/**
 * types.ts — cross-boundary types and the `MessageType` union.
 *
 * `MessageType` mixes background-bound and content-script-bound messages.
 * Background-bound types have a case in `src/background/messages.ts`.
 * Content-script-bound types (PING, SUMMON_AUTOFILL, VAULT_LOCKED,
 * RESTART_AUTO_LOCK, etc.) are sent *to* content scripts or the popup and
 * have no handler in messages.ts by design — that absence is not a missing
 * handler. Add new cross-boundary types here, not inline in call sites.
 */

export interface ManualSummonRecord {
  firstSummonedAt: number;
  summonCount: number;
  lastSummonedAt: number;
}

export interface Canary {
  webhookUrl: string;
  label?: string;
  lastPinged?: number;
  pingCount?: number;
}

export type CardNetwork = "visa" | "mastercard" | "amex" | "discover" | "unknown";

/**
 * Passkey credential data attached to a VaultEntry. New in v2.11.0 — passkeys
 * are no longer a separate entry type; instead they hang off any login entry.
 * A passkey-only entry is a `type:"login"` entry with no username/password
 * but a `passkey` sub-object set. A login that ALSO has a passkey is just a
 * normal login with `passkey` populated.
 *
 * privateKeyJwk is present only on Chrome-created passkeys, where Peach is
 * the authenticator. Firefox-created passkeys delegate to the platform
 * authenticator, so the field is absent — `browser` distinguishes the two.
 */
export interface PasskeyData {
  rpId: string;
  rpName: string;
  credentialId: string;
  publicKeyCose: string;
  privateKeyJwk?: JsonWebKey;
  userHandle: string;
  userName: string;
  userDisplayName: string;
  algorithm: -7 | -8;
  signCount: number;
  aaguid: string;
  backupEligible: boolean;
  backupState: boolean;
  lastUsedAt?: number;
  browser?: "chrome" | "firefox";
  transports?: string[];
  /** When the credential was first registered with Peach. */
  createdAt: number;
}

export interface VaultEntry {
  id: string; // crypto.randomUUID()
  /**
   * Entry type. As of v2.11.0 passkeys are stored on `type:"login"` entries
   * via the `passkey` sub-object — `"passkey"` here is a legacy value still
   * accepted on read but rewritten to `"login"` on next vault save.
   */
  type?: "login" | "note" | "passkey" | "card";
  title: string;
  username?: string; // only for login entries
  email?: string; // separate email address — for sites that require both a username and an email
  password?: string; // only for login entries
  url?: string; // only for login entries
  /**
   * Additional sites this entry should match for autofill. Login entries only.
   * Each value is a full origin or URL (e.g. `https://login.foo.com`).
   * The vault domain index keys against the hostname of every entry in this
   * list, in addition to `url`.
   */
  additionalUrls?: string[];
  totp?: string; // base32 seed, stored encrypted — only for login entries
  notes?: string;
  breach?: number; // HIBP exposure count; 0 or undefined = clean — only for login entries
  /**
   * When the password field was last changed. Set on first-write of `password`
   * and refreshed on every subsequent change. Defaults to `createdAt` when
   * legacy entries are read by the advanced health analyser.
   */
  passwordChangedAt?: number;
  canary?: Canary;
  createdAt: number; // Date.now()
  modifiedAt: number;
  deletedAt?: number;
  tags?: string[];
  /** Passkey credential attached to this entry, if any. */
  passkey?: PasskeyData;
  // ── Legacy passkey flat fields (pre-v2.11.0). Populated by vault read
  // migration so that the old import/sanitize paths keep typing; new code
  // should always read `entry.passkey?.*` instead. The migration drops these
  // on next vault save. Do not introduce new readers of these fields.
  rpId?: string;
  rpName?: string;
  credentialId?: string;
  publicKeyCose?: string;
  privateKeyJwk?: JsonWebKey;
  userHandle?: string;
  userName?: string;
  userDisplayName?: string;
  algorithm?: -7 | -8;
  signCount?: number;
  aaguid?: string;
  backupEligible?: boolean;
  backupState?: boolean;
  lastUsedAt?: number;
  browser?: "chrome" | "firefox";
  transports?: string[];
  // Card entry fields
  cardholderName?: string;
  cardNumber?: string;       // full PAN, stored encrypted in vault
  expMonth?: string;
  expYear?: string;
  cvc?: string;
  cardNickname?: string;
  network?: CardNetwork;
  last4?: string;
}

/**
 * Returns true when an entry has a passkey credential attached. After v2.11.0
 * migration this is the canonical check; pre-migration entries with a flat
 * `rpId`/`credentialId` shape get rewritten by the vault read pass before
 * any consumer sees them.
 */
export function hasPasskey(entry: VaultEntry): boolean {
  return entry.passkey !== undefined && entry.passkey.credentialId.length > 0;
}

/**
 * Returns true when an entry is "passkey-only" — has a passkey credential
 * but no password to fill into a form. Login fields hide for these entries
 * and the inline autofill selector filters them out (signing in via the
 * passkey is a separate WebAuthn flow). Username may still be populated
 * (the migration mirrors passkey.userName onto the entry's username so the
 * domain-index/search keep working) and is not part of this discriminator.
 */
export function isPasskeyOnly(entry: VaultEntry): boolean {
  return hasPasskey(entry) && !entry.password;
}

export interface LegacyVaultEntry {
  id: string;
  title: string;
  username: string;
  password: string;
  url: string;
  totp?: string;
  notes?: string;
  breach?: number;
  created: number;
  updated: number;
  deletedAt?: number;
}

export interface CardEntry extends VaultEntry {
  type: "card";
  cardholderName: string;
  cardNumber: string;
  expMonth: string;
  expYear: string;
  cvc: string;
}


export interface PendingPasskeyRequest {
  requestId: number;
  type: "create" | "get";
  rpId: string;
  rpName: string;
  userName: string;
  userDisplayName?: string;
  /**
   * Firefox path: when present, the popup performs the navigator.credentials
   * call itself rather than completing a chrome.webAuthenticationProxy
   * request. Absent for Chrome (the existing webAuthenticationProxy flow).
   */
  browser?: "chrome" | "firefox";
  /** Firefox create: base64url challenge minted by the popup-context flow. */
  challenge?: string;
  /** Firefox create: base64url user handle. Generated if absent. */
  userHandle?: string;
}

export interface PasskeyProviderState {
  supported: boolean;
  enabled: boolean;
  attached: boolean;
  browserLabel: string;
  statusLabel: string;
  conflict?: string;
}

export interface StoredVault {
  version: 1; // AAD for AES-GCM --- prevents downgrade
  salt: string; // hex --- 16 bytes, CSPRNG, stored not secret
  nonce: string; // hex --- 12 bytes, CSPRNG, fresh per write
  ciphertext: string; // hex --- AES-256-GCM output
  tag: string; // hex --- 16-byte GCM auth tag
  // Recovery escrow: root key wrapped under recovery words via AES-256-GCM.
  // Absent on vaults created before v2.12 (migrateToRecovery adds them on first unlock).
  recovery_salt?: string; // hex --- 16 bytes, CSPRNG, HKDF salt for recovery key
  recovery_wrapped_root_key?: string; // hex --- AES-256-GCM ciphertext of 32-byte root key
  recovery_nonce?: string; // hex --- 12 bytes, fresh nonce for the above
  recovery_tag?: string; // hex --- 16-byte GCM auth tag for the above
  // Second wrapping of the same root key under the password-derived key.
  // Lets unlock() recover the rootKey bytes without the user's recovery
  // words, so GET_RECOVERY_WORDS works across lock/unlock cycles. Refreshed
  // on every password change so the words stay valid (H2/COR-006).
  pw_root_ciphertext?: string; // hex --- AES-256-GCM ciphertext of 32-byte root key (hex-encoded)
  pw_root_nonce?: string; // hex --- 12-byte nonce
  pw_root_tag?: string; // hex --- 16-byte GCM auth tag
}

// Background-bound message types — sent from popup/content scripts,
// handled in src/background/messages.ts. Everything in this group must
// have a matching case in that file's switch statement.
export type MessageType =
  | "UNLOCK"
  | "LOCK"
  | "IS_UNLOCKED"
  | "HAS_VAULT"
  | "GET_ENTRIES"
  | "ADD_ENTRY"
  | "BATCH_ADD_ENTRIES"
  | "RESTORE_ENTRIES"
  | "CLEAR_VAULT_ENTRIES"
  | "UPDATE_ENTRY"
  | "ADD_ADDITIONAL_URL"
  | "DELETE_ENTRY"
  | "AUTOFILL_QUERY"
  | "COPY"
  | "CREATE_VAULT"
  | "GET_ENTRY_FOR_FILL"
  | "CHECK_ALL_BREACHES"
  | "GET_SETTINGS"
  | "UPDATE_SETTINGS"
  | "FIRE_CANARY_PING"
  | "ACTIVATE_LICENSE"
  | "GET_LICENSE"
  | "GET_LICENSE_KEY"
  | "IS_DURESS_ENABLED"
  | "SETUP_DURESS"
  | "DISABLE_DURESS"
  | "VERIFY_MAIN_PASSWORD"
  | "CHANGE_PASSWORD"
  | "GET_SITE_PASSWORD_POLICY"
  | "CHIRP_GET_LOCAL_IDENTITY"
  | "CHIRP_COMPLETE_PAIRING"
  | "CHIRP_LIST_PAIRED_DEVICES"
  | "CHIRP_UNPAIR_DEVICE"
  | "CHIRP_RENAME_LOCAL_DEVICE"
  | "GET_PENDING_PASSKEY"
  | "APPROVE_PASSKEY"
  | "DENY_PASSKEY"
  | "GET_PASSKEY_PROVIDER_STATE"
  | "SET_PASSKEY_PROVIDER_ENABLED"
  | "GET_DELETED_ENTRIES"
  | "RESTORE_ENTRY"
  | "PURGE_ENTRY"
  | "PURGE_EXPIRED_TRASH"
  | "GET_VAULT_HISTORY"
  | "RESTORE_VAULT_SNAPSHOT"
  | "COUNT_DUPLICATES"
  | "DEDUPLICATE_ENTRIES"
  | "RECORD_MANUAL_SUMMON"
  | "DECLINE_CARD_SAVE"
  | "IS_CARD_DECLINED"
  | "SUBMIT_FEEDBACK"
  | "GET_VAULT_STATUS"
  | "GET_ADVANCED_HEALTH_REPORT"
  | "INITIATE_PASSWORD_CHANGE"
  | "DEACTIVATE_LICENSE"
  | "GET_IDENTITIES"
  | "DESTROY_VAULT"
  | "INITIATE_FIREFOX_PASSKEY_CREATE"
  | "COMPLETE_FIREFOX_PASSKEY_CREATE"
  | "PASSKEY_OFFER_DECLINE"
  | "GET_PASSKEY_OFFER_DECLINED"
  | "GET_PASSKEY_FOR_DOMAIN"
  // Firefox content-script proxy path (v2.12.0). Sent FROM the page-world
  // monkey-patch through the extension-world relay TO the background. See
  // src/shared/passkey-flags.ts for removal conditions.
  | "PASSKEY_HAS_CREDENTIALS"
  | "PASSKEY_CREATE"
  | "PASSKEY_GET"
  // Android / iOS message types — activate only when Capacitor.isNativePlatform() is true.
  | "UNLOCK_WITH_KEY"
  | "GET_DERIVED_KEY"
  // Recovery word messages
  | "VALIDATE_RECOVERY_WORDS"
  | "RECOVER_WITH_WORDS"
  | "GET_RECOVERY_WORDS"
  | "GET_IDENTITY_SUGGESTIONS"
  | "TOUCH_AUTO_LOCK"
  | "POPULATE_INLINE_VAULT"
  | "SAVE_NOTE"
  | "DELETE_NOTE"
  | "GET_NOTES"
  | "SEARCH_VAULT"
  | "ML_INIT"
  | "ML_PREDICT_BATCH"
  // Content-script-bound message types — sent BY the background TO content
  // scripts. They never reach messages.ts's switch. Kept in this union so
  // existing call sites type-check; do not add cases for them in the
  // background handler.
  | "PING"            // background → content: liveness probe
  | "SUMMON_AUTOFILL" // background → content: open the in-page palette
  | "VAULT_LOCKED"    // background → content/popup: vault just locked
  | "VAULT_UNLOCKED"  // background → content/popup: vault just unlocked
  | "PRO_GATE_TRIGGERED" // background → popup: a Pro feature was attempted on free
  | "PASSKEY_PRO_GATE" // background → content: show passkey Pro gate in inline popup
  | "OPEN_PRO_GATE" // content → background: open popup and navigate to License section
  | "SHOW_PASSKEY_TOAST"    // background → content tab: show passkey auth toast
  | "DISMISS_PASSKEY_TOAST" // background → content tab: dismiss passkey auth toast
  | "PASSKEY_AUTH_RESPONSE" // content → background: user approved or denied the toast
  | "SHOULD_PLAY_CELEBRATION"
  | "MARK_CELEBRATION_PLAYED"
  // Peach Codex (v2.42.0). Generation runs in the popup — the SW only
  // sources vault data and applies the restored slots.
  | "GET_CODEX_VAULT_DATA"
  | "ESTIMATE_CODEX_PAGES"
  | "GENERATE_CODEX"
  | "RESTORE_FROM_CODEX";

export type ProFeature =
  | "sync"
  | "passkeys"
  | "advanced_health"
  | "smart_password_change"
  | "ios_app"
  | "codex";

/**
 * License export shape included in PeachScript and encrypted JSON backups.
 * `celebrationPlayed` is intentionally absent — a new device deserves the moment.
 */
export interface PeachLicenseExport {
  key: string;
  activatedAt?: number;
}

export interface AdvancedHealthEntryReport {
  id: string;
  title: string;
  domain: string;
  url?: string;
  score: number;
  ageDays: number;
  reasons: string[];
  factors: {
    breached: boolean;
    breachCount: number;
    reused: boolean;
    aged: boolean;
    weak: boolean;
    missingTotpOnSensitive: boolean;
  };
}

export interface AdvancedHealthReport {
  vaultScore: number;
  generatedAt: number;
  entryCount: number;
  reusedGroups: number;
  agedCount: number;
  remediation: AdvancedHealthEntryReport[];
}

export const ACCENT_COLORS = [
  { name: "peach",    hex: "#F49C70" },
  { name: "rose",     hex: "#FF8AA6" },
  { name: "plum",     hex: "#D597F2" },
  { name: "lavender", hex: "#A6A8FF" },
  { name: "sky",      hex: "#5BC8EE" },
  { name: "mint",     hex: "#5EE0B0" },
  { name: "sage",     hex: "#B5D870" },
  { name: "butter",   hex: "#FFD45A" },
  { name: "sand",     hex: "#EDBC85" },
  { name: "clay",     hex: "#F08660" },
  { name: "slate",    hex: "#80BEDE" },
  { name: "stone",    hex: "#C8B8A8" },
] as const;

export type AccentColorName = typeof ACCENT_COLORS[number]["name"];

export interface SavedIdentity {
  value: string;
  type: "email" | "username";
  lastUsed: number;
  useCount: number;
  exampleDomain?: string;
}

export interface PasswordPolicy {
  minLength?: number;
  maxLength?: number;
  requiresUppercase?: boolean;
  requiresLowercase?: boolean;
  requiresNumbers?: boolean;
  requiresSymbols?: boolean;
  forbidsSymbols?: boolean;
  allowedSymbols?: string;
  /** Characters the site explicitly disallows. Filtered from every pool before generation. */
  forbiddenChars?: string;
}

/**
 * A single vault history snapshot. The `vault_a` and `vault_b` fields are the
 * raw encrypted blobs from chrome.storage.local — already AES-256-GCM
 * protected by the master password, so storing them in history adds no
 * security surface.
 *
 * Snapshots are taken BEFORE every vault write so the saved blob represents
 * what is about to be lost, not what was just written. The reason field
 * documents the trigger so the UI can render "saved" / "synced" / "imported"
 * / "restored" labels next to each row.
 */
export interface VaultSnapshot {
  id: string;
  savedAt: number;
  reason: "local_save" | "sync_received" | "import" | "restore";
  vault_a: string;
  vault_b: string;
  /** Active entry count when the snapshot was taken; null if vault was locked. */
  entryCount: number | null;
}

export interface VaultHistory {
  /** Newest first; capped at HISTORY_MAX (10). */
  snapshots: VaultSnapshot[];
}

export interface Message {
  type: MessageType;
  payload?: unknown;
}

// Canonical snake_case error codes returned by message handlers. Keep this
// union the authoritative catalogue — new handlers must reuse an entry or
// add one here. Free-form strings still appear (network/operation failures
// surface their raw .message), so error stays string at runtime; the union
// is the documented set callers should switch on.
export type ErrorCode =
  | "vault_locked"
  | "vault_corrupted"
  | "no_vault"
  | "entry_not_found"
  | "invalid_payload"
  | "invalid_message"
  | "invalid_sender"
  | "wrong_passphrase"
  | "incorrect_current_password"
  | "recovery_not_setup"
  | "android_only"
  | "not_available"
  | "pro_required"
  | "pairing_not_verified"
  | "sync_rejected_unpaired_initiator"
  | "vault_not_applied"
  | "url_required"
  | "domain_required"
  | "rpid_required"
  | "rpid_and_username_required"
  | "publickeyhex_required"
  | "missing_payload"
  | "login_entries_only"
  | "passkey_not_fillable"
  | "invalid_webhook_url"
  | "invalid_feedback_endpoint"
  | "message_empty"
  | "network_error"
  | "no_reset_url"
  | "failed_to_open_tab"
  | "operation_failed"
  | "unknown_message_type";

export interface MessageResponse {
  ok: boolean;
  data?: unknown;
  error?: string;
  unlocked?: boolean;
  // Set on UNLOCK responses when the vault decrypted but failed schema
  // validation (M7/COR-007). The popup may offer a history-restore flow.
  canRestoreFromHistory?: boolean;
}