vault.ts

1/**2 * vault.ts — sole owner of vault state and chrome.storage vault keys.3 *4 * Every read/write of `peach_vault_a`, `peach_vault_b`, and `peach_settings`5 * goes through this module. No other file accesses those keys directly.6 * External callers reach vault operations via `messages.ts` — never by7 * importing from here cross-boundary (popup/content must not). Invariants8 * for the two-slot schema, unlock timing, and key/disk atomicity are in9 * Projects.md §3.2–§3.6.10 */1112import { deriveKey, generateSalt } from "../crypto/argon2";13import { extractDomain } from "../shared/domain";14import {15  rootKeyToWords,16  wordsToRootKeyMaterial,17  deriveRecoveryKey,18} from "../shared/recovery-words";19import type {20  AccentColorName,21  LegacyVaultEntry,22  ManualSummonRecord,23  SavedIdentity,24  StoredVault,25  VaultEntry,26  VaultHistory,27  VaultSnapshot,28} from "../shared/types";29import { decrypt, encrypt, zeroKey } from "./aes";30import { clearAutoLock, touchAutoLock } from "./alarms";3132type EntryDraft = Omit<33  VaultEntry,34  "id" | "createdAt" | "modifiedAt" | "deletedAt"35>;3637// Slot-neutral storage keys (v1.4.24+). Both slots always exist; slot B38// either holds the decoy vault (when duress is configured) or random noise39// that looks identical at rest. No external indicator is stored — duress40// configuration is recorded only inside the encrypted payload of slot A.41const SLOT_A = "peach_vault_a";42const SLOT_B = "peach_vault_b";4344// Legacy keys, migrated away on first access.45const LEGACY_MAIN = "peach_vault";46const LEGACY_DECOY = "peach_decoy_vault";47const LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG = "peach_duress";4849// Plaintext is padded to the next multiple of this size before encryption.50// This coarsens ciphertext-length leakage into 1 KiB buckets.51const PAD_BLOCK = 1024;5253let derivedKey: Uint8Array | null = null;54// 32-byte random root key, separate from the derivedKey used for vault encryption.55// The root key is wrapped (encrypted) under the recovery key derived from the56// 12-word phrase. When the user changes their password, only the wrapping changes;57// the root key and recovery words remain stable.58let rootKey: Uint8Array | null = null;59let entries: VaultEntry[] = [];60let domainIndex: Map<string, VaultEntry[]> = new Map();61let vaultMode: "real" | "decoy" = "real";62// Cached post-unlock view of whether the real vault records that duress is63// configured. Only meaningful after a real-mode unlock; for decoy-mode unlock64// this stays false because we never see slot A's plaintext.65let duressConfigured = false;6667let migrationRan = false;6869// Set to a corruption reason during the last unlock() attempt when both slots70// decrypted but failed schema validation. Consumed and cleared by71// consumeLastUnlockFailureReason() so messages.ts can surface vault_corrupted72// distinctly from wrong-password (M7/COR-007).73let lastUnlockFailureReason: string | null = null;7475export function consumeLastUnlockFailureReason(): string | null {76  const r = lastUnlockFailureReason;77  lastUnlockFailureReason = null;78  return r;79}8081// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------82// Settings (persisted inside the encrypted vault store as a sidecar key)83// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------8485export type DisplayFont = "cormorant-italic" | "cormorant" | "inter" | "system";86export type TextSize = "small" | "medium" | "large";8788export interface VaultSettings {89  accentColor?: AccentColorName;90  theme?: "dark" | "light";91  autoLockMinutes?: number;92  clipboardClearSeconds?: number;93  lockOnClose?: boolean;94  breachMonitoring?: boolean;95  passkeyProviderEnabled?: boolean;96  trashRetentionDays?: number;97  manualSummonDomains?: Record<string, ManualSummonRecord>;98  declinedCardFingerprints?: string[];99  /**100   * Display font for headlines, brand wordmark, and narrative copy. Default101   * is "cormorant-italic" — the bold italic serif that ships as Peach's102   * voice. Non-italic options exist for users who prefer upright type.103   */104  displayFont?: DisplayFont;105  /**106   * Text size scale for body copy and entry titles. Stops at "large" by107   * design — XL clips dense screens (Vault, Health) inside the fixed108   * 330×480 popup surface.109   */110  textSize?: TextSize;111  /**112   * When true, all entrance/exit transitions and ambient animations are113   * collapsed to instant. Honoured alongside the user's OS-level114   * `prefers-reduced-motion`.115   */116  reduceMotion?: boolean;117  /**118   * Android-only: when true, the master key is escrowed in AndroidKeyStore119   * and the lock screen offers biometric unlock. Toggled from Settings →120   * Security → Biometrics. Has no effect on desktop builds.121   */122  biometricsEnabled?: boolean;123  /**124   * User overrides for keyboard shortcuts. Keys are ShortcutAction names125   * (see src/shared/shortcuts.ts). Missing actions fall through to126   * DEFAULT_BINDINGS — `getActiveBindings(settings.shortcuts)` is the127   * canonical lookup. Storing only the deltas keeps the vault payload128   * small and lets default updates land for users who never rebind.129   */130  shortcuts?: Record<string, { key: string; ctrl?: boolean; meta?: boolean; shift?: boolean; alt?: boolean }>;131}132133let settings: VaultSettings = {};134135export function getSettings(): VaultSettings {136  return settings;137}138139export async function ensureSettingsLoaded(): Promise<VaultSettings> {140  await loadSettings();141  return settings;142}143144export async function updateSettings(patch: Partial<VaultSettings>): Promise<void> {145  await loadSettings();146  settings = { ...settings, ...patch };147  await persistSettings();148}149150async function persistSettings(): Promise<void> {151  try {152    await chrome.storage.local.set({ peach_settings: settings });153  } catch (err) {154    throw mapStorageError(err);155  }156}157158function mapStorageError(err: unknown): Error {159  const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);160  if (/QUOTA_BYTES|quota/i.test(message)) {161    return new Error("STORAGE_QUOTA_EXCEEDED");162  }163  return err instanceof Error ? err : new Error(message);164}165166async function loadSettings(): Promise<void> {167  const result = await chrome.storage.local.get("peach_settings");168  settings = (result as { peach_settings?: VaultSettings }).peach_settings ?? {};169}170171// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------172// HIBP breach check (k-anonymity model)173// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------174175export async function checkBreach(password: string): Promise<number> {176  const encoder = new TextEncoder();177  const hashBuffer = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-1", encoder.encode(password));178  const hashHex = Array.from(new Uint8Array(hashBuffer))179    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))180    .join("")181    .toUpperCase();182183  const prefix = hashHex.slice(0, 5);184  const suffix = hashHex.slice(5);185186  try {187    const res = await fetch(`https://api.pwnedpasswords.com/range/${prefix}`);188    if (!res.ok) return 0;189    const text = await res.text();190    const match = text.split("\r\n").find((l) => l.startsWith(suffix));191    return match ? parseInt(match.split(":")[1], 10) : 0;192  } catch {193    return 0; // Network unavailable — don't block194  }195}196197export async function declineCardSaveOffer(last4: string, expMonth: string, expYear: string): Promise<void> {198  const fingerprint = await cardFingerprint(last4, expMonth, expYear);199  await loadSettings();200  settings = {201    ...settings,202    declinedCardFingerprints: [...(settings.declinedCardFingerprints ?? []), fingerprint],203  };204  await persistSettings();205}206207export async function isCardDeclined(last4: string, expMonth: string, expYear: string): Promise<boolean> {208  await loadSettings();209  const fingerprint = await cardFingerprint(last4, expMonth, expYear);210  return (settings.declinedCardFingerprints ?? []).includes(fingerprint);211}212213async function cardFingerprint(last4: string, expMonth: string, expYear: string): Promise<string> {214  const encoder = new TextEncoder();215  const buf = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-1", encoder.encode(`${last4}${expMonth}${expYear}`));216  return Array.from(new Uint8Array(buf)).map(b => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0")).join("");217}218219function hex(buf: Uint8Array): string {220  return Array.from(buf)221    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))222    .join("");223}224225function unhex(s: string): Uint8Array {226  const out = new Uint8Array(s.length / 2);227  for (let i = 0; i < s.length; i += 2) {228    out[i / 2] = parseInt(s.slice(i, i + 2), 16);229  }230  return out;231}232233// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------234// Root key generation and recovery word wrapping235// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------236237/**238 * Generate a random 32-byte root key and wrap it (AES-256-GCM) under a key239 * derived from the recovery word material via HKDF-SHA256. The wrapped blob240 * fields are stored in slot A alongside the password-wrapped ciphertext. The241 * root key itself is kept in memory for the session so getRecoveryWords() can242 * encode it without re-deriving.243 */244async function generateAndWrapRootKey(): Promise<{245  rawRootKey: string; // hex of the plaintext root key — caller stores in rootKey246  recoverySalt: string;247  wrappedRootKey: string;248  wrappedNonce: string;249  wrappedTag: string;250}> {251  const rootKeyBytes = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32));252253  // Derive the recovery key from the BIP39 words encoding of the root key.254  const words = await rootKeyToWords(rootKeyBytes);255  const wordMaterial = await wordsToRootKeyMaterial(words);256  const recoverySalt = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));257  const recoveryKey = await deriveRecoveryKey(wordMaterial, recoverySalt);258259  // Wrap the root key with the recovery key using AES-256-GCM directly.260  // We hex-encode rootKeyBytes so the plaintext is always valid UTF-8.261  const nonce = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));262  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(hex(rootKeyBytes));263  const raw = await crypto.subtle.encrypt(264    {265      name: "AES-GCM",266      iv: nonce,267      additionalData: new Uint8Array([1]).buffer as ArrayBuffer,268      tagLength: 128,269    },270    recoveryKey,271    encoded272  );273  // WebCrypto returns ciphertext || auth tag concatenated; split them.274  const rawU8 = new Uint8Array(raw);275  const ciphertext = hex(rawU8.slice(0, rawU8.length - 16));276  const tag = hex(rawU8.slice(rawU8.length - 16));277278  return {279    rawRootKey: hex(rootKeyBytes),280    recoverySalt: hex(recoverySalt),281    wrappedRootKey: ciphertext,282    wrappedNonce: hex(nonce),283    wrappedTag: tag,284  };285}286287/**288 * Unwrap the root key using recovery words. Called during recovery flow when289 * the user provides their 12-word phrase and a new password.290 * Exported for use by the RECOVER_WITH_WORDS message handler.291 */292export async function unwrapRootKeyForRecovery(293  wrappedRootKey: string,294  wrappedNonce: string,295  wrappedTag: string,296  recoverySaltHex: string,297  words: string[]298): Promise<void> {299  const wordMaterial = await wordsToRootKeyMaterial(words);300  const recoverySalt = unhex(recoverySaltHex);301  const recoveryKey = await deriveRecoveryKey(wordMaterial, recoverySalt);302303  // Decrypt and cache the root key. The root key bytes were hex-encoded before304  // encryption so the ciphertext is valid UTF-8. We inline the AES-GCM decrypt305  // here to avoid passing a CryptoKey to the string-based encrypt/decrypt helpers.306  // Each component is stored separately in the vault slot; decode them individually307  // so the nonce is always exactly the 12 bytes from wrappedNonce.308  const nonceRaw = unhex(wrappedNonce);309  const ciphertextRaw = unhex(wrappedRootKey);310  const tagRaw = unhex(wrappedTag);311  // Combine ciphertext and tag for AES-GCM (expects ciphertext||tag).312  // Use explicit ArrayBuffer allocations to satisfy TS BufferSource constraints.313  const nonceU8 = nonceRaw as unknown as Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>;314  const combined = new Uint8Array(ciphertextRaw.length + tagRaw.length);315  combined.set(ciphertextRaw, 0);316  combined.set(tagRaw, ciphertextRaw.length);317  const raw = await crypto.subtle.decrypt(318    { name: "AES-GCM", iv: nonceU8, additionalData: new Uint8Array([1]).buffer as ArrayBuffer, tagLength: 128 },319    recoveryKey,320    combined321  );322  const decryptedHex = new TextDecoder().decode(raw);323  rootKey = unhex(decryptedHex);324}325326/**327 * Re-wrap the cached root key under a new derived key (from the user's new328 * password). Called after password change and after recovery re-key so the329 * same recovery words continue to work with the updated password — and so330 * subsequent unlocks can rehydrate rootKey via deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey.331 *332 * recovery_* fields are intentionally not touched: those wrap rootKey under333 * the recovery words, which do not change when the password changes.334 */335export async function rewrapRootKeyForPassword(336  newDerivedKey: Uint8Array,337  _newSalt: Uint8Array338): Promise<void> {339  if (!rootKey) throw new Error("root key not set");340  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);341  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");342  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(newDerivedKey, rootKey);343  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, { ...slotA, ...pwRoot });344}345346/**347 * Change the vault encryption to a new derived key (already derived from348 * the user's new password). Used by RECOVER_WITH_WORDS and changePassword.349 * Caller is responsible for key swap and snapshot.350 */351async function reencryptVaultForNewKey(352  newKey: Uint8Array,353  slotA: StoredVault354): Promise<void> {355  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured);356  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(newKey, plaintext);357  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, {358    ...slotA,359    nonce,360    ciphertext,361    tag,362  });363}364365/**366 * Full password change with an already-derived key (used after recovery).367 * Unlike changePassword(), this skips re-verification of current password368 * since recovery flow has already validated the user's identity via words.369 */370export async function changePasswordWithNewKey(371  newSalt: Uint8Array,372  newKey: Uint8Array373): Promise<void> {374  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);375  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");376  // reencryptVaultForNewKey must receive the updated salt so that subsequent377  // UNLOCK calls with the new password can re-derive the correct key.378  await reencryptVaultForNewKey(newKey, { ...slotA, salt: hex(newSalt) });379  if (derivedKey) zeroKey(derivedKey);380  derivedKey = newKey;381  // Refresh pw_root_* under the new key so deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey works382  // on the next unlock (H2/COR-006). If rootKey is missing — recovery flow383  // should have populated it — fall back silently rather than blowing up the384  // recovery path; migrateToRecovery will rehydrate on the next unlock.385  if (rootKey) {386    const slotAfter = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);387    if (slotAfter) {388      const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(newKey, rootKey);389      await writeSlot(SLOT_A, { ...slotAfter, ...pwRoot });390    }391  }392  if (!duressConfigured) {393    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(slotA.ciphertext.length / 2));394  }395  await stampLocalVaultMutation();396}397398// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------399// Salt generation --- exported so the RECOVER_WITH_WORDS handler can derive400// a new key after password reset without re-importing the crypto module.401// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------402403export { deriveKey, generateSalt };404405export async function loadSlotA(): Promise<StoredVault | null> {406  return loadSlot(SLOT_A);407}408409/**410 * Recover the session root key by AES-GCM-decrypting the pw_root_* fields411 * (a second wrapping of the root key under the password-derived key). This412 * is what makes GET_RECOVERY_WORDS work across lock/unlock cycles without413 * the user re-entering their recovery phrase: the same root key bytes —414 * and therefore the same 12 words — survive every unlock.415 *416 * Returns null when the pw_root fields are absent (pre-v2.12 vault that417 * hasn't been migrated yet) or when decryption fails (wrong derived key,418 * tampered ciphertext). On null the caller should fall through to419 * migrateToRecovery() to populate the fields.420 */421async function deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(422  derivedKeyBytes: Uint8Array,423  slotA: StoredVault,424): Promise<Uint8Array | null> {425  if (!slotA.pw_root_ciphertext || !slotA.pw_root_nonce || !slotA.pw_root_tag) {426    return null;427  }428  try {429    const rootHex = await decrypt(430      derivedKeyBytes,431      slotA.pw_root_nonce,432      slotA.pw_root_ciphertext,433      slotA.pw_root_tag,434    );435    return unhex(rootHex);436  } catch {437    return null;438  }439}440441// AES-GCM-wrap rootKey under derivedKey for the pw_root_* fields. Returns the442// hex-encoded ciphertext/nonce/tag triple ready to embed in StoredVault.443async function wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(444  derivedKeyBytes: Uint8Array,445  rootKeyBytes: Uint8Array,446): Promise<{ pw_root_ciphertext: string; pw_root_nonce: string; pw_root_tag: string }> {447  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKeyBytes, hex(rootKeyBytes));448  return {449    pw_root_ciphertext: ciphertext,450    pw_root_nonce: nonce,451    pw_root_tag: tag,452  };453}454455/**456 * For vaults created before v2.12 (no recovery_salt/recovery_wrapped_root_key),457 * generate the root key, wrap it under the recovery words, and persist the458 * recovery escrow into slot A. The caller must show the recovery words to the459 * user before calling this — once called, those words are the vault's recovery460 * path. This runs once, on the first unlock of an upgraded vault.461 */462export async function migrateToRecovery(): Promise<void> {463  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {464    throw new Error("vault must be unlocked in real mode");465  }466  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);467  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");468  const hasRecoveryEscrow =469    !!slotA.recovery_salt && !!slotA.recovery_wrapped_root_key;470  const hasPwRoot = !!slotA.pw_root_ciphertext && !!slotA.pw_root_nonce;471  if (hasRecoveryEscrow && hasPwRoot) return; // already done472473  // If recovery escrow already exists but pw_root doesn't, we cannot recover474  // the original rootKey without the user's words. The least-surprising path475  // is to rotate to a fresh root key — the user's old recovery words become476  // invalid but we surface peach_recovery_pending so the popup re-presents477  // the words. The unlock-path callers all set that flag.478  const { rawRootKey, recoverySalt, wrappedRootKey, wrappedNonce, wrappedTag } =479    await generateAndWrapRootKey();480  rootKey = unhex(rawRootKey);481482  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(derivedKey, rootKey);483  const nextSlotA: StoredVault = {484    ...slotA,485    recovery_salt: recoverySalt,486    recovery_wrapped_root_key: wrappedRootKey,487    recovery_nonce: wrappedNonce,488    recovery_tag: wrappedTag,489    ...pwRoot,490  };491  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, nextSlotA);492  await stampLocalVaultMutation();493}494495/**496 * Returns the 12 recovery words for the current session's root key.497 * Must be called while the vault is unlocked. Throws if recovery has not498 * been set up (pre-v2.12 vault that hasn't migrated yet).499 */500export async function getRecoveryWords(): Promise<string[]> {501  if (!rootKey) {502    throw new Error("recovery not set up — vault may need migration");503  }504  return rootKeyToWords(rootKey);505}506507async function loadSlot(key: string): Promise<StoredVault | null> {508  const result = await chrome.storage.local.get(key);509  return (result as Record<string, StoredVault | undefined>)[key] ?? null;510}511512async function writeSlot(key: string, vault: StoredVault): Promise<void> {513  try {514    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [key]: vault });515  } catch (err) {516    throw mapStorageError(err);517  }518}519520async function stampLocalVaultMutation(): Promise<void> {521  await chrome.storage.local.set({522    peach_last_modified_at: String(Date.now()),523  });524}525526/**527 * One-shot migration from the pre-A-2 schema (peach_vault + peach_decoy_vault528 * + peach_duress flag) to the slot-neutral schema (peach_vault_a +529 * peach_vault_b). Runs at most once per session; safe to call repeatedly.530 */531async function ensureMigrated(): Promise<void> {532  if (migrationRan) return;533  migrationRan = true;534535  const keys = [LEGACY_MAIN, LEGACY_DECOY, LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG, SLOT_A, SLOT_B];536  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get(keys);537  const slotAExists = raw[SLOT_A] !== undefined;538  const slotBExists = raw[SLOT_B] !== undefined;539  const legacyMain = raw[LEGACY_MAIN] as StoredVault | undefined;540  const legacyDecoy = raw[LEGACY_DECOY] as StoredVault | undefined;541542  // Fresh install with nothing in storage — nothing to do; createVault() sets up both slots.543  if (!slotAExists && !legacyMain) return;544545  // Already migrated.546  if (slotAExists && slotBExists && !legacyMain && !legacyDecoy) return;547548  let didMigrate = false;549  if (legacyMain && !slotAExists) {550    await writeSlot(SLOT_A, legacyMain);551    didMigrate = true;552  }553554  // If slot B isn't set, populate it: use legacy decoy when present, else noise.555  if (!slotBExists) {556    const target = (legacyMain ?? raw[SLOT_A]) as StoredVault | undefined;557    if (legacyDecoy) {558      await writeSlot(SLOT_B, legacyDecoy);559      didMigrate = true;560    } else if (target) {561      await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(target.ciphertext.length / 2));562      didMigrate = true;563    }564  }565566  const toRemove: string[] = [];567  if (legacyMain) toRemove.push(LEGACY_MAIN);568  if (legacyDecoy) toRemove.push(LEGACY_DECOY);569  if (raw[LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG] !== undefined) toRemove.push(LEGACY_DURESS_FLAG);570  if (toRemove.length > 0) {571    await chrome.storage.local.remove(toRemove);572    didMigrate = true;573  }574  if (didMigrate) {575    await stampLocalVaultMutation();576  }577}578579// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------580// Padding + noise helpers581// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------582583/**584 * Pads the plaintext string with trailing spaces so that the encoded byte585 * length is a multiple of PAD_BLOCK. JSON.parse tolerates trailing586 * whitespace after a complete document, so the padding is transparent on587 * decode. Ciphertext length equals plaintext length plus a 16-byte tag.588 */589function padPlaintext(json: string): string {590  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(json);591  const target = Math.max(PAD_BLOCK, Math.ceil(encoded.length / PAD_BLOCK) * PAD_BLOCK);592  const padLen = target - encoded.length;593  return json + " ".repeat(padLen);594}595596/**597 * Produces a StoredVault-shaped record filled with CSPRNG bytes. The598 * ciphertext length matches the given byte count. Because GCM ciphertext is599 * pseudo-random, this blob is indistinguishable at rest from a real600 * encrypted vault without the key.601 *602 * crypto.getRandomValues() caps each call at 65536 bytes (the Web Crypto603 * spec hard limit). Chunk the fill so vaults larger than that — common once604 * the user has dozens of entries or any passkey — don't throw.605 */606const CSPRNG_CHUNK = 65_536;607608function fillRandom(buf: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {609  for (let offset = 0; offset < buf.length; offset += CSPRNG_CHUNK) {610    const end = Math.min(offset + CSPRNG_CHUNK, buf.length);611    const chunk = new Uint8Array(end - offset);612    crypto.getRandomValues(chunk);613    buf.set(chunk, offset);614  }615  return buf;616}617618function generateNoiseBlob(ciphertextBytes: number): StoredVault {619  const salt = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));620  const nonce = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));621  const cipher = fillRandom(new Uint8Array(ciphertextBytes));622  const tag = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));623  return {624    version: 1,625    salt: hex(salt),626    nonce: hex(nonce),627    ciphertext: hex(cipher),628    tag: hex(tag),629  };630}631632// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------633// Encrypted plaintext envelope634// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------635636type VaultPayload = {637  entries: VaultEntry[];638  duressConfigured?: boolean;639};640641type DecryptedPayload = {642  entries: VaultEntry[];643  duressConfigured: boolean;644  /**645   * True when at least one entry in the on-disk payload had a legacy shape646   * (pre-v2.11.0 passkey type/flat fields, or pre-A-2 created/updated keys)647   * and got rewritten by normalizeEntry. The unlock path uses this to648   * persist the new shape immediately — without it, the migration would649   * re-run on every unlock and old shape never disappears from disk.650   */651  migratedFromLegacy: boolean;652};653654function encodePayload(entries: VaultEntry[], duress: boolean): string {655  const envelope: VaultPayload = { entries, duressConfigured: duress };656  return padPlaintext(JSON.stringify(envelope));657}658659function rawNeedsMigration(raw: VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry): boolean {660  if ("created" in raw || "updated" in raw) return true;661  const flat = raw as Partial<VaultEntry>;662  if (flat.type === "passkey") return true;663  // Flat rpId without a passkey sub-object means pre-v2.11.0 schema.664  if (flat.rpId !== undefined && flat.passkey === undefined) return true;665  return false;666}667668function decodePayload(plain: string): DecryptedPayload {669  const parsed = JSON.parse(plain) as670    | Array<VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry>671    | VaultPayload;672673  const rawEntries = Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed : parsed.entries ?? [];674  const flatMigrationNeeded = rawEntries.some(rawNeedsMigration);675676  const normalized = rawEntries.map(normalizeEntry);677  const { merged } = mergePasskeyOnlyIntoLogins(normalized);678679  if (Array.isArray(parsed)) {680    return {681      entries: normalized,682      duressConfigured: false,683      migratedFromLegacy: true, // pre-A-2 array shape always needs save684    };685  }686687  return {688    entries: normalized,689    duressConfigured: parsed.duressConfigured === true,690    migratedFromLegacy: flatMigrationNeeded || merged,691  };692}693694/**695 * One-time consolidation pass run alongside the legacy passkey migration.696 *697 * Pre-v2.11.0 the Chrome passkey path always created a fresh `type:"passkey"`698 * entry per registration — so users who tested registration multiple times699 * accumulated several passkey-bearing entries for the same RP, and the700 * migration to the unified shape carried that duplication forward. This701 * pass collapses the duplicates:702 *703 *   1. Group passkey-bearing (and not deleted) entries by `passkey.rpId`.704 *   2. Within each group, the most recently-active credential wins (prefer705 *      lastUsedAt, fall back to passkey.createdAt, fall back to modifiedAt).706 *   3. If a NON-passkey login entry exists for that RP (matched by url or707 *      additionalUrls hostname), attach the winning passkey to it and708 *      soft-delete every passkey-bearing entry in the group.709 *   4. Otherwise, soft-delete every loser in the group, keeping the winner710 *      as a passkey-only entry.711 *712 * Soft delete (deletedAt) rather than splice — the trash flow keeps the713 * record around for retention and the user can restore if the heuristic714 * picked wrong. The `merged` flag goes back to decodePayload so the715 * unlock path persists the consolidated shape immediately.716 */717function mergePasskeyOnlyIntoLogins(entries: VaultEntry[]): { merged: boolean } {718  let merged = false;719  const now = Date.now();720721  const candidates = entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt && e.passkey);722  const byRpId = new Map<string, VaultEntry[]>();723  for (const e of candidates) {724    const rpId = e.passkey!.rpId;725    const list = byRpId.get(rpId);726    if (list) list.push(e);727    else byRpId.set(rpId, [e]);728  }729730  for (const [rpId, group] of byRpId) {731    if (group.length === 0) continue;732    group.sort((a, b) => {733      const aT =734        a.passkey!.lastUsedAt ?? a.passkey!.createdAt ?? a.modifiedAt ?? a.createdAt;735      const bT =736        b.passkey!.lastUsedAt ?? b.passkey!.createdAt ?? b.modifiedAt ?? b.createdAt;737      return bT - aT;738    });739    const winner = group[0]!;740741    // Look for a NON-passkey login entry matching this RP. Use the URL742    // hostname rather than a substring search so a "login.foo.com" entry743    // doesn't accidentally absorb a passkey for "foo.com".744    const loginTarget = entries.find((e) => {745      if (e.deletedAt || e.passkey || e.type !== "login") return false;746      if (e.url && extractDomain(e.url) === rpId) return true;747      for (const extra of e.additionalUrls ?? []) {748        if (extractDomain(extra) === rpId) return true;749      }750      return false;751    });752753    if (loginTarget) {754      loginTarget.passkey = winner.passkey;755      loginTarget.modifiedAt = now;756      for (const dup of group) {757        if (!dup.deletedAt) {758          dup.deletedAt = now;759          dup.modifiedAt = now;760        }761      }762      merged = true;763    } else if (group.length > 1) {764      for (let i = 1; i < group.length; i += 1) {765        const dup = group[i]!;766        if (!dup.deletedAt) {767          dup.deletedAt = now;768          dup.modifiedAt = now;769        }770      }771      merged = true;772    }773  }774775  return { merged };776}777778// Validates that a `StoredVault` record on disk has the field shape we expect779// before treating an AES-GCM decrypt success as a clean unlock. AES-GCM only780// authenticates the static VERSION_BYTE AAD, not the `version` field on the781// outer record — a corrupted `version: 42` slot still decrypts cleanly. This782// check surfaces that as `corrupted` (M7/COR-007) so the popup can offer a783// history-restore path instead of falsely reporting "wrong password".784function hasValidVaultSchema(v: unknown): v is StoredVault {785  if (typeof v !== "object" || v === null) return false;786  const r = v as Record<string, unknown>;787  return (788    r.version === 1 &&789    typeof r.salt === "string" &&790    typeof r.nonce === "string" &&791    typeof r.ciphertext === "string" &&792    typeof r.tag === "string"793  );794}795796export type TryDecryptResult =797  | { status: "ok"; payload: DecryptedPayload }798  | { status: "wrong_key" }799  | { status: "corrupted"; reason: string };800801// Exported solely for `unlockFromCodex` below, which needs to verify a802// supplied passphrase against a slotA blob *without* committing anything to803// storage. Keep this internal otherwise — callers crossing the messages.ts804// boundary should always go through `unlock` / `verifyMainPassword` so the805// constant-time invariants in Projects.md §3.4 are not bypassed.806export async function tryDecryptSlot(807  vault: StoredVault,808  key: Uint8Array809): Promise<DecryptedPayload | null> {810  const res = await tryDecryptSlotResult(vault, key);811  return res.status === "ok" ? res.payload : null;812}813814export async function tryDecryptSlotResult(815  vault: StoredVault,816  key: Uint8Array817): Promise<TryDecryptResult> {818  if (!hasValidVaultSchema(vault)) {819    return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_slot_schema" };820  }821  let plain: string;822  try {823    plain = await decrypt(key, vault.nonce, vault.ciphertext, vault.tag);824  } catch {825    return { status: "wrong_key" };826  }827  try {828    const parsed = JSON.parse(plain) as unknown;829    if (typeof parsed !== "object" || parsed === null) {830      return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_payload_shape" };831    }832    if (!Array.isArray(parsed) && !Array.isArray((parsed as VaultPayload).entries)) {833      return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_payload_shape" };834    }835    return { status: "ok", payload: decodePayload(plain) };836  } catch {837    return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_payload_json" };838  }839}840841// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------842// Core operations843// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------844845function buildDomainIndexSync(all: VaultEntry[]): void {846  domainIndex = new Map();847848  for (const entry of all) {849    if (entry.deletedAt) continue;850    if (entry.type === "note" || entry.type === "card") continue;851852    // An entry can match multiple sites via `additionalUrls`. Index each853    // hostname so `queryDomain` returns the entry regardless of which alias854    // the user is currently visiting. Dedupe per-entry so a single entry855    // never appears twice in one bucket.856    const domains = new Set<string>();857    const primary = extractDomain(entry.url ?? "");858    if (primary) domains.add(primary);859    for (const extra of entry.additionalUrls ?? []) {860      const d = extractDomain(extra);861      if (d) domains.add(d);862    }863    if (domains.size === 0) continue;864865    for (const domain of domains) {866      const bucket = domainIndex.get(domain) ?? [];867      bucket.push(entry);868      domainIndex.set(domain, bucket);869    }870  }871}872873export async function createVault(password: string): Promise<void> {874  await ensureMigrated();875876  const salt = generateSalt();877  derivedKey = await deriveKey(password, salt);878  entries = [];879  vaultMode = "real";880  duressConfigured = false;881  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);882883  // Generate and wrap the root key for recovery word escrow.884  const { rawRootKey, recoverySalt, wrappedRootKey, wrappedNonce, wrappedTag } =885    await generateAndWrapRootKey();886  rootKey = unhex(rawRootKey);887888  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured);889  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKey, plaintext);890891  // Second wrapping of rootKey under derivedKey so future unlocks can rehydrate892  // it without recovery words (H2/COR-006).893  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(derivedKey, rootKey);894895  const slotA: StoredVault = {896    version: 1,897    salt: hex(salt),898    nonce,899    ciphertext,900    tag,901    recovery_salt: recoverySalt,902    recovery_wrapped_root_key: wrappedRootKey,903    recovery_nonce: wrappedNonce,904    recovery_tag: wrappedTag,905    ...pwRoot,906  };907  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, slotA);908909  // Matching-size noise blob for slot B, so a fresh install shows two910  // similarly-shaped records regardless of whether duress is ever set up.911  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2));912  await stampLocalVaultMutation();913914  touchAutoLock();915}916917export async function hasVault(): Promise<boolean> {918  await ensureMigrated();919  return (await loadSlot(SLOT_A)) !== null;920}921922/**923 * Returns whether the real vault has recorded that a duress passphrase is924 * configured. Reliable only after a real-mode unlock — before unlock or in925 * decoy mode, returns false because we cannot read slot A's plaintext.926 */927export async function isDuressEnabled(): Promise<boolean> {928  return vaultMode === "real" && duressConfigured;929}930931export async function setupDuress(duressPassword: string): Promise<void> {932  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {933    throw new Error("vault must be unlocked in real mode");934  }935  await ensureMigrated();936937  // Encrypt the decoy payload (empty entries) under the duress key. Pad to938  // at least the current slot A ciphertext size so the two slots look the939  // same at rest at setup time.940  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);941  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");942943  const decoySalt = generateSalt();944  const decoyKey = await deriveKey(duressPassword, decoySalt);945  try {946    // Pad the decoy plaintext to match slot A's ciphertext length (minus the947    // 16-byte tag) so encrypted sizes align exactly.948    const targetBytes = slotA.ciphertext.length / 2;949    let plaintext = encodePayload([], false);950    const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(plaintext);951    if (encoded.length < targetBytes) {952      plaintext = plaintext + " ".repeat(targetBytes - encoded.length);953    }954    const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(decoyKey, plaintext);955    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, {956      version: 1,957      salt: hex(decoySalt),958      nonce,959      ciphertext,960      tag,961    });962  } finally {963    zeroKey(decoyKey);964  }965966  // Re-encrypt slot A with the duressConfigured flag set to true. No external967  // flag is written — the bit lives inside the encrypted envelope.968  duressConfigured = true;969  await persistSlotA();970}971972export async function disableDuress(): Promise<void> {973  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {974    throw new Error("vault must be unlocked in real mode");975  }976  await ensureMigrated();977978  // Overwrite slot B with fresh noise that matches slot A's size. The slot979  // remains occupied so its mere existence does not signal that duress was980  // ever configured.981  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);982  if (slotA) {983    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(slotA.ciphertext.length / 2));984  }985986  duressConfigured = false;987  await persistSlotA();988}989990export async function verifyMainPassword(password: string): Promise<boolean> {991  await ensureMigrated();992  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);993  if (!slotA) return false;994  const key = await deriveKey(password, unhex(slotA.salt));995  try {996    return (await tryDecryptSlot(slotA, key)) !== null;997  } finally {998    zeroKey(key);999  }1000}10011002export async function unlock(password: string): Promise<boolean> {1003  await ensureMigrated();10041005  // Load both slots in parallel. Both always exist post-migration; the1006  // parallel load and the parallel derivation below keep wall-clock time1007  // constant regardless of which slot's passphrase (real or decoy) the1008  // caller supplied, so a timing side channel cannot distinguish the1009  // duress path from the real-unlock path (DUR-002).1010  const [slotA, slotB] = await Promise.all([1011    loadSlot(SLOT_A),1012    loadSlot(SLOT_B),1013  ]);10141015  // Derive both keys in parallel, unconditionally.1016  const [keyA, keyB] = await Promise.all([1017    slotA ? deriveKey(password, unhex(slotA.salt)) : Promise.resolve(null),1018    slotB ? deriveKey(password, unhex(slotB.salt)) : Promise.resolve(null),1019  ]);10201021  // Attempt both decrypts in parallel. The Result variant lets us distinguish1022  // 'wrong_key' from 'corrupted' so callers can offer a history-restore path1023  // when a slot's schema is invalid even though AES-GCM authenticated (M7).1024  const [resultA, resultB] = await Promise.all([1025    keyA && slotA1026      ? tryDecryptSlotResult(slotA, keyA)1027      : Promise.resolve({ status: "wrong_key" } as TryDecryptResult),1028    keyB && slotB1029      ? tryDecryptSlotResult(slotB, keyB)1030      : Promise.resolve({ status: "wrong_key" } as TryDecryptResult),1031  ]);1032  const payloadA = resultA.status === "ok" ? resultA.payload : null;1033  const payloadB = resultB.status === "ok" ? resultB.payload : null;10341035  if (payloadA && keyA) {1036    derivedKey = keyA;1037    vaultMode = "real";1038    entries = payloadA.entries;1039    duressConfigured = payloadA.duressConfigured;1040    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1041    await loadSettings();1042    touchAutoLock();1043    if (keyB) zeroKey(keyB);10441045    // slotA is non-null when payloadA is truthy (keyA was derived from slotA).1046    if (slotA) {1047      const needsRecoverySetup =1048        !slotA.recovery_salt || !slotA.recovery_wrapped_root_key;1049      if (!needsRecoverySetup) {1050        rootKey = await deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(keyA, slotA);1051      }1052      // Pre-v2.12 vault, or a vault whose pw_root_* fields haven't been written1053      // yet: generate the recovery escrow and seed pw_root_* so subsequent1054      // unlocks can rehydrate rootKey without the user's recovery words.1055      // Best-effort — a failure here must not block unlock.1056      if (needsRecoverySetup || !rootKey) {1057        try {1058          await migrateToRecovery();1059          if (needsRecoverySetup) {1060            // String "1" matches the popup's existing peach_recovery_pending1061            // check; surfaced so the user re-confirms recovery words after a1062            // legacy-vault unlock (H2/COR-006).1063            await chrome.storage.local.set({ peach_recovery_pending: '1' });1064          }1065        } catch (migrationErr) {1066          console.warn('[Peach] recovery migration failed:', migrationErr);1067        }1068      }1069    }10701071    // If the payload had a pre-v2.11.0 shape (legacy passkey type, flat1072    // passkey fields, or pre-A-2 created/updated keys), rewrite it now so1073    // the next save uses the new format and migration doesn't re-run forever.1074    if (payloadA.migratedFromLegacy) {1075      await persistSlotA();1076    }1077    return true;1078  }10791080  if (payloadB && keyB) {1081    derivedKey = keyB;1082    vaultMode = "decoy";1083    entries = payloadB.entries;1084    duressConfigured = false;1085    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1086    await loadSettings();1087    touchAutoLock();1088    if (keyA) zeroKey(keyA);1089    return true;1090  }10911092  if (keyA) zeroKey(keyA);1093  if (keyB) zeroKey(keyB);1094  // Surface corruption (good AES tag, broken schema) distinctly from1095  // wrong-password so the popup can offer history-restore (M7/COR-007).1096  if (resultA.status === "corrupted") {1097    lastUnlockFailureReason = resultA.reason;1098  } else if (resultB.status === "corrupted") {1099    lastUnlockFailureReason = resultB.reason;1100  }1101  return false;1102}11031104export function lock(): void {1105  if (derivedKey) {1106    zeroKey(derivedKey);1107    derivedKey = null;1108  }1109  if (rootKey) {1110    rootKey.fill(0);1111    rootKey = null;1112  }11131114  entries = [];1115  domainIndex = new Map();1116  vaultMode = "real";1117  duressConfigured = false;1118  clearAutoLock();1119}11201121export function isUnlocked(): boolean {1122  return derivedKey !== null;1123}11241125// Opens the vault using a pre-derived AES-256 key (skipping Argon2id).1126// Used by Android biometric unlock — the key was derived on the native side.1127export async function unlockWithKey(1128  masterKeyHex: string,1129): Promise<{ ok: true; entries: VaultEntry[] } | { ok: false; error: string }> {1130  try {1131    const masterKeyBytes = unhex(masterKeyHex);1132    const stored = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1133    if (!stored) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };1134    const payload = await tryDecryptSlot(stored, masterKeyBytes);1135    if (!payload) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };11361137    derivedKey = masterKeyBytes;1138    vaultMode = "real";1139    entries = payload.entries;1140    duressConfigured = payload.duressConfigured;1141    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1142    await loadSettings();1143    touchAutoLock();1144    return { ok: true, entries };1145  } catch {1146    return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };1147  }1148}11491150/**1151 * Restore the vault from a parsed Peach Codex payload.1152 *1153 * The supplied passphrase is verified against the Codex's slotA *before* any1154 * storage mutation — wrong passphrases return without touching disk. On1155 * success, the current vault state is snapshotted (reason: "restore") so the1156 * user can revert via Settings -> Vault History, then slotA/slotB are written1157 * and `peach_last_modified_at` is set to the Codex's recorded timestamp. A1158 * regular `unlock()` follows so the rest of the SW sees the standard1159 * post-unlock state.1160 *1161 * Intentionally non-Pro-gated — see peach_codex_v2.md "Pro gating". A Codex1162 * printed by a Pro user must always be restorable, even on a free device.1163 *1164 * Timing is not held constant here (in contrast to `unlock`): the Codex flow1165 * is an explicit user action with a known passphrase, not a passive lock1166 * screen, so the duress-vs-real timing side channel does not apply.1167 */1168export async function unlockFromCodex(params: {1169  slotA: string; // JSON string of StoredVault for slot A1170  slotB: string | null; // JSON string of StoredVault for slot B, or null1171  timestamp: number;1172  masterPassphrase: string;1173}): Promise<1174  | { ok: true; entryCount: number }1175  | { ok: false; reason: "wrong_passphrase" | "invalid_slot_format" }1176> {1177  let parsedSlotA: StoredVault;1178  let parsedSlotB: StoredVault | null = null;1179  try {1180    const rawA = JSON.parse(params.slotA) as unknown;1181    if (!hasValidVaultSchema(rawA)) {1182      return { ok: false, reason: "invalid_slot_format" };1183    }1184    parsedSlotA = rawA;1185    if (params.slotB !== null) {1186      const rawB = JSON.parse(params.slotB) as unknown;1187      if (!hasValidVaultSchema(rawB)) {1188        return { ok: false, reason: "invalid_slot_format" };1189      }1190      parsedSlotB = rawB;1191    }1192  } catch {1193    return { ok: false, reason: "invalid_slot_format" };1194  }11951196  // Verify the passphrase against the supplied slotA WITHOUT writing anything.1197  // If this fails the on-disk vault is left completely untouched.1198  const trialKey = await deriveKey(params.masterPassphrase, unhex(parsedSlotA.salt));1199  const trialPayload = await tryDecryptSlot(parsedSlotA, trialKey);1200  if (!trialPayload) {1201    zeroKey(trialKey);1202    return { ok: false, reason: "wrong_passphrase" };1203  }1204  // Drop the trial key; `unlock()` below derives its own copy. Holding two1205  // copies of the master key in memory at once would be a needless surface.1206  zeroKey(trialKey);12071208  // Snapshot the about-to-be-overwritten on-disk state so the user can revert1209  // a mistaken Codex restore via the Vault History UI. Non-fatal if it fails.1210  await takeVaultSnapshot("restore");12111212  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, parsedSlotA);1213  if (parsedSlotB) {1214    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, parsedSlotB);1215  } else {1216    // Slot B must always exist with ciphertext length matching slot A1217    // (Projects.md §3.2). Codex prints may omit slot B (duress wasn't1218    // configured); regenerate noise to satisfy the invariant.1219    await writeSlot(1220      SLOT_B,1221      generateNoiseBlob(parsedSlotA.ciphertext.length / 2),1222    );1223  }1224  await chrome.storage.local.set({1225    peach_last_modified_at: String(params.timestamp),1226  });12271228  // Standard unlock path so domain index, settings, auto-lock, and1229  // recovery-key state all populate exactly as a normal unlock would.1230  const ok = await unlock(params.masterPassphrase);1231  if (!ok) {1232    // Should be unreachable — we just verified the passphrase against the1233    // same slotA we wrote. Treat as wrong_passphrase to keep the contract1234    // simple if some race or storage anomaly intrudes.1235    return { ok: false, reason: "wrong_passphrase" };1236  }1237  return { ok: true, entryCount: getEntries().length };1238}12391240// Returns the current in-memory derived key as a hex string.1241// Used by the biometric enable flow in Settings to store the key in Android Keystore.1242export function getDerivedKeyHex(): string {1243  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_not_unlocked");1244  return hex(derivedKey);1245}12461247export function getEntries(): VaultEntry[] {1248  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");1249  return entries.filter((entry) => !entry.deletedAt);1250}12511252const EMAIL_RE = /^[^\s@]+@[^\s@]+\.[^\s@]+$/;12531254export function getIdentities(): SavedIdentity[] {1255  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");1256  const active = entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt && e.type === "login");12571258  const emailMap = new Map<string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }>();1259  const usernameMap = new Map<string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }>();12601261  for (const entry of active) {1262    const value = entry.username?.trim();1263    if (!value) continue;1264    const map = EMAIL_RE.test(value) ? emailMap : usernameMap;1265    const existing = map.get(value);1266    const domain = extractDomain(entry.url ?? "") ?? "";1267    const modifiedAt = entry.modifiedAt ?? entry.createdAt ?? 0;1268    if (!existing || modifiedAt > existing.lastUsed) {1269      map.set(value, { lastUsed: modifiedAt, count: (existing?.count ?? 0) + 1, domain });1270    } else {1271      map.set(value, { ...existing, count: existing.count + 1 });1272    }1273  }12741275  const toIdentity = (type: "email" | "username") =>1276    ([value, d]: [string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }]): SavedIdentity => ({1277      value, type, lastUsed: d.lastUsed, useCount: d.count, exampleDomain: d.domain || undefined,1278    });12791280  return [1281    ...[...emailMap.entries()].map(toIdentity("email")).sort((a, b) => b.useCount - a.useCount),1282    ...[...usernameMap.entries()].map(toIdentity("username")).sort((a, b) => b.useCount - a.useCount),1283  ];1284}12851286export async function batchAddEntries(drafts: EntryDraft[]): Promise<VaultEntry[]> {1287  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");12881289  const now = Date.now();1290  const added: VaultEntry[] = [];1291  for (const draft of drafts) {1292    try {1293      const sanitized = sanitizeEntryDraft(draft);1294      const nextEntry: VaultEntry = {1295        ...sanitized,1296        id: crypto.randomUUID(),1297        createdAt: now,1298        modifiedAt: now,1299      };1300      entries.push(nextEntry);1301      added.push(nextEntry);1302    } catch {1303      // Skip invalid drafts silently — caller can see diff between input and output length1304    }1305  }13061307  if (added.length > 0) {1308    await persistEntries();1309  }13101311  return added;1312}13131314/**1315 * Restore a set of entries in full fidelity — preserves id, createdAt,1316 * modifiedAt, and every other field unlike `batchAddEntries` which1317 * assigns fresh identity. Used by restore paths where the backup is the1318 * authoritative source of truth. `mode` controls how entries already in1319 * the vault are treated.1320 */1321export async function restoreEntries(1322  incoming: VaultEntry[],1323  mode: "replace" | "merge"1324): Promise<{ added: number; updated: number; skipped: number }> {1325  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");13261327  // A replace with zero incoming entries is almost certainly a caller bug1328  // (e.g. an import that silently dropped everything). Refuse rather than1329  // wipe the vault.1330  if (mode === "replace" && incoming.length === 0) {1331    throw new Error("refuse to replace with empty entry set");1332  }13331334  let added = 0;1335  let updated = 0;1336  let skipped = 0;13371338  if (mode === "replace") {1339    entries = [];1340    for (const entry of incoming) {1341      const normalized = sanitizeRestoredEntry(entry);1342      if (!normalized) {1343        skipped += 1;1344        continue;1345      }1346      entries.push(normalized);1347      added += 1;1348    }1349  } else {1350    const byId = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();1351    for (const e of entries) byId.set(e.id, e);13521353    for (const entry of incoming) {1354      const normalized = sanitizeRestoredEntry(entry);1355      if (!normalized) {1356        skipped += 1;1357        continue;1358      }1359      const existing = byId.get(normalized.id);1360      if (!existing) {1361        entries.push(normalized);1362        added += 1;1363      } else if (normalized.modifiedAt > existing.modifiedAt) {1364        const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === existing.id);1365        if (idx !== -1) {1366          entries[idx] = normalized;1367          updated += 1;1368        }1369      } else {1370        skipped += 1;1371      }1372    }1373  }13741375  await persistEntries("import");1376  return { added, updated, skipped };1377}13781379/**1380 * Validate + normalise a VaultEntry coming from a backup. Accepts1381 * anything structurally sound; keeps all metadata verbatim. Returns1382 * null for values the live vault shouldn't accept (e.g., missing title).1383 */1384function sanitizeRestoredEntry(entry: VaultEntry): VaultEntry | null {1385  if (!entry || typeof entry !== "object") return null;1386  const title = typeof entry.title === "string" ? entry.title.trim() : "";1387  if (!title) return null;1388  const id = typeof entry.id === "string" && entry.id ? entry.id : crypto.randomUUID();1389  const now = Date.now();1390  const createdAt = typeof entry.createdAt === "number" ? entry.createdAt : now;1391  const modifiedAt = typeof entry.modifiedAt === "number" ? entry.modifiedAt : createdAt;13921393  // Migrate legacy passkey shape on import (same logic as on-disk read).1394  // Imports from pre-v2.11.0 vault backups still carry type:"passkey" with1395  // flat fields; bring them into the new shape immediately.1396  const migrated: VaultEntry = migrateLegacyPasskey(1397    {1398      ...entry,1399      id,1400      title,1401      type: entry.type ?? "login",1402      createdAt,1403      modifiedAt,1404    },1405    entry1406  );14071408  // Login entries from backup must carry a password (or be passkey-only,1409  // in which case the passkey sub-object replaces the password requirement).1410  if (1411    migrated.type === "login" &&1412    !migrated.passkey &&1413    typeof migrated.password !== "string"1414  ) {1415    return null;1416  }1417  if (migrated.passkey && !migrated.passkey.credentialId) {1418    return null;1419  }14201421  return migrated;1422}14231424// Soft-deletes every non-deleted entry in one call. The literal string1425// argument is a tripwire against accidental calls — any caller that would1426// wipe the vault has to consciously type "REPLACE_ALL". Do not relax this1427// to a boolean.1428export async function clearVaultEntries(1429  confirmation: "REPLACE_ALL"1430): Promise<void> {1431  if (confirmation !== "REPLACE_ALL") {1432    throw new Error("clearVaultEntries requires explicit confirmation");1433  }1434  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");1435  for (const entry of entries) {1436    if (!entry.deletedAt) {1437      entry.deletedAt = Date.now();1438      entry.modifiedAt = Date.now();1439    }1440  }1441  await persistEntries();1442}14431444export async function addEntry(entry: EntryDraft): Promise<VaultEntry> {1445  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");14461447  const sanitized = sanitizeEntryDraft(entry);1448  const now = Date.now();1449  const nextEntry: VaultEntry = {1450    ...sanitized,1451    id: crypto.randomUUID(),1452    createdAt: now,1453    modifiedAt: now,1454    // Stamp passwordChangedAt at creation so age tracking is accurate from1455    // day one. Non-login entries carry the same stamp harmlessly.1456    passwordChangedAt: sanitized.password ? now : undefined,1457  };14581459  entries.push(nextEntry);1460  await persistEntries();14611462  // Fire-and-forget breach check (only for login entries if breach monitoring is enabled or not set)1463  if (settings.breachMonitoring !== false && nextEntry.type === "login" && nextEntry.password) {1464    checkBreach(nextEntry.password).then(async (count) => {1465      if (count > 0) {1466        const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === nextEntry.id);1467        if (idx !== -1) {1468          entries[idx] = { ...entries[idx], breach: count, modifiedAt: Date.now() };1469          await persistEntries();1470        }1471      }1472    });1473  }14741475  return nextEntry;1476}14771478export async function updateEntry(1479  id: string,1480  patch: Partial<VaultEntry>1481): Promise<void> {1482  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");14831484  const idx = entries.findIndex((entry) => entry.id === id);1485  if (idx === -1 || entries[idx].deletedAt) {1486    throw new Error("entry not found");1487  }14881489  const current = entries[idx];1490  const sanitizedPatch = sanitizeEntryPatch(patch);1491  // Refresh passwordChangedAt only when the password value actually changes —1492  // a metadata-only update (title, tags, etc.) must not reset the age clock1493  // that drives the Pro health rotation recommendation.1494  const passwordChanged =1495    "password" in patch &&1496    typeof sanitizedPatch.password === "string" &&1497    sanitizedPatch.password !== current.password;1498  entries[idx] = {1499    ...current,1500    ...sanitizedPatch,1501    modifiedAt: Date.now(),1502    ...(passwordChanged ? { passwordChangedAt: Date.now() } : {}),1503  };15041505  // A login entry must carry SOMETHING fillable — either a password or a1506  // passkey credential. An empty-password login with no passkey is dead1507  // state. Permit the password-clear when a passkey is attached (that's1508  // the legitimate "drop the password, keep the passkey" path).1509  if (1510    entries[idx].type === "login" &&1511    !entries[idx].password &&1512    !entries[idx].passkey1513  ) {1514    entries[idx] = current;1515    throw new Error("password or passkey required");1516  }15171518  // Card entries must retain their card number1519  if (entries[idx].type === "card" && !entries[idx].cardNumber) {1520    entries[idx] = current;1521    throw new Error("card number is required for card entries");1522  }15231524  await persistEntries();15251526  // Breach check when password changes: clear immediately so old breach doesn't linger,1527  // then async-check the new password and only re-set if it's also found.1528  if ("password" in patch && settings.breachMonitoring !== false && entries[idx].type === "login") {1529    entries[idx] = { ...entries[idx], breach: undefined };1530    await persistEntries();1531    const password = entries[idx].password;1532    if (password) {1533      checkBreach(password).then(async (count) => {1534        const i = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id);1535        if (i !== -1 && count > 0) {1536          entries[i] = { ...entries[i], breach: count, modifiedAt: Date.now() };1537          await persistEntries();1538        }1539      });1540    }1541  }1542}15431544export async function deleteEntry(id: string): Promise<void> {1545  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");15461547  const entry = entries.find((item) => item.id === id);1548  if (!entry || entry.deletedAt) {1549    throw new Error("entry not found");1550  }15511552  entry.deletedAt = Date.now();1553  entry.modifiedAt = Date.now();1554  await persistEntries();1555}15561557export function getDeletedEntries(): VaultEntry[] {1558  if (!derivedKey) return [];1559  return entries.filter((e) => !!e.deletedAt);1560}15611562export async function restoreEntry(id: string): Promise<void> {1563  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");1564  const entry = entries.find((e) => e.id === id && e.deletedAt);1565  if (!entry) throw new Error("deleted entry not found");1566  delete entry.deletedAt;1567  entry.modifiedAt = Date.now();1568  await persistEntries();1569  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1570}15711572export async function purgeEntry(id: string): Promise<void> {1573  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");1574  const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id && e.deletedAt);1575  if (idx === -1) throw new Error("deleted entry not found");1576  entries.splice(idx, 1);1577  await persistEntries();1578}15791580/** Permanently delete entries whose deletedAt is older than retentionMs. 0 = keep forever. */1581export async function purgeExpiredTrash(retentionMs: number): Promise<number> {1582  if (!derivedKey || retentionMs === 0) return 0;1583  const cutoff = Date.now() - retentionMs;1584  const before = entries.length;1585  entries = entries.filter((e) => !(e.deletedAt && e.deletedAt < cutoff));1586  const purged = before - entries.length;1587  if (purged > 0) await persistEntries();1588  return purged;1589}15901591export function queryDomain(domain: string): VaultEntry[] {1592  return domainIndex.get(domain) ?? [];1593}15941595export function getEntryById(id: string): VaultEntry | undefined {1596  return entries.find((entry) => entry.id === id && !entry.deletedAt);1597}15981599async function persistSlotA(1600  reason: VaultSnapshot["reason"] = "local_save",1601): Promise<StoredVault> {1602  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");16031604  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1605  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");16061607  // Snapshot the about-to-be-overwritten state BEFORE we mutate disk. Failures1608  // are swallowed by takeVaultSnapshot — history must never block a save.1609  await takeVaultSnapshot(reason);16101611  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured);1612  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKey, plaintext);16131614  // Preserve existing recovery escrow fields.1615  const nextSlotA: StoredVault = {1616    ...slotA,1617    nonce,1618    ciphertext,1619    tag,1620    // recovery_salt and recovery_wrapped_root_key are already set from loadSlot1621  };1622  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, nextSlotA);16231624  // When duress is not configured, keep slot B size-matched with slot A by1625  // regenerating its noise. When duress IS configured, leave slot B alone —1626  // we don't have the decoy key to re-encrypt it. This is a known trade-off.1627  if (!duressConfigured) {1628    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2));1629  }1630  await stampLocalVaultMutation();16311632  return nextSlotA;1633}16341635async function persistSlotB(): Promise<void> {1636  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");16371638  const slotB = await loadSlot(SLOT_B);1639  if (!slotB) throw new Error("missing slot B");16401641  // Decoy plaintext always reports duressConfigured=false — the decoy user1642  // sees a clean slate.1643  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, false);1644  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKey, plaintext);16451646  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, { ...slotB, nonce, ciphertext, tag });1647  await stampLocalVaultMutation();1648}16491650async function persistEntries(1651  reason: VaultSnapshot["reason"] = "local_save",1652): Promise<void> {1653  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");16541655  if (vaultMode === "decoy") {1656    await persistSlotB();1657  } else {1658    await persistSlotA(reason);1659  }1660  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1661}16621663function cleanAdditionalUrls(values: string[] | undefined): string[] | undefined {1664  if (!Array.isArray(values)) return undefined;1665  const seen = new Set<string>();1666  const cleaned: string[] = [];1667  for (const value of values) {1668    const trimmed = typeof value === "string" ? value.trim() : "";1669    if (!trimmed) continue;1670    const key = trimmed.toLowerCase();1671    if (seen.has(key)) continue;1672    seen.add(key);1673    cleaned.push(trimmed);1674  }1675  return cleaned.length > 0 ? cleaned : undefined;1676}16771678function sanitizeEntryDraft(entry: EntryDraft): EntryDraft {1679  const title = entry.title.trim();1680  // Accept legacy `type:"passkey"` drafts but rewrite to "login" — the new1681  // model is "any entry, optionally with a passkey sub-object." Imports and1682  // any in-flight callers from before v2.11.0 keep working without throwing.1683  let type: VaultEntry["type"] = entry.type ?? "login";1684  if (type === "passkey") type = "login";16851686  if (!title) throw new Error("title is required");1687  // A login entry needs either a password or a passkey credential to be useful.1688  // Passkey-only entries (passkey present, no password) are valid.1689  if (type === "login" && !entry.password?.trim() && !entry.passkey) {1690    throw new Error("password or passkey required");1691  }1692  if (entry.passkey) {1693    const p = entry.passkey;1694    if (1695      !p.rpId ||1696      !p.credentialId ||1697      !p.publicKeyCose ||1698      !p.userHandle ||1699      !p.userName ||1700      (p.algorithm !== -7 && p.algorithm !== -8)1701    ) {1702      throw new Error("invalid passkey credential");1703    }1704  }1705  if (type === "card") {1706    if (!entry.cardholderName?.trim() || !entry.cardNumber?.trim()) {1707      throw new Error("cardholder name and card number are required");1708    }1709  }17101711  return {1712    type,1713    title,1714    username: type === "login" ? entry.username?.trim() ?? "" : undefined,1715    password: type === "login" ? entry.password : undefined,1716    url: type === "login" ? entry.url?.trim() ?? "" : undefined,1717    additionalUrls: type === "login" ? cleanAdditionalUrls(entry.additionalUrls) : undefined,1718    totp: type === "login" ? entry.totp?.trim() || undefined : undefined,1719    notes: entry.notes?.trim() || undefined,1720    breach: type === "login" ? entry.breach : undefined,1721    canary: type === "login" ? entry.canary : undefined,1722    tags: entry.tags,1723    passkey: entry.passkey,1724    cardholderName: type === "card" ? entry.cardholderName?.trim() : undefined,1725    cardNumber: type === "card" ? entry.cardNumber?.trim() : undefined,1726    expMonth: type === "card" ? entry.expMonth?.trim() : undefined,1727    expYear: type === "card" ? entry.expYear?.trim() : undefined,1728    cvc: type === "card" ? entry.cvc?.trim() : undefined,1729    cardNickname: type === "card" ? entry.cardNickname?.trim() || undefined : undefined,1730    network: type === "card" ? entry.network : undefined,1731    last4: type === "card" ? entry.last4?.trim() : undefined,1732  };1733}17341735function sanitizeEntryPatch(patch: Partial<VaultEntry>): Partial<VaultEntry> {1736  const nextPatch: Partial<VaultEntry> = {};17371738  if ("type" in patch) {1739    nextPatch.type = patch.type;1740  }17411742  if ("title" in patch) {1743    const title = patch.title?.trim() ?? "";1744    if (!title) throw new Error("title is required");1745    nextPatch.title = title;1746  }17471748  if ("url" in patch) {1749    nextPatch.url = patch.url?.trim() ?? "";1750  }17511752  if ("additionalUrls" in patch) {1753    const incoming = Array.isArray(patch.additionalUrls) ? patch.additionalUrls : [];1754    const seen = new Set<string>();1755    const cleaned: string[] = [];1756    for (const value of incoming) {1757      const trimmed = typeof value === "string" ? value.trim() : "";1758      if (!trimmed) continue;1759      const key = trimmed.toLowerCase();1760      if (seen.has(key)) continue;1761      seen.add(key);1762      cleaned.push(trimmed);1763    }1764    nextPatch.additionalUrls = cleaned.length > 0 ? cleaned : undefined;1765  }17661767  if ("username" in patch) {1768    nextPatch.username = patch.username?.trim() ?? "";1769  }17701771  if ("email" in patch) {1772    nextPatch.email = patch.email?.trim() || undefined;1773  }17741775  if ("password" in patch) {1776    const password = patch.password ?? "";1777    // Allow clearing a password (e.g. on passkey-only entries)1778    nextPatch.password = password || undefined;1779  }17801781  if ("totp" in patch) {1782    nextPatch.totp = patch.totp?.trim() || undefined;1783  }17841785  if ("notes" in patch) {1786    nextPatch.notes = patch.notes?.trim() || undefined;1787  }17881789  if ("breach" in patch) {1790    nextPatch.breach = patch.breach;1791  }17921793  if ("canary" in patch) {1794    nextPatch.canary = patch.canary;1795  }17961797  if ("passkey" in patch) {1798    // Passkey sub-object replaces all the legacy flat passkey fields. A1799    // patch with `passkey: undefined` removes the credential from the entry1800    // (used by "remove passkey" without deleting the whole entry).1801    nextPatch.passkey = patch.passkey;1802  }18031804  if ("tags" in patch) {1805    nextPatch.tags = patch.tags;1806  }18071808  if ("cardholderName" in patch) {1809    nextPatch.cardholderName = patch.cardholderName?.trim() || undefined;1810  }1811  if ("cardNumber" in patch) {1812    const n = patch.cardNumber ?? "";1813    nextPatch.cardNumber = n || undefined;1814  }1815  if ("expMonth" in patch) {1816    nextPatch.expMonth = patch.expMonth?.trim() || undefined;1817  }1818  if ("expYear" in patch) {1819    nextPatch.expYear = patch.expYear?.trim() || undefined;1820  }1821  if ("cvc" in patch) {1822    nextPatch.cvc = patch.cvc?.trim() || undefined;1823  }1824  if ("cardNickname" in patch) {1825    nextPatch.cardNickname = patch.cardNickname?.trim() || undefined;1826  }1827  if ("network" in patch) {1828    nextPatch.network = patch.network;1829  }1830  if ("last4" in patch) {1831    nextPatch.last4 = patch.last4?.trim() || undefined;1832  }18331834  return nextPatch;1835}18361837function normalizeEntry(entry: VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry): VaultEntry {1838  const createdAt = "createdAt" in entry ? entry.createdAt : entry.created;1839  const modifiedAt =1840    "modifiedAt" in entry ? entry.modifiedAt : entry.updated;18411842  const base: VaultEntry = {1843    id: entry.id,1844    type: "type" in entry ? entry.type : "login",1845    title: entry.title,1846    username: entry.username,1847    password: entry.password,1848    url: entry.url,1849    totp: entry.totp,1850    notes: entry.notes,1851    breach: entry.breach,1852    canary: "canary" in entry ? entry.canary : undefined,1853    passkey: "passkey" in entry ? entry.passkey : undefined,1854    createdAt,1855    modifiedAt,1856    deletedAt: entry.deletedAt,1857    tags: "tags" in entry ? entry.tags : undefined,1858    cardholderName: "cardholderName" in entry ? entry.cardholderName : undefined,1859    cardNumber: "cardNumber" in entry ? entry.cardNumber : undefined,1860    expMonth: "expMonth" in entry ? entry.expMonth : undefined,1861    expYear: "expYear" in entry ? entry.expYear : undefined,1862    cvc: "cvc" in entry ? entry.cvc : undefined,1863    cardNickname: "cardNickname" in entry ? entry.cardNickname : undefined,1864    network: "network" in entry ? entry.network : undefined,1865    last4: "last4" in entry ? entry.last4 : undefined,1866  };18671868  return migrateLegacyPasskey(base, entry);1869}18701871/**1872 * v2.11.0 read migration. Pre-v2.11.0 passkey entries used `type:"passkey"`1873 * with flat top-level fields (rpId, credentialId, etc.). This converts them1874 * to the new shape — `type:"login"` with a `passkey` sub-object — so all1875 * downstream consumers can rely on the new model. The result is rewritten1876 * to disk on next vault save (hasLegacyShape detects the un-migrated case).1877 */1878function migrateLegacyPasskey(1879  base: VaultEntry,1880  raw: VaultEntry | LegacyVaultEntry1881): VaultEntry {1882  if (base.passkey) return base;1883  const flat = raw as Partial<VaultEntry>;1884  const isPasskeyType = base.type === "passkey";1885  const hasFlatPasskeyFields =1886    typeof flat.rpId === "string" &&1887    typeof flat.credentialId === "string" &&1888    typeof flat.publicKeyCose === "string" &&1889    typeof flat.userHandle === "string" &&1890    typeof flat.userName === "string";1891  if (!isPasskeyType && !hasFlatPasskeyFields) return base;1892  if (!hasFlatPasskeyFields) return base;18931894  const algorithm: -7 | -8 = flat.algorithm === -8 ? -8 : -7;1895  base.passkey = {1896    rpId: flat.rpId!,1897    rpName: flat.rpName ?? flat.rpId!,1898    credentialId: flat.credentialId!,1899    publicKeyCose: flat.publicKeyCose!,1900    privateKeyJwk: flat.privateKeyJwk,1901    userHandle: flat.userHandle!,1902    userName: flat.userName!,1903    userDisplayName: flat.userDisplayName ?? flat.userName!,1904    algorithm,1905    signCount: flat.signCount ?? 0,1906    aaguid: flat.aaguid ?? "",1907    backupEligible: flat.backupEligible === true,1908    backupState: flat.backupState === true,1909    lastUsedAt: flat.lastUsedAt,1910    browser: flat.browser,1911    transports: flat.transports,1912    createdAt: base.createdAt,1913  };1914  // Promote to "login" so the unified Entry view renders. Username gets1915  // populated from the passkey's userName so the entry is searchable in the1916  // existing autofill flow without a separate code path.1917  if (isPasskeyType) base.type = "login";1918  if (!base.username) base.username = flat.userName;1919  if (!base.url) base.url = `https://${flat.rpId}`;1920  return base;1921}192219231924// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------1925// Deduplication1926// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------19271928function entryDupeKey(e: VaultEntry): string {1929  if (e.type === "note") return `note|${e.title.toLowerCase()}`;1930  // Passkey-bearing entries dedupe by the credential's RP + user. Two logins1931  // on different sites that happen to share a username are still distinct;1932  // two passkey credentials for the same RP+user are duplicates regardless1933  // of any login fields they may also carry.1934  if (e.passkey) {1935    return `passkey|${e.passkey.rpId.toLowerCase()}|${e.passkey.userName.toLowerCase()}`;1936  }1937  return `login|${e.title.toLowerCase()}|${(e.url ?? "").toLowerCase()}|${(e.username ?? "").toLowerCase()}`;1938}19391940/** Returns the number of duplicate entries (those that would be removed). */1941export function countDuplicates(): number {1942  const best = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();1943  let dupeCount = 0;1944  for (const e of entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt)) {1945    const key = entryDupeKey(e);1946    const existing = best.get(key);1947    if (!existing) {1948      best.set(key, e);1949    } else {1950      dupeCount++;1951      // Keep the more recently modified one in the map1952      if ((e.modifiedAt ?? e.createdAt ?? 0) > (existing.modifiedAt ?? existing.createdAt ?? 0)) {1953        best.set(key, e);1954      }1955    }1956  }1957  return dupeCount;1958}19591960/**1961 * Soft-deletes duplicate entries, keeping the most recently modified copy of1962 * each group. Returns the number of entries moved to trash.1963 */1964export async function deduplicateEntries(): Promise<number> {1965  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault locked");1966  // Dedup reshapes slot B permanently under the decoy key, which is1967  // forensically distinguishable from a freshly-seeded decoy vault. Refuse.1968  if (vaultMode === "decoy") {1969    throw new Error("deduplicate disabled in decoy mode");1970  }19711972  const best = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();1973  for (const e of entries.filter((en) => !en.deletedAt)) {1974    const key = entryDupeKey(e);1975    const existing = best.get(key);1976    if (!existing) {1977      best.set(key, e);1978    } else if ((e.modifiedAt ?? e.createdAt ?? 0) > (existing.modifiedAt ?? existing.createdAt ?? 0)) {1979      best.set(key, e);1980    }1981  }19821983  const keepIds = new Set(Array.from(best.values()).map((e) => e.id));1984  const now = Date.now();1985  let removed = 0;1986  entries = entries.map((e) => {1987    if (!e.deletedAt && !keepIds.has(e.id)) {1988      removed++;1989      return { ...e, deletedAt: now };1990    }1991    return e;1992  });19931994  if (removed > 0) await persistEntries();1995  return removed;1996}19971998// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------1999// Vault history — snapshot BEFORE every vault write so the saved blob is2000// what is about to be lost, not what was just written. Capped at 10. The2001// stored blobs are AES-256-GCM ciphertext under the master password, so2002// history adds zero security surface.2003// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------20042005const HISTORY_KEY = "peach_vault_history";2006const HISTORY_MAX = 10;20072008/**2009 * Snapshot the CURRENT on-disk vault state into history. Call this BEFORE2010 * overwriting peach_vault_a so the saved blob captures the about-to-be-lost2011 * state. Identical-to-most-recent blobs are skipped to avoid filling history2012 * with no-op writes.2013 */2014export async function takeVaultSnapshot(2015  reason: VaultSnapshot["reason"],2016): Promise<void> {2017  try {2018    const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get([SLOT_A, SLOT_B, HISTORY_KEY]);2019    const slotA = (raw as Record<string, StoredVault | undefined>)[SLOT_A];2020    const slotB = (raw as Record<string, StoredVault | undefined>)[SLOT_B];20212022    // Nothing to snapshot if the real slot doesn't exist yet (fresh install,2023    // pre-createVault). createVault skips snapshots intentionally — there is2024    // no prior state to preserve.2025    if (!slotA) return;20262027    const vault_a = JSON.stringify(slotA);2028    const vault_b = JSON.stringify(slotB ?? slotA);20292030    // Best-effort entry count: only meaningful when the in-memory state is2031    // unlocked AND in real mode. Decoy mode would leak the decoy entry2032    // count; locked mode has no entries to count. Both fall through to null.2033    let entryCount: number | null = null;2034    if (derivedKey && vaultMode === "real") {2035      try {2036        entryCount = entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt).length;2037      } catch {2038        entryCount = null;2039      }2040    }20412042    const existingRaw = (raw as Record<string, VaultHistory | undefined>)[HISTORY_KEY];2043    const history: VaultHistory = existingRaw && Array.isArray(existingRaw.snapshots)2044      ? existingRaw2045      : { snapshots: [] };20462047    // Deduplication: if the most recent snapshot has byte-identical blobs,2048    // skip — saves the same vault N times in a row would otherwise burn the2049    // entire history window with no recovery value.2050    const latest = history.snapshots[0];2051    if (latest && latest.vault_a === vault_a && latest.vault_b === vault_b) {2052      return;2053    }20542055    const snapshot: VaultSnapshot = {2056      id: crypto.randomUUID(),2057      savedAt: Date.now(),2058      reason,2059      vault_a,2060      vault_b,2061      entryCount,2062    };20632064    history.snapshots = [snapshot, ...history.snapshots].slice(0, HISTORY_MAX);2065    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [HISTORY_KEY]: history });2066  } catch {2067    // Non-fatal — history must never block a save. A failed snapshot just2068    // means the user loses one rung of the safety ladder for this write.2069  }2070}20712072/** Wipe all vault history. Called by Panic / DESTROY_VAULT. */2073export async function clearVaultHistory(): Promise<void> {2074  try {2075    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [HISTORY_KEY]: { snapshots: [] } satisfies VaultHistory });2076  } catch {2077    // Non-fatal — DESTROY_VAULT also runs storage.local.clear().2078  }2079}20802081/** Read all snapshots, newest first, for the Settings vault history view. */2082export async function getVaultHistory(): Promise<VaultSnapshot[]> {2083  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get(HISTORY_KEY);2084  const history = (raw as Record<string, VaultHistory | undefined>)[HISTORY_KEY];2085  if (!history || !Array.isArray(history.snapshots)) return [];2086  return history.snapshots;2087}20882089/**2090 * Replace the on-disk vault with the chosen snapshot's blobs and lock the2091 * vault. The current state is itself snapshotted with reason 'restore' first2092 * so the restore is reversible. After this returns, the user must unlock2093 * with the password that matches the restored blob.2094 */2095export async function restoreVaultSnapshot(2096  snapshotId: string,2097): Promise<{ ok: true } | { ok: false; error: string }> {2098  const history = await getVaultHistory();2099  const snapshot = history.find((s) => s.id === snapshotId);2100  if (!snapshot) return { ok: false, error: "snapshot_not_found" };21012102  // Snapshot the about-to-be-replaced current state so the restore is2103  // reversible. takeVaultSnapshot is no-op when the most recent entry is2104  // byte-identical, so a restore-of-a-restore stays clean.2105  await takeVaultSnapshot("restore");21062107  let restoredA: StoredVault;2108  let restoredB: StoredVault;2109  try {2110    restoredA = JSON.parse(snapshot.vault_a) as StoredVault;2111    restoredB = JSON.parse(snapshot.vault_b) as StoredVault;2112  } catch {2113    return { ok: false, error: "snapshot_corrupt" };2114  }21152116  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, restoredA);2117  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, restoredB);2118  await stampLocalVaultMutation();21192120  // Lock so the user must prove they can decrypt the restored blob. If they2121  // restored a pre-password-change snapshot they discover it immediately at2122  // the lock screen rather than silently holding an inaccessible vault.2123  lock();21242125  return { ok: true };2126}21272128/**2129 * Change the master password. Re-encrypts slot A with a fresh salt + new2130 * derived key. Slot B (duress or noise) is left untouched when duress is2131 * configured — it uses an independent key derived from the duress password —2132 * and regenerated as noise when duress is not configured.2133 */2134export async function changePassword(2135  currentPassword: string,2136  newPassword: string2137): Promise<boolean> {2138  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") return false;21392140  // Verify current password before allowing any change2141  const valid = await verifyMainPassword(currentPassword);2142  if (!valid) return false;21432144  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);2145  if (!slotA) return false;2146  if (!rootKey) return false;21472148  // Derive fresh key from new password + new random salt2149  const newSalt = generateSalt();2150  const newKey = await deriveKey(newPassword, newSalt);21512152  // Re-encrypt the in-memory entries with the new key2153  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured);2154  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(newKey, plaintext);21552156  // Pre-wrap root key under the new derived key. Recovery fields wrap rootKey2157  // under recovery words and remain untouched — recovery phrase keeps working2158  // across password changes (H4/COR-002).2159  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(newKey, rootKey);21602161  const finalSlotA: StoredVault = {2162    ...slotA,2163    salt: hex(newSalt),2164    nonce,2165    ciphertext,2166    tag,2167    ...pwRoot,2168  };21692170  // Snapshot the OLD-key blob before overwriting it. If the user later2171  // restores from this snapshot they will need the OLD password — the2172  // post-restore lock surfaces that immediately.2173  await takeVaultSnapshot("local_save");21742175  // Single atomic write: ciphertext, salt, and pw_root_* fields all land in2176  // one storage transaction. An SW kill before this point leaves the old2177  // slot intact; after this point everything tied to the new password is2178  // already on disk together (M6/COR-004).2179  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, finalSlotA);21802181  // Swap the in-memory key synchronously before any further await. If we2182  // threw between the Slot A write and this swap, the next persistEntries()2183  // would overwrite Slot A with old-key ciphertext, locking the user out.2184  zeroKey(derivedKey);2185  derivedKey = newKey;21862187  // Regenerate noise for slot B when duress is not in use. Runs after the2188  // key swap so a failure here is a disposable noise regeneration, not a2189  // lockout.2190  if (!duressConfigured) {2191    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2));2192  }2193  await stampLocalVaultMutation();21942195  return true;2196}21972198// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------2199// Sync helpers2200// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------22012202export async function getVaultBlobForSync(): Promise<{2203  blob: string;2204  timestamp: number;2205  license?: string;2206} | null> {2207  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get([SLOT_A, SLOT_B, 'peach_last_modified_at', 'peach_license']);2208  const slotA = (raw as Record<string, unknown>)[SLOT_A];2209  if (!slotA) return null;2210  const slotB = (raw as Record<string, unknown>)[SLOT_B];2211  const blob = JSON.stringify({ a: slotA, b: slotB });2212  const rawTs = (raw as Record<string, unknown>)['peach_last_modified_at'];2213  const timestamp = typeof rawTs === 'string' ? parseInt(rawTs) : 0;2214  const license = (raw as Record<string, unknown>)['peach_license'];2215  return {2216    blob,2217    timestamp,2218    license: typeof license === 'string' ? license : undefined,2219  };2220}22212222export async function applyIncomingVault(2223  blobJson: string,2224  remoteTimestamp: number,2225  remoteLicense?: string,2226): Promise<boolean> {2227  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get('peach_last_modified_at');2228  const rawTs = (raw as Record<string, unknown>)['peach_last_modified_at'];2229  const localTimestamp = typeof rawTs === 'string' ? parseInt(rawTs) : 0;22302231  if (remoteLicense) {2232    const licenseRaw = await chrome.storage.local.get('peach_license');2233    const existing = (licenseRaw as Record<string, unknown>)['peach_license'];2234    if (!existing) {2235      await chrome.storage.local.set({ peach_license: remoteLicense });2236    }2237  }22382239  if (remoteTimestamp <= localTimestamp) return false;22402241  // Parse + shape-validate before any storage mutation. A malformed blob2242  // (non-JSON, non-object, missing slot fields) must NOT touch slot A —2243  // otherwise an unauthenticated remote could poison the local vault by2244  // sending '[]' or '42' (M10/COR-012). Mirror the structural check2245  // already used in unlockFromCodex.2246  let parsed: unknown;2247  try {2248    parsed = JSON.parse(blobJson);2249  } catch {2250    throw new Error('invalid_incoming_vault_blob');2251  }2252  if (typeof parsed !== 'object' || parsed === null || Array.isArray(parsed)) {2253    throw new Error('invalid_incoming_vault_blob');2254  }2255  const { a, b } = parsed as { a?: unknown; b?: unknown };2256  if (!hasValidVaultSchema(a)) {2257    throw new Error('invalid_incoming_vault_blob');2258  }22592260  // Snapshot before overwriting — failure is non-fatal2261  await takeVaultSnapshot('sync_received').catch(() => {});22622263  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, a);2264  if (hasValidVaultSchema(b)) await writeSlot(SLOT_B, b);2265  await chrome.storage.local.set({2266    peach_last_sync_at: String(Date.now()),2267    peach_last_modified_at: String(remoteTimestamp),2268  });22692270  return true;2271}22722273export async function getSyncIdentity(): Promise<{2274  privateKeyBytes: Uint8Array;2275  publicKeyBytes: Uint8Array;2276  publicKeyHex: string;2277}> {2278  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get('peach_sync_identity');2279  const stored = (raw as Record<string, unknown>)['peach_sync_identity'];2280  if (typeof stored === 'string') {2281    const { priv, pub } = JSON.parse(stored) as { priv: string; pub: string };2282    const privateKeyBytes = base64DecodeBytes(priv);2283    const publicKeyBytes = base64DecodeBytes(pub);2284    return { privateKeyBytes, publicKeyBytes, publicKeyHex: bytesToHex(publicKeyBytes) };2285  }22862287  // Generate a fresh X25519 keypair and persist it.2288  const { generateKeyPair } = await import('@stablelib/x25519');2289  const keypair = generateKeyPair();2290  await chrome.storage.local.set({2291    peach_sync_identity: JSON.stringify({2292      priv: base64EncodeBytes(keypair.secretKey),2293      pub: base64EncodeBytes(keypair.publicKey),2294    }),2295  });2296  return {2297    privateKeyBytes: keypair.secretKey,2298    publicKeyBytes: keypair.publicKey,2299    publicKeyHex: bytesToHex(keypair.publicKey),2300  };2301}23022303// Re-decrypt vault entries from storage using the current in-memory key.2304// Called after applyIncomingVault so the in-memory state stays consistent2305// with what was just written to storage.2306export async function reloadEntriesAfterSync(): Promise<boolean> {2307  if (!derivedKey) return false;2308  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);2309  if (!slotA) return false;2310  try {2311    const payload = await tryDecryptSlot(slotA, derivedKey);2312    if (!payload) return false;2313    entries = payload.entries;2314    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);2315    return true;2316  } catch {2317    return false;2318  }2319}23202321function bytesToHex(bytes: Uint8Array): string {2322  return Array.from(bytes).map(b => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('');2323}23242325function base64EncodeBytes(bytes: Uint8Array): string {2326  let binary = '';2327  for (let i = 0; i < bytes.length; i++) binary += String.fromCharCode(bytes[i]);2328  return btoa(binary);2329}23302331function base64DecodeBytes(b64: string): Uint8Array {2332  const binary = atob(b64);2333  const bytes = new Uint8Array(binary.length);2334  for (let i = 0; i < binary.length; i++) bytes[i] = binary.charCodeAt(i);2335  return bytes;2336}