sync-types.ts

1// Vault sync — type definitions.2//3// Pairing happens once per device pair over a relay rendezvous; all ongoing4// sync afterwards runs over that same relay with Noise KK. There is one5// transport — LAN peer-to-peer sync is retired6// (docs/sync-lan-retirement.md).78// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------9// Device types10// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------1112export type DeviceType = "extension" | "android" | "ios";1314// Numeric tags for DeviceType on the wire — not the string form.15export const DEVICE_TYPE_EXTENSION = 0x01 as const;16export const DEVICE_TYPE_ANDROID = 0x02 as const;17export const DEVICE_TYPE_IOS = 0x03 as const;1819export type DeviceTypeByte =20  | typeof DEVICE_TYPE_EXTENSION21  | typeof DEVICE_TYPE_ANDROID22  | typeof DEVICE_TYPE_IOS;2324// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------25// Long-term paired device registry26// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------2728/**29 * Trust source of a paired-device entry — per v2 brief §4.2.30 *31 *   "direct"  — established via a pairing-code session with this device.32 *   "vouched" — introduced by a directly-paired peer via a signed device33 *               manifest during a normal sync. A valid v3 route is admitted34 *               automatically as same-vault membership. It is equivalent to35 *               direct for sync, but cannot issue manifests itself;36 *               surfaced with an "Added automatically" badge in Settings.37 */38export type TrustSource = "direct" | "vouched";3940/**41 * v3 paired-device record. Stored in `chrome.storage.local` — cryptographic42 * keys must not leave the device via a third-party cloud service.43 *44 * `longTermPublicKeyHex` is the counterpart's vault-derived X25519 sync45 * identity static key — see `deriveSyncIdentityKeypair`. Every WebSocket46 * reconnect runs Noise KK with both local static keys, followed by a47 * PAIR_IDENTITY exchange bound to the authenticated keys.48 *49 * `lastKnownIp` is intentionally NOT stored here — it's per-network and50 * lives in `chrome.storage.local` keyed by `longTermPublicKeyHex`. See51 * `getLastKnownIp` / `setLastKnownIp` in `paired-devices.ts`.52 */53export interface PairedDevice {54  deviceId: string;55  deviceName?: string;56  deviceType?: DeviceType;57  longTermPublicKeyHex?: string;58  /**59   * Long-term Ed25519 verification key for the peer's device-manifest60   * signatures (v2 brief §4.3). Derived deterministically from the same61   * master key as `longTermPublicKeyHex`, via `deriveSyncSigningKeypair`.62   */63  signingPublicKeyHex?: string;64  /** v2 brief §4.2 — distinguishes direct-paired vs vouched-via-manifest. */65  trustSource?: TrustSource;66  /**67   * The peer's WebSocket sync port. Current Android hosts use fixed port 4914268   * and announce it inside the encrypted pairing channel.69   */70  wsPort?: number;71  /** Pair-only 32-byte reconnect capability, derived from the first handshake. */72  rendezvousSecretHex?: string;73  /** Validated wss relay used by this pair. */74  relayUrl?: string;75  pairedAt: number;76  lastSyncedAt?: number;77}7879// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------80// v3 wire protocol — phase-2 WebSocket manifest sync81// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------8283/**84 * v3 wire protocol — after reconnect Noise KK is open and PAIR_IDENTITY has85 * been bound to both authenticated static keys.86 *87 * Every frame is JSON, then ChaCha20-Poly1305 encrypted by Noise KK. The88 * WebSocket transport sees only ciphertext.89 *90 * The manifest carries per-entry timestamps; the receiver requests entries91 * where the remote timestamp beats its own. Entries traverse as opaque92 * encrypted blobs — the sync layer never decrypts vault data.93 */94export type SyncMessage =95  | { type: "SYNC_HELLO"; vaultId: string; deviceId: string; version: number; deviceTime: number }96  | { type: "SYNC_MANIFEST"; entries: Record<string, number>; tombstones: Record<string, number> }97  | { type: "SYNC_REQUEST"; entryIds: string[] }98  | { type: "SYNC_ENTRIES"; entries: Record<string, string> }99  | { type: "SYNC_TOMBSTONES"; tombstones: Record<string, number> }100  | { type: "SYNC_DEVICE_MANIFEST"; manifest: SignedDeviceManifest | null }101  | { type: "SYNC_DONE"; entriesReceived?: number; entriesSent?: number }102  | { type: "SYNC_ERROR"; error: string };103104// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------105// Browser-to-browser relay frames (phone forwards; see peach-android's106// RelayFrames.kt / RelayHub.kt, the source of truth this mirrors — NOT the107// older 4-frame PEACH_SYNC_RELAY_DESIGN.md sketch, which is stale).108//109// Type-only for now: nothing in this repo sends or handles these yet — no110// browser can listen, so relaying laptop-to-laptop traffic through a shared111// phone is unbuilt browser-side work, tracked separately. This exists so112// that work starts from the real wire contract instead of the stale doc.113// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------114115/** RelayMessage.targetDeviceId/peerDeviceId are the destination's Noise116 *  static public key as lowercase hex — NOT `PairedDevice.deviceId`. */117export type RelayMessage =118  | { type: "RELAY_REQUEST"; targetDeviceId: string }119  | { type: "RELAY_ACCEPT" }120  | { type: "RELAY_UNAVAILABLE" }121  | { type: "RELAY_DISABLED" }122  | { type: "RELAY_OPEN"; peerDeviceId: string }123  | { type: "RELAY_FRAME"; payload: string }124  | { type: "RELAY_CLOSE" };125126// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------127// v3 device manifest — propagates trust between mobile devices (v2 brief §4.3)128// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------129130/** 0x03 adds each peer edge's relay URL so a newly introduced pair can agree131 *  on a route without depending on the introducing device. Coordinated wire132 *  change with peach-android. */133export const DEVICE_MANIFEST_VERSION = 0x03 as const;134/** Manifests older than this are silently rejected (v2 brief §4.3). */135export const DEVICE_MANIFEST_FRESHNESS_MS = 5 * 60_000;136137/**138 * One device entry inside a signed manifest. `longTermPublicKeyHex` is the139 * X25519 sync identity key the receiver will use for Noise KK reconnect.140 * `signingPublicKeyHex` is the141 * peer's Ed25519 manifest-verification key — needed so a vouched mobile142 * can in turn verify manifests issued by the same vault from a different143 * device.144 */145export interface ManifestDeviceEntry {146  deviceId: string;147  deviceName: string;148  deviceType: DeviceType;149  longTermPublicKeyHex: string;150  signingPublicKeyHex: string;151  /**152   * Optional sync WebSocket port for native/mobile hosts. Preserving this in153   * vouched entries lets mobile peers connect without another audio pairing.154   */155  wsPort?: number;156  /** Relay the issuer currently uses for this peer edge. */157  relayUrl?: string;158  pairedAt: number;159}160161/**162 * A device that must no longer be synced with. Revocation is TERMINAL: once a163 * deviceId OR its long-term key appears here, no manifest may re-vouch it and164 * no pending entry carrying it may be confirmed. That is deliberate —165 * tombstone-style "newest timestamp wins" ordering would let a peer resurrect a166 * revoked device just by issuing a manifest with a fresh `pairedAt`, and every167 * timestamp in a manifest is peer-supplied. Re-admitting a device requires a168 * direct, SAS-confirmed re-pair with a physically present user.169 *170 * HONEST LIMIT: every mesh member holds the vault root key, and signing keys171 * are derived from it (`deriveSyncSigningKeypair(rootKey, deviceId)`), so these172 * signatures prove *vault membership*, not device identity. A revoked device173 * still holds the root key and, running modified software, can ignore its own174 * revocation. This mechanism stops honest peers from talking to a revoked175 * device; it is not a cryptographic ejection. See HOLE 4 — a genuinely176 * compromised device needs the master password and recovery words rotated.177 */178export interface DeviceRevocation {179  deviceId: string;180  /** X25519 sync identity key at the moment of revocation. Load-bearing, not181   *  descriptive: `deviceId` is whatever an issuing manifest says it is, so the182   *  key is what re-vouching is actually matched against. `0`×64 means no key183   *  was ever stored for the device and matches nothing. */184  longTermPublicKeyHex: string;185  revokedAt: number;186  /** deviceId that issued the revocation, for display only. */187  revokedByDeviceId: string;188}189190/** Body that gets canonicalised + signed. Wire format JSON-stable. */191export interface DeviceManifestBody {192  manifestVersion: number;193  issuerDeviceId: string;194  issuedAt: number;195  devices: ManifestDeviceEntry[];196  revoked: DeviceRevocation[];197}198199export interface SignedDeviceManifest {200  body: DeviceManifestBody;201  /** Hex-encoded 64-byte Ed25519 signature over canonicalised body. */202  signatureHex: string;203}204205export type SyncStatusV3 = "up_to_date" | "syncing" | "unreachable" | "never";