// Production adapter that backs `runSyncInitiator` with the live vault.
//
// The coordinator (sync-coordinator.ts) never decrypts vault data; it
// only moves opaque base64 entry blobs and metadata. This adapter is the
// boundary where vault plaintext meets the sync layer — entries leave the
// vault as encrypted envelopes here, and incoming envelopes are decrypted
// here before being merged via `applyMergedRemoteEntries`.
//
// Envelope cipher: AES-GCM with a PER-ENTRY key derived as
//   HKDF-SHA256(ikm = syncMasterKey, salt = "", info = entryId + "\x00" + "sync-entry-v1")
// (random 12B nonce, aad = "peach-sync-entry-v1"). Binding the key to the
// entry id means a ciphertext minted for one entry slot cannot be replayed
// into another: decryptEntryOrNull rejects any envelope whose decrypted
// entry.id does not match the map key it arrived under. Both sides hold the
// same syncMasterKey (same vault) so keys match without prior negotiation. The
// Noise KK reconnect session encrypts the transport on top — the envelope is
// belt-and-braces so a transport-layer leak doesn't expose plaintext entries.
//
// Device-manifest exchange (v2 brief §4.3) is plumbed here. Any admitted
// mesh peer may issue one — see applyVerifiedPeerManifest for why the issuer
// is not restricted by device type or first-pair topology, and for what the
// Noise-authenticated static key gates. docs/mesh-vouching-authority.md is the
// end-to-end trace.

import { HKDF } from "@stablelib/hkdf";
import { SHA256 } from "@stablelib/sha256";
import type { SyncVaultAdapter } from "./sync-coordinator";
import { getDeviceName, getOrCreateDeviceId } from "./device-identity";
import {
  computeVaultId,
  deriveSyncIdentityKeypair,
  deriveSyncSigningKeypair,
  hexToPubkey,
  pubkeyToHex,
} from "../shared/sync-identity";
import {
  buildSignedDeviceManifest,
  verifyDeviceManifest,
} from "../shared/device-manifest";
import { constantTimeEqualHex } from "../shared/constant-time";
import {
  applyMergedRemoteEntries,
  getTombstoneManifest,
  getRootKeyHex,
  getEntries,
  getEntryById,
  getVaultVersion,
  isUnlocked,
} from "./vault";
import {
  findPairedDeviceById,
  findPairedDeviceByPubkey,
  isDeviceRevoked,
  listDeviceRevocations,
  listPairedDevices,
  mergeDeviceRevocations,
  removePairedDeviceById,
  upsertPairedDevice,
} from "./paired-devices";
import { setPairSecret } from "./pair-secrets";
import {
  removePendingVouchedDevice,
} from "./pending-vouched-devices";
import {
  bytesToHex as rendezvousBytesToHex,
  deriveMeshRendezvousSecret,
  normalizeRelayUrl,
} from "../shared/rendezvous";
import { recordSyncAlerts } from "./sync-alerts";
import { SYNC_LIMITS, clampSyncTimestamp } from "../shared/sync-limits";
import type { VaultEntry } from "../shared/types";
import type {
  ManifestDeviceEntry,
  PairedDevice,
  SignedDeviceManifest,
} from "../shared/sync-types";
import { replaceLockedSyncSpool, drainLockedSyncInbox } from "./locked-sync-spool";

// Each entry uses a unique AES-GCM key: HKDF(masterKey, info = entryId + "\x00" + "sync-entry-v1").
// The info binding prevents a ciphertext from one entry slot being replayed into another.
const ENTRY_KEY_INFO_SUFFIX = "sync-entry-v1";
const ENTRY_AAD = "peach-sync-entry-v1";

export class VaultLockedError extends Error {
  constructor() {
    super("vault_locked");
    this.name = "VaultLockedError";
  }
}

export function createSyncVaultAdapter(
  _context: { deviceName?: string } = {},
): SyncVaultAdapter {
  return {
    async computeVaultId() {
      const master = requireMasterKey();
      return computeVaultId(master);
    },

    async getOurDeviceId() {
      return getOrCreateDeviceId();
    },

    async getLocalVersion() {
      return getVaultVersion();
    },

    async buildEntryManifest() {
      requireUnlocked();
      const manifest: Record<string, number> = {};
      for (const entry of getEntries()) {
        manifest[entry.id] = entry.modifiedAt;
      }
      return manifest;
    },

    async buildTombstoneManifest() {
      requireUnlocked();
      return getTombstoneManifest();
    },

    async getEncryptedEntries(entryIds) {
      requireUnlocked();
      const masterKey = requireMasterKey();
      const out: Record<string, string> = {};
      for (const id of entryIds) {
        const entry = getEntryById(id);
        if (!entry) continue;
        const key = await deriveEntryKey(masterKey, id);
        out[id] = await encryptEntry(key, entry);
      }
      return out;
    },

    async applyEntries(entries) {
      requireUnlocked();
      const entryList = Object.entries(entries);
      // MV-3: bound the batch before any per-entry crypto work.
      if (entryList.length > SYNC_LIMITS.MAX_ENTRY_COUNT) {
        throw new Error(
          `sync entry count ${entryList.length} exceeds limit ${SYNC_LIMITS.MAX_ENTRY_COUNT}`,
        );
      }
      const masterKey = requireMasterKey();
      const decrypted: VaultEntry[] = [];
      for (const [id, envelope] of entryList) {
        // MV-3: per-entry ceiling, checked on the (base64) envelope before
        // decrypting. Base64 inflates by 4/3, so allow that factor.
        if (envelope.length > (SYNC_LIMITS.MAX_ENTRY_PLAINTEXT_BYTES * 4) / 3 + 64) {
          continue; // oversized envelope — skip, never decrypt
        }
        const key = await deriveEntryKey(masterKey, id);
        const entry = await decryptEntryOrNull(key, envelope);
        if (!entry) continue;
        // MV-3: defense in depth — re-measure the decrypted plaintext.
        if (JSON.stringify(entry).length > SYNC_LIMITS.MAX_ENTRY_PLAINTEXT_BYTES) {
          continue;
        }
        // The map key is the authority on id — refuse mismatched envelopes
        // so a swapped envelope can't poison a different entry slot.
        if (entry.id !== id) continue;
        decrypted.push(entry);
      }
      if (decrypted.length > 0) {
        await applyMergedRemoteEntries(decrypted, {});
      }
    },

    async applyTombstones(tombstones) {
      requireUnlocked();
      const tombstoneList = Object.entries(tombstones);
      // MV-3: bound the tombstone batch before processing.
      if (tombstoneList.length > SYNC_LIMITS.MAX_TOMBSTONE_COUNT) {
        throw new Error(
          `sync tombstone count ${tombstoneList.length} exceeds limit ${SYNC_LIMITS.MAX_TOMBSTONE_COUNT}`,
        );
      }
      const cleaned: Record<string, number> = {};
      for (const [id, ts] of tombstoneList) {
        if (typeof ts === "number" && Number.isFinite(ts) && ts > 0) {
          // HV-1c: clamp before the value participates in any comparison.
          // vault.ts clamps again defensively; clamping here keeps the
          // invariant local to the boundary where peer data enters.
          cleaned[id] = clampSyncTimestamp(ts);
        }
      }
      if (Object.keys(cleaned).length > 0) {
        await applyMergedRemoteEntries([], cleaned);
      }
    },

    async buildOutgoingDeviceManifest() {
      requireUnlocked();
      const masterKey = requireMasterKey();
      const issuerDeviceId = await getOrCreateDeviceId();
      const signing = await deriveSyncSigningKeypair(masterKey, issuerDeviceId);
      const revoked = await listDeviceRevocations();
      const revokedIds = new Set(revoked.map((r) => r.deviceId));
      const devices = (await listPairedDevices())
        .filter((d) => !revokedIds.has(d.deviceId))
        .map(toManifestEntry)
        .filter((d): d is ManifestDeviceEntry => d !== null);
      return buildSignedDeviceManifest(
        issuerDeviceId,
        devices,
        signing.privateKey,
        { revoked },
      );
    },

    async applyIncomingDeviceManifest(manifest, authenticatedRemoteStaticPublicKey) {
      requireUnlocked();
      await applyVerifiedPeerManifest(
        manifest,
        authenticatedRemoteStaticPublicKey,
      );
    },
  };
}

export async function refreshLockedSyncSpool(): Promise<void> {
  requireUnlocked();
  const masterKey = requireMasterKey();
  const deviceId = await getOrCreateDeviceId();
  const identity = await buildCachedIdentity(masterKey, deviceId);
  const cachedEntries: Record<string, { modifiedAt: number; ciphertext: string }> = {};
  try {
    for (const entry of getEntries()) {
      if (entry.deletedAt) continue;
      const key = await deriveEntryKey(masterKey, entry.id);
      cachedEntries[entry.id] = {
        modifiedAt: entry.modifiedAt,
        ciphertext: await encryptEntry(key, entry),
      };
    }
    const tombstones = getTombstoneManifest();
    // PB-26-104: the private key rides along because locked sync needs it, but
    // the spool is written to chrome.storage.session — never to disk. See
    // locked-sync-spool.ts for why session storage is the only home that
    // satisfies both constraints.
    const { longTermPrivateKeyBytes: _privateKeyBytes, ...storedIdentity } = identity;
    await replaceLockedSyncSpool({
      ...storedIdentity,
      localVersion: await getVaultVersion(),
      entries: cachedEntries,
      tombstones,
    });
  } finally {
    masterKey.fill(0);
    identity.longTermPrivateKeyBytes.fill(0);
  }
}

export async function drainAndRefreshLockedSyncSpool(): Promise<void> {
  const live = createSyncVaultAdapter();
  await drainLockedSyncInbox(live);
  await refreshLockedSyncSpool();
}

async function buildCachedIdentity(masterKey: Uint8Array, deviceId: string) {
  const vaultId = await computeVaultId(masterKey);
  const keys = deriveSyncIdentityKeypair(masterKey, deviceId);
  const deviceName = await getDeviceName();
  return {
    vaultId,
    deviceId,
    deviceName,
    deviceType: "extension" as const,
    longTermPublicKeyHex: pubkeyToHex(keys.publicKey),
    longTermPrivateKeyHex: bytesToHex(keys.secretKey),
    longTermPrivateKeyBytes: keys.secretKey,
  };
}

function toManifestEntry(device: PairedDevice): ManifestDeviceEntry | null {
  if (
    !device.deviceId ||
    !device.deviceName ||
    !device.deviceType ||
    !device.longTermPublicKeyHex ||
    !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(device.longTermPublicKeyHex) ||
    !device.signingPublicKeyHex ||
    !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(device.signingPublicKeyHex)
  ) {
    return null;
  }
  return {
    deviceId: device.deviceId,
    deviceName: device.deviceName,
    deviceType: device.deviceType,
    longTermPublicKeyHex: device.longTermPublicKeyHex,
    signingPublicKeyHex: device.signingPublicKeyHex,
    wsPort: device.wsPort,
    relayUrl: device.relayUrl,
    pairedAt: device.pairedAt,
  };
}

/**
 * Apply a device manifest issued by a peer we pair with directly.
 *
 * The issuer used to be required to be an "extension", on the assumption that
 * the extension was the mesh's trust anchor. It is not: the device a fresh
 * install joins through is the one holding the peer list to hand over.
 *
 * The issuer must already be admitted locally as either direct or vouched.
 * That is the decentralisation boundary: an unknown key has no session and no
 * authority, while every authenticated member can propagate the same signed
 * pool without the original hub online. A v3 entry is admitted only when it
 * carries a valid relay route; both endpoints independently derive the same
 * pair-only capability from their vault root and public keys.
 */
async function applyVerifiedPeerManifest(
  manifest: SignedDeviceManifest,
  authenticatedRemoteStaticPublicKey: Uint8Array,
): Promise<void> {
  const issuerId = manifest?.body?.issuerDeviceId;
  if (typeof issuerId !== "string" || !issuerId) { return; }

  if (authenticatedRemoteStaticPublicKey.length !== 32) {
    return;
  }
  const authenticatedPubkeyHex = pubkeyToHex(authenticatedRemoteStaticPublicKey);
  const issuer = await findPairedDeviceByPubkey(authenticatedPubkeyHex);
  if (
    !issuer ||
    issuer.deviceId !== issuerId ||
    (
      issuer.trustSource !== "direct" &&
      issuer.trustSource !== "vouched"
    ) ||
    !issuer.signingPublicKeyHex ||
    !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(issuer.signingPublicKeyHex)
  ) {
    return;
  }

  let body: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof verifyDeviceManifest>>;
  try {
    body = await verifyDeviceManifest(
      manifest,
      hexToPubkey(issuer!.signingPublicKeyHex!),
    );
  } catch {
    // Stored key may be stale (older builds persisted the key derived at
    // first-pair and never refreshed it). The signing keypair is deterministic
    // from (masterKey, deviceId) on both sides, so retry once with the locally
    // re-derived pubkey. A genuinely forged signature throws here and is
    // silently rejected — only a stale-but-correct key survives the retry.
    const masterForIssuer = requireMasterKey();
    try {
      const derived = await deriveSyncSigningKeypair(
        masterForIssuer,
        issuer.deviceId,
      );
      body = await verifyDeviceManifest(manifest, derived.publicKeyRaw);
    } catch {
      return;
    } finally {
      masterForIssuer.fill(0);
    }
  }
  if (body.issuerDeviceId !== issuer.deviceId) {
    return;
  }

  const ourDeviceId = await getOrCreateDeviceId();
  const masterKey = requireMasterKey();
  const localKeys = deriveSyncIdentityKeypair(masterKey, ourDeviceId);

  try {
    // Revocations are absorbed BEFORE any vouching, so a manifest that both
    // revokes and re-vouches the same device in one payload cannot race itself.
    // A peer may not revoke US — that would let one compromised device sever the
    // whole mesh — so our own id is filtered out first.
    const newlyRevoked = await mergeDeviceRevocations(
      body.revoked.filter((r) => r.deviceId !== ourDeviceId),
    );
    for (const deviceId of newlyRevoked) {
      await removePairedDeviceById(deviceId);
      await removePendingVouchedDevice(deviceId);
      void recordSyncAlerts([
        {
          type: "DEVICE_REVOKED",
          entryId: "",
          entryTitle: deviceId,
          deviceName: issuer.deviceName ?? "paired device",
          timestamp: Date.now(),
        },
      ]);
    }

    for (const entry of body.devices) {
      if (entry.deviceId === ourDeviceId || entry.deviceId === issuer.deviceId) {
        continue;
      }
      // Terminal: no manifest re-admits a revoked device. Matched on the key as
      // well as the id, because the id is the issuer's to choose — checking only
      // the id let a revoked key walk back in under a fresh one. The check sits
      // ahead of the existing-device lookup so it also refuses rotating a device
      // we still trust onto a revoked key.
      if (await isDeviceRevoked(entry.deviceId, entry.longTermPublicKeyHex)) {
        continue;
      }
      const existing = await findPairedDeviceById(entry.deviceId);
      const meshRoute = deriveManifestMeshRoute(
        masterKey,
        localKeys.publicKey,
        entry,
      );

      // A v3 manifest from an admitted, KK-authenticated issuer proves
      // same-vault membership and carries enough route material for the two
      // introduced endpoints to derive their own capability. Admit it
      // immediately so a six-device vault converges without keeping the
      // original pairing hub online.
      if (!existing) {
        if (!meshRoute) continue;
        await upsertPairedDevice({
          deviceId: entry.deviceId,
          deviceName: entry.deviceName,
          deviceType: entry.deviceType,
          longTermPublicKeyHex: entry.longTermPublicKeyHex.toLowerCase(),
          signingPublicKeyHex: entry.signingPublicKeyHex.toLowerCase(),
          wsPort: entry.wsPort,
          relayUrl: meshRoute.relayUrl,
          pairedAt: entry.pairedAt,
          trustSource: "vouched",
        });
        // PB-26-213: the secret bypasses the public registry into the
        // encrypted pair-secret record.
        await setPairSecret(entry.deviceId, meshRoute.rendezvousSecretHex, masterKey);
        await removePendingVouchedDevice(entry.deviceId);
        continue;
      }

      // MV-8d: a key changing under a stable deviceId is legitimate after a
      // reinstall, but it is exactly what a graph-poisoning attack looks like —
      // signal the user either way, durably (the alert queue survives a closed
      // popup) and live (the broadcast updates an open one).
      if (
        existing.longTermPublicKeyHex &&
        !constantTimeEqualHex(
          existing.longTermPublicKeyHex,
          entry.longTermPublicKeyHex,
        )
      ) {
        // S5: name the device from the LOCAL record, never from the manifest.
        // The issuer is a third party here (its own entry is skipped above), so
        // `entry.deviceName` is an unverified claim about someone else — an
        // attacker who could put it on screen could make its own key rotation
        // read as a rotation on a device the user trusts more.
        const knownName = existing.deviceName ?? entry.deviceName;
        notifyPopup({
          type: "DEVICE_KEY_ROTATED",
          payload: { deviceName: knownName, deviceId: entry.deviceId },
        });
        void recordSyncAlerts([
          {
            type: "DEVICE_KEY_ROTATED",
            entryId: "",
            entryTitle: knownName,
            deviceName: knownName,
            timestamp: Date.now(),
          },
        ]);
      }

      // Existing device — update in place as before. The name is deliberately
      // NOT taken from the manifest: a device's name is set by that device at
      // pairing, and letting a third-party issuer rewrite it is the rename-then-
      // impersonate half of S5. Self-renames never arrive here anyway.
      await upsertPairedDevice({
        ...existing,
        deviceId: entry.deviceId,
        deviceName: existing.deviceName ?? entry.deviceName,
        deviceType: entry.deviceType,
        longTermPublicKeyHex: entry.longTermPublicKeyHex.toLowerCase(),
        signingPublicKeyHex: entry.signingPublicKeyHex.toLowerCase(),
        pairedAt: existing.pairedAt ?? entry.pairedAt,
        trustSource: existing.trustSource,
        wsPort: existing.wsPort ?? entry.wsPort,
        relayUrl:
          existing.trustSource === "vouched" && meshRoute
            ? meshRoute.relayUrl
            : existing.relayUrl,
        lastSyncedAt: existing.lastSyncedAt,
      });
      if (existing.trustSource === "vouched" && meshRoute) {
        await setPairSecret(entry.deviceId, meshRoute.rendezvousSecretHex, masterKey);
      }
    }
  } finally {
    masterKey.fill(0);
    localKeys.secretKey.fill(0);
  }
}

function deriveManifestMeshRoute(
  masterKey: Uint8Array,
  localPublicKey: Uint8Array,
  entry: ManifestDeviceEntry,
): { rendezvousSecretHex: string; relayUrl: string } | null {
  try {
    if (!entry.relayUrl) return null;
    const relayUrl = normalizeRelayUrl(entry.relayUrl);
    const secret = deriveMeshRendezvousSecret(
      masterKey,
      localPublicKey,
      hexToPubkey(entry.longTermPublicKeyHex),
    );
    try {
      return {
        rendezvousSecretHex: rendezvousBytesToHex(secret),
        relayUrl,
      };
    } finally {
      secret.fill(0);
    }
  } catch {
    return null;
  }
}

function notifyPopup(msg: { type: string; payload?: unknown }): void {
  try {
    void chrome.runtime.sendMessage(msg).catch(() => undefined);
  } catch {
    /* popup closed — the durable sync-alert queue remains authoritative */
  }
}

function requireUnlocked(): void {
  if (!isUnlocked()) throw new VaultLockedError();
}

// Sync derives everything — vault_id, the Noise static key, the Ed25519
// manifest signing key, and the per-entry envelope keys — from the vault's
// stable root key, NOT the password-derived key. This keeps paired devices'
// identities and envelope keys constant across a master-password change on
// either side (SEV-2-B); two paired devices with independently-rotated
// passwords still share this key and can decrypt each other's entries.
function requireMasterKey(): Uint8Array {
  if (!isUnlocked()) throw new VaultLockedError();
  const hex = getRootKeyHex();
  if (!hex) throw new VaultLockedError();
  return hexToBytes(hex);
}

async function deriveEntryKey(masterKey: Uint8Array, entryId: string): Promise<CryptoKey> {
  // Null-byte separator (HKDF hardening): entryId cannot contain \x00, so this
  // makes the (entryId, suffix) boundary unambiguous regardless of future id
  // formats. Coordinated wire change — peach-android VaultSyncAdapter derives
  // the identical info; the two MUST stay byte-for-byte in lockstep.
  const info = new TextEncoder().encode(`${entryId}\x00${ENTRY_KEY_INFO_SUFFIX}`);
  const raw = new HKDF(SHA256, masterKey, new Uint8Array(0), info).expand(32);
  return crypto.subtle.importKey(
    "raw",
    raw.buffer as ArrayBuffer,
    { name: "AES-GCM" },
    false,
    ["encrypt", "decrypt"],
  );
}

async function encryptEntry(key: CryptoKey, entry: VaultEntry): Promise<string> {
  const plaintext = new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(entry));
  const nonce = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));
  const aad = new TextEncoder().encode(ENTRY_AAD);
  const ct = await crypto.subtle.encrypt(
    {
      name: "AES-GCM",
      iv: nonce.buffer as ArrayBuffer,
      additionalData: aad.buffer as ArrayBuffer,
      tagLength: 128,
    },
    key,
    plaintext.buffer as ArrayBuffer,
  );
  const ctBytes = new Uint8Array(ct);
  const envelope = new Uint8Array(nonce.length + ctBytes.length);
  envelope.set(nonce, 0);
  envelope.set(ctBytes, nonce.length);
  return bytesToBase64(envelope);
}

async function decryptEntryOrNull(key: CryptoKey, envelopeB64: string): Promise<VaultEntry | null> {
  try {
    const bytes = base64ToBytes(envelopeB64);
    if (bytes.length < 12 + 16) return null;
    const nonce = bytes.subarray(0, 12);
    const ct = bytes.subarray(12);
    const aad = new TextEncoder().encode(ENTRY_AAD);
    const pt = await crypto.subtle.decrypt(
      {
        name: "AES-GCM",
        iv: nonce.buffer.slice(nonce.byteOffset, nonce.byteOffset + nonce.byteLength) as ArrayBuffer,
        additionalData: aad.buffer as ArrayBuffer,
        tagLength: 128,
      },
      key,
      ct.buffer.slice(ct.byteOffset, ct.byteOffset + ct.byteLength) as ArrayBuffer,
    );
    const json = new TextDecoder().decode(pt);
    const parsed = JSON.parse(json);
    if (!parsed || typeof parsed !== "object" || typeof parsed.id !== "string") return null;
    return parsed as VaultEntry;
  } catch {
    return null;
  }
}

function hexToBytes(hex: string): Uint8Array {
  if (hex.length % 2 !== 0) throw new Error("hex length must be even");
  const out = new Uint8Array(hex.length / 2);
  for (let i = 0; i < out.length; i++) {
    out[i] = parseInt(hex.slice(i * 2, i * 2 + 2), 16);
  }
  return out;
}

function bytesToBase64(bytes: Uint8Array): string {
  let bin = "";
  for (let i = 0; i < bytes.length; i++) bin += String.fromCharCode(bytes[i]);
  return btoa(bin);
}

function bytesToHex(bytes: Uint8Array): string {
  return Array.from(bytes, (byte) => byte.toString(16).padStart(2, "0")).join("");
}

function base64ToBytes(b64: string): Uint8Array {
  const bin = atob(b64);
  const out = new Uint8Array(bin.length);
  for (let i = 0; i < bin.length; i++) out[i] = bin.charCodeAt(i);
  return out;
}