vault.ts

1/**2 * vault.ts — sole owner of vault state and chrome.storage vault keys.3 *4 * Every read/write of `peach_vault_a`, `peach_vault_b`, and `peach_settings`5 * goes through this module. No other file accesses those keys directly.6 * External callers reach vault operations via `messages.ts` — never by7 * importing from here cross-boundary (popup/content must not). Invariants8 * for the two-slot schema, unlock timing, and key/disk atomicity are in9 * Projects.md §3.2–§3.6.10 */1112import { deriveKey, generateSalt } from "../crypto/argon2";13import { extractDomain } from "../shared/domain";14import { clampSyncTimestamp } from "../shared/sync-limits";15import { computeVaultId } from "../shared/sync-identity";16// Static, not `await import()`: runtime import() throws in an MV3 service17// worker. Neither module imports vault.ts back, so there is no cycle to break.18import { triggerSyncIfReachable } from "./sync-trigger";19import { clearPairedDevices } from "./paired-devices";20import {21  rootKeyToWords,22  wordsToRootKeyMaterial,23  deriveRecoveryKey,24} from "../shared/recovery-words";25import type {26  AccentColorName,27  Canary,28  ManualSummonRecord,29  PasskeyData,30  SavedIdentity,31  StoredVault,32  VaultEntry,33  VaultHistory,34  VaultSnapshot,35} from "../shared/types";36import { decrypt, encrypt, zeroKey } from "./aes";37import { clearAutoLock, touchAutoLock } from "./alarms";38import {39  clearRecoveryConfirmPending,40  setRecoveryConfirmPending,41} from "./recovery-pending";4243type EntryDraft = Omit<44  VaultEntry,45  "id" | "createdAt" | "modifiedAt" | "deletedAt"46>;4748// Slot-neutral storage keys (v1.4.24+). Both slots always exist; slot B49// either holds the decoy vault (when duress is configured) or random noise50// that looks identical at rest. No external indicator is stored — duress51// configuration is recorded only inside the encrypted payload of slot A.52const SLOT_A = "peach_vault_a";53const SLOT_B = "peach_vault_b";5455// Plaintext is padded to the next multiple of this size before encryption.56// This coarsens ciphertext-length leakage into 1 KiB buckets.57const PAD_BLOCK = 1024;5859// How many past passwords to retain per entry. Generous enough to be useful as60// a recovery aid while bounding the secret material we hold (and the ciphertext61// growth) for an entry whose password is rotated frequently.62const PASSWORD_HISTORY_MAX = 50;6364// When duress is configured, BOTH slots are padded to this fixed ceiling so65// their ciphertext lengths are identical and cannot reveal that a hidden decoy66// vault exists (audit MEDIUM — plausible-deniability leak). 256 KiB comfortably67// holds a very large vault (thousands of entries incl. passkeys). The decoy68// slot can't be re-encrypted on every real-vault save (the real session has no69// decoy key), so a fixed ceiling — rather than size-matching on each write — is70// what keeps the two slots equal. A real vault whose plaintext exceeds this71// would grow past the ceiling and re-expose the bit; that is an extreme,72// documented edge well beyond normal use.73const DURESS_SLOT_SIZE = 262_144;7475let derivedKey: Uint8Array | null = null;76// 32-byte random root key, separate from the derivedKey used for vault encryption.77// The root key is wrapped (encrypted) under the recovery key derived from the78// 12-word phrase. When the user changes their password, only the wrapping changes;79// the root key and recovery words remain stable.80let rootKey: Uint8Array | null = null;81let entries: VaultEntry[] = [];82// Tombstones outlive their full entry records so a peer that was offline83// during a purge cannot reintroduce an old ciphertext envelope. This map is84// serialized only inside the encrypted vault payload.85let tombstones = new Map<string, number>();86let domainIndex: Map<string, VaultEntry[]> = new Map();87let vaultMode: "real" | "decoy" = "real";88// Cached post-unlock view of whether the real vault records that duress is89// configured. Only meaningful after a real-mode unlock; for decoy-mode unlock90// this stays false because we never see slot A's plaintext.91let duressConfigured = false;9293// Set to a corruption reason during the last unlock() attempt when both slots94// decrypted but failed schema validation. Consumed and cleared by95// consumeLastUnlockFailureReason() so messages.ts can surface vault_corrupted96// distinctly from wrong-password (M7/COR-007).97//98// NOTE: module-level state — if vault.ts is ever moved to a worker context,99// this must be replaced with a structured return value from unlock() or a100// postMessage channel. The signal is invisible across module-instance101// boundaries.102let lastUnlockFailureReason: string | null = null;103104export function consumeLastUnlockFailureReason(): string | null {105  const r = lastUnlockFailureReason;106  lastUnlockFailureReason = null;107  return r;108}109110// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------111// Settings (persisted inside the encrypted vault store as a sidecar key)112// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------113114export type TextSize = "small" | "medium" | "large";115116export interface VaultSettings {117  accentColor?: AccentColorName;118  theme?: "dark" | "light";119  autoLockMinutes?: number;120  clipboardClearSeconds?: number;121  lockOnClose?: boolean;122  breachMonitoring?: boolean;123  passkeyProviderEnabled?: boolean;124  trashRetentionDays?: number;125  manualSummonDomains?: Record<string, ManualSummonRecord>;126  declinedCardFingerprints?: string[];127  /**128   * Text size scale for body copy and entry titles. Stops at "large" by129   * design — XL clips dense screens (Vault, Health) inside the fixed130   * 330×480 popup surface.131   */132  textSize?: TextSize;133  /**134   * When true, all entrance/exit transitions and ambient animations are135   * collapsed to instant. Honoured alongside the user's OS-level136   * `prefers-reduced-motion`.137   */138  reduceMotion?: boolean;139  /** Whether this vault has a local PIN unlock wrapper configured. */140  pinEnabled?: boolean;141  /** Whether the lock screen should open on PIN instead of the password. */142  pinPreferred?: boolean;143  /**144   * User overrides for keyboard shortcuts. Keys are ShortcutAction names145   * (see src/shared/shortcuts.ts). Missing actions fall through to146   * DEFAULT_BINDINGS — `getActiveBindings(settings.shortcuts)` is the147   * canonical lookup. Storing only the deltas keeps the vault payload148   * small and lets default updates land for users who never rebind.149   */150  shortcuts?: Record<string, { key: string; ctrl?: boolean; meta?: boolean; shift?: boolean; alt?: boolean }>;151}152153interface StoredPinWrap {154  version: 1;155  salt: string;156  nonce: string;157  ciphertext: string;158  tag: string;159}160161const PIN_WRAP_STORAGE = "peach_pin_wrap";162const PIN_ATTEMPTS_STORAGE = "peach_pin_attempts";163const PIN_MIN_LENGTH = 4;164const PIN_MAX_LENGTH = 12;165const PIN_MAX_ATTEMPTS = 3;166167let settings: VaultSettings = {};168let inMemoryPinWrap: StoredPinWrap | null = null;169let inMemoryPinFailedAttempts = 0;170let sessionPinStorageFailed = false;171172export function getSettings(): VaultSettings {173  return settings;174}175176export async function ensureSettingsLoaded(): Promise<VaultSettings> {177  await loadSettings();178  return settings;179}180181export async function updateSettings(patch: Partial<VaultSettings>): Promise<void> {182  await loadSettings();183  // LV-7: cheap insurance against prototype pollution if a future caller ever184  // feeds parsed external JSON here (native spread keeps __proto__ an own-185  // property today, but Object.assign-style consumers and JSON revivers have186  // been burned before).187  const safe = Object.fromEntries(188    Object.entries(patch).filter(189      ([k]) => !["__proto__", "constructor", "prototype"].includes(k),190    ),191  ) as Partial<VaultSettings>;192  settings = { ...settings, ...safe };193  await persistSettings();194}195196function isValidPin(pin: string): boolean {197  return new RegExp(`^\\d{${PIN_MIN_LENGTH},${PIN_MAX_LENGTH}}$`).test(pin);198}199200/** Set up a local PIN wrapper after proving the current master password. */201export async function setupPinUnlock(currentPassword: string, pin: string): Promise<boolean> {202  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real" || !isValidPin(pin)) return false;203  if (!(await verifyMainPassword(currentPassword))) return false;204205  const salt = generateSalt();206  const pinKey = await deriveKey(pin, salt);207  try {208    const wrapped = await encrypt(pinKey, hex(derivedKey), "pin_wrap_v1");209    await savePinWrap({ version: 1, salt: hex(salt), ...wrapped });210    await updateSettings({ pinEnabled: true });211    return true;212  } finally {213    zeroKey(pinKey);214  }215}216217async function clearPinUnlockStorage(): Promise<void> {218  inMemoryPinWrap = null;219  inMemoryPinFailedAttempts = 0;220  sessionPinStorageFailed = false;221  if (chrome.storage.session) {222    await chrome.storage.session.remove([PIN_WRAP_STORAGE, PIN_ATTEMPTS_STORAGE]);223  }224  await updateSettings({ pinEnabled: false });225}226227/** Remove the PIN wrapper after proving the current master password. */228export async function disablePinUnlock(currentPassword: string): Promise<boolean> {229  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") return false;230  if (!(await verifyMainPassword(currentPassword))) return false;231  await clearPinUnlockStorage();232  return true;233}234235/** Unlock the real vault from its locally stored PIN-wrapped derived key. */236export async function unlockWithPin(pin: string): Promise<boolean> {237  if (!isValidPin(pin)) return false;238  await loadSettings();239  if (!settings.pinEnabled) return false;240241  const { stored, failedAttempts } = await loadPinState();242  if (failedAttempts >= PIN_MAX_ATTEMPTS) return false;243  if (244    !stored ||245    stored.version !== 1 ||246    !stored.salt ||247    !stored.nonce ||248    !stored.ciphertext ||249    !stored.tag250  ) return false;251252  const pinKey = await deriveKey(pin, unhex(stored.salt));253  let unwrappedKey: Uint8Array | null = null;254  try {255    const masterKeyHex = await decrypt(256      pinKey,257      stored.nonce,258      stored.ciphertext,259      stored.tag,260      "pin_wrap_v1",261    );262    if (!/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(masterKeyHex)) return false;263    unwrappedKey = unhex(masterKeyHex);264    const result = await unlockWithKey(masterKeyHex);265    if (!result.ok) return false;266    await saveSessionKey(unwrappedKey, "real");267    await resetPinFailedAttempts();268    return true;269  } catch {270    await recordPinFailure(failedAttempts + 1);271    return false;272  } finally {273    zeroKey(pinKey);274    if (unwrappedKey) zeroKey(unwrappedKey);275  }276}277278async function savePinWrap(stored: StoredPinWrap): Promise<void> {279  inMemoryPinWrap = stored;280  inMemoryPinFailedAttempts = 0;281  sessionPinStorageFailed = !chrome.storage.session;282  if (!chrome.storage.session) return;283  try {284    await chrome.storage.session.set({ [PIN_WRAP_STORAGE]: stored, [PIN_ATTEMPTS_STORAGE]: 0 });285    sessionPinStorageFailed = false;286  } catch {287    // Firefox fallback: keep the wrapper only in this background context.288    sessionPinStorageFailed = true;289  }290}291292async function loadPinState(): Promise<{293  stored: StoredPinWrap | undefined;294  failedAttempts: number;295}> {296  if (!chrome.storage.session) {297    return { stored: inMemoryPinWrap ?? undefined, failedAttempts: inMemoryPinFailedAttempts };298  }299  try {300    const result = await chrome.storage.session.get([PIN_WRAP_STORAGE, PIN_ATTEMPTS_STORAGE]);301    return {302      stored: (result[PIN_WRAP_STORAGE] as StoredPinWrap | undefined) ??303        (sessionPinStorageFailed ? inMemoryPinWrap ?? undefined : undefined),304      failedAttempts: typeof result[PIN_ATTEMPTS_STORAGE] === "number"305        ? result[PIN_ATTEMPTS_STORAGE]306        : 0,307    };308  } catch {309    return { stored: inMemoryPinWrap ?? undefined, failedAttempts: inMemoryPinFailedAttempts };310  }311}312313async function recordPinFailure(failedAttempts: number): Promise<void> {314  inMemoryPinFailedAttempts = Math.min(failedAttempts, PIN_MAX_ATTEMPTS);315  if (!chrome.storage.session) return;316  try {317    await chrome.storage.session.set({ [PIN_ATTEMPTS_STORAGE]: inMemoryPinFailedAttempts });318  } catch { /* in-memory counter remains the fallback */ }319}320321async function resetPinFailedAttempts(): Promise<void> {322  inMemoryPinFailedAttempts = 0;323  if (!chrome.storage.session) return;324  try {325    await chrome.storage.session.set({ [PIN_ATTEMPTS_STORAGE]: 0 });326  } catch { /* in-memory counter remains the fallback */ }327}328329export async function getPinUnlockStatus(): Promise<{330  configured: boolean;331  available: boolean;332  attemptsRemaining: number;333}> {334  await loadSettings();335  if (!settings.pinEnabled) {336    return { configured: false, available: false, attemptsRemaining: 0 };337  }338  const { stored, failedAttempts } = await loadPinState();339  const available = Boolean(stored) && failedAttempts < PIN_MAX_ATTEMPTS;340  return {341    configured: true,342    available,343    attemptsRemaining: stored ? Math.max(0, PIN_MAX_ATTEMPTS - failedAttempts) : 0,344  };345}346347async function persistSettings(): Promise<void> {348  try {349    await chrome.storage.local.set({ peach_settings: settings });350  } catch (err) {351    throw mapStorageError(err);352  }353}354355function mapStorageError(err: unknown): Error {356  const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);357  if (/QUOTA_BYTES|quota/i.test(message)) {358    return new Error("STORAGE_QUOTA_EXCEEDED");359  }360  return err instanceof Error ? err : new Error(message);361}362363async function loadSettings(): Promise<void> {364  const result = await chrome.storage.local.get("peach_settings");365  settings = (result as { peach_settings?: VaultSettings }).peach_settings ?? {};366}367368// Fire-and-forget sync trigger after a committed vault write. A failure here369// must never fail the write that caused it.370function fireSyncTrigger(reason: "vault_change"): void {371  void Promise.resolve()372    .then(() => triggerSyncIfReachable({ reason }))373    .catch(() => {374      /* no sync runner registered, or nothing reachable — non-fatal */375    });376}377378let lockedSyncRefreshHook: (() => Promise<void>) | null = null;379let lockedSyncUnlockHook: (() => Promise<void>) | null = null;380381export function setLockedSyncHooks(hooks: {382  refresh: () => Promise<void>;383  afterUnlock: () => Promise<void>;384}): void {385  lockedSyncRefreshHook = hooks.refresh;386  lockedSyncUnlockHook = hooks.afterUnlock;387}388389async function refreshLockedSyncState(): Promise<void> {390  if (vaultMode !== "real" || !rootKey || !lockedSyncRefreshHook) return;391  await lockedSyncRefreshHook().catch((error) => {392    console.warn("[Peach sync] locked spool refresh failed:", error);393  });394}395396// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------397// HIBP breach check (k-anonymity model)398// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------399400export async function checkBreach(password: string): Promise<number> {401  // HIBP k-anonymity API is keyed on SHA-1 prefixes — this is dictated by402  // the public API, not a security choice. Do not migrate to SHA-256 here.403  const encoder = new TextEncoder();404  const hashBuffer = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-1", encoder.encode(password));405  const hashHex = Array.from(new Uint8Array(hashBuffer))406    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))407    .join("")408    .toUpperCase();409410  const prefix = hashHex.slice(0, 5);411  const suffix = hashHex.slice(5);412413  try {414    // PCH-02-007: request HIBP response padding so response length does not415    // reveal how many suffixes a queried prefix returned.416    const res = await fetch(`https://api.pwnedpasswords.com/range/${prefix}`, {417      headers: { "Add-Padding": "true" },418    });419    if (!res.ok) return 0;420    const text = await res.text();421    const match = text.split("\r\n").find((l) => l.startsWith(suffix));422    return match ? parseInt(match.split(":")[1], 10) : 0;423  } catch {424    return 0; // Network unavailable — don't block425  }426}427428export async function declineCardSaveOffer(last4: string, expMonth: string, expYear: string): Promise<void> {429  const fingerprint = await cardFingerprint(last4, expMonth, expYear);430  await loadSettings();431  settings = {432    ...settings,433    declinedCardFingerprints: [...(settings.declinedCardFingerprints ?? []), fingerprint],434  };435  await persistSettings();436}437438export async function isCardDeclined(last4: string, expMonth: string, expYear: string): Promise<boolean> {439  await loadSettings();440  const fingerprint = await cardFingerprint(last4, expMonth, expYear);441  return (settings.declinedCardFingerprints ?? []).includes(fingerprint);442}443444async function cardFingerprint(last4: string, expMonth: string, expYear: string): Promise<string> {445  const encoder = new TextEncoder();446  const buf = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", encoder.encode(`${last4}|${expMonth}|${expYear}`));447  return Array.from(new Uint8Array(buf).slice(0, 8))448    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))449    .join("");450}451452function hex(buf: Uint8Array): string {453  return Array.from(buf)454    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))455    .join("");456}457458function unhex(s: string): Uint8Array {459  const out = new Uint8Array(s.length / 2);460  for (let i = 0; i < s.length; i += 2) {461    out[i / 2] = parseInt(s.slice(i, i + 2), 16);462  }463  return out;464}465466// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------467// Root key generation and recovery word wrapping468// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------469470/**471 * Generate a random 32-byte root key and wrap it (AES-256-GCM) under a key472 * derived from the recovery word material via HKDF-SHA256. The wrapped blob473 * fields are stored in slot A alongside the password-wrapped ciphertext. The474 * root key itself is kept in memory for the session so getRecoveryWords() can475 * encode it without re-deriving.476 *477 * SECURITY MODEL (PCH-01-005): the recovery KEK is derived from the 12-word478 * material, which encodes only rootKey[0..16] (recovery-words.ts). The KEK is thus479 * derived from a PREFIX of the very plaintext it wraps, and effective recovery480 * security is 128-bit (standard for a 12-word phrase), NOT 256-bit. This is safe —481 * unwrapping requires the words, and the GCM ciphertext leaks nothing without them —482 * but it is intentional, not an oversight. A future escrow version wanting 256-bit483 * recovery must derive the words from INDEPENDENT entropy, not from the root key.484 */485async function generateAndWrapRootKey(): Promise<{486  rawRootKey: string; // hex of the plaintext root key — caller stores in rootKey487  recoverySalt: string;488  wrappedRootKey: string;489  wrappedNonce: string;490  wrappedTag: string;491}> {492  const rootKeyBytes = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32));493494  // Derive the recovery key from the BIP39 words encoding of the root key.495  const words = await rootKeyToWords(rootKeyBytes);496  const wordMaterial = await wordsToRootKeyMaterial(words);497  const recoverySalt = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));498  const recoveryKey = await deriveRecoveryKey(wordMaterial, recoverySalt);499500  // Wrap the root key with the recovery key using AES-256-GCM directly.501  // We hex-encode rootKeyBytes so the plaintext is always valid UTF-8.502  const nonce = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));503  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(hex(rootKeyBytes));504  const raw = await crypto.subtle.encrypt(505    {506      name: "AES-GCM",507      iv: nonce,508      additionalData: new Uint8Array([1]).buffer as ArrayBuffer,509      tagLength: 128,510    },511    recoveryKey,512    encoded513  );514  // WebCrypto returns ciphertext || auth tag concatenated; split them.515  const rawU8 = new Uint8Array(raw);516  const ciphertext = hex(rawU8.slice(0, rawU8.length - 16));517  const tag = hex(rawU8.slice(rawU8.length - 16));518519  return {520    rawRootKey: hex(rootKeyBytes),521    recoverySalt: hex(recoverySalt),522    wrappedRootKey: ciphertext,523    wrappedNonce: hex(nonce),524    wrappedTag: tag,525  };526}527528async function wrapExistingRootKeyForRecovery(rootKeyBytes: Uint8Array): Promise<{529  recoverySalt: string;530  wrappedRootKey: string;531  wrappedNonce: string;532  wrappedTag: string;533}> {534  if (rootKeyBytes.length !== 32) {535    throw new Error("ADOPT_INVALID_ROOT_KEY: expected 32 bytes");536  }537538  const words = await rootKeyToWords(rootKeyBytes);539  const wordMaterial = await wordsToRootKeyMaterial(words);540  const recoverySalt = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));541  const recoveryKey = await deriveRecoveryKey(wordMaterial, recoverySalt);542  const nonce = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));543  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(hex(rootKeyBytes));544  const raw = await crypto.subtle.encrypt(545    {546      name: "AES-GCM",547      iv: nonce,548      additionalData: new Uint8Array([1]).buffer as ArrayBuffer,549      tagLength: 128,550    },551    recoveryKey,552    encoded,553  );554  const rawU8 = new Uint8Array(raw);555  return {556    recoverySalt: hex(recoverySalt),557    wrappedRootKey: hex(rawU8.slice(0, rawU8.length - 16)),558    wrappedNonce: hex(nonce),559    wrappedTag: hex(rawU8.slice(rawU8.length - 16)),560  };561}562563/**564 * Unwrap the root key using recovery words. Called during recovery flow when565 * the user provides their 12-word phrase and a new password.566 * Exported for use by the RECOVER_WITH_WORDS message handler.567 */568export async function unwrapRootKeyForRecovery(569  wrappedRootKey: string,570  wrappedNonce: string,571  wrappedTag: string,572  recoverySaltHex: string,573  words: string[]574): Promise<void> {575  const wordMaterial = await wordsToRootKeyMaterial(words);576  const recoverySalt = unhex(recoverySaltHex);577  const recoveryKey = await deriveRecoveryKey(wordMaterial, recoverySalt);578579  // Decrypt and cache the root key. The root key bytes were hex-encoded before580  // encryption so the ciphertext is valid UTF-8. We inline the AES-GCM decrypt581  // here to avoid passing a CryptoKey to the string-based encrypt/decrypt helpers.582  // Each component is stored separately in the vault slot; decode them individually583  // so the nonce is always exactly the 12 bytes from wrappedNonce.584  const nonceRaw = unhex(wrappedNonce);585  const ciphertextRaw = unhex(wrappedRootKey);586  const tagRaw = unhex(wrappedTag);587  // Combine ciphertext and tag for AES-GCM (expects ciphertext||tag).588  // Use explicit ArrayBuffer allocations to satisfy TS BufferSource constraints.589  const nonceU8 = nonceRaw as unknown as Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>;590  const combined = new Uint8Array(ciphertextRaw.length + tagRaw.length);591  combined.set(ciphertextRaw, 0);592  combined.set(tagRaw, ciphertextRaw.length);593  const raw = await crypto.subtle.decrypt(594    { name: "AES-GCM", iv: nonceU8, additionalData: new Uint8Array([1]).buffer as ArrayBuffer, tagLength: 128 },595    recoveryKey,596    combined597  );598  const decryptedHex = new TextDecoder().decode(raw);599  rootKey = unhex(decryptedHex);600}601602/**603 * Re-wrap the cached root key under a new derived key (from the user's new604 * password). Called after password change and after recovery re-key so the605 * same recovery words continue to work with the updated password — and so606 * subsequent unlocks can rehydrate rootKey via deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey.607 *608 * recovery_* fields are intentionally not touched: those wrap rootKey under609 * the recovery words, which do not change when the password changes.610 */611export async function rewrapRootKeyForPassword(612  newDerivedKey: Uint8Array,613  _newSalt: Uint8Array614): Promise<void> {615  if (!rootKey) throw new Error("root key not set");616  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);617  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");618  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(newDerivedKey, rootKey);619  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, { ...slotA, ...pwRoot });620}621622/**623 * Change the vault encryption to a new derived key (already derived from624 * the user's new password). Used by RECOVER_WITH_WORDS and changePassword.625 * Caller is responsible for key swap and snapshot.626 */627async function reencryptVaultForNewKey(628  newKey: Uint8Array,629  slotA: StoredVault630): Promise<void> {631  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured, duressConfigured ? DURESS_SLOT_SIZE : 0);632  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(newKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");633  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, {634    ...slotA,635    nonce,636    ciphertext,637    tag,638  });639}640641/**642 * Full password change with an already-derived key (used after recovery).643 * Unlike changePassword(), this skips re-verification of current password644 * since recovery flow has already validated the user's identity via words.645 */646export async function changePasswordWithNewKey(647  newSalt: Uint8Array,648  newKey: Uint8Array649): Promise<void> {650  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);651  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");652  // reencryptVaultForNewKey must receive the updated salt so that subsequent653  // UNLOCK calls with the new password can re-derive the correct key.654  await reencryptVaultForNewKey(newKey, { ...slotA, salt: hex(newSalt) });655  if (derivedKey) zeroKey(derivedKey);656  derivedKey = newKey;657  // PCH-01-008: re-escrow the new key (see changePassword). The recovery flow658  // reaches this path, so a post-recovery SW restart would otherwise lock out659  // a user who just reset their password.660  void saveSessionKey(newKey, "real");661  // Refresh pw_root_* under the new key so deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey works662  // on the next unlock (H2/COR-006). If rootKey is missing — recovery flow663  // should have populated it — fall back silently rather than blowing up the664  // recovery path; the escrow is already present on every supported vault.665  if (rootKey) {666    const slotAfter = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);667    if (slotAfter) {668      const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(newKey, rootKey);669      await writeSlot(SLOT_A, { ...slotAfter, ...pwRoot });670    }671  }672  if (!duressConfigured) {673    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(slotA.ciphertext.length / 2));674  }675  await clearPinUnlockStorage();676  await stampLocalVaultMutation();677}678679// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------680// Salt generation --- exported so the RECOVER_WITH_WORDS handler can derive681// a new key after password reset without re-importing the crypto module.682// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------683684export { deriveKey, generateSalt };685686export async function loadSlotA(): Promise<StoredVault | null> {687  return loadSlot(SLOT_A);688}689690/**691 * Recover the session root key by AES-GCM-decrypting the pw_root_* fields692 * (a second wrapping of the root key under the password-derived key). This693 * is what makes GET_RECOVERY_WORDS work across lock/unlock cycles without694 * the user re-entering their recovery phrase: the same root key bytes —695 * and therefore the same 12 words — survive every unlock.696 *697 * Returns null when the escrow is absent or decryption fails.698 */699async function deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(700  derivedKeyBytes: Uint8Array,701  slotA: StoredVault,702): Promise<Uint8Array | null> {703  if (!slotA.pw_root_ciphertext || !slotA.pw_root_nonce || !slotA.pw_root_tag) {704    return null;705  }706  try {707    const rootHex = await decrypt(708      derivedKeyBytes,709      slotA.pw_root_nonce,710      slotA.pw_root_ciphertext,711      slotA.pw_root_tag,712      "pw_root_v1",713    );714    return unhex(rootHex);715  } catch {716    return null;717  }718}719720// AES-GCM-wrap rootKey under derivedKey for the pw_root_* fields. Returns the721// hex-encoded ciphertext/nonce/tag triple ready to embed in StoredVault.722async function wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(723  derivedKeyBytes: Uint8Array,724  rootKeyBytes: Uint8Array,725): Promise<{ pw_root_ciphertext: string; pw_root_nonce: string; pw_root_tag: string }> {726  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKeyBytes, hex(rootKeyBytes), "pw_root_v1");727  return {728    pw_root_ciphertext: ciphertext,729    pw_root_nonce: nonce,730    pw_root_tag: tag,731  };732}733734/** Returns the 12 recovery words for the current session's root key. */735export async function getRecoveryWords(): Promise<string[]> {736  if (!rootKey) {737    throw new Error("recovery not set up");738  }739  return rootKeyToWords(rootKey);740}741742async function loadSlot(key: string): Promise<StoredVault | null> {743  const result = await chrome.storage.local.get(key);744  return (result as Record<string, StoredVault | undefined>)[key] ?? null;745}746747async function writeSlot(key: string, vault: StoredVault): Promise<void> {748  try {749    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [key]: vault });750  } catch (err) {751    throw mapStorageError(err);752  }753}754755/**756 * Roll back a vault that was created by [createVaultFromRootKey] but757 * couldn't be paired (e.g. the subsequent license activation, identity758 * derivation, or paired-device upsert failed). Without this, a failed759 * receiver session leaves behind an empty vault — the user has to760 * re-pair to get a working setup, but the empty vault sits in the way.761 *762 * The call is idempotent: removing keys that aren't there is a no-op.763 */764export async function rollbackAdoptedVault(): Promise<void> {765  lock();766  try {767    await chrome.storage.local.remove([768      SLOT_A,769      SLOT_B,770      "peach_last_modified_at",771    ]);772  } catch (err) {773    throw mapStorageError(err);774  }775}776777async function commitCreatedVaultSlots(slotA: StoredVault, slotB: StoredVault): Promise<void> {778  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get("peach_last_modified_at");779  const previous = Number(780    (raw as Record<string, unknown>).peach_last_modified_at,781  );782  const next = Math.max(783    Date.now(),784    Number.isFinite(previous) ? previous + 1 : 0,785  );786  try {787    await chrome.storage.local.set({788      [SLOT_A]: slotA,789      [SLOT_B]: slotB,790      peach_last_modified_at: String(next),791    });792  } catch (err) {793    throw mapStorageError(err);794  }795}796797// Monotonic clock for per-entry modifiedAt / deletedAt timestamps. Guards the798// sync layer's last-write-wins merge against wall-clock regressions (NTP step,799// manual clock change, DST glitch): a backwards Date.now() must never produce800// an entry timestamp that's <= the entry's existing modifiedAt, or a genuine801// local edit would lose to a stale remote copy. The returned value is always802// strictly greater than both the entry's current modifiedAt and the previous803// call's result (SEV-2-E).804let lastEntryTimestamp = 0;805function monotonicEntryTimestamp(currentModifiedAt?: number): number {806  const base = Math.max(807    Date.now(),808    (currentModifiedAt ?? 0) + 1,809    lastEntryTimestamp + 1,810  );811  lastEntryTimestamp = base;812  return base;813}814815async function stampLocalVaultMutation(): Promise<void> {816  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get("peach_last_modified_at");817  const previous = Number(818    (raw as Record<string, unknown>).peach_last_modified_at,819  );820  const next = Math.max(821    Date.now(),822    Number.isFinite(previous) ? previous + 1 : 0,823  );824  await chrome.storage.local.set({825    peach_last_modified_at: String(next),826  });827}828829// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------830// Padding + noise helpers831// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------832833/**834 * Pads the plaintext string with trailing spaces so that the encoded byte835 * length is a multiple of PAD_BLOCK. JSON.parse tolerates trailing836 * whitespace after a complete document, so the padding is transparent on837 * decode. Ciphertext length equals plaintext length plus a 16-byte tag.838 */839function padPlaintext(json: string, minBytes = 0): string {840  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(json);841  const bucket = Math.max(PAD_BLOCK, Math.ceil(encoded.length / PAD_BLOCK) * PAD_BLOCK);842  // minBytes lets the duress path force a fixed ceiling so both slots match.843  const target = Math.max(bucket, minBytes);844  const padLen = target - encoded.length;845  return json + " ".repeat(padLen);846}847848/**849 * Produces a StoredVault-shaped record filled with CSPRNG bytes. The850 * ciphertext length matches the given byte count. Because GCM ciphertext is851 * pseudo-random, this blob is indistinguishable at rest from a real852 * encrypted vault without the key.853 *854 * crypto.getRandomValues() caps each call at 65536 bytes (the Web Crypto855 * spec hard limit). Chunk the fill so vaults larger than that — common once856 * the user has dozens of entries or any passkey — don't throw.857 */858const CSPRNG_CHUNK = 65_536;859860function fillRandom(buf: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {861  for (let offset = 0; offset < buf.length; offset += CSPRNG_CHUNK) {862    const end = Math.min(offset + CSPRNG_CHUNK, buf.length);863    const chunk = new Uint8Array(end - offset);864    crypto.getRandomValues(chunk);865    buf.set(chunk, offset);866  }867  return buf;868}869870function generateNoiseBlob(ciphertextBytes: number): StoredVault {871  const salt = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));872  const nonce = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));873  const cipher = fillRandom(new Uint8Array(ciphertextBytes));874  const tag = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));875  return {876    version: 1,877    salt: hex(salt),878    nonce: hex(nonce),879    ciphertext: hex(cipher),880    tag: hex(tag),881  };882}883884// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------885// Encrypted plaintext envelope886// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------887888type VaultPayload = {889  entries: VaultEntry[];890  tombstones?: Record<string, number>;891  duressConfigured?: boolean;892};893894type DecryptedPayload = {895  entries: VaultEntry[];896  tombstones: Map<string, number>;897  duressConfigured: boolean;898};899900function encodePayload(entries: VaultEntry[], duress: boolean, minBytes = 0): string {901  const envelope: VaultPayload = {902    entries,903    tombstones: Object.fromEntries(tombstones),904    duressConfigured: duress,905  };906  return padPlaintext(JSON.stringify(envelope), minBytes);907}908909function decodeTombstones(raw: unknown, allEntries: VaultEntry[]): Map<string, number> {910  const result = new Map<string, number>();911  if (raw && typeof raw === "object" && !Array.isArray(raw)) {912    for (const [id, timestamp] of Object.entries(raw as Record<string, unknown>)) {913      if (typeof timestamp === "number" && Number.isFinite(timestamp) && timestamp > 0) {914        result.set(id, timestamp);915      }916    }917  }918  // Older payloads had no ledger. Rebuild the durable portion from any919  // soft-deleted entries before they are eligible for a later purge.920  for (const entry of allEntries) {921    if (typeof entry.deletedAt !== "number" || !Number.isFinite(entry.deletedAt) || entry.deletedAt <= 0) {922      continue;923    }924    if ((result.get(entry.id) ?? 0) < entry.deletedAt) {925      result.set(entry.id, entry.deletedAt);926    }927  }928  return result;929}930931function reconcileTombstones(): void {932  const byId = new Map(entries.map((entry) => [entry.id, entry]));933  for (const [id] of tombstones) {934    if (byId.has(id) && !byId.get(id)?.deletedAt) tombstones.delete(id);935  }936  for (const entry of entries) {937    if (typeof entry.deletedAt === "number" && Number.isFinite(entry.deletedAt) && entry.deletedAt > 0) {938      if ((tombstones.get(entry.id) ?? 0) < entry.deletedAt) {939        tombstones.set(entry.id, entry.deletedAt);940      }941    }942  }943}944945function decodePayload(plain: string): DecryptedPayload {946  const parsed = JSON.parse(plain) as VaultPayload;947  if (!parsed || typeof parsed !== "object" || !Array.isArray(parsed.entries)) {948    throw new Error("invalid vault payload");949  }950  const normalized = parsed.entries.map(normalizeEntry);951  return {952    entries: normalized,953    tombstones: decodeTombstones(parsed.tombstones, normalized),954    duressConfigured: parsed.duressConfigured === true,955  };956}957958/**959 * Consolidate duplicate passkey records after registration.960 *961 * Multiple registrations for one RP can leave duplicate passkey records. This962 * pass collapses the duplicates:963 *964 *   1. Group passkey-bearing (and not deleted) entries by `passkey.rpId`.965 *   2. Within each group, the most recently-active credential wins (prefer966 *      lastUsedAt, fall back to passkey.createdAt, fall back to modifiedAt).967 *   3. If a NON-passkey login entry exists for that RP (matched by url or968 *      additionalUrls hostname), attach the winning passkey to it and969 *      soft-delete every passkey-bearing entry in the group.970 *   4. Otherwise, soft-delete every loser in the group, keeping the winner971 *      as a passkey-only entry.972 *973 * Soft delete (deletedAt) rather than splice — the trash flow keeps the974 * record around for retention and the user can restore if the heuristic975 * picked wrong. The `merged` flag goes back to decodePayload so the976 * unlock path persists the consolidated shape immediately.977 */978function mergePasskeyOnlyIntoLogins(entries: VaultEntry[]): { merged: boolean } {979  let merged = false;980  const now = Date.now();981982  const candidates = entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt && e.passkey);983  const byRpId = new Map<string, VaultEntry[]>();984  for (const e of candidates) {985    const rpId = e.passkey!.rpId;986    const list = byRpId.get(rpId);987    if (list) list.push(e);988    else byRpId.set(rpId, [e]);989  }990991  for (const [rpId, group] of byRpId) {992    if (group.length === 0) continue;993    group.sort((a, b) => {994      const aT =995        a.passkey!.lastUsedAt ?? a.passkey!.createdAt ?? a.modifiedAt ?? a.createdAt;996      const bT =997        b.passkey!.lastUsedAt ?? b.passkey!.createdAt ?? b.modifiedAt ?? b.createdAt;998      return bT - aT;999    });1000    const winner = group[0]!;10011002    // Look for a NON-passkey login entry matching this RP. Use the URL1003    // hostname rather than a substring search so a "login.foo.com" entry1004    // doesn't accidentally absorb a passkey for "foo.com".1005    const loginTarget = entries.find((e) => {1006      if (e.deletedAt || e.passkey || e.type !== "login") return false;1007      if (e.url && extractDomain(e.url) === rpId) return true;1008      for (const extra of e.additionalUrls ?? []) {1009        if (extractDomain(extra) === rpId) return true;1010      }1011      return false;1012    });10131014    if (loginTarget) {1015      loginTarget.passkey = winner.passkey;1016      // A passkey entry may also carry the site's TOTP seed. Preserve it when1017      // the passkey is consolidated onto an existing login instead of1018      // soft-deleting the only record that held the 2FA configuration.1019      if (!loginTarget.totp && winner.totp) {1020        loginTarget.totp = winner.totp;1021        loginTarget.totpAlgorithm = winner.totpAlgorithm;1022        loginTarget.totpDigits = winner.totpDigits;1023        loginTarget.totpPeriod = winner.totpPeriod;1024      }1025      loginTarget.modifiedAt = now;1026      for (const dup of group) {1027        if (!dup.deletedAt) {1028          dup.deletedAt = now;1029          dup.modifiedAt = now;1030        }1031      }1032      merged = true;1033    } else if (group.length > 1) {1034      for (let i = 1; i < group.length; i += 1) {1035        const dup = group[i]!;1036        if (!dup.deletedAt) {1037          dup.deletedAt = now;1038          dup.modifiedAt = now;1039        }1040      }1041      merged = true;1042    }1043  }10441045  return { merged };1046}10471048// Validates that a `StoredVault` record on disk has the field shape we expect1049// before treating an AES-GCM decrypt success as a clean unlock. AES-GCM only1050// authenticates the static VERSION_BYTE AAD, not the `version` field on the1051// outer record — a corrupted `version: 42` slot still decrypts cleanly. This1052// check surfaces that as `corrupted` (M7/COR-007) so the popup can offer a1053// history-restore path instead of falsely reporting "wrong password".1054function hasValidVaultSchema(v: unknown): v is StoredVault {1055  if (typeof v !== "object" || v === null) return false;1056  const r = v as Record<string, unknown>;1057  return (1058    r.version === 1 &&1059    typeof r.salt === "string" &&1060    typeof r.nonce === "string" &&1061    typeof r.ciphertext === "string" &&1062    typeof r.tag === "string"1063  );1064}10651066export type TryDecryptResult =1067  | { status: "ok"; payload: DecryptedPayload }1068  | { status: "wrong_key" }1069  | { status: "corrupted"; reason: string };10701071// Exported solely for `unlockFromCodex` below, which needs to verify a1072// supplied passphrase against a slotA blob *without* committing anything to1073// storage. Keep this internal otherwise — callers crossing the messages.ts1074// boundary should always go through `unlock` / `verifyMainPassword` so the1075// constant-time invariants in Projects.md §3.4 are not bypassed.1076export async function tryDecryptSlot(1077  vault: StoredVault,1078  key: Uint8Array,1079  aadTag?: string,1080): Promise<DecryptedPayload | null> {1081  const res = await tryDecryptSlotResult(vault, key, aadTag);1082  return res.status === "ok" ? res.payload : null;1083}10841085export async function tryDecryptSlotResult(1086  vault: StoredVault,1087  key: Uint8Array,1088  aadTag?: string,1089): Promise<TryDecryptResult> {1090  if (!hasValidVaultSchema(vault)) {1091    return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_slot_schema" };1092  }1093  let plain: string;1094  try {1095    plain = await decrypt(key, vault.nonce, vault.ciphertext, vault.tag, aadTag);1096  } catch {1097    return { status: "wrong_key" };1098  }1099  try {1100    const parsed = JSON.parse(plain) as unknown;1101    if (typeof parsed !== "object" || parsed === null) {1102      return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_payload_shape" };1103    }1104    if (!Array.isArray(parsed) && !Array.isArray((parsed as VaultPayload).entries)) {1105      return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_payload_shape" };1106    }1107    return { status: "ok", payload: decodePayload(plain) };1108  } catch {1109    return { status: "corrupted", reason: "invalid_payload_json" };1110  }1111}11121113// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------1114// Core operations1115// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------11161117function buildDomainIndexSync(all: VaultEntry[]): void {1118  domainIndex = new Map();11191120  for (const entry of all) {1121    if (entry.deletedAt) continue;1122    if (entry.type === "note" || entry.type === "card") continue;11231124    // An entry can match multiple sites via `additionalUrls`. Index each1125    // hostname so `queryDomain` returns the entry regardless of which alias1126    // the user is currently visiting. Dedupe per-entry so a single entry1127    // never appears twice in one bucket.1128    const domains = new Set<string>();1129    const primary = extractDomain(entry.url ?? "");1130    if (primary) domains.add(primary);1131    for (const extra of entry.additionalUrls ?? []) {1132      const d = extractDomain(extra);1133      if (d) domains.add(d);1134    }1135    if (domains.size === 0) continue;11361137    for (const domain of domains) {1138      const bucket = domainIndex.get(domain) ?? [];1139      bucket.push(entry);1140      domainIndex.set(domain, bucket);1141    }1142  }1143}11441145export async function createVault(password: string): Promise<void> {1146  const salt = generateSalt();1147  derivedKey = await deriveKey(password, salt);1148  entries = [];1149  tombstones = new Map();1150  vaultMode = "real";1151  duressConfigured = false;1152  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);11531154  // Generate and wrap the root key for recovery word escrow.1155  const { rawRootKey, recoverySalt, wrappedRootKey, wrappedNonce, wrappedTag } =1156    await generateAndWrapRootKey();1157  rootKey = unhex(rawRootKey);11581159  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured, duressConfigured ? DURESS_SLOT_SIZE : 0);1160  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");11611162  // Second wrapping of rootKey under derivedKey so future unlocks can rehydrate1163  // it without recovery words (H2/COR-006).1164  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(derivedKey, rootKey);11651166  const slotA: StoredVault = {1167    version: 1,1168    salt: hex(salt),1169    nonce,1170    ciphertext,1171    tag,1172    recovery_salt: recoverySalt,1173    recovery_wrapped_root_key: wrappedRootKey,1174    recovery_nonce: wrappedNonce,1175    recovery_tag: wrappedTag,1176    ...pwRoot,1177  };1178  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, slotA);11791180  // Matching-size noise blob for slot B, so a fresh install shows two1181  // similarly-shaped records regardless of whether duress is ever set up.1182  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2));1183  await stampLocalVaultMutation();11841185  touchAutoLock();1186}11871188/**1189 * Creates a local vault from an existing vault root key received through the1190 * SAS-gated adoption protocol. The password is local to this device; it wraps1191 * the adopted root key at rest and does not need to match the source device.1192 */1193export async function createVaultFromRootKey(1194  password: string,1195  rootKeyHex: string,1196): Promise<{ vaultId: string }> {1197  if (typeof password !== "string" || password.length === 0) {1198    throw new Error("ADOPT_INVALID_PASSWORD");1199  }1200  if (typeof rootKeyHex !== "string" || !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(rootKeyHex)) {1201    throw new Error("ADOPT_INVALID_ROOT_KEY: expected 64 lowercase hex chars");1202  }12031204  const rootKeyBytes = unhex(rootKeyHex);1205  if (rootKeyBytes.length !== 32) {1206    rootKeyBytes.fill(0);1207    throw new Error("ADOPT_INVALID_ROOT_KEY: expected 32 bytes");1208  }12091210  let nextDerivedKey: Uint8Array | null = null;1211  let sessionRootKey: Uint8Array | null = null;1212  try {1213    if ((await loadSlot(SLOT_A)) !== null) {1214      throw new Error("ADOPT_VAULT_ALREADY_EXISTS");1215    }12161217    const nextEntries: VaultEntry[] = [];1218    const nextDuressConfigured = false;1219    const vaultId = await computeVaultId(rootKeyBytes);1220    const salt = generateSalt();1221    nextDerivedKey = await deriveKey(password, salt);1222    const recovery = await wrapExistingRootKeyForRecovery(rootKeyBytes);12231224    sessionRootKey = new Uint8Array(rootKeyBytes);1225    const plaintext = encodePayload(nextEntries, nextDuressConfigured, 0);1226    const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(nextDerivedKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");1227    const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(nextDerivedKey, sessionRootKey);1228    const slotA: StoredVault = {1229      version: 1,1230      salt: hex(salt),1231      nonce,1232      ciphertext,1233      tag,1234      recovery_salt: recovery.recoverySalt,1235      recovery_wrapped_root_key: recovery.wrappedRootKey,1236      recovery_nonce: recovery.wrappedNonce,1237      recovery_tag: recovery.wrappedTag,1238      ...pwRoot,1239    };1240    const slotB = generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2);1241    await commitCreatedVaultSlots(slotA, slotB);12421243    const previousDerivedKey = derivedKey;1244    const previousRootKey = rootKey;1245    derivedKey = nextDerivedKey;1246    rootKey = sessionRootKey;1247    nextDerivedKey = null;1248    sessionRootKey = null;1249    entries = nextEntries;1250    tombstones = new Map();1251    vaultMode = "real";1252    duressConfigured = nextDuressConfigured;1253    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1254    if (previousDerivedKey && previousDerivedKey !== derivedKey) zeroKey(previousDerivedKey);1255    if (previousRootKey && previousRootKey !== rootKey) previousRootKey.fill(0);1256    touchAutoLock();12571258    return { vaultId };1259  } finally {1260    rootKeyBytes.fill(0);1261    if (nextDerivedKey) zeroKey(nextDerivedKey);1262    if (sessionRootKey) sessionRootKey.fill(0);1263  }1264}12651266export async function hasVault(): Promise<boolean> {1267  return (await loadSlot(SLOT_A)) !== null;1268}12691270/**1271 * Returns whether the real vault has recorded that a duress passphrase is1272 * configured. Reliable only after a real-mode unlock — before unlock or in1273 * decoy mode, returns false because we cannot read slot A's plaintext.1274 */1275export async function isDuressEnabled(): Promise<boolean> {1276  return vaultMode === "real" && duressConfigured;1277}12781279export async function setupDuress(duressPassword: string): Promise<void> {1280  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {1281    throw new Error("vault must be unlocked in real mode");1282  }1283  // Encrypt the decoy payload (empty entries) under the duress key. Pad to1284  // at least the current slot A ciphertext size so the two slots look the1285  // same at rest at setup time.1286  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1287  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");12881289  const decoySalt = generateSalt();1290  const decoyKey = await deriveKey(duressPassword, decoySalt);1291  try {1292    // Pad the decoy to the fixed duress ceiling. Slot A is re-encrypted to the1293    // same ceiling by the persistSlotA() call below (duressConfigured is now1294    // true), so both slots are exactly DURESS_SLOT_SIZE+tag at rest and their1295    // lengths cannot reveal that duress is configured (audit MEDIUM).1296    const plaintext = encodePayload([], false, DURESS_SLOT_SIZE);1297    const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(decoyKey, plaintext, "slot_b_v1");1298    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, {1299      version: 1,1300      salt: hex(decoySalt),1301      nonce,1302      ciphertext,1303      tag,1304    });1305  } finally {1306    zeroKey(decoyKey);1307  }13081309  // Re-encrypt slot A with the duressConfigured flag set to true. No external1310  // flag is written — the bit lives inside the encrypted envelope.1311  duressConfigured = true;1312  await persistSlotA();1313}13141315export async function disableDuress(): Promise<void> {1316  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {1317    throw new Error("vault must be unlocked in real mode");1318  }1319  // Overwrite slot B with fresh noise that matches slot A's size. The slot1320  // remains occupied so its mere existence does not signal that duress was1321  // ever configured.1322  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1323  if (slotA) {1324    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(slotA.ciphertext.length / 2));1325  }13261327  duressConfigured = false;1328  await persistSlotA();1329}13301331// L14/COR-015: this function intentionally checks slot A (real vault) only.1332// A duress-mode user attempting changePassword is rejected earlier by the1333// vaultMode === 'decoy' check at changePassword. The real-vs-decoy1334// distinction here is by design — duress users cannot rotate the real1335// password by guessing it, and the asymmetry in error timing is acceptable1336// because duress mode is opt-in and the user knows their own decoy key.1337export async function verifyMainPassword(password: string): Promise<boolean> {1338  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1339  if (!slotA) return false;1340  const key = await deriveKey(password, unhex(slotA.salt));1341  try {1342    return (await tryDecryptSlot(slotA, key, "slot_a_v1")) !== null;1343  } finally {1344    zeroKey(key);1345  }1346}13471348export async function unlock(password: string): Promise<boolean> {1349  return attemptUnlockWithDerive(password, deriveKey);1350}13511352async function attemptUnlockWithDerive(1353  password: string,1354  derive: typeof deriveKey,1355): Promise<boolean> {1356  // Load both current-format slots in parallel. Both exist on a supported1357  // install; the1358  // parallel load and the parallel derivation below keep wall-clock time1359  // constant regardless of which slot's passphrase (real or decoy) the1360  // caller supplied, so a timing side channel cannot distinguish the1361  // duress path from the real-unlock path (DUR-002).1362  const [slotA, slotB] = await Promise.all([1363    loadSlot(SLOT_A),1364    loadSlot(SLOT_B),1365  ]);13661367  // Derive both keys in parallel, unconditionally.1368  const [keyA, keyB] = await Promise.all([1369    slotA ? derive(password, unhex(slotA.salt)) : Promise.resolve(null),1370    slotB ? derive(password, unhex(slotB.salt)) : Promise.resolve(null),1371  ]);13721373  // Attempt both decrypts in parallel. The Result variant lets us distinguish1374  // 'wrong_key' from 'corrupted' so callers can offer a history-restore path1375  // when a slot's schema is invalid even though AES-GCM authenticated (M7).1376  const [resultA, resultB] = await Promise.all([1377    keyA && slotA1378      ? tryDecryptSlotResult(slotA, keyA, "slot_a_v1")1379      : Promise.resolve({ status: "wrong_key" } as TryDecryptResult),1380    keyB && slotB1381      ? tryDecryptSlotResult(slotB, keyB, "slot_b_v1")1382      : Promise.resolve({ status: "wrong_key" } as TryDecryptResult),1383  ]);1384  const payloadA = resultA.status === "ok" ? resultA.payload : null;1385  const payloadB = resultB.status === "ok" ? resultB.payload : null;13861387  if (payloadA && keyA) {1388    derivedKey = keyA;1389    void saveSessionKey(keyA, "real");1390    vaultMode = "real";1391    entries = payloadA.entries;1392    tombstones = payloadA.tombstones;1393    duressConfigured = payloadA.duressConfigured;1394    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1395    await loadSettings();1396    touchAutoLock();1397    if (keyB) zeroKey(keyB);13981399    // Current vaults always carry a password-wrapped root key. Older vaults1400    // without this escrow are outside the supported storage format.1401    rootKey = slotA ? await deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(keyA, slotA) : null;1402    if (!rootKey) {1403      lock();1404      return false;1405    }14061407    await lockedSyncUnlockHook?.().catch((error) => {1408      console.warn("[Peach sync] locked inbox drain failed:", error);1409    });1410    await resetPinFailedAttempts();1411    return true;1412  }14131414  if (payloadB && keyB) {1415    derivedKey = keyB;1416    void saveSessionKey(keyB, "decoy");1417    vaultMode = "decoy";1418    entries = payloadB.entries;1419    tombstones = payloadB.tombstones;1420    duressConfigured = false;1421    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1422    await loadSettings();1423    touchAutoLock();1424    if (keyA) zeroKey(keyA);1425    return true;1426  }14271428  if (keyA) zeroKey(keyA);1429  if (keyB) zeroKey(keyB);1430  // Surface corruption (good AES tag, broken schema) distinctly from1431  // wrong-password so the popup can offer history-restore (M7/COR-007).1432  if (resultA.status === "corrupted") {1433    lastUnlockFailureReason = resultA.reason;1434  } else if (resultB.status === "corrupted") {1435    lastUnlockFailureReason = resultB.reason;1436  }1437  return false;1438}14391440// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------1441// MV3 service worker session key — survives SW restarts within a browser session1442// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------14431444// chrome.storage.session is cleared on browser close; survives SW restart.1445// Firefox does not implement it (persistent background script, no restart risk).1446const SESSION_KEY_STORAGE = "peach_session_dk";14471448async function saveSessionKey(key: Uint8Array, mode: "real" | "decoy"): Promise<void> {1449  if (!chrome.storage.session) return;1450  await chrome.storage.session.set({ [SESSION_KEY_STORAGE]: { keyHex: hex(key), mode } });1451}14521453async function clearSessionKey(): Promise<void> {1454  if (!chrome.storage.session) return;1455  await chrome.storage.session.remove(SESSION_KEY_STORAGE);1456}14571458/**1459 * On SW restart, re-derive all in-memory vault state from the session key1460 * stored in chrome.storage.session (set at unlock time, cleared by lock();1461 * also cleared on browser close or when restoration fails).1462 * Returns true if the vault was restored, false if no session key was found.1463 * No-ops if the vault is already unlocked.1464 */1465export async function restoreFromSession(): Promise<boolean> {1466  if (derivedKey !== null) return true;1467  if (!chrome.storage.session) return false;1468  const stored = await chrome.storage.session.get(SESSION_KEY_STORAGE);1469  const entry = stored[SESSION_KEY_STORAGE] as { keyHex: string; mode: "real" | "decoy" } | undefined;1470  if (!entry?.keyHex) return false;14711472  const key = unhex(entry.keyHex);1473  const slotKey = entry.mode === "real" ? SLOT_A : SLOT_B;1474  const aadTag = entry.mode === "real" ? "slot_a_v1" : "slot_b_v1";1475  const slot = await loadSlot(slotKey);1476  if (!slot) { await clearSessionKey(); return false; }14771478  const result = await tryDecryptSlotResult(slot, key, aadTag);1479  if (result.status !== "ok") { await clearSessionKey(); return false; }14801481  derivedKey = key;1482  vaultMode = entry.mode;1483  entries = result.payload.entries;1484  tombstones = result.payload.tombstones;1485  duressConfigured = entry.mode === "real" ? result.payload.duressConfigured : false;1486  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1487  await loadSettings();1488  touchAutoLock();14891490  // Rehydrate the root key used by sync identity derivation from the password1491  // escrow stored on the current vault format.1492  if (entry.mode === "real") {1493    rootKey = await deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(key, slot);1494    if (!rootKey) {1495      lock();1496      return false;1497    }1498  }14991500  await lockedSyncUnlockHook?.().catch((error) => {1501    console.warn("[Peach sync] locked inbox drain failed:", error);1502  });15031504  return true;1505}15061507export function lock(): void {1508  // A user-initiated lock must be durable across MV3 service-worker restarts.1509  // The SW is idle-killed after ~30s of inactivity, and the popup's next open1510  // wakes a cold SW whose restoreFromSession() reads chrome.storage.session.1511  // If the session key survived lock(), that restore would silently re-unlock1512  // the vault ~a minute after the user locked it — a lock that only held1513  // while the SW happened to stay alive. The background-sync convenience the1514  // session key once bought (sync runner re-waking to a restored vault) is1515  // not worth an unlocked vault the user never asked to unlock; when locked,1516  // sync-runner correctly reports VAULT_LOCKED instead.1517  void clearSessionKey();1518  void clearRecoveryConfirmPending();1519  if (derivedKey) {1520    zeroKey(derivedKey);1521    derivedKey = null;1522  }1523  if (rootKey) {1524    rootKey.fill(0);1525    rootKey = null;1526  }15271528  entries = [];1529  tombstones = new Map();1530  domainIndex = new Map();1531  vaultMode = "real";1532  duressConfigured = false;1533  clearAutoLock();1534}15351536export function isUnlocked(): boolean {1537  return derivedKey !== null;1538}15391540// Opens the vault using a pre-derived AES-256 key (skipping Argon2id). The1541// PIN-unlock path unwraps this key from its PIN wrap; the passphrase path1542// always derives from scratch via Argon2id.1543export async function unlockWithKey(1544  masterKeyHex: string,1545): Promise<{ ok: true; entries: VaultEntry[] } | { ok: false; error: string }> {1546  try {1547    const masterKeyBytes = unhex(masterKeyHex);1548    const stored = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);1549    if (!stored) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };1550    const payload = await tryDecryptSlot(stored, masterKeyBytes, "slot_a_v1");1551    if (!payload) return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };15521553    derivedKey = masterKeyBytes;1554    vaultMode = "real";1555    entries = payload.entries;1556    tombstones = payload.tombstones;1557    duressConfigured = payload.duressConfigured;1558    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);1559    await loadSettings();1560    touchAutoLock();15611562    rootKey = await deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey(masterKeyBytes, stored);1563    if (!rootKey) {1564      lock();1565      return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };1566    }1567    return { ok: true, entries };1568  } catch {1569    return { ok: false, error: "invalid_key" };1570  }1571}15721573// --- Adoption duress-slot helpers (passthrough, no decrypt) ---15741575/**1576 * Adoption SOURCE helper: returns the sealed slot B as a JSON string when1577 * duress is configured and slot B exists, so the inline snapshot can ship it1578 * to the receiver. Returns null otherwise. Never decrypts.1579 */1580export async function exportDuressSlotForAdoption(): Promise<string | null> {1581  if (!(await isDuressEnabled())) return null;1582  const slotB = await loadSlot(SLOT_B);1583  if (!slotB) return null;1584  return JSON.stringify(slotB);1585}15861587/**1588 * Adoption RECEIVER helper: installs a duress slot received from a source1589 * device. Validates the StoredVault shape (same guard as unlockFromCodex)1590 * and writes it to slot B. Throws on invalid shape so the caller can treat1591 * it as a non-fatal snapshot failure. Never decrypts.1592 */1593export async function installAdoptedDuressSlot(json: string): Promise<void> {1594  let parsed: StoredVault;1595  try {1596    const raw = JSON.parse(json) as unknown;1597    if (!hasValidVaultSchema(raw)) {1598      throw new Error("invalid_duress_slot_shape");1599    }1600    parsed = raw;1601  } catch (err) {1602    if (err instanceof SyntaxError) {1603      throw new Error("invalid_duress_slot_shape");1604    }1605    throw err;1606  }1607  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, parsed);1608}16091610/**1611 * Restore the vault from a parsed Peach Codex payload.1612 *1613 * The supplied passphrase is verified against the Codex's slotA *before* any1614 * storage mutation — wrong passphrases return without touching disk. On1615 * success, the current vault state is snapshotted (reason: "restore") so the1616 * user can revert via Settings -> Vault History, then slotA/slotB are written1617 * and `peach_last_modified_at` is set to the Codex's recorded timestamp. A1618 * regular `unlock()` follows so the rest of the SW sees the standard1619 * post-unlock state.1620 *1621 * Intentionally non-Pro-gated — see peach_codex_v2.md "Pro gating". A Codex1622 * printed by a Pro user must always be restorable, even on a free device.1623 *1624 * Timing is not held constant here (in contrast to `unlock`): the Codex flow1625 * is an explicit user action with a known passphrase, not a passive lock1626 * screen, so the duress-vs-real timing side channel does not apply.1627 */1628export async function unlockFromCodex(params: {1629  slotA: string; // JSON string of StoredVault for slot A1630  slotB: string | null; // JSON string of StoredVault for slot B, or null1631  timestamp: number;1632  masterPassphrase: string;1633}): Promise<1634  | { ok: true; entryCount: number }1635  | { ok: false; reason: "wrong_passphrase" | "invalid_slot_format" }1636> {1637  let parsedSlotA: StoredVault;1638  let parsedSlotB: StoredVault | null = null;1639  try {1640    const rawA = JSON.parse(params.slotA) as unknown;1641    if (!hasValidVaultSchema(rawA)) {1642      return { ok: false, reason: "invalid_slot_format" };1643    }1644    parsedSlotA = rawA;1645    if (params.slotB !== null) {1646      const rawB = JSON.parse(params.slotB) as unknown;1647      if (!hasValidVaultSchema(rawB)) {1648        return { ok: false, reason: "invalid_slot_format" };1649      }1650      parsedSlotB = rawB;1651    }1652  } catch {1653    return { ok: false, reason: "invalid_slot_format" };1654  }16551656  // Verify the passphrase against the supplied slotA WITHOUT writing anything.1657  // If this fails the on-disk vault is left completely untouched.1658  const trialKey = await deriveKey(params.masterPassphrase, unhex(parsedSlotA.salt));1659  const trialPayload = await tryDecryptSlot(parsedSlotA, trialKey, "slot_a_v1");1660  if (!trialPayload) {1661    zeroKey(trialKey);1662    return { ok: false, reason: "wrong_passphrase" };1663  }1664  // Drop the trial key; `unlock()` below derives its own copy. Holding two1665  // copies of the master key in memory at once would be a needless surface.1666  zeroKey(trialKey);16671668  // Snapshot the about-to-be-overwritten on-disk state so the user can revert1669  // a mistaken Codex restore via the Vault History UI. Non-fatal if it fails.1670  await takeVaultSnapshot("restore");16711672  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, parsedSlotA);1673  if (parsedSlotB) {1674    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, parsedSlotB);1675  } else {1676    // Slot B must always exist with ciphertext length matching slot A1677    // (Projects.md §3.2). Codex prints may omit slot B (duress wasn't1678    // configured); regenerate noise to satisfy the invariant.1679    await writeSlot(1680      SLOT_B,1681      generateNoiseBlob(parsedSlotA.ciphertext.length / 2),1682    );1683  }1684  await chrome.storage.local.set({1685    peach_last_modified_at: String(params.timestamp),1686  });16871688  // Standard unlock path so domain index, settings, auto-lock, and1689  // recovery-key state all populate exactly as a normal unlock would.1690  const ok = await unlock(params.masterPassphrase);1691  if (!ok) {1692    // Should be unreachable — we just verified the passphrase against the1693    // same slotA we wrote. Treat as wrong_passphrase to keep the contract1694    // simple if some race or storage anomaly intrudes.1695    return { ok: false, reason: "wrong_passphrase" };1696  }1697  return { ok: true, entryCount: getEntries().length };1698}16991700// Returns the current in-memory derived key as a hex string. Only the PIN1701// unlock path needs this value, and it reads module state directly; this1702// accessor exists so unlockWithKey's root-key rehydration is testable.1703export /* @testable */ function getDerivedKeyHex(): string {1704  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_not_unlocked");1705  return hex(derivedKey);1706}17071708/**1709 * Returns the vault's stable root key as hex, or null when locked / not yet1710 * populated. The root key is random per-vault, generated at creation, escrowed1711 * under the recovery words, and re-wrapped (not regenerated) on every password1712 * change — so it is INVARIANT across password rotation, unlike getDerivedKeyHex.1713 *1714 * This is the correct input for sync identity derivation (vault_id, the Noise1715 * NK static key, the Ed25519 manifest signing key, and per-entry envelope1716 * keys): paired devices keep the same identity and can still decrypt each1717 * other's entries after either side rotates its master password (SEV-2-B).1718 *1719 * Returns null rather than throwing so sync callers degrade to VAULT_LOCKED1720 * instead of crashing; rootKey is populated on every supported real-mode1721 * unlock via deriveRootKeyFromDerivedKey.1722 */1723export function getRootKeyHex(): string | null {1724  return rootKey ? hex(rootKey) : null;1725}17261727export function getEntries(): VaultEntry[] {1728  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1729  return entries.filter((entry) => !entry.deletedAt);1730}17311732const EMAIL_RE = /^[^\s@]+@[^\s@]+\.[^\s@]+$/;17331734export function getIdentities(): SavedIdentity[] {1735  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");1736  const active = entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt && e.type === "login");17371738  const emailMap = new Map<string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }>();1739  const usernameMap = new Map<string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }>();17401741  for (const entry of active) {1742    const domain = extractDomain(entry.url ?? "") ?? "";1743    const modifiedAt = entry.modifiedAt ?? entry.createdAt ?? 0;17441745    function tally(map: Map<string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }>, v: string) {1746      const existing = map.get(v);1747      if (!existing || modifiedAt > existing.lastUsed) {1748        map.set(v, { lastUsed: modifiedAt, count: (existing?.count ?? 0) + 1, domain });1749      } else {1750        map.set(v, { ...existing, count: existing.count + 1 });1751      }1752    }17531754    const uVal = entry.username?.trim();1755    if (uVal) tally(EMAIL_RE.test(uVal) ? emailMap : usernameMap, uVal);17561757    // Also count the dedicated email field — entries created via the inline1758    // popup new-entry form store email here rather than in username.1759    const eVal = entry.email?.trim();1760    if (eVal) tally(emailMap, eVal);1761  }17621763  const toIdentity = (type: "email" | "username") =>1764    ([value, d]: [string, { lastUsed: number; count: number; domain: string }]): SavedIdentity => ({1765      value, type, lastUsed: d.lastUsed, useCount: d.count, exampleDomain: d.domain || undefined,1766    });17671768  return [1769    ...[...emailMap.entries()].map(toIdentity("email")).sort((a, b) => b.useCount - a.useCount),1770    ...[...usernameMap.entries()].map(toIdentity("username")).sort((a, b) => b.useCount - a.useCount),1771  ];1772}17731774export async function batchAddEntries(drafts: EntryDraft[]): Promise<VaultEntry[]> {1775  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");17761777  const now = Date.now();1778  const added: VaultEntry[] = [];1779  for (const draft of drafts) {1780    try {1781      const sanitized = sanitizeEntryDraft(draft);1782      const nextEntry: VaultEntry = {1783        ...sanitized,1784        id: crypto.randomUUID(),1785        createdAt: now,1786        modifiedAt: monotonicEntryTimestamp(),1787      };1788      entries.push(nextEntry);1789      added.push(nextEntry);1790    } catch {1791      // Skip invalid drafts silently — caller can see diff between input and output length1792    }1793  }17941795  if (added.length > 0) {1796    await persistEntries();1797  }17981799  return added;1800}18011802/**1803 * Restore a set of entries in full fidelity — preserves id, createdAt,1804 * modifiedAt, and every other field unlike `batchAddEntries` which1805 * assigns fresh identity. Used by restore paths where the backup is the1806 * authoritative source of truth. `mode` controls how entries already in1807 * the vault are treated.1808 */1809export async function restoreEntries(1810  incoming: VaultEntry[],1811  mode: "replace" | "merge"1812): Promise<{ added: number; updated: number; skipped: number }> {1813  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");18141815  // A replace with zero incoming entries is almost certainly a caller bug1816  // (e.g. an import that silently dropped everything). Refuse rather than1817  // wipe the vault.1818  if (mode === "replace" && incoming.length === 0) {1819    throw new Error("refuse to replace with empty entry set");1820  }18211822  let added = 0;1823  let updated = 0;1824  let skipped = 0;18251826  if (mode === "replace") {1827    entries = [];1828    for (const entry of incoming) {1829      const normalized = naturalizeRestoredId(sanitizeRestoredEntry(entry));1830      if (!normalized) {1831        skipped += 1;1832        continue;1833      }1834      entries.push(normalized);1835      if (normalized.deletedAt) {1836        tombstones.set(1837          normalized.id,1838          Math.max(tombstones.get(normalized.id) ?? 0, normalized.deletedAt),1839        );1840      } else {1841        tombstones.delete(normalized.id);1842      }1843      added += 1;1844    }1845  } else {1846    const byId = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();1847    for (const e of entries) byId.set(e.id, e);18481849    for (const entry of incoming) {1850      const normalized = naturalizeRestoredId(sanitizeRestoredEntry(entry));1851      if (!normalized) {1852        skipped += 1;1853        continue;1854      }1855      const existing = byId.get(normalized.id);1856      if (!existing) {1857        entries.push(normalized);1858        if (normalized.deletedAt) tombstones.set(normalized.id, normalized.deletedAt);1859        else tombstones.delete(normalized.id);1860        added += 1;1861      } else if (normalized.modifiedAt > existing.modifiedAt) {1862        const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === existing.id);1863        if (idx !== -1) {1864          entries[idx] = normalized;1865          if (normalized.deletedAt) tombstones.set(normalized.id, normalized.deletedAt);1866          else tombstones.delete(normalized.id);1867          updated += 1;1868        }1869      } else {1870        skipped += 1;1871      }1872    }1873  }18741875  await persistEntries("import");1876  return { added, updated, skipped };1877}18781879/**1880 * A Peach entry id is a UUID. A restored or imported file carries whatever id1881 * its author used, and no reader bounds it, so one oversized id would ride1882 * into every future sync frame and be rejected there — a permanent, opaque1883 * failure on both platforms, caused by data that was already local.1884 *1885 * The action is mint, not reject: this is the last point where an id is still1886 * ours to choose, so the worst outcome is one duplicate if the same vault is1887 * later restored beside a device still holding the old id. Rejecting would1888 * lose the user's import.1889 *1890 * Deliberately NOT inside sanitizeRestoredEntry, which applyMergedRemoteEntries1891 * also calls. Sync has to adopt a peer's id verbatim — that is the only thing1892 * keeping two devices agreed on which entry they are discussing — so reminting1893 * there would fork identity on every device, on every round.1894 */1895const ENTRY_ID_SHAPE = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,64}$/;18961897function naturalizeRestoredId(entry: VaultEntry | null): VaultEntry | null {1898  if (!entry || ENTRY_ID_SHAPE.test(entry.id)) return entry;1899  return { ...entry, id: crypto.randomUUID() };1900}19011902/**1903 * Validate + normalise a VaultEntry coming from a backup, import, or sync1904 * peer. MV-6: this is a strict field WHITELIST — `normalizeEntry` copies1905 * only known VaultEntry fields (unknown/attacker keys are dropped), and1906 * nested `passkey`/`canary` shapes are rebuilt field-by-field, never1907 * spread. Returns null for values the live vault shouldn't accept.1908 */1909function sanitizeRestoredEntry(entry: VaultEntry): VaultEntry | null {1910  if (!entry || typeof entry !== "object") return null;1911  const title = typeof entry.title === "string" ? entry.title.trim() : "";1912  if (!title) return null;1913  const id = typeof entry.id === "string" && entry.id ? entry.id : crypto.randomUUID();1914  const now = Date.now();1915  const createdAt = typeof entry.createdAt === "number" ? entry.createdAt : now;1916  const modifiedAt = typeof entry.modifiedAt === "number" ? entry.modifiedAt : createdAt;19171918  // normalizeEntry whitelists every known VaultEntry field before the entry1919  // reaches the live vault.1920  const normalized = normalizeEntry({1921    ...entry,1922    id,1923    title,1924    type: entry.type ?? "login",1925    createdAt,1926    modifiedAt,1927  });19281929  if (normalized.passkey) {1930    normalized.passkey = sanitizePasskey(normalized.passkey);1931  }1932  if (normalized.canary) {1933    normalized.canary = sanitizeCanary(normalized.canary);1934  }1935  // PCH-01-016: bound tags on the restore path too, so both import funnels agree.1936  normalized.tags = sanitizeTags(normalized.tags);19371938  // Login entries from backup must carry a password (or be passkey-only,1939  // in which case the passkey sub-object replaces the password requirement).1940  if (1941    normalized.type === "login" &&1942    !normalized.passkey &&1943    typeof normalized.password !== "string"1944  ) {1945    return null;1946  }1947  if (entry.passkey && !normalized.passkey) {1948    // Entry claimed a passkey but the shape didn't validate — refuse the1949    // whole entry rather than silently importing a credential-less husk.1950    return null;1951  }19521953  return normalized;1954}19551956/**1957 * Rebuild a PasskeyData object from untrusted input, field by field.1958 * Returns undefined when required fields are missing/mistyped — a rogue1959 * passkey credential must not activate via import (MV-6 attack scenario).1960 */1961function sanitizePasskey(pk: unknown): PasskeyData | undefined {1962  if (!pk || typeof pk !== "object") return undefined;1963  const r = pk as Record<string, unknown>;1964  if (1965    typeof r.rpId !== "string" || !r.rpId ||1966    typeof r.credentialId !== "string" || !r.credentialId ||1967    typeof r.publicKeyCose !== "string" ||1968    typeof r.userHandle !== "string" ||1969    typeof r.userName !== "string"1970  ) {1971    return undefined;1972  }1973  return {1974    rpId: r.rpId,1975    rpName: typeof r.rpName === "string" ? r.rpName : r.rpId,1976    credentialId: r.credentialId,1977    publicKeyCose: r.publicKeyCose,1978    privateKeyJwk:1979      r.privateKeyJwk && typeof r.privateKeyJwk === "object"1980        ? (r.privateKeyJwk as JsonWebKey)1981        : undefined,1982    userHandle: r.userHandle,1983    userName: r.userName,1984    userDisplayName:1985      typeof r.userDisplayName === "string" ? r.userDisplayName : r.userName,1986    algorithm: r.algorithm === -8 ? -8 : -7,1987    signCount: typeof r.signCount === "number" ? r.signCount : 0,1988    aaguid: typeof r.aaguid === "string" ? r.aaguid : "",1989    backupEligible: r.backupEligible === true,1990    backupState: r.backupState === true,1991    lastUsedAt: typeof r.lastUsedAt === "number" ? r.lastUsedAt : undefined,1992    browser: r.browser === "chrome" || r.browser === "firefox" ? r.browser : undefined,1993    transports: Array.isArray(r.transports)1994      ? r.transports.filter((t): t is string => typeof t === "string")1995      : undefined,1996    createdAt: typeof r.createdAt === "number" ? r.createdAt : Date.now(),1997  };1998}19992000/**2001 * Rebuild a Canary object from untrusted input. The webhook must be a2002 * well-formed HTTPS URL — a poisoned canary.webhookUrl is a standing2003 * exfiltration endpoint that the canary subsystem will POST entry titles2004 * to (MV-6 attack scenario). Invalid → the canary is dropped, not the2005 * entry. FIRE_CANARY_PING re-validates with the full SSRF guard at fire2006 * time (isAllowedCanaryWebhookUrl), so this import-time check is the2007 * outer of two gates.2008 */2009function sanitizeCanary(c: unknown): Canary | undefined {2010  if (!c || typeof c !== "object") return undefined;2011  const r = c as Record<string, unknown>;2012  if (typeof r.webhookUrl !== "string") return undefined;2013  let url: URL;2014  try {2015    url = new URL(r.webhookUrl);2016  } catch {2017    return undefined;2018  }2019  if (url.protocol !== "https:") return undefined;2020  return {2021    webhookUrl: url.toString(),2022    label: typeof r.label === "string" ? r.label : undefined,2023    lastPinged: typeof r.lastPinged === "number" ? r.lastPinged : undefined,2024    pingCount: typeof r.pingCount === "number" ? r.pingCount : undefined,2025  };2026}20272028/**2029 * MV-6 / PCH-01-016: tags from imported / batch-added entries are untrusted.2030 * Keep only non-empty strings, cap each at 256 chars, and cap the count at 2552031 * (the same per-entry ceiling the export codec enforces, peachPayload.ts).2032 * Non-array or all-invalid input collapses to undefined.2033 */2034function sanitizeTags(tags: unknown): string[] | undefined {2035  if (!Array.isArray(tags)) return undefined;2036  const out: string[] = [];2037  for (const t of tags) {2038    if (typeof t !== "string") continue;2039    const trimmed = t.trim();2040    if (!trimmed) continue;2041    out.push(trimmed.slice(0, 256));2042    if (out.length >= 255) break;2043  }2044  return out.length > 0 ? out : undefined;2045}20462047// Soft-deletes every non-deleted entry in one call. The literal string2048// argument is a tripwire against accidental calls — any caller that would2049// wipe the vault has to consciously type "REPLACE_ALL". Do not relax this2050// to a boolean.2051export async function clearVaultEntries(2052  confirmation: "REPLACE_ALL"2053): Promise<void> {2054  if (confirmation !== "REPLACE_ALL") {2055    throw new Error("clearVaultEntries requires explicit confirmation");2056  }2057  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");2058  for (const entry of entries) {2059    if (!entry.deletedAt) {2060      const stamp = monotonicEntryTimestamp(Math.max(2061        entry.modifiedAt,2062        tombstones.get(entry.id) ?? 0,2063      ));2064      entry.deletedAt = stamp;2065      entry.modifiedAt = stamp;2066      tombstones.set(entry.id, stamp);2067    }2068  }2069  await persistEntries();2070}20712072export async function addEntry(entry: EntryDraft): Promise<VaultEntry> {2073  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");20742075  const sanitized = sanitizeEntryDraft(entry);2076  const now = Date.now();2077  const stamp = monotonicEntryTimestamp();2078  const nextEntry: VaultEntry = {2079    ...sanitized,2080    id: crypto.randomUUID(),2081    createdAt: now,2082    modifiedAt: stamp,2083    // Stamp passwordChangedAt at creation so age tracking is accurate from2084    // day one. Non-login entries carry the same stamp harmlessly.2085    passwordChangedAt: sanitized.password ? stamp : undefined,2086  };20872088  // Clone-and-replace so a failed persist rolls back the in-memory state2089  // (COR-008). Without this, a quota-full or storage error leaves the2090  // module-level `entries` ahead of what's actually on disk.2091  const rollback = entries;2092  entries = [...entries, nextEntry];2093  try {2094    await persistEntries();2095  } catch (err) {2096    entries = rollback;2097    throw err;2098  }20992100  // Fire-and-forget breach check (only for login entries if breach monitoring is enabled or not set)2101  if (settings.breachMonitoring !== false && nextEntry.type === "login" && nextEntry.password) {2102    checkBreach(nextEntry.password).then(async (count) => {2103      if (count > 0) {2104        const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === nextEntry.id);2105        if (idx !== -1) {2106          entries[idx] = { ...entries[idx], breach: count, modifiedAt: monotonicEntryTimestamp(entries[idx].modifiedAt) };2107          await persistEntries();2108        }2109      }2110    });2111  }21122113  fireSyncTrigger("vault_change");21142115  return nextEntry;2116}21172118/**2119 * Run the passkey-merge pass on the live in-memory entries and persist if2120 * anything changed. Called immediately after any passkey registration so that2121 * a same-domain TOTP-only entry already in the vault gets consolidated right2122 * away instead of waiting until the next lock/unlock cycle.2123 */2124export async function consolidatePasskeyEntries(): Promise<void> {2125  if (!derivedKey) return;2126  const { merged } = mergePasskeyOnlyIntoLogins(entries);2127  if (merged) {2128    await persistEntries();2129  }2130}21312132export async function updateEntry(2133  id: string,2134  patch: Partial<VaultEntry>2135): Promise<void> {2136  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");21372138  const idx = entries.findIndex((entry) => entry.id === id);2139  if (idx === -1 || entries[idx].deletedAt) {2140    throw new Error("entry_not_found");2141  }21422143  const current = entries[idx];2144  const sanitizedPatch = sanitizeEntryPatch(patch);2145  // Refresh passwordChangedAt only when the password value actually changes —2146  // a metadata-only update (title, tags, etc.) must not reset the age clock2147  // that drives the Pro health rotation recommendation.2148  const passwordChanged =2149    "password" in patch &&2150    typeof sanitizedPatch.password === "string" &&2151    sanitizedPatch.password !== current.password;2152  const stamp = monotonicEntryTimestamp(current.modifiedAt);2153  // When the password actually changes, push the outgoing one onto the history2154  // (newest first) so the user can reveal/copy/restore it later. We record the2155  // age it carried (passwordChangedAt, falling back to createdAt) rather than2156  // `now`, so the list reflects when each password was last in effect. Only2157  // capture a non-empty prior value — clearing a password leaves no secret to2158  // keep, and we skip an immediate exact duplicate (e.g. restore-then-restore)2159  // to avoid noise.2160  const priorPassword = current.password;2161  const shouldCapture =2162    passwordChanged &&2163    typeof priorPassword === "string" &&2164    priorPassword.length > 0 &&2165    current.passwordHistory?.[0]?.password !== priorPassword;2166  const nextHistory = shouldCapture2167    ? [2168        { password: priorPassword!, changedAt: current.passwordChangedAt ?? current.createdAt },2169        ...(current.passwordHistory ?? []),2170      ].slice(0, PASSWORD_HISTORY_MAX)2171    : current.passwordHistory;2172  entries[idx] = {2173    ...current,2174    ...sanitizedPatch,2175    modifiedAt: stamp,2176    ...(passwordChanged ? { passwordChangedAt: stamp, passwordHistory: nextHistory } : {}),2177  };2178217921802181  // Card entries must retain their card number2182  if (entries[idx].type === "card" && !entries[idx].cardNumber) {2183    entries[idx] = current;2184    throw new Error("card number is required for card entries");2185  }21862187  // Roll the in-memory entry back to its pre-edit state if the disk write2188  // fails (e.g. storage quota). Without this the module-level `entries` array2189  // would hold an edit that never landed on disk, diverging from the vault2190  // until the next unlock silently reverts it (SEV-3-A). Mirrors addEntry.2191  try {2192    await persistEntries();2193  } catch (err) {2194    entries[idx] = current;2195    throw err;2196  }21972198  // Breach check when password changes: clear immediately so old breach doesn't linger,2199  // then async-check the new password and only re-set if it's also found.2200  if ("password" in patch && settings.breachMonitoring !== false && entries[idx].type === "login") {2201    entries[idx] = { ...entries[idx], breach: undefined };2202    await persistEntries();2203    const password = entries[idx].password;2204    if (password) {2205      checkBreach(password).then(async (count) => {2206        const i = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id);2207        if (i !== -1 && count > 0) {2208          entries[i] = { ...entries[i], breach: count, modifiedAt: monotonicEntryTimestamp(entries[i].modifiedAt) };2209          await persistEntries();2210        }2211      });2212    }2213  }22142215  fireSyncTrigger("vault_change");2216}22172218export async function deleteEntry(id: string): Promise<void> {2219  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");22202221  const entry = entries.find((item) => item.id === id);2222  if (!entry || entry.deletedAt) {2223    throw new Error("entry_not_found");2224  }22252226  // Tombstone timestamp must be strictly greater than the entry's last2227  // modification so the deletion wins LWW against any in-flight edit, even2228  // under clock skew (SEV-2-E).2229  const previousModifiedAt = entry.modifiedAt;2230  const previousTombstone = tombstones.get(id);2231  const stamp = monotonicEntryTimestamp(Math.max(entry.modifiedAt, previousTombstone ?? 0));2232  entry.deletedAt = stamp;2233  entry.modifiedAt = stamp;2234  tombstones.set(id, stamp);2235  // Roll the tombstone back if the disk write fails, so a quota error doesn't2236  // leave the entry deleted in memory but alive on disk (SEV-3-A).2237  try {2238    await persistEntries();2239  } catch (err) {2240    delete entry.deletedAt;2241    entry.modifiedAt = previousModifiedAt;2242    if (previousTombstone === undefined) tombstones.delete(id);2243    else tombstones.set(id, previousTombstone);2244    throw err;2245  }2246  fireSyncTrigger("vault_change");2247}22482249export function getDeletedEntries(): VaultEntry[] {2250  if (!derivedKey) return [];2251  return entries.filter((e) => !!e.deletedAt);2252}22532254/** Return all durable deletion timestamps, including purged full entries. */2255export function getTombstoneManifest(): Record<string, number> {2256  if (!derivedKey) return {};2257  return Object.fromEntries(tombstones);2258}22592260/**2261 * Returns the vault's monotonic version — the `peach_last_modified_at` value2262 * stamped on every user-initiated write. Remote (sync) writes do NOT advance2263 * this version so a sync round never cascades into a second outbound sync.2264 */2265export async function getVaultVersion(): Promise<number> {2266  try {2267    const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get("peach_last_modified_at");2268    const v = (raw as Record<string, unknown>).peach_last_modified_at;2269    if (typeof v === "number") return v;2270    if (typeof v === "string" && v !== "") {2271      const n = Number.parseInt(v, 10);2272      return Number.isFinite(n) ? n : 0;2273    }2274    return 0;2275  } catch {2276    return 0;2277  }2278}22792280/**2281 * Apply a batch of remote entries + tombstones from a sync peer.2282 * Last-write-wins by `modifiedAt`; a tombstone supersedes a live entry when2283 * `deletedAt > modifiedAt` on the local side. Mutates `entries` directly and2284 * persists with reason `sync_received` — does NOT fire the sync dispatcher, so2285 * applying a sync round cannot cascade into another outbound sync.2286 *2287 * `applied` counts entries that actually changed local state (new add,2288 * overwrite-by-newer, or new tombstone). `received` is the raw payload size2289 * the caller can surface in the sync result UI.2290 */2291export async function applyMergedRemoteEntries(2292  remoteEntries: VaultEntry[],2293  remoteTombstones: Record<string, number>,2294  _context: { deviceName?: string } = {},2295): Promise<{ received: number; applied: number; conflicts: number }> {2296  // DESIGN: last-write-wins is applied PER-ENTRY, not per-field. If two devices2297  // concurrently edit different fields of the same entry, the one with the2298  // newer modifiedAt wins the whole entry and the other device's field edits2299  // are dropped silently. This is the deliberate trade-off for a simple,2300  // conflict-free merge — per-field CRDT merge is out of scope. Guidance for2301  // users: edit a given entry on one device at a time.2302  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");23032304  const received = remoteEntries.length + Object.keys(remoteTombstones).length;2305  let applied = 0;2306  let conflicts = 0;23072308  const byId = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();2309  for (const e of entries) byId.set(e.id, e);23102311  const mergeNow = Date.now();2312  const remoteTombstoneTimes = new Map<string, number>();2313  for (const [id, rawDeletedAt] of Object.entries(remoteTombstones)) {2314    if (typeof rawDeletedAt === "number" && Number.isFinite(rawDeletedAt) && rawDeletedAt > 0) {2315      remoteTombstoneTimes.set(id, clampSyncTimestamp(rawDeletedAt, mergeNow));2316    }2317  }23182319  for (const remote of remoteEntries) {2320    const sanitized = sanitizeRestoredEntry(remote);2321    if (!sanitized) continue;2322    // HV-1a: a far-future remote modifiedAt must not permanently pin a2323    // malicious value against honest local edits. Clamp BEFORE any2324    // comparison against local timestamps.2325    sanitized.modifiedAt = clampSyncTimestamp(sanitized.modifiedAt, mergeNow);2326    if (typeof sanitized.deletedAt === "number") {2327      sanitized.deletedAt = clampSyncTimestamp(sanitized.deletedAt, mergeNow);2328    }2329    const remoteTombstoneTs = remoteTombstoneTimes.get(sanitized.id);2330    const localTombstoneTs = tombstones.get(sanitized.id);2331    const tombstoneTs = Math.max(remoteTombstoneTs ?? 0, localTombstoneTs ?? 0);2332    if (tombstoneTs > 0 && tombstoneTs >= sanitized.modifiedAt) {2333      continue;2334    }2335    const local = byId.get(sanitized.id);2336    if (!local) {2337      entries.push(sanitized);2338      byId.set(sanitized.id, sanitized);2339      tombstones.delete(sanitized.id);2340      applied += 1;2341    } else if (sanitized.modifiedAt > local.modifiedAt) {2342      const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === local.id);2343      if (idx !== -1) {2344        entries[idx] = sanitized;2345        byId.set(sanitized.id, sanitized);2346        tombstones.delete(sanitized.id);2347        applied += 1;2348        if (!local.deletedAt) conflicts += 1;2349      }2350    }2351  }23522353  for (const [id, rawDeletedAt] of Object.entries(remoteTombstones)) {2354    if (typeof rawDeletedAt !== "number" || !Number.isFinite(rawDeletedAt) || rawDeletedAt <= 0) continue;2355    // HV-1a/1c: clamp the tombstone timestamp before every comparison.2356    const deletedAt = remoteTombstoneTimes.get(id)!;2357    const knownTombstone = tombstones.get(id);2358    if (knownTombstone !== undefined && knownTombstone >= deletedAt) continue;2359    const local = byId.get(id);2360    if (!local) {2361      tombstones.set(id, deletedAt);2362      applied += 1;2363      continue;2364    }2365    if (local.deletedAt && local.deletedAt >= deletedAt) continue;2366    if (deletedAt < local.modifiedAt) continue;2367    const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id);2368    if (idx !== -1) {2369      entries[idx] = { ...local, deletedAt, modifiedAt: deletedAt };2370      tombstones.set(id, deletedAt);2371      applied += 1;2372    }2373  }23742375  if (applied > 0) {2376    await persistEntries("sync_received");2377    buildDomainIndexSync(entries);2378  }2379  return { received, applied, conflicts };2380}23812382export async function restoreEntry(id: string): Promise<void> {2383  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");2384  const entry = entries.find((e) => e.id === id && e.deletedAt);2385  if (!entry) throw new Error("deleted entry not found");2386  const previousDeletedAt = entry.deletedAt;2387  const previousModifiedAt = entry.modifiedAt;2388  const previousTombstone = tombstones.get(id);2389  delete entry.deletedAt;2390  entry.modifiedAt = monotonicEntryTimestamp(Math.max(2391    entry.modifiedAt,2392    previousTombstone ?? 0,2393  ));2394  tombstones.delete(id);2395  try {2396    await persistEntries();2397  } catch (err) {2398    entry.deletedAt = previousDeletedAt;2399    entry.modifiedAt = previousModifiedAt;2400    if (previousTombstone !== undefined) tombstones.set(id, previousTombstone);2401    throw err;2402  }2403  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);2404}24052406export async function purgeEntry(id: string): Promise<void> {2407  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");2408  const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.id === id && e.deletedAt);2409  if (idx === -1) throw new Error("deleted entry not found");2410  const entry = entries[idx]!;2411  tombstones.set(id, Math.max(tombstones.get(id) ?? 0, entry.deletedAt!));2412  entries.splice(idx, 1);2413  await persistEntries();2414}24152416/** Permanently delete entries whose deletedAt is older than retentionMs. 0 = keep forever. */2417export async function purgeExpiredTrash(retentionMs: number): Promise<number> {2418  if (!derivedKey || retentionMs === 0) return 0;2419  const cutoff = Date.now() - retentionMs;2420  const before = entries.length;2421  for (const entry of entries) {2422    if (entry.deletedAt && entry.deletedAt < cutoff) {2423      tombstones.set(entry.id, Math.max(tombstones.get(entry.id) ?? 0, entry.deletedAt));2424    }2425  }2426  entries = entries.filter((e) => !(e.deletedAt && e.deletedAt < cutoff));2427  const purged = before - entries.length;2428  if (purged > 0) await persistEntries();2429  return purged;2430}24312432export function queryDomain(domain: string): VaultEntry[] {2433  return domainIndex.get(domain) ?? [];2434}24352436export function getEntryById(id: string): VaultEntry | undefined {2437  return entries.find((entry) => entry.id === id && !entry.deletedAt);2438}24392440async function persistSlotA(2441  reason: VaultSnapshot["reason"] = "local_save",2442): Promise<StoredVault> {2443  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");24442445  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);2446  if (!slotA) throw new Error("missing slot A");24472448  // Snapshot the about-to-be-overwritten state BEFORE we mutate disk. Failures2449  // are swallowed by takeVaultSnapshot — history must never block a save.2450  await takeVaultSnapshot(reason);24512452  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured, duressConfigured ? DURESS_SLOT_SIZE : 0);2453  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");24542455  // Preserve existing recovery escrow fields.2456  const nextSlotA: StoredVault = {2457    ...slotA,2458    nonce,2459    ciphertext,2460    tag,2461    // recovery_salt and recovery_wrapped_root_key are already set from loadSlot2462  };2463  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, nextSlotA);24642465  // Slot A (the real vault) is now committed. Wrap every later write so a2466  // mid-persist failure (e.g. a storage error after slot A landed) restores the2467  // prior slot A before rethrowing. Without this, a "failed" save that already2468  // wrote slot A leaves disk ahead of the in-memory rollback in addEntry/2469  // updateEntry/deleteEntry — the entry stays silently on disk and resurfaces2470  // as a duplicate on the next unlock (observed under storage-quota pressure).2471  try {2472    // When duress is not configured, keep slot B size-matched with slot A by2473    // regenerating its noise. When duress IS configured, leave slot B alone —2474    // we don't have the decoy key to re-encrypt it. This is a known trade-off.2475    if (!duressConfigured) {2476      await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2));2477    }2478    // Only advance the vault version for locally-originated writes. Entries2479    // applied from a sync peer ("sync_received") must NOT bump the counter —2480    // otherwise applying a remote round makes us look newer than the peer and2481    // triggers a redundant outbound sync, defeating the no-op optimisation2482    // and risking a ping-pong between two devices (SEV-2-C).2483    if (reason !== "sync_received") {2484      await stampLocalVaultMutation();2485    }2486  } catch (err) {2487    // Best-effort restore — the prior slot A is smaller-or-equal, so this write2488    // fits even when the failure was a quota overflow.2489    await writeSlot(SLOT_A, slotA).catch(() => {});2490    throw err;2491  }24922493  return nextSlotA;2494}24952496async function persistSlotB(): Promise<void> {2497  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");24982499  const slotB = await loadSlot(SLOT_B);2500  if (!slotB) throw new Error("missing slot B");25012502  // Decoy plaintext always reports duressConfigured=false — the decoy user2503  // sees a clean slate. persistSlotB only runs in decoy mode, which only2504  // exists once duress is configured, so pad to the fixed duress ceiling to2505  // keep slot B's length equal to slot A's (audit MEDIUM — deniability).2506  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, false, DURESS_SLOT_SIZE);2507  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(derivedKey, plaintext, "slot_b_v1");25082509  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, { ...slotB, nonce, ciphertext, tag });2510  // Symmetric with persistSlotA: if the version stamp fails after the decoy2511  // slot committed, restore the prior slot B so a failed decoy-mode save can't2512  // leave disk ahead of the in-memory rollback.2513  try {2514    await stampLocalVaultMutation();2515  } catch (err) {2516    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, slotB).catch(() => {});2517    throw err;2518  }2519}25202521async function persistEntries(2522  reason: VaultSnapshot["reason"] = "local_save",2523): Promise<void> {2524  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");25252526  // Reconcile direct soft-delete callers while restoring the previous map if2527  // storage rejects the save.2528  const previousTombstones = tombstones;2529  tombstones = new Map(tombstones);2530  reconcileTombstones();2531  try {2532    if (vaultMode === "decoy") {2533      await persistSlotB();2534    } else {2535      await persistSlotA(reason);2536    }2537  } catch (err) {2538    tombstones = previousTombstones;2539    throw err;2540  }2541  buildDomainIndexSync(entries);2542  await refreshLockedSyncState();2543}25442545// PB-26-011: drop URLs whose parsed scheme is not http(s) at the storage2546// boundary. Schemeless values (e.g. "github.com") are inert and kept — they2547// pre-date this guard in existing data. Unparseable values are kept: the2548// reviewed render paths never execute them (favicons via _favicon/, domains2549// via tldts); this is defense-in-depth against future sinks.2550function allowHttpUrl(url: string | undefined): string {2551  const trimmed = url?.trim() ?? "";2552  if (!trimmed) return "";2553  try {2554    const parsed = new URL(trimmed);2555    if (parsed.protocol !== "https:" && parsed.protocol !== "http:") return "";2556  } catch {2557    // No scheme to reject.2558  }2559  return trimmed;2560}25612562function cleanAdditionalUrls(values: string[] | undefined): string[] | undefined {2563  if (!Array.isArray(values)) return undefined;2564  const seen = new Set<string>();2565  const cleaned: string[] = [];2566  for (const value of values) {2567    const trimmed = typeof value === "string" ? value.trim() : "";2568    if (!trimmed) continue;2569    if (!allowHttpUrl(trimmed)) continue;2570    const key = trimmed.toLowerCase();2571    if (seen.has(key)) continue;2572    seen.add(key);2573    cleaned.push(trimmed);2574  }2575  return cleaned.length > 0 ? cleaned : undefined;2576}25772578function sanitizeEntryDraft(entry: EntryDraft): EntryDraft {2579  const title = entry.title.trim();2580  const type: VaultEntry["type"] = entry.type ?? "login";25812582  if (!title) throw new Error("title is required");25832584  if (entry.passkey) {2585    const p = entry.passkey;2586    if (2587      !p.rpId ||2588      !p.credentialId ||2589      !p.publicKeyCose ||2590      !p.userHandle ||2591      !p.userName ||2592      (p.algorithm !== -7 && p.algorithm !== -8)2593    ) {2594      throw new Error("invalid passkey credential");2595    }2596  }2597  if (type === "card") {2598    if (!entry.cardholderName?.trim() || !entry.cardNumber?.trim()) {2599      throw new Error("cardholder name and card number are required");2600    }2601  }26022603  return {2604    type,2605    title,2606    username: type === "login" ? entry.username?.trim() ?? "" : undefined,2607    email: type === "login" ? entry.email?.trim() || undefined : undefined,2608    password: type === "login" ? entry.password : undefined,2609    url: type === "login" ? allowHttpUrl(entry.url) : undefined,2610    additionalUrls: type === "login" ? cleanAdditionalUrls(entry.additionalUrls) : undefined,2611    totp: type === "login" ? entry.totp?.trim() || undefined : undefined,2612    // PCH-01-019: preserve non-default TOTP params through batch-add/import so2613    // they are not silently stripped (they fall back to SHA-1/6/30 when absent).2614    totpAlgorithm: type === "login" ? entry.totpAlgorithm : undefined,2615    totpDigits: type === "login" ? entry.totpDigits : undefined,2616    totpPeriod: type === "login" ? entry.totpPeriod : undefined,2617    notes: entry.notes?.trim() || undefined,2618    breach: type === "login" ? entry.breach : undefined,2619    // PCH-01-016: the batch-add path was bypassing the MV-6 canary/tags2620    // whitelist applied on the RESTORE_ENTRIES path. Run both sanitizers here.2621    canary: type === "login" ? sanitizeCanary(entry.canary) : undefined,2622    tags: sanitizeTags(entry.tags),2623    passkey: entry.passkey,2624    cardholderName: type === "card" ? entry.cardholderName?.trim() : undefined,2625    cardNumber: type === "card" ? entry.cardNumber?.trim() : undefined,2626    expMonth: type === "card" ? entry.expMonth?.trim() : undefined,2627    expYear: type === "card" ? entry.expYear?.trim() : undefined,2628    cvc: type === "card" ? entry.cvc?.trim() : undefined,2629    cardNickname: type === "card" ? entry.cardNickname?.trim() || undefined : undefined,2630    network: type === "card" ? entry.network : undefined,2631    last4: type === "card" ? entry.last4?.trim() : undefined,2632  };2633}26342635function sanitizeEntryPatch(patch: Partial<VaultEntry>): Partial<VaultEntry> {2636  const nextPatch: Partial<VaultEntry> = {};26372638  if ("type" in patch) {2639    nextPatch.type = patch.type;2640  }26412642  if ("title" in patch) {2643    const title = patch.title?.trim() ?? "";2644    if (!title) throw new Error("title is required");2645    nextPatch.title = title;2646  }26472648  if ("url" in patch) {2649    nextPatch.url = allowHttpUrl(patch.url);2650  }26512652  if ("additionalUrls" in patch) {2653    const incoming = Array.isArray(patch.additionalUrls) ? patch.additionalUrls : [];2654    const seen = new Set<string>();2655    const cleaned: string[] = [];2656    for (const value of incoming) {2657      const trimmed = typeof value === "string" ? value.trim() : "";2658      if (!trimmed || !allowHttpUrl(trimmed)) continue;2659      const key = trimmed.toLowerCase();2660      if (seen.has(key)) continue;2661      seen.add(key);2662      cleaned.push(trimmed);2663    }2664    nextPatch.additionalUrls = cleaned.length > 0 ? cleaned : undefined;2665  }26662667  if ("username" in patch) {2668    nextPatch.username = patch.username?.trim() ?? "";2669  }26702671  if ("email" in patch) {2672    nextPatch.email = patch.email?.trim() || undefined;2673  }26742675  if ("password" in patch) {2676    const password = patch.password ?? "";2677    // Allow clearing a password (e.g. on passkey-only entries)2678    nextPatch.password = password || undefined;2679  }26802681  if ("totp" in patch) {2682    nextPatch.totp = patch.totp?.trim() || undefined;2683  }26842685  if ("notes" in patch) {2686    nextPatch.notes = patch.notes?.trim() || undefined;2687  }26882689  if ("breach" in patch) {2690    nextPatch.breach = patch.breach;2691  }26922693  if ("canary" in patch) {2694    // PCH-02-001: route update patches through the same canary whitelist used2695    // by add/restore/sync. Invalid shapes drop the canary; `undefined` clears it.2696    nextPatch.canary = patch.canary ? sanitizeCanary(patch.canary) : undefined;2697  }26982699  if ("passkey" in patch) {2700    // A patch with `passkey: undefined` removes the credential from the entry2701    // (used by "remove passkey" without deleting the whole entry).2702    if (patch.passkey === undefined || patch.passkey === null) {2703      nextPatch.passkey = undefined;2704    } else {2705      const sanitized = sanitizePasskey(patch.passkey);2706      if (!sanitized) throw new Error("invalid passkey credential");2707      nextPatch.passkey = sanitized;2708    }2709  }27102711  if ("tags" in patch) {2712    // PCH-02-001: bound tags exactly like both import funnels.2713    nextPatch.tags = sanitizeTags(patch.tags);2714  }27152716  if ("cardholderName" in patch) {2717    nextPatch.cardholderName = patch.cardholderName?.trim() || undefined;2718  }2719  if ("cardNumber" in patch) {2720    const n = patch.cardNumber ?? "";2721    nextPatch.cardNumber = n || undefined;2722  }2723  if ("expMonth" in patch) {2724    nextPatch.expMonth = patch.expMonth?.trim() || undefined;2725  }2726  if ("expYear" in patch) {2727    nextPatch.expYear = patch.expYear?.trim() || undefined;2728  }2729  if ("cvc" in patch) {2730    nextPatch.cvc = patch.cvc?.trim() || undefined;2731  }2732  if ("cardNickname" in patch) {2733    nextPatch.cardNickname = patch.cardNickname?.trim() || undefined;2734  }2735  if ("network" in patch) {2736    nextPatch.network = patch.network;2737  }2738  if ("last4" in patch) {2739    nextPatch.last4 = patch.last4?.trim() || undefined;2740  }27412742  return nextPatch;2743}27442745function normalizeEntry(entry: VaultEntry): VaultEntry {2746  const base: VaultEntry = {2747    id: entry.id,2748    type: entry.type,2749    title: entry.title,2750    username: entry.username,2751    email: entry.email,2752    password: entry.password,2753    url: entry.url,2754    additionalUrls:2755      "additionalUrls" in entry && Array.isArray(entry.additionalUrls)2756        ? entry.additionalUrls2757        : undefined,2758    totp: entry.totp,2759    // PCH-01-019: carry TOTP params through the normalize/restore path too.2760    totpAlgorithm: entry.totpAlgorithm,2761    totpDigits: entry.totpDigits,2762    totpPeriod: entry.totpPeriod,2763    notes: entry.notes,2764    breach: entry.breach,2765    // Preserve the password-age clock across lock/unlock. Without this the2766    // field is dropped on every decode and the advanced-health "aged password"2767    // signal silently resets to createdAt on each unlock (SEV-2-A).2768    passwordChangedAt:2769      "passwordChangedAt" in entry ? entry.passwordChangedAt : undefined,2770    // Preserve past-password history across lock/unlock. normalizeEntry is a2771    // field whitelist, so an unlisted field is silently dropped on every decode2772    // (same class as the passwordChangedAt SEV-2-A above).2773    passwordHistory:2774      "passwordHistory" in entry && Array.isArray(entry.passwordHistory)2775        ? entry.passwordHistory2776        : undefined,2777    canary: entry.canary,2778    passkey: entry.passkey,2779    createdAt: entry.createdAt,2780    modifiedAt: entry.modifiedAt,2781    deletedAt: entry.deletedAt,2782    tags: entry.tags,2783    cardholderName: "cardholderName" in entry ? entry.cardholderName : undefined,2784    cardNumber: "cardNumber" in entry ? entry.cardNumber : undefined,2785    expMonth: "expMonth" in entry ? entry.expMonth : undefined,2786    expYear: "expYear" in entry ? entry.expYear : undefined,2787    cvc: "cvc" in entry ? entry.cvc : undefined,2788    cardNickname: "cardNickname" in entry ? entry.cardNickname : undefined,2789    network: "network" in entry ? entry.network : undefined,2790    last4: "last4" in entry ? entry.last4 : undefined,2791  };27922793  return base;2794}279527962797// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------2798// Deduplication2799// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------28002801function entryDupeKey(e: VaultEntry): string {2802  if (e.type === "note") return `note|${e.title.toLowerCase()}`;2803  // Passkey-bearing entries dedupe by the credential's RP + user. Two logins2804  // on different sites that happen to share a username are still distinct;2805  // two passkey credentials for the same RP+user are duplicates regardless2806  // of any login fields they may also carry.2807  if (e.passkey) {2808    return `passkey|${e.passkey.rpId.toLowerCase()}|${e.passkey.userName.toLowerCase()}`;2809  }2810  return `login|${e.title.toLowerCase()}|${(e.url ?? "").toLowerCase()}|${(e.username ?? "").toLowerCase()}`;2811}28122813/** Returns the number of duplicate entries (those that would be removed). */2814export function countDuplicates(): number {2815  const best = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();2816  let dupeCount = 0;2817  for (const e of entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt)) {2818    const key = entryDupeKey(e);2819    const existing = best.get(key);2820    if (!existing) {2821      best.set(key, e);2822    } else {2823      dupeCount++;2824      // Keep the more recently modified one in the map2825      if ((e.modifiedAt ?? e.createdAt ?? 0) > (existing.modifiedAt ?? existing.createdAt ?? 0)) {2826        best.set(key, e);2827      }2828    }2829  }2830  return dupeCount;2831}28322833/**2834 * Soft-deletes duplicate entries, keeping the most recently modified copy of2835 * each group. Returns the number of entries moved to trash.2836 */2837export async function deduplicateEntries(): Promise<number> {2838  if (!derivedKey) throw new Error("vault_locked");2839  // Dedup reshapes slot B permanently under the decoy key, which is2840  // forensically distinguishable from a freshly-seeded decoy vault. Refuse.2841  if (vaultMode === "decoy") {2842    throw new Error("deduplicate disabled in decoy mode");2843  }28442845  const best = new Map<string, VaultEntry>();2846  for (const e of entries.filter((en) => !en.deletedAt)) {2847    const key = entryDupeKey(e);2848    const existing = best.get(key);2849    if (!existing) {2850      best.set(key, e);2851    } else if ((e.modifiedAt ?? e.createdAt ?? 0) > (existing.modifiedAt ?? existing.createdAt ?? 0)) {2852      best.set(key, e);2853    }2854  }28552856  const keepIds = new Set(Array.from(best.values()).map((e) => e.id));2857  let removed = 0;2858  entries = entries.map((e) => {2859    if (!e.deletedAt && !keepIds.has(e.id)) {2860      removed++;2861      const deletedAt = monotonicEntryTimestamp(Math.max(2862        e.modifiedAt,2863        tombstones.get(e.id) ?? 0,2864      ));2865      tombstones.set(e.id, deletedAt);2866      return { ...e, deletedAt };2867    }2868    return e;2869  });28702871  if (removed > 0) await persistEntries();2872  return removed;2873}28742875// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------2876// Vault history — snapshot BEFORE every vault write so the saved blob is2877// what is about to be lost, not what was just written. Capped at 5. The2878// stored blobs are AES-256-GCM ciphertext under the master password, so2879// history adds zero security surface.2880// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------28812882const HISTORY_KEY = "peach_vault_history";2883const HISTORY_MAX = 5;28842885// PCH-01-023: coarsen a live-entry count into a low-resolution bucket so the2886// plaintext snapshot field cannot reveal exact vault size or single-entry change2887// deltas. Buckets widen as the vault grows so absolute leakage stays roughly2888// proportional rather than exact.2889function bucketEntryCount(n: number): number {2890  if (n <= 0) return 0;2891  if (n <= 10) return 10;2892  if (n <= 25) return 25;2893  if (n <= 50) return 50;2894  if (n <= 100) return 100;2895  if (n <= 250) return 250;2896  if (n <= 500) return 500;2897  return Math.ceil(n / 500) * 500;2898}28992900/**2901 * Snapshot the CURRENT on-disk vault state into history. Call this BEFORE2902 * overwriting peach_vault_a so the saved blob captures the about-to-be-lost2903 * state. Identical-to-most-recent blobs are skipped to avoid filling history2904 * with no-op writes.2905 */2906export async function takeVaultSnapshot(2907  reason: VaultSnapshot["reason"],2908): Promise<void> {2909  try {2910    const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get([SLOT_A, SLOT_B, HISTORY_KEY]);2911    const slotA = (raw as Record<string, StoredVault | undefined>)[SLOT_A];2912    const slotB = (raw as Record<string, StoredVault | undefined>)[SLOT_B];29132914    // Nothing to snapshot if the real slot doesn't exist yet (fresh install,2915    // pre-createVault). createVault skips snapshots intentionally — there is2916    // no prior state to preserve.2917    if (!slotA) return;29182919    const vault_a = JSON.stringify(slotA);2920    const vault_b = JSON.stringify(slotB ?? slotA);29212922    // Best-effort entry count: only meaningful when the in-memory state is2923    // unlocked AND in real mode. Decoy mode would leak the decoy entry2924    // count; locked mode has no entries to count. Both fall through to null.2925    // PCH-01-023: store a coarse bucket, not the exact count — chrome.storage2926    // .local sits next to the AES-GCM blobs in plaintext, so an exact count would2927    // leak vault size and per-write deltas (the metadata padding hides this).2928    let entryCount: number | null = null;2929    if (derivedKey && vaultMode === "real") {2930      try {2931        entryCount = bucketEntryCount(entries.filter((e) => !e.deletedAt).length);2932      } catch {2933        entryCount = null;2934      }2935    }29362937    const existingRaw = (raw as Record<string, VaultHistory | undefined>)[HISTORY_KEY];2938    const history: VaultHistory = existingRaw && Array.isArray(existingRaw.snapshots)2939      ? existingRaw2940      : { snapshots: [] };29412942    // Deduplication: if the most recent snapshot has byte-identical blobs,2943    // skip — saves the same vault N times in a row would otherwise burn the2944    // entire history window with no recovery value.2945    const latest = history.snapshots[0];2946    if (latest && latest.vault_a === vault_a && latest.vault_b === vault_b) {2947      return;2948    }29492950    const snapshot: VaultSnapshot = {2951      id: crypto.randomUUID(),2952      savedAt: Date.now(),2953      reason,2954      vault_a,2955      vault_b,2956      entryCount,2957    };29582959    history.snapshots = [snapshot, ...history.snapshots].slice(0, HISTORY_MAX);2960    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [HISTORY_KEY]: history });2961  } catch (err) {2962    // Non-fatal — history must never block a save. A failed snapshot just2963    // means the user loses one rung of the safety ladder for this write.2964    // M4/QUA-006: log so the failure is visible; if it looks like a quota2965    // problem, notify the popup so the user can prune history themselves.2966    console.warn('[Peach] takeVaultSnapshot failed:', err);2967    if (String(err).includes('QUOTA') || String(err).includes('quota')) {2968      try {2969        await chrome.runtime.sendMessage({ type: 'VAULT_STORAGE_QUOTA_WARNING' });2970      } catch {2971        // popup may be closed; surfaced via console.warn above2972      }2973    }2974  }2975}29762977/** Wipe all vault history. Called by Panic / DESTROY_VAULT. */2978export async function clearVaultHistory(): Promise<void> {2979  try {2980    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [HISTORY_KEY]: { snapshots: [] } satisfies VaultHistory });2981  } catch {2982    // Non-fatal — DESTROY_VAULT also runs storage.local.clear().2983  }2984}29852986/** Read all snapshots, newest first, for the Settings vault history view. */2987export async function getVaultHistory(): Promise<VaultSnapshot[]> {2988  const raw = await chrome.storage.local.get(HISTORY_KEY);2989  const history = (raw as Record<string, VaultHistory | undefined>)[HISTORY_KEY];2990  if (!history || !Array.isArray(history.snapshots)) return [];2991  return history.snapshots;2992}29932994/**2995 * Replace the on-disk vault with the chosen snapshot's blobs and lock the2996 * vault. The current state is itself snapshotted with reason 'restore' first2997 * so the restore is reversible. After this returns, the user must unlock2998 * with the password that matches the restored blob.2999 */3000export async function restoreVaultSnapshot(3001  snapshotId: string,3002): Promise<{ ok: true } | { ok: false; error: string }> {3003  const history = await getVaultHistory();3004  const snapshot = history.find((s) => s.id === snapshotId);3005  if (!snapshot) return { ok: false, error: "snapshot_not_found" };30063007  // Snapshot the about-to-be-replaced current state so the restore is3008  // reversible. takeVaultSnapshot is no-op when the most recent entry is3009  // byte-identical, so a restore-of-a-restore stays clean.3010  await takeVaultSnapshot("restore");30113012  let restoredA: StoredVault;3013  let restoredB: StoredVault;3014  try {3015    restoredA = JSON.parse(snapshot.vault_a) as StoredVault;3016    restoredB = JSON.parse(snapshot.vault_b) as StoredVault;3017  } catch {3018    return { ok: false, error: "snapshot_corrupt" };3019  }30203021  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, restoredA);3022  await writeSlot(SLOT_B, restoredB);3023  await stampLocalVaultMutation();30243025  // Lock so the user must prove they can decrypt the restored blob. If they3026  // restored a pre-password-change snapshot they discover it immediately at3027  // the lock screen rather than silently holding an inaccessible vault.3028  lock();30293030  return { ok: true };3031}30323033/**3034 * Rotate the vault's sync identity by generating a FRESH ROOT KEY and3035 * re-wrapping everything under it (MV-8). Because every sync credential —3036 * vault_id, the Noise static keypair, the Ed25519 manifest signing key,3037 * and the per-entry envelope keys — derives from the root key, rotation3038 * makes a lost/stolen device's retained key material useless. All paired3039 * devices must re-pair afterwards.3040 *3041 * CONSEQUENCE THE UI MUST SURFACE: the 12 recovery words also derive from3042 * the root key, so rotation INVALIDATES the old recovery phrase. The flow3043 * sets peach_recovery_pending so the popup re-presents the new words for3044 * confirmation, same as the initial recovery-word confirmation path.3045 */3046export async function rotateSyncIdentity(): Promise<{ ok: boolean; error?: string }> {3047  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") {3048    return { ok: false, error: "vault_locked" };3049  }3050  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);3051  if (!slotA) return { ok: false, error: "missing_slot_a" };30523053  // 1. Fresh root key + recovery escrow (new words).3054  const { rawRootKey, recoverySalt, wrappedRootKey, wrappedNonce, wrappedTag } =3055    await generateAndWrapRootKey();30563057  // 2. Re-wrap the new root key under the current password-derived key.3058  const newRootKey = unhex(rawRootKey);3059  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(derivedKey, newRootKey);30603061  // 3. Snapshot, then single atomic slot write — both escrow wrappings of3062  //    the new root key land together (same transactional rule as3063  //    changePassword). Entries are untouched: they are sealed under the3064  //    password-derived key, not the root key.3065  await takeVaultSnapshot("local_save");3066  const nextSlotA: StoredVault = {3067    ...slotA,3068    recovery_salt: recoverySalt,3069    recovery_wrapped_root_key: wrappedRootKey,3070    recovery_nonce: wrappedNonce,3071    recovery_tag: wrappedTag,3072    ...pwRoot,3073  };3074  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, nextSlotA);30753076  // 4. Swap in memory only after disk committed.3077  if (rootKey) zeroKey(rootKey);3078  rootKey = newRootKey;30793080  // 5. Old peers' identities derive from the dead root key — drop them all.3081  await clearPairedDevices();30823083  // 6. Force re-presentation of the NEW recovery words on next popup view.3084  await setRecoveryConfirmPending(); // same flag the create-vault flow uses30853086  await stampLocalVaultMutation();3087  return { ok: true };3088}30893090/**3091 * Change the master password. Re-encrypts slot A with a fresh salt + new3092 * derived key. Slot B (duress or noise) is left untouched when duress is3093 * configured — it uses an independent key derived from the duress password —3094 * and regenerated as noise when duress is not configured.3095 */3096export async function changePassword(3097  currentPassword: string,3098  newPassword: string3099): Promise<boolean> {3100  if (!derivedKey || vaultMode !== "real") return false;31013102  // Verify current password before allowing any change3103  const valid = await verifyMainPassword(currentPassword);3104  if (!valid) return false;31053106  const slotA = await loadSlot(SLOT_A);3107  if (!slotA) return false;3108  if (!rootKey) return false;31093110  // Derive fresh key from new password + new random salt3111  const newSalt = generateSalt();3112  const newKey = await deriveKey(newPassword, newSalt);31133114  // Re-encrypt the in-memory entries with the new key3115  const plaintext = encodePayload(entries, duressConfigured, duressConfigured ? DURESS_SLOT_SIZE : 0);3116  const { nonce, ciphertext, tag } = await encrypt(newKey, plaintext, "slot_a_v1");31173118  // Pre-wrap root key under the new derived key. Recovery fields wrap rootKey3119  // under recovery words and remain untouched — recovery phrase keeps working3120  // across password changes (H4/COR-002).3121  const pwRoot = await wrapRootKeyForDerivedKey(newKey, rootKey);31223123  const finalSlotA: StoredVault = {3124    ...slotA,3125    salt: hex(newSalt),3126    nonce,3127    ciphertext,3128    tag,3129    ...pwRoot,3130  };31313132  // Snapshot the OLD-key blob before overwriting it. If the user later3133  // restores from this snapshot they will need the OLD password — the3134  // post-restore lock surfaces that immediately.3135  await takeVaultSnapshot("local_save");31363137  // Single atomic write: ciphertext, salt, and pw_root_* fields all land in3138  // one storage transaction. An SW kill before this point leaves the old3139  // slot intact; after this point everything tied to the new password is3140  // already on disk together (M6/COR-004).3141  await writeSlot(SLOT_A, finalSlotA);31423143  // Swap the in-memory key synchronously before any further await. If we3144  // threw between the Slot A write and this swap, the next persistEntries()3145  // would overwrite Slot A with old-key ciphertext, locking the user out.3146  zeroKey(derivedKey);3147  derivedKey = newKey;31483149  // PCH-01-008: the MV3 session escrow still holds the OLD key. Without this,3150  // the next service-worker restore decrypts the new-key Slot A with the stale3151  // key, fails tryDecryptSlotResult, and silently drops the user to a lock3152  // screen. Re-escrow the new key so restore survives a password change.3153  void saveSessionKey(newKey, "real");31543155  // Regenerate noise for slot B when duress is not in use. Runs after the3156  // key swap so a failure here is a disposable noise regeneration, not a3157  // lockout.3158  if (!duressConfigured) {3159    await writeSlot(SLOT_B, generateNoiseBlob(ciphertext.length / 2));3160  }3161  await clearPinUnlockStorage();3162  await stampLocalVaultMutation();31633164  return true;3165}