c08326b6cda4
expand hidden vault threat model in duress settings — clarifies what it protects against and what it doesn't
- time
- 2026-05-17 13:38 UTC · 5 months ago
- machine
- koh2
- parent
- 0a5a9828b51d
↓ peach-browser-c08326b6.tar.gzatlas at this save
files changed1 file
src/popup/views/Settings.tsx+1 −1src/popup/views/Settings.tsx+1 −1
@@ -791,7 +791,7 @@791791 <Show when={duressEnabled() && !showDuressSetup()}>792792 <div class="peach-settings-row peach-settings-row--meta">793793 <span class="peach-settings-value" style="font-size:11px;line-height:1.5;color:var(--peach-t2)">794- If someone forces you to unlock Peach, enter the duress password instead. A decoy empty vault opens; your real vault stays hidden.794+ If someone forces you to unlock Peach, enter the duress password instead. A decoy empty vault opens; your real vault stays hidden. The encrypted storage is identical in size whether a hidden vault exists or not, so the hidden vault cannot be proven or disproven without both passwords. This protects against a coercer who demands your password — not against device malware or someone who already has your device unlocked.795795 </span>796796 </div>797797 </Show>