage.session.get(SESSION_KEY_STORAGE);1153  const entry = stored[SESSION_KEY_STORAGE] as { keyHex: string; mode: "real" | "decoy" } | undefined;1154  if (!entry?.keyHex) return false;11551156  const key = unhex(entry.keyHex);1157  const slotKey = entry.mode === "real" ? SLOT_A : SLOT_B;1158  const aadTag = entry.mode === "real" ? "slot_a_v1" : "slot_b_v1";1159  const slot = await loadSlot(slotKey);1160  if (!slot) { await clearSessionKey(); return false; }11611162  const result = await tryDecryptSlotResult(slot, key, aadTag);1163  if (result.status !== "ok") { await clearSessionKey(); return false; }11641165  derivedKey = key;1166  vaultMode = entry.mode;1167  entries = result.payload.entries;1168  duressConfigured = entry.mode === "real" ? result.payload.duressConfigured : false;1169  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1170  await loadSettings();1171  touchAutoLock();11721173  if (entry.mode === "real" && slot.recovery_salt && slot.recovery_wrapped_root_key) {1174    try { rootKey = await deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(key, slot); } catch { /* non-fatal */ }1175  }11761177  return true;1178}11791180export function lock(): void {1181  void clearSessionKey();1182  if (derivedKey) {1183    zeroKey(derivedKey);1184    derivedKey = null;1185  }1186  if (rootKey) {1187    rootKey.fill(0);1188    rootKey = null;1189  }11901191  entries = [];1192  domainIndex = new Map();1193  vaultMode = "real";1194  duressConfigured = false;1195  clearAutoLock();1196}11971198export function isUnlocked(): boolean {1199  return derivedKey !== null;1200}12011202// Opens the vault using a pre-derived AES-256 key (skipping Argon2id).1203// Used by Android biometric unlock — the key was derived on the native side.1204export async function unlockWithKey(1205  masterKeyHex: string,1206): Promise<{ ok: true; entries: VaultEntry[] } | { ok: false; error: string }> {1207  try {1208    const masterKeyBytes = unhex(masterKeyHex);1209    const stored = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1210    if (!stored) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };1211    const payload = await tryDecryptSlot(stored, masterKeyBytes, "slot_a_v1");1212    if (!payload) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };12131214    derivedKey = masterKeyBytes;1215    vaultMode = "real";1216    entries = payload.entries;1217    duressConfigured = payload.duressConfigured;1218    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1219    await loadSettings();1220    touchAutoLock();1221    return { ok: true, entries };1222  } catch {1223    return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };1224  }1225}12261227/**1228 * Restore the vault from a parsed Peach Codex payload.1229 *1230 * The supplied passphrase is verified against the Codex's slotA *before* any1231 * storage mutation — wrong passphrases return without touching disk. On1232 * success, the current vault state is snapshotted (reason: "restore") so the1233 * user can revert via Settings -> Vault History, then slotA/slotB are written1234 * and `peach_last_modified_at` is set to the Codex's recorded timestamp. A1235 * regular `unlock()` follows so the rest of the SW sees the standard1236 * post-unlock state.1237 *1238 * Intentionally non-Pro-gated — see peach_codex_v2.md "Pro gating". A Codex1239 * printed by a Pro user must always be restorable, even on a free device.1240 *1241 * Timing is not held constant here (in contrast to `unlock`): the Codex flow1242 * is an explicit user action with a known passphrase, not a passive lock1243 * screen, so the duress-vs-real timing side channel does not apply.1244 */1245export async function unlockFromCodex(params: {1246  slotA: string; // JSON string of StoredVault for slot A1247  slotB: string | null; // JSON string of StoredVault for slot B, or null1248  timestamp: number;1249  masterPassphrase: string;1250}): Promise<1251  | { ok: true; entryCount: number }1252  | { ok: false; reason: "wrong_passphrase" | "invalid_slot_format" }1253> {1254  let parsedSlotA: StoredVault;1255  let parsedSlotB: StoredVault | null = null;1256  try {1257    const rawA = JSON.parse(params.slotA) as unknown;1258    if (!hasValidVaultSchema(rawA)) {1259      return { ok: false, reason: "invalid_slot_format" };1260    }1261    parsedSlotA = rawA;1262    if (params.slotB !== null) {1263      const rawB = JSON.parse(params.slotB) as unknown;1264      if (!hasValidVaultSchema(rawB)) {1265        return { ok: false, reason: "invalid_slot_format" };1266      }1267      parsedSlotB = rawB;1268    }1269  } catch {1270    return { ok: false, reason: "invalid_slot_format" };1271  }12721273  // Verify the passphrase against the supplied slotA WITHOUT writing anything.1274  // If this fails the on-disk vault is left completely untouched.1275  const trialKey = await deriveKey(params.masterPassphrase, unhex(parsedSlotA.salt));1276  const trialPayload = await tryDecryptSlot(parsedSlotA, trialKey, "slot_a_v1");1277  if (!trialPayload) {1278    zeroKey(trialKey);1279    return { ok: false, reason: "wrong_passphrase" };1280  }1281  // Drop the trial key; `unlock()` below derives its own copy. Holding two1282  // copies of the master key in memory at once would be a needless surface.1283  zeroKey(trialKey);12841285  // Snapshot the about-to-be-overwritten on-disk state so the user can revert1286  // a mistaken Codex restore via the Vault History UI. Non-fatal if it fails.1287  await takeVaultSnapshot("restore");12881289  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, parsedSlotA);1290  if (parsedSlotB) {1291    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, parsedSlotB);1292  } else {1293    // Slot B must always exist with ciphertext length matching slot A1294    // (Projects.md §3.2). Codex prints may omit slot B (duress wasn't1295    // configured); regenerate noise to satisfy the invariant.1296    await writeSlot(1297      SLOT_B,1298      generateNoiseBlob(parsedSlotA.ciphertext.length / 2),1299    );1300  }1301  await chrome.storage.local.set({1302    peach_last_modified_at: String(params.timestamp),1303  });13041305  // Standard unlock path so domain index, settings, auto-lock, and1306  // recovery-key state all populate exactly as a normal unlock would.1307  const ok = await unlock(params.masterPassphrase);1308  if (!ok) {1309    // Should be unreachable — we just verified the passphrase against the1310    // same slotA we wrote. Treat as wrong_passphrase to keep the contract1311    // simple if some race or storage anomaly intrudes.1312    return { ok: false, reason: "wrong_passphrase" };1313  }1314  return { ok: true, entryCount: getEntries().length };1315}13161317// Returns the current in-memory derived key as a hex string.1318// Used by the biometric enable flow in Settings to store the key in Android Keystore.1319export function getDerivedKeyHex(): string {1320  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_not_unlocked");1321  return hex(derivedKey);1322}13231324export function getEntries(): VaultEntry[] {1325  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1326  return entries.filter((entry) => !entry.deletedAt);1327}13281329const EMAIL_RE = /^[^\s@]+@[^\s@]+\.[^\s@]+$/;13301331export function getIdentities(): SavedIdentity[] {1332  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1333  const active = entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt && e.type === "login");13341335  const emailMap = new Map<string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }>();1336  const usernameMap = new Map<string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }>();13371338  for (const entry of active) {1339    const value = entry.username?.trim();1340    if (!value) continue;1341    const map = EMAIL_RE.test(value) ? emailMap : usernameMap;1342    const existing = map.get(value);1343    const domain = extractDomain(entry.url ?? "") ?? "";1344    const modifiedAt = entry.modifiedAt ?? entry.createdAt ?? 0;1345    if (!existing || modifiedAt > existing.lastUsed) {1346      map.set(value, { lastUsed: modifiedAt, count: (existing?.count ?? 0) + 1, domain });1347    } else {1348      map.set(value, { ...existing, count: existing.count + 1 });1349    }1350  }13511352  const toIdentity = (type: "email" | "username") =>1353    ([value, d]: [string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }]): SavedIdentity => ({1354      value, type, lastUsed: d.lastUsed, useCount: d.count, exampleDomain: d.domain || undefined,1355    });13561357  return [1358    ...[...emailMap.entries()].map(toIdentity("email")).sort((a, b) => b.useCount - a.useCount),1359    ...[...usernameMap.entries()].map(toIdentity("username")).sort((a, b) => b.useCount - a.useCount),1360  ];1361}13621363export async function batchAddEntries(drafts: EntryDraft[]): Promise<VaultEntry[]> {1364  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");13651366  const now = Date.now();1367  const added: VaultEntry[] = [];1368  for (const draft of drafts) {1369    try {1370      const sanitized = sanitizeEntryDraft(draft);1371      const nextEntry: VaultEntry = {1372        ...sanitized,1373        id: crypto.randomUUID(),1374        createdAt: now,1375        modifiedAt: now,1376      };1377      entries.push(nextEntry);1378      added.push(nextEntry);1379    } catch {1380      // Skip invalid drafts silently — caller can see diff between input and output length1381    }1382  }13831384  if (added.length > 0) {1385    await persistEntries();1386  }13871388  return added;1389}13901391/**1392 * Restore a set of entries in full fidelity — preserves id, createdAt,1393 * modifiedAt, and every other field unlike `batchAddEntries` which1394 * assigns fresh identity. Used by restore paths where the backup is the1395 * authoritative source of truth. `mode` controls how entries already in1396 * the vault are treated.1397 */1398export async function restoreEntries(1399  incoming: VaultEntry[],1400  mode: "replace" | "merge"1401): Promise<{ added: number; updated: number; skipped: number }> {1402  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");14031404  // A replace with zero incoming entries is almost certainly a caller bug1405  // (e.g. an import that silently dropped everything). Refuse rather than1406  // wipe the vault.1407  if (mode === "replace" && incoming.length === 0) {1408    throw new Error("refuse to replace with empty entry set");1409  }14101411  let added = 0;1412  let updated = 0;1413  let skipped = 0;14141415  if (mode === "replace") {1416    entries = [];1417    for (const entry of incoming) {1418      const normalized = sanitizeRestoredEntry(entry);1419      if (!normalized) {1420        skipped += 1;1421        continue;1422      }1423      entries.push(normalized);1424      added += 1;1425    }1426  } else {1427    const byId = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();1428    for (const e of entries) byId.set(e.id, e);14291430    for (const entry of incoming) {1431      const normalized = sanitizeRestoredEntry(entry);1432      if (!normalized) {1433        skipped += 1;1434        continue;1435      }1436      const existing = byId.get(normalized.id);1437      if (!existing) {1438        entries.push(normalized);1439        added += 1;1440      } else if (normalized.modifiedAt > existing.modifiedAt) {1441        const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === existing.id);1442        if (idx !== -1) {1443          entries[idx] = normalized;1444          updated += 1;1445        }1446      } else {1447        skipped += 1;1448      }1449    }1450  }14511452  await persistEntries("import");1453  return { added, updated, skipped };1454}14551456/**1457 * Validate + normalise a VaultEntry coming from a backup. Accepts1458 * anything structurally sound; keeps all metadata verbatim. Returns1459 * null for values the live vault shouldn't accept (e.g., missing title).1460 */1461function sanitizeRestoredEntry(entry: VaultEntry): VaultEntry | null {1462  if (!entry || typeof entry !== "object") return null;1463  const title = typeof entry.title === "string" ? entry.title.trim() : "";1464  if (!title) return null;1465  const id = typeof entry.id === "string" && entry.id ? entry.id : crypto.randomUUID();1466  const now = Date.now();1467  const createdAt = typeof entry.createdAt === "number" ? entry.createdAt : now;1468  const modifiedAt = typeof entry.modifiedAt === "number" ? entry.modifiedAt : createdAt;14691470  // Migrate legacy passkey shape on import (same logic as on-disk read).1471  // Imports from pre-v2.11.0 vault backups still carry type:"passkey" with1472  // flat fields; bring them into the new shape immediately.1473  const migrated: VaultEntry = migrateLegacyPasskey(1474    {1475      ...entry,1476      id,1477      title,1478      type: entry.type ?? "login",1479      createdAt,1480      modifiedAt,1481    },1482    entry1483  );14841485  // Login entries from backup must carry a password (or be passkey-only,1486  // in which case the passkey sub-object replaces the password requirement).1487  if (1488    migrated.type === "login" &&1489    !migrated.passkey &&1490    typeof migrated.password !== "string"1491  ) {1492    return null;1493  }1494  if (migrated.passkey && !migrated.passkey.credentialId) {1495    return null;1496  }14971498  return migrated;1499}15001501// Soft-deletes every non-deleted entry in one call. The literal string1502// argument is a tripwire against accidental calls — any caller that would1503// wipe the vault has to consciously type "REPLACE_ALL". Do not relax this1504// to a boolean.1505export async function clearVaultEntries(1506  confirmation: "REPLACE_ALL"1507): Promise<void> {1508  if (confirmation !== "REPLACE_ALL") {1509    throw new Error("clearVaultEntries requires explicit confirmation");1510  }1511  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1512  for (const entry of entries) {1513    if (!entry.deletedAt) {1514      entry.deletedAt = Date.now();1515      entry.modifiedAt = Date.now();1516    }1517  }1518  await persistEntries();1519}15201521export async function addEntry(entry: EntryDraft): Promise<VaultEntry> {1522  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");15231524  const sanitized = sanitizeEntryDraft(entry);1525  const now = Date.now();1526  const nextEntry: VaultEntry = {1527    ...sanitized,1528    id: crypto.randomUUID(),1529    createdAt: now,1530    modifiedAt: now,1531    // Stamp passwordChangedAt at creation so age tracking is accurate from1532    // day one. Non-login entries carry the same stamp harmlessly.1533    passwordChangedAt: sanitized.password ? now : undefined,1534  };15351536  // Clone-and-replace so a failed persist rolls back the in-memory state1537  // (COR-008). Without this, a quota-full or storage error leaves the1538  // module-level `entries` ahead of what's actually on disk.1539  const rollback = entries;1540  entries = [...entries, nextEntry];1541  try {1542    await persistEntries();1543  } catch (err) {1544    entries = rollback;1545    throw err;1546  }15471548  // Fire-and-forget breach check (only for login entries if breach monitoring is enabled or not set)1549  if (settings.breachMonitoring !== false && nextEntry.type === "login" && nextEntry.password) {1550    checkBreach(nextEntry.password).then(async (count) => {1551      if (count > 0) {1552        const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === nextEntry.id);1553        if (idx !== -1) {1554          entries[idx] = { ...entries[idx], breach: count, modifiedAt: Date.now() };1555          await persistEntries();1556        }1557      }1558    });1559  }15601561  return nextEntry;1562}15631564export async function updateEntry(1565  id: string,1566  patch: Partial<VaultEntry>1567): Promise<void> {1568  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");15691570  const idx = entries.findIndex((entry) => entry.id === id);1571  if (idx === -1 || entries[idx].deletedAt) {1572    throw new Error("entry_not_found");1573  }15741575  const current = entries[idx];1576  const sanitizedPatch = sanitizeEntryPatch(patch);1577  // Refresh passwordChangedAt only when the password value actually changes —1578  // a metadata-only update (title, tags, etc.) must not reset the age clock1579  // that drives the Pro health rotation recommendation.1580  const passwordChanged =1581    "password" in patch &&1582    typeof sanitizedPatch.password === "string" &&1583    sanitizedPatch.password !== current.password;1584  entries[idx] = {1585    ...current,1586    ...sanitizedPatch,1587    modifiedAt: Date.now(),1588    ...(passwordChanged ? { passwordChangedAt: Date.now() } : {}),1589  };15901591  // A login entry must carry SOMETHING fillable — either a password or a1592  // passkey credential. An empty-password login with no passkey is dead1593  // state. Permit the password-clear when a passkey is attached (that's1594  // the legitimate "drop the password, keep the passkey" path).1595  if (1596    entries[idx].type === "login" &&1597    !entries[idx].password &&1598    !entries[idx].passkey1599  ) {1600    entries[idx] = current;1601    throw new Error("password or passkey required");1602  }16031604  // Card entries must retain their card number1605  if (entries[idx].type === "card" && !entries[idx].cardNumber) {1606    entries[idx] = current;1607    throw new Error("card number is required for card entries");1608  }16091610  await persistEntries();16111612  // Breach check when password changes: clear immediately so old breach doesn't linger,1613  // then async-check the new password and only re-set if it's also found.1614  if ("password" in patch && settings.breachMonitoring !== false && entries[idx].type === "login") {1615    entries[idx] = { ...entries[idx], breach: undefined };1616    await persistEntries();1617    const password = entries[idx].password;1618    if (password) {1619      checkBreach(password).then(async (count) => {1620        const i = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id);1621        if (i !== -1 && count > 0) {1622          entries[i] = { ...entries[i], breach: count, modifiedAt: Date.now() };1623          await persistEntries();1624        }1625      });1626    }1627  }1628}16291630export async function deleteEntry(id: string): Promise<void> {1631  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");16321633  const entry = entries.find((item) => item.id === id);1634  if (!entry || entry.deletedAt) {1635    throw new Error("entry_not_found");1636  }16371638  entry.deletedAt = Date.now();1639  entry.modifiedAt = Date.now();1640  await persistEntries();1641}16421643export function getDeletedEntries(): VaultEntry[] {1644  if (!derivedKey) return [];1645  return entries.filter((e) => !!e.deletedAt);1646}16471648export async function restoreEntry(id: string): Promise<void> {1649  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1650  const entry = entries.find((e) => e.id === id && e.deletedAt);1651  if (!entry) throw new Error("deleted entry not found");1652  delete entry.deletedAt;1653  entry.modifiedAt = Date.now();1654  await persistEntries();1655  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1656}16571658export async function purgeEntry(id: string): Promise<void> {1659  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1660  const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id && e.deletedAt);1661  if (idx === -1) throw new Error("deleted entry not found");1662  entries.splice(idx, 1);1663  await persistEntries();1664}16651666/** Permanently delete entries whose deletedAt is older than retentionMs. 0 = keep forever. */1667export async function purgeExpiredTrash(retentionMs: number): Promise<number> {1668  if (!derivedKey || retentionMs === 0) return 0;1669  const cutoff = Date.now() - retentionMs;1670  const before = entries.length;1671  entries = entries.filter((e) => !(e.deletedAt && e.deletedAt < cutoff));1672  const purged = before - entries.length;1673  if (purged > 0) await persistEntries();1674  return purged;1675}16761677export function queryDomain(domain: string): VaultEntry[] {1678  return domainIndex.get(domain) ?? [];1679}16801681export function getEntryById(id: string): VaultEntry | undefined {1682  return entries.find((entry) => entry.id === id && !entry.deletedAt);1683}16841685async function persistSlotA(1686  reason: VaultSnapshot["reason"] = "local_save",1687): Promise<StoredVault> {1688  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");16891690  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1691  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");16921693  // Snapshot the about-to-be-overwritten state BEFORE we mutate disk. Failures1694  // are swallowed by takeVaultSnapshot — history must never block a save.1695  await takeVaultSnapshot(reason);16961697  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured);1698  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");16991700  // Preserve existing recovery escrow fields.1701  const nextSlotA: StoredVault = {1702    ...slotA,1703    nonce,1704    ciphertext,1705    tag,1706    // recovery_salt and recovery_wrapped_root_key are already set from loadSlot1707  };1708  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, nextSlotA);17091710  // When duress is not configured, keep slot B size-matched with slot A by1711  // regenerating its noise. When duress IS configured, leave slot B alone —1712  // we don't have the decoy key to re-encrypt it. This is a known trade-off.1713  if (!duressConfigured) {1714    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2));1715  }1716  await stampLocalVaultMutation();17171718  return nextSlotA;1719}17201721async function persistSlotB(): Promise<void> {1722  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");17231724  const slotB = await loadSlot(SLOT_B);1725  if (!slotB) throw new Error("missing slot B");17261727  // Decoy plaintext always reports duressConfigured=false — the decoy user1728  // sees a clean slate.1729  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, false);1730  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKey, plaintext, "slot_b_v1");17311732  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, { ...slotB, nonce, ciphertext, tag });1733  await stampLocalVaultMutation();1734}17351736async function persistEntries(1737  reason: VaultSnapshot["reason"] = "local_save",1738): Promise<void> {1739  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");17401741  if (vaultMode === "decoy") {1742    await persistSlotB();1743  } else {1744    await persistSlotA(reason);1745  }1746  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1747}17481749function cleanAdditionalUrls(values: string[] | undefined): string[] | undefined {1750  if (!Array.isArray(values)) return undefined;1751  const seen = new Set<string>();1752  const cleaned: string[] = [];1753  for (const value of values) {1754    const trimmed = typeof value === "string" ? value.trim() : "";1755    if (!trimmed) continue;1756    const key = trimmed.toLowerCase();1757    if (seen.has(key)) continue;1758    seen.add(key);1759    cleaned.push(trimmed);1760  }1761  return cleaned.length > 0 ? cleaned : undefined;1762}17631764function sanitizeEntryDraft(entry: EntryDraft): EntryDraft {1765  const title = entry.title.trim();1766  // Accept legacy `type:"passkey"` drafts but rewrite to "login" — the new1767  // model is "any entry, optionally with a passkey sub-object." Imports and1768  // any in-flight callers from before v2.11.0 keep working without throwing.1769  let type: VaultEntry["type"] = entry.type ?? "login";1770  if (type === "passkey") type = "login";17711772  if (!title) throw new Error("title is required");1773  // A login entry needs either a password or a passkey credential to be useful.1774  // Passkey-only entries (passkey present, no password) are valid.1775  if (type === "login" && !entry.password?.trim() && !entry.passkey) {1776    throw new Error("password or passkey required");1777  }1778  if (entry.passkey) {1779    const p = entry.passkey;1780    if (1781      !p.rpId ||1782      !p.credentialId ||1783      !p.publicKeyCose ||1784      !p.userHandle ||1785      !p.userName ||1786      (p.algorithm !== -7 && p.algorithm !== -8)1787    ) {1788      throw new Error("invalid passkey credential");1789    }1790  }1791  if (type === "card") {1792    if (!entry.cardholderName?.trim() || !entry.cardNumber?.trim()) {1793      throw new Error("cardholder name and card number are required");1794    }1795  }17961797  return {1798    type,1799    title,1800    username: type === "login" ? entry.username?.trim() ?? "" : undefined,1801    password: type === "login" ? entry.password : undefined,1802    url: type === "login" ? entry.url?.trim() ?? "" : undefined,1803    additionalUrls: type === "login" ? cleanAdditionalUrls(entry.additionalUrls) : undefined,1804    totp: type === "login" ? entry.totp?.trim() || undefined : undefined,1805    notes: entry.notes?.trim() || undefined,1806    breach: type === "login" ? entry.breach : undefined,1807    canary: type === "login" ? entry.canary : undefined,1808    tags: entry.tags,1809    passkey: entry.passkey,1810    cardholderName: type === "card" ? entry.cardholderName?.trim() : undefined,1811    cardNumber: type === "card" ? entry.cardNumber?.trim() : undefined,1812    expMonth: type === "card" ? entry.expMonth?.trim() : undefined,1813    expYear: type === "card" ? entry.expYear?.trim() : undefined,1814    cvc: type === "card" ? entry.cvc?.trim() : undefined,1815    cardNickname: type === "card" ? entry.cardNickname?.trim() || undefined : undefined,1816    network: type === "card" ? entry.network : undefined,1817    last4: type === "card" ? entry.last4?.trim() : undefined,1818  };1819}18201821function sanitizeEntryPatch(patch: Partial<VaultEntry>): Partial<VaultEntry> {1822  const nextPatch: Partial<VaultEntry> = {};18231824  if ("type" in patch) {1825    nextPatch.type = patch.type;1826  }18271828  if ("title" in patch) {1829    const title = patch.title?.trim() ?? "";1830    if (!title) throw new Error("title is required");1831    nextPatch.title = title;1832  }18331834  if ("url" in patch) {1835    nextPatch.url = patch.url?.trim() ?? "";1836  }18371838  if ("additionalUrls" in patch) {1839    const incoming = Array.isArray(patch.additionalUrls) ? patch.additionalUrls : [];1840    const seen = new Set<string>();1841    const cleaned: string[] = [];1842    for (const value of incoming) {1843      const trimmed = typeof value === "string" ? value.trim() : "";1844      if (!trimmed) continue;1845      const key = trimmed.toLowerCase();1846      if (seen.has(key)) continue;1847      seen.add(key);1848      cleaned.push(trimmed);1849    }1850    nextPatch.additionalUrls = cleaned.length > 0 ? cleaned : undefined;1851  }18521853  if ("username" in patch) {1854    nextPatch.username = patch.username?.trim() ?? "";1855  }18561857  if ("email" in patch) {1858    nextPatch.email = patch.email?.trim() || undefined;1859  }18601861  if ("password" in patch) {1862    const password = patch.password ?? "";1863    // Allow clearing a password (e.g. on passkey-only entries)1864    nextPatch.password = password || undefined;1865  }18661867  if ("totp" in patch) {1868    nextPatch.totp = patch.totp?.trim() || undefined;1869  }18701871  if ("notes" in patch) {1872    nextPatch.notes = patch.notes?.trim() || undefined;1873  }18741875  if ("breach" in patch) {1876    nextPatch.breach = patch.breach;1877  }18781879  if ("canary" in patch) {1880    nextPatch.canary = patch.canary;1881  }18821883  if ("passkey" in patch) {1884    // Passkey sub-object replaces all the legacy flat passkey fields. A1885    // patch with `passkey: undefined` removes the credential from the entry1886    // (used by "remove passkey" without deleting the whole entry).1887    nextPatch.passkey = patch.passkey;1888  }18891890  if ("tags" in patch) {1891    nextPatch.tags = patch.tags;1892  }18931894  if ("cardholderName" in patch) {1895    nextPatch.cardholderName = patch.cardholderName?.trim() || undefined;1896  }1897  if ("cardNumber" in patch) {1898    const n = patch.cardNumber ?? "";1899    nextPatch.cardNumber = n || undefined;1900  }1901  if ("expMonth" in patch) {1902    nextPatch.expMonth = patch.expMonth?.trim() || undefined;1903  }1904  if ("expYear" in patch) {1905    nextPatch.expYear = patch.expYear?.trim() || undefined;1906  }1907  if ("cvc" in patch) {1908    nextPatch.cvc = patch.cvc?.trim() || undefined;1909  }1910  if ("cardNickname" in patch) {1911    nextPatch.cardNickname = patch.cardNickname?.trim() || undefined;1912  }1913  if ("network" in patch) {1914    nextPatch.network = patch.network;1915  }1916  if ("last4" in patch) {1917    nextPatch.last4 = patch.last4?.trim() || undefined;1918  }19191920  return nextPatch;1921}19221923function normalizeEntry(entry: VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry): VaultEntry {1924  const createdAt = "createdAt" in entry ? entry.createdAt : entry.created;1925  const modifiedAt =1926    "modifiedAt" in entry ? entry.modifiedAt : entry.updated;19271928  const base: VaultEntry = {1929    id: entry.id,1930    type: "type" in entry ? entry.type : "login",1931    title: entry.title,1932    username: entry.username,1933    password: entry.password,1934    url: entry.url,1935    totp: entry.totp,1936    notes: entry.notes,1937    breach: entry.breach,1938    canary: "canary" in entry ? entry.canary : undefined,1939    passkey: "passkey" in entry ? entry.passkey : undefined,1940    createdAt,1941    modifiedAt,1942    deletedAt: entry.deletedAt,1943    tags: "tags" in entry ? entry.tags : undefined,1944    cardholderName: "cardholderName" in entry ? entry.cardholderName : undefined,1945    cardNumber: "cardNumber" in entry ? entry.cardNumber : undefined,1946    expMonth: "expMonth" in entry ? entry.expMonth : undefined,1947    expYear: "expYear" in entry ? entry.expYear : undefined,1948    cvc: "cvc" in entry ? entry.cvc : undefined,1949    cardNickname: "cardNickname" in entry ? entry.cardNickname : undefined,1950    network: "network" in entry ? entry.network : undefined,1951    last4: "last4" in entry ? entry.last4 : undefined,1952  };19531954  return migrateLegacyPasskey(base, entry);1955}19561957/**1958 * v2.11.0 read migration. Pre-v2.11.0 passkey entries used `type:"passkey"`1959 * with flat top-level fields (rpId, credentialId, etc.). This converts them1960 * to the new shape — `type:"login"` with a `passkey` sub-object — so all1961 * downstream consumers can rely on the new model. The result is rewritten1962 * to disk on next vault save (hasLegacyShape detects the un-migrated case).1963 */1964function migrateLegacyPasskey(1965  base: VaultEntry,1966  raw: VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry1967): VaultEntry {1968  if (base.passkey) return base;1969  const flat = raw as Partial<VaultEntry>;1970  const isPasskeyType = base.type === "passkey";1971  const hasFlatPasskeyFields =1972    typeof flat.rpId === "string" &&1973    typeof flat.credentialId === "string" &&1974    typeof flat.publicKeyCose === "string" &&1975    typeof flat.userHandle === "string" &&1976    typeof flat.userName === "string";1977  if (!isPasskeyType && !hasFlatPasskeyFields) return base;1978  if (!hasFlatPasskeyFields) return base;19791980  const algorithm: -7 | -8 = flat.algorithm === -8 ? -8 : -7;1981  base.passkey = {1982    rpId: flat.rpId!,1983    rpName: flat.rpName ?? flat.rpId!,1984    credentialId: flat.credentialId!,1985    publicKeyCose: flat.publicKeyCose!,1986    privateKeyJwk: flat.privateKeyJwk,1987    userHandle: flat.userHandle!,1988    userName: flat.userName!,1989    userDisplayName: flat.userDisplayName ?? flat.userName!,1990    algorithm,1991    signCount: flat.signCount ?? 0,1992    aaguid: flat.aaguid ?? "",1993    backupEligible: flat.backupEligible === true,1994    backupState: flat.backupState === true,1995    lastUsedAt: flat.lastUsedAt,1996    browser: flat.browser,1997    transports: flat.transports,1998    createdAt: base.createdAt,1999  };2000  // Promote to "login" so the unified Entry view renders. Username gets2001  // populated from the passkey's userName so the entry is searchable in the2002  // existing autofill flow without a separate code path.2003  if (isPasskeyType) base.type = "login";2004  if (!base.username) base.username = flat.userName;2005  if (!base.url) base.url = `https://${flat.rpId}`;2006  return base;2007}200820092010// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------2011// Deduplication2012// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------20132014function entryDupeKey(e: VaultEntry): string {2015  if (e.type === "note") return `note|${e.title.toLowerCase()}`;2016  // Passkey-bearing entries dedupe by the credential's RP + user. Two logins2017  // on different sites that happen to share a username are still distinct;2018  // two passkey credentials for the same RP+user are duplicates regardless2019  // of any login fields they may also carry.2020  if (e.passkey) {2021    return `passkey|${e.passkey.rpId.toLowerCase()}|${e.passkey.userName.toLowerCase()}`;2022  }2023  return `login|${e.title.toLowerCase()}|${(e.url ?? "").toLowerCase()}|${(e.username ?? "").toLowerCase()}`;2024}20252026/** Returns the number of duplicate entries (those that would be removed). */2027export function countDuplicates(): number {2028  const best = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();2029  let dupeCount = 0;2030  for (const e of entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt)) {2031    const key = entryDupeKey(e);2032    const existing = best.get(key);2033    if (!existing) {2034      best.set(key, e);2035    } else {2036      dupeCount++;2037      // Keep the more recently modified one in the map2038      if ((e.modifiedAt ?? e.createdAt ?? 0) > (existing.modifiedAt ?? existing.createdAt ?? 0)) {2039        best.set(key, e);2040      }2041    }2042  }2043  return dupeCount;2044}20452046/**2047 * Soft-deletes duplicate entries, keeping the most recently modified copy of2048 * each group. Returns the number of entries moved to trash.2049 */2050export async function deduplicateEntries(): Promise<number> {2051  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");2052  // Dedup reshapes slot B permanently under the decoy key, which is2053  // forensically distinguishable from a freshly-seeded decoy vault. Refuse.2054  if (vaultMode === "decoy") {2055    throw new Error("deduplicate disabled in decoy mode");2056  }20572058  const best = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();2059  for (const e of entries.filter((en) => !en.deletedAt)) {2060    const key = entryDupeKey(e);2061    const existing = best.get(key);2062    if (!existing) {2063      best.set(key, e);2064    } else if ((e.modifiedAt ?? e.createdAt ?? 0) > (existing.modifiedAt ?? existing.createdAt ?? 0)) {2065      best.set(key, e);2066    }2067  }20682069  const keepIds = new Set(Array.from(best.values()).map((e) => e.id));2070  const now = Date.now();2071  let removed = 0;2072  entries = entries.map((e) => {2073    if (!e.deletedAt && !keepIds.has(e.id)) {2074      removed++;2075      return { ...e, deletedAt: now };2076    }2077    return e;2078  });20792080  if (removed > 0) await persistEntries();2081  return removed;2082}20832084// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------2085// Vault history — snapshot BEFORE every vault write so the saved blob is2086// what is about to be lost, not what was just written. Capped at 10. The2087// stored blobs are AES-256-GCM ciphertext under the master password, so2088// history adds zero security surface.2089// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------20902091const HISTORY_KEY = "peach_vault_history";2092const HISTORY_MAX = 10;20932094/**2095 * Snapshot the CURRENT on-disk vault state into history. Call this BEFORE2096 * overwriting peach_vault_a so the saved blob captures the about-to-be-lost2097 * state. Identical-to-most-recent blobs are skipped to avoid filling history2098 * with no-op writes.2099 */2100export async function takeVaultSnapshot(2101  reason: VaultSnapshot["reason"],2102): Promise<void> {2103  try {2104    const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get([SLOT_A, SLOT_B, HISTORY_KEY]);2105    const slotA = (raw as Record<string, StoredVault | undefined>)[SLOT_A];2106    const slotB = (raw as Record<string, StoredVault | undefined>)[SLOT_B];21072108    // Nothing to snapshot if the real slot doesn't exist yet (fresh install,2109    // pre-createVault). createVault skips snapshots intentionally — there is2110    // no prior state to preserve.2111    if (!slotA) return;21122113    const vault_a = JSON.stringify(slotA);2114    const vault_b = JSON.stringify(slotB ?? slotA);21152116    // Best-effort entry count: only meaningful when the in-memory state is2117    // unlocked AND in real mode. Decoy mode would leak the decoy entry2118    // count; locked mode has no entries to count. Both fall through to null.2119    let entryCount: number | null = null;2120    if (derivedKey && vaultMode === "real") {2121      try {2122        entryCount = entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt).length;2123      } catch {2124        entryCount = null;2125      }2126    }21272128    const existingRaw = (raw as Record<string, VaultHistory | undefined>)[HISTORY_KEY];2129    const history: VaultHistory = existingRaw && Array.isArray(existingRaw.snapshots)2130      ? existingRaw2131      : { snapshots: [] };21322133    // Deduplication: if the most recent snapshot has byte-identical blobs,2134    // skip — saves the same vault N times in a row would otherwise burn the2135    // entire history window with no recovery value.2136    const latest = history.snapshots[0];2137    if (latest && latest.vault_a === vault_a && latest.vault_b === vault_b) {2138      return;2139    }21402141    const snapshot: VaultSnapshot = {2142      id: crypto.randomUUID(),2143      savedAt: Date.now(),2144      reason,2145      vault_a,2146      vault_b,2147      entryCount,2148    };21492150    history.snapshots = [snapshot, ...history.snapshots].slice(0, HISTORY_MAX);2151    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [HISTORY_KEY]: history });2152  } catch (err) {2153    // Non-fatal — history must never block a save. A failed snapshot just2154    // means the user loses one rung of the safety ladder for this write.2155    // M4/QUA-006: log so the failure is visible; if it looks like a quota2156    // problem, notify the popup so the user can prune history themselves.2157    console.warn('[Peach] takeVaultSnapshot failed:', err);2158    if (String(err).includes('QUOTA') || String(err).includes('quota')) {2159      try {2160        await chrome.runtime.sendMessage({ type: 'VAULT_STORAGE_QUOTA_WARNING' });2161      } catch {2162        // popup may be closed; surfaced via console.warn above2163      }2164    }2165  }2166}21672168/** Wipe all vault history. Called by Panic / DESTROY_VAULT. */2169export async function clearVaultHistory(): Promise<void> {2170  try {2171    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [HISTORY_KEY]: { snapshots: [] } satisfies VaultHistory });2172  } catch {2173    // Non-fatal — DESTROY_VAULT also runs storage.local.clear().2174  }2175}21762177/** Read all snapshots, newest first, for the Settings vault history view. */2178export async function getVaultHistory(): Promise<VaultSnapshot[]> {2179  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get(HISTORY_KEY);2180  const history = (raw as Record<string, VaultHistory | undefined>)[HISTORY_KEY];2181  if (!history || !Array.isArray(history.snapshots)) return [];2182  return history.snapshots;2183}21842185/**2186 * Replace the on-disk vault with the chosen snapshot's blobs and lock the2187 * vault. The current state is itself snapshotted with reason 'restore' first2188 * so the restore is reversible. After this returns, the user must unlock2189 * with the password that matches the restored blob.2190 */2191export async function restoreVaultSnapshot(2192  snapshotId: string,2193): Promise<{ ok: true } | { ok: false; error: string }> {2194  const history = await getVaultHistory();2195  const snapshot = history.find((s) => s.id === snapshotId);2196  if (!snapshot) return { ok: false, error: "snapshot_not_found" };21972198  // Snapshot the about-to-be-replaced current state so the restore is2199  // reversible. takeVaultSnapshot is no-op when the most recent entry is2200  // byte-identical, so a restore-of-a-restore stays clean.2201  await takeVaultSnapshot("restore");22022203  let restoredA: StoredVault;2204  let restoredB: StoredVault;2205  try {2206    restoredA = JSON.parse(snapshot.vault_a) as StoredVault;2207    restoredB = JSON.parse(snapshot.vault_b) as StoredVault;2208  } catch {2209    return { ok: false, error: "snapshot_corrupt" };2210  }22112212  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, restoredA);2213  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, restoredB);2214  await stampLocalVaultMutation();22152216  // Lock so the user must prove they can decrypt the restored blob. If they2217  // restored a pre-password-change snapshot they discover it immediately at2218  // the lock screen rather than silently holding an inaccessible vault.2219  lock();22202221  return { ok: true };2222}22232224/**2225 * Change the master password. Re-encrypts slot A with a fresh salt + new2226 * derived key. Slot B (duress or noise) is left untouched when duress is2227 * configured — it uses an independent key derived from the duress password —2228 * and regenerated as noise when duress is not configured.2229 */2230export async function changePassword(2231  currentPassword: string,2232  newPassword: string2233): Promise<boolean> {2234  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") return false;22352236  // Verify current password before allowing any change2237  const valid = await verifyMainPassword(currentPassword);2238  if (!valid) return false;22392240  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);2241  if (!slotA) return false;2242  if (!rootKey) return false;22432244  // Derive fresh key from new password + new random salt2245  const newSalt = generateSalt();2246  const newKey = await deriveKey(newPassword, newSalt);22472248  // Re-encrypt the in-memory entries with the new key2249  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured);2250  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(newKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");22512252  // Pre-wrap root key under the new derived key. Recovery fields wrap rootKey2253  // under recovery words and remain untouched — recovery phrase keeps working2254  // across password changes (H4/COR-002).2255  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(newKey, rootKey);22562257  const finalSlotA: StoredVault = {2258    ...slotA,2259    salt: hex(newSalt),2260    nonce,2261    ciphertext,2262    tag,2263    ...pwRoot,2264  };22652266  // Snapshot the OLD-key blob before overwriting it. If the user later2267  // restores from this snapshot they will need the OLD password — the2268  // post-restore lock surfaces that immediately.2269  await takeVaultSnapshot("local_save");22702271  // Single atomic write: ciphertext, salt, and pw_root_* fields all land in2272  // one storage transaction. An SW kill before this point leaves the old2273  // slot intact; after this point everything tied to the new password is2274  // already on disk together (M6/COR-004).2275  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, finalSlotA);22762277  // Swap the in-memory key synchronously before any further await. If we2278  // threw between the Slot A write and this swap, the next persistEntries()2279  // would overwrite Slot A with old-key ciphertext, locking the user out.2280  zeroKey(derivedKey);2281  derivedKey = newKey;22822283  // Regenerate noise for slot B when duress is not in use. Runs after the2284  // key swap so a failure here is a disposable noise regeneration, not a2285  // lockout.2286  if (!duressConfigured) {2287    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2));2288  }2289  await stampLocalVaultMutation();22902291  return true;2292}