sync-types.ts

1// Vault sync — type definitions (Master Brief v2).2//3// v3 — code pairing once per device pair (Phase 1). All ongoing vault sync4// after that runs over a direct WebSocket on the local network (Phase 2).5// The two phases never overlap.67// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------8// Device types9// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------1011export type DeviceType = "extension" | "android" | "ios";1213// Numeric tags for DeviceType on the wire — not the string form.14export const DEVICE_TYPE_EXTENSION = 0x01 as const;15export const DEVICE_TYPE_ANDROID = 0x02 as const;16export const DEVICE_TYPE_IOS = 0x03 as const;1718export type DeviceTypeByte =19  | typeof DEVICE_TYPE_EXTENSION20  | typeof DEVICE_TYPE_ANDROID21  | typeof DEVICE_TYPE_IOS;2223// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------24// Long-term paired device registry25// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------2627/**28 * Trust source of a paired-device entry — per v2 brief §4.2.29 *30 *   "direct"  — established via a pairing-code session with this device.31 *   "vouched" — introduced by a directly-paired peer via a signed device32 *               manifest during a normal sync, then confirmed by the user33 *               (MV-7). Functionally equivalent to direct for sync purposes;34 *               surfaced with an "Added automatically" badge in Settings.35 */36export type TrustSource = "direct" | "vouched";3738/**39 * v3 paired-device record. Stored in `chrome.storage.local` — cryptographic40 * keys must not leave the device via a third-party cloud service.41 *42 * `longTermPublicKeyHex` is the counterpart's vault-derived X25519 sync43 * identity static key — see `deriveSyncIdentityKeypair`. Every WebSocket44 * reconnect runs Noise KK with both local static keys, followed by a45 * PAIR_IDENTITY exchange bound to the authenticated keys.46 *47 * `lastKnownIp` is intentionally NOT stored here — it's per-network and48 * lives in `chrome.storage.local` keyed by `longTermPublicKeyHex`. See49 * `getLastKnownIp` / `setLastKnownIp` in `paired-devices.ts`.50 */51export interface PairedDevice {52  deviceId: string;53  deviceName?: string;54  deviceType?: DeviceType;55  longTermPublicKeyHex?: string;56  /**57   * Long-term Ed25519 verification key for the peer's device-manifest58   * signatures (v2 brief §4.3). Derived deterministically from the same59   * master key as `longTermPublicKeyHex`, via `deriveSyncSigningKeypair`.60   */61  signingPublicKeyHex?: string;62  /** v2 brief §4.2 — distinguishes direct-paired vs vouched-via-manifest. */63  trustSource?: TrustSource;64  /**65   * The peer's WebSocket sync port. Current Android hosts use fixed port 4914266   * and announce it inside the encrypted pairing channel.67   */68  wsPort?: number;69  /** Pair-only 32-byte reconnect capability, derived from the first handshake. */70  rendezvousSecretHex?: string;71  /** Validated wss relay used by this pair. */72  relayUrl?: string;73  pairedAt: number;74  lastSyncedAt?: number;75}7677// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------78// v3 wire protocol — phase-2 WebSocket manifest sync79// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------8081/**82 * v3 wire protocol — after reconnect Noise KK is open and PAIR_IDENTITY has83 * been bound to both authenticated static keys.84 *85 * Every frame is JSON, then ChaCha20-Poly1305 encrypted by Noise KK. The86 * WebSocket transport sees only ciphertext.87 *88 * The manifest carries per-entry timestamps; the receiver requests entries89 * where the remote timestamp beats its own. Entries traverse as opaque90 * encrypted blobs — the sync layer never decrypts vault data.91 */92export type SyncMessage =93  | { type: "SYNC_HELLO"; vaultId: string; deviceId: string; version: number; deviceTime: number }94  | { type: "SYNC_MANIFEST"; entries: Record<string, number>; tombstones: Record<string, number> }95  | { type: "SYNC_REQUEST"; entryIds: string[] }96  | { type: "SYNC_ENTRIES"; entries: Record<string, string> }97  | { type: "SYNC_TOMBSTONES"; tombstones: Record<string, number> }98  | { type: "SYNC_DEVICE_MANIFEST"; manifest: SignedDeviceManifest | null }99  | { type: "SYNC_DONE"; entriesReceived?: number; entriesSent?: number }100  | { type: "SYNC_ERROR"; error: string };101102// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------103// Browser-to-browser relay frames (phone forwards; see peach-android's104// RelayFrames.kt / RelayHub.kt, the source of truth this mirrors — NOT the105// older 4-frame PEACH_SYNC_RELAY_DESIGN.md sketch, which is stale).106//107// Type-only for now: nothing in this repo sends or handles these yet — no108// browser can listen, so relaying laptop-to-laptop traffic through a shared109// phone is unbuilt browser-side work, tracked separately. This exists so110// that work starts from the real wire contract instead of the stale doc.111// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------112113/** RelayMessage.targetDeviceId/peerDeviceId are the destination's Noise114 *  static public key as lowercase hex — NOT `PairedDevice.deviceId`. */115export type RelayMessage =116  | { type: "RELAY_REQUEST"; targetDeviceId: string }117  | { type: "RELAY_ACCEPT" }118  | { type: "RELAY_UNAVAILABLE" }119  | { type: "RELAY_DISABLED" }120  | { type: "RELAY_OPEN"; peerDeviceId: string }121  | { type: "RELAY_FRAME"; payload: string }122  | { type: "RELAY_CLOSE" };123124// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------125// v3 device manifest — propagates trust between mobile devices (v2 brief §4.3)126// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------127128export const DEVICE_MANIFEST_VERSION = 0x01 as const;129/** Manifests older than this are silently rejected (v2 brief §4.3). */130export const DEVICE_MANIFEST_FRESHNESS_MS = 5 * 60_000;131132/**133 * One device entry inside a signed manifest. `longTermPublicKeyHex` is the134 * X25519 sync identity key the receiver will use for Noise KK reconnect.135 * `signingPublicKeyHex` is the136 * peer's Ed25519 manifest-verification key — needed so a vouched mobile137 * can in turn verify manifests issued by the same vault from a different138 * device.139 */140export interface ManifestDeviceEntry {141  deviceId: string;142  deviceName: string;143  deviceType: DeviceType;144  longTermPublicKeyHex: string;145  signingPublicKeyHex: string;146  /**147   * Optional sync WebSocket port for native/mobile hosts. Preserving this in148   * vouched entries lets mobile peers connect without another audio pairing.149   */150  wsPort?: number;151  pairedAt: number;152}153154/** Body that gets canonicalised + signed. Wire format JSON-stable. */155export interface DeviceManifestBody {156  manifestVersion: number;157  issuerDeviceId: string;158  issuedAt: number;159  devices: ManifestDeviceEntry[];160}161162export interface SignedDeviceManifest {163  body: DeviceManifestBody;164  /** Hex-encoded 64-byte Ed25519 signature over canonicalised body. */165  signatureHex: string;166}167168export type SyncStatusV3 = "up_to_date" | "syncing" | "unreachable" | "never";