fix: authenticate the picker→MainActivity new-entry handoff (v2.10.17) Security scan finding F3 (low), slice 2 of the verified-fix queue. MainActivity is the exported launcher, so any app could raise EXTRA_OPEN_NEW_ENTRY and pre-fill the new-entry editor with an attacker-chosen url/username/email. The legitimate sender is the non-exported AutofillEntryPickerActivity — now proven with a one-time in-memory token (issueNewEntryToken/consumeNewEntryToken in AutofillIntents): single-use, and a wrong token does not burn the pending one, so a spoofed launch can fail but not DoS the real handoff. Tests: AutofillNewEntryTokenTest (3).
$ koh steal kepr.uk/peach-android@6eb341d43801
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parent: 0413521f37b3
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