fix: cap CodexCodec.inflate at 16 MiB against decompression bombs (v2.10.18) Security scan finding F4 (low), slice 3 of the verified-fix queue. CodexCodec.inflate grew its output buffer without bound from attacker-controlled code data. Now capped at MAX_INFLATED_BYTES = 16 MiB — the same cap PeachPayloadCodec applies to PeachScript sections, since a codex payload is the same vault JSON. Violations throw CodexException(PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE) with a clear message (new CodexErrorCode value). Tests: exact-cap round-trip passes; cap+1 bomb throws PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE.
$ koh steal kepr.uk/peach-android@96e60825c044
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parent: 6eb341d43801
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